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Report of the Joint Inspection Unit for 2011 and programme of work for 2012

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Note

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Abbreviations

CEB	United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICT	information and communications technology
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IPSAS	International Public Sector Accounting Standards
ITC	International Trade Centre
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services

UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UN-Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UNWTO	World Tourism Organization
UPU	Universal Postal Union
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

Mission statement

As the only independent external oversight body of the United Nations system mandated to conduct evaluations, inspections and investigations system-wide, the Joint Inspection Unit aims:

(a) To assist the legislative organs of the participating organizations in meeting their governance responsibilities in respect of their oversight function concerning management by the secretariats of human, financial and other resources;

(b) To help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the respective secretariats in achieving the legislative mandates and the mission objectives established for the organizations;

(c) To promote greater coordination among the organizations of the United Nations system;

(d) To identify best practices, propose benchmarks and facilitate information-sharing throughout the system.

Preface

In accordance with article 10, paragraph 1, of the statute of the Joint Inspection Unit, I am pleased to submit this annual report of the Unit for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2011 and a description of its programme of work for 2012.

In 2011, JIU completed 11 reports and 1 note, which have been addressed to its participating organizations. Eight reports and a note were of a system-wide nature, one concerned several organizations and two were reviews of single organizations.

While the overall output for the year is within the average annual output in recent years, the Unit was unable to meet all the expected accomplishments for the medium term of its strategic framework for 2010-2019, which foresaw an increase in the number of management and administration reviews for each participating organization, with a view to enhancing the accountability of their managers. This is due to the fact that the associated need for an increase in budgetary resources has not been provided, except for the web-based follow-up system. Hence, the Unit has adjusted its strategic goals, objectives and outputs (see annex I).

The Unit performed well in 2011. Not only have we been able to keep up a solid level of outputs, which included four reports mandated by the General Assembly, but we have also progressed on the development of a web-based recommendation tracking system, commenced the redesign of the JIU website and been requested to undertake three new mandated reports for 2012. We have increased outreach to participating organizations and their legislative bodies, which has resulted in a strengthened commitment to JIU, including funding for the tracking system, with almost 90 per cent of participating organizations advancing their contribution in 2011. Participating organizations also submitted 32 suggestions for the 2012 programme of work. We continued our quest to improve the work of the Unit. The internal working procedures were updated in early 2011 and a review of the evaluation norms and standards confirmed that the established practices in JIU are well in line with United Nations Evaluation Group norms and standards. The Unit further decided to establish a preliminary list of topics for 2013 in order to enhance the planning of resources approved for the biennium. This list will form the basis for the 2013 programme of work and will be revisited in December 2012.

In that light, and with a commitment to address the backlog of ongoing projects, the JIU programme of work for 2012 includes 12 new projects.

In my exchanges with executive heads of participating organizations during 2011, I suggested ways and means of improving the handling of and action on JIU reports, since the lack of action undermines the potential value added and impact of the Unit’s contributions to enhanced efficiency, effectiveness and system-wide coherence and cooperation. The Unit will continue working closely with Member States as well to address this situation. It is expected that the forthcoming web-based recommendation tracking system, mandated by the General Assembly, will enhance those contributions. I wish to express appreciation, on behalf of JIU, to participating organizations that contributed to its financing. At the same time, we look forward to securing all the resources needed to effectively operationalize the tracking system.

Finally, in response to the invitation of the General Assembly, in its resolution 65/270, to report on the reform process, and the progress achieved therein, and to present new assessments on options for enhancing the effectiveness of its work, I am pleased to present the section entitled “Reform of the Joint Inspection Unit: progress and the way forward” (chap. I, sect. B). An expanded report on JIU reform can be found on the JIU website (www.unjiu.org/en/reform.htm). I am confident that both the Secretary-General and Member States will pay due consideration to the reform proposals.

(*Signed*) Mohamed Mounir **Zahran**
Chair

Geneva, 24 January 2012

Chapter I
Annual report for 2011

A. Implementation of the strategic framework 2010-2019: progress to date

1. In 2008, the Joint Inspection Unit developed its first medium- and long-term strategic framework, covering the period from 2010 to 2019, providing a road map for increased oversight in response to stakeholders' demands (A/63/34, annex III), which was subsequently acknowledged by the General Assembly in its resolution 63/272. Unfortunately, this acknowledgement did not translate into a fully sustained request for an increase in resources. Hence, the Unit had no choice but to adjust its annual programmes of work accordingly.

2. Furthermore, in its resolution 65/270, the General Assembly stressed the need for the Unit to continuously update and improve its medium- and long-term strategy for 2010-2019, taking into account the dynamics and challenges of the environment in which it undertook its activities. In response to that request, the Unit reviewed its objectives and outputs and downscaled them in line with available resources. A revised strategic framework is being proposed in annex I to the present report. Accordingly, fewer management and administration reviews of single organizations will be conducted. The Unit has, however, stretched its existing resources to the maximum owing to the implementation of its mandated web-based recommendation tracking system and a knowledge management strategy. It will thus continue to produce an average of 11 or 12 reports per year with a focus on system-wide issues.

B. Reform of the Joint Inspection Unit: progress and the way forward

3. The General Assembly, in paragraph 8 of its resolution 65/270, invited the Joint Inspection Unit to report on the reform process, and the progress achieved therein, and to present new assessments on options for enhancing the effectiveness of its work, and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Assembly on any related implications.

4. While the Unit has seen a number of reform efforts since its creation, the most significant reform process in recent years was initiated by the Unit itself in 2003 (see A/58/343 and Add.1 and 2), which included five main objectives:

(a) Improved relevance of JIU reports, notes and management letters;

(b) Improved follow-up to JIU reports and recommendations;

(c) Strengthened working methods, internal working procedures and norms and standards;

(d) Enhanced professionalization of staff;

(e) Better composition of the Unit.

1. Reform progress

5. Significant progress has been made in the first four areas, as outlined in a paper on JIU reform efforts, which can be found at www.unjiu.org/en/reform.htm,

however, the fifth area remains basically unaddressed, as any change to the current composition of the Unit is subject to the agreement of Member States and amendment of its statute. The only change decided in the selection of inspectors is that countries wishing to recommend candidates for JIU should indicate their names to the General Assembly to allow for a better-informed decision. Other changes proposed were not acted upon, as further explained below. (For the current composition of the Unit, see annex II.)

2. Better composition of the Unit

6. While the Unit has moved forward in most areas indicated in its above-mentioned reform documents of 2003 and 2004, the part that has not yet been addressed touches on the composition of the Unit.

7. To further improve its composition, States Members of the United Nations should devote careful attention to bringing to JIU the best-qualified candidates. The required qualifications are set out in article 2 of the JIU statute, which stipulates that the inspectors, who serve in their personal capacity, shall be "chosen from among members of national supervision or inspection bodies, or from among persons of a similar competence on the basis of their special experience in national or international administrative and financial matters, including management questions". To make those requirements more explicit, in the absence of an agreed job description for inspectors, the General Assembly stressed, in paragraph 7 of its resolution 59/267, "the importance of ensuring that candidates have experience in at least one of the fields illustrated as follows: oversight, audit, inspection, investigation, evaluation, finance, project evaluation, programme evaluation, human resources management, management, public administration, monitoring and/or programme performance, as well as knowledge of the United Nations system and its role in international relations".

8. An improvement in the selection process was introduced in section II, paragraph 3, of General Assembly resolution 61/238, which stipulated that the names of countries requested to propose candidates for JIU and the names of their respective candidates should be submitted simultaneously to the Assembly. Subsequently, it has become a standard practice for countries to share the curricula vitae of their candidates.

9. In 2003, the Unit suggested the establishment of an advisory candidate review panel to assist the President of the General Assembly in the performance of the duties assigned to him or her under article 3 of the JIU statute for proposing candidates to be elected as inspectors.

3. The way forward

10. The foregoing summary of the many actions and initiatives taken by the Unit to introduce reform measures in recent years is indicative of its commitment to better serve the interests of the participating organizations and Member States. Nevertheless, the Unit is conscious of the fact that more remains to be done and herewith reiterates its commitment to making continuous improvement in all areas under its direct purview, including improving strategic planning, professionalizing its staff and upgrading its working methods, enhancing standards and procedures and improving coordination, with an emphasis on quality control and knowledge management and sharing.

11. Nevertheless, the Unit is convinced that there are areas where, without the support of Member States and its participating organizations, no true progress towards greater accountability, efficiency, effectiveness and impact can be achieved. This is so in the case of the composition of the Unit and the follow-up to its recommendations, where progress has been recorded but stronger commitment is needed.

12. The increased complexity and system-wide nature of the work of the Unit has also posed new challenges that cannot be met with the measures described above alone. At a time when much evaluation work in United Nations agencies is outsourced and then managed by evaluation units, JIU cannot bring in the necessary cutting-edge expertise. This has a bearing on the length it takes to produce reports, notes and management letters, and also on the capacity to go into depth on more complex issues. Combined with static travel resources, this also implies that much of the Unit's work is done from Geneva, without the ability to learn first-hand in duty stations how new policies and reforms are affecting the work of the United Nations in the field. Providing the means to bring in technical and sector-specific expertise that is not available in the Unit and to allow more thorough field visits must be considered in any further reform of JIU. In this regard, it is important to note that the Unit received an additional allocation of $100,000 for consultancies in the 2012-2013 budget.

13. Enhancing the capacity of the Unit to deal with system-wide evaluation is the right response to the calls made by the General Assembly in paragraph 8 of its resolution 63/311 and paragraphs 11 to 13 of its resolution 64/289 on the need to strengthen evaluation as a United Nations system function. In the latter resolution the Assembly affirmed that the establishment of an independent system-wide evaluation mechanism within the United Nations system should be aimed at fully utilizing and strengthening the existing institutional framework and capacities, including in particular JIU. Since the independent review commissioned by the Secretary-General to review evaluation mechanisms and to propose options has not yet been finalized, no concrete proposals are made in this regard at this time.

4. Options for enhancing the effectiveness of the Unit

14. The General Assembly, in its resolution 65/270, invites JIU to report on the reform process and requests it to present new assessments on options for enhancing the effectiveness of its work. In line with that request, the Unit therefore proposes the following:

(a) For action by Member States:

(i) Highly qualified inspectors are important for the effective functioning of JIU. Therefore, it is crucial that Member States identify, propose and select the best candidates for the position of inspector;

(ii) The General Assembly may wish to reiterate the importance of the effective implementation of the relevant provisions of resolution 59/267, including paragraph 8 on the consultation process in the review of qualifications of the proposed candidates for inspectors;

(iii) Bearing in mind paragraph 9 of the same resolution, the Assembly may wish to consider various options for the inspectors' terms of office with a view

to both making full use of the experience acquired within JIU and facilitating the renewal and updating of the expertise of the Unit;

(iv) The Assembly and other legislative bodies of JIU participating organizations may wish to review the current modalities for the consideration of JIU reports and establish a process that leads to timely action on pending recommendations addressed to those bodies;

(b) For action by participating organizations of the Joint Inspection Unit: The secretariats of participating organizations should ensure the timely and effective consideration of JIU reports, notes and management letters through proper internal follow-up mechanisms, the preparation of comments, including concrete action to be taken in respect of each recommendation, and the prompt scheduling of reports on the agenda of relevant legislative bodies to allow sufficient time to consider and act on recommendations addressed to Member States;

(c) For action by the CEB secretariat:

(i) The CEB secretariat should shorten the deadline of six months for the provision of comments to a maximum of three months, thus shortening the delay in the consideration of JIU reports and recommendations by the legislative bodies of participating organizations;

(ii) The CEB secretariat should include in the agendas of its high-level committees on management and on programmes an item related to JIU and invite the Unit to make a presentation and to advocate for observer status of JIU in the committees. This would have the benefit of involving JIU in major reform initiatives in the United Nations system;

(d) For action by JIU: While actions by Member States and participating organizations are vital, JIU itself is committed to continuing its efforts to improve working methods, procedures, effectiveness and relevance. Hence, the following actions are being or will be taken by JIU as part of the implementation of its 2010-2019 strategic framework:

(i) Reducing the length of reports by considering alternative ways of reporting on key findings, conclusions and recommendations, such as summary papers, and placing part of the extensive research undertaken on its website;

(ii) Rigorously implementing the internal yardsticks for the preparation of reviews so as to set clear starting and finishing dates for reports, notes and management letters, thus seeking to reduce the number of projects experiencing delays and the backlog;

(iii) Continuing to fine-tune the work of the Unit by continuously updating the internal working procedures, adopting norms and standards of evaluation, investigation and inspection and identifying more flexible and innovative review processes;

(iv) Tightening the management of the available resources so as to maximize their use (including improved planning of travel, increased use of videoconferencing and Skype, identification of support and expertise from other United Nations entities and use of consultants);

(v) Bringing in additional expertise through the solicitation of associate experts funded by Member States, the continued management of the internship

programme and the identification of additional extrabudgetary resources when needed for complex projects;

(vi) Undertaking a targeted strategy of outreach to the legislative bodies of participating organizations so as to increase their awareness of JIU products and to participate in salient policy debates and developments in a timely manner;

(vii) Strengthening its knowledge-management and communications strategy so as to ensure greater awareness and use of JIU reports through the development and implementation of a robust web-based tracking system and a revised, more user-friendly website and the production of tailored and targeted communications products to reach out to Member States and participating organizations alike;

(viii) Implementing a self-evaluation.

C. Reports prepared in 2011

15. The programme of work for 2011, adopted by the Unit at its December 2010 session (A/65/34, chap. II), contained 11 new projects. One report was cancelled and put on the roster because of the unexpected departure of the respective report coordinator, who was named Permanent Representative of his country to the United Nations. In addition, 8 projects had been carried forward from 2010 and 2 from 2009, for a total of 21 projects in 2011.

16. By the end of 2011, four of the new projects and eight projects from the previous programme of work had been completed. Eight projects, of which two had begun only in November, are being carried forward to 2012. In an effort by the Unit to tighten the average duration of projects, four of them will be finalized in early 2012, and the remainder by mid-year (see annex III).

17. In 2011, the Unit prepared 11 reports and 1 note, containing a total of 86 recommendations. Of those, eight reports and the note were of a system-wide nature, one concerned several organizations, and two were reviews of single organizations. The reports and notes are summarized below.

18. *JIU/REP/2011/1,* "*Review of the medical service in the United Nations system*" (see A/66/327). In this system-wide review, JIU assessed the manner in which medical services are provided, managed, supported and monitored in the United Nations system and proposed improvements that will enable the United Nations to fulfil its duty of care with regard to the health and safety of staff worldwide, especially in the field. The report draws attention to the issue of accountability in field medical services and points out that the Medical Services Division of the Office of Human Resources Management of the Secretariat has no input with regard to the budgets and workplans of field units, notwithstanding its role as "technical supervisor". While the United Nations has invested considerable resources in employing a large number of health-care personnel across the system, the review found that the structures required to oversee and manage those resources according to modern health-care standards have not been created as yet.

19. The adoption of occupational safety and health policies by United Nations system organizations will necessitate a paradigm shift in the provision of medical services. Emphasis will now be placed on prevention rather than cure. With a view

to facilitating the implementation of occupational safety and health policies and enhancing coordination, the report also recommends the establishment of a system-wide network for such issues (including, but not limited to, medical services), to be modelled on the Inter-Agency Security Management Network. This network will support the CEB High-level Committee on Management in its comprehensive review of issues pertaining to the entire occupational safety and health structure in the United Nations.

20. *JIU/REP/2011/2, "Transparency in the selection and appointment of senior managers in the United Nations Secretariat"* (see A/66/380). Pursuant to paragraph 19 of General Assembly resolution 64/259, entitled "Towards an accountability system in the United Nations Secretariat", JIU reviewed the effectiveness, coherence, timeliness and transparency of the current processes for the selection and appointment of senior managers in the Secretariat. The review was mandated because of concern expressed by Member States that the implementation of the process, as outlined in the report of the Secretary-General on accountability (A/64/640), was opaque. Senior managers, for the purpose of the review, are defined as the Deputy Secretary-General, Under-Secretaries-General and Assistant Secretaries-General.

21. Both the Member States and the inspectors recognize the explicit discretionary power of the Secretary-General in making senior appointments, but the inspectors believe that this does not mean that the Secretary-General has carte blanche to avoid transparency in the process he has established. In order to strike a balance between providing enough information to Member States so that they are confident that the process is open, fair and transparent without compromising the privacy of the candidates and jeopardizing the confidentiality of the deliberative process of either the interview panels or the Secretary-General himself, the inspectors recommend issuing vacancy announcements for all positions, except for special envoys and personal advisers, and setting up a website to convey information on senior appointments to Member States and potential candidates. Notes verbales transmitting vacancy announcements for every position should be sent to all Member States and all United Nations agencies, funds and programmes with at least one month's notice. This should satisfy the requirements of paragraph 3 (e) of resolution 46/232, whereby the General Assembly decided that, as a general rule, no national of a Member State should succeed a national of that State in a senior post and that there should be no monopoly on senior posts by nationals of any State or group of States. In the case of positions for which the Assembly has decided that there should be geographic rotation between the "North" and the "South", in the inspectors' opinion candidacies should be sought only from the region whose turn it is to hold the position. The inspectors are convinced that merit should be the primary criteria for the selection of senior managers and that Member States are responsible for putting forward fully qualified candidates for the Secretary-General to consider.

22. *JIU/REP/2011/3, "South-South and triangular cooperation in the United Nations system"*. Mandated by the High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation, the report addresses issues of coherence, coordination and intergovernmental processes. It identifies a lack of understanding of the definitions and concepts of South-South cooperation and triangular cooperation, poor application of guidelines and little adherence to existing reporting mechanisms on activities in support of South-South cooperation. It notes that coordination at the regional and country levels is inadequate or non-existent, hampering the potential impact of South-South cooperation. Referring to lost opportunities owing to the limited role of regional

commissions, it recommends that the regional presence of the UNDP Special Unit for South-South Cooperation be strengthened and located at the headquarters of the regional commissions in order to enhance the visibility of JIU and create synergies. The report highlights the lack of financing as a major stumbling block in advancing support to South-South cooperation within the United Nations system and recommends that a greater proportion of core budgets be devoted to this activity and that organizations raise condition-free funds in support of South-South cooperation. The report was the basis of the report of the Secretary-General on the state of South-South cooperation (A/66/229), which will be an input to the quadrennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the United Nations system to be conducted by the General Assembly at its sixty-seventh session.

23. *JIU/REP/2011/4, "Multilingualism in the United Nations system organizations — status of implementation"* (forthcoming). In spite of numerous resolutions promoting multilingualism, few organizations have a formal policy or strategic action plans. Thus, imbalances among the official languages of the organizations and the disparity between the working languages of their secretariats continue to be a matter of concern for Member States. Aiming at assessing the status of implementation of multilingualism across the system, the report covers such areas as conference- and language-related services, human resources, training, public information and outreach, as well as institutional partnerships, while underlining the striking fact that the effective implementation of multilingualism is a collective and shared responsibility of all stakeholders, including Member States and their representatives, executive heads and secretariats.

24. In the report, JIU recommends that the organizations of the United Nations adhere more strictly to the principles of equality in respect of their official languages and ensure the equitable use of the working languages within the secretariats; endorse, including through budgetary channels, the necessary arrangements for ensuring effective compliance in delivering the organizations' core work in all official and working languages; require the appointment of senior officials as coordinators for multilingualism; require a good knowledge of a second working language by all staff; tackle the alarming issues of shortages of qualified interpreters and translators, effective succession planning, targeted training and career development; and establish within CEB an ad hoc working group on multilingualism to develop common policies and to monitor approaches and strategies of action.

25. *JIU/REP/2011/5, "Accountability frameworks in the United Nations system"*. Mandated by the General Assembly in its resolution 64/259 for consideration at its sixty-seventh session, the report contains a system-wide comparative analysis of the organizations' various accountability frameworks. JIU identifies the various components of accountability by evaluating the institutions and practices of accountability realized by the United Nations system organizations, even where there is no formal framework in place. The complexity of the concept of accountability, which goes beyond the requirement of having an internal control system in place, is stressed, and strong emphasis is placed on the importance of realizing transparency and a culture of accountability, which together constitute the pillars underpinning any accountability framework. Such a culture of accountability will be fully developed only once the senior managers lead by example.

26. Seven United Nations system organizations that have established formal stand-alone accountability frameworks are identified, and the organizations that have not

yet done so are strongly advised to develop such a framework. In this connection, 17 benchmarks are proposed that serve as a road map for measuring and assessing the degree to which accountability is realized. Although the assessment focuses on the organizations, it also draws attention to the oversight responsibility of Member States as an important factor in upholding accountability. The report concludes with a recommendation that executive heads undertake an evaluation, in the coming few years, of their accountability frameworks, structures and the culture of accountability in their respective organizations.

27. *JIU/REP/2011/6, "Business continuity in the United Nations system"*. The review examined the existence of business continuity strategies, policies and plans in the United Nations system organizations, identifying commonalities and differences; best practices for implementation; liaison and coordination mechanisms; and the functioning and staffing of business continuity units, including their financing frameworks and funding mechanisms for their operation. The review found that few organizations had an approved business continuity policy and plan or had started its implementation in a comprehensive way. Different elements of business continuity were handled in isolation rather than holistically. The lack of knowledge and understanding on the part of senior management about the purpose of business continuity management has led to inadequate political and financial support by Member States. The review also found that inter-agency cooperation on business continuity issues was of an ad hoc nature and that there were economies of scale to be gained through more organized system-wide cooperation and harmonization of practices, which can be discussed in the High-level Committee on Management forum.

28. In the report, JIU recommends that business continuity managers be located in the office of the executive head or the executive office for management; senior leadership commitment and Member State support be strengthened; dedicated human and financial resources be allocated; business continuity policies, strategies and plans be developed; and responsibility for their implementation be assigned. Organizations should raise awareness through business continuity training that is incorporated in development and induction courses for all staff, and periodic training should be provided to critical staff as an integral part of business continuity management. The report further recommends that the scope of business continuity plans should be Organization-wide, including field offices. The resident coordinators should oversee the knowledge-sharing, cooperation and complementarity of business continuity preparedness of United Nations organizations in their duty stations.

29. *JIU/REP/2011/7, "The investigation function in the United Nations system"* (forthcoming). The review follows up on previous JIU reports on oversight to determine progress made in strengthening the investigation function in United Nations organizations over the past decade. The review established that, as in the past, internal oversight entities are not operationally independent from the executive head, as the heads of oversight entities are not free to decide their own budgetary requirements nor are they able to exercise total control over their human resources. The review found furthermore that in a number of organizations, responsibility for investigations is fragmented, with the result that some investigations are conducted by non-professional investigators.

30. The report includes recommendations designed to foster system-wide coherence and harmonization and calls for consolidating all investigations into the internal oversight service of each organization, professionalizing the investigation

function through the recruitment of qualified staff and their exemption from mobility and rotation schemes within the same organization, centralizing the follow-through of the results of investigations, periodic review of the adequacy of resources and staffing for the investigation function, as well as institutionalizing the cooperation of oversight bodies and the exchange of best practices in the investigations field. The Secretary-General, under the auspices of CEB, is called upon to establish an inter-agency task force to develop options for establishing a single consolidated United Nations system investigation unit by the end of 2013 for the consideration of legislative bodies. This consolidation would benefit small agencies that lack an investigative capacity, harmonize business practices, lead to common standards and procedures in conducting investigations, resolve independence issues, result in the hiring of only professional investigators, provide staff promotion opportunities and address fragmentation issues.

31. *JIU/REP/2011/8, "Review of management and administration in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization"* (forthcoming). This review was postponed from 2009 at the request of UNESCO to avoid duplication and oversight fatigue, as the Organization was already engaged in a major external evaluation process at the time. It is recognized that a number of advances have been made on key issues since the issuance of the previous JIU report (JIU/REP/2000/4), and a number of challenges are identified in the areas of governance, executive management, administration, strategic planning, human resources management and oversight. In the report, JIU recommends reconsidering the current leadership structure of the change management process, enlarging its steering committee and placing it under the responsibility of a dedicated full-time change manager for a temporary period, and, at the same time, strengthening internal communication to staff at all levels. Finally, States and the UNESCO secretariat are urged to tackle, as a matter of priority, the pivotal debate on the focus of UNESCO, as this has an impact on many other managerial aspects.

32. *JIU/REP/2011/9, "Information and communications technology governance in the United Nations system organizations"* (forthcoming). ICT has become a dynamic, strategic and indispensable asset for achieving the missions and goals of organizations. The report aims to promote effective ICT governance through a comparative analysis of the different governance frameworks, practices and processes in the various United Nations system organizations with a view to identifying best practices and lessons learned. The report's 11 recommendations seek to strengthen the ICT governance frameworks of the United Nations system organizations regarding the role, composition and effectiveness of the organizations' ICT governance committee or equivalent; the organizations' ICT strategy and its alignment with business needs; the role and responsibilities of the Chief Information Officer or equivalent position; ICT risk management; ICT performance and oversight; and ICT investments. Finally, the report recommends enhancing coordination and cooperation under the guidance of CEB.

33. *JIU/REP/2011/10, "Staff-management relations within the United Nations"* (forthcoming). The review, based on suggestions by representatives of management and staff, sought to identify and promote the conditions that would further staff-management relations at all levels in the Secretariat, at all duty stations and in the separately administered organs, funds and programmes, tribunals, United Nations University, peace operations and political missions on the basis of the principles and texts agreed to by the Member States.

34. The review found that the implementation of the principles of staff-management relations as established from a legal and political point of view was far from equally satisfactory within the various entities and was problematic at all levels of staff-management interaction. Effective staff-management relations require, from both sides, the willingness to participate in discussions in good faith and a proper understanding of the issues at stake, the latter point being tied closely to training on staff-management relations. The inspector observed that in a number of joint bodies, including the Staff-Management Committee (formerly known as the Staff-Management Coordinating Committee), which is the only Secretariat-wide staff-management negotiating body, some agreements on human resources-related matters are the outcome of negotiations, demonstrating the existence of de facto collective bargaining. The report proposes the explicit acknowledgment of this concept for the joint negotiation bodies and calls upon the General Assembly to recognize the application of the relevant ILO instruments in this regard to United Nations staff. It also suggests a series of concrete improvements in the Staff-Management Committee.

35. *JIU/REP/2011/11, "Evaluation of the scope, organization, effectiveness and approach of the work of the United Nations in mine action"* (forthcoming). The objective of the review, requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 64/84, was to provide Member States with an independent perspective on the work of the United Nations in the area of mine action and to contribute to the development of the new United Nations inter-agency mine action strategy for the period 2011-2015.

36. The review concluded that, because of the diversity of mine action-related activities and actors, stronger coordination and full adherence to the principles of partnership were required. The review also identified a gap between mine action and national health systems, which was not addressed properly by the United Nations system, and a need for a leading entity for victim assistance within the system. The report calls for separating the coordination of mine action activities and mine action project management and/or implementation to enhance transparency, and includes a number of recommendations to avoid any conflict of interest in the administration and channelling of mine action funding through the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action.

37. *JIU/NOTE/2011/1, "Procurement reforms in the United Nations system"* (forthcoming). This system-wide review assessed the efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and coherence of procurement policies, practices and reform initiatives adopted by United Nations system organizations and identified good practices from within and outside the system. The review found that, owing to the dramatic increase in the total procurement volume of the United Nations system, from $6.5 billion to $13.8 billion between 2004 and 2009, as well as the increase in the variety and complexity of procurement activities, many of the larger organizations have become more aware of the strategic importance of procurement in achieving the broader goals of their organizations. This situation has led organizations, particularly the larger ones, to initiate procurement reforms in such areas as the professionalization of procurement staff, information systems, strategy development, ethics, vendor management (establishing vendor debarred lists and complaints mechanisms) and sustainable procurement. The review revealed that, while some organizations are more advanced in implementing reform efforts, others are lagging behind. It also found that collaboration among organizations was on the rise but that there was room for improvement and a need to take a more strategic approach to the issue of analysing major procurement items in the system and to favour common

consolidated procurement strategies and joint long-term agreements in order to leverage the volume of the system, which would allow significant savings for the organizations. Greater collaboration between the larger organizations and the smaller ones can contribute to further progress in reform.

D. Interaction with participating organizations and legislative bodies

38. In response to requests of the General Assembly, the Unit continued to enhance its dialogue with participating organizations.

39. Improving relationships with participating organizations was featured prominently in 2011. The Unit had formal high-level meetings with the President of the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly and the executive heads of IAEA, ITC, ITU, UNCTAD, UNIDO, UNICEF, UNODC, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNHCR, UNOPS, WHO and WIPO. During those meetings, executive heads expressed their strong support for the work of JIU and their readiness to enhance cooperation with the Unit.

40. In addition, focal point inspectors, during their project-related missions, used the opportunity to meet with executive heads and/or senior managers and focal points of the respective participating organizations, as appropriate. During the meetings, issues of common concern for both the Unit and the participating organizations were discussed, in particular the follow-up to JIU recommendations. Contacts with JIU focal points have been strengthened, in particular following the successful meeting with focal points in 2010. To further strengthen this relationship, the Unit plans to organize a similar meeting in September 2012.

41. Inspectors also participated in sessions of the legislative/governing bodies of ILO, the United Nations, UNODC and WHO. At the United Nations, report coordinators met with Member States and regional groups and also introduced their reports, as appropriate, in the Fifth and Second Committees of the General Assembly and to the Economic and Social Council.

42. JIU was also represented at several formal and informal consultations with the Fifth Committee and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to discuss the Unit's annual report, programme of work and budget requirements.

43. In July 2010, in the context of ongoing reform, the General Assembly created UN-Women, which joined the family of United Nations funds and programmes. As such, UN-Women has become a JIU participating organization, and contacts were established in 2011.

E. Follow-up to recommendations

44. An effective and efficient follow-up system is fundamental for achieving the intended impact of the Unit's oversight activities. In its resolution 60/258, the General Assembly requested the Unit to strengthen the follow-up of the implementation of its recommendations, and it has repeatedly shown an interest in such a follow-up system, as originally set out in resolution 54/16.

45. The number of recommendations tracked by the Joint Inspection Unit for the current reporting period (2008-2010) reached 371 (see table 1).

46. In preparation for the present report, the Unit requested the participating organizations to provide information on all recommendations issued between 2008 and 2010. At the time of drafting, the JIU secretariat had received information from all but two organizations (UN-Habitat and WMO).

Table 1
Publication of reports, notes and management or confidential letters

	2008	*2009*	*2010*	*Total*
Single-organization publications	2	5	3	10
Single-organization recommendations	23	65	40	128
Publications that are system-wide and related to several organizations	9	6	8	23
Recommendations that are system-wide and related to several organizations	96	62	85	243
Total publications	**11**	**11**	**11**	**33**
Total recommendations	**119**	**127**	**125**	**371**

1. Consideration of reports, notes and management or confidential letters

47. Data available on the consideration of the 33 reports, notes and management or confidential letters issued in 2008, 2009 and 2010 were analysed against the provisions of article 11, paragraphs 4 and 5, of the JIU statute. Annex IV provides details regarding the consideration of system-wide reports by organizations. On the basis of official documentation found on the organizations' websites, the Unit welcomes the continued efforts in record-tracking by UNIDO and WHO, as well as the United Nations Secretariat, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNOPS and WFP.

48. The Unit notes with concern that several organizations (IAEA, ITU[1] and the World Tourism Organization[2]), to which more than 20 reports were sent during the reporting period, have not yet informed JIU about their consideration or action taken. One of them, the World Tourism Organization, has stated that it lacks the capacity to follow up on JIU reports. This is regrettable, and JIU wishes to encourage the Organization to make maximum use of the reports, including the recent management and administrative review of that body (JIU/REP/2009/1). JIU included a follow-up to that report in its 2012 programme of work, hoping that the review would shed light on the difficulties encountered by the organization in following up on JIU reports and recommendations.

49. Several secretariats informed the Unit about concrete actions (i.e. acceptance, rejection or otherwise) taken with regard to recommendations addressed to their respective executive heads for action. However, the secretariats of most organizations do not propose to their legislative bodies a concrete course of action to accept, reject or modify the recommendations addressed to them. In the absence of a specific course of action, there is little in-depth discussion on the merits of recommendations, resulting in a lack of follow-up and action by legislative bodies.

[1] Except JIU/REP/2009/3.
[2] Except JIU/REP/2009/1.

50. A notable exception has been observed, however, in the case of follow-up by a non-participating organization, the secretariat of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification, to the Unit's report entitled "Assessment of the Global Mechanism of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification" (JIU/REP/2009/4; A/64/379). The assessment was carried out in response to decision 3/COP.8 (para. 27) of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention at its eighth session, in 2007. The report and its recommendations were considered by the Conference of the Parties at its ninth and tenth sessions, in 2009 and 2011, respectively. Of the six recommendations submitted, all four of those addressed to the Conference of the Parties and one of the two addressed to executive heads were accepted, all of which are being implemented. The General Assembly, in paragraphs 3 and 4 of its resolution 66/201, welcomed the outcome of the tenth session of the Conference of the Parties and its effort to find lasting solutions with respect to the governance and institutional arrangements of the Global Mechanism, as a follow-up to various external assessments undertaken, including the 2009 report of JIU, with a view to better servicing the Conference of the Parties.


2. Single-organization reports and notes

Acceptance or approval of recommendations

51. An analysis of available data concerning the 128 recommendations contained in single-organization reports and notes issued in 2008, 2009 and 2010 as at the end of 2011 shows a 61 per cent acceptance rate, a rate similar to that in previous triennial reporting periods (see figure I).

Figure I
Acceptance rate of recommendations contained in single-organization reports and notes, 2006-2010

(Percentage)



	2006-2008	2007-2009	2008-2010
No information provided	13	1	6
Under consideration	11	29	31
Accepted	64	62	61
Rejected	14	8	2

Source: A/63/34 and Corr.1, A/64/34 and information provided by the organizations.


52. No information was provided for 6 per cent of the recommendations, and only 2 per cent of all recommendations were rejected.

53. Of the recommendations concerned, 31 per cent were under consideration during the current reporting period, the same percentage reported in the previous period. In most instances, the governing bodies, after having considered the reports, "took note" of the recommendations, without explicitly endorsing or rejecting them. Good practice in this regard is demonstrated by FAO, UNESCO, UNODC and UPU. Governing bodies are expected to carry out their governance role by deciding on a concrete course of action on recommendations, avoiding the ambiguity of the term "takes note", which renders the follow-up of recommendations difficult, as it indicates neither agreement nor disagreement and leads to no subsequent action.

Implementation of accepted recommendations

54. The data on recommendations approved or accepted show lower rates of implementation for the most recently published reports owing to the fact that a considerable number of recommendations had yet to be considered. At the end of 2011, the data available for single-organization reports and notes show that 42 per cent of recommendations have been implemented and 35 per cent were in progress. No information on the status of implementation was received for the remaining 19 per cent of the recommendations accepted (see figure II).

Figure II
Implementation rate of accepted or approved recommendations contained in single-organization reports and notes, 2006-2010
(Percentage)



	2006-2008	2007-2009	2008-2010
No information provided	20	22	19
Not started	1	1	4
In progress	32	20	35
Implemented	49	57	42


Source: A/63/34 and Corr.1, A/64/34 and information provided by the organizations.

3. Reports and notes of a system-wide or multi-organizational nature

Acceptance or approval of recommendations

55. An analysis of the data available on the 243 recommendations contained in reports and notes covering the entire United Nations system or several organizations issued between 2008-2010 show an improved rate of acceptance (55 per cent) compared with the previous reporting period (see figure III).

Figure III
Acceptance rate of recommendations contained in system-wide and multi-organization reports and notes, 2006-2010
(Percentage)




	2006-2008	2007-2009	2008-2010
No information provided	40	42	31
Under consideration	8	6	11
Accepted	49	50	55
Rejected	3	2	2

Source: A/63/34 and Corr.1, A/64/34 and information provided by the organizations.

56. The relatively low overall rate of approval or acceptance of 55 per cent results from the fact that no information was provided for 31 per cent of the recommendations. Unlike single-organization reports, which are generally acted upon within a year of issuance, particularly if they are mandated, it takes more time for CEB comments on system-wide reports to be issued and for reports to be scheduled and considered by all participating organizations. Only 2 per cent of the recommendations issued were rejected; 11 per cent of the recommendations were still under consideration.

Figure IV
Implementation rate of accepted or approved recommendations contained in system-wide and multi-organization reports and notes, 2006-2010
(Percentage)



	2006-2008	2007-2009	2008-2010
No information provided	12	19	13
Not started	5	5	6
In progress	33	32	29
Implemented	50	44	53

Source: A/63/34 and Corr.1, A/64/34 and late-2010 information provided by the organizations.

57. The implementation of accepted or approved recommendations in system-wide and multi-organization reports and notes issued in 2008, 2009 and 2010 show a positive variance, with 53 per cent of the recommendations implemented and 29 per cent in progress. In the case of recommendations for which implementation had not begun, the rate remained stable, at 6 per cent. No information was received on the status of implementation for 13 per cent of accepted recommendations (see figure IV).

58. Overall, implementation rates for the period from 2008 to 2010 increased by a solid 9 per cent.

59. Table 2 shows the aggregate acceptance and implementation rate by organization since the inception of the follow-up system, from 2004 to 2010, and it is self-explanatory in terms of the commitment of each organization to the follow-up system.

60. Consistent strong performance regarding the status of acceptance is reported to be above 70 per cent for FAO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNIDO and WFP, owing to their robust follow-up processes. In this regard, ICAO, UNESCO and UNDP continue to report the highest rates of implementation.

Table 2
Aggregate status of acceptance and implementation of Joint Inspection Unit recommendations by participating organizations, 2004-2010
(Percentage)

	Acceptance					*Implementation of accepted recommendations*			
	Not relevant	*Accepted/ approved*	*Rejected*	*Under consideration*	*No information provided*	*Not started*	*In progress*	*Implemented*	*No information provided*
United Nations	1.3	63.1	6.7	5.2	23.6	1.1	23.1	56.2	19.6
UNCTAD	64.1	26.6	1.6	7.0	0.8	5.9	26.5	58.8	8.8
UNDP	1.9	**90.4**	1.1	7.7	0.0	3.4	26.6	65.2	4.7
UNEP	8.6	31.8	3.5	28.8	27.3	4.8	22.2	6.3	66.7
UNFPA	2.7	**70.7**	2.0	0.8	23.8	1.1	28.7	54.7	15.5
UN-Habitat[a]	33.5	34.1	0.0	0.0	32.4	14.8	31.1	54.1	0.0
UNHCR	6.0	48.2	1.2	9.2	35.5	1.7	40.5	53.7	4.1
UNICEF	5.1	60.9	0.8	14.5	18.8	1.9	24.4	50.0	23.7
UNODC	41.6	37.1	1.7	2.2	17.4	7.6	36.4	56.1	0.0
UNRWA	6.6	45.3	0.0	0.6	47.5	8.5	36.6	35.4	19.5
WFP	0.4	**75.6**	1.9	13.9	8.3	4.0	30.8	55.2	10.0
FAO	0.0	**89.3**	6.1	3.3	1.2	4.6	30.7	53.2	11.5
IAEA	12.1	61.9	12.6	8.2	5.2	2.8	16.8	50.3	30.1
ICAO	13.5	65.3	6.4	3.2	11.6	0.6	15.2	**83.5**	0.6
ILO	11.5	26.7	0.8	3.4	57.6	0.0	20.0	21.4	58.6
IMO	14.8	66.2	2.9	2.4	13.8	22.3	3.6	34.5	39.6
ITU	2.5	37.2	0.0	16.5	43.8	3.3	40.0	35.6	21.1
UNESCO	8.0	**80.2**	4.2	6.8	0.8	0.5	28.0	69.2	2.4
UNIDO	10.2	**75.8**	3.4	10.6	0.0	10.6	52.5	33.0	3.9
UNWTO	0.0	2.5	8.8	11.8	76.9	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0
UPU	10.9	43.9	1.4	18.1	25.8	6.2	45.4	43.3	5.2
WHO	1.6	52.7	2.0	8.6	35.2	11.1	25.9	28.9	34.1
WIPO	18.5	42.1	0.9	13.3	25.3	0.0	25.5	56.1	18.4
WMO[a]	8.2	48.5	6.0	2.2	35.1	6.2	16.9	68.5	8.5
UNOPS	2.0	44.0	0.0	12.0	42.0	4.5	59.1	36.4	0.0

Note: The data of organizations with rate of acceptance and/or implementation of over 70 per cent are in bold.
[a] Data set is incomplete owing to non-reporting in 2011.

Impact

61. Intended impact (see table 3) is tracked over the full period covered by the follow-up system since its inception in 2004. JIU uses eight different categories to better determine and report on the impact of its recommendations.

62. The majority of the recommendations focus on enhanced effectiveness and efficiency. Enhanced accountability, controls and compliance, and dissemination of best practices also feature as important thrusts for recommendations. It remains

difficult, however, to quantify impact in the absence of regular feedback from participating organizations. While few recommendations explicitly addressed financial savings, this impact category should be read in conjunction with enhanced efficiency. The application of best practices may also lead to financial savings.

Table 3
Intended impact of Joint Inspection Unit recommendations, 2004-2011

	Number of recommendations								
Impact category	*2004*	*2005*	*2006*	*2007*	*2008*	*2009*	*2010*	*2011*	*Average (Percentage)*
Enhanced effectiveness	11	18	34	63	40	43	53	32	37
Enhanced efficiency	19	37	8	43	20	23	9	12	21
Enhanced accountability	4	2	20	10	19	19	15	11	12
Enhanced controls and compliance	3	17	4	13	13	5	9	12	9
Enhanced coordination and cooperation	6	20	10	7	7	5	14	8	9
Dissemination of best practices	12	20	15	4	8	19	9	8	11
Financial savings	0	1	1	3	6	1	3	1	2
Other	0	2	0		6	12	13	2	4
Total	**55**	**117**	**92**	**143**	**119**	**127**	**125**	**86**	

F. Web-based recommendation tracking system

63. In response to the Unit's presentation to the Fifth Committee on the feasibility study and in view of the anticipated cost of $309,000, the General Assembly, in its resolution 65/270, advanced the United Nations share in the middle of the biennium, encouraging other participating organizations to follow suit. Only three organizations have not responded to the invitation, and they will be requested to provide their share, amounting to 5 per cent of the cost of the system, during the biennium 2012-2013 in line with article 20, paragraph 2, of the JIU statute, under which the participating organizations are to share the expenditures of the Unit. (For the list of contributing organizations, see annex V.)

64. This welcome provision of funding in 2011 has allowed the Unit and the selected contractor to begin to develop the system rather than waiting until funds were provided under the regular programme budget for 2012-2013, potentially resulting in additional costs and delays. Work on the development of the system, which started in mid-2011, was phased in line with the provision of resources. An internal task force and an external users group have been created with membership from interested participating organizations. The project is well on track, with some software modules already being tested by the secretariat of the Unit. The project is expected to be finalized and the system ready to go live in mid-2012. Once the system is in place, it could be of use, with some minor modifications, for other oversight bodies, thus achieving significant economies of scale. In fact, OIOS is interested in the system and is considering its use, with some adaptations required by their specific work.

65. Resources for maintaining the web-based recommendation tracking system are included in the programme budget of JIU for the biennium 2012-2013, made available in part through an increase under consultancy. Still lacking is funding for at least one position to ensure quality control. The Unit will nevertheless do its utmost with the available resources, given the resource-tightening in many of its organizations, and, on the basis of an assessment of experience during the first year of implementation, will report on any additional requirements. In addition, the Unit plans to seek funding for an associate expert to assist with quality control.

G. Relationships with other oversight and coordinating bodies

66. The Unit continued its increasingly active and regular interactions with other oversight and coordinating bodies in 2011, in particular OIOS and the United Nations Board of Auditors. A regular exchange has also been maintained with the Independent Audit Advisory Committee and the Management Committee established by the Secretary-General. In addition, cooperation was sought with oversight bodies of other participating organizations.

67. During the annual tripartite meeting with the Board of Auditors and OIOS, the parties formally presented and discussed their workplans for 2012 with a view to avoiding overlap and duplication and to achieving further synergy and cooperation.

68. The Unit also had regular contacts with other internal oversight services, in particular those that have been designated as their organization's focal point for dealing with JIU.

69. The Unit participated as an observer in the annual meeting of the United Nations Evaluation Group (a group of professional practitioners of evaluation in the organizations of the United Nations system), held in Paris in April 2011; in the Conference of International Investigators, held in Washington, D.C., in May; and in the meeting of Representatives of Internal Audit Services of the United Nations organizations and multilateral financial institutions, held in Paris in September. These are all important forums for the exchange of oversight practices and the discussion of system-wide oversight issues.

H. Resources

70. The approved human resources for JIU in 2011 continued to include 11 Inspectors (D-2), the Executive Secretary (D-2), 10 Professional posts dedicated to evaluation and inspection (2 P-5, 3 P-4, 3 P-3 and 1 P-2) and to investigation (1 P-3), 1 Senior Research Assistant (G-7) and 8 General Service (Other level) staff, of whom 4 are assigned as research assistants to several specific projects and 4 provide administrative, information technology, documentation management, editorial and other support to the Unit. In addition, the Government of Germany agreed to continue to provide a Junior Professional Officer at the P-2 level for two more years, starting in October 2011, thus ensuring full support during the year. The Unit also continued its active internship programme in support of the implementation of the programme of work, when needed. This resulted in almost 80 working months of internship resources during the year. At the end of December the Unit had a vacancy rate of zero.

71. The efforts to develop staff professional capacity and skills continued during the year. On average, each staff member benefited from five days' training, meeting the United Nations target. An in-house workshop on the theme "Establishing robust conclusions and useful recommendations" was provided by an external consultant. Videoconferencing and online seminars were used for a number of sessions at very low cost. Two staff members attended a one-week residential evaluation training course, one staff member attended a specialized training course on investigations, and three of the most senior staff participated in the Leadership Development Programme (D-1 and D-2) and the Management Development Programme (P-4 and P-5).

72. In terms of financial resources, the regular allotment for 2011 amounted to $14 million, of which $13 million (93 per cent) was for staff costs, with the remainder being allocated for travel ($550,800) and other non-staff costs ($236,500). As mentioned, these resources are insufficient to address all programmatic needs.

73. No new extrabudgetary contributions were received in 2011. However, resources for some travel and a workshop were provided in 2010 by UNDP, the Mine Action Service of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Government of Norway.

74. In its internal strategic workplan for 2011, the secretariat included, as one of its main strategic objectives, the improvement of knowledge management and sharing. Within this overall objective, the updating and modernization of the current website is a critical element of the new strategic communications strategy. For 2012, the main strategic objectives will be to ensure full and satisfactory achievement of the two information technology projects; organize a meeting and training session on the web-based tracking system with focal points; tighten the time required for standard reviews; roll out the communications strategy and establish improved quality-control mechanisms.

I. Other issues

Investigations

75. The Unit, as the only external, independent and system-wide oversight body of the United Nations system, is mandated, among other functions, to conduct investigations. An investigation capability was established within the Unit, as called for in article 8 of the statute. Principles and policies for investigation were adopted in 2008 and were generally in line with those adopted by the Conference of International Investigators, which defined the nature and scope of the investigations the Unit envisions conducting, as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 62/246. An Investigations Officer was recruited in 2010 and started her function in 2011 to assist inspectors in their investigations.

76. In June 2009, the Conference of International Investigators adopted revised uniform guidelines for investigations, an internationally accepted document setting the standards for investigations conducted by international organizations and multilateral institutions. In that light, the Unit has been updating the principles and policies for its investigations. Meanwhile, the Unit has received a few allegations on the conduct of individuals of a number of international organizations. A preliminary assessment to determine the need to conduct full investigations is still under way.

Delivering as one

77. The Unit has been involved, through the participation of an inspector, in the Evaluation Management Group for the independent evaluation of lessons learned from "Delivering as one". While declining an offer to serve as the secretariat of the Group, the JIU secretariat hosted two events of the Group in Geneva in 2011.

System-wide evaluation mechanism

78. The Unit has also been engaged in discussions on the identification of a mechanism for system-wide evaluation, as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 64/289, through the preparation of a position paper for the Second Committee. The Executive Secretary participated in a reference group set up by the Deputy Secretary-General and in October attended the first of two workshops in New York facilitated by two independent consultants focusing on developing a mechanism for system-wide evaluation. In meetings with the consultants, the Unit has reiterated its position that what is required is strengthening existing mechanisms, including, in particular, JIU. The Unit looks forward to the outcome of this exercise, which will be submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at its sixty-seventh session.

Visas

79. In its resolutions 62/246, 63/272 and 64/262, the General Assembly requested JIU to report on any difficulty or delay in obtaining visas for official travel of some inspectors and members of its secretariat. Incidents were again registered in 2011, causing unnecessary delays and implications for increased costs.

Chapter II
Programme of work for 2012

80. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 61/260, by which the Assembly decided to consider jointly the annual report and programme of work of JIU during the first part of its resumed session, the Unit launched the preparation of its 2012 programme of work in June 2011, inviting participating organizations and oversight bodies to submit their suggestions by the end of August.

81. The Unit considered 32 new topics suggested by participating organizations and 3 suggested by oversight bodies. Three of the suggestions received from participating organizations were mandated by their legislative bodies. Five requests were received from other sources. In addition, 5 internal proposals and 7 roster items were considered, resulting in a total of 52 proposals being considered, of which 38 were system-wide topics and 3 were relevant for several organizations. The Unit also pre-screened the files for seven potential management and administration reviews of participating organizations.

82. As part of a consultative process with other oversight and coordinating bodies, the list of proposals for 2012 and the roster were shared with those bodies, which were invited to provide their comments and ratings in respect of the topics proposed. Participating organizations were also consulted and invited to comment and express their priorities and preferences with respect to the proposals for 2012. The ratings and comments were considered when the Unit drafted the 2012 programme of work at its winter session. JIU further shared the tentative programme with the Board of Auditors and the Office of Internal Oversight Services during the December 2011 tripartite meeting.

83. Out of the 52 potential projects considered by the Unit, 12 were selected,[3] of which 7 are system-wide, 1 concerns several organizations, 3 are management and administration reviews of single organizations and 1 covers a specific issue of a single organization. Of those, two single organization reviews and one system-wide review were mandated by the legislative bodies of the respective organizations.

A. Management and administration review of and review of decentralization in the World Health Organization

84. JIU undertook a management and administration review of WHO in 2001 and covered its decentralization in a report in 1993. Following the special session of the WHO Executive Board, held in November 2011, on the reform of WHO, JIU was requested to revisit the issues addressed in its two previous reports.[4] The requested management and administration review and a separate report analysing decentralization will be inputs to the ongoing WHO reform process, which addresses challenges in the areas of core business, governance, financing, human resources policies and management. As for decentralization, the reform process is

[3] The programme of work is subject to change in the course of the year; new reports may be added, planned reports may be modified, postponed or cancelled when circumstances warrant, and titles may be changed to reflect the thrust of reports.

[4] See WHO document EBSS/2/DIV/2, decision EBSS2 (3), para. 7.

seeking ways to improve corporate alignment between the global, regional and country levels of WHO.

B. Management and administration review of the International Atomic Energy Agency

85. According to its statute, the Unit is to conduct regular management and administration reviews of participating organizations. The first review of IAEA is scheduled for 2012. The review is aimed at identifying areas for improvement in the management and administration practices in IAEA within the framework of ongoing reform processes. It will focus on governance, programme planning, design and implementation, financial and executive management, human resources management, budget and oversight, among other areas.

C. Reference-checking process in the organizations of the United Nations system

86. Stemming from a suggestion made by the Department of Field Support, the review builds on the findings of the review of recruitment, which indicate that reference checks at the time of recruitment are neither systematically nor uniformly sought in the United Nations system organizations and that the process significantly varies from one organization to another. The review will examine relevant policies, procedures and arrangements, including outsourcing; and will assess differences and shortcomings and identify best practices, while aiming to prevent duplication and inconsistency in the application of various standards, with a view to aligning and harmonizing policies and practices across the United Nations system.

D. Follow-up review of the World Tourism Organization

87. In 2009, JIU conducted a management and administration review of the World Tourism Organization (JIU/REP/2009/1), which was presented to the Organization's Executive Council at its meeting in Mali in May 2009, and later in the year to its General Assembly in Kazakhstan. To date, the Organization maintains that the recommendations contained in the report are still under consideration. The Organization has acknowledged, however, that JIU has provided useful guidance to both the secretariat and member States in the preparation of a white paper commissioned by the Secretary-General of the Organization and endorsed by the Organization's General Assembly in the Republic of Korea in October 2011, in which fundamental changes in the way the Organization operates are recommended. The 2012 review will take stock of the implementation status of the recommendations of the previous review.

E. Lump-sum payments in lieu of entitlements

88. The review of lump-sum payments in lieu of entitlements, originally suggested by the Department of Management of the United Nations Secretariat and supported by 13 participating organizations, will consider the current and possible future application of the lump-sum option for existing entitlements to determine whether

its use saves on overhead, reduces bureaucracy and provides greater flexibility for staff while not having a significant financial implication. It will consider the need to harmonize existing lump-sum procedures and to establish acceptable and consistent calculation criteria and procedural rules, particularly to ensure fairness to staff working in different United Nations system organizations, especially those in the same duty station.

F. Evaluation of UN-Oceans

89. JIU was invited by the General Assembly, in its resolution 66/231, to review UN-Oceans with a view to strengthening the mechanism of cooperation and coordination in ocean affairs and the law of the sea and to present the results of the review to the Assembly at its sixty-seventh session. In parallel, a proposal for the JIU programme of work for 2012 had been received from the United Nations Secretariat to review UN-Oceans with a view to providing inputs for a reformed mechanism for strengthening United Nations coherence and coordination on oceans. The objective of the evaluation will be to examine the UN-Oceans inter-agency mechanism and propose tangible recommendations for the improvement of its efficiency and effectiveness of coordination. The findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation will feed concretely into the revision of the terms of reference of UN-Oceans.

G. Flexible working arrangements in United Nations system organizations

90. The review, suggested by WIPO, will examine the various flexible working arrangements throughout the United Nations system, the policies in place and the practical implications of the differing arrangements for staff, management and the Organization. The review will seek to identify both pitfalls and best practices in existing flexible working arrangements to see whether there are other such arrangements that could be adapted to the United Nations system.

H. Records and archives management in the United Nations

91. The project will look into the effective application of policies and procedures for records and archives management in the various United Nations entities (Secretariat, regional commissions, funds and programmes, peacekeeping missions, etc.). The organizational and administrative arrangements of the dedicated services, the resources allocated and the challenges faced by United Nations entities in this strategic area may vary significantly with the risk that the relevant policies are not being consistently understood and/or applied, leading to the loss of valuable information that should be preserved and exploited to ensure institutional memory and increase organizational effectiveness. A clear and consistently applied archiving policy could facilitate the handover of files from staff members when changing duty station or function or leaving their organization. The inspector intends to compare the challenges met and the solutions implemented and assess them against state-of-the-art practices in this area in both the public and private sectors, taking into account the quick evolution of the technologies used.

I. Assessment of policy and practices in the use of long-term agreements in procurement in the United Nations system

92. In recent years, the use of long-term agreements in United Nations organizations has been on the rise. The objective of the study is to assess relevant policies and practices and identify best practices and lessons learned in the use of long-term agreements with a view to providing recommendations for improvement. The study will also provide an inventory of long-term agreements in the system, including their number, types, modalities and level of utilization. Another important element of the study will be the assessment of system-wide or multiagency use of long-term agreements. Their proper use can provide a number of opportunities, such as using volume leverage to reduce prices and getting better delivery and maintenance conditions within the organizations and across the system. However, the optimal use of long-term agreements would require good planning of procurement, including the standardization of products and the aggregation of demand as well as the careful design of contract conditions. In order to gain the optimum benefit from long-term agreements, it is important to assess their performance and identify best practices and lessons learned.

J. Comparative analysis of the use of enterprise resource planning systems in United Nations system organizations

93. Enterprise resource planning systems adopted within the United Nations system vary greatly among the organizations, due in part to variations in business practices. The project will analyse the successes and failures of the implementation of enterprise resource planning systems in United Nations system organizations and establish benchmarks for their effective implementation. The review will seek to identify system-wide opportunities to share, harmonize and standardize enterprise resource planning operations among the organizations, sharing services or merging components of systems, in order to maximize synergies between the organizations and reduce the implementation and operating costs of such systems in the future.

K. Review of system-wide joint programming and administrative arrangements of operational activities in the United Nations system

94. The review, originally suggested by the Board of Auditors and the FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, will assess the effectiveness and efficiency of arrangements in achieving joint programmes' development goals and objectives and the impact on target beneficiaries and will seek to streamline procedures and improve collaboration and coordination among organizations and between the United Nations system and counterparts or partners. It will review the programmes and administrative arrangements administered by the United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office of UNDP. The review is aimed at identifying and disseminating substantive lessons learned and good practices in undertaking remedial actions to reduce the duplication of activities and transaction costs as well as enhancing the coherence and accountability of United Nations operational activities for development.

Annex I

Revised strategic framework of the Joint Inspection Unit for 2010-2019

Introduction

1. The Joint Inspection Unit presented to Member States its long-term strategic framework for 2010-2019 in its annual report for 2009 (A/63/34 and Corr.1). The General Assembly, in paragraph 17 of its resolution 63/272, acknowledged the undertaking by the Unit of a medium- and long-term strategy approach for 2010-2019 and decided to consider any resources associated with the implementation of the strategy in future programme budgets. Two subsequent budget submissions by the Unit did not result, however, in the anticipated and necessary increase in resources, despite several resolutions calling upon the Secretary-General to reflect the appropriate resource requirements associated with the implementation of the relevant portions of the strategy. At the request of Member States in Assembly resolutions 64/262 (para. 14) and 65/270 (para. 6), the Unit has decided to update and improve its medium- and long-term strategy for 2010-2019, taking into account the dynamics and challenges of the environment in which it undertakes its activities.

2. The updated strategy should be read in conjunction with the one submitted originally. It reflects mainly the fact that the resources necessary to attain the objectives set out for the decade have not yet been obtained. The updated strategy builds on the experience gained in the first two years of its implementation and also reflects the challenges faced by the United Nations system at the time of the update.

Overall orientation and long-term strategy

3. Bearing in mind the provisions of its statute, in particular chapter III, the long-term strategy of the Unit will continue to be influenced largely by the needs and requests of its major stakeholders. The Unit will focus its future activities on the major areas identified through the mandates received from the General Assembly and the corresponding legislative organs of the specialized agencies and other international organizations in the United Nations system. The strategy also reflects the relevant provisions of Assembly resolutions 62/226, 62/246, 63/272, 64/262 and 65/270, in which the Joint Inspection Unit was requested to focus its work on system-wide issues of interest and relevance to the participating organizations and to provide advice on ways to ensure more efficient and effective use of resources in implementing the mandates of the United Nations system organizations. Owing to a scarcity of resources, JIU was not in a position to undertake independent oversight on peacekeeping missions.

Long-term strategic objectives

4. The long-term goals are inherent to the fulfilment of the Unit’s mission and mandate, and thus remain unchanged, namely:

(a) To assist the legislative organs of the participating organizations in meeting their governance responsibilities in respect of their oversight function concerning management by the secretariats of human, financial and other resources;

(b) To help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the respective secretariats in achieving the legislative mandates and the mission objectives established for the organizations;

(c) To promote greater coordination among the organizations of the United Nations system;

(d) To identify best practices, propose benchmarks and facilitate information-sharing throughout the system.

5. The main objective for the period 2010-2019 is to provide the United Nations system organizations with concrete guidance and benchmarks so that they can have in place:

(a) Rigorous accountability principles, systems and mechanisms, including oversight, administration of justice and ethics;

(b) Improved and harmonized administrative and management practices of the system in the areas of human resources management, results-based management, procurement, strategic management and planning, risk management, security and safety and information technology;

(c) Better coordinated and more effective policies, strategies and collaboration on the realization of internationally agreed objectives, including the Millennium Development Goals; South-South and North-South collaboration; humanitarian, post-conflict and development assistance; environmental issues; "Delivering as one"; and the like;

(d) Improved and more effective governance arrangements.

Medium-term planning (2010-2015)

6. The Unit's expected accomplishments constitute the critical results to be cemented and assessed by the Unit over the first four years covered by the strategic framework. The four-year medium-term planning is underpinned by the Unit's reform proposals, as issued in its in-depth review of the statute and working methods (A/58/343), as well as numerous General Assembly resolutions. The following medium-term objectives have consequently been established: (a) strengthening the follow-up system for the implementation of recommendations; (b) the development of strategic annual programmes of work focused on system-wide issues; (c) systematic review of all participating organizations; (d) improved relevance and outreach; and (e) enhanced qualifications and tools of the JIU secretariat.

Strengthened follow-up system

7. The General Assembly, in its resolution 65/270, welcomed the efforts of the Unit to develop a web-based follow-up system to track the acceptance and implementation of recommendations of the Unit and gave a green light for its funding and development in 2011. The implementation of a more efficient and transparent follow-up system is a medium-term commitment of the Unit, which includes concrete, expected achievements, as set out below.

Increased system-wide perspective of the work of the Unit

8. The medium-term strategy is implemented through successive programmes of work for the period from 2010 to 2013. The Unit considers that in order to meet client needs, its annual programmes of work should focus on the long-term strategic areas from a system-wide perspective, in accordance with the mandates received from the governing bodies. Specific mandates received from the competent legislative organs of the participating organizations of the United Nations system might have an impact on a given annual programme of work. However, the activities undertaken by the Unit, in the medium term, should show progress towards the achievement of its long-term objective.

Systematic management and administration reviews of the participating organizations

9. The Unit is of the view that a more systematic approach is required to review the management and administration of participating organizations, and it intends to ensure full coverage of all organizations over a long-term time frame, starting with those entities that have not yet been fully reviewed, followed by organizations that have already been reviewed, starting with those reviewed earlier. Although the ideal target is a review of each of them at least once every five years, current resources allow for a cyclical review only every eight years. The table below indicates the dates on which participating organizations were last reviewed.

10. As already demonstrated during 2010-2011, the management and administration reviews are not considered useful only by the participating organizations and governing boards, they also help enhance the Unit's knowledge of the participating organizations, allowing it to fulfil one of the major components of its mission, which is to identify and disseminate best practices across the system.

Organization	*Year last review was completed*	*Remarks*
United Nations	—	A full review has not yet been conducted; a partial review, of ECLAC, is planned for 2012
UNICEF	—	A full review has not yet been conducted
UNCTAD	2011	Review is under way
UNDP	—	A full review has not yet been conducted
UNEP	—	A full review has not yet been conducted
UNHCR	2004	JIU/REP/2004/4
UN-Habitat	—	A full review has not yet been conducted
UNOPS	—	Partially reviewed in 1998; a full review has not yet been conducted
UNODC	2010	JIU/REP/2010/10
UNFPA	—	A full review has not yet been conducted
WFP	2009	JIU/REP/2009/7

Organization	*Year last review was completed*	*Remarks*
UNRWA	—	A full review has not yet been conducted and is planned for 2014
FAO	2002	JIU/REP/2002/8
IAEA	—	First review planned for 2012
ICAO	2007	JIU/REP/2007/5
ILO	1999	JIU/REP/99/4
IMO	2007	JIU/REP/2007/7
ITU	2001	JIU/REP/2001/3
UNESCO	2011	JIU/REP/2011/9
UNIDO	2003	JIU/REP/2003/1
UPU	2008	JIU/REP/2008/1
WHO	2001	JIU/REP/2001/5; mandated follow-up for 2012
WIPO	—	Partially reviewed in 2005 (JIU/REP/2005/1); a full review has not yet been done
WMO	2007	JIU/REP/2007/11
UNWTO	2009	JIU/REP/2009/1

Improved relevance and outreach of the reports of the Unit

11. The first self-evaluation exercise, in 2008, helped JIU to better understand stakeholders' perceptions of how the Unit is undertaking its activities and progressing towards the fulfilment of its mission. Furthermore, the introduction of a rating system for proposed topics has also contributed to a programme of work that increasingly reflects the priorities of the system and that of legislative and governing bodies. The Unit plans to use self-evaluation data and performance-related feedback for purposes of subsequent planning, accountability, learning and decision-making. The Unit's website will be reconfigured to provide improved and fully searchable access to reports and other products of the Unit. A self-evaluation will be initiated in 2012.

Enhanced qualifications and tools for the evaluation staff of the Unit

12. The development of staff skills through adequate external and/or internal training programmes is a key component of the medium-term strategy. Staff will continue to receive training in state-of-the-art evaluation techniques as well as other technical skills. Furthermore, internal guidance materials will be prepared, refining the methodology, strategy and professional rigour of the reviews.

Expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement for the medium term (by 2015)

13. The expected accomplishments and indicators of achievement are as follows:

(a) Strengthened system of follow-up on the acceptance and implementation of recommendations:

(i) New web-based information system for follow-up of recommendations in place

Associated target: new system for legislative organs and secretariats available and fully operational by the end of 2012

(ii) Rate of acceptance of recommendations by the participating organizations

Associated target: percentage of acceptance of recommendations in the medium-term period should not be less than 60 per cent

(b) Increased system-wide and strategic focus of the programme of work of the Unit:

(i) Balanced number of reports related to each of the defined strategic areas

Associated target: all reports produced by the Unit should be related to at least one of the strategic areas

(ii) Percentage of system-wide reports or reports on several organizations issued during the period

Associated target: should be at least 70 per cent of the total number of reports produced in the period

(c) Systematic review of the management and administration of participating organizations:

(i) Number of reviews of management and administration of participating organizations

Associated target: all participating organizations are reviewed at least once every eight years

(ii) Number of reviews of management and administration of participating organizations

Associated target: at least two reviews per year

(d) Improved relevance and outreach of the reports of the Unit:

(i) Percentage of the programme of work that is based on proposals and/or suggestions made by Member States, oversight bodies and/or participating organizations

Associated target: 75 per cent

(ii) Number of visitors to the revised website of the Unit

Associated target: website visits reach 100,000 per year

(e) Enhanced qualifications and tools of evaluation staff: average number of relevant training days per year

Associated target: at least 10 days per Professional staff member

Short-term programming

14. Short-term programming and short-term performance reporting are not part of the present framework. For this purpose the Unit will continue using its annual programme of work, a strategic workplan for the Secretariat and related performance reports.

15. It should be noted that the Unit is making every effort to link its medium-term planning, including expected accomplishments and associated targets, to its short-term activities. This is done through the cascading of meaningful and linked objectives at different levels down to the individual level, to be reflected in staff performance appraisals.

Resources

16. The implementation of the above long- and medium-term strategy requires, inter alia, the availability of commensurate resources, both human and financial. Given that the United Nations allocates resources on a biennial basis, the Unit continues to assume that the resources necessary for the implementation of its long- and medium-term strategy will be made available in due time. In particular, it is fundamental to ensure coherence and compatibility between budgeting and programming decisions (e.g. any budget cuts should correspond to specific identified programme cuts). The increase in system-wide coverage has also stretched the JIU budget even further, making it impossible to ensure adequate geographic coverage of the work of the United Nations. Therefore, the Unit stresses the need to align the long-term objectives with the appropriate resources.

Annex II

Composition of the Joint Inspection Unit

1. The composition of the Joint Inspection Unit for 2011 was as follows (each member's term of office expires on 31 December of the year indicated in parentheses):

M. Mounir Zahran (Egypt), Chair (2012)

Tadanori Inomata (Japan), Vice-Chair (2014)

Gérard Biraud (France) (2015)

Nikolay V. Chulkov (Russian Federation) (2012)

Papa Louis Fall (Senegal) (2015)

Even Fontaine Ortiz (Cuba) (2012)

Istvan Posta (Hungary) (2015)

Enrique Roman-Morey (Peru) (2011)

Cihan Terzi (Turkey) (2015)

M. Deborah Wynes (United States of America) (2012)

Yishan Zhang (China) (2012)

2. In accordance with article 18 of its statute, which provides that each year the Unit shall elect from among its inspectors a Chair and Vice-Chair, on 2 December 2011 the Unit re-elected M. Mounir Zahran (Egypt) as Chair and elected Istvan Posta (Hungary) as Vice-Chair for 2012. Also, upon the early resignation of Roman-Morey at the end of October 2011 before the end of his tenure, the General Assembly appointed Jorge T. Flores Callejas (Honduras) on 24 December 2011, to replace him, with effect from January 2012.

Annex III

Workplan for 2011: status of project implementation (as at 31 December 2011)

Type[a]	*Title*	*Programme of work of year*	*Effective start date*	*Symbol/expected end date*
S	Management and administration review of ECLAC	2011	Nov. 2011	3rd quarter 2012
SW	Accountability frameworks in the United Nations system	2011	Feb. 2011	JIU/REP/2011/5
SW	Investigation function in the United Nations system	2011	Feb. 2011	JIU/REP/2011/7
SW	Management of sick leave in the organizations of the United Nations system	2011	Feb. 2011	1st quarter 2012
SW	Individual consultancy policies and practices in United Nations organizations	2011	Aug. 2011	2nd quarter 2012
SW	Information and communications technology governance in United Nations system organizations	2011	Jan. 2011	JIU/REP/2011/9
SW	Recruitment of staff in United Nations system organizations	2011	Feb. 2011	1st quarter 2012
SW	Review of strategic planning in United Nations system organizations	2011	Nov. 2011	3rd quarter 2012
SW	Business continuity in the United Nations system	2011	Feb. 2011	JIU/REP/2011/6
SO	Staff-management relations in the specialized agencies and the United Nations common system	2011	Aug. 2011	2nd quarter 2012
SW	Safety and security[b]	2011	Cancelled	Cancelled
SW	Evaluation of the scope, organization, effectiveness and approach of the work of the United Nations in mine action	2010	May 2010	JIU/REP/2011/11
SW	Status of implementation of multilingualism in the United Nations system organizations	2010	Feb. 2010	JIU/REP/2011/4
SW	Medical service in the United Nations system	2010	Feb. 2010	JIU/REP/2011/1
SW	Procurement reforms in the United Nations system	2010	Sep. 2010	JIU/NOTE/2011/1
SW	Financing for humanitarian operations in the United Nations system	2010	March 2010	1st quarter 2012
S	Management and administration review of UNCTAD	2010	Dec. 2010	1st quarter 2012
SW	South-South and triangular cooperation in the United Nations system	2010	March 2010	JIU/REP/2011/3

Type[a]	*Title*	*Programme of work of year*	*Effective start date*	*Symbol/expected end date*
S	Transparency in the selection and appointment of senior managers in the United Nations Secretariat	2010	Aug. 2010	JIU/REP/2011/2
SO	Staff-management relations within the United Nations	2009	Nov. 2009	JIU/REP/2011/10
S	Management and administration review of UNESCO	2009	Sep. 2009	JIU/REP/2011/8

[a] S, single organization; SO, several organizations; SW, system-wide.
[b] The project was cancelled because of the departure of the report coordinator (see para. 15 of the present report).

Annex IV

Consideration of system-wide reports of the Joint Inspection Unit issued between 2008 and 2010 by legislative bodies[a]

			United Nations and its funds and programmes							*Specialized agencies and IAEA*													*Number not considered*
Report	*Subject*	*Sent for action*	*UN*	*UNDP*	*UNFPA*	*UNOPS*	*UNICEF*	*WFP*	*UNEP*	*ILO*	*FAO*	*UNESCO*	*ICAO*	*WHO*	*UPU*	*ITU*	*WMO*	*IMO*	*WIPO*	*UNIDO*	*UNWTO*	*IAEA*	
JIU/REP/2008/2	Junior Professional Officer programmes	22/12/2008											X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X		2
JIU/REP/2008/3	Environmental governance	24/02/2009																					8
JIU/REP/2008/4	National execution of technical cooperation projects	24/02/2009																					6
JIU/REP/2008/5	ICT hosting services	24/02/2009																					5
JIU/REP/2008/6	Management of Internet websites	24/02/2009																					5
JIU/REP/2009/5	Coherence support for Africa	22/10/2009																					8
JIU/REP/2009/6	Offshoring	03/11/2009																					8
JIU/REP/2009/8	Executive heads	10/02/2010																					6
JIU/REP/2009/9	Special representatives of the Secretary-General	12/05/2010																					12
JIU/REP/2010/1	Environmental profile	19/03/2010																					6
JIU/REP/2010/2	Travel	19/05/2010																					7
JIU/REP/2010/3	Ethics	18/06/2010																					6
JIU/REP/2010/4	Enterprise risk management	22/11/2010																					11
JIU/REP/2010/5	Audit function	04/01/2010							X												X		9
JIU/REP/2010/6	IPSAS	22/11/2010																					10
JIU/REP/2010/7	Trust funds	16/12/2010																					11
JIU/REP/2010/8	Staff mobility	29/03/2010																					14
Total reports to be considered			**17**	**17**	**17**	**17**	**17**	**17**	**16**	**17**	**17**	**17**	**16**	**17**	**16**	**16**	**16**	**16**	**16**	**16**	**16**	**17**	**16.6**
Total reports not considered			**4**	**2**	**2**	**2**	**5**	**3**	**14**	**5**	**6**	**2**	**7**	**0**	**5**	**16**	**12**	**2**	**16**	**0**	**15**	**17**	**6.8**
Percentage of reports not considered			**24**	**12**	**12**	**12**	**29**	**18**	**88**	**29**	**35**	**12**	**44**	**0**	**31**	**100**	**75**	**13**	**100**	**0**	**94**	**100**	**41**

[a] Based on available official documentation found on the organizations' websites.

Considered

Not yet considered

X Sent for information only

Annex V

List of contributing organizations and their percentage share in the costs of the Joint Inspection Unit for 2012

FAO	3.9
IAEA	2.0
ICAO	0.8
ILO[a]	2.0
IMO	0.2
ITU	0.5
PAHO	0.9
United Nations[b]	16.8
UNAIDS	0.9
UNDP	19.7
UNESCO	1.9
UNFPA	2.7
UNHCR	6.0
UNICEF	11.4
UNIDO	0.8
UNOPS	4.1
UNRWA	2.8
UN-Women[c]	—
UNWTO	0.1
UPU	0.2
WFP	14.3
WHO	6.7
WIPO	1.0
WMO	0.3

[a] Includes United Nations System Staff College.

[b] Including the United Nations Secretariat as well as UNEP, UNCTAD, UN-Habitat, ITC, UNITAR and UNODC. UNRWA and UNHCR, which are also Secretariat entities, are listed separately above, as their contributions are reflected separately in the CEB methodology. Peacekeeping operations are excluded.

[c] Share not yet established.

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JIU/REP/2011/1

REVIEW OF THE MEDICAL SERVICE IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

Prepared by

Nikolay Chulkov

Joint Inspection Unit

Geneva 2011

United Nations

GE.11-00268

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Original: ENGLISH

REVIEW OF THE MEDICAL SERVICE IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

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United Nations, Geneva 2011

GE.11-00268

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Review of the medical service in the United Nations system
JIU/REP/2011/1

This system-wide review assesses the manner in which medical services are provided, managed, supported and monitored in the United Nations system, with a view to proposing improvements that will enable the United Nations to fulfil its duty of care with regard to the health and safety of staff. This is of particular importance when considered in the context of the United Nations strategic movement towards mobility and increased field presence, and of particular relevance to staff deployed at hardship duty stations.

The report considers the mandate of the United Nations Chief Medical Director and the Medical Services Division (MSD), as specified in ST/SGB/2004/8, and concludes that in the light of the recommendation of the High-Level Committee on Management (HLCM) on Occupational Safety and Health (OSH), the Secretary-General should modify the mandate/role of MSD. One key feature of OSH, and in particular of OSH medical services, is that such services should remain independent from other administrative/organizational units and report either directly to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or to his/her appointed representative. This implies that OSH medical services, while working in close collaboration with human resources, must not report to them directly.

The adoption of OSH policies by United Nations system organizations will necessitate a paradigm shift in the provision of medical services. It will also lead to cost-efficiencies. Emphasis will now be placed on prevention rather than cure. As stated by a former Secretary-General of the United Nations, "…staff are this Organization's greatest asset. We must treat them as such."

While describing the medical services and programmes provided at headquarters duty stations, the report focuses on medical services in the field, as the latter are deemed to be inadequate. It describes the functions of the respective service providers and their interaction with MSD, United Nations Medical Directors Working Group (UNMDWG) and United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), and draws attention to the need to improve the overall coordination of system-wide medical services. The issue of accountability in field medical services is raised; for although MSD is supposed to be the "technical supervisor", it actually has no input with regard to the budgets and work plans of field units, nor in the performance management process of the other service providers. Furthermore, United Nations dispensaries are now "managed" by the respective Resident Representatives and/or Country Teams on the basis of a draft Terms of Reference prepared by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This decentralization has led to accountability issues and difficulties in overcoming disagreements on cost-sharing by the various agencies using the facilities.

An overview of the existing system-wide and inter-agency bodies that coordinate and/or cooperate on medical and OSH issues is presented. With a view to facilitating the implementation of OSH policies and enhancing coordination, the report concludes with a call for the establishment of a system-wide network for OSH issues (including, but not limited to, medical services), modelled on the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) that addresses security issues. The proposed new coordinating body would monitor the implementation of United Nations OSH policies, practices and

procedures, and thereby support HLCM in its comprehensive review of issues pertaining to the entire United Nations occupational safety and health structure.

The United Nations has invested considerable resources in employing a large number of health-care personnel across the system, but has not yet created the structures required to oversee and manage these resources according to modern health-care standards.

The review contains seven recommendations, of which the following two are addressed to legislative bodies.

Recommendation 2

The legislative bodies of United Nations system organizations should adopt appropriate standards with regard to Occupational Safety and Health issues, taking into account and ensuring compatibility with emerging modifications to the Minimum Operating Safety and Security Standards.

Recommendation 7

The General Assembly should mandate the Secretary-General to create the United Nations Network on Occupational Safety and Health, with a defined Terms of Reference, and which should be headed by the United Nations Chief Medical Director.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ACC	Administrative Committee on Coordination
CEB	United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
COE	Contingent Owned Equipment
CISMU	Critical Incident Stress Management Unit
CISWG	Critical Incident Stress Working Group
CTBTO	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization
DFS	Department of Field Support
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
EAP	Employee Assistance Programme
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECE	Economic Commission for Europe
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ERP	Enterprise Resource Planning
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
ESCWA	Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FMT	Forward Medical Teams
HLCM	High-Level Committee on Management of the CEB
HRN	Human Resources Network
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IASMN	Inter-Agency Security Management Network
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INFM	Inter-Agency Network for Facilities Management
IOM	International Organization for Migration
ITC	International Trade Centre
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit of the United Nations system
LOA	Letter of Agreement
LSD	Logistics Support Division
MOSS	Minimum Operating Safety and Security Standards
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSD	Medical Services Division
MSS	Medical Support Section
MSU	Medical Support Unit
OIOS	United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OPS	Office of Planning and Support
OSH	Occupational Safety and Health
PCC	Police Contributing Countries
PHTLS	Pre-Hospital Trauma and Life Support
SSS	Specialist Support Section
TCC	Troop Contributing Countries
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS

UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNEPs	United Nations Examining Physicians
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHQ	United Nations Headquarters
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNMDWG	United Nations Medical Directors Working Group
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNNOSH	United Nations Network on Occupational Safety and Health
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOG	United Nations Office at Geneva
UNON	United Nations Office at Nairobi
UNOV	United Nations Office at Vienna
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSECOORD	United Nations Security Coordinator
UNSIC	United Nations System Influenza Coordination
UNSSCG	United Nations Staff/Stress Counsellors Special Interest Group
UNV	United Nations Volunteers
UNWTO	World Tourism Organization of the United Nations
UPU	Universal Postal Union
VIC	Vienna International Centre
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

I. INTRODUCTION

1. As part of its programme of work for 2010, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) conducted, from February to November 2010, a "Review of the medical service in the United Nations system", based on proposals submitted by the Office of Human Resources Management - Medical Services Division (MSD) and the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS).

2. This system-wide review assesses the manner in which medical services in the United Nations system are provided, managed, supported and monitored, with a view to proposing improvements that will enable the United Nations to fulfil its duty of care with regard to the health and safety of staff. This is of particular importance when considered in the context of the United Nations strategic movement towards mobility and increased field presence, and of particular relevance to staff deployed at hardship duty stations. As stated by a former Secretary-General of the United Nations, "…staff are this Organization's greatest asset. We must treat them as such."[1]

3. The scope of the report does not include medical insurance issues, as they have been dealt with in a previous JIU report,[2], nor does it address the quality of care (medical treatment) provided by United Nations medical staff. It also does not delve into the subject of sick-leave management, as this will most likely be the topic of a forthcoming JIU review, as has been requested by a number of United Nations system organizations.

4. The report will further elaborate on the implications of the endorsement by the High-Level Committee on Management (HLCM) of the Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) of the proposal submitted by the United Nations Medical Directors Working Group (UNMDWG) for the adoption of an Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) policy[3] and its recommendation that all organizations adopt an individual OSH policy.[4]

5. The adoption of OSH policies by United Nations system organizations will necessitate a paradigm shift in the provision of medical services, as emphasis will now be placed on prevention rather than cure[5]. Chapter II describes what this shift entails, while chapter III provides background information on the medical services currently provided at both headquarter and field duty stations, taking into account the fact that future organizational/managerial change somewhat limits the analysis of current practices.

6. Chapter IV of the report provides an overview of the system-wide bodies that currently either cooperate on or coordinate health issues. Finally, chapter V calls for the establishment of a system-wide mechanism to monitor and manage OSH.

Methodology

7. In accordance with JIU internal standards and guidelines, the methodology followed in preparing this report included a detailed desk review, questionnaires, interviews and an in-depth analysis.

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1 See http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/sgsm10705.
2 United Nations system staff medical coverage (JIU/REP/2007/2).
3 Occupational Health and Safety Policy in the UN System, Submission of the UN Medical Directors Working Group, CEB/2010/HLCM/11, 11 February 2010.
4 Healthcare and its management in the United Nations system, CEB/2009/HLCM/32.
5 CEB/2010/3, para 77.

8. The Inspector conducted interviews in person and by tele/videoconference, as well as on-site visits to United Nations medical facilities in order to obtain the views of many medical service staff, as well as officials in human resources and finance departments within the United Nations system organizations and in various duty stations, as well as UNMDWG member organizations. The Inspector also visited Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) medical facilities in Lebanon and Liberia. Close collaboration was maintained between the Inspector and members of the UNMDWG steering committee at various stages of the review.

9. The Inspector was invited to present his preliminary findings, based on the responses received to his questionnaires, at the UNMDWG annual meeting, hosted by the International Labour Organization (ILO) in Geneva, Switzerland, in October 2010. After the presentation, the participants discussed at length the emerging findings and possible recommendations.

10. Comments on the draft report were sought from all the United Nations system organizations and UNMDWG members who responded to the questionnaires, and taken into account in finalizing the report.

11. In accordance with article 11.2 of the JIU statute, this report was finalized after consultation among the Inspectors aimed at testing its conclusions and recommendations against the collective wisdom of the Unit.

12. To facilitate the handling of the report, implementation of its recommendations and monitoring thereof, annex V contains a table indicating whether the report has been submitted to the organizations concerned for action or for information. The table identifies the recommendations relevant to each organization, and specifies whether they require a decision by the organization's legislative or governing body, or whether they can be acted upon by the organization's executive head.

13. The Inspector wishes to express his appreciation to all those who assisted him in the preparation of this report, in particular the persons who participated in the interviews, provided responses to the questionnaires, and so willingly shared their knowledge and expertise.

II. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH

14. The ILO Occupational Health Services Convention (No. 161) defines "occupational health services" as services entrusted with essentially preventive functions and responsible for advising the employer, the workers and their representatives in the undertaking on the requirements for establishing and maintaining a safe and healthy working environment which will facilitate optimal physical and mental health in relation to work; and the adaptation of work to the capabilities of workers in the light of their state of physical and mental health (article 1).

15. The manner in which such health services are provided is usually stated in the organization's occupational safety and health (OSH) policy, prepared by the CEO of the organization. A written policy provides the framework within which an effective OSH programme can be implemented. An OSH policy statement should concisely define the mandate, and allocate specific resources to health and safety activities. The policy should be updated regularly.

16. The implementation of an OSH policy is usually codified in a manual (administrative instruction). While the content and structure may vary between organizations, there are certain common features, as specified below.

17. Responsibility and accountability: OSH is a responsibility which starts at the highest organizational level and is passed down the line management chain to all supervisors. Employees have a duty to follow the health and safety rules of the organization, and to participate in the implementation of OSH policies and activities. It should be noted that it is **not** the medical service or the OSH service that is responsible for staff health and safety. Rather those services and other dedicated OSH staff assist management in fulfilling its responsibility and duty of care concerning staff health and safety.

18. Risk management: This is a process in which hazards in the workplace are identified and analyzed in terms of the risk they pose, and risk elimination or mitigation strategies are developed and implemented. While effective emergency response is an important element of risk management to reduce the impact of work-related injuries, ill health, diseases and accidents, it should always be preceded by efforts to prevent such incidents from occurring in the first place.

19. OSH oversight body: Effective implementation of an organizations' OSH policy is best achieved through the appointment of a representative group of staff with a clear mandate and documented responsibilities in the form of an OSH committee. This committee should comprise, at the minimum, staff representatives, representatives of the OSH medical and counselling services, representatives from human resources, representatives from facilities and services management, representatives of the health insurance office, and security services.

Senior management commitment to OSH would be reflected through this committee being chaired and supervised by the Deputy CEO or his/her representative.

20. Training: A successful OSH programme presupposes that managers and employees, in particular the members of the OSH committee, are trained (and on a continuous basis) in order to understand their roles, responsibilities and expected actions, so as to achieve OSH goals.

21. All staff must be made aware of potential risks in the work environment, and the measures adopted to minimize such risks. More importantly, they must be familiar with the OSH services available to them, including what they do, and do not, provide. The expected outcomes of the components of such services are listed in Table 1 below. The extent to which such OSH services are provided is relative to each organization's risk profile.

Table 1
Representative components and outputs of an Organizational Safety and Health programme[6]

Leadership/management

- Organizational commitment;
- Innovation and change management;
- Health information systems;
- Programme evaluation and quality improvement;
- Privacy, medical confidentiality and health records management systems;
- Systematic research, statistics and epidemiology.

Healthy workers

- Health evaluation of workers (pre-assignment/pre-placement, medical monitoring, post-illness or injury, fitness-for-duty evaluation, independent medical examinations);
- Occupational injury and illness management;
- Non-occupational injury and illness management (depending on local health care infrastructure);
- Travellers health and infection control;
- Mental and behavioural health/misuse of substances;
- Medical screening and preventive services.

Health environment

- Workplace health hazard evaluations, inspection and abatement;
- Education regarding environmental hazards;
- Personal protective equipment (when exposure cannot be avoided);
- Toxicology assessments;
- Environmental protection programmes;
- Emergency preparedness, business continuity planning and disruption prevention;
- Healthy organization (health promotion programmes);
- Health benefits management;
- Integrated health and productivity management.


[6] Occupational Health and Safety Policy in the UN System, Submission of the UN Medical Directors Working Group, annex 1, CEB/2010/HLCM/11, 11 February 2010.

OSH implementation

22. While a few organizations have adopted an OSH policy (see Figure 1 below), the Inspector wishes to cite the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) as organizations that have implemented the OSH core elements stated above.[7] The ILO's OSH announcement, on the other hand, does not specify that it is the Director-General who is responsible, rather responsibility is vested in the Office of the Director-General; nor are resources specifically allocated for OSH, instead, they fall "within the provisions of the programme and budget."[8] The World Health Organization (WHO) has recently adopted an OSH policy, which in the Inspector's view, incorporates key aspects of the core elements. However, the Director-General does not specifically assume responsibility, rather it is staff with managerial and supervisory responsibilities that do so.[9]

23. Be that as it may, the Inspector notes that many organizations/entities are in the process of adopting OSH policies, by designating focal points to drive the process. In that respect, some have already restructured their medical services to provide occupational health services for their staff at headquarters, and in some field presences. Thus there is precedence and best practice for other organizations to follow.

Figure 1
Number of organizations/entities with an OSH policy statement
(as of March 2011)




Note: Policy: FAO, IMO, OPCW, WHO, World Bank.
Policy in Process: ESCWA, ILO, IOM, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNHQ, UNWTO.
No Policy: ECA, ECLAC, ESCAP, IAEA, ICAO, ICTR, UNOG, UNON, UNRWA, UPU, WFP.
Source: Organizations' response to the Inspector's questionnaire.

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7 FAO Occupational Safety and Health Policy (to be published in 2011); OPCW Health and Safety Policy; OPCW Health and Safety Regulations, dated 14 May 1997 (C-1/DEC.8).
8 ILO, Director-General's announcement, IODS number 48 (version 1), 11 November 2008.
9 WHO, Occupational Safety and Health policy, para 8.

24. One key feature of OSH, and in particular of OSH medical services, is that such services should remain independent from other administrative/organizational units, and report either directly to the CEO or to his/her appointed representative, within the office of the CEO. This implies that OSH medical services, while working in close collaboration with human resources, must not report to them directly. This is the case already in some organizations (see Figure 2 for a breakdown), where medical services report to the Head of Administration or the Executive Office. While reporting lines can demonstrate independence from administrative/organizational units, it is better defined contractually and through a formal, legal basis. From a historical perspective, it should be noted that the United Nations Medical Service in New York was under the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (see SGB 97/Rev.1 (1 January 1955) and 97/Amend.2 (6 October 1955), and the Health Service was designated as an "independent service reporting to the Secretary-General through the Executive Office". Responsibility for the Medical Service was transferred to the Office of Human Resources Management in 1959 to meet a temporary situation, and still remains there today.[10]

Figure 2
Medical service reporting chain in the organization/entity (at headquarters)
(as of June 2010)



Note: Reporting to HR: ESCAP, ESCWA, IAEA, ICAO, ILO, IMO, UNHQ, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNOG, UNON, WFP, WHO, World Bank.
Reporting to other bodies: ECA, ECLAC, FAO, ICTR, IOM, OPCW.
Source: Organizations' reponse to the Inspector's questionnaire.

25. A successful OSH policy would also lead to cost-efficiencies. For example, most of the medical expenses of OPCW Health and Safety Branch are related to external referrals for medical examinations, pathology (blood) testing or radiology. Each of these activities is being progressively implemented, subject to an "evidence-based" review. Well-established

[10] Internal Memorandum to Joseph E. Connor, Under-Secretary-General, Department of Administration and Management, from Ingrid Laux, Director, Medical and Employment Assistance Division, Office of Human Resources Management, 4 March 1996.

statistical proofs are used as the benchmark for adding to, removing or changing aspects of each activity. To date, this has led to a 26 per cent reduction in pathology costs, and a 90 per cent reduction in radiology costs. Revised clinical examination guidelines to be put in place in 2011 are expected to result in a 30 per cent decrease in overall pre-employment medical costs.[11] As well as monetary savings, this approach also saves significant staff time, which can then be directed towards newer strategies which have been shown to yield positive results, such as active case management and enhanced early return-to-work programmes. Over time, indirect savings, such as reduced sick leave and disability rates, are generated, which in turn give rise to significant benefits in the longer term, including financial savings, and removing or changing aspects of each activity.

26. Implementation of the recommendations below would enhance efficiency.

Recommendation 1

Executive heads of United Nations system organizations should appoint focal points in their respective organizations to facilitate the development and implementation of the necessary Occupational Safety and Health policies and procedures, and should present them without delay to their respective legislative bodies for adoption.

Recommendation 2

The legislative bodies of United Nations system organizations should adopt appropriate standards with regard to Occupational Safety and Health issues, taking into account and ensuring compatibility with emerging modifications to the Minimum Operating Safety and Security Standards.

[11] Source: OPCW Health and Safety Branch.

III. MEDICAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

27. The Director of the Medical Services Division (MSD) coordinates the system-wide implementation of United Nations medical standards and health policies, addresses health-care issues arising from all duty stations, and ensures staff access to benefit programmes. The Director is accountable to the Assistant Secretary-General for Human Resources Management. He/she acts as medical adviser on matters pertaining to the Advisory Board on Compensation Claims and is the designated medical consultant for the United Nations Joint Staff Pension Fund.[12]

28. The core functions of MSD include:[13]

- To provide for the physical and mental health of staff worldwide and advise administration on staff benefits;
- To formulate and review United Nations medical standards, policies and guidelines, and ensure coordination and monitoring of system-wide implementation;
- To establish, update and coordinate United Nations system health advisories, including travel precautions, pre- and post-travel examinations, consultations, vaccinations, health education materials and travel kits;
- To promote a healthy, safe and compassionate work environment through health policies and guidelines, health promotion programmes, comprehensive medical emergency preparedness plans, and coordinate system-wide implementation of medical policies for HIV/AIDS;
- To provide medical clearance for recruitment, reassignment and mission deployment of staff worldwide, military observers and civilian police monitors;
- To evaluate and certify sick leave for staff worldwide;
- To determine the health rating of all duty stations reviewed by the International Civil Service Commission;
- To provide psychological assistance in the context of mission assignments, substance abuse and emergency preparedness;
- To advise on service-incurred injury and illness benefits for staff, and PKO military observers, police and contingents;
- To provide courtesy medical services to the staff of all permanent missions and observer missions to the United Nations, and to visitors and contractors;
- To provide health services to all New York-based staff of the United Nations system, including:
  - Medical examinations and consultations;
  - Travel health clinic;
  - Walk-in clinic;
  - Emergency and first-aid care;
  - Referral to outside specialists or hospitals;
  - Planning, organizing and implementing on-site health improvement programmes.


While the above describes the services provided by MSD, Figure 3 below indicates the medical/occupational health services provided by organizations/entities at their respective headquarters.[14]

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[12] Secretary-General's bulletin, Organization of the Office of Human Resources Management (ST/SGB/2004/8), paras. 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3.

[13] Ibid., para. 7.5.

Figure 3
Main medical services and programmes provided at headquarters duty stations (as of June 2010)



Source: Organizations' reponse to the Inspector's questionnaire.

29. Some duty stations have established in-house laboratories, because they have determined that their presence on-site lowers costs (when compared with external providers) and is convenient for staff. Staff convenience and well-being were also reasons for establishing fitness centres, which is indicative of management initiative and support. The Inspector wishes to highlight certain additional services that are provided at some headquarters duty stations, at little or no extra cost to the organization/entity, which may be replicated at other locations. These services are indicative of an organization/entity's desire to provide a convenient means to improve the general well-being of staff. For example, FAO has a private medical clinic on the premises, which has a general practitioner and a physiotherapist. In Vienna, staff can schedule appointments with a private gynaecologist who runs a weekly clinic in the Vienna International Centre (VIC). The VIC also houses a pharmacy, which enables staff to fill prescriptions without leaving the building. Some organizations also provide self-measurement blood pressure machines. Finally, the World Bank has a dedicated website for health promotion, and organizes regular information sessions on various health-related topics.[15]

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[14] See annex I for a detailed list of services provided at individual headquarters duty stations.

[15] For further information on measures adopted by United Nations system organizations with regard to work-life balance, see JIU report on Inter-agency Staff Mobility and Work/Life Balance in the Organizations of the United Nations System (JIU/REP/2010/8).

30. Most of the organizations surveyed also offer assistance to their staff to deal with their work-related or personal problems that may adversely affect their work performance, health and general well-being. Such assistance is usually provided "in-house", either through staff welfare officers, staff counsellors, stress counsellors, ombudsmen, ethics officers, and others addressing staff relations, or a combination of the above. Such assistance may also be concurrently outsourced to external providers, as is the case of the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). In that respect, the role and service description of the service providers should be clearly delineated so as to avoid confusion and/or misunderstanding. The reporting lines of such providers are also important; in some organizations (UNHQ, WHO, FAO), staff/stress counsellors report to the medical service, in others (the majority) counsellors report to human resources or security.

31. Assistance/support may be provided for a wide range of issues, including conflict in the workplace, harassment and bullying, substance abuse, depression, burnout, work-life balance, loneliness/isolation, marital and family issues, pre- and post-deployment issues, traumatic stress and secondary trauma, and human resources-related issues.

32. The matter of reporting lines is also linked to confidentiality. While counsellors who report to medical services have clearly defined "firewalls" between them, and patient files are kept separate from each other, and the same may hold true for counsellors reporting to human resources/management, the paramount concern is that of independence. In other words, staff members providing counselling services should function in an environment where their professional independence is guaranteed, thereby enabling them to better serve their client base. To this end, the Inspector is of the view that such service providers should not be reporting to medical services, nor to human resources, nor to security, but rather to the head of the OSH unit (see chapter II).

A. Medical directors – post levels

33. While the post of Director of MSD is graded as D-2, those of other medical directors are not at a similar grade (see Table 2 below). The Inspector is of the view that the posts of United Nations system health-care staff should be consistently graded system-wide, so as to accurately reflect the responsibilities that are shouldered on a daily basis, both in the field and at headquarters. In fact, some medical chiefs have expressed dissatisfaction regarding the grade discrepancies between duty stations of posts with similar levels of responsibility, especially as some of them are not only in charge of their own organization, but of others as well.

Table 2
Medical chiefs (headquarters) – post levels
(as of June 2010)

Organizations/entities	Grade
UNHQ	D2
FAO	D1
UNHCR	D1
WHO	D1
IAEA	D1
UNOG	P5
UNON	P5
ILO	P5
UNESCO	P5
UNRWA	P5
WFP (under FAO)	P5
ECA	P5
ECLAC	P4
ESCAP	P4
ESCWA	P4
ICTR	P4
ICAO[1]	N/A
IMO[2]	N/A
World Bank	equivalent to D2
OPCW	D1
IOM	P4

[1] Medical Chief is a consultant.

[2] Medical Chief is an advisor.

Source: Organizations' response to the Inspector's questionnaire.

34. For example, the medical chief posts at UNOG and UNON should be upgraded to that of Director, as they not only have inherent decision-making powers and are functionally independent from MSD, but are also responsible for services provided to many international organizations (headquarters) in Geneva and in Nairobi on a cost-sharing basis. The Inspector is also of the view that the medical chief posts in the regional commissions (ESCAP, ESCWA and ECLAC) should be reclassified to a senior managerial level, and the posts that are currently financed through extra-budgetary funds, should be converted to regular budget posts, pending reclassification.

B. Staff members' medical records

35. Given the emphasis today on staff mobility and increased field presence within the United Nations system, as well as from an administrative point of view, staff members' medical records should be easily accessible and transferable between duty stations. Apart from the ready availability offered, storage of medical records in electronic format would also meet current business-continuity and disaster-recovery requirements.[16] Table 3 below indicates the number of organizations/entities that have implemented this practice.

[16] See A/RES/63/269, 7 May 2009.

Table 3
Availability of staff members' medical records in electronic format
(as of June 2010)

	Organizations/entities	TOTAL
Yes	ECLAC, FAO, UNHQ, UNOG, WFP, WHO World Bank	7
No	ECA, ESCAP, ESCWA, IAEA, ICAO, ICTR, ILO, IMO, IOM, OPCW, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNON, UNRWA, UNWTO, UPU	16

Source: Organizations' response to the Inspector's questionnaire.

36. The Inspector notes that organizations/entities have adopted different programs for electronic filing of medical records, including EarthMed at United Nations headquarters, CHIMED/Préventiel at WHO, and Jasmine Web at UNOG. While it would seem optimal to adopt one program across the board, an organization's choice of electronic records platform should be respected. However, such platforms should, to the extent possible, enable system-wide compatibility. They should also be able to interface with Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems, while ensuring the protection of confidential medical information.

37. The implementation of the recommendation below would facilitate the dissemination of best practices.


Recommendation 3

Executive heads of United Nations system organizations should implement systems enabling the electronic capture/archiving of staff members' medical records, if they are not already in place.

C. Financing of medical services

38. The Inspector notes from the responses to his questionnaire that, in general, resources at headquarters duty stations are sufficient for providing adequate medical services. All the organizations/entities have either maintained or increased their budgetary resources (regular, extra-budgetary or insurance participation) for that purpose. Figure 4 below lists some organizations/entities and the resources allocated for medical services.

Figure 4
Medical service budget at selected organizations/entities (headquarters) 2008-2009



	ECA	ESCWA	FAO	IAEA	ICAO	UNHCR	UNIDO	UNOG	WFP
2008	1462	253	1463	1807	100	1971	253	1688	294
2009	1798	330	1463	1819	105	1966	259	1681	302

Source: Organizations' reponse to the Inspector's questionnaire.

39. Nevertheless, some organizations/entities (such as ECA, ECLAC, ESCAP, IAEA, ILO, MSD, UNICEF, UNHCR, WFP and WHO) stated in their responses to the Inspector's questionnaire that there were insufficient resources to, for example:

- Hire additional medical service staff, including staff counsellors, to improve service delivery;
- Deliver training to medical service personnel;
- Support health promotion programmes at headquarters and field locations;
- Introduce a database and perform statistical analysis of work being done;
- Respond to emergency situations in the context of a national pandemic;
- Establish a satellite clinic in the Somali region;
- Provide mobile clinics in other regions (from Addis Ababa).

40. The quantum of financing for medical services provided by dispensaries could not be included as UNDP did not respond to the Inspector's questionnaire, and MSD does not have access to such information. Nevertheless, as each dispensary is financed on a cost-sharing basis, there is collective responsibility on all the organizations whose staff use the facilities. The prevalent use of United Nations volunteers (see figures 6 and 7) is perhaps indicative of the desire to minimize costs related to medical/OSH service provision.

D. Medical services in the field

41. United Nations staff are increasingly deployed to field duty stations, including to many areas with sub-optimal medical and health-care infrastructure. These deployments come with an increased risk to health and safety, as evidenced by recent attacks on United Nations premises (in Baghdad, Algiers and Afghanistan), and exposure to natural disasters (such as Haiti).[17]

42. At its annual meeting in Geneva in 2010, UNMDWG specifically expressed their concerns to the Inspector about the inadequacy of medical services in the field, compared to the overall adequacy of services at headquarters: "It is a fact that Headquarters staff benefit from access to world-class local medical services, while field staff are often at risk, in an environment where health-care infrastructure, including that of the United Nations, is inadequate."[18] Similar views were expressed in response to the Inspector's questionnaire by JIU participating organizations/entities and staff associations, as well as in meetings with concerned stakeholders.

43. Excluding facilities of troop-contributing countries in peacekeeping missions, the United Nations currently operates 121 health-care facilities in field locations (including dispensaries and civilian clinics in peacekeeping operations). Some 166 doctors, 197 nurses, and a similar number of support staff, are currently employed by the United Nations to work in these field facilities.[19] A dispensary is expected to provide primary clinical care and occupational health services (see annex II for a list of services) to a sufficient number (at least 200) of internationally and nationally recruited personnel of the United Nations system, and their recognized dependants, where locally available medical facilities are found to be inadequate.[20] However, if the health conditions in a country constitute an emergency, the United Nations Medical Director can, after consultation with the other Medical Directors in the United Nations system, recommend the establishment of a dispensary.[21] This recommendation is submitted to the relevant Resident Coordinator/Resident Representative who then forwards the proposal to the United Nations agencies concerned to obtain their agreement.

44. While MSD provides support to these facilities, by way of technical oversight of the medical staff, their daily administration/management is usually under the responsibility of the Country Teams, and individual overall accountability falls under either the Resident Coordinator or Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Hence, as a matter of urgency, the management and accountability framework for supporting United Nations clinics and dispensaries in the field should be clarified and promulgated in a defined Terms of Reference (TOR), taking into account the inter-agency common services that they are required to deliver. The Inspector was informed that, to date, such clinics are established/managed according to a draft UNDP TOR.[22] Challenges faced in resourcing United Nations field medical facilities, particularly United Nations dispensaries, should be addressed with dispatch, considering the services that they are expected to deliver in difficult, and often isolated, circumstances. These conditions should be taken into account when finalizing the above-mentioned TOR.

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[17] A/65/305, 2 September 2010, para 140.
[18] Consolidated response to JIU presentation at UNMDWG annual meeting, October 2010.
[19] A/65/305, 2 September 2010, para 141.
[20] UN Dispensaries Draft, UNDP Office of Human Resources Bureau of Management, 2009.
[21] Ibid., para 11 (b).
[22] Refer to Guideline for Provision of Field Health Services.

45. The Department of Field Support (DFS) drew the Inspector's attention to the challenges it faces in making its medical facilities accessible to other United Nations entities in the field. DFS medical facilities are deployed based on specific budgetary guidelines and operational needs, without necessarily considering the requirements of other United Nations entities that deploy in the field with negligible medical resources. Considering the prolonged negotiation periods for the finalization of local memorandums of understanding (MOUs) for such services in the field, due in part to difficulties defining reimbursement terms and in harmonizing budget lines, headquarters offices of some of these agencies are working with DFS to develop an umbrella MOU for sharing common services in the field. DFS can easily take the lead as far as the medical component of this MOU is concerned by providing the required medical, operational and logistics support to these entities. In order to fulfil this role, DFS would require adequate resources for the entire United Nations field presence. The inherent advantages would include harmonization of the definition of medical capabilities and of resources available in the field, joint utilization of resources for efficiency and savings, as well as transferability of resources from one organization to another.

46. WHO informed the Inspector that when the management of dispensaries was decentralized to the country level (under the Resident Representative and/or Country Team) and on an inter-agency cost-sharing basis, it became unmanageable and no one was really held responsible or accountable; there were disagreements on the cost-share among various agencies. When management was centralized under UNDP at UNHQ, procurement for dispensaries was done globally by WHO. With decentralization, WHO did not regularly receive reimbursements for advance orders and this was one of the reasons why they terminated this practice.[23]

47. Similar concerns have been addressed by the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (IASMN) with regard to the limited resources in the United Nations system to manage, support and monitor field medical services. IASMN therefore supported and encouraged "the ongoing efforts of the Medical Directors Working Group to establish an infrastructure capable of ensuring adequate health care, including emergency medical services for United Nations system staff worldwide."[24] The Network further recommended that United Nations Medical Dispensaries be properly staffed and equipped to assist United Nations staff in the event of mass casualty incidents, by supplementing local response capabilities to the extent practicable.[25] UNMDWG also noted that the future strategic direction of the United Nations system included greater emphasis on field presence and staff mobility. This has critical implications for the health standards applied during the selection of staff, and the provision of supportive health-care services for staff deployed in areas with inadequate medical infrastructures.[26] The Inspector strongly supports the above-mentioned positions.

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[23] WHO's response to the Inspector's questionnaire.
[24] Report of the Inter-Agency Security Management Network (Lyon, 28-30 July 2008), CEB/2008/HLCM/13, para. 50.
[25] Ibid., para 25.
[26] CEB/2009/HLCM/32, para 9.

48. Implementation of the recommendation below would enhance the accountability of all stakeholders.


Recommendation 4

The Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme, in consultation with the United Nations Medical Services Division and UNMDWG, should finalize and adopt the Terms of Reference for the administration of United Nations dispensaries, thereby ensuring consistent and transparent management practices to meet the medical requirements of United Nations system staff concerned.

E. Field medical service providers

49. Figure 5 below shows the linkages between field medical service providers. While MSD could be considered as the nucleus and linked to all, with the exception of the CISMU/DPKO counsellors, in fact, some providers do not interact with each other. It is clear from figure 5, and further elaborated in the text, that clear accountability and reporting lines are missing, hence the difficulty in obtaining system-wide coherence on the issue at hand. For example, MSS provides the necessary logistical support for DPKO medical facilities, yet they are not called on to provide similar services to dispensaries, where synergies could be maximized; indeed, United Nations dispensaries have no centralized logistical support, and each makes its own arrangements for procurement and supplies.

Figure 5
Field medical service providers - linkages



United Nations Medical Services Division

50. MSD is tasked with managing, supporting and monitoring a globally distributed health-care service which currently crosses departmental and organizational boundaries. It ensures staff worldwide access to health services by:[27]

- Advising on and assisting with medical evacuation and repatriation requests by staff and their recognized dependants, military observers, civilian police monitors and United Nations peacekeeping troops;
- Making periodic on-site assessments of local health facilities and living conditions at field duty stations and advising staff and administration accordingly;
- Advising on and assisting in establishing new United Nations field medical facilities, when and where necessary;
- Providing technical support to all United Nations medical facilities;
- Appointing and reviewing United Nations examining physicians in all duty stations;
- Evaluating and providing technical clearance for all candidates applying for medically related United Nations posts, including United Nations volunteers, nurses and medical technicians.

51. However, MSD faces challenges in undertaking the above roles. Indeed, the Secretary-General has noted that the capacity of the United Nations to manage, support and monitor a globally distributed health-care workforce is minimal.[28] Apart from resource constraints, issues concerning lines of authority, responsibility and accountability need to be addressed. Specifically, the majority of the United Nations health-care staff (doctors, nurses and paramedical staff) that MSD "oversees" actually work for different organizations, or in different departments. For example, physicians deployed in peacekeeping missions have contracts with the Department of Field Support, and physicians working in United Nations dispensaries have contracts with UNDP. The Inspector is of the view that it is very unlikely that MSD can effectively exercise authority, responsibility, and accountability over the staff it supervises when it has little, if any, influence in employment decisions, no input into budgets and work plans of field units, and no involvement in the performance management process of the various organizations concerned.

52. While medical services in most duty stations have relatively clear internal reporting lines, authority and accountability, the Inspector recommends (in Chapter V) the establishment of a network that would group all stakeholders involved under a single structure dealing with system-wide accountability. This also implies modifications to the current MSD mandate stipulated in the bulletin on Organization of the Office of Human Resources Management (ST/SGB/2004/8), taking into account its role in the proposed network, and the emphasis to be given to the implementation of OSH policies.

[27] ST/SGB//2004/8.
[28] A/65/305, 2 September 2010, para. 141.

53. The implementation of the recommendation below would enhance the effectiveness of MSD.

Recommendation 5

The Secretary-General should amend ST/SGB/2004/8 to reflect the revised mandate and role of the United Nations Medical Services Division, ensuring effective implementation of Occupational Safety and Health policies and the United Nations global health-care system.

54. Prior to 2007, the only direct contact that MSD staff had with field physicians was limited to the six to eight budgeted assessment visits conducted by MSD per year. Considering the large number of facilities that actually fall under MSD's mandate of professional supervision, each facility could only be visited approximately once every eight years, falling far short of any reasonable managerial monitoring requirement. On noting the above-mentioned situation, the current Medical Director, who took office in 2007, instituted the practice of holding a regular annual meeting for all field physicians, one for United Nations dispensary physicians, and one for physicians from peacekeeping missions. Limited headquarters funding only covers the participation of MSD staff in these meetings; Country Teams and missions are requested to cover the participation cost of their respective physicians. The meetings are intended to provide the opportunity for direct interaction between headquarters and field medical staff, to facilitate explanation and coordination of United Nations medical policies and procedures, and to foster professional networking and communication among doctors who share similar difficulties and circumstances. In addition, the meetings are used for training and development purposes. For example, following the concerns expressed by medical directors regarding medical emergency preparedness in their report to the HLCM in February 2009,[29] MSD arranged internationally certified training in pre-hospital trauma and life support (PHTLS) at both of the field physician meetings in 2009. This was followed by a two-day tabletop simulation training during the 2010 meetings, covering communications and organizational management with regard to responding to crises and mass-casualty incidents. During the meetings planned for 2011, field physicians will be trained in how to adapt and apply planning templates for emergency preparedness at their own duty stations.

55. In order to further develop contact and communication for all United Nations health-care staff (field and headquarters), MSD should identify additional resources necessary to achieving this purpose, and submit a proposal to the Secretary-General through the appropriate channels, for onward transmission to the General Assembly for consideration.

United Nations examining physicians

56. MSD is responsible for appointing United Nations examining physicians (UNEPs), based on recommendations made by Resident Coordinators and WHO representatives, and issuing an updated list on an annual basis. The services of UNEPs are available to all United Nations system organizations; UNEPs are not given any formal contracts, and their fees for services provided are expected to be reasonable and customary.

[29] CEB/2009/HLCM/17, 18 February 2009.

57. The main functions of UNEPs include the performance of pre-employment medical examinations; periodic medical examinations; exit medical examinations (if required); assisting with medical evacuations, i.e. if a staff member or eligible dependant needs to be medically evacuated, a United Nations examining physician is required to make a recommendation to the Head of the Fund/Programme/Agency that the staff member belongs to; and assist with sick leave and other medical/occupational health issues.

58. While there are over 600 UNEPs in the field,[30] the Inspector notes that there is no systematic monitoring and evaluation of the services they provide, and the list is updated sporadically. MSD does assess UNEPs practising in the areas where they undertake missions (six to eight per year) to field locations, but this is a very small percentage of the full group. Some organizations have complained about the reliability of the list, since some UNEPs listed have either retired or are deceased. Organizations often rely on other health-care providers for the required services.

59. The implementation of the recommendation below would ensure control and compliance with the responsibilities assigned to MSD.

Recommendation 6

The United Nations Medical Services Division should develop an effective monitoring and evaluation tool for assessing the services provided by United Nations examining physicians and update the global list on an annual basis.

Department of Peacekeeping Operations

60. The purpose of United Nations medical support for peacekeeping operations is to "secure the health and well-being of members of the United Nations peacekeeping operations through planning, coordination, execution, monitoring and professional supervision of excellent medical care in the field."[31] The medical support extended to DPKO personnel must meet standards that are acceptable to all participating nations, with the aim of providing a standard of care comparable to prevailing peacetime medical care. Such support, therefore, must maintain a high state of readiness and availability, providing timely, responsive and continuous care to any patient or casualty within the medical system.[32]

61. DPKO has adopted a four-level medical support structure with the classification level of a unit determined by its treatment capability and capacity (see annex III for a description). The allocation of medical resources is intrinsically linked to the peacekeeping mandate, type of peacekeeping operation, existing medical infrastructure, geographical factors, and assessed medical threats. Prior to the establishment of a peacekeeping mission, a technical survey is conducted in the potential mission area in order to determine the main medical threats, as well as the medical facilities/resources required to support peacekeepers and international staff in such an operation.

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[30] Source: MSD's response to the Inspector's questionnaire.
[31] DPKO/OPS/MSU, Medical Support Manual for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2nd edition), 1999, para. 1.01.
[32] Ibid., paras. 1.02 C and D.

Peacekeeping mandate: Official United Nations policy is that there is no obligation to provide or take responsibility for medical services to the local population, though this is sometimes rendered according to the dictates of international humanitarian law, and the ethical code of the medical profession.[33]

Type of peacekeeping operation: While missions involving military observers/civilian police often do not require the deployment of a medical unit, those that are of a high-risk nature, such as peace enforcement and demining do.[34]

Existing medical and civil infrastructure: Where local hospitals and clinics within the mission area do not meet acceptable United Nations standards, or where these are not readily accessible, there is a requirement to deploy a higher level of medical support within the mission, regardless of its troop strength or deployment.[35]

Geographical factors: Terrain, accessibility by land and air, physical distance, climate and other geographical factors influence the level of medical support required and deployment within the mission area. Where there are good land communications and/or adequate air evacuation assets, local medical facilities and those in a nearby country may be utilized instead of deploying United Nations medical units. Where access is poor, medical units of varying sizes and capabilities may be deployed.[36]

Medical threat assessment: Deployed medical units should meet the daily health care needs of United Nations personnel in the field. As such, apart from treating minor ailments (primary health care) and endemic infectious diseases, they may be required to manage severe trauma and mass casualty situations. The latter may arise as a result of direct acts of hostility and where land mines are involved, particularly if civilians are treated under a humanitarian mandate. Thus deployments of field surgical units, radiology facilities, laboratories and blood banks may be warranted. It is also important to have dental facilities.

Medical services support – Department of Field Support

62. The Medical Support Section (MSS), Specialist Support Section (SSS) under the Logistics Support Division (LSD) of the Department of Field Support (DFS) is the executive arm of the United Nations for the planning, coordinating and monitoring of medical logistics support to field missions. It provides technical advice on all health-related issues to DFS/DPKO where it is integrated within their logistics systems; MSS also operates in close collaboration with MSD. Its core functions can be grouped into six areas: advisory; coordination; medical support planning for field missions; medical logistics; procurement; and training (see annex IV for a breakdown of activities).

63. DPKO issued the first edition of the Medical Support Manual for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in 1995, with a revised edition in 1999, to provide a comprehensive reference document for planning, coordinating and executing medical support, as well as serve as a tool for training peacekeepers and medical personnel on the medical aspects of

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[33] Ibid., para. 5.03 F.
[34] Ibid., para. 4.02 B.
[35] Ibid., para. 4.02 C.
[36] Ibid., para. 4.02 D.

United Nations peacekeeping operations.[37] The current edition is being revised and will incorporate lessons learned from recent peacekeeping operations, and focus on improvement of the quality of medical services provided to peacekeepers, and on achieving greater efficiency in medical evacuation, within and out of a mission area.[38]

Critical Incident Stress Management Unit

64. The United Nations Department of Safety and Security, Critical Incident Stress Management Unit (UNDSS CISMU) was established as a distinct unit within UNDSS in 2000 further to a General Assembly mandate which expressly sought to address the needs of the increasing number of United Nations staff exposed to traumatic events while in service to the organization.[39] From a historical perspective, with the creation of the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECCORD) in 1988, the counselling role emerged as security officers began to provide such services to staff working in hazardous environments and facing security threats and psychosocial risks. It soon became evident that there was a need to secure the services of professional counsellors to look after staff affected by critical incidents. In this respect, the deployment of counsellors enhanced security operations, and in May 1994, the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) concluded that "in view of the link between security incidents and critical-incident stress, the United Nations Security Coordinator should serve as the focal point for developing strategy to manage stress… and there should be a two-tiered strategy for stress-management: preventive stress management and critical-incident stress management."[40]

65. Based on the mandate given, CISMU has two key roles: strategic and operational. Regarding the former, it provides strategic guidance, design approaches and educational tools on critical incident stress prevention management to senior/line managers, organizations and security management teams in both headquarters and the field. With regard to the latter, it monitors and responds to critical incidents system-wide and provides capacity building for staff on preventive stress management including preparedness to respond to psychosocial emergencies.

66. In addition to chairing the recruitment panels of the DPKO/DFS/DPA field staff counsellors, CISMU is responsible for their technical supervision and the system-wide coordination of their psychosocial and counselling activities. To this end, the Inspector notes the possible overlapping of mandates as MSD also has the responsibility to "provide psychological assistance in the context of mission assignments, substance abuse and emergency preparedness."[41] While CISMU and DPKO counsellors provide services for critical incidents in the field, there will be circumstances where they will be required to perform other counselling services. In fact, the issue has been raised in IASMN as to whether CISMU should remain in UNDSS or be moved to MSD or elsewhere within the Department of Management.[42] The Inspector is of the view that the proposed establishment of the United Nations Network on Occupational Safety and Health (UNNOSH), discussed in Chapter V, of which CISMU should be a member, would facilitate inter-departmental coordination in this area.


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[37] Ibid., para. 1.05.
[38] A/64/643, para 42.
[39] A/RES/56/255.
[40] A/C.5/49/56, 16 February 1995, para. 3.
[41] ST/SGB/2004/8, para. 7.1.
[42] Minutes of IASMN Meeting, Nairobi, 1-5 February 2010, para. 72.

United Nations field medical services staff

67. The Inspector would like to draw attention to the disparities in field staff grading. To this end, figures 6 and 7 below show the staffing and post levels of medical staff serving in peacekeeping missions and country offices. As is the case for medical directors at headquarters, a similar harmonization for medical staff is required. This is of particular relevance to field medical staff, who are often isolated from collegial support and specialist referral networks, and whose decisions can have life or death consequences. Dispensary and civilian clinical physicians have expressed dissatisfaction with the post-level discrepancies between duty stations of posts with similar levels of responsibility, as well as with the overall lack of recognition of the high level of responsibility required.[43] In addition, there is no system of organized career progression, and marked job insecurity exists.[44] OIOS also expressed similar concerns during their meeting with the Inspector; they felt that some dispensary doctors were given responsibilities that were not commensurate with their post levels.

Figure 6
Health-care staff post levels at United Nations Peacekeeping Missions
(as of September 2010)




Source: MSD.

[43] UNMDWG, Statement on Field Health Care (Washington DC, March 2008), Attachment 1, CEB/2009/HLCM/17, 18 February 2009.

[44] Ibid.

Figure 7
Physician post levels at United Nations dispensaries
(as of June 2010)



[1] As contracts are given by Resident Coordinator, the exact post level is not known by the Chief Medical Doctor.

68. The majority of the medical service posts in the field are held by United Nations volunteers. These staff are professionally competent and motivated, and perform basically similar functions at different locations, all under different contractual arrangements and, in some cases, with precarious durations and conditions. For credibility purposes, and to ensure the stability and range of essential services, the contractual status of all medical staff must be reviewed to ensure fairness and equality across the entire system.

F. Deep field

69. UNHCR and WFP pointed out to the Inspector, during his mission to Liberia, that while medical facilities are normally available at most duty stations, the same cannot be said for all. Some locations are remote and medical services are limited. For these "deep field"[45] areas where access to such services is difficult, top priority should be given by the organizations to ensuring that basic and emergency medical services are available to, or within easy/reasonable access by, staff based there.

[45] Expression originally used by UNHCR, and which has now obtained widespread acceptance/usage within the United Nations system.

70. UNMDWG has been requested to provide a set of Medical Minimum Operating Standards which should be adapted for inclusion in the Minimum Operating Safety and Security Standards (MOSS).[46] Their inclusion into MOSS and subsequent implementation will result in additional costs for those organizations with staff in "deep field" areas. The Inspector notes that such costs are not only unavoidable but necessary.

G. Case study - Liberia

71. Current JIU budget restrictions prevented the Inspector from visiting an adequate sample of field duty stations. To compensate, however, the Inspector sought the views of staff associations, in particular those with a field presence. He wishes to thank, in particular, the headquarters staff associations of FAO, WFP and UNICEF for obtaining feedback from their respective field counterparts. The main view, shared by all, was that headquarters staff were privileged, in that most of the services available to them were not available to the field staff. The Inspector also obtained information on medical facilities in selected field duty stations, based on confidential evaluation reports prepared by WHO and MSD, for which gratitude is expressed.

72. The following paragraphs contain the Inspector's impressions of his site visit to the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and highlight the challenges it faces, which are perhaps similar in other peacekeeping missions.

73. Local hospitals and medical facilities in Liberia are poorly equipped and are incapable of providing many required services. Medical emergency services are limited; blood supply is unreliable and unsafe for transfusion; medicines are scarce, often beyond expiration dates, and generally unavailable in most areas.

74. United Nations personnel rely on services provided by UNMIL resources. Due to a lack of advanced medical diagnostic facilities, UNMIL still evacuates patients to Accra (Ghana) for routine investigations. Poor environmental hygiene and the lack of access to safe water and sanitation facilities are the most serious risk factors for infectious diseases. Peacekeepers and United Nations staff are affected by food and water-borne diseases. Malaria is one of the major health risks encountered by personnel there.

75. The United Nations dispensary services all United Nations staff members and their dependents. Attendance increased from 1,963 in 2008 to 3,292 in 2009, which resulted in considerable depletion of consumables (drugs, supplies, vaccines), and the dispensary has run out of many essential drugs that must be replenished urgently.

76. The following operational challenges were mentioned by the UNMIL medical service:

- Due to insufficient staffing of the medical section, United Nations Level 1 clinics in some regions are operating with a single doctor or a nurse;
- Unavailability of competent medical suppliers locally to support the huge number of UNMIL medical facilities in case of urgent need;
- Unavailability of contracted (global) air medical evacuation facilities to transport critical patients to a Level 4 hospital;

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
[46] CEB/2009/HLCM/17, 18 February 2009, para. 3.

- Provision of medical support in some sectors in Liberia depends on medical support from troop contributing countries (TCCs). However, the specific TCC medical facilities in the region do not take this into consideration when sourcing drugs and other medical supplies;
- There are no training facilities for continuous medical education in the country for medical professionals; programmes to ensure ongoing medical skills maintenance and development should be designed and implemented;
- Certification of medical staff should be reviewed by the United Nations. As medical professionals are recruited worldwide, having doctors and nurses practicing in a uniform manner is at times difficult.

IV. CURRENT SYSTEM-WIDE MEDICAL SERVICE COORDINATION/COOPERATION

This chapter describes the various system-wide/inter-agency bodies that coordinate/cooperate on Medical/OSH services. Figure 8 below indicates the absence of a system-wide "umbrella" coordinating body.

Figure 8
System-wide and inter-agency medical/OSH bodies



A. United Nations Medical Directors Working Group (UNMDWG)

77. In existence since 1996, UNMDWG was formally established and recognized by HLCM in March 2005.[47] It adopted a statement of purpose which established its mandate in broad terms. The working group is composed of, but not limited to, the medical directors of the United Nations and the specialized agencies, and includes the medical directors of other inter-governmental development agencies.[48]

78. Its objectives are to optimize the health and well-being of the staff of the United Nations, specialized agencies and inter-governmental organizations through collaboration and coordination of their medical services.[49]

79. The group, which meets once a year and is chaired traditionally by the United Nations Medical Director, promotes and shares medical, technical and professional knowledge and resources in the area of occupational health; promotes best practices and procedures of the medical services; initiates and harmonizes proactive occupational health policies throughout the United Nations common system; and presents recommendations and expert advice to member organization administrations, and appropriate bodies of the common system.[50]

80. There are no specific costs/commitments required for group membership; members are expected to cover their own travel costs to attend meetings. The World Bank, from inception in 1996, and FAO thereafter, have provided secretariat services on a pro bono basis. The World Bank is hosting/updating the group's website.

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[47] CEB/2005/3, 23 May 2005, para 76 (b).
[48] The UN Medical Directors Group, document submitted by FAO, CEB/2005/HLCM/R.12, 24 March 2005.
[49] Ibid., para. 5.
[50] Ibid., para. 6.

81. UNMDWG recently submitted a series of papers to HLCM aimed at drawing attention to the working group's concerns regarding emergency medical management; the capacity of the United Nations to support, monitor and manage the globally distributed workforce of the United Nations health-care staff; and the need for a safety and health policy in the United Nations system.[51] These papers have been endorsed by HLCM.[52]

82. The working group has also produced a plethora of position and policy guidance statements over the years on topics such as screening and testing of HIV/AIDS; continuing professional development of medical staff; guidance for upgrade of travel class for medical reasons; medical confidentiality; and employment of disabled persons. In 2002-2003, the working group coordinated an inter-agency project to facilitate health education, prevention and care for HIV/AIDS for United Nations staff and their families; the final outcome of the project contributed to the creation of UN Cares.[53]

B. United Nations Staff/Stress Counsellors Special Interest Group (UNSSCG)

83. The group is comprised of mental health professionals and social workers employed as staff/stress counsellors in the United Nations system and related organizations.[54] Its mission is "to promote the psychological and social well-being and welfare of the staff and the organizations."[55]

84. The group's first meeting was organized by WFP in 2000, when they invited counterparts from other organizations to join and share their work experiences and visions about the future direction of staff counselling in the United Nations system. CEB formally recognized the group as part of the Human Resources Network (HRN) at the HRN meeting in February 2010.[56]

85. Like UNMDWG, there are no costs/commitments for group membership. Members are expected to cover their own costs to attend annual meetings and participate in working group meetings. The Inspector encourages organizations to support the participation of their staff counsellors in these meetings, thereby ensuring adequate system-wide participation and fulfilling the group's mandate as endorsed by the HRN.

86. The Inspector welcomes the formal training sessions that the group organizes for its members to coincide with their annual meetings. Identification and communication of professional and technical standards, and providing opportunities for relevant continuing education, should continue to be one of the cornerstone activities of the group. The group's proposal on Confidentiality Guidelines for the United Nations Staff/Stress Counsellors has been adopted by HRN[57] and the group is currently finalizing a proposal on Guidelines for Staff/Stress Counselling Services in the United Nations system.[58]

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[51] CEB/2009/HLCM/17, 18 February 2009; CEB/2009/HLCM/32, 15 September 2009; CEB/2010/HLCM/11, 11 February 2010.
[52] CEB/2009/3, 23 March 2009; CEB/2009/6, 21 October 2009; CEB/2010/3, 15 March 2010.
[53] Guideline for providing access to care and treatment for HIV/AIDS to UN system employees and their families, WHO publication, 2004.
[54] United Nations Staff/Stress Counsellors' Group – Mandate, Annex 2, CEB/2010/HLCM/HR/18, 28 March 2010.
[55] UNSSCG Statement of Purpose, reviewed and finalized at the annual meeting of September 2003.
[56] Conclusions of the Meeting of the Human Resources Network, CEB/2010/HLCM/HR/18, 28 March 2010.
[57] CEB/2010/HLCM/HR/35, 27 September 2010, paras. 110 and 111.
[58] UNSSCG's response to the Inspector's questionnaire, July 2010.

C. Critical Incident Stress Working Group (CISWG)

87. UNDSS, and its predecessor, the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD), were mandated by the General Assembly to "ensure that all United Nations staff members receive adequate security training, including physical and psychological training prior to their deployment in the field and … through the implementation of a comprehensive security and stress and trauma management training, support and assistance programme for United Nations staff throughout the system, before, during and after missions."[59] Thus, in order to ensure a coordinated and coherent response to critical incident stress management, IASMN endorsed the establishment of CISWG in April 2005, as the governing and coordinating body to formulate policy and standards for submission to IASMN for decision.

88. CISWG members, nominated by their respective security focal points, develop and promote policies to enhance the provision of critical incident stress prevention and management in order to improve the psychosocial well-being of staff in the United Nations system, and improve coordination between UNDSS staff/stress counsellors and security through IASMN.

89. To date, CISWG has produced a document on standard operating procedures and a strategic framework on critical incident stress, as well as a paper on critical incident stress management, and guidelines on communication in crisis and non-crisis settings.

D. UN Cares

90. Established as an outcome of a coordinated UNMDWG/WHO project,[60] UN Cares is the system-wide workplace programme on HIV that provides United Nations personnel and their families with access to information, learning opportunities, preventive commodities, and post-exposure prophylaxis (treatment taken immediately after exposure to HIV in an effort to prevent infection) as established by the *UN Cares 10 Minimum Standards.* The Minimum Standards serve as a model for the United Nations reform process by "delivering as one" an HIV workplace programme that builds on existing workplace efforts of various United Nations agencies, while eliminating duplication of effort.[61]

91. In operation since 2008 and funded by 21 international organizations, UN Cares estimates that by 2013, participating organizations could accumulate combined savings of close to USD 36 million.[62] This would be in the form of a reduction in costs related to "funerary benefits, death benefits, and recruitment and training for new workers required to replace those who are unable to work with AIDS."[63]

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[59] A/RES/57/155, 3 March 2003, para 21.
[60] See footnote 53 above.
[61] Living in a world with HIV: Information for UN system personnel and their families, UNAIDS, second revised reprint 2009. See also www.uncares.org.
[62] UN Cares: The Programme on HIV in the UN System Workplace, Current Status 2010-2011 and Strategy Beyond 2011, CEB/2010/HLCM/HR/29, 28 June 2010.
[63] The Financial Impact of HIV and AIDS on the UN Workplace, available at www.uncares.org.

92. The Inspector notes that the current UN Cares programme budget (approved by HLCM) is funded on a 50 per cent basis to the tune of only USD 2.6 million.[64] He noted that the United Nations Secretariat had not yet paid its contribution of USD 350,000 (although the funds had been requested) for the 2010/2011 budget.[65] The Secretary-General has made UN Cares a priority, and has stated his determination to make the United Nations a model of how the workplace should respond to HIV.

93. While the success of UN Cares is dependent on the leadership and action of all participating members, the Inspector noted that contribution by all would permit the agreed external evaluation of the programme to be carried out in 2011.[66]

E. UN Plus

94. On the recommendation of the UN Cares Task Force, UN Plus was established in 2005 as part of the United Nations Reform in action with the mission statement, "Uniting for Solidarity, equality and acceptance for people living with HIV within the United Nations system through awareness raising, policy change and advocacy."[67]

95. In order to achieve its stated objectives of (i) creating a more enabling environment for all HIV-positive staff members, irrespective of the level of disclosure of their HIV status; (ii) creating an organized and effective voice for people living with HIV within the United Nations system that challenges stigma and discrimination; and (iii) contributing to the development and/or improvement of existing policies on HIV among United Nations agencies, over 30 UN Plus members from 11 organizations met in 2006 to address the challenges faced in four key areas: confidentiality; mobility and travel; health insurance; and stigma and discrimination.

96. The position papers prepared and published in 2007 address the realities and needs of United Nations staff members and their immediate families affected by HIV and AIDS, as well as provide guidance for policy makers entrusted with implementing/modifying the 1991 United Nations Personnel Policy on HIV/AIDS to meet the requirements of their respective organizations.

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[64] UN Cares: The Programme on HIV in the UN System Workplace, Current Status 2010-2011 and Strategy Beyond 2011, CEB/2010/HLCM/HR/29, 28 June 2010.
[65] Ibid., p. 5.
[66] UN Cares: The Programme on HIV in the UN System Workplace, Current Status 2010-2011 and Strategy Beyond 2011, CEB/2010/HLCM/HR/29, 28 June 2010, p. 5.
[67] UN Plus homepage at www.unplus.org.

V. TOWARDS A SYSTEM-WIDE MEDICAL SERVICE/ OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH COORDINATION AND COOPERATION MECHANISM

97. The adoption of OSH policies will require the centralization of distinct OSH services under one umbrella, not only at the organizational level, but also at the system-wide level, so as ensure effective coordination and implementation. This is particularly the case for system-wide implementation, as current practice is hampered not only by the absence of a system-wide mechanism, but also by the fact that the fragmentation (in lines of authority) of medical/OSH services provided by United Nations system organizations is not conducive to service level optimization.

98. Using the following example as an illustration, the Inspector reiterates the need for a system-wide body to coordinate and assume responsibility for a system-wide medical response.

99. The recent H1N1 influenza pandemic provided an important opportunity for the United Nations Medical Services to experience and assess the complex processes needed for a centralized system-wide procurement exercise for common medical supplies within the United Nations system.

100. In September 2009, the difficulties encountered by United Nations staff in accessing the H1N1 vaccine was discussed by the High-Level Steering Committee on Influenza at a meeting chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General. At the time, the United Nations found itself in a uniquely unfavourable situation, because of the reduced yield by the candidate H1N1-vaccine virus in eggs (resulting in massive underproduction of vaccines), the already existing shortage of global vaccine manufacturing capacity, and huge bulk purchases made in advance by governments (accounting for all available and immediately prospective vaccine-production quotas). **Only governmental or linked organizations were able to purchase the vaccines at the time.**[68] The Steering Committee on Influenza therefore decided that a way forward should be found to ensure that United Nations staff and their dependents, particularly those in remote locations, had equitable access to the H1N1 vaccine.

101. From that first meeting of the Steering Committee on Influenza, it was another three months before an agreed approach and way forward could be decided and formally endorsed. During that period, an inter-agency task force considered issues such as legal liability, priority groups to access the vaccine, and mechanisms for central procurement, distribution and administration of the vaccine. Following endorsement of a plan in December 2009, another three months were needed to negotiate and finalize a Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations Secretariat and UNICEF, which had agreed to be the lead agency for procurement and worldwide distribution of the vaccine. The MOU was signed on 9 April 2010, but further delays occurred as DPKO required another three months for redeployment of associated funds from their missions back to UNHQ, and more time to transfer those funds from UNHQ to UNICEF. In fact, up to November 2010, more than a year after the pandemic outbreak, efforts were still underway to acquire vaccine stocks and ship them to staff in some remote DPKO locations.

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[68] Noni Macdonald, “H1N1 influenza vaccine: Global access for a global problem”. Editorial, Canadian Medical Association Journal, 181 (3-4), August 4, 2009, available at http://www.cmaj.ca/cgi/reprint/181/3-4/123; and based on MSD’s exploratory discussions with pharmaceutical companies, Novartis and Sanofi-Aventis.

102. In the Inspector's view, the above scenario constitutes an unacceptable delay, and there is clearly a strong need to improve the United Nations system's processes to prevent and avoid the recurrence of such long delays, whether the need is related to medical supplies for a flu pandemic, a natural disaster, or other medical emergency.

103. The above case highlights the need for a centralized, properly structured and funded procurement system for medical supplies, which would increase efficiencies of bulk purchasing, reduce unnecessary and duplicated administration, and minimize such delays in the future. Designated buyers at headquarters would be able to work directly with vendors to purchase medical supplies on behalf of United Nations entities, and effect immediate transfer of payment to vendors, as might be called for in a crisis. A centralized procurement system would provide a standardized, economical system for acquisition and distribution of commonly used medical supplies for use by United Nations staff globally, and a reduction in administrative costs through elimination of duplication in purchasing staff, records and procedures.

104. For security-related issues, the United Nations system established IASMN, which brings together senior managers of all partners in the United Nations security management system, including agencies, funds and programmes, to coordinate security practices and policies across the United Nations system. The Inspector is of the opinion that a similar network should be instituted for OSH-related issues, and to that effect, the Secretary-General should submit a formal request to the General Assembly for its establishment.

105. IASMN is also concerned with OSH issues. At its meeting in Nairobi in 2010, IASMN strongly supported the cross-disciplinary initiative to "develop a comprehensive and well-managed relevant occupational health and safety framework for the United Nations system, and requested UNMDWG to provide an update on its progress at their next meeting."[69] UNMDWG is aware that the draft Medical Minimum Operating Standards needs to be adapted to the concept and structure of the Minimum Operating Security Standards (MOSS).[70] Further to the above, the establishment of a coordinating body would be the enabling mechanism to achieve this goal.


106. The proposed coordinating body, the United Nations Network on Occupational Safety and Health (UNNOSH), derived from the IASMN model, would provide support to HLCM in its comprehensive review of policies and resource-related issues pertaining to the entire United Nations occupational safety and health structure, which is an important item on its agenda.

107. UNNOSH would bring together senior managers who have managerial oversight of the occupational safety and health functions within the bodies shown in Figure 9 below.

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[69] Minutes of the IASMN meeting, Nairobi, 1-5 February 2010, para. 89.
[70] CEB/2009/HLCM/17, 18 February 2009, para. 3.

Figure 9
Suggested membership of the proposed UNNOSH



UNNOSH should include all CEB member organizations, as well as those organizations which have concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations for the purposes of participating in the United Nations OSH structure. It should also include United Nations Staff Federations (observer status) and any organization or department which has a specific mandate to manage the occupational safety and health of United Nations staff, or which are directly involved in the coordination, delivery and support of United Nations activities in the field, especially during emergencies and in high-risk environments. WHO and ILO, both having recognized mandates in the OSH field, should play key supporting roles in UNNOSH.

108. UNNOSH should monitor the implementation of United Nations OSH policies, practices and procedures by all actors of the United Nations system, including the related programme budget, and report and make recommendations thereon to HLCM.

109. The implementation of the following recommendation would enhance the coordination, cooperation and accountability of stakeholders.

Recommendation 7

The General Assembly should mandate the Secretary-General to create the United Nations Network on Occupational Safety and Health, with a defined Terms of Reference, and which should be headed by the United Nations Chief Medical Director.

110. The Inspector notes that the expansion of OSH-related matters and the lack of resources will impact the effectiveness of the network, and **strongly** recommends the creation of a small UNNOSH secretariat consisting of one professional and one general service staff within MSD.

111. The Inspector is of the view that existing system-wide mechanisms, such as UNMDWG, UNSSCG and CISWG, continue with their present mandates and focus on their specific subject areas, rather than be merged under UNNOSH. Areas of overlap should therefore be discussed at UNNOSH.

112. As UNNOSH will be the first inter-agency policy-making group to address system-wide OSH, it will have to address a wide range of issues, and advise on policy and procedural guidelines as required. The list below, which is not exhaustive, illustrates the magnitude of the task ahead, as well as the potential negative impact of continuing to operate without systemic coordination and management of OSH:

- Guidance and monitoring regarding overall OSH policies, and their implementation system wide;

- Introduction of risk management principles for both occupational health and safety, and promotion of individual health and well-being;

- Guidance on ethical standards for OSH in general, and specific occupational sub-groups (e.g. doctors, nurses, counsellors, etc);

- Issuance of professional standards for OSH practitioners (entry standards for employment, continuing development standards for skills maintenance/updating, and professional certification);

- Provision of continuing professional development training to achieve skills maintenance standards;

- Guidance for adjudication of professional disputes and/or challenges regarding ethical and professional standards of care;

- Development of health-care facility standards (for facilities accessible by United Nations staff);

- Development of standards regarding OSH working environment and conditions in United Nations workplaces (e.g. ergonomics of workplace equipment, lighting, noise, etc);

- Good practice guidelines for OSH facilities, including confidentiality issues, and standardization of electronic medical and health-care record systems;

- Establishment of a decentralized management structure enabling development, support, oversight, and monitoring of a predominantly field-based OSH system;

- Formulation of recommendations regarding job descriptions, post levels, and career development for OSH staff;

- Establishment of a reliable and responsive centralized procurement process for medical and health-care supplies;

- Re-evaluation of current traditional medical procedures and services, with a view to adapting to a more modern approach of preventive OSH (e.g. regarding sick leave, medical clearance, etc);

- Evaluating and recommending outsourcing options to avoid conflicts of interest (e.g. simultaneous provision of health-care, and adjudication of insurance benefits for staff);

- Improving pre-travel and pre-deployment risk assessment procedures, and individual preparedness and resilience for hardship missions;

- Reviewing and advising on organizational management of psychosocial health issues, including substance abuse;

- Providing system-wide guidance on emergency medical preparedness and response, including for pandemics, mass casualty incidents, and other public health emergencies;

- Coordinating a system-wide approach to medical evacuation;

- Reviewing and advising on the medical aspects of organizational policies and approaches to HIV/AIDS;

- Reviewing, advising, and coordinating a system-wide approach to compensation for service-incurred injury and illness, disability benefits, and special benefits (e.g., special education grant and grants for disabled children).

ANNEXES

Annex I

Medical services and programmes provided at headquarters duty stations (as of June 2010)

	Emergency/Primary Care	Vaccination	Periodic Medical Examination	Medical Clearance	Travel Briefing	Certification Sick/Maternity Leave	Health Promotion	Medical Evacuation	First Aid Training	Ergonomics	Disability Assessment	Entry Medical Examination	HIV/AIDS Counselling	Walk-in Clinic	Screening Programmes	Psychological/Social Assistance	Stress Management	Fitness Center	Laboratory
ECA	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x		x	x		x	x		x	x
ECLAC	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x		x		
ESCAP	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x		x			
ESCWA	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x					
FAO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x
IAEA	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x			
ICAO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x				x	x	x	
ICTR	x	x	x		x	x	x		x			x		x		x	x		x
ILO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
IMO	x	x					x						x		x		x		
IOM	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x					x	x	x	
OPCW	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x				x			x	
UNESCO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	
UNHCR	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x
UNHQ	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x
UNOG	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	3x	x
UNON	x		x	x	x	x		x			x	x		x					
UNRWA			x	x								x							
WFP	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x
WHO	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x		x	x	x	x	x
World Bank	x	x		x	x	x	x	x		x			x	x	x	x	x	x	x
TOTAL	**20**	**19**	**19**	**18**	**18**	**18**	**18**	**17**	**16**	**16**	**15**	**15**	**15**	**14**	**14**	**14**	**14**	**12**	**9**

Source: Organizations' response to the Inspector's questionnaire.

Annex II
Services generally expected of on-site United Nations dispensaries

a) **Primary clinical care to United Nations system personnel**
   - (i) First aid and emergency services in response to accidents occurring in the workplace;
   - (ii) Consultation and treatment for acute medical conditions for walk-in patients;
   - (iii) Ongoing management or assistance with follow-up of chronic medical conditions diagnosed and for which treatment has already started;
   - (iv) Necessary diagnostic tests required by clinical conditions, either on-site or through locally available laboratories;
   - (v) Facilitation of staff access to local medical facilities and ensure follow-up.

b) **Occupational health services**
   - (i) Promote health of staff, ensuring medical compatibility with job requirements;
   - (ii) Provide travel medical services for staff on official travel, incorporating destination-specific health advice, immunization, prophylactic medications and travel medical kits;
   - (iii) Advise staff about all medical and health issues related to their work;
   - (iv) Assess and respond to staff concerns regarding health and ergonomic aspects of their workplace, and other matters related to work environment;
   - (v) Conduct preventive health and health-promotion programs, such as blood pressure monitoring, screening of diabetes and smoke cessation;
   - (vi) Contribute to induction and other health-related training, such as first aid training, CPR, etc.;
   - (vii) Provide continuous support and assist in fully implementing the activities and programmes related to UN HIV/AIDS personnel policy;

c) **Advisory services to management of all United Nations agencies**
   - (i) Recommend and arrange for medical evacuation to the recognized regional medical evacuation centres;
   - (ii) Provide advice on sick leave issues;
   - (iii) Provide advice on and assist with reasonable work accommodation for staff who are not able to carry out his/her regular duties full time for a specific period;
   - (iv) Provide medical advice for disability cases, special dependency, work-related illness or injury and education benefits;
   - (v) Verify appropriateness, reasonableness and customary nature of medical bills.

d) **Other services**
   - (i) Organize periodic orientation sessions with all staff on the services provided by the United Nations dispensary;
   - (ii) Create and update a one-page flyer on their mission and services, including contact information and hours of service;
   - (iii) Supply, replenish and update all medical kits for all duty stations within the country, including medical kits for United Nations official vehicles;
   - (iv) Systematically access and liaise with local medical facilities; establish a referral list and update it regularly.

Source: UN Dispensaries Draft, UNDP Office of Human Resources, Bureau of Management, 8 July 2009 update.

Annex III
Description of United Nations levels 1 to 4 medical facilities

- **Level 1 Medical support facility**

A Level 1 medical support facility is the first level of medical care which provides primary health care, and immediate lifesaving and resuscitation services. It is the first level of medical care at which a doctor or physician is available. It has the capacity to provide treatment to 20 ambulatory patients per day, a holding capacity of 5 patients for up to 2 days, and medical supplies and consumables for 60 days. The actual composition and number of Level I medical personnel may vary depending on operational requirements and agreed in the MOU. However, the basic manpower proposal (including the capability of splitting into two forward medical teams (FMT), each comprising 1 doctor and 2 to 3 paramedics) is 2 medical officers, 6 paramedics/nurses, and 3 support staff.

- **Level 1+ Medical facility**

In accordance with specific mission requirements, a Level 1 medical facility can be upgraded to Level 1+ by the addition of supplementary capabilities that enhance the medical support facilities. Services are reimbursed separately, in accordance with the Contingent Owned Equipment (COE) Manual and the MOU. Examples of additional capabilities include:

- Primary dental care
- Preventive medicine
- Basic laboratory testing
- Aero-medical evacuation team
- Surgical capability (forward surgical module) — only in exceptional situations, as required by exigencies of medical service support; additional patient holding capacity and deployment should be based only on the requirements of DPKO/DFS.

- **Level 2 Medical support facility**

A Level 2 medical support facility corresponds to the next level of medical care, and is the first level at which basic surgical expertise is available, and life support services and basic hospital and ancillary services are provided within the mission area. A Level 2 medical support facility provides all Level 1 capabilities in addition to emergency surgery, life and limb saving surgery, post-operative services, high-dependency care, intensive care resuscitation, in-patient services, as well as basic imaging services, laboratory, pharmaceutical, preventive medicine and dental services. Patient record maintenance and tracking of evacuated patients are also minimum capabilities at a Level 2 medical support facility. It has the capacity to perform 3 to 4 surgical operations per day, hospitalization for 10 to 20 sick or wounded for up to 7 days, examine up to 40 outpatients per day, 5 to 10 dental consultations per day, enough medical supplies, fluids and consumables for 60 days. The actual composition and number of Level 2 medical personnel may vary depending on the operational requirements, and agreed in the MOU. However, the basic manpower proposal is 2 surgeons (one general; one orthopaedic); 1 anaesthetist; 1 internist; 1 general physician; 1 dentist; 1 hygiene officer; 1 pharmacist; 2 head nurses; 2 intensive-care nurses; 1 operation theatre assistant; 19 nurses/paramedics; 1 radiographer; 1 laboratory technician; 1 dental assistant; 2 drivers; 8 support staff.

- **Level 2+ Medical facility**

A Level 2 facility can be enhanced to Level 2+ by augmentation with additional capabilities that enhance the medical support facilities. Services are reimbursed separately, in accordance with the COE Manual and MOU. Examples of additional capabilities include:

- Orthopaedic capability
- Gynaecology capability

- Additional internal medicine capability
- Additional diagnostic imaging capability (CT scan)

Level 2 or Level 2+ medical facilities may be provided by a troop/police contributor, a United Nations-owned medical facility, or commercially contracted.

- **Level 3 Medical support facility**

A Level 3 medical support facility corresponds to the third and highest level of medical care deployed within a mission area. A Level 3 facility has all the capabilities of a Level 1 and a Level 2 medical support facility, in addition to capabilities for multi-disciplinary surgical services, specialist services and specialist diagnostic services, increased high-dependency care capacity and extended intensive-care services, specialist outpatient services, maxillofacial surgery.

- **Level 4 Medical support facility**

A Level 4 facility is the highest level medical care facility that provides definitive medical care and specialist treatment in all fields of surgery and medicine.

Source: MSD

Annex IV
Core functions of the Medical Support Section

A. Advisory
- Advise DPKO/DFS, DPA and field missions on all medical support planning and logistics matters
- Develop medical support policies, doctrine, and guidelines

B. Coordination
- Plan and coordinate the medical logistic component of United Nations global medical support in collaboration with UNHQ departments, TCCs and United Nations agencies, for new, ongoing and liquidating missions

C. Medical support planning for field missions
- Participation in technical assessment and evaluation of field missions
- Develop medical support concept
- Develop medical support plan
- Develop and review of standard operating procedures and guidelines
- Pre-deployment medical assessment for TCCs and PCCs
- Briefing of TCCs and PCCs and medical requirements
- MOU/ Letter of Agreement (LOA) negotiations
- Implementation of medical support plan
- Assessment of medical facilities in start-up, ongoing and liquidating missions
- MSS desk officers at UNHQ provide oversight to missions in the implementation of the medical support plan

D. Medical logistics
- Missions budgeting and finance for medical support
- Develop material resource plan
- Develop material acquisition plan
- Manage strategic deployment stock
- Manage mission medical assets for start-up, ongoing and liquidating phases
- Develop material disposition plans
- Provide briefing on medical support matters to LSD director
- Provide medical support component in strategic planning exercises, i.e. DFS global field support strategy, benchmarking study, roadmap for medical data reporting from missions, service delivery module of ERP, etc.
- Review and proffer solutions to LSD director regarding medical aspects of Board of Inquiry recommendations

E. Procurement
- Develop technical specifications and statement of requirement (SOR) for medical equipment, consumables, drugs and pharmaceuticals, blood and blood products
- Develop SORs for commercial medical services
- Management of UNHQ global contract for medical services
- Oversight role in local procurement activities

F. Training
- Medical personnel in medical planning and management of medical resources
- Chief medical officers annual workshop

Source: MSS' response to the Inspector's questionnaire.

Annex V
Overview of action to be taken by participating organizations on JIU recommendations
JIU/REP/2011/1

		Intended impact	United Nations, funds and programmes												Specialized agencies and IAEA													
			United Nations*	UNCTAD	UNODC/UNOV	UNEP	UN-HABITAT	UNHCR	UNRWA	UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	WFP	(OTHERS)	ILO	FAO	UNESCO	ICAO	WHO	UPU	ITU	WMO	IMO	WIPO	UNIDO	UNWTO	IAEA
Report	**For action**		☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☐	☒	☐	☒	☒	☐	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒
	For information		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☒	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Recommendation 1		**g**	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		E		E	E		E	E	E		E	E	E	E
Recommendation 2		**g**	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		L		L	L		L	L	L		L	L	L	L
Recommendation 3		**b**	E		E	E	E	E	E						E		E	E		E			E		E	E	E
Recommendation 4		**a**	E							E																	
Recommendation 5		**e**	E																								
Recommendation 6		**d**	E																								
Recommendation 7		**c**	L																								

Legend: **L :** Recommendation for decision by legislative organ **E:** Recommendation for action by executive head
: Recommendation does not require action by this organization

Intended impact: **a:** enhanced accountability **b:** dissemination of best practices **c:** enhanced coordination/cooperation **d:** enhanced controls and compliance
e: enhanced effectiveness **f:** significant financial savings **g:** enhanced efficiency **o:** other

* Covers all entities listed in ST/SGB/2002/11 other than UNCTAD, UNODC, UNEP, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR and UNRWA

JIU/REP/2011/2

TRANSPARENCY IN THE SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT OF SENIOR MANAGERS IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT

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Joint Inspection Unit

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United Nations, Geneva 2011

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Transparency in the selection and appointment of senior managers in the United Nations Secretariat

JIU/REP/2011/2

The report was prepared pursuant to paragraph 19 of General Assembly resolution 64/259, "Towards an accountability system in the United Nations Secretariat", and will be submitted to the General Assembly at the main part of its sixty-sixth session. The objective of the study was to review the effectiveness, coherence, timeliness and transparency of the current selection and appointment processes of senior managers in the United Nations Secretariat and provide recommendations leading to enhanced transparency. For the purpose of this report, senior managers are defined as the Deputy Secretary-General, Under-Secretaries-General and Assistant Secretaries-General; the scope is limited to the United Nations Secretariat.

Main findings and conclusions

Member States are familiar with the process as outlined in the Secretary-General's report on accountability (A/64/640) and for the most part, no major concerns were expressed with the description of the process itself. The concern is with the implementation of the process, which is seen as opaque, raising many questions as to how the process actually works.

Both the Member States and the Inspectors recognize the explicit discretionary power of the Secretary-General in making senior manager appointments, but the Inspectors believe discretionary authority does not mean that the Secretary-General has carte blanche to avoid the process that he has established; discretionary authority should not be used as an excuse to avoid transparency in that process.

The challenge is to strike a balance between providing enough information to Member States so they are confident that the process is open, fair and transparent without compromising the privacy of the candidates and jeopardizing the confidentiality of the deliberative process of either the interview panels or the Secretary-General himself.

The Inspectors believe that vacancy announcements should be issued for all positions, except for special envoys and personal advisers, as soon as it is known that a vacancy will arise. Notes verbale transmitting vacancy announcements for every position should be sent to all Member States and all United Nations agencies, funds and programmes with at least one month's notice.

Frequently, Member States will nominate a candidate whose qualifications may not be suitable for a particular vacancy. The Inspectors are convinced that merit should be the primary criteria in the selection of senior managers and that Member States are responsible for putting forward fully qualified candidates for the Secretary-General to consider. A website should be set up to convey information on senior appointments to Member States and potential candidates.

The Inspectors found that interview panel members, who are the most senior officials in the Organization, spend their time on basic screening of candidates and that detailed reference checks are not performed. Basic screening to filter out candidates who do not satisfy mandatory eligibility criteria should be performed by OHRM or its equivalent. To avoid serious reputational risk to the Organization, once a short list is determined, all information provided by those candidates should be thoroughly vetted by OHRM or its equivalent, e.g., degrees, references, performance history, etc., before the interview panel forwards the list to the Secretary-General for decision.

The Secretary-General recognizes the political realities that he must reflect in the Organization, but reportedly no position is reserved for any Member State. However, annex II shows that historically no Secretary-General has been immune to political pressure in this regard. The Inspectors believe that if all vacancies are announced and announcements are sent to all Member States and the United Nations funds and programmes, the requirements of paragraph 3 (e) in resolution 46/232, whereby the General Assembly decided that as a general rule, no national of a Member State should succeed a national of that State in a senior post and that there should be no monopoly on senior posts by nationals of any State or group of States, should be satisfied.

For those positions where the United Nations General Assembly has decided that there be geographic rotation between the "North" and the "South", in the Inspectors' opinion candidacies should be sought only from the region whose turn it is to hold the position. For example, assuming that a current incumbent is from the North and a successor should be from the South, notes verbale with the vacancy announcement requesting nominations of candidates for the upcoming vacancy should be sent to the Member States from the South only, with information to the Member States from the North.

Recommendations for consideration by the General Assembly

- The General Assembly should direct the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG) to set-up and maintain on a monthly basis a dedicated website which will convey specific information on senior appointments to Member States and potential candidates as described in paragraph 88 of this report.

- The General Assembly should endorse the guidelines in paragraph 87 (a) to (l) of this report and direct the Secretary-General to follow the guidelines in selecting and appointing senior managers in tandem with the process outlined in the Secretary-General's accountability report.

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Abbreviations

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ASG	Assistant Secretary-General
AU-UN	African Union - United Nations
BINUB	United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
BINUCA	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic
BNUB	United Nations Office in Burundi
CMP	Capital Master Plan
CTED	Counter-terrorism Committee Executive Directorate
DESA	Department of Economic and Social Affairs
DFS	Department of Field Support
DGACM	Department for General Assembly and Conference Management
DM	Department of Management
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPI	Department of Public Information
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DR Congo	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DSG	Deputy Secretary-General
DSRSG	Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General
DSS	Department of Safety and Security
EOSG	Executive Office of the Secretary-General
ERC	Emergency Relief Coordinator (OCHA)
FR Germany	Federal Republic of Germany
FT	Fixed term
FYROM	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
HC	Humanitarian Coordinator
HR	Human Resources
IAAP	Interagency Advisory Panel
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
JMST	Joint African Union - United Nations Mediation Support Team
MINURCAT	United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OCSS	Office of Central Support Services
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OHRLLS	Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States
OHRM	Office of Human Resources Management
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
OPPBA	Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts
OSRSG/CAAC	Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office
PRSG	Personal Representative of the Secretary-General
RB	Regular budget
RC	Resident Coordinator
ROK	Republic of Korea
RR	Resident Representative (UNDP)
SLAS	Senior Leadership Appointments Section
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UK	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
UN Women	United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMI	United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIOSIL	United Nations Integrated Office in Sierra Leone
UNIPSIL	United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Mission in Sierra Leone
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS	United Nations Mission in the Sudan
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOG	United Nations Office in Geneva
UNOGBIS	United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau
UNOLA	United Nations Office of Legal Affairs
UNON	United Nations Office in Nairobi
UNOV	United Nations Office in Vienna
UNOWA	United Nations Office for West Africa
UNPOS	United Nations Political Office for Somalia
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency
UNSCO	Untied Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process
UNSCOL	Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
USA	United States of America
USG	Under-Secretary-General
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WAE	When actually employed
WFP	World Food Programme

I. INTRODUCTION

1. Pursuant to paragraph 19 of General Assembly resolution 64/259, "Towards an accountability system in the United Nations Secretariat", the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) included in its 2010 programme of work a review on possible measures to further enhance transparency in the selection and appointment process of senior managers.

2. The report is to be submitted to the General Assembly at the main part of its sixty-sixth session. The request comes from the conclusion of Member States that the two reports of the Secretary-General on accountability show that insufficient progress has been made enhancing transparency in the recruitment process.[1]

3. Selection and appointment of senior managers has been an issue since the founding of the United Nations in 1945. There has always been and will continue to be a natural tension between the Secretary-General's authority to select and appoint senior staff and the desire of Member States to ensure that their nationals be placed in such positions. This is further compounded by the need to respect as wide as possible geographical distribution and gender balance. There is a widespread perception of a "non-transparent culture" in the selection process of these appointments, which needs to be addressed.

4. The objective of the study was to review the effectiveness, coherence, timeliness and transparency of the current selection and appointment processes of senior managers in the United Nations Secretariat[2] and provide recommendations leading to enhanced transparency. Senior managers are defined as the Deputy Secretary-General, Under-Secretaries-General and Assistant Secretaries-General. Although the Secretary-General has a personal role in the selection and appointment of the Directors at the D-2 level,[3] the review excluded this group because the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) performed an audit on the subject, the scope of which included D-1 and D-2 levels of Directors.[4] The scope of this review was confined to the United Nations Secretariat, pursuant to resolution 64/259, and excluded the heads of funds and programmes and other entities which were addressed in the JIU report on the "Selection and conditions of service of Executive Heads in the United Nations System Organizations".[5]

5. In accordance with the internal standards and guidelines of the JIU and its internal working procedures, the methodology followed in preparing this report included an in-depth desk review, questionnaires, interviews, and in-depth analyses of policy documents and information gathered in this regard. A detailed questionnaire was sent to the Executive Office of the Secretary-General. On the basis of the responses received, the Inspectors conducted interviews with officials and also sought the views of a number of former officials, other

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[1] The ACABQ report (A/64/683, para. 28) on the Secretary General's report, entitled "Towards an accountability system in the United Nations Secretariat", recalled that the Secretary-General was to have developed "a framework and process for the open and transparent nomination and selection procedure for senior management positions that relates the qualifications and experience of candidates to available positions". ACABQ concluded that "insufficient progress has been made in implementing this approach".

[2] For organization of the Secretariat of the United Nations, please see ST/SGB/2002/11 and http://www.un.org/aboutun/chart_en.pdf.

[3] See Senior Review Group ST/SGB/2009/2, in force as of 1 January 2009, and Staff selection system ST/AI/2010/3, as of 21 April 2010, Section 3, Scope, paras. 3.1 and 3.2.

[4] Audit of the recruitment process for senior level positions in the Secretariat, AH2010/512/01.

[5] JIU/REP/2009/8.

international organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and of representatives of Member States. Comments from the United Nations Secretariat on the draft report have been sought and taken into account in finalizing the report (see annex III).

6. In accordance with article 11.2 of the JIU statute, this report has been finalized after consultation among the Inspectors so as to test its conclusions and recommendations against the collective wisdom of the Unit.

7. To facilitate the handling of the report and the implementation of its recommendations and the monitoring thereof, annex IV contains a table specifying those recommendations that require a decision by the General Assembly and those that can be acted upon by the Secretary-General.

8. The Inspectors wish to express their appreciation to all who assisted them in the preparation of this report, and particularly to those who participated in the interviews and so willingly shared their knowledge and expertise. However, the Inspectors must point out their regret that, overall, the day-to-day cooperation of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General (EOSG) was not good. A number of submissions in response to the team's requests were incomplete, ignored or simply were not provided despite numerous reminders.

9. The Inspectors note that it is they who determine what is and is not relevant for their work. As such, the Inspectors intended to perform a review of a sample of files to test the selection and appointment process in place. Unfortunately, access to the files was not granted under the pretext of confidentiality, despite article 6 (2) and (3) of the JIU Statute and despite confirming to the EOSG that the Inspectors were not interested in candidates' personal information or their identity. It was only after the publication of the Unit's Annual Report (A/65/34) referencing this problem and after the receipt by the EOSG of this report in draft for their comment, that the Secretariat decided that the files could be made available to the Geneva-based Inspectors in a designated room in New York. All costs associated with the second visit to New York would have to be absorbed by the JIU team; an offer too little and too late for this report. This serves the Secretary-General poorly and gives credence to the notion that there is a culture of secrecy. It reinforces Member States' calls for greater transparency in the selection and appointment process of senior managers, with which the Inspectors agree.

10. The Inspectors are, however, grateful to both Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon and former Secretary-General Kofi Annan for spending considerable time with them. It was important for this review to understand the pressures placed on the Secretary-General and how they factor into the decision-making processes.

II. ROLE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

11. According to the Charter of the United Nations, the Secretariat comprises a Secretary-General and "such staff as the Organization may require". The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council and is the chief administrative officer of the Organization.[6] In the performance of their duties, the Secretary-General and the staff are not to seek or receive instructions from any Government or from any other authority external to the Organization. They are to refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as international officials responsible only to the Organization.[7]

12. The Secretary-General enjoys independence over questions of staffing with the paramount consideration in the employment of staff being the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity.[8] The Charter further requires that "due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible".[9]

13. Staff Regulations of the United Nations and provisional Staff Rules (Staff Regulations and Rules)[10] reinforce the Charter by stating that the power of appointment of staff members rests with the Secretary-General. Staff members are subject to the authority of the Secretary-General and to assignment by him to any of the activities or offices of the United Nations.[11] The Secretary-General can make exceptions to the Rules "provided that such exception is not inconsistent with any Staff Regulation or other decision of the General Assembly and provided further that it is agreed to by the staff member directly affected and is, in the opinion of the Secretary-General, not prejudicial to the interests of any other staff member or group of staff members".[12]

14. Over the years there were many exceptions to the established rules for the recruitment, placement and promotion of staff. As a result, the General Assembly adopted resolution 51/226 which, while reiterating its full support for the Secretary-General as the chief administrative officer of the Organization, deplored the high number of exceptions to the established procedures and requested:

> "…the Secretary-General to announce all vacancies so as to give equal opportunity to all qualified staff and to encourage mobility, **it being understood that the discretionary power of the Secretary-General of appointment and promotion outside the established procedures should be limited to his Executive Office and the under-secretary-general and assistant secretary-general levels, as well as special envoys at all levels".** [13]

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[6] Charter of the United Nations, Article 97.
[7] Charter, Article 100.1.
[8] Charter, Article 101.1: "The staff shall be appointed by the Secretary-General under regulations established by the General Assembly".
[9] Charter, Article 101.3.
[10] ST/SGB/2010/6.
[11] Staff Regulation 1.2 (c).
[12] Staff Rule 12.3 (b).
[13] General Assembly resolution 51/226, section II, paragraph 5.

III. MEMBER STATES' CONCERNS

15. The selection and appointment of senior managers has been an issue of both interest and concern to Member States since the founding of the United Nations in 1945. It continues to be so to this day. It has been discussed in the context of human resources management as well as peace issues. On multiple occasions, the General Assembly has decided that reform and revitalization of the United Nations should be aimed at:[14]

> (a) Ensuring transparency in recruitment procedures and practices, including those for senior posts;
>
> (b) Ensuring that the highest standards of efficiency, competence and integrity are the paramount considerations in the recruitment and performance of international civil servants;
>
> (c) Ensuring a more effective application of the principle that the recruitment of staff should be on as wide a geographical basis as possible to improve the composition of the Secretariat and that at the senior and policy-making levels of the Secretariat, equitable representation of Member States exists, especially for those with inadequate representation at those levels, unrepresented and under-represented, in particular developing countries;
>
> (d) Ensuring that, as a general rule, no national of a Member State should succeed a national of that State in a senior post and there should be no monopoly on senior posts by nationals of any state or group of States; and,
>
> (e) Improving the representation and the status of women in the Secretariat, in particular at the higher echelons.

16. Most recently, in 2009 in its resolution 63/276, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to present measures to ensure transparency in the selection and appointment process of senior managers, including at the assistant secretary-general and under-secretary-general levels (A/64/683, para. 26). In response, the report of the Secretary-General, "Towards an accountability system in the United Nations Secretariat" (A/64/640), presented the main steps of the selection and appointment process of these senior officials.

17. ACABQ recalled that the Secretary-General was to have developed "a framework and process for the open and transparent nomination and selection procedure for senior management positions that relates the qualifications and experience of candidates to available positions". ACABQ concluded that the report of the Secretary-General "did not expand on specific measures to ensure transparency in the process and considered there had been insufficient progress in this regard (A/64/683, para. 28). As a result, the General Assembly, in paragraph 19 of its resolution 64/259 of 29 March 2010, requested the Joint Inspection Unit to submit a report on possible measures to further enhance transparency in the selection and appointment process of senior managers at the main part of its sixty-sixth session.

18. In accordance with the statutory role of the Secretary-General and the concerns expressed by Member States, the Inspectors recommend the adoption of guidelines and the establishment of a website, both of which are referred to throughout this report, and in particular in paragraphs 87 and 88 below, as a means to enhance transparency in the selection and appointment of senior managers.

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[14] For example, see General Assembly resolutions 41/206 A (1986), 46/232 (1991), 47/120 (1992), 51/226 (1996), 53/221 (1998), 55/258 (2000),

IV. LEVELS AND FUNCTIONS OF SENIOR MANAGERS

19. Distinction needs to be made between the levels and functions of senior managers. Under-Secretary-General (USG) and Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) are terms used to describe a rank, a grade, and a level of appointment. Senior managers at these levels can perform the following functions:

(a) Be a Deputy Secretary-General

(b) Be a head or a deputy head of a department

(c) Be a Special Representative of the Secretary-General, an Envoy or perform another special high-level function, as explained below

20. Another difference to note is the place where these individuals live and work. While those in the first and second group live and work in one of the headquarters locations, for individuals in the third group, the place is determined based on the function they perform. Special Representatives of the Secretary-General,[15] their Deputies and Force Commanders reside in the field mission where they work; Special Envoys, Envoys and other special high-level functionaries only visit the area they are responsible for from time to time.

A. Definitions

21. **The Inspectors discovered during this review innumerable Under-Secretary and Assistant Secretary-General positions and titles, and sought definitions from the EOSG in an effort to provide an understanding and clarification among them. Notwithstanding the definitions provided (which in the interest of brevity have been shortened), the Inspectors believe there is a clear need to rationalize and streamline the number and title of these positions**.

Deputy Secretary-General

22. The post of Deputy Secretary-General (DSG), established in 1997,[16] is an integral part of the Office of the Secretary-General. The incumbent has the grade of Under-Secretary-General, but holds the title of Deputy Secretary-General. The DSG is appointed following consultations with Member States and in accordance with Article 101 of the Charter of the United Nations. The terms of office of the DSG do not exceed that of the Secretary-General.

Head or a Deputy Head of a Department

23. Under-Secretaries-General and Assistant Secretaries-General, in addition to being titles used to distinguish a rank, are also titles used for certain, primarily Headquarters-based positions, such as Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs, or Assistant Secretary-General for Field Support.

Special Representatives, Envoys and Other Special High-Level Functions

24. Representatives of the Secretary-General serve at the level and title designated by him. Such designation can be prescribed by the Security Council or the General Assembly, and

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[15] Except for Special Representatives concerned with thematic issues; see paragraph 25.
[16] The General Assembly in its resolution 52/12 B (1997) decided to establish the post of Deputy Secretary-General. The post was formally established in resolution 52/220.

often the Secretary-General advises the Security Council of the appointment of his special representatives for Security Council-mandated peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and special political missions.[17]

25. *Special representatives of the Secretary-General* are usually designated at the Under-Secretary-General level (a) as head of a field mission, in accordance with a Security Council or General Assembly mandate (i.e. the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for UNAMI or UNAMA), (b) in pursuance of an initiative of the Secretary-General's good offices (i.e. negotiations in compliance with Security Council resolutions), and (c) as representatives of the Secretary-General on thematic issues (i.e. the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for migration).

26. *Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General* are appointed at the Assistant Secretary-General level, or lower, to assist Special Representatives with their diplomatic, political and managerial responsibilities (i.e. Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General for MINUSTAH).

27. For those missions that have a major military component, the *Force Commander* is appointed at the Assistant Secretary-General level (i.e. Force Commander for MONUSCO). These individuals are seconded from their Governments.

28. The Secretary-General also appoints at Under-Secretary or Assistant Secretary-General level:

(a) *Representatives* (i.e. Representative of the Secretary-General on the human rights for internally displaced persons);

(b) *Executive Representatives* who perform multi-hatted functions as heads of integrated offices (see paragraph 44, for example, the Executive Representative of the Secretary-General for the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL));

(c) *High Representatives* such as Special Representatives of the Secretary-General can be appointed for a thematic issue or based on a Security Council resolution for functions such as heading a dialogue, representing a group of countries, monitoring an electoral process or coordinating activities of the Organization in the civilian aspects of a peace process (High Representative of the Secretary-General for the Alliance of Civilizations);

(d) *Personal Representatives* to attend specific international conferences, meetings and/or negotiations on behalf of the Secretary-General (the Personal Representative of the Secretary-General on the Border Controversy between Guyana and Venezuela).

29. *Special Envoys of the Secretary-General* are usually assigned at the Under-Secretary-General level to undertake a special mission relating to matters of which the Security Council or the General Assembly are seized (the Special Envoy for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)[18] or Special Envoy for Haiti).

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[17] A/62/7/Add.29, para. 12 (a) to (f).

[18] Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) is a resolution by which the Security Council declared its support for free presidential elections in Lebanon. The Secretary-General appointed a Special Envoy for its implementation.

30. *Envoys of the Secretary-General* are assigned at the Assistant Secretary-General level, or lower (as at 31 December 2010 there are no examples of Envoys). [19] *Personal Envoys of the Secretary-General* are assigned at any level to undertake a mission in pursuance of an initiative of the Secretary-General (the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara).

31. *Special Advisers to the Secretary-General,* normally at the Under-Secretary-General or Assistant Secretary-General level, are assigned to advise the Secretary-General in regard to specific subject matters on an ad hoc basis (the Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide). [20]

32. *High-level Coordinators,* normally at the Under-Secretary-General level, are appointed by the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the fulfilment of a resolution (i.e. the High-level Coordinator for compliance by Iraq with its obligations regarding the repatriation or return of all Kuwaiti and third-country nationals or their remains, as well as the return of all Kuwaiti property, including archives seized by Iraq).

33. *Special Coordinator,* normally at the Under-Secretary-General level, is a Special or Personal Representative who coordinates the work of the United Nations and represents the Secretary-General on all political aspects of the United Nations work in a country (i.e. the Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process).

34. *Senior Coordinators,* usually assigned at the Assistant Secretary-General level, are the most senior public experts in a certain field who ensure that the United Nations system makes an effective and coordinated contribution to a given issue of global concern (i.e. the Senior Coordinator for Avian and Human Influenza).

35. In addition, there is a *Chief Mediator* and a *Deputy Chief Mediator* for which no definitions were provided.

B. Current selection and appointment processes

Duration and types of appointments

36. The appointment of Under-Secretaries-General and Assistant Secretaries-General is normally for a period of up to five years, subject to prolongation or renewal.[21] By practice, contracts are, however, most commonly issued on a yearly basis.

37. The general provisions for the use of "When actually employed" (WAE) contracts for special representatives, envoys and other special high-level positions are contained in ST/SGB/283 of 29 August 1996. WAE contracts are used when there is a need (a) for work of an intermittent or discontinuous nature, (b) for assignments whose duration is uncertain, or whose timing is not clearly identifiable in advance, or (c) to ensure the availability at short notice of persons with special skills required by the Organization. WAE contracts are to be used when standard appointments under Staff Rules or standard special service agreements would not be appropriate, for example, in peacekeeping operations or special assignments for the Secretary-General.

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[19] A/62/7/Add.29, paragraph 12 (a) to (f); A/47/277-S24111, para. 25 (c)
[20] Ibid.
[21] ST/SGB/2010/6, Regulation 4.5 (a), United Nations Staff Rules and Regulations.

38. Individuals working on dollar-a-year contracts have fixed-term appointments. Such contracts are used on an exceptional basis, limited to high-level appointments and are not to be used for all forms of volunteer service/gratis personnel. Dollar-a-year contracts are considered a form of volunteer service and are distinguished from gratis personnel in that there is no payment from an individual Government.

The processes

39. The Secretary-General has in most cases[22] of senior appointments the ultimate authority to make the final selection, taking into account other factors, such as geographical distribution and gender balance.

40. The Secretary-General's report on accountability[23] documents the current process for the selection and appointment of senior managers, which the Inspectors now understand to be related in the main to USGs and ASGs primarily based at headquarters or headquarters locations such as Geneva, Vienna and Nairobi:

> (a) Upcoming openings are reviewed on an ongoing basis in order to commence the required selection process in a timely manner;
>
> (b) Predetermined criteria, against which the candidates are to be reviewed, are established and reflected in the terms of reference of the interview panel and conveyed to the Member States when soliciting nominations;
>
> (c) In order to ensure a diverse pool of qualified candidates for such positions, a notification is sent to Member States through a note verbale and an advertisement is placed in suitable print media and United Nations websites, as needed, to complement the Secretary-General's own search efforts;
>
> (d) The consideration of the candidates includes review and advice by a panel of senior United Nations officials with relevant knowledge and experience drawn from the United Nations Secretariat and/or the funds and programmes, as well as outside experts as deemed necessary;
>
> (e) The most suitable final candidates, of which at least one is a woman, are submitted to the Secretary-General for final decision;
>
> (f) The Secretary-General personally interviews the finalists, as appropriate, prior to making his decision;
>
> (g) For some positions, consultations with intergovernmental bodies are required and conducted accordingly.

41. The Inspectors learned that, in addition to the process outlined in the accountability report above, there are a number of other processes in place for senior appointments. However, the Inspectors consider them a variation on theme in that they arguably could be subsumed under (a)-(g) above (e.g., field appointments and appointments related to other special high-level functions). This may explain why the Secretary-General did not point out these different processes in the accountability report.

Deputy Secretary-General

42. There is no written process in place for the selection of the Deputy Secretary-General, but the process of how the current Deputy Secretary-General was selected was described to the Inspectors as follows:

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[22] For exceptions, see paragraph 45.
[23] A/64/640, Section II/E/ paragraph 43 (a) through (g).

(a) The Secretary-General considered names of potential candidates based on his own search efforts and following his review of high-level persons, either known to him or brought to his attention for consideration. (The Secretary-General knew the current DSG from their previous roles as foreign ministers of their respective countries.);

(b) Various interactions were undertaken between the potential candidates and the Secretary-General beforehand given the sensitivity of the appointment. The incumbent had to be able to establish a relationship of trust with the Secretary-General and have the necessary calibre and expertise for such a high-level appointment;

(c) The Secretary-General appointed his Deputy following confidential consultations with Member States.

Field operations

43. The Department of Field Support (DFS), and within it, the Senior Leadership Appointments Section (SLAS), plays an essential role in the administration of the senior field leadership selection process. The core functions of SLAS are stated in ST/SGB/2010/2, paragraph 4.5. The process is essentially the same for all field appointments and can be summarized as follows, unless the selection is for one of the "multi-hatted" positions (para. 44 below):

(a) Leadership requirements are reviewed and identified on a monthly basis in order to plan and manage the selection process in a timely manner. Thus, most vacancies are known in advance, however, some vacancies do occur on short notice;

(b) Post specific terms of reference and post profile are developed and/or updated and serve as the criterion against which potential candidates are reviewed;

(c) The Secretary-General may decide to advertise the position or send a notification to Member States through a Note Verbale (e.g., Force Commander posts).[24] Caution is exercised not to advertise senior field positions too soon, so that the incumbent's relationships with his/her counterparts on the ground are not compromised;

(d) A shortlist of potentially suited candidates is generated in consultation with the EOSG, lead departments, existing mission leadership and other key stakeholders. The Senior Leadership Database (LEAD) managed by the Department of Field Support serves as an important source for the identification of potential candidates;

(e) In generating a slate of candidates, consideration is paid to organizational objectives of gender and geographical representation as well as to candidates from troop and police contributing countries (for DPKO-led missions).

[24] Force Commanders are selected by the Military Adviser's Office, DPKO, which sends notes verbale to groups of Member States. These positions are all at the D2 level or below, with four exceptions noted in the table in annex I, which are at ASG level. These individuals are seconded from their governments.

The missions' operating environment, including the United Nations' existing leadership complement on the ground, will factor into the process;

(f) Short-listed candidates are normally evaluated through formal interdepartmental interview panels, the outcome of which is presented for the Secretary-General's consideration. In accordance with the Secretary-General's directives, three candidates are presented to the Secretary-General, of which at least one must be a woman. In those cases where a woman is not presented, a written explanation highlights the circumstances;

(g) The Secretary-General takes the final decision based on the panel's recommendation and may decide to personally interview the finalist/s before taking a decision;

(h) Formal or informal consultations may be required with regional organizations or Member States.

Multi-hatted field positions

44. The Resident Coordinator (RC) position is normally combined with the Resident Representative position and may also serve as the Designated Official and/or the Humanitarian Coordinator. Normally RCs are D-1 or D-2 level, but in those countries with peacekeeping and/or political missions the RC can be at ASG level. In such cases, RCs wear several hats (i.e. the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the United Nations Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator). The RC recruitment process is described in the Guidelines for the Selection and Appointments of Resident Coordinators (30 November 2009). The positions are open to candidates from the entire United Nations system and external candidates. However, both internal and external candidates must be nominated by a United Nations entity, an individual cannot apply to such positions independently. To be eligible for RC positions candidates are required to take a competency-based assessment after which they are placed in the RC pool. Nominated candidates are short-listed by the Interagency Advisory Panel (IAAP), interviewed, and the final short-list is submitted to the Secretary-General for his decision.[25] **In the Inspectors' view, all Resident Coordinator pool members, given the extensive qualification process, should be able to apply independently for RC positions and not be dependent on being nominated by their entity of origin**.

Special Envoys/Advisers:

(a) Departments or offices backstopping such mandates are consulted regarding the terms of reference and selection criteria for such positions;

(b) In some cases the Secretary-General relies on the substantive department concerned for the initial search, interview and identification of finalists before proceeding with the final appointment.

[25] The shortlist of candidates is submitted by IAAP to the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) Chair and the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC). The UNDG Chair, the ERC and the USG of the lead department jointly interview the short-listed candidates, with input from the concerned SRSG.

Appointments governed by specific General Assembly resolutions

45. A number of senior appointments are governed by specific General Assembly resolutions: Commissioner-General of UNRWA, High-Commissioner for Refugees, Secretary-General of UNCTAD, Executive Director of UNEP, High Commissioner for Human Rights, Under-Secretaries-General for Internal Oversight Services, UN Habitat, Safety and Security, UN Women and the Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support. Various stipulations are placed on their appointment process ranging from term limits, due regard for equitable geographical representation or rotation, requirement for consultations with Member States and General Assembly approval or election of the nominee etc[26].

[26] Refer to A/RES/302 (IV) for UNRWA, A/RES/428 (V) for UNHCR, A/RES/1995 (XIX) for UNCTAD, A/RES/2997 (XXVII) for UNEP, A/RES/48/141 for OHCHR , A/RES/48/218 B for USG/OIOS, A/RES/56/206 for USG/UN Habitat, A/RES/59/276 for USG/DSS, A/RES/64/289 for UN Women and A/RES/62/236 for ASG/PBSO.

V. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROCESS(ES)

46. The Inspectors found that Member States were familiar with the process as outlined in the Secretary-General's accountability report and that, for the most part, no major concerns were expressed with the description of the process itself. In fact, some felt it was good. It is the implementation of the process which is of major concern; it is not seen as transparent, but opaque, raising many questions as to how the process actually works. The Inspectors share these concerns. While all recognized the explicit discretionary power of the Secretary-General in making these appointments and the need to hold him accountable for his choices, they nevertheless felt there was significant room for improvement leading to more transparency. The Inspectors believe the discretionary authority does not mean that the Secretary-General has carte blanche to avoid the process he himself has established.

47. The General Assembly itself is free to put guidelines on the process because this does not affect the Secretary-General's ability to choose a candidate; the Secretary-General's discretionary authority cannot be used as an excuse to avoid transparency in the process. The process can be transparent while preserving the Secretary-General's ultimate authority to select the person for the job. The Inspectors are pleased that the Secretary-General has developed a process, as evidenced in the Accountability report (para. 40 above), which, if coupled with the guidelines in this report (para. 87) and the establishment of a dedicated website (para. 88) should ensure an open and transparent selection and recruitment process for senior managers.

48. Senior staff in the Executive Office of the Secretary-General explained that for any appointment they are guided by the requirements of General Assembly resolutions and within that context they ensure that the process is transparent vis-à-vis both the Member States and the candidates. The challenge is to strike a balance between providing enough information to Member States so that they are confident that the process is open and transparent without compromising the privacy of the candidates and interview panel members. They believe that the process in place as described in the Accountability report best keeps this balance and protects it from undue political pressure.

49. The Inspectors agree on the need for the privacy of candidates and interview panel members. This however does not mean that the process has to be so closely guarded such that Member States have no idea or understanding of the senior appointment process and its raison d'être. The following are the Inspectors' findings related to and paralleling the process steps described in the Accountability report (para. 40 above).

Timing of the review of upcoming vacancies

50. Member States are concerned that appointments are not always made on time, that there is almost no overlap between incumbents, that the actual recruitment process is sometimes too long and that positions are vacant for long periods of time. The Inspectors share these concerns. Despite the fact that OHRM provides the EOSG with a monthly list of senior appointments, including such data as expiry date of each appointment and the EOSG using this information to monitor appointments due to expire within a four-month period, the problem persists. The EOSG needs to be more vigilant in order to process the necessary extensions or to initiate succession planning so that it is timely, gaps do not exist, and to the extent possible that there is a minimum two week overlap with incumbents.

51. For field appointments, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Field Support and the Department of Political Affairs collaborate with the EOSG to identify appointments that require consideration for extension or replacement within three months

from the date of expiry. In these cases, the EOSG explained that the process cannot be started too soon because the incumbents in place could lose their working relationship with the relevant counterparts and be turned into a "lame duck" too quickly.

52. In exceptional cases, appointments have to be made urgently, such as the appointment of the SRSG in Haiti and the resulting ASG appointment in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.[27] While the Inspectors understand that there might be an occasional exception to the rule, the process more often than not should be predictable, familiar and consistent. When the Secretary-General determines it necessary to deviate from the established process, this should be stated upfront and he should inform Member States of the reason for any such deviation. Delays in the appointment imply costs to the organization, the most obvious of which is the absence of leadership. The Inspectors believe that if the guidelines in paragraph 87 (a), (b), and (j) are followed, this issue will be addressed.

Guidelines, para.87:

a. Allow two-week overlap

b. All vacancies announced

j. Deviations from the process disclosed in advance

Vacancy announcements and solicitation of nominations

Predetermined criteria

53. The Inspectors were informed that once upcoming openings are determined, the EOSG and the department concerned examine any General Assembly resolution or legislative instrument for mandate and objectives. Existing terms of reference are also examined and revised as needed. The terms of reference or profile developed are the criteria against which the qualifications of the candidates are assessed.

Vacancy announcements

54. It is clear that not all vacancies are announced or known to all Member States. At times nominations are solicited from Member States via notes verbale, sometimes vacancies are advertised online and/or in print media. However, there is not a clear, consistent and established procedure. Other times there is no vacancy announcement as is the case for SRSG positions.

Advertising

55. The EOSG explained that a position is advertised in the print media if the position is technical, and a wide pool of candidates is needed. Generally these positions are advertised in *The Economist* magazine due to its wide circulation, although at times depending on the profile of the position the EOSG would also place advertisements in *Le Monde*, *Jeune Afrique*, and/or *The Asia Star*. Some positions are advertised also on iSeek for Member States and on the Internet.

Notes verbale

56. Member States are concerned that they do not receive notes verbale for each vacancy. The EOSG explained that, when the current Secretary-General took office, he used his

[27] Mr. Edmund Mullet, ASG/DPKO, took on the function of SRSG/MINUSTAH from 14 January 2010 following the 12 January 2010 earthquake and was officially appointed SRSG/MINUSTAH on 31 March 2010. Subsequently, Mr. Atul Khare was appointed ASG/DPKO.

discretionary power considerably in forming his cabinet, and will plan to do so again if re-elected. They noted, however, that Member States have been notified of all subsequent senior management vacancies through notes verbale with the exception of USG/DGACM and USG/OCHA vacancies. Calls for nominations are sent to all 192 Member States, primarily to complement the Secretary-General's own search efforts and to help compile a broader, more geographically-balanced or gender-balanced list of candidates. Such correspondence describes the main elements of the position and the profile of the candidates the Secretary-General is seeking to identify. Member States traditionally provide a curriculum vitae or biography of their nominee(s).

57. The above explanation makes it clear that when the EOSG talks about transparency in selection and recruitment of senior managers, it is talking about headquarters-based positions only. **The Inspectors found that a whole group of vacancies for senior field-based positions is not advertised and there are no vacancy announcements or notes verbale sent to Member States.**[28] There is, however, the LEAD database and outreach to Member States by SLAS/DFS to identify the individuals who match the requirements of the position. The names are then provided to the USGs for DFS/DPKO/DPA and ultimately to the Secretary-General.

58. The Inspectors recognize that progress has been made in the selection of senior field managers (SRSGs, DSRSGs) since the establishment of SLAS/DFS in 2006, which is essentially a service provider to lead departments in need of candidates. The effort is not only put in finding the right persons for the job, but in establishing the right leadership teams that will complement each other in the field which is critical for the effective functioning of the Mission.

Guidelines, para. 87:

b. All vacancies announced

c. Announcements are sent to all Member States and UN agencies, funds and programmes

Recommendation 1:

A website is set up to convey information on senior appointments to Member States and potential candidates

59. The Inspectors recognize that this is a complicated, political process involving Member States' interests and interests inside the organization and in the field. They also recognize that the type of people required to do these types of jobs are not found everywhere and that they need to be current in the political environment. They welcome DFS' planned improvement to the process to invite annually all Member States to send nominations for inclusion in the database.

60. However, the Inspectors see no reason why all vacancies when they occur, including field-based, should not be communicated to all Member States. In the Inspectors' view, if the guidelines in paragraph 87 (b) and (c) are followed and recommendation 1 in paragraph 90 is implemented both the Member States and the potential candidates will be informed of all upcoming vacancies.

Member States Responsibilities

61. As a general rule, Member States are requested to submit nominations for candidates within a month from when the note verbale is sent. A number of Member States felt this did not accord them sufficient time to submit a nomination given the need to communicate with their capitals. In the Inspectors' view, Member States should be vigilant in finding and

[28] Unless they are for "multi-hatted" positions, in which case, announcements are shared internally through the IAAP process, as explained in paragraph 44 in this report.

nominating suitable candidates for vacancies. They can proactively search for good candidates to nominate before formal vacancy announcements are received.

62. In this regard, the Inspectors believe that the annual call to Member States to nominate candidates for field positions, which is planned to be implemented by DFS in 2011, can be expanded by the Secretariat to include all positions that may become vacant in a year, not just field positions. For those positions which cannot be determined that far in advance, the EOSGs practice of one month official notification seems reasonable. Additionally, the Inspectors believe the Secretariat, Member States and potential candidates would benefit significantly were a dedicated website established that would include comprehensive information regarding all upcoming senior management vacancies, including field positions.

63. Frequently, Member States will nominate a candidate whose qualifications may not be suitable for a particular vacancy. The Inspectors are convinced that merit should be the primary criteria in the selection of senior managers and that Member States are responsible for putting forward fully qualified candidates for the Secretary-General to consider. Sometimes this will require casting their nets wider than otherwise may be the case and reaching out to their experts in the private sector. The Inspectors believe that if recommendation 1 in paragraph 90 is implemented, it should ensure that a larger pool of candidates is correctly informed about the requirements for each vacancy.

Recommendation 1:

A website is set up to convey information on senior appointments to Member States and potential candidates

Screening of candidates

64. The Inspectors found through their interviews that Member States do not understand how interview panels are constituted nor how or when a decision is made to have an outside expert serve on a panel. Further Member States wanted more clarity on the screening process so that they would understand how candidates are selected.

65. The Inspectors were informed that an interview panel (sometimes called a Senior Appointment Group), is put together by the Chef de Cabinet to assist the Secretary-General in the selection process. The members of the panel are selected from among senior United Nations officials at the same level or higher as the position under recruitment. The panel can comprise up to eight individuals. The identity of panel members is kept confidential to protect the panellists from undue political pressures. The Chef de Cabinet determines, based on the nature of the position, if there is a need to have an outside expert serving on the panel (for recruitment of the USG for UN Women, an outside panellist was invited). The presence of an outside expert brings another perspective and, in certain instances, useful outside expertise, that helps in focusing and in narrowing down the best candidates for the opening. For senior field appointments, the lead departments are delegated authority by the Secretary-General to convene interview panels. Following the conduct of interviews, it is the lead department which submits the final short-list for the Secretary-General's consideration.

66. Interview panels are convened for each vacancy bearing in mind relevant background, geographical and gender balance. The interview panel chooses from among the applications, a long-list of candidates to be interviewed. After the interviews, the interview panel produces a shortlist of candidates, without ranking them, and this list is forwarded to the Secretary-General for selection.

67. The Inspectors see two problems in the process: (a) the interview panel members, who are the most senior officials in the organization, spend their time on basic screening of candidates, and (b) detailed reference checks are not performed, e.g., degrees, references, performance history etc. are not verified. This is of major concern and should be corrected urgently as it can result in serious reputational risk for the organization. In the Inspectors' opinion, if the guidelines in paragraph 87 (e) and (f) are followed, the interview panel would only deal with candidates who satisfy the requisite qualifications, candidates suggested to the Secretary-General would have their references checked and the selection and overall recruitment time should be reduced.

Guidelines, para.87:

e. OHRM or its equivalent screens candidates

f. OHRM or its equivalent vets short-listed candidates before interview panel forwards the list to the Secretary-General

Shortlist of candidates

68. In the interview with the Office of the Chef de Cabinet, the Inspectors were told that the primary consideration in hiring USGs/ASGs is merit-based, followed by gender and geographic balance, which are considered to be of equal importance. The Member States want to know how large the pool of candidates for a position is and if their candidates were considered. The Inspectors believe that once Member States submit their nominations, further feedback on individual candidates should be provided only to those candidates who made the long and/or short-list, not to the Member States, as the feedback will contain candidates' personal information.

69. The Inspectors were informed that the Secretary-General insists that the interview panel should submit to him a choice of at least three candidates for any position, at least one of whom is a woman. If this is not the case, he will return the proposed list and ask for a new search. He recognizes that on occasion, it has to be accepted that a female candidate cannot be found, but there must be a valid justification and the Secretary-General must be satisfied that a proper search effort was made. The Inspectors recognize the Secretary-General as do Member States for his commitment to and success in increasing the number of women in higher echelons.

70. The Secretary-General does not have a set formula for geographical balance since most of the positions he is dealing with are not subject to geographical distribution in the true sense of the word (see annex I). He has available to him from OHRM, data on the geographical distribution of top echelon staff in the Organization and makes maximum effort to ensure that there is an equitable geographical balance. While interview panels deal exclusively with one position, the Secretary-General more often than not is considering more than one position at a time. For example, interview panel A may forward three candidates to the Secretary-General with interview panel B doing the same for another position. Each of the two interview panels, while separate and distinct from each other, may have candidates from the same country. Thus the Secretary-General's request to be provided with multiple candidates from diverse backgrounds is to ensure as best he can geographical and gender balance as well as to prevent being constrained in choice. The Inspectors were informed that the Secretary-General consults with his senior advisers, including the Deputy Secretary-General in making his final decision.

71. The Secretary-General sees it as his responsibility to ensure that the right person is selected for the job. To avoid undue pressure from Member States campaigning for their own candidate, he has decided to keep the short-list of candidates confidential. This point can be argued, but the Inspectors agree with the decision of the Secretary-General. Many individuals are interested to be considered only if their names are kept confidential. On several occasions,

good candidates were lost because of the possibility that official shortlists would be made public. These individuals are of high calibre with high-profile jobs, often political. Public humiliation from knowing that they were considered, but not selected for a position is a risk many are not willing to take. Unfortunately there are times when names are published in the media but the names are obtained from the candidates themselves or different sources, but not from the EOSG.

Guidelines, para.87:

g. Secretary-General shares interview panel's report detailing information as indicated in paragraph 88 f and g in consultations with Member States

i. Interviewees are notified of the outcome of recruitment

l. Secretary-General holds bi-annual briefings for Permanent Representatives

72. While the Inspectors agree that the deliberations of interview panels and their recommendations to the Secretary-General should be confidential, they believe the interview panels should prepare a summary report, disclosing their terms of reference, how the interview panel was constituted, the number of members on the interview panel and their grade levels, and whether there were outside experts. This information, coupled with the disclosure to Member States of the number, nationality and gender of long and short-listed candidates, would not jeopardize the confidentiality of the deliberative process of either the interview panels or the Secretary-General himself. Furthermore, the Secretary-General should biannually brief Permanent Representatives on the senior appointments made in the preceding six months and should share with them, either orally or in written form, the information from the interview panels' summary reports. The Inspectors believe, if the guidelines in paragraph 87 (g), (i), and (l) are followed, more light should be shed on the selection process, without compromising privacy.

Interviews and decision-making

73. The Inspectors were told that the Secretary-General has made known his keen desire to interview the finalists. However, by using the term "as appropriate" in the description (paragraph 40 (f)) the Secretary-General leaves open the possibility that he may not interview the finalists himself (see also paragraph 43 (g)). Due to the heavy demands on the Secretary-General's schedule, he may choose to request one of his senior advisers (the supervising USG or the Chef de Cabinet) to interview on his behalf the short-list of the three candidates for a particular position. In these situations, the Secretary-General may decide, after selection, to interact with the selected candidate prior to their reporting date.

Guideline, para.87:

h. Uniform application of the process and equal treatment of candidates

74. In the Inspectors' view, consistency has to prevail. If any of the candidates are to be interviewed by the Secretary-General or any official, then all should be interviewed, be they internal or external candidates, to ensure their equal treatment. Moreover, all interviews should be conducted by the same official whether this is the Secretary-General or his representative. It is not fair to candidates that some are interviewed while others are not. The Inspectors believe that if the guideline in paragraph 87 (h) is followed, the process should be more equitable.

Consultations

75. Consultations with Member States are required for positions for which there are legislative stipulations mandating approval by the General Assembly or the Security Council upon nomination by the Secretary-General. Such positions include the USG/UN Women,

USG/OIOS, USG/UN-Habitat, USG/UNEP, USG/UNHCR, USG/OHCHR and ASG/PBSO, positions for which there are legislative stipulations mandating consultation with intergovernmental bodies e.g. USG/UNRWA, and positions of Special Representatives of the Secretary-General. Consultations for SRSG positions involve a letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council by which he informs of his intention to appoint an SRSG. The President of the Security Council brings the letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council and conveys their "no objection" to the Secretary-General in a letter by stating that the members of the Security Council took note of the Secretary-General's intention.

76. The Inspectors found that there is a discrepancy in interpreting the term "consultation" between the Secretary-General and certain Member States with respect to senior appointments. Some Member States expressed concern that they are simply informed of the Secretary-General's decisions, whereas they interpret consultation in a broader sense as "agreement" or "consensual understanding". The EOSG explained that the idea is not to ask for agreement, but to gauge reaction to determine possible difficulties with an appointment the Secretary-General is considering.

77. The Inspectors did not find a single document where the terms consultation vs. information are defined in the United Nations except for a note from the World Food Programme and the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs (UNOLA) to the Executive Board of the WFP.[29] The note indicated that the expression "in consultation with" and "after consultation with" in the practice of the United Nations is the process by which the views of the parties consulted are sought or ascertained and that it must be distinguished from "agreement", "concurrence" or "consent".

78. The EOSG explained that there is an informal and formal process of consultations. Once the Secretary-General has interviewed the finalists and taken a decision, he informally consults with the Chairs/coordinators of the regional groups of Member States, or relevant intergovernmental body, to "test" his selection of the candidate he intends to appoint. The selection process is reportedly explained to Member States at this time, including the initial procedures, number of candidates, pre-screening criteria, interview process, and candidate selection, without disclosing the identities of the candidates. These informal exchanges are followed by formal consultations when the final choice is confirmed.

Guideline, para.87:

k. Secretary-General consults with Chairs/coordinators of regional groups a week prior to announcing the appointment

79. In practice, however, the process is inconsistent, as on occasions, consultations are held with entire regional groups, and at other times, they are held with the Chairs/coordinators only. In the Inspectors' opinion, if the guideline in paragraph 87 (k) is followed, the process should be clear, consistent, and uniform.

Political pressure and job reservations

80. Some Member States suggested that their representatives should be invited to serve on interview panels for the selection of candidates for senior management positions. Having

[29] The note is related to the appointment of the Executive Director of the WFP, who is to be appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization after consultation with the WFP Executive Board.

Member States serve on the interview panels would put even more political pressure and possible roadblocks on the process and be chaotic in terms of which Member States would serve on which panels and why. The Inspectors are of the opinion that while it is incumbent upon Member States to provide the best possible candidates, the Secretary-General, as the chief administrative officer of the Organization, is the one who must work with and trust his managers to fulfil his mandate. At the end of the day, the Secretary-General is accountable to Member States for his choice.

81. The Inspectors were told during their interviews with the EOSG that the Secretary-General recognizes the political realities that he must reflect in the Organization, but that no position is reserved for any Member State. In the event that the Secretary-General decides that a national of a certain country will be appointed, he insists that that country provide him a slate of candidates for consideration. If he is not provided with a choice, he cannot select, and therefore, he will request new nominations. The information presented in annex II, however, shows that historically, certain positions are reserved for certain Member States and that no Secretary-General has been immune to political pressure in this regard.

Guidelines, para. 87:

b. All vacancies announced

c. Announcements are sent to all Member States and UN agencies, funds and programmes

82. Using discretionary authority to broadly follow the process by arguing political realities and thereby excluding certain political appointments is tantamount to reserving jobs for Member States, which is exactly what the General Assembly has repeatedly cautioned against as stated in paragraph 15 (c) and (d) in this report. The Inspectors believe that if the guidelines in paragraph 87 (b) and (c) are followed, the requirements of paragraph 3 (e) in resolution 46/232, whereby the General Assembly decided that as a general rule, no national of a Member State should succeed a national of that State in a senior post and that there should be no monopoly on senior posts by nationals of any State or group of States, should be satisfied.

Geographical rotation

83. The issue of geographical rotation, which the Inspectors consider to be different from geographical distribution, arose frequently regarding the recent delayed appointment of the USG/OIOS, who serves for one fixed term of five years without the possibility of renewal. The Inspectors wish to make clear at the outset that no one questions the qualifications of the new USG/OIOS which are exemplary, but rather many member states were troubled that the "North" succeeded the "North" in that position.[30]

84. By General Assembly resolution 48/218 B, the appointment of the USG/OIOS is to be made with due regard to geographical rotation and in so doing the Secretary-General is to be guided by the provisions of paragraph 3 (e) of resolution 46/232. During interviews with both Member States and Secretariat officials, it was clear that rotation meant the position would rotate between the "North" and the "South" with the North and the South being defined as developed and developing countries respectively. The Inspectors were informed that although it is not written anywhere, there was and is an implicit understanding among all to this effect.

85. The appointment of the USG/OIOS from the North was not expected by Member States from the South as it was the South's turn to hold that position according to the common understanding of 48/218 B. There even seemed to have been an informal understanding that

[30] USG Lapointe, Canadian, succeeded USG Ahlenius, Swede.

the candidate would come from Africa. One of the leading finalists indeed was from Africa, the EOSG reported, but as the candidate withdrew, the Secretary-General was apparently left with a choice to start a new search all over again or appoint a candidate from the North as there were no other qualified candidates from the South.

86. The Inspectors find it inconceivable that there was a scarcity of qualified candidates from the South for this position. This was not an unexpected vacancy: everyone agrees on how the concept of geographical rotation works, there is a resolution guiding the appointment, when the vacancy was coming up was known to all five years in advance, and clearly, it was known to all that the successor should be from the South. The Inspectors believe that if the guidelines in paragraph 87 (b), (c), and (d) are followed, it should ensure that every effort is put in place to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 3 (e) in resolution 46/232 and be in accordance with the implicit understanding of the meaning of geographical rotation.

Guidelines, para.87:

b. All vacancies announced

c. Announcements are sent to all Member States and UN agencies, funds and programmes

d. Candidacies are sought from the region whose turn it is to hold the position

VI. MEASURES TO ENHANCE TRANSPARENCY: GUIDELINES AND WEBSITE

87. The selection and appointment of senior managers should comply with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, in particular Article 101, paragraph 3, and the relevant General Assembly resolutions as stated in paragraph 15 above. The Inspectors believe that implementation of the following guidelines in tandem with the process outlined in the Secretary General's accountability report (para. 40 above) coupled with the establishment of a dedicated website designed to convey specific information as per paragraph 88 below should further enhance transparency in the selection and appointment process of senior managers.

Guidelines

(a) The recruitment process should be planned to allow for a minimum of two weeks of overlap between the two incumbents;

(b) Vacancy announcements should be issued for all positions except for special envoys and personal advisers as soon as it is known that a vacancy will arise, stipulating clearly defined responsibilities and specific qualifications/experience required in un-ambiguous terms;

(c) Notes verbale, transmitting vacancy announcements for every position should be sent to all Member States and all United Nations agencies, funds and programmes with at least one month notice;

(d) For those positions where the United Nations General Assembly has decided that there be geographic rotation (as per paragraph 45 above), between the "North" and the "South", candidacies should be sought only from the region whose turn it is to hold the position. For example, assuming that a current incumbent is from the North and a successor should be from the South, notes verbale with the vacancy announcement requesting nominations of candidates for the upcoming vacancy should be sent to the Member States from the South only, with information to the Member States from the North;

(e) Basic screening to filter out candidates who do not satisfy mandatory eligibility criteria should be performed by OHRM or its equivalent. Only candidates who satisfy the obligatory requirements as stated in the vacancy announcement should be forwarded for consideration of the interview panel;

(f) Once the interview panel has decided on a short list, that list should revert to OHRM or its equivalent for a thorough vetting of the references, performance record and information provided by the candidates. Once completed, OHRM or its equivalent should return the short-list to the interview panel for forwarding to the Secretary-General for selection;

(g) At the conclusion of their work, the interview panel should prepare a summary report detailing the information as indicated in the website per paragraph 88 (f) and (g) below. This report should be shared by the Secretary-General in his consultations with Member States;

(h) There should be a uniform application of the selection and appointment process. Candidates are to be treated equally. All short-listed

candidates should be interviewed and all interviews should be performed by the same official, whether this is the Secretary-General himself or his representative;

(i) Long and short-listed candidates should be provided with feedback on their progress throughout the selection process if they so request; but in all cases interviewees should be notified of the outcome of the recruitment process. No feedback should be provided to the Member States on the candidates they nominated. Member States should be able to follow recruitment developments via periodic updates on a dedicated web-site as detailed in paragraph 88 below;

(j) If there are deviations from the selection and appointment process, the Secretary-General should fully disclose them in advance of the appointment or as soon as they need to occur;

(k) For appointments requiring consultations with Member States, at least a week prior to announcing the appointment, the Secretary-General should consult with the Chairs/coordinators of the regional groups of Member States. Consultation in this regard means that the Secretary-General informs the Chairs/coordinators of his choice and that the Chairs/coordinators are given a week to register with the Secretary-General any concerns of their regional group. It is the responsibility of the Member States to organize themselves within their regional groups to ensure that the Chairs/coordinators represent the views of the entire group;

(l) Bi-annual briefings should be held by the Secretary-General for Permanent Representatives on the selection process and appointments made in the preceding six months summarizing the information contained in the reports of interview panels as per the guideline in paragraph 87 (g) above.

Website

88. The EOSG should set-up and maintain a dedicated website, which should be updated at least monthly to convey specific information on senior appointments of USGs and ASGs to Member States and potential candidates. The website should contain information as recommended below. Information in points (c) to (h) should be available to the public, while access to information in points (a) and (b) should be restricted to the Permanent Missions:

(a) A listing of all current appointments at USG and ASG levels, other than special envoys and personal advisers, containing information similar in content and presentation to that in annex I. This will allow Member States advance planning to find the best qualified candidates;

(b) A separate listing of upcoming vacancies of USG and ASG positions, other than special envoys and personal advisers, over a two month period. This listing should be based solely on the date of expiry of each appointment regardless of the individuals' or Secretary-General's intentions to extend or discontinue their contract;

(c) The vacancy announcement for each vacancy should be published on the website as soon as it is clear that a vacancy will arise;

(d) An indication of intent to advertise in the print media as well as an indication of the need for input from civil society so as to cast the net more widely;

(e) An indication of the expected time-line for each vacancy specifying the date by which:

(i) All applications need to be received;

(ii) Candidates selected for interviews will be contacted;

(iii) Interviewed candidates will be informed of the results of the recruitment process;

(iv) Consultations are expected to be conducted and the final selection announced;

(v) The new incumbent is expected to report for duty;

(f) Disclosure of the terms of reference for interview panels established for each vacancy with an explanation of how the interview panel was constituted, how many members served on the interview panel, what were their grades, and whether other agencies/entities and/or external experts were invited to sit on the interview panel and why;

(g) Disclosure of the number of candidates who applied for each vacancy, nationalities and gender of the candidates interviewed by the interview panel (the long list) and also of the candidates on the short-list recommended by the interview panel to the Secretary-General; and,

(h) The statement announcing the final choice of candidate.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

89. Implementation of the following recommendations should result in enhanced accountability and transparency in the selection and appointment of senior managers in the United Nations Secretariat.

Recommendation 1

90. The General Assembly should direct the Executive Office of the Secretary-General to set-up and maintain on a monthly basis a dedicated website which will convey specific information on senior appointments to Member States and potential candidates as described in paragraph 88 of this report.

Recommendation 2

91. The General Assembly should endorse the guidelines in paragraph 87 (a) to (l) of this report and direct the Secretary-General to follow the guidelines in selecting and appointing senior managers in tandem with the process outlined in the Secretary-General's accountability report (A/64/640).

Annex I
Under-Secretaries-General and Assistant Secretaries-General as of 31 December 2010

No.	Department/Entity	Name	Function	Classification	Rank	Female	Male	Country of Nationality	Date Appointed	Contractual Status	Duration of Appointment[31]	Funding Source	Subject to Geographical Distribution	Position Vacant
1	Alliance of Civilizations	Jorge Sampaio	High Representative	Representative	USG		M	Portugal	1-May-07	WAE	30-Apr-11		No	
2	Border Controversy between Guyana and Venezuela	Norman Girvan	Personal Representative	Representative	USG		M	Jamaica	1-Mar-10	WAE	28-Feb-11		No	
3	Border dispute between Equatorial Guinea and Gabon	Nicolas Michel	Special Adviser and Mediator	Adviser	USG		M	Switzerland	1-Sep-08	WAE	30-Nov-10		No	
4	Compliance by Iraq with its obligations regarding Kuwait	Gennady P. Tarasov	Secretary-General's High-level Coordinator	Coordinator	USG		M	Russia	24-Apr-08	WAE	31-Dec-10		No	
5	Cyprus	Alexander Downer	Special Adviser	Adviser	USG		M	Australia	14-Jul-08	WAE	13-Jan-11		No	
6	DESA	Sha Zukang	USG for Economic and Social Affairs	Head	USG		M	China	1-Jul-07	FT	30-Jun-11	RB	Yes	
7	DFS	Susana Malcorra	USG for Field Support	Head	USG	F		Argentina	4-May-08	FT	3-May-11	RB	Yes	
8	DGACM	Shaaban Muhammad Shaaban	USG for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Management	Head	USG		M	Egypt	1-Mar-07	FT	28-Feb-11	RB	Yes	
9	DM	Angela Kane	USG for Management	Head	USG	F		Germany	1-Jun-08	FT	31-May-11	RB	Yes	
10	DPA	B. Lynn Pascoe	USG for Political Affairs	Head	USG		M	USA	1-Mar-07	FT	28-Feb-11	RB	Yes	
11	DPI	Kiyotaka Akasaka	USG for Communication and Public Information	Head	USG		M	Japan	1-Apr-07	FT	31-Mar-11	RB	Yes	
12	DPKO	Alain Le Roy	USG for Peacekeeping Operations	Head	USG		M	France	24-Aug-08	FT	23-Aug-11	RB	Yes	

[31] According to Regulation 4.5 (a), United Nations Staff Rules and Regulations, ST/SGB/2010/6, the appointment of Under-Secretaries-General and Assistant Secretaries-General is normally for a period of up to five years, subject to prolongations or renewal. Contracts are most commonly issued on a yearly basis

No.	Department/Entity	Name	Function	Classification	Rank	Female	Male	Country of Nationality	Date Appointed	Contractual Status	Duration of Appointment[31]	Funding Source	Subject to Geographical Distribution	Position Vacant
13	DSS	Gregory B. Starr	USG for Safety and Security	Head	USG		M	USA	31-May-09	FT	31-May-11	RB	Yes	
14	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific	Noeleen Heyzer	Executive Secretary	Head	USG	F		Singapore	23-Aug-07	FT	22-Aug-11	RB	Yes	
15	Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia	Rima Khalaf	Executive Secretary	Head	USG	F		Jordan	1-Oct-10	FT	30-Sep-12	RB	Yes	
16	Economic Commission for Africa	Abdoulie Janneh	Executive Secretary	Head	USG		M	Gambia	1-Nov-05	FT	31-Oct-11	RB	Yes	
17	Economic Commission for Europe	Jan Kubis	Executive Secretary	Head	USG		M	Slovakia	19-Dec-08	FT	26-Jan-11	RB	Yes	
18	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean	Alicia Barcena	Executive Secretary	Head	USG	F		Mexico	1-Jul-08	FT	30-Jun-11	RB	Yes	
19	EOSG	Asha-Rose Migiro	Deputy Secretary-General	Head	USG	F		Tanzania	1-Feb-07	FT	31-Jan-11	RB	Yes	
20	EOSG	Vijay K. Nambiar	Chef de Cabinet	Head	USG		M	India	1-Jan-07	FT	31-Dec-10	RB	Yes	
21	Greece-FYROM Talks	Matthew Nimetz	Personal Envoy	Envoy	USG		M	USA	15-Mar-07	$1/yr	14-Mar-11		No	
22	Haiti	Paul Farmer	Deputy Special Envoy	Envoy	USG		M	USA	11-Aug-09	$1/yr	10-Aug-11		No	
23	Haiti	William J. Clinton	Special Envoy	Envoy	USG		M	USA	15-Jun-09	$1/yr	14-Jun-11		No	
24	HIV/AIDS in Asia	Nafis Sadik	Special Envoy	Envoy	USG	F		Pakistan	1-Jan-01	$1/yr	31-Dec-10		No	
25	HIV/AIDS in Eastern Europe		Special Envoy	Envoy	USG								No	Vacant
26	Implementation of Security Council resolution 1559/2004	Terje Roed-Larsen	Special Envoy	Envoy	USG		M	Norway	1-Jan-05	$1/yr	31-Dec-10		No	
27	Innovative Finance for Development	Philippe Douste-Blazy	Special Adviser	Adviser	USG		M	France	1-Jun-08	$1/yr	31-May-11		No	
28	Internet Governance	Nitin Desai	Adviser of the Secretary-General	Adviser	USG		M	India	1-Jan-06	WAE	31-Dec-10		No	

No.	Department/Entity	Name	Function	Classification	Rank	Female	Male	Country of Nationality	Date Appointed	Contractual Status	Duration of Appointment[31]	Funding Source	Subject to Geographical Distribution	Position Vacant
29	Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises	John Ruggie	SRSG	Representative	USG		M	USA	28-Jul-05				No	
30	Joint African Union - United Nations Mediation Support Team (JMST)	Djibril Yipene Bassole	Chief Mediator	Mediator	USG		M	Burkina Faso	31-Jul-08	FT	31-Jan-11		No	
31	Migration	Peter Sutherland	SRSG	Representative	USG		M	Ireland	23-Jan-06	$1/yr	31-Dec-10		No	
32	Millennium Development Goals	Jeffrey Sachs	Senior Adviser	Adviser	USG		M	USA	1-Feb-02	$1/yr	31-Aug-11		No	
33	MINURCAT	Youssef Mahmoud	SRSG	Representative	USG		M	Tunisia	1-Apr-10	FT	31-Dec-10		No	
34	MINUSTAH	Edmond Mulet	SRSG	Representative	USG		M	Guatemala	1-Apr-10	FT	31-Mar-11		No	
35	MONUSCO	Roger A. Meece	SRSG	Representative	USG		M	USA	11-Jul-10	FT	10-Jul-11		No	
36	OCHA	Valerie Amos	USG for Humanitarian Affairs, Emergency Relief Coordinator	Head	USG	F		UK	6-Sep-10	FT	5-Sep-12	RB	Yes	
37	Office for Disarmament Affairs	Sergio de Queiroz Duarte	High Representative	Representative	USG		M	Brazil	11-Jul-07	FT	10-Jul-11	RB	Yes	
38	OHCHR	Navanethem Pillay	High Commissioner	Head	USG	F		South Africa	1-Sep-08	FT	31-Aug-12	RB	Yes	
39	OHRLLS	Cheick Sidi Diarra	Special Adviser on Africa and High Representative for LLS	Head	USG		M	Mali	1-Aug-07	FT	31-Jul-11	RB	Yes	
40	OIOS	Carman Louise Lapointe	USG for Oversight Services	Head	USG	F		Canada	14-Sep-10	FT	13-Sep-15	RB	Yes	
41	OLA	Patricia O'Brien	USG for Legal Affairs	Head	USG	F		Ireland	24-Aug-10	FT	23-Aug-11	RB	Yes	
42	OSRSG/CAAC	Radhika Coomaraswamy	SRSG	Representative	USG	F		Sri Lanka	15-Apr-06	FT	28-Feb-11	RB	Yes	
43	Pakistan	Rauf Engin Soysal	Special Envoy	Envoy	USG		M	Turkey	27-Sep-10	FT	27-Sep-11		No	
44	Prevention of Genocide	Francis Deng	Special Adviser to the Secretary-General	Adviser	USG		M	Sudan	1-Jan-08	FT	31-Jul-11		No	

No.	Department/Entity	Name	Function	Classification	Rank	Female	Male	Country of Nationality	Date Appointed	Contractual Status	Duration of Appointment[31]	Funding Source	Subject to Geographical Distribution	Position Vacant
45	Sexual Violence in Conflict	Margot Wallstrom	SRSG	Representative	USG	F		Sweden	1-Apr-10	FT	31-Mar-12		No	
46	Special Adviser on Human Security	Yukio Takasu	Special Adviser	Adviser	USG		M	Japan	10-Dec-10				No	
47	Special Adviser to the Secretary-General	Iqbal Riza	Special Adviser to the Secretary-General	Adviser	USG		M	Pakistan		$1/yr	28-Feb-11		No	
48	Special Adviser to the Secretary-General	Joseph V. Reed	Special Adviser to the Secretary-General	Adviser	USG		M	USA	1-Jan-05	$1/yr	28-Feb-11		No	
49	Sport for Development and Peace	Wilfried Lemke	Special Adviser	Adviser	USG		M	Germany	11-Apr-08	$1/yr	10-Apr-11		No	
50	Tuberculosis	Jorge Sampaio	Special Envoy	Envoy	USG		M	Portugal	1-May-07	WAE			No	
51	UN Habitat	Joan Clos	Executive Director	Head	USG		M	Spain	18-Oct-10	FT	17-Oct-14	RB	Yes	
52	UN WOMEN	Michelle Bachelet	Executive Director	Head	USG	F		Chile	19-Oct-10	FT	18-Sep-14		No	
53	UNAMA	Staffan de Mistura	SRSG	Representative	USG		M	Sweden	1-Mar-10	FT	28-Feb-11		No	
54	UNAMI	Ad Melkert	SRSG	Representative	USG		M	Netherlands	9-Jul-10	FT	8-Jul-11		No	
55	UNAMID	Ibrahim Gambari	Joint Special Representative	Representative	USG		M	Nigeria	1-Jan-10	FT	31-Dec-10		No	
56	UNCTAD	Supachai Panitchpakdi	Secretary-General	Head	USG		M	Thailand	1-Sep-05	FT	31-Aug-13	RB	Yes	
57	UNHCR	Antonio Manuel de Oliveira Guterres	High Commissioner	Head	USG		M	Portugal	15-Jun-05				No	
58	UNMIK	Lamberto Zannier	SRSG	Representative	USG		M	Italy	20-Jun-08	FT	19-Jun-11		No	
59	UNMIL	Ellen Margrethe Loj	SRSG	Representative	USG	F		Denmark	16-Jan-08	FT	15-Sep-11		No	
60	UNMIS	Haile Menkerios	SRSG	Representative	USG		M	South Africa	1-Mar-10	FT	28-Feb-11		No	
61	UNMIT	Ameerah Haq	SRSG	Representative	USG	F		Bangladesh	3-Jan-10	FT	2-Jan-11		No	
62	UNOCI	Choi Young-Jin	SRSG	Representative	USG		M	ROK	29-Oct-07	FT	30-Apr-11		No	
63	UNOG	Sergei Ordzhonikidze	Director-General	Head	USG		M	Russia	1-Mar-02	FT	28-Feb-11	RB	Yes	

No.	Department/Entity	Name	Function	Classification	Rank	Female	Male	Country of Nationality	Date Appointed	Contractual Status	Duration of Appointment[31]	Funding Source	Subject to Geographical Distribution	Position Vacant
64	UNON/UNEP	Achim Steiner	Director-General of UNON and Executive Director of UNEP	Head	USG		M	Germany	15-Jun-06	FT	14-Jun-14	RB	Yes	
65	UNOV/UNODC	Yuri Fedotov	Director-General of UNOV and Executive Director of UNODC	Head	USG		M	Russia	13-Sep-10	FT	19-Sep-12	RB	Yes	
66	UNOWA	Said Djinnit	SRSG	Representative	USG		M	Algeria	1-Apr-08	FT	31-Mar-11		No	
67	UNPOS	Augustine P. Mahiga	SRSG	Representative	USG		M	Tanzania	1-Jul-10	FT	30-Jun-11		No	
68	UNRWA	Filippo Grandi	Commissioner-General	Head	USG		M	Italy	20-Jan-10				No	
69	UNSCO	Robert H. Serry	Special Coordinator/PRSG	Coordinator	USG		M	Netherlands	1-Jan-08	FT	31-Dec-10		No	
70	UNSCOL	Michael Williams	Special Coordinator/PRSG	Coordinator	USG		M	UK	1-Jun-07	FT	30-Sep-11		No	
71	Western-Sahara	Christopher Ross	Personal Envoy	Envoy	USG		M	USA	18-Jan-09	WAE	17-Jan-11		No	
72	BINUB	Charles Petrie	Executive Representative/RC/RR/HC and Designated Official	Representative	ASG		M	France	16-Apr-10	FT	15-Apr-11		No	
	BNUB	Karin Landgren	Special Representative and Head of the United Nations Office in Burundi	Representative	ASG	F		Sweden	Announced on 31-Dec-10	FT			No	
73	BINUCA	Sahle-Work Zewde	SRSG	Representative	ASG		M	Ethiopia	14-Jun-09	FT	13-Jun-11		No	
74	CTED	Michael Peter Floyd Smith	Executive Director	Head	ASG		M	Australia	19-Nov-07	FT	31-Dec-10	RB	Yes	
75	DESA	Thomas Stelzer	ASG for Policy Coordination and Inter-agency Affairs	Head	ASG		M	Austria	4-Mar-08	FT	3-Mar-11	RB	Yes	
76	DESA	Kwame S. Jomo	ASG for Economic Affairs	Head	ASG		M	Malaysia	1-Jan-05	FT	31-Dec-10	RB	Yes	
77	DESA	Rachel N. Mayanja	Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women	Adviser	ASG	F		Uganda	15-Nov-04	FT	31-Dec-10	RB	Yes	
78	DFS	Anthony Banbury	ASG for Field Support	Head	ASG		M	USA	22-Jun-09	FT	21-Jun-11	RB	Yes	

No.	Department/Entity	Name	Function	Classification	Rank	Female	Male	Country of Nationality	Date Appointed	Contractual Status	Duration of Appointment[31]	Funding Source	Subject to Geographical Distribution	Position Vacant
79	DGACM	Franz Baumann	ASG for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Management	Head	ASG		M	Germany	13-Jun-09	FT	12-Jun-11	RB	Yes	
80	DM/CMP	Michael Adlerstein	Executive Director	Head	ASG		M	USA	30-Jul-07	FT	20-Jul-11		No	
81	DM/OCSS	Warren Edward Sach	ASG for Central Support Services	Head	ASG		M	UK	19-Aug-08	FT	18-Aug-11	RB	Yes	
82	DM/OHRM	Catherine Pollard	ASG for HR Management	Head	ASG	F		Guyana	27-May-08	FT	26-May-11	RB	Yes	
83	DM/OPPBA	Jun Yamazaki	Controller	Head	ASG		M	Japan	19-Aug-08	FT	18-Aug-11	RB	Yes	
84	DPA	Taye Brook Zerihoun	ASG for Political Affairs	Head	ASG		M	Ethiopia	1-May-10	FT	30-Apr-11		No	
85	DPA	Oscar Fernandez-Taranco	ASG for Political Affairs	Head	ASG		M	Argentina	1-Jul-09	FT	30-Jun-11	RB	Yes	
86	DPKO	Babacar Gaye	Military Adviser	Head	ASG		M	Senegal	13-Sep-10	FT	12-Sep-11		No	
87	DPKO	Atul Khare	ASG for Peacekeeping Operations	Head	ASG		M	India	1-May-10	FT	30-Apr-11		No	
88	DPKO	Dimitry Titov	ASG for Rule of Law and Security Institutions	Head	ASG		M	Russia	30-Aug-07	FT	29-Aug-11	RB	Yes	
89	EOSG	Kim Won-Soo	Deputy Chef de Cabinet	Head	ASG		M	ROK	1-Jan-07	FT	31-Dec-10	RB	Yes	
90	EOSG	Robert C. Orr	ASG for Policy Planning	Head	ASG		M	USA	16-Aug-04	FT	31-Dec-10	RB	Yes	
91	HIV/AIDS in Africa	Elizabeth Mataka	Special Envoy	Envoy	ASG	F		Botswana	21-May-07	$1/yr	31-Dec-10		No	
92	HIV/AIDS in the Caribbean Region	George Alleyne	Special Envoy	Envoy	ASG		M	Barbados	4-Feb-03	$1/yr	31-Dec-10		No	
93	Human Rights for Internally Displaced Persons	Walter Kalin	Representative	Representative	ASG		M	Switzerland	21-Sep-04				No	
94	ICT	Choi Soon-hong	Chief Information Technology Officer	Head	ASG		M	ROK	28-Aug-07	FT	27-Aug-11	RB	Yes	
95	Implementation of the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction	Margareta Wahlstrom	SRSG	Representative	ASG	F		Sweden	1-Jan-09	FT	31-Dec-10		No	

No.	Department/Entity	Name	Function	Classification	Rank	Female	Male	Country of Nationality	Date Appointed	Contractual Status	Duration of Appointment[31]	Funding Source	Subject to Geographical Distribution	Position Vacant
96	Joint African Union - United Nations Mediation Support Team (JMST)	Azouz Ennifar	Deputy Chief Mediator	Mediator	ASG		M	Tunisia	20-Oct-08	FT	30-Nov-10		No	
97	Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism and the international discussions in Geneva on security and stability and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees	Antti Turunen	UN Representative	Representative	ASG		M	Finland	14-Mar-10	FT	31-Dec-10		No	
98	Malaria	Ray Chambers	Special Envoy	Envoy	ASG		M	USA	14-Feb-08	$1/yr	13-Feb-11		No	
99	MINURCAT	Rima Salah	DSRSG	Representative	ASG	F		Jordan	7-May-08	FT	31-Dec-10		No	
100	MINURSO	Hany Abdel-Aziz	SRSG	Representative	ASG		M	Egypt	5-Nov-09	FT	4-Nov-10		No	
101	MINUSTAH	Kevin Kennedy	DSRSG	Representative	ASG		M	USA	8-Apr-10	FT	7-Apr-11		No	
102	MINUSTAH	Nigel Fisher	DSRSG/RC/HC	Representative	ASG		M	Canada	3-Apr-10	FT	15-Jul-11		No	
103	MONUSCO	Chander Prakash Wadhwa	Force Commander	Force Commander	ASG		M	India	13-Aug-10	FT	12-Aug-11		No	
104	MONUSCO	Fidele Sarassoro	DSRSG/RC/HC	Representative	ASG		M	Cote d'Ivoire	7-Feb-10	FT	6-Feb-11		No	
105	MONUSCO	Leila Zerrougui	DSRSG	Representative	ASG	F		Algeria	10-Oct-08	FT	9-Oct-10		No	
106	OCHA	Catherine Bragg	ASG for Humanitarian Affairs and Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator	Head	ASG	F		Canada	11-Feb-08	FT	10-Feb-11	RB	Yes	
107	OHCHR	Ivan Simonovic	ASG for Human Rights, New York	Head	ASG		M	Croatia	17-Jul-10	FT	16-Jul-11		No	
108	OHCHR	Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff	Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva	Head	ASG		M	USA	30-Jan-10	FT	29-Jan-12		No	
109	OHCHR	Kang Kyung-wha	Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva	Head	ASG	F		ROK	1-Jan-07	FT	31-Dec-10	RB	Yes	

No.	Department/Entity	Name	Function	Classification	Rank	Female	Male	Country of Nationality	Date Appointed	Contractual Status	Duration of Appointment[31]	Funding Source	Subject to Geographical Distribution	Position Vacant
110	OLA	D. Stephen Mathias	ASG for Legal Affairs	Head	ASG		M	USA	7-Sep-10	FT	6-Sep-12	RB	Yes	
111	OMBUDSMAN	Johnston Barkat	Ombudsman	Head	ASG		M	USA	21-Apr-08	FT	20-Apr-13	RB	Yes	
112	PBSO	Judy Cheng-Hopkins	ASG for Peacebuilding Support	Head	ASG	F		Malaysia	1-Sep-09	FT	31-Aug-11	RB	Yes	
113	Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia	Miroslav Jenca	SRSG and Head	Representative	ASG		M	Slovakia	1-Jun-08	FT	31-May-11		No	
114	Senior UN System Coordinator for Avian and Human Influenza	David Nabarro	Coordinator	Representative	ASG		M	UK	1-Oct-05		30-Sep-11		No	
115	Special Adviser to the Secretary-General	Edward C. Luck	Special Adviser	Adviser	ASG		M	USA	21-Feb-08	$1/yr	20-Feb-11		No	
116	UN Habitat	Inga Bjork-Klevby	Deputy Executive Director	Head	ASG	F		Sweden	1-Jan-06	FT	28-Dec-10		No	
117	UNAMA	Martin Kobler	DSRSG	Representative	ASG		M	Germany	2-Apr-10	FT	1-Apr-11		No	
118	UNAMA	Robert Watkins	DSRSG/RC/HC	Representative	ASG		M	Canada	24-Jun-09	FT	23-Jun-11		No	
119	UNAMI	Jerzy Skuratowicz	DSRSG	Representative	ASG		M	Poland	9-Jan-10	FT	8-Jan-11		No	
120	UNAMI	Christine McNab	DSRSG/RC/HC	Representative	ASG	F		Sweden	1-Nov-09	FT	31-Oct-11		No	
121	UNAMID	Mohamed Yonis	Deputy Joint AU-UN Special Representative for Operations and Management	Representative	ASG		M	Somalia	1-Sep-09	FT	31-Aug-11		No	
122	UNAMID	Patrick Nyamvumba	Force Commander	Force Commander	ASG		M	Rwanda	20-Aug-09	FT	19-Aug-11		No	
123	UNAMID		Deputy Joint AU-UN Special Representative	Representative	ASG								No	Vacant
124	UNCTAD	Petko Draganov	Deputy Secretary-General	Head	ASG		M	Bulgaria	1-May-09	FT	30-Apr-11	RB	Yes	
125	UNCTAD	Patricia Francis	Executive Director	Head	ASG	F		Jamaica	4-Jun-06	FT	3-Jun-12		No	
126	UNDOF	Natalio C. Ecarma III	Head of Mission/Force Commander	Force Commander	ASG		M	Philippines	14-Feb-10	FT	13-Feb-11		No	
127	UNFICYP	Lisa Buttenheim	SRSG	Representative	ASG	F		USA	16-Aug-10	FT	15-Aug-11		No	

No.	Department/Entity	Name	Function	Classification	Rank	Female	Male	Country of Nationality	Date Appointed	Contractual Status	Duration of Appointment[31]	Funding Source	Subject to Geographical Distribution	Position Vacant
128	UNHCR	T. Alexander Aleinikoff	Deputy High Commissioner	Head	ASG		M	USA	2-Dec-09				No	
129	UNIFIL	Alberto Asarta Cuevas	Head of Mission/Force Commander	Force Commander	ASG		M	Spain	20-Jan-10	FT	19-Jan-11		No	
130	UNIPSIL	Michael von der Schulenburg	Executive Representative	Representative	ASG		M	Germany	9-Jan-09	FT	8-Jan-11		No	
131	United Nations International School	Silvia Fuhrman	SRSG	Representative	ASG	F		USA	1-Aug-96	FT	30-Jun-11		No	
132	United Nations Office to the African Union in Addis Ababa	Zachary Muburi-Muita	Head of Office	Head	ASG		M	Kenya	29-Sep-10	FT	28-Sep-11		No	
133	UNMIL	Moustapha Soumare	DSRSG/RC/HC	Representative	ASG		M	Mali	30-Aug-09	FT	29-Aug-11		No	
134	UNMIL	Henrietta Joy Abena Nyarko Mensa-Bonsu	DSRSG	Representative	ASG	F		Ghana	28-Oct-07	FT	31-Oct-11		No	
135	UNMIS	Georg Charpentier	DSRSG/RC/HC	Representative	ASG		M	Finland	20-Feb-10	FT	19-Feb-11		No	
136	UNMIS	Jasbir Singh Lidder	DSRSG	Representative	ASG		M	India	10-Jan-10	FT	9-Jan-11		No	
137	UNMIT	Shigeru Mochida	DSRSG	Representative	ASG		M	Japan	30-Aug-10	FT	29-Aug-11		No	
138	UNMIT	Finn Reske-Nielsen	DSRSG/RC/HC	Representative	ASG		M	Denmark	28-Aug-06	FT	27-Aug-11		No	
139	UNOCI	Ndolamb Ngokwey	DSRSG/RC/HC	Representative	ASG		M	DR Congo	29-Jul-10	FT	28-Jul-11		No	
140	UNOCI	Abou Moussa	Principal DSRSG	Representative	ASG		M	Chad	1-Sep-05	FT	31-Dec-10		No	
141	UNOG		Deputy Director-General	Head	ASG					FT			No	Vacant
142	UNOGBIS	Joseph Mutaboba	SRSG	Representative	ASG		M	Rwanda	7-Feb-09	FT	31-Dec-10		No	
143	UNON/UNEP	Angela Cropper	Deputy Executive Director of UNEP	Head	ASG	F		Trinidad and Tobago	1-Feb-08	FT	31-Jan-11		No	
144	UNPOS		DSRSG	Representative	ASG					FT			No	Vacant
145	UNRWA	Margot Ellis	Deputy Commissioner-General	Head	ASG	F		USA	20-Jan-10				No	

No.	Department/Entity	Name	Function	Classification	Rank	Female	Male	Country of Nationality	Date Appointed	Contractual Status	Duration of Appointment[31]	Funding Source	Subject to Geographical Distribution	Position Vacant
146	UNSCO	Maxwell Gaylard	Deputy Special Coordinator/RC/HC	Coordinator	ASG		M	Australia	30-Mar-08	FT	29-Mar-11		No	
147	UNSCOL	Marta Ruedas	Deputy Special Coordinator/RC/HC	Coordinator	ASG	F		Spain	1-Oct-07	FT	31-Dec-10		No	
		Robert Watkins	Deputy Special Coordinator/RC/HC	Coordinator	ASG		M	Canada	Announced on 22-Dec-10	FT			No	
148	UNTSO	Robert Mood	Chief of Staff and Head of Mission	Head	ASG		M	Norway	10-Feb-09	FT	9-Feb-11		No	
149	Violence Against Children	Marta Santos Pais	SRSG	Representative	ASG	F		Portugal	1-Sep-09	FT	31-Aug-11		No	

Summary	USG	ASG	Total
Total	71	78	149
Vacant	1	3	4
Appointments announced	-	2	2
Female	16	19	35
Male	54	56	110
Fixed term	47	69	116
WAE	8	0	8
$1/yr	11	4	15
Funded from regular budget (RB)	27	20	47
Posts subject to geographical distribution	27	20	47

Annex II
Historical overview of Under-Secretaries-General and Assistant Secretaries-General or equivalent ranks[32]

Department	Rank	Year	Name	Country	Gender
Executive Office of the Secretary-General	USG:	2007-current	Asha-Rose Migiro	Tanzania	F
		2007-current	Vijay K. Nambiar	India	M
		2005-2006	Mark Malloch Brown	UK	M
		2004-2005	Lakhdar Brahimi	Algeria	M
		2003-2003	Maurice Strong	Canada	M
		2002-2002	Martin Lees	UK	M
		2001-2001	Nafis I. Sadik	Pakistan	F
		1999-1999	Mohamed Sahnoun	Algeria	M
		1999-1999	Diego Cordovez	Ecuador	M
		1999-1999	Jamsheed K.A. Marker	Pakistan	M
		1998-2006	Louise Frechette	Canada	F
		1997-2005	Iqbal Riza	Pakistan	M
		1997-2001	Maurice Strong	Canada	M
		1993-1996	Chinmaya R. Gharekhan	India	M
		1992-1992	Joseph Verner Reed	USA	M
		1982-1992	Virendra Dayal	India	M
		1978-1981	Rafeeuddin Ahmed	Pakistan	M
		1961-1972	Chakravarthi V. Narasmihan	India	M
		1953-1961	Andrew W. Cordier	USA	M
	ASG:	2007-current	Kim Won-Soo	ROK	M
		2005-2006	Alicea Barcena Ibarra	Mexico	F
		2004-current	Robert C. Orr	USA	M
		2004-2005	Elisabeth Lindenmayer	France	F
		2002-2003	Patricia M. Durrant	Jamaica	F
		2002-2002	Diego Arria	Venezuela	M
		2001-2002	Michael Doyle	USA	M
		1998-1999	Miles Stoby	Guyana	M
		1997-2002	Gillian M. Sorensen	USA	F
		1997-2000	John Ruggie	USA	M
		1995-1996	Rosario Green	Mexico	F
		1994-1994	Benita Ferrero-Waldner	Austria	F
		1992-1994	Alvaro de Soto	Peru	M
		1991-1996	Jean-Claude Aime	Haiti	M
		1988-1990	Alvaro de Soto	Peru	M
		1986-1993	Aly I. Teymour	Egypt	M
Department of Field Support	USG:	2008-current	Susana Malcorra	Argentina	F
	ASG:	2009-current	Anthony Banbury	USA	M
		2007-2008	Jane Hall Lute	USA	F
Department of Peacekeeping Operations	USG:	2008-current	Alain Le Roy	France	M

[32] Source: Yearbooks of the United Nations, United Nations Info Quest (UNIQUE), United Nations Dag Hammarskjold Library

Department	Rank	Year	Name	Country	Gender
		2000-2008	Jean-Marie Guehenno	France	M
		1997-2000	Bernard Miyet	France	M
		1993-1996	Kofi A. Annan	Ghana	M
		1992-1993	Marrack I. Goulding	UK	M
	ASG:	2010-current	Atul Khare	India	M
		2010-current	Babacar Gaye	Senegal	M
		2008-2010	Chikadibia Obiakor	Nigeria	M
		2007-current	Dmitry Titov	Russian Federation	M
		2007-2010	Edmond Mulet	Guatemala	M
		2003-2007	Jane Hall Lute	USA	F
		2001-2003	Michael A. Sheehan	USA	M
		1999-2007	Alvaro de Soto	Peru	M
		1998-1999	Choi Young-Jin	ROK	M
		1997-2007	Hedi Annabi	Tunisia	M
		1994-1998	Manfred Eisele	Germany	M
		1993-1996	Iqbal Riza	Pakistan	M
		1992-1992	Kofi A. Annan	Ghana	M
		1975-1977	Rafeeuddin Ahmed	Pakistan	M
		1973-1974	Ismat Kittani	Iraq	M
Department of Political Affairs and predecessors	USG:	2007-current	B. Lynn Pascoe	USA	M
		2005-2007	Ibrahim A. Gambari	Nigeria	M
		1999-2002	Ibrahim A. Gambari	Nigeria	M
		1997-2005	Kieran Prendergast	UK	M
		1995-1995	Mahmoud Mestiri	Tunisia	M
		1993-1996	Marrack I. Goulding	UK	M
		1992-1993	Vladimir Petrovsky	Russian Federation	M
		1991-1994	James O.C. Jonah	Sierra Leone	M
		1989-1991	Ronald I. Spiers	USA	M
		1987-1991	Vasiliy S. Safronchuk	USSR	M
		1987-1988	Joseph Verner Reed	USA	M
		1986-1991	Marrack I. Goulding	UK	M
		1983-1986	Rafeeuddin Ahmed	Pakistan	M
		1981-1988	Diego Cordovez	Ecuador	M
		1981-1986	Viacheslav A. Ustinov	USSR	M
		1979-1990	Abdulrahim Abby Farah	Somalia	M
		1979-1982	Issoufou Saidou Djermakoye	Niger	M
		1979-1980	Javier Perez de Cuellar	Peru	M
		1978-1980	Mikhail D. Sytenko	USSR	M
		1976-1986	William B. Buffum	USA	M
		1974-1986	Brian E. Urquhart	UK	M
		1973-1977	Arkady N. Shevchenko	USSR	M
		1972-1978	Tang Ming-chao	China	M
		1972-1975	Bradford Morse	USA	M
		1971-1978	Roberto E. Guyer	Argentina	M
		1968-1972	Leonid N. Kutakov	USSR	M
		1967-1972	Issoufou Saidou Djermakoye	Niger	M
		1965-1970	Jose Rolz-Bennett	Guatemala	M

Department	Rank	Year	Name	Country	Gender
		1965-1967	Alexei E. Nesterenko	USSR	M
		1963-1965	Godfrey K. J. Amachree	Nigeria	M
		1963-1964	Vladimir P. Suslov	USSR	M
		1962-1963	Omar Loutfi	United Arab Republic	M
		1962-1963	Evgeny D. Kiselyv	USSR	M
		1960-1961	Georgy P. Arkadev	USSR	M
		1959-1960	Chakravarthi V. Narasmihan	India	M
		1958-1959	Anatoly F. Dobrynin	USSR	M
		1958-1958	Humphrey Trevelyan	UK	M
		1956-1964	Dragoslav Protitch	Yugoslavia	M
		1954-1970	Ralph Bunche	USA	M
		1954-1957	Benjamin A. Cohen	Chile	M
		1953-1956	Ilya S. Tchernychev	USSR	M
		1953-1953	Victor Hoo	China	M
		1952-1953	Constantin E. Zinchenko	USSR	M
	ASG:	2010-current	Taye-Brook Zerihoun	Ethiopia	M
		2009-current	Oscar Fernandez-Taranco	Argentina	M
		2007-2010	Haile Menkerios	Eritrea	M
		2005-2008	Angela Kane	Germany	F
		2004-2007	Javier Ruperez	Spain	M
		2002-2007	Tulaimeni Kalomoh	Namibia	M
		2000-2005	Danilo Turk	Slovenia	M
		1997-2001	Ibrahima Fall	Senegal	F
		1995-1999	Alvaro de Soto	Peru	M
		1995-1995	G.B. Schlittler-Silva	Brazil	M
		1994-1996	Lansana Kouyate	Guinea	M
		1994-1994	Rosario Green	Mexico	F
		1992-1993	Benon Vahe Sevan	Cyprus	M
		1992-1992	Giandomenico Picco	Italy	M
		1991-1992	Alvaro de Soto	Peru	M
		1987-1991	Sotirios Mousouris	Greece	M
		1987-1990	James O.C. Jonah	Sierra Leone	M
		1985-1986	Iqbal A. Akhund	Pakistan	M
		1985-1986	Najmuddine S. Rifai	Syria	M
		1984-1985	Robert Muller	France	M
		1984-1984	George L. Sherry	USA	M
		1983-1986	Fou-Tchin Liu	China	M
		1983-1984	Enuga Reddy	India	M
		1980-1981	M'Hamed Essaafi	Tunisia	M
		1980-1980	Fou-Tchin Liu	China	M
		1979-1979	Ilter Turkmen	Turkey	M
		1978-1981	Gordon K. Goundrey	Canada	M
		1973-1978	Abdulrahim Abby Farah	Somalia	M
		1972-1973	Brian E. Urquhart	UK	M
		1946-1948	Arkady Sobolev	USSR	M
Department of Safety and Security	USG:	2009- current	Gregory B. Starr	USA	M
		2005-2008	David Veness	UK	M

Department	Rank	Year	Name	Country	Gender
Department of Economic and Social Affairs and predecessors	USG:	2007- current	Sha Zukang	China	M
		2003-2007	Jose Antonio Ocampo	Colombia	M
		1996-1996	Jin Yongjian	China	M
		1993-1996	Jean-Claude Milleron	France	M
		1992-2002	Nitin Desai	India	M
		1991-1995	Ji Chaozhu	China	M
		1989-1991	Antoine Blanca	France	M
		1987-1991	Rafeeuddin Ahmed	Pakistan	M
		1985-1990	Xie Qimei	China	M
		1982-1986	Shuaib Uthman Yolah	Nigeria	M
		1979-1984	Bi Jilong	China	M
		1978-1988	Jean Louis Ripert	France	M
		1978-1981	K.K.S. Dadzie	Ghana	M
		1975-1977	Gabriel Van Laetham	France	M
		1973-1978	Issoufou Saidou Djermakoye	Niger	M
		1954-1974	Philippe de Seynes	France	M
	ASG:	2008-current	Thomas Stelzer	Austria	M
		2005-current	Jomo Kwame Sundaram	Malaysia	M
		2004-current	Rachel Mayanja	Uganda	F
		1998-2007	Patrizio M. Civili	Italy	M
		1997-2003	Angela E.V. King	Jamaica	F
		1987-1987	Meredith Alister McIntyre	Grenada	M
		1986-1986	Tamar Oppenheimer	Canada	F
		1985-1992	Goran P. Ohlin	Sweden	M
		1985-1987	Luis Maria Gomez	Argentina	M
		1984-1986	Sotirios Mousouris	Greece	M
		1984-1986	Vladimir S. Pozharski	USSR	M
		1981-1991	Enrique ter Horst	Venezuela	M
		1981-1985	Leticia R. Shahani	Philippines	F
		1981-1983	Robert Muller	France	M
		1978-1986	Margaret Joan Anstee	UK	F
		1978-1984	Peter Hansen	Denmark	M
		1978-1984	P.N. Dhar	India	M
		1978-1980	Diego Cordovez	Ecuador	M
		1972-1980	Helvi Sipila	Finland	F
		1972-1972	Abdulrahim Abby Farah	Somalia	M
		1962-1971	Victor Hoo	China	M
		1951-1954	Guillaume Georges-Picot	France	M
		1946-1951	David K. Owen	UK	M
		1946-1950	Henri Laugier	France	M
Department of General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services and predecessors	USG:	2007- current	Shaaban Muhammad Shaaban	Egypt	M
		2001-2006	Chen Jian	China	M
		1997-2000	Yongjian Jin	China	M
		1982-1991	Eugeniusz Wyzner	Poland	M

Department	Rank	Year	Name	Country	Gender
		1972-1981	Bohdan Lewandowski	Poland	M
		1962-1971	Giri Nosek	Czechoslovakia	M
		1954-1961	Victor Hoo	China	M
	ASG:	2009-current	Franz Baumann	Germany	M
		2006-2009	Yohannes Mengesha	Ethiopia	M
		2004-2005	Angela Kane	Germany	F
		2001- 2003	Miles Stoby	Guyana	M
		1997-2000	Federico Riesco-Quintana	Chile	M
		1953-1954	Shamaldharee Lall	India	M
		1946-1949	Adriannus Adrian Pelt	Netherlands	M
Department of Management	USG:	2008- current	Angela Kane	Germany	F
		2007-2008	Alicia Barcena Ibarra	Mexico	F
		2005-2006	Christopher Bancroft Burnham	USA	M
		2003-2005	Catherine Bertini	USA	F
		1994-2002	Joseph E. Connor	USA	M
		1993-1993	Melissa Wells	USA	F
		1992-1992	Dick Thornburgh	USA	M
		1991-1991	J. Richard Foran	Canada	M
		1990-1990	Martii Ahtisaari	Finland	M
		1989-1989	Luis Maria Gomez	Argentina	M
		1987-1988	Martii Ahtisaari	Finland	M
		1982-1986	Patricio Ruedas	Spain	M
		1979-1981	Helmut F. Debatin	FR Germany	M
		1972-1978	George F. Davidson	Canada	M
		1971-1971	Horatio Keith Matthews	UK	M
		1968-1970	Andrew A. Stark	UK	M
		1954-1967	Department of Administrative and Financial Services was discontinued		
		1946-1953	Byron Price	USA	M
DM/Capital Master Plan	ASG:	2007-current	Michael Adlerstein	USA	M
		2005-2006	Louis Frederick Reuter IV	USA	M
		2004-2004	Vacant		
		2003-2004	Toshiyuki Niwa	Japan	M
DM/Office of Central Support Services	ASG:	2008-current	Warren Sach	UK	M
		2003-2007	Andrew Toh	Singapore	M
		1998-2003	Toshiyuki Niwa	Japan	M
		1994-1997	Benon Vahe Sevan	Cyprus	M
		1993-1993	Carole R. Thompson	USA	F
		1992-1993	Francoise Cestac	France	F
		1987-1992	J. Richard Foran	Canada	M
		1984-1986	Alice Weil	USA	F
		1977-1983	Clayton C. Timbrell	USA	M
		1972-1976	Robert J. Ryan	USA	M
		1953-1971	David B. Vaughn	USA	M
		1947-1953	Byron F. Wood	Canada	M
		1946-1947	John B. Hutson	USA	M
DM/Office of Human Resources Management	ASG:	2008- current	Catherine Pollard	Guyana	F

Department	Rank	Year	Name	Country	Gender
		2005-2008	Jan Beagle	New Zealand	F
		2003-2005	Rosemary McCreery	Ireland	F
		1997-2003	Rafiah Salim	Malaysia	F
		1994-1996	Dennis J. Halliday	Ireland	M
		1993-1993	Christine Dodson	USA	F
		1992-1992	Armando Duque Gonzalez	Colombia	M
		1990-1991	Abdou Ciss	Senegal	M
		1987-1989	Kofi A. Annan	Ghana	M
		1985-1987	Mercedes Pulido de Briceno	Venezuela	F
		1983-1986	Louis-Pascal Negre	Mali	M
		1982-1982	Leila H. Doss	Egypt	F
		1979-1986	James O.C. Jonah	Sierra Leone	M
		1969-1978	Mohamed Habib Gherab	Tunisia	M
		1962-1967	Alexander MacFarquhar	UK	M
		1959-1961	W. A. B. Hamilton	UK	M
		1958-1958	John McDiarmid	USA	M
		1954-1957	J. A. C. Robertson	UK	M
DM/Office of Programme Planning, Budget and Accounts	ASG:	2008-current	Jun Yamazaki	Japan	M
		2005-2008	Warren Sach	UK	M
		1996-2005	Jean-Pierre Halbwachs	Mauritius	M
		1992-1995	Yukio Takasu	Japan	M
		1992-1992	J. Richard Foran	Canada	M
		1990-1991	Kofi A. Annan	Ghana	M
		1987-1989	Luis Maria Gomez	Argentina	M
		1982-1986	J. Richard Foran	Canada	M
		1979-1981	Patricio Ruedas	Spain	M
		1974-1978	Helmut F. Debatin	FR Germany	M
		1972-1973	Wilbur H. Ziehl	USA	M
		1955-1971	Bruce R. Turner	New Zealand	M
		1954-1954	H. C. Andersen	Iceland	M
Department of Public Information	USG:	2007- current	Kiyotaka Akasaka	Japan	M
		2001-2007	Shashi Tharoor	India	M
		1998-2001	Kensaku Hogen	Japan	M
		1992-1992	Eugeniusz Wyzner	Poland	M
		1987-1991	Therese Paquet-Sevigny	Canada	F
		1979-1986	Yasushi Akashi	Japan	M
		1960-1964	Hernane Tavares de Sa	Brazil	M
		1954-1958	Ahmed S. Bokhari	Pakistan	M
	ASG:	1994-1997	Samir Sanbar	Lebanon	M
		1993-1993	Marco Vianello-Chiodo	Italy	M
		1972-1978	Genichi Akatani	Japan	M
		1968-1971	Agha Abdul Hamid	Pakistan	M
		1946-1954	Benjamin A. Cohen	Chile	M
Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific	USG:	2007- current	Noeleen Heyzer	Singapore	F
		2000-2007	Kim Hak-Su	ROK	M

Department	Rank	Year	Name	Country	Gender
		1995-2000	Adrianus Mooy	Indonesia	M
		1994-1994	Seiko Takahashi	Japan	F
		1992-1994	Rafeeuddin Ahmed	Pakistan	M
		1981-1992	S.A.M.S. Kibria	Bangladesh	M
		1973-1981	J.B.P. Maramis	Indonesia	M
		1959-1973	U Nyun	Myanmar	M
		1956-1959	Chakravarthi V. Narasmihan	India	M
		1947-1956	P.S. Lokanathan	India	M
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia	USG:	2010-current	Rima Khalaf	Jordan	F
		2007-2010	Bader Al-Dafa	Qatar	M
		2000-2007	Mervat Tallawy	Egypt	F
		1995-2000	Hazem El-Beblawi	Egypt	M
		1993-1995	Sabbaheddin Bakjaji	Syria	M
		1989-1993	Tayseer Abdel Jaber	Jordan	M
		1985-1988	Mohammad Said Al-Nabulsi	Jordan	M
		1974-1985	Mohammad Said Al-Attar	Yemen	M
Economic Commission for Africa	USG:	2005-current	Abdoulie Janneh	Gambia	M
		1995-2005	Kingsley Amoako	Ghana	M
		1992-1995	Layashi Yaker	Algeria	M
		1991-1992	Issa Diallo	Guniea	M
		1975-1991	Adebayo Adedeji	Nigeria	M
		1961-1975	Robert K.A. Gardiner	Ghana	M
		1959-1961	Mekki Abbas	Sudan	M
Economic Commission for Europe	USG:	2009-current	Jan Kubis	Slovakia	M
		2005-2008	Marek Belka	Poland	M
		2002-2005	Brigita Schmognerova	Slovakia	F
		2000-2001	Danuta Hubner	Poland	F
		1993-2000	Yves Berthelot	France	M
		1987-1993	Gerald Hinteregger	Austria	M
		1983-1986	Klaus Sahlgren	Finland	M
		1968-1982	Janez Stanovnik	Yugoslavia	M
		1960-1967	Vladimir Velebit	Yugoslavia	M
		1957-1960	Sakari Tuomioja	Finland	M
		1947-1957	Gunnar Myrdal	Sweden	M
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean	USG:	2008-current	Alicia Barcena Ibarra	Mexico	F
		2003-2008	Jose Luis Machinea	Argentina	M
		1998-2003	Jose Antonio Ocampo	Colombia	M
		1988-1997	Gert Rosenthal	Guatemala	M
		1985-1987	Norberto Gonzalez	Argentina	M
		1972-1985	Enrique V. Iglesias	Uruguay	M
		1967-1972	Carlos Quintana	Mexico	M
		1963-1966	Jose Antonio Mayobre	Venezuela	M
		1950-1963	Raul Prebisch	Argentina	M
		1948-1950	Gustavo Martinez Cabanas	Mexico	M

Department	Rank	Year	Name	Country	Gender
Office for Disarmament Affairs	USG:	2007-current	Sergio de Queiroz Duarte	Brazil	M
		2006-2007	Nobuaki Tanaka	Japan	M
		2003-2006	Nobuyasu Abe	Japan	M
		1998-2003	Jayantha Dhanapala	Sri Lanka	M
		1992-1997	Prvoslav Davinic	Yugoslavia	M
		1987-1991	Yasushi Akashi	Japan	M
		1982-1987	Jan Martenson	Sweden	M
	ASG:	1979-1982	Jan Martenson	Sweden	M
		1977-1979	Rolf G. Bjornerstedt	Sweden	M
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and predecessors	USG:	2010-Current	Valerie Amos	UK	F
		2007-2010	John Holmes	UK	M
		2003-2007	Jan Egland	Norway	M
		2001-2003	Kenzo Oshima	Japan	M
		1998-2000	Sergio Vieira de Mello	Brazil	M
		1996-1998	Yasushi Akashi	Japan	M
		1994-1996	Peter Hansen	Denmark	M
		1992-1994	Jan K. Eliasson	Sweden	M
		1982-1992	M'Hamed Essaafi	Tunisia	M
		1972-1981	Faruk N. Berkol	Turkey	M
	ASG:	2008-current	Catherine Bragg	Canada	F
		2004-2008	Margareta Wahlstrom	Sweden	F
		2000-2003	Carolyn McAskie	Canada	F
		1996-1996	Gualtiero Fulcheri	Italy	M
Office of Information and Communication Technology	ASG:	2007-current	Choi Soon-Hong	ROK	M
Office of Internal Oversight Services and predecessors	USG:	2010-current	Carman Lapointe	Canada	F
		2005-2010	Inga-Britt Ahlenius	Sweden	F
		2000-2005	Dileep Nair	Singapore	M
		1999-1999	Vacant		
		1994-1999	Karl Theodor Paschke	Germany	M
	ASG:	1993-1994	Mohamed Aly Niazi	Egypt	M
Office of Legal Affairs	USG:	2008- current	Patricia O'Brien	Ireland	F
		2004-2008	Nicolas Michel	Switzerland	M
		1994-2004	Hans Axel Valdemar Corell	Sweden	M
		1983-1994	Carl-August Fleischhauer	Germany	M
		1974-1982	Eric Suy	Belgium	M
		1953-1973	Constantin A. Stavropoulos	Greece	M
	ASG:	2010-current	Stephen Mathias	USA	M
		2008-2010	Peter Taksoe-Jensen	Denmark	M
		2006-2008	Larry Johnson	USA	M
		2002-2002	Robin Vincent	UK	M
		1998-2006	Ralph Zacklin	UK	M
		1946-1952	Ivan S. Kerno	Czechoslovakia	M
		1946-1952	Abraham F. Feller	USA	M

Department	Rank	Year	Name	Country	Gender
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights	USG:	2008-current	Navanethem Pillay	South Africa	F
		2004-2008	Louise Arbour	Canada	F
		2003-2004	Bertrand Ramcharan	Guyana	M
		2002-2003	Sergio Vieira de Mello	Brazil	M
		1997-2002	Mary Robinson	Ireland	F
		1994-1996	Jose Ayala Lasso	Ecuador	M
	ASG:	2010-current	Ivan Simonovic	Croatia	M
		2010-current	Thomas Alexander Aleinikoff	USA	M
		2007-current	Kang Kyung-wha	ROK	F
		2004-2006	Mehr Khan Williams	Pakistan	F
		1998-2002	Bertrand Ramcharan	Guyana	M
		1993-1996	Ibrahima Fall	Senegal	F
Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States	USG:	2007-current	Cheick Sidi Diarra	Mali	M
		2002-2006	Anwarul Karim Chowdhury	Bangladesh	M
Office of the Iraq Programme (Oil for Food: 1997-2004)	USG:	2001-2001	Yuli Vorontsov	Russian Federation	M
		1997-2004	Benon Vahe Sevan	Cyprus	M
	ASG:	2004-2004	Ramiro Lopes da Silva	Portugal	M
		2000-2001	Tun Myat	Myanmar	M
		1998-1999	Hans von Sponeck	Germany	M
Peacebuilding Support Office	ASG:	2009-current	Judy Cheng-Hopkins	Malaysia	F
		2008-2009	Jane Hall Lute	USA	F
		2006-2008	Carolyn McAskie	Canada	F
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development	USG:	2005-current	Supachai Panitchpakdi	Thailand	M
		1995-2003	Rubens Ricupero	Brazil	M
		1986-1994	Kenneth K.S. Dadzie	Ghana	M
		1974-1984	Gamani Corea	Sri Lanka	M
		1969-1973	Manuel Perez-Guerrero	Venezuela	M
		1963-1968	Raul Prebisch	Argentina	M
	ASG:	2009-current	Petko Draganov	Bulgaria	M
		2006-current	Patricia Francis	Jamaica	F
		1998-2005	Carlos Fortin Cabezas	Chile	M
		1993-1994	Carlos Fortin Cabezas	Chile	M
		1985-1992	Yves Berthelot	France	M
		1982-1986	Meredith Alister McIntyre	Grenada	M
		1980-1985	Johannes Pronk	Netherlands	M
		1977-1979	Bernard T. Chidzero	Zimbabwe Rhodesia	M
		1976-1978	Stein Rossen	Norway	M
United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women	USG:	2010-current	Michelle Bachelet	Chile	F
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees	USG:	2005-current	Antonio Manuel de Oliveira Guterres	Portugal	M

Department	Rank	Year	Name	Country	Gender
		2001-2005	Rudolphus Lubbers	Netherlands	M
		1991-2000	Sadako Ogata	Japan	F
		1990-1990	Thorvald Stoltenberg	Norway	M
		1986-1989	Jean-Pierre Hocke	Switzerland	M
		1978-1985	Poul Hartling	Denmark	M
		1965-1977	Sadruddin Aga Khan	Iran	M
		1960-1965	Felix Schnyder	Switzerland	M
		1956-1960	Auguste R. Lindt	Switzerland	M
		1951-1956	Gerrit Jan van Heuven Goedhart	Netherlands	M
	ASG:	2010-current	T. Alexander Aleinikoff	USA	M
		2007-2009	L. Craig Johnstone	USA	M
		2004-2007	Wendy Chamberlin	USA	F
		2001-2003	Mary Ann Wyrsch	USA	F
		1999-2001	Frederick Barton	USA	M
		1993-1999	Gerald Walzer	USA	M
		1990-1992	Martin Douglas Stafford	USA	M
		1986-1989	Arthur Eugene Dewey	USA	M
		1981-1985	William Richard Smyser	USA	M
		1980-1980	Dale S. De Haan	USA	M
		1963-1965	Sadruddin Aga Khan	Iran	M
United Nations Office at Geneva	USG:	2002-current	Sergei Ordzhonikidze	Russian Federation	M
		1993-2002	Vladimir Petrovsky	Russian Federation	M
		1992-1994	Sotirios Mousouris	Greece	M
		1992-1993	Antoine Blanca	France	M
		1987-1991	Jan Martenson	Sweden	M
		1985-1991	Miljan Komatina	Yugoslavia	M
		1983-1986	Eric Suy	Belgium	M
		1980-1981	Mowaffak Allaf	Syrian	M
		1979-1984	Rikhi Jaipal	India	M
		1977-1982	Luigi Cottafavi	Italy	M
		1968-1977	Vittorio Winspeare-Guicciardi	Italy	M
		1958-1967	Pier P. Spinelli	Italy	M
		1954-1957	Adriannus Adrian Pelt	Netherlands	M
		1953-1953	Arthur Rucker	UK	M
		1952-1952	J. Franklin Ray	USA	M
		1946-1952	Wlodzimierz Moderow	Poland	M
United Nations Office at Nairobi / UN Habitat	USG:	2010-current	Joan Clos	Spain	M
		2009-current	Achim Steiner	Germany	M
		2002-2009	Anna Tibaijuka	Tanzania	F
		1998-2007	Klaus Toepfer	Germany	M
		1993-1997	Elizabeth Dowdeswell	Canada	F
		1978-1992	Arcot Ramachandran	India	M
		1975-1992	Mostafa Kamal Tolba	Egypt	M
		1973-1974	Maurice Strong	Canada	M
	ASG:	2008-current	Angela Cropper	Trinidad and Tobago	F
		2006-current	Inga Bjork-Klevby	Sweden	F
		2002-2005	Hamdallah Zedan	Egypt	M

Department	Rank	Year	Name	Country	Gender
		2000-2001	Anna Tibaijuka	Tanzania	F
		1998-2006	Shafqat S. Kakakhel	Pakistan	M
		1998-1998	Reuben James Olembo	Kenya	M
		1997-1997	Darshan Johal	Canada	M
		1994-1996	Wally N'Dow	Gambia	M
		1991-1992	Anthony T. Brough	UK	M
		1989-1991	Sveneld Evteev	USSR	M
		1986-1991	William H. Mansfield III	USA	M
		1984-1992	Sumihiro Kuyama	Japan	M
		1983-1985	Joseph Wheeler	USA	M
		1982-1988	Genady N. Golubev	USSR	M
		1981-1986	Rudolph Schmidt	Germany	M
		1977-1982	Peter Shaw Thacher	USA	M
		1977-1980	Horst Peter Oltmanns	Germany	M
		1977-1980	Sveneld Evteev	USSR	M
		1977-1977	Cesar Quintana	USA	M
		1976-1976	David A. Munro	Canada	M
		1975-1976	Richard B. Stedman	USA	M
		1973-1974	Mostafa Kamal Tolba	Egypt	M
		1973-1974	Robert A. Frosch	USA	M
United Nations Office at Vienna	USG:	2010-current	Yuri Fedotov	Russian Federation	M
		2002-2010	Antonio Maria Costa	Italy	M
		1997-2002	Giuseppe Pino Arlacchi	Italy	M
		1991-1996	Giorgio Giacomelli	Italy	M
		1987-1991	Margaret Joan Anstee	UK	F
		1984-1986	Mowaffak Allaf	Syrian	M
		1980-1982	Charles Bourbonniere	Canada	M
	ASG:	1982-1992	Giuseppe di Gennaro	Italy	M
		1982-1983	Mowaffak Allaf	Syria	M
		1978-1981	Bror A. Rexed	Sweden	M
		1976-1977	Jacobus De Beus	Netherlands	M
United Nations Ombudsman	ASG:	2008-current	Johnston Barkat	USA	M
		2004-2008	Patricia M. Durrant	Jamaica	F
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East	USG:	2010-current	Filippo Grandi	Italy	M
		2005-2010	Karen AbuZayd	USA	F
		1996-2005	Peter Hansen	Denmark	M
		1991-1996	Ilter Turkmen	Turkey	M
		1985-1991	Giorgio Giacomelli	Italy	M
		1979-1985	Olof Rydbeck	Sweden	M
		1977-1979	Thomas W. McElhiney	USA	M
		1971-1977	John Shaw Rennie	UK	M
		1964-1971	Laurence Michelmore	USA	M
		1959-1963	John H. Davis	USA	M
		1958-1958	Leslie J. Carver	UK	M
		1954-1958	Henry R. Labouisse	USA	M
		1951-1953	John B. Blandford	USA	M

Department	Rank	Year	Name	Country	Gender
		1950-1951	Howard Kennedy	Canada	M
	ASG:	2010-current	Margot Ellis	USA	F
		2005-2009	Filippo Grandi	Italy	M
		2001-2004	Karen AbuZayd	USA	F
		1997-2000	Mohamed Abdelmoumene	Algeria	M
		1995-1996	Luce Daniele Biolato	Italy	M
		1994-1994	Mohamed Abdelmoumene	Algeria	M
		1988-1993	William L. Eagleton	USA	M
		1985-1987	Robert S. Dillon	USA	M

Annex III
Overview of comments from the United Nations Secretariat on the JIU draft report

1. As this is a report on possible measures to further enhance transparency in the selection and appointment process of senior managers, the Inspectors were surprised that the United Nations Secretariat comments were designated as "confidential", a classification the Inspectors understand to mean that they are not to be made public. The Inspectors believe this does not comport with the notion of transparency, be it transparency in the preparation of this particular report or transparency in the appointment and selection process of senior managers. Moreover, the Inspectors could find nothing in the "confidential" comments that would warrant such a classification nor could they find a compelling or convincing rationale for this designation as it pertains to this report in the Secretary-General's bulletin on "Information sensitivity, classification and handling" (ST/SGB/2007/6). Nevertheless, due to the "confidential" marking of the comments, and in accordance with article 6(3) of the JIU Statute, the Inspectors did not feel they were in a position to share the Secretariat's comments without their consent; Member States, if they so wish, are free to request the United Nations to "declassify" them. Accordingly, neither those comments nor the Inspectors' analysis on them have been included in this annex.

2. The Inspectors did make a number of clarifications and changes in the text at the suggestion of the Secretariat, for which they are grateful. But most suggested changes to the guidelines and website have not been accommodated as they simply eviscerate the entire report. Major transparency initiatives and website content are asked to be removed, or are deemed impracticable, either because the Secretariat feels they breach confidentiality of the process or impinge on the Secretary-General's discretionary authority. The Inspectors believe to do so would take the Secretariat back to square one and maintain the status quo. Throughout the Secretariat's comments, concerns are expressed about the need for confidentiality of the process, writ large, which is in contrast with the objectives of this report. The Inspectors believe the challenge is to strike a balance between providing enough information to Member States so they are confident that the process is open, fair and transparent without compromising the privacy of the candidates or jeopardizing the confidentiality of the deliberative processes of either the interview panels or the Secretary-General himself. The Inspectors believe this balance has been struck with their suggested guidelines and website.

3. A careful reading of the recommended guidelines and website content makes clear that there should be no compromise to the integrity or effectiveness of the Secretary-General's deliberations. The Inspectors were careful to ensure the privacy of the candidates while making the overall process more transparent to Member States and to the candidates themselves. The Inspectors do not believe and do not agree that the contents of either of the two recommendations in any way breach the Secretary-General's discretionary authority, nor are there any confidentiality issues involved. As explained in the report in paragraphs 46 to 48, the Secretary-General has the discretionary authority to select and appoint whomever he wishes. But, the Secretary-General should not have carte blanche to avoid the process he himself has created. That process, set out in the Secretary-General's accountability report (A/64/640), is in place, but opaque. The Inspectors accept that any process, be it for Headquarters-based, field-based, or other senior positions, is and will be fraught with political volatility, but that cannot be used as an excuse to bypass transparency in the selection and appointment process of these individuals. The Inspectors believe the suggested guidelines and website information should obviate any concerns in this regard and invite Member States to accept, reject or modify the recommendations in this report as appropriate.

Annex IV: Overview of action to be taken by participating organizations on JIU recommendations
JIU/REP/2011/2

		Intended impact	United Nations, its funds and programmes												Specialized agencies and IAEA													
			United Nations*	UNCTAD	UNODC	UNEP	UN-HABITAT	UNHCR	UNRWA	UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	WFP	UNOPS	ILO	FAO	UNESCO	ICAO	WHO	UPU	ITU	WMO	IMO	WIPO	UNIDO	UNWTO	IAEA
Report	**For action**		☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	For information		☐	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒
Recommendation 1		**a**	**L**																									
Recommendation 2		**a**	**L**																									

Legend: **L:** Recommendation for decision by legislative organ
: Recommendation does not require action by this organization

Intended impact: **a:** enhanced accountability **b:** dissemination of best practices **c:** enhanced coordination and cooperation **d:** enhanced controls and compliance **e:** enhanced effectiveness **f:** significant financial savings **g:** enhanced efficiency **o:** other

* Covers all entities listed in ST/SGB/2002/11 other than UNCTAD, UNODC, UNEP, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR, UNRWA.

JIU/REP/2011/3

SOUTH-SOUTH AND TRIANGULAR COOPERATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

Prepared by

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Joint Inspection Unit

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United Nations

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Original: ENGLISH

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United Nations, Geneva 2011

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

South-South and triangular cooperation in the United Nations system
JIU/REP/2011/3

As requested by the High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation (HLC), the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) included in its programme of work for 2010, a system-wide review of the existing United Nations institutional arrangements in support of South-South (SSC) and triangular cooperation (TC). The objective of the review is to assess the current situation and make recommendations on the ways and means of enhancing system-wide contribution to South-South and triangular cooperation, addressing issues of mandates, frameworks and policies, intergovernmental processes, structures, financing and coordination.

Main findings and conclusions

The review found that South-South cooperation has made its way, albeit slowly, across the United Nations system, as called for by the Buenos Aires Plan of Action over 30 years ago. To attain full impact, however, current United Nations institutional arrangements should be improved in terms of overall system-wide policy frameworks, governance, coordination, structures, mechanisms and dedicated resources. Moreover, the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (SU/SSC) should prioritize its activities and resources in line with its extended mandate. In terms of triangular cooperation, more effort is required to enhance its contribution to South-South cooperation.

Absence of a common definition

Despite efforts made by many organizations at mainstreaming SSC into their work and operational activities, lack of understanding of the definition and concept of SSC and TC, and of the differentiation between the regular technical cooperation programmes and those dealing specifically with SSC remain problematic (recommendation 1).

Lack of dedicated intra-agency support structures

Only three organizations have dedicated SSC units in place at headquarters. Other organizations lack a dedicated and identifiable structure or mechanism that can initiate, coordinate, report and evaluate their support to SSC across programme activities. The absence of sufficient dedicated resources for this activity in many organizations has meant that the full potential of SSC has not been tapped (recommendation 3).

Weak overall SSC governance

At the same time, SSC governance, including the mandate and working methods of the HLC, needs to be revisited to ensure better coordination, encourage higher participation in its activities, and drive positive action (recommendation 4).

Poor application of guidelines and guidance

The 2003 Revised Guidelines for the Review of Policies and Procedures Concerning Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (hereafter the “Revised Guidelines”), which provide a common United Nations framework of indicators for measuring progress and results, have not been fully applied by the United Nations organizations, notwithstanding the fact that the contents of the guidelines were discussed thoroughly and

adopted by the system as a whole. With a few exceptions, support to SSC at the regional and country levels has not been effective; guidelines are not adhered to, ignored, or lack operational value. Very few United Nations Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAFs) make reference to SSC, and even fewer have a relevant specific outcome. Although the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) guidance package for UNDAFs was updated in 2009 to include SSC as an area of work, there is no operational guidance for its implementation, nor is there a mechanism in place whereby UNDAFs are systematically scrutinized to ensure mainstreaming of SSC at the country level (recommendation 2).

Weak reporting mechanisms

Barring a few exceptions, there is little adherence by the organizations of the system to existing reporting mechanisms on their activities in support of SSC, and often reporting amalgamates SSC with the regular technical cooperation programmes. This also applies to evaluations; more needs to be done in terms of tracking, monitoring and evaluating SSC activities (recommendation 11).

Underfunding of SSC

Inadequate financing has been a major stumbling block in advancing support to SSC within the United Nations Development System (UNDS). A specific percentage, not less than 0.5 per cent of core budgets must be devoted to this activity and more needs to be done by the organizations of the system to mobilize and allocate conditionality-free extrabudgetary funds in support of SSC (recommendation 9).

More effective action at regional level needed

At the regional level, the United Nations Regional Commissions can play a more effective role in advancing SSC. The lack of an effective presence of the SU/SSC at the regional level has meant lost opportunities for the United Nations development system in advancing SSC through existing regional and subregional integration schemes. The regional presence of SU/SSC should be strengthened and centralized at the headquarters of the Regional Commissions in order to enhance its visibility and input, and create synergies. The regional coordination mechanisms (RCMs) should be leveraged as a means of galvanizing support to SSC by the United Nations system at the regional level. Consideration should be given to developing regional and subregional UNDAFs (recommendations 7 and 8).

Ambitious mandate, not matched with resources

The mismatch between the expanded mandate and functions of the SU/SSC, and existing institutional and financial capacities must be addressed in order to make its work more effective. Activities should be prioritized and the staffing profile reviewed accordingly, including the role of the Regional Commissions. The issue of the independence of the SU/SSC within UNDP needs to be addressed by the HLC (recommendations 5 and 6).

Triangular cooperation lacks coherent strategy and policy

While triangular cooperation (TC) has increased, there is a lack of strategic thinking with regard to policies and financing mechanisms governing such cooperation. More work is required to strengthen its promotion and contribution to SSC (recommendation 10).

Weak coordination mechanisms hamper potential impact of SU/SSC

Current coordination arrangements at the regional and country levels in support of SSC are inadequate, and in certain cases non-existent. There is need for a review of such

arrangements in order to better delineate responsibilities and enhance synergies in the work of the SU/SSC and other United Nations system organizations at the regional and country levels. The effectiveness of the focal point system should be boosted and thematic working groups or clusters should be set up (recommendation 12).

The report contains 12 recommendations, three of which are addressed to the executive heads of the United Nations system organizations, and nine to the legislative or governing bodies of the United Nations system organizations, as follows.

Recommendations for consideration by legislative or governing bodies

Recommendation 1

The High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation (HLC) should request the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Administrator, as Chair of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), to mandate the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (SU/SSC), in coordination with United Nations system entities, including the Regional Commissions, to propose operational definitions of South-South and triangular cooperation, submit them to the General Assembly for approval, through the seventeenth session of the HLC in 2012, and ensure their dissemination and application, including through workshops and training sessions at headquarters and field level system-wide.

Recommendation 3

The legislative bodies of United Nations system organizations should request the Executive Heads to establish identifiable and dedicated structures, mechanisms and focal points tasked with developing agency-specific corporate policy and support strategy, and ensure coordination on South-South and triangular cooperation within their respective organizations and inter-agencies, through the reallocation of the necessary staff and resources for this purpose, as appropriate.

Recommendation 4

The High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation (HLC) should request the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly, no later than the end of 2012, a proposal to review the current South-South cooperation (SSC) governance structure and its secretariat support within the United Nations, so as to ensure more efficient and effective work procedures for the HLC, and better delineation of responsibilities and interaction among all stakeholders. The proposal should address:

(a) The need for greater participation by technical cooperation agencies, related national authorities and focal points in the work of the HLC;

(b) The need for a regular thematic agenda, discussion and action, based on the work of standing thematic groups composed of national authorities, academia, civil society and the private sector, as appropriate;

(c) The consideration of thematic and sectoral reports by relevant United Nations system organizations.

Recommendation 5

The High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation (HLC) should:

(a) Request the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (SU/SSC) to continue implementing its mandate and responsibilities as assigned by the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA), the New Directions for Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries and the Nairobi outcome document, focusing on global and United Nations system policy support and advocacy; inter-agency coordination and facilitation; catalyzing innovate mechanisms; fostering inclusive partnerships and mobilizing resources from both public and private entities to support multi-agency initiatives in implementing the Nairobi outcome document; and supporting knowledge-sharing, networking and exchange of best practices, including through new and existing centres of excellence, the SU/SSC and United Nations system platforms. To that effect, SU/SSC should review its current portfolio of activities and staffing profile with a view to prioritizing activities while ensuring better delineation of responsibilities with other United Nations entities; and

(b) Call on all relevant United Nations system organizations to support the work of the SU/SSC and leverage the services it offers.

Recommendation 6

The High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation (HLC) and the Economic and Social Council, in coordination with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), should consider relocating the regional representatives of the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (SU/SSC) to the Regional Commissions, with direct reporting to UNDP and the SU/SSC.

Recommendation 7

The High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation (HLC) should provide further clarification on the reporting lines of the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (SU/SSC) with a view to reconciling the issue of its separate identity within the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and effecting closer integration of the Unit within the UNDP structure, including requesting the UNDP Administrator to establish collaborative working arrangements at headquarters and in the regions, and the regular participation of the Unit Head and its regional coordinators in all strategic and decision-making mechanisms and meetings, so as to enhance the profile and visibility of the Unit, and ensure that South-South cooperation (SSC) is reflected as a cross-cutting issue in all programmatic decisions at corporate and system-wide levels.

Recommendation 8

The Economic and Social Council should request the United Nations Regional Commissions to set up strategies, structures/mechanisms, and mobilize or reallocate resources at the legislative, programmatic and operational levels dedicated to enhancing subregional, regional and interregional South-South cooperation (SSC), and to use the annual meetings of the regional coordination mechanisms (RCM) as a tool for advancing system-wide cooperation and coordination in support of SSC.

Recommendation 9

The legislative and governing bodies of the United Nations system organizations should request the Executive Heads to apportion a specific percentage – not less than 0.5 per cent – of core budget resources for the promotion of South-South

cooperation (SSC) in their respective areas of competence, in consultation with programme countries; and to agree with donor countries to use a specific portion of extrabudgetary resources to finance SSC and triangular cooperation initiatives.

Recommendation 11

The High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation (HLC)) should request the Executive Heads of United Nations system organizations, funds and programmes, including the Regional Commissions to, starting from 2012:

(a) Put in place systems to monitor their South-South (SSC) and triangular (TC) cooperation activities;

(b) Include in their regular reports to their governing bodies a subsection on their contribution in support of such cooperation;

(c) Provide inputs to regular reports to the Economic and Social Council, the HLC and the General Assembly, including the Secretary-General's biennial reports to the General Assembly;

(d) Produce thematic reports at the request of the HLC; and

(e) Conduct periodic evaluations of their South-South (SSC) and triangular cooperation (TC) activities, based on an agreed set of indicators.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AU	African Union
BAPA	Buenos Aires Plan of Action
BRICS	Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa Alliance
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CEB	United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination
CPCJ	Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DCF	Development Cooperation Forum
DESA	Department of Economic and Social Affairs
EAC	East African Community
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECDC	Economical Cooperation among Developing Countries
ECE	Economic Commission for Europe
ECESA	Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESCAP	Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
ESCWA	Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
G-77	Group of 77
GSSD	Global South-South Development
GSTP	Global System of Trade Preferences
HLCP	High-level Committee on Programmes
HLC	High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IBSA	India, Brazil, South Africa Alliance
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
ITC	International Trade Centre
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
LAC	Latin American and the Caribbean
LDC	Least Developed Country
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa’s Development
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OSAA	Office of the Special Advisor on Africa
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
PGTF	Perez Guerrero Trust Fund
QCPR	Quadrennial Comprehensive Policy Review
RCM	Regional Coordination Mechanism
RDT	Regional Director Team
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SSC	South-South Cooperation
SS-GATE	South-South Global Assets and Technology Exchange
SU/SSC	Special Unit for South-South Cooperation
TC	Triangular Cooperation
TCDC	Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries
TCPR	Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review

TICAD	Tokyo International Conference on African Development
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDS	United Nations Development System
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFSSC	United Nations Fund for South-South Cooperation
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNWTO	World Tourism Organization
UPU	Universal Postal Union
WB	World Bank
WBI	World Bank Institute
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WIDE	Web of Information for Development
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
XB	Extra-budgetary

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Objectives, methodology and scope

1. In its decision 16/1 of 4 February 2010[1], the High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation (HLC) requested the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) to review the existing United Nations institutional arrangements in support of South-South cooperation (SSC) and triangular cooperation (TC), and to make recommendations in order to facilitate the preparation by the Secretary-General of a specific framework of operational guidelines for relevant United Nations organizations and agencies, in accordance with their respective mandates, for the implementation of the Nairobi outcome document of the High-level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation, held in Nairobi from 1 to 3 December 2009, and endorsed by General Assembly resolution 64/222. The JIU thus included this item as a mandated project in its 2010 programme of work.

2. The objective of the review focused on assessing the existing institutional arrangements in support of SSC and TC within the United Nations system, drawing on and sharing lessons learnt, as well as identifying best coordination and collaboration practices for the preparation of the said framework.

3. More specifically, for each organization, the review examined:

(a) The institutional framework, mandate, policy objectives, structures and reporting on SSC and TC;

(b) Responsiveness to Member States requirements for support to SSC, as well as relevant resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly;

(c) Financial arrangements or prospects for resource mobilization.

4. In accordance with the internal standards and guidelines of the JIU and its internal working procedures, the methodology followed in preparing this report comprised the preparation of terms of reference in close consultation with the HLC Bureau and the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (SU/SSC) of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), a preliminary desk review, questionnaires, interviews, field visits and in-depth analysis.

5. The review covered organizations, funds and programmes and specialized agencies of the United Nations system, as well as the United Nations Regional Commissions. Intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and Member States of the HLC were also consulted to solicit their views on current institutional arrangements and areas in which the United Nations system could provide support, as well as their expectations of the findings of this report.

6. Responses to the JIU questionnaire were received from 18 of the 25 JIU participating organizations, three from the five Regional Commissions, four from other United Nations organizations, 10 from 85 Member States, and six from 24 non-United Nations organizations. The Inspectors also conducted interviews with more than 80 officials of the United Nations system and other international organizations, as well as with representatives of the HLC and Member States which either benefit from and/or provide SSC (Annex II). Unfortunately, owing to the small number of responses received to the questionnaires addressed to Member

[1] A/65/39 (supp).

States and non-United Nations organizations and groupings, the Inspectors were unable to arrive at robust and comprehensive conclusions on their perspective. However, the views provided have been included in the report, where appropriate.

7. For the purpose of the review, the terms "technical cooperation among developing countries (TCDC)", "economic cooperation among developing countries (ECDC)", and "south-south cooperation (SSC)" will be used as applicable.

8. This report builds on the findings and recommendations of the JIU report, United Nations development system support to the implementation of the Buenos Aires plan of action on technical cooperation among developing countries (A/40/656), many of which are still valid more than 25 years later. The report on implementing the Buenos Aires plan of action was praised by the then Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) (now the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB)) as a "timely and thought-provoking contribution to the extensive discussions and recommendations that have taken place throughout the United Nations on how best to implement TCDC, as laid down by the Buenos Aires plan of action for promoting and implementing TCDC".[2]

9. Comments from participating organizations, HLC members and other organizations on the draft report have been taken into account in finalizing the report, as appropriate. In accordance with article 11.2 of the JIU statute, the present report has been finalized after consultation among the Inspectors so as to test its conclusions and recommendations against the collective wisdom of the Unit.

10. In the light of this review, the JIU has formulated a set of recommendations, as a basis for the Secretary-General's guidelines framework for the implementation of the Nairobi outcome document, and for consideration by the HLC at its inter-sessional meeting in 2011, as well as by the General Assembly and other legislative/governing bodies of United Nations system organizations. To facilitate the handling of the report, and the implementation of its recommendations, as well as the monitoring thereof, the table in annex V indicates whether the report is submitted to the organizations concerned for action or for information. The table identifies the recommendations relevant for each organization, and specifies whether they require a decision by the organization's legislative or governing body or whether they can be acted on by the Executive Head of the organization.

11. The Inspectors wish to express their appreciation to all who assisted them in the preparation of this report, particularly those who participated in the interviews and questionnaires, and so willingly shared their knowledge and expertise.

B. Background

South-South and Triangular Cooperation

12. This review is based on the underlying premise reiterated time and again in resolutions and decisions of the United Nations, and more recently in the Nairobi outcome document,[3] that the responsibility for technical and economic cooperation among developing countries lies primarily with them, and that the United Nations system should play a supportive and catalytic role in enhancing such cooperation.

13. The idea of cooperation among developing countries originates from the Afro-Asian Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, which gave rise to the Non-Aligned

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[2] A/40/656/Add.1, para. 1.
[3] Paras. 10, 18, 20, 21.

Movement (NAM) in 1961, the creation of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the Group of 77 (G-77) in 1964.

14. Between 1972 and 1977, the General Assembly, driven by the action of NAM and the G-77, adopted a series of resolutions calling on the United Nations system to assist developing countries in their efforts to increase technical cooperation among themselves. The General Assembly decided to establish a working group to formulate recommendations on TCDC; set up a Special Unit within UNDP to promote TCDC; convene a special session at a high political level devoted to development and technical cooperation; and inscribe TCDC as a permanent item in the agenda of the General Assembly.

15. After five years of preparatory work, the first United Nations Conference on TCDC took place in Argentina from 30 August to 12 September 1978, adopting the Buenos Aires plan of action for promoting and implementing technical cooperation among developing countries (BAPA). BAPA was the first major blueprint for TCDC, providing new orientations in approaches to development cooperation, with emphasis on national and collective self-reliance among developing countries, as the foundations for a new international order.

16. Of the 38 recommendations of BAPA, 31 were addressed to the developing countries; and six concerned the organizations of the United Nations development system, more concretely UNDP, requesting that they define policies, procedures and structures to support, promote, finance and coordinate TCDC activities.

17. Recommendation 26 called on the UNDP Administrator to evaluate and improve the functioning of existing information systems on the capacities and needs of developing countries. Recommendations 32 and 33 were directed specifically at organizations of the United Nations system, inviting their governing bodies to contribute to BAPA and requesting their secretariats to integrate TCDC in their programmes of work. Recommendation 34 was addressed to UNDP, requesting it to reorient its activities, programmes and projects to support TCDC, and to work in close collaboration and coordination with the regional commissions and other organs and agencies of the United Nations. Recommendation 37, recognizing UNDP as the principal funding source for the United Nations development system, underlined its particular responsibility for the promotion of and support to TCDC in cooperation with other organizations of the United Nations system, while setting out the intergovernmental arrangements for follow-up. Recommendation 38 concerned the financing of TCDC through UNDP country, regional and global indicative planning figures, increasing resources from organizations of the system devoted to TCDC as well as resources from developed and developing countries.

18. Steps were subsequently taken towards implementing these recommendations. General Assembly resolution 33/134 of December 1978 endorsed BAPA and called for the strengthening of the Special Unit for TCDC to assist the UNDP Administrator in carrying out the functions described in recommendation 34 of BAPA. It also entrusted the overall intergovernmental review of TCDC within the United Nations system to a high-level meeting of representatives of all States participating in the UNDP, to which United Nations organizations, organs and Regional Commissions were invited to participate actively, in line with recommendation 37 of BAPA. The name of the meeting was changed by the General Assembly in its resolution 35/202 of 1980 to High-level Committee on the Review of Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (HLC). In 2004, the General Assembly, in resolution 58/220, replaced the term TCDC by South-South Cooperation (SSC).

19. In 1993, the first Guidelines for TCDC were introduced on an experimental basis; the enriched Revised Guidelines was approved 10 years later in 2003 (TCDC/13/3). In 1995, the General Assembly, in its resolution 50/119, adopted the New Directions for TCDC (TCDC/9/3).

20. Since the adoption of BAPA, TCDC or SSC, as it is now termed, has been on the agenda of successive sessions of the General Assembly, the HLC, the Economic and Social Council, and UNDP Executive Board, and, to a lesser extent, the legislative bodies of other United Nations organizations. Its importance has been increasingly reaffirmed by recent major United Nations conferences; and in 2010, by both the High-level Plenary Meeting of the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly on the Millennium Development Goals, and the G-77 and China Ministerial meeting.[4]

21. In 2008, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the adoption of BAPA, the General Assembly decided, in resolution 62/209, to convene a High-level United Nations Conference on SSC, which was held in Nairobi, from 1 to 3 December 2009. The Nairobi outcome document, while recognizing that SSC and its agenda have to be set by developing countries, reaffirmed the key role of the United Nations system and its Regional Commissions in supporting and promoting such cooperation. It further called on the latter to play a catalytic role in SSC and TC, and in strengthening technical, policy and research support to the countries in their respective regions.[5] The Nairobi Conference has given a major political boost to SSC as the framework on which developing countries have agreed to work together to find solutions to their common development challenges, and as a mechanism of economic growth and sustainable development, sending a timely reminder to the United Nations system organizations to make additional efforts to ensure that they meet Member States' expectations with respect to support for SSC.

The economic context

22. Since the adoption of BAPA in 1978, an increasing number of developing countries have managed to diversify their economies from dependence on the production and export of raw materials to become major exporters of manufactured goods and services. Great strides have been made in industrial development and technological know-how. South-South trade as a percentage of total world trade has risen from some 12 to 22 per cent between 2005 and 2009. Domestic demand of developing countries represented 46 per cent of global growth in 2010, while gross domestic product (GDP) in low- and middle-income countries increased 7 per cent (5.2 per cent, excluding India and China), far outstripping growth in the high-income countries (2.8 per cent in 2010). Foreign direct investment (FDI) among developing countries rose to 16 per cent of the world total in 2010, representing an estimated US$210 billion, and surpassing the previous record of US$187 billion in 2008.[6]

23. Such economic success has given new energy to SSC. Some developing countries have become major regional and interregional economic drivers. Twenty-five pivotal countries were identified by virtue of their capacities and experience as playing a leading role in SSC, namely, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Malta, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Singapore, Senegal, South Africa, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia and Turkey.[7]

24. Among them, the wealth, growing power and influence of Brazil, China, India and South Africa are helping the developing world to return to pre-crisis growth rates.[8]

25. China has established itself as the workshop of the world because of its labour-intensive manufacturing capacity. Brazil has become a major supplier of global food and agricultural markets, the world's largest exporter of sugar, ethanol, beef, poultry meat, coffee and orange

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[4] A/65/L.1, paras. 23(p), 62, 71(g), 73(q); Ministerial Declaration, para 74-79, available at http://www.g77.org/doc/Declaration2010.htm.

[5] Nairobi outcome document in General Assembly res. 64/222, annex, paras. 10, 11 and 21.

[6] Based on World Bank, "Global Economic Prospects 2011: Navigating Strong Currents," January 2011; and UNCTAD data.

[7] A/64/504, para. 23.

[8] OECD, *Perspectives on Global Development 2010: Shifting wealth*, chap. 3, pp. 70-90.

juice with a reserve of 20 million hectares of potentially productive land thus having the possibility of becoming the "breadbasket of the world economy". South Africa's mineral exports have more than tripled in value between 2002-2008; and India, with its highly diversified manufacturing and agricultural base, has become a major player in South-South trade.[9]

26. In 2010, China became the first largest trading partner of the African continent, as well as Latin America, the Caribbean, and South Asia. India is among the top five sources of goods for over one third of Africa, and Brazil-Africa trade has multiplied by eight in eight years.[10]

27. China is the largest outward investor, with an investment stock in excess of US$1 trillion. Both China and India invest mainly in developing countries, to the tune of 80 and 65 per cent, respectively, of their total outward investment, compared to Brazil and South Africa, which target less than 10 per cent of FDI to developing countries.[11]

28. In triangular cooperation, Japan is positioned as a main actor, followed in the last decade by the European Union, the Nordic countries, the United States, and more recently by the Republic of Korea.

II. CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

29. During the course of this review, the Inspectors noted the lack of a unified understanding of the definitions of TCDC, ECDC, SSC and TC. Notwithstanding, there have been numerous attempts at defining these concepts throughout the years.

30. General Assembly resolution 33/134 endorsed BAPA which proposed the following definitions of technical cooperation among developing countries in 1978:

> It is a means of building communication and of promoting wider and more effective co-operation among developing countries… so that they can create, acquire, adapt, transfer and pool knowledge and experience for their mutual benefit and for achieving national and collective self-reliance...
>
> …a multidimensional process. It can be bilateral or multilateral in scope, and sub-regional, regional or interregional in character. It should be organized by and between Governments which can promote, for this purpose, the participation of public organizations and, within the framework of the policies laid down by Governments, that of private organizations and individuals. It may rely on innovative approaches, methods and techniques particularly adapted to local needs and, at the same time, use existing modalities of technical co-operation to the extent that these are useful. While the main flows of technical co-operation visualized would be between two or more developing countries, the support of developed countries and of regional and interregional institutions may be necessary.[12]

31. The group of technical cooperation experts convened in 1990 by the UNDP Administrator, and the 2003 Revised Guidelines for the Review of Policies and Procedures Concerning TCDC[13] provided updates to the above definition.[14]

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[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, paras. 5 and 7, available at http://ssc.undp.org/Buenos-Aires-Plan-of-Action.22.0.html.
[13] Decision 7/5, 6 June, 1991.

32. In the mid-1990s, the concept of TCDC evolved into a wider concept encompassing all forms of cooperation among developing countries, not restricted to technical cooperation. The General Assembly for the first time referred to SSC in its resolution 46/159 of 1991, and in 1993, the Secretary-General was requested by the General Assembly[15] to provide reports on the state of South-South cooperation. In 1995, the report on New Directions for TCDC (TCDC/9/3) (hereafter the "New Directions report") called for the concepts of TCDC and ECDC to become more closely linked at the operational level, as the types of cooperation had been institutionally separate in the United Nations system, with TCDC being the responsibility of UNDP, and ECDC under UNCTAD. In 2004, General Assembly resolution 58/220 changed the name of the HLC/TCDC to High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation (HLC).

33. The most comprehensive and far-reaching description of SSC is provided in the Nairobi outcome document, which advances that SSC involves initiatives "in the social (particularly health and education), economic, environmental, technical and political fields":

> …an important element of international cooperation for development, offers viable opportunities for developing countries in their individual and collective pursuit of sustained economic growth and sustainable development.
>
> …a manifestation of solidarity among peoples and countries of the South that contributes to their national well-being, national and collective self-reliance and the attainment of internationally agreed development goals including the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
>
> …based on their common objectives and solidarity, and guided by, inter alia, the principles of respect for national sovereignty and ownership, free from any conditionalities. South-south cooperation should not be seen as official development assistance, [but as] a partnership among equals based on solidarity.
>
> …takes different and evolving forms, including, inter alia, the sharing of knowledge and experiences, training, technology transfer, financial and monetary cooperation and in-kind contributions, and
>
> …embraces a multi-stakeholder approach, including non-governmental organizations, the private sector, civil society, academia and other actors.[16]

34. A study prepared by United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (DESA) in support to the 2010 Development Cooperation Forum (DCF) proposed to define SSC as a "genuine transfer of resources from the country offering cooperation programmes into the economies of partner countries." SSC includes "grants and concessionary loans (including export credits) provided by one Southern country to another to finance projects, programmes, technical co-operation, debt relief and humanitarian assistance and its contributions to multilateral institutions and regional development banks."[17]

35. The definition of triangular cooperation, originally understood as support provided by a developed country (traditional donor) for cooperation among developing countries[18], has also evolved with time.

36. In the above-mentioned DESA-commissioned study, TC is described as "Northern donors, multilateral institutions or Southern partners providing cooperation to a Southern

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[14] See DP/1990/77, para. 8; and TCDC/13/3, para. 8.
[15] General Assembly res. 38/164, para. 3.
[16] Nairobi outcome document, paras. 9, 11, 12, 18, 19 and 20(h).
[17] Office of ECOSOSC Support and Coordination, UNDESA, *South-South and Triangular Cooperation: Improving Information and Data*, (4 November 2009), p. iv.
[18] TCDC/13/3, para 41; A/58/39; A/RES/58/220, para 1; SSC/14/2, 19 April 2005, para 35 (e).

partner country to execute projects/programmes with the aim of assisting a third Southern partner country."[19]

37. The Nairobi outcome document referred to TC as:

> …support provided by developed countries, international organizations and civil society to developing countries, upon their request, in improving their expertise and national capacities through triangular cooperation mechanisms, including direct support or cost-sharing arrangements, joint research and development projects, third-country training programmes and support for South-South centres, as well as by providing the necessary knowledge, experience and resources, so as to assist other developing countries, in accordance with their national development priorities and strategies." [20]

38. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) defined TC as partnerships between Development Assistance Committee (DAC) traditional donors and pivotal countries (providers of SSC) to implement development co-operation programmes/projects in beneficiary countries (recipients of development aid).[21]

39. Despite the numerous attempts to elucidate the definitions of SSC and TC, based on interviews and information provided, the Inspectors have come to the conclusion that **there is still no universally accepted definition nor clear understanding of these concepts at the operational level.** Interpretations vary as to the nature and scope of SSC and TC. While developing countries do not see SSC in terms of traditional donor-recipient relations, but rather as horizontal cooperation, the contribution of a third developing country to a South-South scheme is interpreted by some as a triangular or as a trilateral arrangement. Similarly, some consider the United Nations system contribution to South-South activities as TC, while others consider it as participation of a traditional donor in the process. The number of countries involved may also vary in the different interpretations when labeling the concepts: for some at least two countries are involved, for others, at least three. The terms TCDC and SSC are amalgamated as if they were considered one and the same concept.

40. The report of the group of experts convened by UNDP in 1990 indicated that "some agencies within the United Nations system profess widely different understandings and interpretations of the concept of TCDC,"[22] and the 2007 Evaluation of UNDP contribution to SSC (hereafter the "UNDP Evaluation") indicated a general lack of clarity on the part of UNDP: "there is limited shared understanding of the concept of South-South cooperation across the organization and inadequate recognition of the value-added […] at the operational level." "Though many UNDP initiatives currently underway have South-South elements, they are not corporately recognized [or labeled] as such".[23] This is therefore a long-standing unresolved issue.

41. One factor that may contribute to the blurring of the concepts of SSC and TC is the attempts to position middle-income countries that are playing a more important role in SSC as "donors". Indeed, one pivotal Member State observed that there was a lack of understanding of the nuances, principles and practices observed in SSC by the United Nations system. It further added that the United Nations was viewing SSC from the perspective of a North-South/donor-recipient relationship. It was not in agreement with the way the concept of TC was being defined by the United Nations system.

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[19] See footnote 20.
[20] Nairobi outcome document, para. 15.
[21] OECD, "Triangular Co-operation and Aid Effectiveness," paper prepared by Talita Yamashiro Fordelone for the Policy Dialogue on Development Co-operation (Mexico City, 28-29 September 2009), p. 4.
[22] DP/1990/77, para. 12.
[23] UNDP Evaluation Office, *Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to South-South Cooperation* (New York, December 2007), p. x.

42. **The Inspectors conclude that the lack of a unified understanding of the definitions of these concepts impacts the promotion and support of the organizations of the United Nations system, and leads to an inaccurate process, in terms of programming, allocating resources, accounting and reporting of activities.**

43. While the Nairobi outcome document conceptually summarizes the principles, objectives and modalities of SSC and TC, more clarity is needed at the operational level to adequately implement the concepts of SSC and TC. The target proposed by SU/SSC in its 2008 Reflections report[24] to work with Member States to agree on an operational definition of SSC should help to enhance understanding, and assist in the practical application of these concepts so as to further generate momentum for SSC and TC.

44. **The Inspectors consider that the SU/SSC should involve all United Nations system organizations in the process of elaborating operational definitions. The General Assembly, through the HLC, should approve such agreed definitions**. United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office (UNDOCO) should ensure that the United Nations resident coordinator system, United Nations country teams (UNCTs) and UNDP regional offices are brought up-to-date on the adopted definitions, and apply them in UNDAF and country programming exercises. This could also form a contribution to the operational guidelines on SSC called for in the Nairobi outcome document. Workshops and training courses should be organized to this effect at both headquarters and field level.

The adoption of the following recommendation would contribute to enhancing effectiveness.

Recommendation 1

The High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation (HLC) should request the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Administrator, as the Chair of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG), to mandate the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (SU/SSC), in coordination with United Nations system entities, including the Regional Commissions, to propose operational definitions of South-South and triangular cooperation, submit them to the General Assembly for approval, through the seventeenth session of HLC in 2012, and ensure their dissemination and application, including through workshops and training sessions at headquarters and field level system-wide.

III. SOUTH-SOUTH AND TRIANGULAR COOPERATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

45. The BAPA called on the United Nations system to play a prominent role, as promoters and catalysts, in TCDC. It also called on their governing bodies to mobilize their organizations to contribute to the implementation of TCDC, and reorient their internal policies and procedures to respond adequately to the principles and objectives of TCDC. The BAPA also called for internal adjustments in their secretariats in order to integrate TCDC in their programmes of work. Bearing in mind the importance that TCDC as an integral part of UNDP activities, the BAPA entrusted the UNDP Administrator with the responsibility "to give the necessary orientation to the activities, programmes and projects of UNDP, in order to

[24] UNDP, SU/SSC, *2008 Reflections* (New York, June 2009), para. 69.

support the objectives of TCDC", including working in collaboration with the regional economic commissions, and the regional offices of other United Nations development organizations, through their respective headquarters. SU/SSC has the role of assisting the Administrator to carry out these functions.[25]

46. Successive resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and HLC, including the latest triennial comprehensive policy review (TCPR) of operational activities for development of the United Nations system,[26] have made similar calls on the United Nations development system to mainstream SSC and TC into their programmes of activities.

47. Furthermore, in his report promoting SSC after 30 years of implementation, issued prior to the Nairobi High-level Conference on SSC, the Secretary-General noted that during the first decade of implementing the BAPA, every biennial report of the HLC had expressed dissatisfaction with the performance of United Nations organizations. However, his comment on the second and third decades of implementation were more encouraging as he noted that United Nations organizations had "hit their stride" as "firm advocates and proponents of SSC", and that "every programme now ha[d] a SSC component; for some it [was] a primary element of policy and programming."[27] Nonetheless, the Nairobi outcome document acknowledged the need to reinvigorate the United Nations development system in supporting and promoting South-South cooperation, through twelve areas of action, including mainstreaming of SSC within United Nations organizations, strengthening the mandate and capacity of the SU/SSC, enhancing the role of the regional economic commissions, applying, improving existing guidelines, and financing, [28] which will be further discussed in this report.

48. This review ascertained the extent to which organizations of the United Nations system have responded to the repeated calls to mainstream SSC in their work programmes and operational activities. The criteria selected included whether they had a legislative mandate from their governing body, and/or directives issued by their executive management; whether there were strategic frameworks and programmes dedicated to SSC; what organizational structures were in place for SSC; amount of human and financial resources dedicated to SSC; mechanisms for monitoring, reporting on and evaluating SSC.

A. Mandate, frameworks, policies, guidelines and programmes

49. In terms of mandate**,** after examining the legislative mandates of TCDC at United Nations organizations, the 1985 JIU Report on the United Nations development system support to the implementation of the Buenos Aires plan of action on technical co-operation among developing countries concluded that since virtually all the governing bodies of the United Nations system had endorsed the BAPA, there was no need for a new system-wide mandate. The Inspectors therefore recommended that the BAPA be considered a binding legislative framework for TCDC activities by the organizations of the United Nations development system.[29] HLC took note of the JIU report and concurred with its findings.[30]

50. While at the time it was understood that there was no need for a new system-wide framework in addition to BAPA, and despite the update provided in 1995 by the New Directions report, it is obvious that notwithstanding the validity of the principles and

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[25] BAPA, para. 45, and recommendations 33 and 34.
[26] General Assembly resolutions 44/222; 46/159; 48/172; 52/205, para. 8; 58/220, paras. 3 and 9; 59/250, para. 8; and 62/208, paras. 2 and 55.
[27] A/64/504, para. 53.
[28] Nairobi outcome document, para. 21(a) to (l).
[29] JIU/REP/85/3, para. 102, recommendation 1(a).
[30] A/40/656, page 36.

recommendations, such mandates, policies and procedures need to be refreshed in the light of more recent developments in international economic and financial relations.

51. In this regard, the Secretary-General's Policy Committee in 2008 requested the SU/SSC to prepare a concept paper updating the principles and strategies contained in the BAPA and the New Directions report, and to develop a framework on food security, climate change and HIV/AIDS to be presented to the first session of CEB in 2009.[31] However, to date, the said paper and framework have not yet been completed.

52. The current JIU review confirmed that all respondent organizations, except UNWTO, WFP and WIPO have legislative mandates on SSC (or TCDC and ECDC). For example, UNDP 2004-2007 Multi-Year Funding Framework and the 2008-2011 Strategic Plan recognized SSC as one of the six drivers of development effectiveness and global partnerships for development; ILO Decent work in the Americas: An agenda for the Hemisphere 2006-2015, adopted at the Sixteenth American Regional Meeting in Brasilia in May 2006, includes horizontal and South-South cooperation, while ILO governing body decision of November 2009 on the organizations' technical cooperation strategy for 2010-2015 refers to SSC; UNFPA has adopted a specific strategic framework for SSC, and UNDP is working on it; UNEP has prepared a policy guidance on SSC that is pending approval; all with support from the SU/SSC. There are also relevant executive directives at UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, and UNIDO (see Annex I).

53. While broadly indicative of the responsiveness on the part of the United Nations system organizations to calls for mainstreaming SSC in their work, the above global picture would be incomplete without delving further into the programmes of activities that system organizations are actually undertaking in support of SSC. Indeed, the JIU found that most organizations had programmes and/or projects identifiable as support to SSC either at headquarters, regional and/or country level, including FAO, ILO, ITC, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-HABITAT, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNODC, WFP, and WHO, in particular the Regional Office for the Americas/PAHO. In other organizations, such as IAEA, ICAO, IMO, UNEP, WIPO and WMO, SSC is subsumed under the regular technical cooperation programmes (see Annex I).

54. Some organizations have implemented important SSC initiatives. For instance, FAO has implemented SSC projects in over 30 countries within the framework of the national and regional programme for food security; ICAO is implementing SSC initiatives, inter alia, in the fields of flight safety, aviation security, prevention of the spread of communicable diseases and civil aviation training at the sub-regional level; ILO is very active in promoting SSC on child labour through the ILO/Brazil partnership agreement; WFP has supported SSC projects to fight hunger and under-nutrition in Latin America; UNESCO carries out SSC activities in education, sciences, communication/information and culture; and UN-HABITAT conducts SSC activities relating to water and sanitation. Since 2002, UNFPA has been promoting the use of regional and national entities of developing countries in providing technical assistance: in 2008, UNFPA supported some 189 South-South initiatives, including partnerships in fistula repair; census management; population surveys; delivery of reproductive health services; HIV infection among women; gender-based violence; use of database software; training on and raising awareness of population and development issues; gender mainstreaming. Since 2008, UNDP has stepped up efforts to use South-South approaches in all focus areas through its global, regional and country programmes, and has supported SSC and TC through strategic partnerships and forums with China (International Poverty Reduction Center), South Africa, India, Japan (TICAD), and the Republic of Korea, through consultancies to country offices

[31] Secretary-General's Policy Committee decision 2008/26.

and knowledge-sharing systems. More than 200 SSC activities in over 130 countries were reported in 2009, including study tours, workshops, training sessions and projects, mainly in the area of governance, but also in energy and the environment, development planning, gender, disaster prevention, crisis management and public administration.

55. UNODC undertakes triangular initiatives at field level under the framework of the Paris Pact/Rainbow Strategy, and in regional and subregional projects in South Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean; UNCTAD, inter alia, carries out research and analysis on SSC and manages the Global System of Trade Preferences (GSTP) among developing countries; UNIDO has a portfolio of ongoing and completed projects in areas including trade capacity-building, renewable energy and technology transfer, through its established industrial south centres in China and India; UNEP, in implementing the Bali Strategic Plan for technology support and capacity development and the Convention on Biodiversity, adopted in May 2008, decision XII/25 on South-South cooperation on biodiversity for development that led to the organization of expert meetings in 2010 and 2011, and the adoption of a Multi-year plan of action, the implementation of which will be reviewed by the 11th meeting of the Conference of Parties in 2012; ITC promotes trade among developing countries and capacity-building for trade in the natural pharmaceutical sector and in agricultural commodities; PAHO supports the development of health services through the sharing of knowledge and exchange of experience among countries of the region. DESA's experience with the tax committee on SSC has helped to identify and improve the opportunities for needs-driven SSC on tax matters, including especially between countries from different regions with experiences that match up, thus improving the ability of representatives from developing country to work collectively.

56. Apart from these activities which can be specifically identified as support to South-South cooperation, the Inspectors found it difficult to differentiate which component(s) of technical assistance programmes constituted support to SSC. This amalgamation is not helpful for developing strategic frameworks and a robust policy of support to SSC, and furthermore, complicates reporting and evaluation.

57. Many of the activities reported by the United Nations system organizations are essentially traditional technical cooperation programmes at the regional and subregional levels, in the form of training courses, workshops, seminars and participation in or contribution to meetings. A few are innovative, such as the creation of centres of excellence, on-line networks and databases. It should be recalled that the 1985 JIU report on United Nations development system support to the implementation of BAPA already considered the former type of activities as traditional technical cooperation practices, and called for innovative approaches and reorientation of existing policies and procedures. **It is noteworthy that after 25 years, this problem continues to plague the system**.

58. At headquarters level, memoranda of understanding have been signed by certain organizations, such as UNDP, ILO and WFP, to frame their participation in SSC and TC with provider Governments and other organizations, whereas projects are most frequently utilized at field level. In this regard, a good practice identified at WHO/PAHO is for all project proposals submitted for approval to indicate whether they include an SSC component, and whether the beneficiary is a priority country.

59. The UNDP 2007 Evaluation of its contribution to SSC found that "UNDP and the Special Unit have been unable to fully deliver on their mandate to promote and support SSC", and that UNDP has not developed a robust and proactive approach to leverage the SU and other programmes to support SSC.[32] It noted that individual initiatives, and not institutional

[32] UNDP, *Evaluation of UNDP contribution to SSC*, 2007, p. ix.

directions, drove UNDP efforts and found that the UNDP approach was ad hoc rather than systemic.[33] The evaluators recommended that UNDP urgently develop a strategy on SSC that builds on experience, addresses emerging issues, integrates all programmes, and is underpinned by resources, incentives and accountability.[34]

60. The Inspectors found that not much progress has been achieved since then. At the time of drafting this report, the UNDP strategy was still in preparation. At the field level, organizations continue to be more reactive than proactive. **There is no systematic approach, and isolated initiatives prevail at the request of providers targeting designated beneficiaries**.

61. **In only a few cases is SSC cited as a part of the UNDAF country document, and in many instances, at the request of the interested country**. An analysis of currently available UNDAFs at 109 country offices showed that only 17 countries explicitly referred to SSC in the document. Of these, only five (Chile, China, Mexico, Mongolia and South Africa) had a specific related outcome. Among the 25 pivotal countries in SSC,[35] only 10 had included SSC in their UNDAFs (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand and Tunisia) (see Annex III). Commitments by UNDP country offices in Addis Ababa, Lima and Nairobi to integrate SSC in the new UNDAF cycle were noted during the field visits. Although the relevant UNDG Guidance for UNDAF was updated in 2009 to include SSC as an area of work, only six of 24 UNDAFs starting in 2010 make reference to SSC.

62. At the same time, it would be unfair to place the full burden of mainstreaming SSC in country programmes on the United Nations system organizations. It should be recalled that the Nairobi outcome document reiterated that every country had the primary responsibility for its own development, that SSC and its agenda was to be set by countries of the South, in accordance with national development priorities, and that it invited developing countries to continue their efforts toward promoting SSC.[36] In that regard, it was noted that national policies and strategies for and Government support to SSC were the main challenges in promoting SSC, and as such, developing countries would need to make an additional effort to implement the BAPA and subsequent resolutions and decisions of the HLC and the General Assembly, as well as the Nairobi outcome document. Indeed, they should be the major drivers of SSC, with the United Nations system playing a catalytic and supporting role. In this regard, United Nations system organizations, in particular UNDP and the SU/SSC have been providing assistance to developing countries to develop the relevant capacities and policies on request, and should continue to do so more proactively.

63. In terms of guidelines, it should be recalled that the first United Nations TCDC guidelines were prepared in 1993, and revised in the light of the New Directions report for TCDC, and approved by the HLC in 2003. The Revised Guidelines provide strategic guidance and focus for the implementation of SSC by United Nations system organizations, and propose a common framework of indicators for measuring progress and results. However, the 2007 Evaluation of UNDP contribution to SSC found that even at UNDP, the framework and indicators were not utilized and were of limited relevance to the programming needs of country offices, and that there was no guidance material on how to operationalize them.[37]

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[33] Ibid., pp. 22 and 23.
[34] Ibid., p. 35.
[35] A/64/504, para. 23.
[36] See paras. 10, 11, 18, 20(a).
[37] UNDP, *Evaluation of UNDP contribution to SSC*, 2007, p. 22.

64. The Nairobi outcome document, while reaffirming the relevance of the Revised Guidelines and calling for their full implementation, recognized the need for their continuous improvement in order to strengthen the capacity of the United Nations system organizations to promote SSC, as well as to further develop a specific framework of operational guidelines.[38] The Inspectors were informed that the SU/SSC and UNDG/UNDOCO have initiated work to develop operational guidelines for SSC. In this respect, it was pointed out that those operational guidelines should also include guidance on the role of the United Nations system to capture and provide relevant data to address the lack of systematic information on SSC projects and initiatives.

65. **In view of the above, the Inspectors conclude that the strategic framework, policies, guidelines and programmatic documents for SSC and TC at most United Nations organizations are weak and need to be improved. The SU/SSC should work more effectively in this regard with all United Nations system organizations, as requested by the BAPA and the Nairobi outcome document**. The HLC should develop such strategic framework, policies and guidelines, which in turn may be adapted to the areas of competence of each organization. UNDG/UNDOCO should ensure that the United Nations resident coordinator system, UNCTs and UNDP regional offices apply them across the system, and include them, as appropriate, in UNDAF and regional/country programming exercises. Workshops and training sessions should be organized to this effect at both headquarters and field levels.

The implementation of the following recommendation would enhance effectiveness.

Recommendation 2

The UNDP Administrator, as Chair of UNDG, should request the SU/SSC, in coordination with United Nations system entities, including the Regional Commissions, and through UNDG/UNDOCO, to develop a common framework and strategy, policies and operational guidelines to support mainstreaming of South-South and triangular cooperation and knowledge-sharing through relevant programmes and projects at headquarters, regional and country levels to be adapted by the organizations to their respective areas of competence, for submission through the High Level Committee on South-South cooperation (HLC) to the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly for approval, with a view to their dissemination and application, including through workshops and training sessions, not later than the end of 2012. All relevant headquarters programmes, UNDAF and technical cooperation projects should contain a SSC component, at the request of Governments, as appropriate.

B. Organizational structures/mechanisms

66. There are a myriad of institutional arrangements for dealing with SSC-related issues in United Nations organizations. Ideally, a dedicated unit in each organization should provide policy guidance, promote a coordinated approach across the organization, and act as a focal point for interaction with other organizations. The Nairobi outcome document welcomed the initiative of some organizations to establish new units and programmes to support and promote SSC within their respective mandates.[39]

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[38] Nairobi outcome document, para. 21(j).

[39] See para. 21(e).

67. This review found that only three organizations have a dedicated unit at headquarters to deal principally with SSC: the Integrated Food Security Support Service (TCSF) at FAO, the Economic Cooperation and Integration among Developing Countries Unit at UNCTAD, and the SU/SSC at UNDP. A unit is scheduled to be set up at UNEP, in accordance with its new policy guidelines on SSC, while ILO has a working group on SSC in the Partnership and Development Cooperation Department, as well as an informal SSC network.

68. The dedicated units have different functions. At UNCTAD, for instance, the Unit is mainly involved in policy research and analysis. However, there are usually other divisions and programmes within these organizations that also actively deal with SSC (except at FAO, where only the TCSF deals with SSC). Better internal coordination is required.

69. At other organizations, the technical cooperation department/division, the policy division or a special programme is in charge of or act as focal point for SSC: the Special Programmes and LDC Group at UNIDO; the Bureau of Strategic Planning at UNESCO; the Division on Policy and Practice at UNICEF; the Development Cooperation Policy Branch at DESA; the Paris Pact Coordination Unit/Integrated Programme and Oversight Branch at UNODC; the Department of Partnerships and United Nations reform at WHO (see Annex 1).

70. SSC is considered a cross-cutting delivery mechanism in most reporting organizations. As such, several programmes and divisions also carry out SSC and TC, including at IAEA, ICAO[40], ILO, IMO, UN-HABITAT and WIPO. According to UNDP, there is a focal point for SSC at each Bureau. However, these programmes, divisions and bureaux do not interact on a regular basis with each other within the same organization. In fact, the SU/SSC indicated that there were 30 United Nations interagency focal points as at 2007. In this regard, it was pointed out that the profile of focal points within organizations should be raised, including through appointing senior professional staff and allocating resources to its effective functioning.

71. Some organizations with field presence at regional and country levels have major components of SSC/TC and dedicated staff: WFP Monitoring and Supporting Unit in Latin America and the Caribbean; UNODC regional office for Brazil and the Southern Cone, which has a unit dedicated to SSC coordination; UNFPA country office in Brazil, which has included SSC as one of its country programme outcomes since 2004 and has assigned funds to facilitate the experience along with funds allocated by the Government of Brazil to its priority issues; UNDP country offices in Brazil and China, for which dedicated staff are funded by the host countries; and at IAEA, the regional agreements (AFRA, ARASIA, ARCAL, RCA), concluded among the parties and endorsed by the Board of Governors, provide coordination for SSC within their own regions. While no explicit coordination across regions is envisaged under the regional agreements, during their quadripartite meeting in September 2010, comprising all regional agreements, the Chairs agreed to exchange information about their activities at regular intervals.

72. In most United Nations organizations, staff and resources fully focused on SSC are not easily identifiable, even in organizations where efforts have been made to mainstream SSC into their programmes of work and operations. For example, in its response to the JIU questionnaire, IAEA stated that it has 63 full-time Professional staff devoted to SSC, with 100 General Service staff and 16 consultants at headquarters. This comprises the full technical cooperation programme of the organization, which covers SSC. ICAO, IMO, UNEP, WIPO

[40] ICAO stated that its Technical Cooperation Bureau is responsible for managing and executing sub-regional programmes, while responsibility for the technical aspects rests with its regular programme.

and WMO stated that SSC is a component of their technical cooperation activities, but they could not break down the number of dedicated staff or specific funding figures. Other organizations provided rough estimates of staff time (partly) devoted to SSC.

73. Without adequate organizational structures and/or coordination mechanisms, dedicated staff and resources, mainstreaming cannot be effective and remains a vague and immeasurable objective. In this respect, the Inspectors consider that since the implementation of SSC is the main responsibility of Member States, it is up to them to take steps to call on the executive heads at each organization to initiate necessary mechanisms.

The implementation of the following recommendation would disseminate best practices.

Recommendation 3

The legislative bodies of United Nations system organizations should request the Executive Heads to establish identifiable and dedicated structures, mechanisms and focal points tasked with developing agency-specific corporate policy and support strategy, and ensure coordination on South-South and triangular cooperation within their respective organizations and inter-agencies, through the reallocation of the necessary staff and resources for this purpose, as appropriate.

C. Governance

74. Since the adoption of the BAPA, the high-level meeting of representatives of all States participating in UNDP (now the HLC) has been entrusted by the General Assembly[41] to undertake the overall intergovernmental review of TCDC and SSC within the United Nations system. UNDS organizations, including the regional economic commissions, were invited to participate actively in its work.

75. The mandate of the HLC includes:

- Reviewing the implementation of the BAPA within the United Nations system;
- Ensuring that efforts to strengthen TCDC are sustained;
- Supporting new policies and innovative approaches for further development of TCDC;
- Considering the availability of financial resources and their effective use; and
- Ensuring the coordination of promotional and operational activities in UNDS.

76. The agenda and working methods of the HLC, as revised at its eleventh session in 1999, provides for a general debate on the review of progress in the implementation of the BAPA, the New Directions report, and the decisions of the Committee. It also reviews the report of the UNDP Administrator on the implementation of guidelines for TCDC and the organizational, administrative and financial arrangements of UNDP in support of SSC. A recent addition has been the selection of issues for a thematic discussion.

77. Since 1980, the HLC has met 16 times on a biennial basis, and has adopted 95 decisions from 1979 to 2007, geared towards steering the action of the United Nations system in SSC.

[41] General Assembly res. 33/134.

Milestones of the HLC include the New Directions report (TCDC/9/3), endorsed by the General Assembly in 1995; the Revised Guidelines (TCDC/13/3), approved in 2003, and the establishment of trust funds to provide additional financing for SSC.

78. Notwithstanding the above, during the interviews, concerns were raised about the agenda, work methods and composition of the HLC, and attendance at its meetings. The issues raised included the dynamics of meetings and the lack of expertise of some participants to deal with technical issues and thematic discussions inscribed on the agenda, the manner in which these issues are handled in general sessions, and the lack of tangible deliverables and follow-up between HLC sessions.

79. A review of the records of a selected number of HLC meetings confirmed that the percentage of participants from technical cooperation agencies, planning, economy- or development-related national authorities, and the number of United Nations organizations (including the regional economic commissions) and other non-United Nations organizations, who can enrich the debate and outcomes with their expertise, has indeed declined over the years. Even the High-level Conference in Nairobi in 2009 did not attract greater participation. This could be an indication of stakeholder perception that the deliberations of the Committee do not lead to concrete targets and results, and therefore the need to re-engineer the HLC.

Figure 1. Participation at HLC meetings

HLC meeting (year)	Number of Member States present	% of participants from technical cooperation agencies and related national authorities **	Number of UN organizations/ regional commissions	Number of non-UN organizations
1997	90	27	13/3	9
2001	76	26	18/3	10
2005	95	14	12/1	6
2009*	92	n/a	4/0	8
2010	84	n/a	5/0	3

*Note: * High-level Conference. ** Percentage calculated from participation lists, where at least one delegate/country comes from the cooperation, planning, economy or development national authority.*

80. The Inspectors are of the view that the work of the HLC should be revitalized, based on a review of its current composition, meeting attendance, work methods, frequency of meetings and reporting procedures, to be more inclusive of all major actors in the United Nations system, Government, academia, civil society and the private sector; to create standing thematic or sectoral working groups with regular meetings; and to better coordinate its work with other intergovernmental bodies dealing with SSC.

81. Although the General Assembly, in its resolution 58/220 (2004), endorsed the modification of the name of the HLC on TCDC to the HLC on SSC, the mandate and scope of activities were not revised. In practice, since SSC has a much wider scope than TCDC, there is a tendency in the United Nations system to address SSC in a multitude of fora, including major United Nations conferences.

82. In this regard, the Inspectors consider that improved intergovernmental governance for SSC should not be limited to the HLC and enhancement of its effectiveness. The United Nations deals with this issue on a regular basis; the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly take account of SSC biennially, as part of their agenda of operational

activities for development, and on a triennial (now quadrennial) basis, in the context of the TCPR/QCPR. The High Level segment of the Economic and Social Council has also been seized of the issue in the context of the biennial sessions of the DCF in 2008 and 2010. Other legislative bodies of United Nations organizations, including the regional economic commissions, also deal with this issue.

83. The multiplicity of fora addressing SSC is not a problem as such, as it may bring to bear different perspectives, and enrich the debate on SSC. However, if it causes fragmentation and lack of coherence in policies and approaches, it would not contribute to sharpening the focus, of enhancing coordination and consistency, or developing strategic policies in support of SSC by UNDS.

84. The HLC is the most appropriate intergovernmental body to bring coherence, coordination and oversight to the implementation of the BAPA and the Nairobi outcome document. The question raised is whether the mandate and current structure of the HLC, which was originally established to oversee the implementation of the BAPA with regard to TCDC, is commensurate with the requirements of an array of issues under SSC, which go beyond what was originally conceived by the BAPA. Thematic and sectoral reporting and discussions should help the HLC to give sharper focus to its work and its agenda when considering specific issues that are addressed by other United Nations organizations, such as SSC in trade, investment and finance by DESA and UNCTAD; SSC in regional cooperation and integration by the regional economic commissions and UNCTAD; SSC and the Millennium Development Goals by UNDP and the General Assembly; SSC and democratic governance by UNDP; SSC in Africa and least developed countries (LDCs) by the Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA) and UNCTAD; SSC in agriculture and food by FAO and WFP; SSC and health by WHO and UNAIDS; SSC in education and culture by UNESCO, among others.

85. **The Inspectors conclude that SSC governance should be rethought with a view to enhancing its effectiveness. The work methods of the HLC should be reviewed in order to create thematic groups, with the participation of experts, to move forward work between biennial sessions. Such an approach could be enhanced by the participation of the relevant United Nations system organizations which deal with the respective themes, as well as national actors and focal points, academia, civil society and the private sector, who would bring different perspectives and a high level of expertise to enrich policy decisions and drive actions on SSC and TC**.

86. Furthermore, there is need for a clear delineation of responsibilities at the intergovernmental level, both at United Nations headquarters and at the level of the United Nations funds, programmes and specialized agencies, as well as better coordination in order to ensure an orderly and pragmatic approach to support to SSC. It is obvious that such rethinking will have an impact on the mandate, funding and structure of the SU/SSC.

The implementation of the following recommendation would increase effectiveness.

Recommendation 4

The High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation (HLC) should request the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly, no later than the end of 2012, a proposal to review the current South-South cooperation (SSC) governance structure and its secretariat support within the United Nations, so as to ensure more efficient and effective work procedures for the HLC, and better delineation of responsibilities and interaction among all stakeholders. The proposal should address:

(a) The need for greater participation by technical cooperation agencies, related national authorities and focal points in the work of the HLC;

(b) The need for a regular thematic agenda, discussion and action, based on the work of standing thematic groups composed of national authorities, academia, civil society and the private sector, as appropriate;

(c) The consideration of thematic and sectoral reports by relevant United Nations system organizations.

D. Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (SU/SSC)

Mandate

87. In 1978, the BAPA proposed that the Special Unit assist the UNDP Administrator to carry out the following functions:

- Assist Governments, at their request, in collaboration with other groups, bodies and organizations of the United Nations development system to undertake TCDC programmes and activities;
- Develop, in collaboration with participating and executing agencies and the regional economic commissions, new ideas, concepts and approaches for promoting TCDC, arrange studies and analyses, and submit them for approval by legislative bodies;
- Coordinate the TCDC activities of UNDP with the participating organizations and the regional economic commissions;
- Expand the efficient use of INRES (now WIDE – Web of Information for Development) with linkages to national and regional information systems and/or focal points;
- Promote communications with inter- and non-governmental organizations to generate financial and other support for TCDC;
- Service intergovernmental arrangements for follow-up (the HLC);
- Prepare modifications to UNDP policies, rules and procedures, in accordance with General Assembly and UNDP Executive Board resolutions and decisions, with a view to improving TCDC capacity and assisting, at their request, other United Nations development system entities in this regard; and

- Prepare progress reports on the implementation of the BAPA, including recommendations to expedite its progress, in consultation with other system organizations, for consideration by the HLC.[42]


88. In 1997, the Unit was also tasked with promoting, monitoring and coordinating TCDC on a system-wide basis;[43] and in 2001, with acting as focal point of the United Nations system for SSC.[44] The Nairobi outcome document reaffirmed the mandate of the SU/SSC as a separate entity within UNDP, and coordinator for promoting and facilitating SSC and TC for development on a global and United Nations system-wide basis.[45]

89. The functions of the SU/SSC have expanded over time to include promoting TCDC and ECDC modalities in the operational activities of the United Nations system; identifying and promoting the role of pivotal countries; promoting triangular cooperation; documenting and facilitating knowledge-sharing; formulating and supporting strategic TCDC activities which benefit a large number of countries; expanding the WIDE system into a multidimensional system, setting up the Global South-South Development (GSSD) Academy and the South-South Global Assets and Technology Exchange (SS-GATE); formulating new partnerships with civil society and the private sector; identifying new funding mechanisms, mobilizing resources and managing the Perez Guerrero Trust Fund (PGTF), the United Nations Trust Fund for SSC, and the IBSA Trust Fund; acting as UNDP focal point to the G-77 and China, providing support on SCC matters and following up on major G-77 conferences and summits; organizing the annual GSSD Expo and the annual United Nations Day for SSC, among others.

90. The Inspectors noted that all these functions are organized under the Fourth Cooperation Framework for SSC (2009-2011), approved by the UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board[46] around three focus areas concerning policy development, research and advocacy; knowledge management; and innovation for scaling up impact. The Inspectors did not assess the design and implementation of this framework which is scheduled to be evaluated by the UNDP Evaluation Office in 2011. However, the Inspectors noted that financial resources are unevenly distributed among the three focus areas in the framework, with a higher concentration on the areas concerning knowledge and programme management. The same is true with regard to staff resources (although staff distribution as per the organizational chart cannot be fully equated to the three focus areas in the strategic framework, and staff in the executive management and regional offices work on several issues according to the Unit's management) (see figure 6 below).

[42] BAPA, recommendation 34.
[43] HLC decision 10/1, endorsed by General Assembly res. 52/205 (1997).
[44] General Assembly res. 56/202, para. 12.
[45] Nairobi outcome document, para. 21(g) and (i.).
[46] DP/CF/SSC/4/Rev.1.

Figure 2: SU/SSC resources by focus area



Source: DP/CF/SSC/4/Rev.1, Fourth Cooperation Framework for SSC

Figure 3: SU/SSC staff resources

2010	Executive management	Policy	Knowledge and programme management	Partnerships and resources	Regional offices
Staff	5	2	6	1	7

Source: SU/SSC, November 2010

91. With higher resources concentrated in focus area 1, Policy development, research and advocacy, the development of corporate strategies and guidelines to actually mainstream SSC into programmes and UNDAF, and integrate into Millennium Development Goals-based national development strategies could be expedited. Better coordination among organizations and focal points, and better servicing of a more dynamic HLC could also be achieved.

92. At the legislative bodies level, the Inspectors found that the SU/SSC is serving at least three masters: first, it must respond to the requirements placed on it by UNDP and its Executive Board, in conjunction with mainstreaming SSC into the activities of the organization at the country and regional levels; second, it acts as the servicing, convening and substantive support secretariat to the HLC and as the United Nations focal point on SSC within the United Nations system, together with the requirements arising from the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, which also periodically take up the issue of SSC based on inputs provided by the Unit; and third, it provides support to the G-77 and China, and acts as a de facto secretariat for the Group on South-South matters.

93. Such an enlarged mandate has tested the capacity of the Unit to deal with all the tasks in a satisfactory manner. In particular, the financing of the Unit has not completely kept up with the increasing demands placed on it.[47]

94. As a practical measure, unless additional resources are provided to back up the extended mandate and to raise the profile of the Unit. **Consideration should be given to reprioritizing the current functions and reorganizing the staffing profile of the SU/SSC. Additional support should be sought and provided, based on a clear division of responsibilities between the Unit and other United Nations offices, taking into account the substantive knowledge base, research capacity and comparative advantage of other organizations**

[47] Ibid.; and General Assembly res. 62/208, para. 53.

with regard to these issues that far surpasses the skill mix and resources available at the SU/SSC. For example, DESA and UNCTAD expertise in the areas of trade, regional integration, finance, technology, investment and services development can be leveraged to provide substantive inputs into the work of the HLC, the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly on SSC. This is also valid for other United Nations system organizations in each specific area of competence: UNIDO (industrial development), WHO (health), ILO (employment), UNEP (environment), and so on. A clearer division of labour between SU/SSC and DESA would be desirable, in particular with regard to research for policy development and knowledge-sharing. Consideration should be given to transferring some operational projects to other United Nations entities, discontinuing/ensuring financing from extra-budgetary (XB) contributions some operational projects. **The SU/SSC should focus on what it can do best, namely providing support to policy development and knowledge-sharing, advocacy, coordination, servicing intergovernmental bodies, matching capacity requirements**. Implementing projects should only be undertaken if additional XB resources are available.

The implementation of the following recommendation would increase efficiency and disseminate best practices.

Recommendation 5

The High Level Committee on South-South cooperation (HLC) should:

(a) Request the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (SU/SSC) to continue implementing its mandate and responsibilities as assigned by Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA), the New Directions for Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, and the Nairobi outcome document, focusing on global and United Nations system policy support and advocacy; inter-agency coordination and facilitation; catalyzing innovate mechanisms; fostering inclusive partnerships and mobilizing resources from both public and private entities to support multi-agency initiatives in implementing the Nairobi outcome document; and supporting knowledge-sharing, networking and exchange of best practices, including through new and existing centres of excellence, the SU/SSC and United Nations system platforms. To that effect, SU/SSC should review its current portfolio of activities and staffing profile with a view to prioritizing activities while ensuring better delineation of responsibilities with other United Nations entities; and

(b) Call on all relevant United Nations system organizations to support the work of the SU/SSC and leverage the services it offers.

Resources

95. Since the adoption of the BAPA, which recommended (recommendation 34) that the SU/SSC continue to be financed from the UNDP administrative budget, the Unit's financing has been the recurrent subject of numerous HLC and General Assembly decisions and resolutions[48], including the recent Nairobi outcome document[49], calling on the Secretary-General and the UNDP Administrator to provide adequate resources to strengthen the Unit's

[48] General Assembly resolutions 52/295; 58/220; 60/212; 62/208; 62/209; 64/222 (Nairobi outcome document).
[49] Para. 20(h) and (i).

capacity to deliver its mandate. Indeed, the financing of the Unit has not kept up with its expanded mandate and functions.


96. In response to the request of the HLC at its 10th session held in 1997, the UNDP Executive Board decided[50] to allocate 0.5 per cent of its total programme (core) resources to SSC (estimated at US$15 million for the First Cooperation Framework for TCDC); a commitment that has apparently not been met. The 2007 UNDP Evaluation found that with its evolving and expanding mandate, the Unit had difficulty in managing all its activities with the available resources, and recommended that UNDP revisit its 1997 commitment to provide 0.5 per cent of it total programme resources to SSC. In its comments to the draft report, the secretariat indicated that the original 0.5 per cent budget commitment for SSC was changed to a fixed amount per year, since UNDP was spending more than 0.5 per cent on SSC throughout the organization[51].

97. The Inspectors found that the mismatch between the resources and mandate of the SU/SSC has not been adequately addressed. Following the recommendation of the Evaluation of its contribution to SSC, UNDP allocated US$13.5 million for SSC programmes in 2009-2011 (estimated at US$4.5 million per year). However, this amount was subsequently reduced to approximately US$4.1 million in 2010, that is, about 0.37 per cent of the UNDP core budget (US$1,100 million).[52] By the end of 2010, such resources corresponded, in nominal terms, to about the same amount as in 1997 when the first SSC framework was approved, representing a decrease in real terms (see figure 4 below).

[50] DP/1995/32; Executive Board decision 95/23; DP/CF/TCDC/1; Executive Board decision 97/10; DP/1998/2.
[51] SU/SSC comments at the meeting of the Bureau of the HLC and the JIU in New York on 10 March 2011.
[52] See Report of the CEB on the Budgetary and financial situation of organizations of the United Nations system (A/65/187), table 1.

Figure 4: SU/SSC core and non-core resources

(US$ million)




Source:Core-resources based on annual average: CF1(1997-2000): US$15 million (DP/CF/TCDC/1, para. 29) and (DP/CF/TCDC/1/extension I); CF2 (2001-2003): US$7.7 million (DP/CF/TCDC/2/extension, para. 14); other figures, including non-core resources, provided by SU/SSC.

98. The graph also shows that the decrease in core resources the UNDP budget has, in general, been accompanied by an increase in donor contributions, resulting from resource mobilization efforts undertaken by the SU/SSC. However, approximately 50 per cent of the XB (non-core) resources are earmarked under the IBSA Trust Fund and the PGTF, and dedicated to projects implemented at field level, which the SU/SSC only manages. The other 50 per cent is allocated to initiatives mutually agreed by donors and the SU/SSC under UNFSSC and cost-sharing arrangements. According to the information provided by the SU/SSC, total XB resources increased from approximately US$2 million in 1997 to US$6.7 million in 2010, thereby exceeding the UNDP core contribution.

99. In contrast, UNDP core resources have increased since 2002, and its non-core resources received a boost, much higher in relative terms than that of the SU/SSC. The rise in UNDP core resources, however, did not entail an increase in the amount apportioned to the SU/SSC. The boost in non-core UNDP resources also had no impact on SSC, since such resources were not allocated to the Unit (see figure 5 below).

Figure 5: Comparison between SU/SSC and UNDP resources

(US$ million for SU/SSC; US$100 million for UNDP)



Source: UNDP resources: CEB report on Budgetary and financial situation of organizations of the United Nations system (A/65/187), tables 1 and 2; SU/SSC resources: Draft fourth cooperation framework for SSC (DP/CF/SSC/4/Rev.1), annex.

100. Nevertheless, it was noted that in addition to the programme resources, the core posts of the Unit are financed from the UNDP operating budget, estimated at approximately US$2.5 million per year. Altogether, the SU/SSC programme and core post resources financed by UNDP amounted to US$6.6 million in 2010.

101. This funding has not been enough to cover the work required by the expanded mandate of the Unit over the past 30 years. Both core and non-core resources fall short of requirements. Indeed, the resources merely finance 16 Professional posts and 5 General service posts, even though there has been an increase in the number of posts compared to 1998 (see figure 6 below), due to the creation of regional coordinator posts. Only one post is financed by trust fund contributions; all other posts are financed by UNDP. The Inspectors noted that about one-fourth of the posts were vacant at the end of 2010, a situation that has a negative impact on programme delivery.

Figure 6: SU/SSC staffing

	Director (D)	Professional (P)	General Service (GS)	Total
1998	3	7	7	**17**
2010	4	12	5	**21**

Source: 1998 data: UNDP, 20 years of South-South Partnership Building, 1978-1998, pp. 30-31; 2010 data: provided by the SU/SSC.

102. In its comments on the draft report, UNDP summarized its contribution to the SSC agenda in the United Nations system as follows:

> By generously and effectively hosting the Unit for over 32 years, UNDP's support to global and United Nations system-wide efforts to advocate, promote, coordinate and facilitate innovative South-South and triangular cooperation has been the unmatched torch-bearer for South-South cooperation and the leader in implementing the evolving South-South agenda, set in motion at the 1978 Buenos Aires Conference on TCDC, and uplifted in the Nairobi outcome document.
>
> …UNDP's support to SSC through global, regional and country programmes is unmatched by any other United Nations organization. However, it must be stressed that UNDP's support to national, regional or global SSC initiatives must be based on the principle that SSC activities must be initiated, designed, managed and implemented by developing countries. UNDP can only provide support at their request. It should also be clarified that when UNDP resources are allocated to a country, it is the national government that decides how to make the best use of UNDP resources. It is therefore not up to the UNDP Regional Representative to freely allocate part of UNDP's national allocation to SSC activities.

103. In its turn, the SU/SSC indicated that:

> With UNDP's full backing, the Special Unit has assisted the Administrator, as convener of the HLC on behalf of the Secretary-General, in preparing and organizing: (1) 16 biennial sessions of the HLC/General Assembly; (2) two major United Nations conferences on SSC, namely the United Nations Conference on TCDC in Argentina in 1978, which resulted in the BAPA, and the High-level United Nations Conference on SSC in Kenya in 2009, which produced the Nairobi outcome document; and (3) the annual United Nations Day for South-South Cooperation, declared by the General Assembly in 2004. UNDP resources allocated to the Special Unit over the years have also enabled the Unit to produce the Secretary-General's biennial reports on the State of South-South cooperation that are submitted to the General Assembly.
>
> Also, the same resources also enabled the Unit to carry out General Assembly-requested studies to assist its legislative bodies to make informed decisions. Such work has been done in the form of organizing inclusive policy dialogue forums and publications such as *Cooperation South* (10 volumes); the *South Report* 2009 on South-South trade, investment, industrial cooperation, environment, creative industries, ICT and development cooperation with UNCTAD, UNIDO, UNEP, UNESCO, ITC and South Centre; *Sharing Innovative Experiences* (18 volumes), as well as subject-specific studies and joint publications at the request of Member States, such as the *Creative Economy Report* (2 editions) in partnership with UNCTAD, UNESCO, WIPO and ICT. With the support of a large number of UNDP country offices, the Special Unit was also able to provide policy support and advice to many SSC pivotal countries governments and multi-stakeholders, such as (a) organizing a number of pivotal countries meetings; (b) DGs meeting during Expo 2009 and 2010; (c) national studies to review SSC policy, institutional arrangement or programmes for Chile, Turkey, Malaysia and establishing SSC units for Rwanda, Kenya and Sierra Leone, and a large number of networks of multi-stakeholders focal points, especially in Africa and the Caribbean.
>
> Finally, UNDP has enabled the Special Unit to develop and offer the multilateral SSC support architecture to support all partners truly committed to South-South and triangular cooperation to directly engage and invest in their own SS initiatives, rather

dependent upon external funding… consisting of (1) the GSSD Academy; (2) the GSSD Expo; and (3) the SS-GATE....

Institutional setting

104. Notwithstanding the above, the Inspectors consider that in addition to enhancing financing, institutional relations with UNDP and regional positioning on the SU/SSC should be enhanced to ensure better support to national Governments, and to be able to fulfill the United Nations system-wide mandate entrusted to it at headquarters, regional and country levels.

105. In an attempt to improve the reach of the Unit at the regional level, the establishment of four regional outposts has been approved in the 3rd and 4th South-South cooperation frameworks, with bases in Johannesburg (for Africa), Bangkok (for Asia-Pacific), Cairo (for the Arab States) - now recruiting, and in a place yet to be determined for Latin America, all located within UNDP regional service centres. Currently, among the 21 posts staffing the office, seven (or 30 per cent) are based in the regions, though not all are fully operational and four of those posts are still vacant. Interviews indicated that the arrangements with UNDP in support of the function and job description of SU/SSC regional coordinators are not fully satisfactory, and that resources allocated to this function are insufficient for the many tasks to be performed. As gathered from interviews and field missions, the relationship between SU/SSC, UNDP and other United Nations officials at field level is complex, the outcome of their work is uneven, and the impact not yet measurable. The work of the SU/SSC regional coordinators is not visible and mostly unrecognized by other United Nations officials and local authorities. They are not invited to participate in the regional coordination mechanisms of the Regional Commissions, nor in the UNDG regional Directors team (RDT) or UNCT meetings. Also, the regional coordinators do not liaise with other United Nations organizations officials involved in SSC field activities. Resolving these issues is a prerequisite for the effective decentralization of SU/SSC functions.

106. In discussions and interviews at the regional level, some United Nations officials suggested that the SU/SSC regional coordinators be relocated within the Regional Commissions to better promote SSC at regional level. However, in further consultations, UNDP did not welcome such a proposal, whereas DESA requested further clarification about reporting lines and whether they would be housed within the Regional Economic Commission as an independent entity or not. **The Inspectors consider that leveraging the Regional Economic Commissions' access to regional integration schemes, and their knowledge of regional and sub-regional dynamics, on the one hand, and participating in the regional coordination mechanisms, that bring together a number of United Nations agencies to provide advice on enhancing SSC within the regions, on the other hand, are compelling justifications for this approach**. It should be recalled that the functions of the regional coordination mechanisms include promoting policy coherence in response to identified regional priorities and initiatives, through thematic clusters and working groups. **The SU/SSC regional coordinators could be even co-located with the secretariat of the regional coordination mechanism, where they exist**. For example, the regional presence of the SU/SSC is located in South Africa, while the African Union Commission (AU) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) located in Addis Ababa work closely with the regional economic communities in Africa and are responsible for the implementation of NEPAD. In interviews with ECA and AU officials, the Inspectors found that they were not even aware of the existence of the SU/SSC in Johannesburg**.** As for reporting, the **regional representative would report to UNDP and the SU/SSC, and should be entrusted with representing the Unit at the regional level**. The operational presence in the Regional Commissions would strengthen the capacity of UNDP, the SU/SSC and the regional

coordination mechanisms and enable them to be more pro-active in providing support to SSC at the regional and subregional levels, through existing integration and coordination schemes.

The implementation of the following recommendation would result in enhanced effectiveness.

Recommendation 6

The High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation (HLC) and the Economic and Social Council, in coordination with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), should consider relocating the regional representatives of the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (SU/SSC) to the Regional Commissions, with direct reporting to UNDP and the SU/SSC.

107. Moreover, from a purely institutional perspective, the Inspectors note that the SU/SSC, with its manifold reporting lines and the dichotomy of being a separate entity hosted by UNDP, whose staff and programmes are financed (even partially) by UNDP, poses, ab initio, a managerial and identity problem that is difficult to reconcile. On the one hand, the Unit needs to work in a harmonious relationship with UNDP, on the other, owing to its special status and as the secretariat of an intergovernmental body to which it reports directly, the Unit enjoys semi-independence, which runs counter to the culture of corporate management. Although this situation is the result of political decisions taken by Member States, the fact remains that it is not conducive to the smooth functioning of the system in support of SSC, which is what Member States ultimately aspire to.

108. Despite the fact that the BAPA calls on the SU/SSC and UNDP to work collaboratively to implement SSC within and outside the United Nations system, the relationship between the two has proven to be complex, as shown by the examples cited below and confirmed in the interviews with UNDP and SU/SSC officials.

109. In terms of operational arrangements, at its 7th session in 1991, the HLC welcomed the inclusion of the Director of the SU/TCDC in the UNDP Action Committee, and called on the UNDP Administrator to include the Unit in other internal decision-making bodies, so as to enable it to participate more closely in all policy and operational matters, project approval, country and inter-country programming processes, and meetings of the regional bureaux.

110. However, the 2007 UNDP Evaluation found that the SU/SSC Director was no longer a member of the Operations Group that replaced the Action Committee, and that the participation of the Unit in programme advisory committees at headquarters was not institutionalized. It also found that some bureaux invited input from the SU on a regular basis, while others did not. With the exception of financial transactions, there was not enough systematic collaboration between the Unit and UNDP. Efforts were found to be insufficient in key areas such as United Nations system-wide coordination of SSC activities; initiatives to mainstream SSC within UNDP and at country level; strengthening the effectiveness of knowledge networks in promoting SSC. The move to post SU/SSC regional coordinators at UNDP regional centres in order to promote stronger joint action was found to produce mixed results: relatively positive in Bangkok, but not so in Johannesburg.[53]

111. The 2007 UNDP Evaluation also noted that the SU/SSC and UNDP had not leveraged their particular strengths, nor had they combined their efforts to strengthen their capacities to serve countries more effectively. It indicated that UNDP needed to recognize that the work of the Unit was not competing with that of UNDP, and that the cooperation framework should

[53] UNDP, *Evaluation of UNDP contribution to SSC*, 2007, pp. 18 and 28.

support the full mandate of the Unit, which it did not at the time. The Evaluation recommended that, inter alia, UNDP and the SU/SSC define clear collaboration arrangements; UNDP provide the SU/SSC with a platform to engage with UNCT with regard to SSC; the Director of the SU/SSC be a member of the UNDP Operations Group; and periodic reporting and discussion of the implementation of the Fourth Cooperation Framework and of the collaboration with the regional bureau take place within the Operations Group. In its response, UNDP management admitted that the relationship between UNDP and the SU/SSC was complex.[54]

112. In the course of the current review, the Inspectors followed up on this issue and found that almost no progress had been achieved since the UNDP 2007 evaluation. During interviews with SU/SSC and UNDP officials, it was felt that the relationship between them was not smooth, and that the lack of leveraging of each other's capacity remained an issue for UNDP capacities, and for the professional capacity of the SU in dealing with system-wide issues. The SU/SSC Director is now formally a member of the management group which discusses policy issues, but has been invited to attend only a few meetings so far. Meetings with UNDP senior management are occasional, even though their relationship requires periodic collaboration, and should not be based on ad hoc meetings. Furthermore, in some cases, collaboration with UNDP bureaux do not work properly.

113. The lack of collaborative arrangements not only affects the work of the Unit, but also has a negative impact on project implementation. For instance, the Government cooperation agency in China reported that the implementation of a number of projects approved in 2008 under the Perez Guerrero Trust Fund (PGTF) of the G-77 and China, and administered by the SU/SSC, could not start because UNDP had declined to sign on behalf of the SU/SSC, and the final payment of old projects was affected. The SU/SSC indicated in its comments to the draft report, that this issue has now been resolved.

114. The Inspectors also found that despite its system-wide mandate, the SU/SSC was often not present at important meetings where SSC was discussed, such as the 2008 meeting of the Secretary-General Policy Committee, and the High-level Committee on Programmes (HLCP) of the CEB meeting in Geneva in 2010. However, the Unit was required by UNDP to prepare briefings for these meetings. In the first instance, it was responsible for the implementation of decisions taken, while in the second case, the SU/SSC Director was unaware of its outcome when interviewed one month later.

115. In view of the above, the **Inspectors conclude that little progress has been achieved in implementing the recommendations of the UNDP Evaluation, which was formulated four years ago. Also, the lack of collaborative and participative working arrangements and clear reporting lines are issues that negatively impact the Unit's operational effectiveness, and therefore need to be resolved.** The Inspectors examined the possibility of upgrading the position of the Unit within the UNDP structure to an Office, thereby increasing its status and visibility in line with the momentum created by the upsurge in SSC. However, they are of the opinion that it is unlikely that this would resolve the problem related to the so-called separate identity of the SU/SSC within the UNDP, which could only be resolved by Member States, since the present situation is the result of their decisions. The Inspectors conclude that UNDP and SU/SSC should contribute jointly, and in an integrated manner, to strengthening and deepening the role of the United Nations system in SSC and TC.

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[54] DP/2008/9, paras. 7 and 8.

The following recommendation is aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the SU/SSC.

Recommendation 7

The High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation should provide further clarification on the reporting lines of the Special Unit for South-South Cooperation (SU/SSC) with a view to reconciling the issue of its separate identity within the United nations Development Programme (UNDP) and effecting closer integration of the Unit within the UNDP structure, including requesting the UNDP Administrator to establish collaborative working arrangements at headquarters and in the regions, and the regular participation of the Unit Head and its regional coordinators in all strategic and decision-making mechanisms and meetings, so as to enhance the profile and visibility of the Unit, and ensure that South-South cooperation (SSC) is reflected as a cross-cutting issue in all programmatic decisions at corporate and system-wide levels.

E. Regional Commissions

116. SSC is at the heart of the mandate of the Regional Commissions, the United Nations outposts in their respective regions, mandated to foster economic integration at the sub-regional and regional levels, promote the regional implementation of internationally agreed development goals, including the Millennium Development Goals, and support regional sustainable development, so as to contribute to bridging economic, social and environmental gaps among member countries and sub-regions through multilateral dialogue, knowledge-sharing and networking at the regional level, by working together to promote interregional cooperation, both among themselves and through collaboration with other regional organizations.

117. The Regional Economic Commissions have been cited in several BAPA recommendations[55] as well as in relevant General Assembly and Economic and Social Council resolutions as having an important role to play within their respective regions in promoting SSC. However, there has been insufficient attention to their role in advancing the SSC agenda. With the increasing number of regional economic groupings, as well as integration schemes, and bearing in mind the nature of the Commissions' mandates and their close proximity and knowledge of the countries in their respective regions, it would stand to reason that they should play an increasingly active role in supporting SSC.

118. The Secretary-General's 2009 report promoting 30 years of SSC implementation recommended that the United Nations system support SSC and TC primarily from the regional perspective, by promoting subregional and regional integration processes.[56] Although the report refers to the United Nations system as a whole, this recommendation is relevant to the work of the Regional Commissions. The Nairobi outcome document subsequently called on the Regional Commissions to play a catalytic role in promoting SSC and TC and in strengthening their technical, policy and research support for the countries of their regions, and requested that they help developing countries establish or strengthen

[55] BAPA, recommandations 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 34, 37.
[56] A/64/504, para. 92.

existing South-South centers of excellence, especially at the regional and interregional levels.[57]

119. In his reports on Regional cooperation in the economic, social and related fields to the Economic and Social Council, the Secretary-General recognized the importance of SSC as a vehicle for development and disparity reduction within and among regions,[58] mentioning regional trade agreements/schemes as useful tools for promoting regional cooperation and integration. The Inspectors note that the Regional Commissions are indeed active in this area. For instance, the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) has provided secretariat support to the Asia-Pacific Trade Agreement (APTA); ECLAC to the Associación Latino-Americana de Integración (ALADI), the Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA), the Latin American and Caribbean Summit on Integration and Development (CALC), the China-Latin America Business Summit, the Andean Community, the Rio Group and Mercosur; the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) supported the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA); ECA supports the regional economic communities in Africa through its Committee on Regional Cooperation and Integration. The Regional Commissions have also supported regional responses to food (ESCAP), fuel (ESCWA), the financial crisis and climate change (ESCAP, ECLAC), and HIV/AIDS (ECA).

120. ECLAC has worked intensively on dialogue and policy development for SSC; it is the only Regional Commission with a sessional committee on SSC, established in 1979, one year after the BAPA.[59] This committee meets biennially during the Commission sessions to consider the secretariat's biennial report on SSC in the region, and to adopt decisions to guide the activities of the Commission in this regard. Its report for the 2008-2009 biennium covered far-reaching and extensive activities carried out in support of SSC in the region.[60] In 2010, the committee requested the secretariat to develop a set of indicators to measure the social and economic impact of SSC, and to initiate a process to strengthen the capacity of institutions responsible for international cooperation in the countries of the region, especially as regards generating statistics and establishing appropriate information systems.[61]

121. ESCAP has been instrumental in organizing regional and subregional initiatives on SSC. Following the 2007 Almaty Declaration in which members requested the secretariat to strengthen the leadership of the Commission in promoting SSC to enhance development in the region,[62] it organized, in collaboration with DESA, the Asia-Pacific regional DCF, held in Bangkok in 2008, focusing on SSC and TC. In 2010, the Commission organized a High-level Consultation on the G-20 Seoul Summit to help non-G20 countries in the region to discuss and voice their concerns about the G-20 agenda. In addition, ESCAP coordinates several workshops in developing countries in the region aimed at strengthening macroeconomic capacity and South-South dialogue, and has defined an SSC regional framework for food security.

122. Based on information collected, all the Regional Commissions have a SSC component in their work programmes. At ECLAC, SSC is part of at least seven of the 12 sub-programmes, where it is referred to as horizontal cooperation; at ESCWA, the Economic Development and Globalization Division handles SSC initiatives; at the Economic

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[57] Nairobi outcome document, para. 21(d) and (e).
[58] E/2008/15, paras. 40-46; and E/2010/15, paras. 34-45.
[59] ECLAC resolutions 387(XVIII) of April 1979; and 611(XXX) of June 2004.
[60] LC/G.2439(SES.33/10).
[61] ECLAC res. 647(XXXIII) of May 2010.
[62] ESCAP resolution 63/1 of May 2007.

Commission for Europe (ECE), the Technical Cooperation Unit is the focal point for SSC issues, and all other divisions are also involved in SSC, though to a lesser extent; at ESCAP, the Programme Management Division and the Macroeconomic Policy and Development Division have implemented ad hoc projects/activities; and ECA has set up the Regional Coordination Mechanism Secretariat dedicated to coordinating United Nations support to NEPAD and the Millennium Development Goals in Africa, including SSC regional initiatives. However, none of the regional Commissions has a formal SSC focal point tasked with ensuring coordination within each Commission and with other regional organizations, neither is there a common strategy or framework for implementing SSC and TC through their work.

123. The Inspectors found that there was a great deal of variety in the manner in which the Regional Commissions provide support to SSC, as well as in the breadth and depth of their involvement. In this respect, the annual meetings of the Regional Commissions in the regions, and the meetings of the Executive Secretaries and the Chiefs of Programme Planning of the Regional Commissions in New York, could help to develop such a framework and strategy, as well as identify priorities and mechanisms for intra- and inter-regional cooperation on SSC and TC. Since 1999, the meetings of the Regional Commissions have been convened annually, pursuant to Economic and Social Council resolution 1998/46 which mandated the Regional Commissions to hold regular inter-agency meetings in their respective region. The meetings are currently held regularly in all regions, with an executive tier discussing broader or emerging policy issues, and a thematic tier addressing specific programmatic issues of regional priorities. The added advantage of the regional meetings is that they bring together most organizations of the United Nations development system in the respective region, and can therefore act as a powerful tool for involving the system in advancing SSC at the regional level. Similarly, the annual meetings of the Executive Secretaries and Chiefs of Programme Planning are organized in New York to foster coordination and collaboration among the Commissions at the policy and programming level.

124. **The Inspectors conclude that the role of the United Nations Regional Commissions in promoting SSC and TC as a key tool for accelerating the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals should be enhanced at the policy and programme levels**, through the design and implementation of a subregional, regional and/or interregional strategy on SSC, and the allocation of dedicated resources in the biennial work programme of the Regional Commissions. At the legislative level, the establishment of an SSC Committee at ECLAC is a good practice that should be replicated by the other Regional Commissions, like the biennial reporting on SSC. At the operational level, focal points for SSC should be designated at each Regional Commission, and the regional meetings should be used as an important tool to advance system-wide cooperation and coordination in support of SSC and TC.

The implementation of the following recommendation would increase efficiency and disseminate best practices.

Recommendation 8

The Economic and Social Council should request the United Nations Regional Commissions to set up strategies, structures/mechanisms and mobilize or reallocate resources at the legislative, programmatic and operational levels dedicated to enhancing subregional, regional and interregional South-South cooperation (SSC), and to use the annual meetings of the regional coordination mechanisms (RCM) as a tool for advancing system-wide cooperation and coordination in support of SSC.

F. Financing South-South cooperation

125. The BAPA, General Assembly resolutions and the Nairobi outcome document have called on Member States and United Nations system organizations to increase their financing efforts in support of SSC. The BAPA recognized that developing countries have the primary responsibility for the promotion and implementation of SSC activities and called on them to allocate funds from their national budgets to support SSC activities. The BAPA also called on the United Nations development system, particularly UNDP, to contribute financially to SSC activities.[63] Subsequent HLC and General Assembly decisions and resolutions have made similar calls to contribute financially to both SSC and TC.[64] Recognizing the effect of financial, economic and food crises, poverty and climate change on developing countries – many of which are unable to allocate funds to SSC activities –, the Nairobi outcome document invited developed countries and multilateral institutions to enhance their support to SSC and TC. It also called upon all relevant United Nations organizations to consider increasing allocations of human, technical and financial resources for South-South cooperation, as appropriate, and invited all countries to contribute in support of SSC.[65]

126. In recent years, SSC and TC have become increasingly important financing mechanisms for development cooperation. In his report on Trends and progress in international development cooperation, the Secretary-General stated that SSC and TC had risen to 10 per cent of total development cooperation by 2008, amounting to US$16.2 billion. About 25 per cent of this amount was provided through multilateral organizations.

127. The bulk of SSC is in the form of project aid and technical assistance, but with an increasing focus on humanitarian assistance, which exceeded US$1 billion in 2008. However, TC remains centered on technical cooperation. Sixteen out of the 23 DAC donors have participated in TC projects, and multilateral development banks, United Nations system organizations and Southern development cooperation providers are increasingly using this modality.

128. Contributors to SSC continue to allocate most assistance to countries with which they have close political and economic ties, in particular in nearby regions, reflecting cultural and language links, a better understanding of needs and opportunities, and lower administrative costs. There has also been an expansion of cooperation among regions.[66]

129. From the JIU questionnaire and interviews conducted, the Inspectors were informed by major South-South horizontal cooperation providers that indeed most of the contribution to SSC is through bilateral, as opposed to multilateral channels, which naturally includes the United Nations. In this regard, no precise figures or percentages could be obtained on the amount of assistance channeled through the United Nations system. Even in pivotal South countries where SSC is an instrument of foreign policy, and where international cooperation agencies manage the cooperation portfolio of the Governments, the assistance provided is not

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[63] BAPA, recommendations 35 and 38.
[64] TCDC/13/3, para. 41; A/58/39; General Assembly resolutions 58/220; and 62/209, paras. 9 and 10.
[65] Nairobi outcome document, paras. 20(b) and (e) and 21(k) and (l).
[66] E/2010/93, paras. 106-109.

exclusively routed through these agencies, but also by individual Ministries, such as agriculture, health and others, making it difficult to identify and quantify.

130. Unlike OECD countries with official development assistance (ODA), most developing countries do not have a system to account for the value of horizontal cooperation. The completeness and comparability of such data, where available, and not only the lack of it, is a complex and unresolved issue. The United Nations, in particular the Regional Commissions, could make a substantive contribution in this regard.

131. The Inspectors also note that SSC is concentrated at the subregional level, particularly among countries sharing borders or within the immediate vicinity, as well as at the regional level. However, intraregional SSC has been growing at a rapid pace, with South-South dialogue, learning and knowledge-sharing becoming an increasingly important element of international cooperation for development, including countries with cultural and language links (as in the case of Brazil), but also those without such links (as with China).

132. The following paragraphs summarize some of the findings from the field missions and interviews conducted with major SSC actors, and the responses by governments to the JIU questionnaire. In light of the limited number of replies received, the findings should not be considered exhaustive. However, they demonstrate the commitment and leading role played by new and emerging economies in SSC among other pivotal countries, and the need to further expand TC in order to mobilize more resources for SSC.

133. The scale of China's assistance to other developing countries has increased by 30 per cent and reached 1 per cent of China's GDP, surpassing all other Southern countries, and many Northern ones. Strategic direction was provided to focus assistance along the lines of the Millennium Development Goals to meet traditional needs in Africa (where there is the highest concentration of Chinese medical and construction teams), and in countries affected by natural disasters. Aid is also provided in the form of concessionary loans through the Eximbank (estimated by the World Bank at US$19 billion).[67] China's aid often comes as a package in the form of complete turn-key projects, which provide planning, financing, manpower and training. Financing is channeled through Eximbank loans (to Africa). It was not possible to establish the precise amount of Chinese assistance to SSC through the United Nations system. The Chinese authorities felt that the United Nations should play a more active role in coordination. In 2009, China signed a General Trust Fund Agreement with FAO for SSC, and a MoU for support to SSC with UNDP in September 2010.

134. Brazil is a major actor in SSC and has been increasingly devoting resources to such cooperation. Brazil's total cooperation is estimated at approximately US$750 million. In addition to the US$30 million allocated to the Brazilian Agency for Cooperation (ABC), humanitarian assistance has a separate budget handled by Itamarati, and other ministries have separate cooperation budgets. ABC allocates 75 per cent of the US$30-million budget to cooperation with UNDP, and the rest to the other United Nations organizations. UNFPA is an ABC partner which in 2010 facilitated cooperation assistance between Brazil and Guinea Bissau, Sao Tome and Principe, Haiti, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Costa Rica. ABC's SSC projects are spread over some 80 countries; many are Lusophone developing countries, but increasingly in Latin American countries.

135. India is a key actor of SSC in a wide range of areas, including through cooperation and collaboration with the United Nations system. In 2007, India announced an annual budget of approximately US$1 billion for development cooperation. In addition to financial assistance

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[67] OECD, *Perspectives on Global Development 2010: Shifting wealth*, chap. 3, pp. 70-90.

(annual grants of US$500 million), it also provides technical assistance and training (currently to 15,000 students from Africa).[68] The country has provided capacity building in the area of trade to other developing countries through 40 such programmes between 2008 and 2010. It is establishing a major capacity-building programme in the cotton sector with African cotton producers. It has provided assistance in the areas of employment, food and agriculture, health, industry, integration of women, science and technology and new materials, telecoms, tourism, transport, communications and migration in cooperation with the United Nations system.

136. South Africa has only a modest bilateral programme, focusing on the region, including technical assistance for capacity-building within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and support to Liberia and Congo.[69] It is a major actor in NEPAD and has recently joined the BRICS alliance (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). South Africa does not necessarily go through the United Nations for SSC. As a member of IBSA, South Africa contributes US$1 million yearly to the trust fund established and managed by the SU/SSC to support SSC.

137. Within the United Nations system, respondent organizations indicated that estimates of their regular budget and XB resources devoted specifically to SSC activities are difficult to render, except where there are clear indications in the programme-budget exercise and in technical cooperation funds explicitly earmarked for SSC/TCDC activities. Others did not distinguish between resources for regular technical cooperation activities and those specifically devoted to SSC. Several organizations (UNCTAD, ILO, UN-HABITAT, UNFPA, UNICEF) reported staff costs dedicated to SSC, either full or part time, as part of SSC financing. FAO, among others, included the number of "coopérants" from various countries who have been involved in their projects.[70] A number of organizations did not indicate any figure in their responses.

138. UNESCO is the only organization with a set target, allocating 0.5 per cent (approximately US$3 million) of its total regular resources in its 2010-2011 budget to SSC/TC initiatives. UNDP also set a target of 0.5 per cent to partly finance the SU/SSC, but does not meet it, as already explained (para. 96 above).

139. In terms of XB resources, United Nations system organizations which reported specifically financing SSC activities in 2010 totaling a little over US$100 million include FAO, IFAD, ILO, ITC, UNCTAD, UNIDO, WFP, UNESCO and UNODC. UNESCO accounts for just less than half of the total (US$40 million), followed by UNODC (US$27 million). Just under half of the funds comes from OECD countries (in the form of TC), and the other half from developing countries. Among developing country contributors, Brazil, China, Qatar and Saudi Arabia topped the list.

140. These figures do not account for the XB resources of organizations which did not specify what part of their non-core budgets were devoted to SSC. Even assuming the unaccounted resources in technical cooperation funds financed by XB resources for SSC accounts for half of the above figure, it would still represent an insufficient sum for the United Nations system organizations as a whole.

141. UNDP, the main United Nations development agency which the BAPA called on to dedicate a sizeable amount to fund SSC and TC projects at the global, regional and country levels, did not provide figures from either core or non-core resources, other than those

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[68] Ibid.
[69] Ibid.
[70] There were over 1,500 "coopérants" from developing countries and China, half of which were Chinese.

allocated to the SU/SSC. In this regard, the **Inspectors consider that in order to be effective, the 0.5 per cent target agreed for the financing of the SU/SSC should be set across the board to all programmes at all levels for core and non-core resources**.

142. In the case of the SU/SSC, three main trust funds finance joint SSC activities:

United Nations Fund for South-South Cooperation (UNFSSC)*:* established within UNDP in 1996, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 50/119, and renamed in 2005, which designated it as the main United Nations trust fund for promoting and supporting SSC and TC.[71] The Fund is open to contributions (cash and in-kind) from Governments of Member States, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and private sources. It has received contributions from three developed countries, the Ford Foundation, OFID (to SS-GATE), the United Nations, ILO (to "South-South in action" publication), and around 20 developing countries. The largest segment is earmarked for initiatives agreed between the donor and the SU/SSC. The major donors are China (US$6 million as multi-year SSC facility), Algeria (US$2 million for the tsunami disaster) and Nigeria (US$1 million in 2007 to support the SU/SSC knowledge-sharing facility among oil-and-gas-producing countries). Since its establishment, UNFSSC has accumulated approximately US$13.5 million.[72]

Perez-Guerrero Trust Fund (PGTF)*:* established by General Assembly resolution 38/201 of 20 December 1983. It is jointly administered by the SU/SSC and the G-77 for the purpose of supporting economic and technical cooperation activities among member countries according to priorities set by them. To date, about 33 G-77 countries and one international organization (IFAD) have made contributions for a total of US$1.5 million. The funds are used as grants to support projects carried out by three or more developing countries in line with the priorities set by the Caracas Programme of Action on ECDC of 1981, and the Havana Programme of Action of 2000. As of May 2010, 688 project proposals had been submitted, and 213 projects supported in 120 beneficiary countries, mainly at inter-regional (41 per cent) and sub-regional (40 per cent) levels in the areas of food and agriculture (28 per cent), TCDC (27 per cent) and trade (15 per cent). Two thirds of approved projects have been completed (see results on the G-77 website).[73] Nonetheless, the modest size of the fund limits its ability to respond to the increased demand for support.

IBSA Trust Fund for poverty and hunger alleviation*:* established in 2003 within the India, Brazil and South Africa Dialogue Forum. It identifies replicable and scalable projects contributing to the interests of developing countries (e.g. projects in Guinea Bissau and Haiti) through initiatives as diverse as reducing urban violence or delivering safe drinking water. It finances projects on a demand-driven basis through partnerships with local governments, UNDP and national institutions. The SU/SSC acts as fund manager, but a donors committee decides on the allocation of funds. As of May 2010, the three countries have contributed US$14.7 million, and funded eight projects in seven countries to support the most vulnerable segments of the population.

143. Regarding the Regional Commissions, ECLAC issued a report[74] in 2010 in which it indicated that it would be difficult to attempt to distinguish activities in support of SSC from other activities, as virtually all ECLAC work financed from the regular budget and non-

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[71] General Assembly resolutions 50/119, p. 5; and 60/212, p. 14.
[72] Summary of non-core contributions to SSC (as of September 2010), SU/SSC internal document.
[73] Group of 77 website, http://www.g77.org/.
[74] Activities of the ECLAC System to Promote and Support SSC during the 2008-2009 biennium (LC/G.2439 (SES.33/10), p. 5.

recurring resources supported and promoted SSC and TC to a degree. Technical cooperation expenditure for the biennium 2008-2009 amounted to US$34.5 million, but it was not possible to cost the SSC components. ECE regular budgetary spending on SSC in 2010 amounted to approximately US$1.7 million, with XB resources at around US$9 million; estimates for 2011 are US$1.6 million and US$12 million, respectively. The situation is more complex at ESCWA, with regular and XB resources for various projects in 2010 and 2011 ranging from US$11,000 to US$ 100,000. ECA is involved in SSC initiatives at the regional level through its Regional integration and economic cooperation sub-programme, which received XB resources of US$0.42 million in 2009.[75] At ESCAP, SSC is mainstreamed in the sub-programmes, so its provisions for SSC are not easily identifiable. However, about US$42,000 in total was spent to organize workshops and high-level consultations in 2010, with partial support from the Korea-ESCAP Cooperation Fund.

144. Based on information obtained from the interviews and respondents to the questionnaire, the lack of resources from the United Nations system organizations was the common thread in identifying the challenge of meeting the support requirements for SSC. In addition, the increasing trend towards XB resources for SSC/TC initiatives constitutes an important challenge for the United Nations system, due to earmarking and the attachment of conditionalities.

145. **The Inspectors conclude that the modest financial resources dedicated so far to SSC initiatives by the United Nations system organizations do not do justice to the spirit and letter of the BAPA, nor HLC and General Assembly resolutions or the Nairobi outcome document**. In this regard, the Inspectors recall that the 1985 JIU report recommended that "all organizations of UNDS, with the exception of UNDP, should earmark no less than 10 per cent of their technical cooperation resources for TCDC activities, and additionally establish TCDC trust funds, when appropriate. Support to TCDC should be explicitly emphasized in medium-term plans and should be introduced in programme budgets as a separate sub-programme of technical cooperation".[76] However, this recommendation did not find an echo within the organizations of the system.

146. Today, increasing resources are needed to fund new opportunities for SSC, particularly in the context of the crises affecting Southern countries, such as the food crisis, climate change and natural disasters. Although limited in size and lacking detailed allocation, the targets set by UNDP and UNESCO constitute a good practice which should be replicated in other organizations across board in programmes at all levels, based on planned results. Moreover, such a minimum target should be applied to both regular and XB resources, in response to the calls of the BAPA and subsequent General Assembly resolutions requesting the allocation of sizeable and increasing resources to promote SSC. Noting, however, that XB resources are earmarked by donor-specific activities and therefore cannot be unilaterally allocated to SSC unless agreed with that donor, the Inspectors suggest that the mobilization and allocation of additional resources for SSC be included in medium-term plans, programme budget requests and project designs. Resources from overhead or project support costs charged to contributions managed by the organization can finance SSC and TC, and resources from cost-sharing arrangements (interest earned on contributions) can be used with the agreement of the donors, as currently done by UNDP Brazil. Contributors to SSC should be reminded of the efficiency gains brought by SSC, since assistance generally goes to countries with close political and economic links, or cultural and language ties, which result in a better understanding of needs and opportunities and lower administrative costs.

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[75] ECA 2010 annual report (E/ECA/COE/29/7), p. 38.
[76] JIU/REP/85/3, recommendation 5.

The following recommendation will contribute to increased effectiveness and to disseminating best practices.

Recommendation 9

The legislative and governing bodies of the United Nations system organizations should request the Executive Heads to apportion a specific percentage – not less than 0.5 per cent – of core budget resources for the promotion of South-South cooperation (SSC) in their respective areas of competence, in consultation with programme countries; and to agree with donor countries to use a specific portion of extrabudgetary resources to finance SSC and triangular cooperation initiatives.

147. Support for TC from the traditional donor community has not been in tandem with the rise in cooperation among the countries of the South. A major reason is perhaps that TC does not lend itself to traditional modes of North-South aid delivery. It is conceptually different from the conventional context of North-South ODA. In this regard, traditional donors are placing emphasis on aligning the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. However, within developing countries, there is no consensus that these initiatives should be taken forward. There is concern, including among major providers and recipients of cooperation, that aligning North-South aid and SSC/TC – two different concepts – may have political and policy implications which would go well beyond the discussion of aid effectiveness. The very basis of SSC, namely the principles of collective self-reliance, solidarity, sovereignty, national ownership and non-conditionality could be put into question. Moreover, while the conventional approach to aid effectiveness issues is much more attuned to bilateral aid flows, it does not capture regional or interregional cooperation which SSC/TC usually entails. Another factor to be taken into consideration is transaction costs which seem to be much lower in SSC than in traditional North-South arrangements.

148. The alignment of traditional donor policies with SSC modalities in TC can be problematic, but not insurmountable. Among the first OECD/DAC donors to engage in TC successfully was Japan. Japan's development assistance is channeled through the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). The Inspectors were informed that Japan's support to SSC was initially mainly concentrated in the Asian region, in particular in close working relations with ASEAN. This cooperation was formalized through the JICA-ASEAN Regional Cooperation Meeting. Japan funds cooperation among the ASEAN countries as well as cooperation between Japan and Africa in support to SSC through the use of expertise from ASEAN, such as capacity building in rice and agriculture through training workshops organized by FAO. The partnership programme now covers not only ASEAN and African regions but also Latin America and the Middle East, with 12 pivotal countries from all the regions interested in SSC.

149. The Inspectors were informed that the main tools of Japanese support to SSC are the Third Country Training and Experts programme, which support Asia-Africa cooperation as well as cooperation within the African continent. Currently, it accounts for the greater portion of such cooperation. Through the Third Country programme, Japan has provided training to over 51,000 participants since 1975. In fiscal years 2008-2009, the programme had 7,600 participants, including 2,600 from Asia and 2,500 from Africa, at a cost of 2,511 million Japanese yen (approximately 30.9 million United States Dollars).

150. With the United Nations, Japan launched the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) as the vehicle for Japan's assistance to Africa. It has developed an important SSC component based on networks of official and private stakeholders among African and other developing regions in this context. The Conference was co-organized by

the Government of Japan, the United Nations Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA), UNDP and the World Bank with the substantial involvement of the African Development Bank and ECA. UNDP ensured constant agenda setting in collaboration with the African Union and NEPAD, through TICAD/UNDP (Africa Bureau).

151. Financing for the Asia-Africa Trust Fund, which was set up to support TICAD activities within UNDP, has declined in recent years from US$2.4 million/year to US$1 million in 2010. In addition, through the Japanese Human Resources Development Fund (JHRDF), which was terminated in 2002 and replaced by the UNDP-Japan Partnership Fund in 2003, Japan has contributed US$33.3 million to financing the SU/SSC activities.

152. Other OECD countries particularly active in TC are Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand (mostly in the Asian-Pacific region), Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United States of America. The Russian Federation is becoming an increasingly active participant, particularly in the Central Asian region and in the context of BRICS.

153. The European Union (EU) supports TC with leading Southern countries, such as Brazil, China and Egypt, through economic partnership agreements. Around 15-20 of EU TC projects are implemented jointly or through United Nations agencies. The EU has strategic partnerships with six United Nations system agencies, including in particular UNDP.

154. **The Inspectors note that there is a lack of strategic thinking regarding TC within United Nations system organizations**. Much more work is required to better identify strategies, financing and implementation modalities for TC, including through partnerships with Southern countries and traditional donors in areas of mutual benefit such as agriculture, climate change and regional public goods, among others. The combined research and operational experience of relevant United Nations organizations should be leveraged by the SU/SSC and through UNDG/UNDOCO.

The implementation of the following recommendation would increase the effectiveness of TC.

Recommendation 10

The UNDP Administrator should request the SU/SSC to develop strategies and financing modalities, in consultation with UNDG/UNDOCO, United Nations system organizations, DESA and donor countries, to promote triangular cooperation (TC), including through partnerships that bring together providers of horizontal development cooperation, traditional donors and the United Nations system organizations in areas of common interest.

G. Reporting, Monitoring and Evaluation

155. In its resolution 50/119 of 1995, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to produce a biennial report on the State of South-South Cooperation, in cooperation with other United Nations organizations, in particular UNCTAD and the Regional Commissions, to provide analytical and quantitative data and indicators on SSC, including recommendations for strengthening such cooperation. The 2003 Revised TCDC guidelines provide a set of 15 normative and operational indicators to be used for reporting on progress and results

achieved.[77] Based on these guidelines, the SU/SSC has elaborated questionnaires, which are circulated to United Nations system organizations in order to gather the information necessary to preparing the reports. However, a review of some of the recent reports showed that the indicators proposed were not fully used in reporting, and the quality of the data and the analysis needs to be enhanced in order to drive informed decisions by Member States. UNDP indicated that this might attest to the potential weakness of the indicators and provide an explanation to the difficulty experienced by UNDP in using them. In this regard, a review of the indicators and/or more guidance on their use is perhaps needed from the SU/SSC.

156. The Secretary-General's biennial report to the General Assembly on the State of South-South Cooperation is very similar in content to the biennial report to the HLC on the implementation of the BAPA, and both are submitted during the same year. **Therefore, for the sake of efficiency, it would be advisable to combine the two reports into a single enriched report**. It should be recalled that in addition to these two reports, the SU/SSC prepares the UNDP Administrator's biennial report to the HLC on the implementation of the Revised Guidelines, resources and organizational arrangements for SSC, the biennial reports of the HLC submitted to the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, as well as the Administrator's report on the implementation of the SSC framework, and input to several other reports as requested.

157. Several organizations report to their legislative or governing bodies on SSC within their overall annual reporting of activities or thematically within agenda items dedicated to economic and technical cooperation. In terms of thematic agenda, for instance, the DESA report to the biennial ECOSOC/DCF on Trends and Progress in International Cooperation includes a chapter on SSC and TC; DESA also reports to ECOSOC on an annual basis on the implementation of GA resolutions on the comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development, which has a dedicated section on SSC; the United Nations Regional Commissions report to the Economic and Social Council on Regional cooperation in the economic, social and related fields often includes a chapter or references to SSC; and ECLAC reports on a biennial basis on activities in support of SSC to the Commission.

158. Among organizations that include references, however brief, to SSC in their annual reports are FAO, ICAO, ITU, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNIDO and WFP (see Annex IV). For instance, the 2009 annual report of the UNDP Administrator includes two paragraphs on SSC, one referring to the changing context of development cooperation, and the second including five examples of actions in SSC at country and interregional levels.[78]

159. Monitoring and reviewing the implementation of SSC activities by the legislative bodies of United Nations development organizations was provided for in the BAPA.[79] Monitoring of SSC activities was also highlighted as a primary role of the focal point network on SSC in the Revised Guidelines[80] of which the Nairobi outcome document calls for the full implementation.[81] In many United Nations system organizations, the overall picture is fragmented and/or based on ad hoc monitoring tools related to single initiatives, such as at FAO, IAEA, ILO, and UNCTAD. At UNDP, the 2007 evaluation identified a lack of tracking or monitoring systems to provide reliable data, particularly at the country level, and recommended the development of monitoring and evaluation tools with clear benchmarks and

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[77] TCDC/13/3, paras. 51 and 52.
[78] DP/2010/17, paras. 91 and 92.
[79] BAPA, recommendation 32.
[80] TCDC/13/3, para. 45(b) and (g).
[81] Nairobi outcome document, para. 21(j).

indicators.[82] As a first response, the draft fourth cooperation framework for SSC (2009-2011) includes benchmarks and indicators which provide a basis for assessing the contributions of the SU/SSC and UNDP to national, regional and global SSC initiatives[83] and a database was set up to monitor the SSC activities reported by UNDP country offices. This is a good practice that should be concretely replicated by other organizations, but which necessitates dedicated resources. At UNICEF and WFP, country offices are required to enumerate SSC activities/initiatives in their annual country reports. However, the Inspectors were unable to determine what use is made of this wealth of information collected, which could be valuable not only for knowledge-sharing and lessons learned, but also for decision-making. In this regard, the Inspectors recall their proposal to enhance the HLC action through thematic discussions, which could be based on periodic reporting by organizations; for example, reporting on SSC in trade, investment and finance by DESA and UNCTAD, on SSC in regional cooperation and integration by the Regional Commissions and UNCTAD, on SSC and the Millennium Development Goals by UNDP, on SSC in Africa and LDCs by the Office of the Special Advisor on Africa (OSAA), sectoral reports on SSC in agriculture and food by FAO and WFP, on SSC and health by WHO and UNAIDS, and on education and culture by UNESCO.

160. In summary, the review presents/shows that there is no regular, comprehensive and standard monitoring and reporting on SSC within the United Nations system organizations, other than the reports prepared by the SU/SSC, DESA and the Regional Commissions. The content and frequency of reports, when they do exist, are uneven and the indicators proposed in the 2003 Revised Guidelines are not commonly used in monitoring and reporting. Furthermore, tracking and monitoring systems are generally lacking, except for some funds and programmes, and the impact of the reports produced is uncertain.

161. The preparation of the Secretary-General's specific framework for operational guidelines should take into account the need to develop standard measuring and reporting guidelines for relevant United Nations system organizations, including the regional Commissions, in accordance with their respective mandates. A reporting proposal revisiting the indicators proposed in the 2003 Revised Guidelines, including indicators on social development, and indicating clear reporting lines, should be jointly developed with all parties and included in the operational guidelines. Consideration should be given to enhancing the reporting by the SU/SSC to legislatives bodies, consolidating reports dealing with similar issues, and increasing thematic reporting by organizations to the HLC for greater impact. To avoid duplication of work and additional reporting, the Inspectors suggest that SSC/TC be a statutory section in already existing reports, including TCPR/QCPRs.

162. In terms of evaluation, the situation is no better. According to information collected, apart from UNDP, where a major evaluation of the organization's support to SSC was carried out in 2007, and a follow-up evaluation of the fourth cooperation framework on SSC will be completed in 2011, only IAEA and IMO have carried out relevant evaluations, even though those evaluations were part of their normal technical cooperation activities and not specific to SSC. IAEA is conducting evaluations of regional agreements which address South-South cooperation. At FAO, an evaluation of the Special Programme on Food Security in 2002 included the SSC programme. At UNICEF, while no evaluation has been undertaken, a stock-taking based on experience over the past two years on SSC was done in 2010 as an input to the draft guidance to be included in the Programme Processes and Policy Manual. UNIDO has indicated that its 2011 evaluation of South-South centres will include a thematic review of

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[82] UNDP, *Evaluation of UNDP's contribution to South-South cooperation*, 2007, pp. 5 and 35.
[83] DP/CF/SSC/4/Rev.1, paras. 48-52.

SSC. WHO intends to complete a report in 2011 on all SSC activities financed by Brazil, China and India in the health sector, to be presented at the Seoul Forum on aid effectiveness. At the end of each budgetary biennium, WHO/PAHO conducts an internal revision/evaluation of technical cooperation/SSC projects. DESA conducts an evaluation of the effectiveness and efficiency of United Nations operational activities in support of SSC, as part of the preparations for the TCPR/QCPR.

The implementation of the following recommendation would contribute to greater accountability.

Recommendation 11

The High-level Committee on South-South Cooperation (HLC) should request the Executive Heads of United Nations system organizations, funds and programmes, including the Regional Commissions to, starting from 2012:

(a) Put in place systems to monitor their South-South (SSC) and triangular (TC) cooperation activities;

(b) Include in their regular reports to their governing bodies a subsection on their contribution in support of such cooperation;

(c) Provide inputs to regular reports to the Economic and Social Council, the HLC and the General Assembly, including the Secretary-General's biennial reports to the General Assembly;

(d) Produce thematic reports at the request of the HLC; and

(e) Conduct periodic evaluations of their South-South (SSC) and triangular cooperation (TC) activities, based on an agreed set of indicators.

IV. COORDINATION

163. Coordination in support of SSC and TC within the United Nations system organizations must be undertaken at the headquarters, regional and country levels. The SU/SSC and its focal point system should be central to such coordination, as required by the BAPA, HLC decisions and General Assembly resolutions, the 2003 Revised Guidelines and the Nairobi outcome document [84]

A. Headquarters level

164. At headquarters level, the highest interagency coordinating mechanism within the system is the HLCP, which follows up on intergovernmental decisions and major United Nations conferences and summits, and identifies emerging issues requiring a system-wide response, in order to elaborate common strategies, policies and tools.

165. The CEB (formerly the ACC) has twice taken up the issue of TCDC: in 1985 in connection with comments to the JIU report on the implementation of the BAPA, and in 1993, when it approved the first set of Guidelines for TCDC.[85] More recently, in 2010, the

[84] Nairobi outcome document, para. 21 (c), (e), (f), (g) and (h).
[85] See A/40/656/Add.1; and ACC/1993/2/Add.1.

CEB included SSC on the agenda of the HLCP meeting for a briefing on the organization of the GSSD Expo, and agreed to further discuss the policy coherence dimension of SSC and TC at a later session.[86] In 2008, the Secretary-General Policy Committee had called on the CEB to encourage all members, in accordance with their mandates, to adopt measures to mainstream support to SSC in their corporate policies, instruments and strategies, backed by the designation of senior focal points and, where possible, provide the necessary budget allocations.[87] To date, no substantive discussion on the subject has taken place.

166. In addition to the HLCP, the Executive Committee on Economic and Social Affairs (ECESA) should set up a SSC cluster dedicated to bringing coherence and promoting common approaches in normative, analytical and technical work on SSC among participant United Nations entities, including DESA, funds, programmes, and Regional Commissions.

167. At the working level, the SU/SSC acts as the system-wide focal point for SSC and TC. According to the 2003 Revised Guidelines, the SU/SSC should undertake regular consultations among SSC focal points of the system organizations, organize annual meetings, and promote coordinated action between SSC focal points.[88]

168. According to the SU/SSC, there used to be a network of 30 United Nations interagency SSC focal points. However, over the last six years, only three meetings have taken place, as side events to the biennial HLC session. Considering the limited number of United Nations organizations participating in these meetings, the effectiveness of such a coordination mechanism is of serious concern. Although the SU/SSC indicated that some focal points have been involved in annual events such as the GSSD Expo and Academy, SS-GATE and the production of the South Report, those activities nevertheless fall far short of its mandate. Most organizations report ad hoc contacts. **Greater attention should be paid to leveraging the United Nations system support to SSC through the focal point system with updated terms of reference and an agreed programme of work**.

169. The Regional Commissions do not participate in the meetings of the United Nations focal points on SSC. Indeed, they have little or no interaction with the SU/SSC.

B. Regional and country levels

170. At the regional and country levels where most of the development assistance of the United Nations system takes place, the coordination of policies on operational activities is undertaken by UNDG, another CEB pillar, through UNDAF and the UNCTs. Although as early as 1998, the UNDP Administrator, in his capacity as UNDG Chair, had identified TCDC as one of the core responsibilities (among others) of the UNDP resident representatives and coordinators, institutional response has been slow.[89] It was only in response to the 2007 UNDP Evaluation, which was quite critical in this regard, that UNDG updated the Guidelines for the preparation of UNDAFs in 2009 and issued a set of strategic priorities for 2010-2011, including SSC and TC as vehicles for national capacity development. It also identified the roles and responsibilities in a work plan that encouraged UNCTs and regional UNDG teams to appropriately promote SSC and TC in support of the Millennium Development Goals.[90] Again, this updated guidance failed to provide concrete proposals, for instance, for the establishment of SSC focal points, task forces and clusters with specific terms of reference in support of SSC.


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[86] CEB/2010/6, paras. 51-55.
[87] Decision 2008/26 of the Secretary-General.
[88] TCDC/13/3, para. 46.
[89] SU/TCDC, "Message from the Administrator" in *Cooperation South*, No. 1, 1998.
[90] UNDG Strategic Priorities for 2010-2011 and UNDG Work Plan for 2010-2011 (outputs 1.1 and 3.2).

171. **The Inspectors noted that the SU/SSC has not been given sufficient tools to leverage United Nations system support. Many United Nations officials interviewed ignore the existence of the SU/SSC, and national technical cooperation agencies generally reported infrequent contacts with the Unit. The Inspectors identified the following shortcomings**:


- There is no regional or subregional UNDAF to enhance support for SSC at the regional and interregional levels;
- UNCTs and UNDAFs have not set up clusters or working groups dedicated to this issue, as for other cross-cutting issues. Exceptionally, there are task forces of the UNCTs in Brasilia and Beijing, but they were established at the request of the respective Governments;
- There is no mechanism to check UNDAFs and project proposals for SSC component;
- The field presence of the SU/SSC at UNDP regional service centres is not sufficiently staffed to ensure visibility or appropriate regional and country coverage;
- The SU/SSC regional coordinators do not participate in RCM and RDT meetings to help orient the relevant work of the Regional Commissions and UNDS;
- Not all organizations have designated focal points for SSC at regional and country levels;
- There is no regular interaction at the regional and country levels with country specific focal points, though the SU/SSC has organized three national focal points workshops at ECOWAS, CARICOM and EAC since 2008. As of 2010, there were 89 national focal points, comprising multiple stakeholders from Government, the private sector, civil society and academia. The SU/SSC intends to organize a workshop at SADC in 2011. Interaction among country focal points exists, for instance, in Latin America, where there is a regional network of SSC focal points at national technical cooperation agencies, set up in the framework of the Secretaria General Iberoamericana, which in 2008 and 2010 drafted concept papers and met to coordinate policies, with UNDP support, but without the participation of United Nations system organizations. They reflect the recent decision taken by the ECLAC SSC Committee in Brasilia in May-June 2010, which gave ECLAC a concrete mandate to develop SSC impact indicators, strengthen the capacity of cooperation agencies in the region to generate statistics, and establish information systems. **This is a good practice that should be replicated at the request of national governments and with United Nations support and participation**.

Figure 7: Current SSC coordination structure




UN System			
Level	Organization / entities	Coordination arrangements	Framework
HQ	• SU/SSC – Five UNDP Regional Bureaux • UNDESA • SSC units in FAO and UNCTAD's HQs	• DOCO (UNDG) • HLCP • ECESA • SSC focal points / biennial meetings	• BAPA (1978) • GA resolutions & HLC decisions • TCDC Revised Guidelines (2003) • TCPR (2007) • Nairobi Outcome Document (2009) • SU/ SSC Cooperation Frameworks • UNFPA SSC framework
Regional / Sub-regional	• Five Regional Economic Commissions • Six UNDP Regional / Sub-regional Service Centers and sub-centers (RCSs) • Two SU / SSC regional offices • Other UN organizations' regional offices	• RDTs/ RCM	
Country	• UNDP country offices • Other UN organizations' country offices	• UNRCs/ UNCTs	• SSC in 5 country UNDAFs

Figure 8: Proposed SSC coordination structure



UN System			
Level	Organization / entities	Coordination arrangements	Framework
HQ	• SU/SSC – Five UNDP Regional Bureaux • UNDESA • **SSC units/structures in all UN organizations' HQs**	• DOCO (UNDG) • HLCP / **agenda item** • ECESA / **SSC cluster** • SSC focal points / **annual meetings**	• BAPA (1978) • GA resolutions & HLC decisions • TCDC Revised Guidelines (2003) • TCPR (2007) • Nairobi Outcome Document (2009) • SU / SSC Cooperation Frameworks • **SSC framework at all UN orgs**
Regional / Sub-regional	• Five Regional Economic Commissions • Six UNDP Regional / Sub-regional Service Centers and sub-centers (RCSs) • **Four SU / SSC regional offices** • Other UN organizations' regional offices	• RDTs / RCM: **SSC clusters and focal points**	• **Regional / sub-regional UNDAFs**
Country	• UNDP country offices • Other UN organizations' country offices	• UNRCs / UNCTs: **SSC task forces and focal points**	• **SSC in all country UNDAFs**



172. In the light of the foregoing, the **Inspectors conclude that active and effective presence and coordination are lacking, which has resulted in lost opportunities, particularly at the regional and country levels. They consider that the current coordination arrangements need to be reviewed in order to enhance synergies among the work of the SU/SSC and other United Nations system organizations**. At the headquarters level, it is imperative that the HLCP accelerate its discussions on this issue; and the ECESA should set up a cluster dedicated to SSC. At the regional and country levels, in addition to relocating the regional representatives of the SU/SSC to the headquarters of the regional coordination mechanisms, including the Regional Commissions and country offices, and ensuring participation of its regional coordinators in RCM and RDT meetings, the operational guidelines, which are being developed by UNDG/UNDOCO, should address in particular the introduction of regional and subregional UNDAFs with SSC components as a priority area and outcome. Furthermore, regional clusters should be established, and country task forces and focal points should be designated by each organization, starting with UNDP, with clear terms of reference and an agreed programme of work. The focal point system should be made more dynamic and interactive at all levels across the United Nations system, with impetus from SU/SSC. Figures 7 and 8 above provide an overview of the current and proposed architectural structure for United Nations system-wide SSC coordination.

In addition, implementation of the following recommendation would contribute to greater efficiency.

Recommendation 12

The Secretary-General should ensure, as from 2012 that:

(a) South-South cooperation (SSC) is built into the agendas of existing coordination arrangements at headquarters, regional and country levels, in particular the HLCP/CEB, UNDG, ECESA, RCM, RDTs and UNCTs;

(b) Regular meetings of SSC thematic clusters, task forces and focal points are held with agreed terms of reference and programmes of work;

(c) South-South cooperation (SSC) is included in relevant country UNDAFs and new subregional/regional UNDAFs; and

(d) The SU/SSC is represented in all relevant coordination mechanisms, task forces and thematic clusters, as applicable.

V. CONCLUSION

173. The JIU review found that despite the efforts made by several United Nations system organizations to mainstream SSC in their activities, the existing institutional arrangements for SSC and TC need to be strengthened. The combined lack of understanding of the definition and concept of South-South (SSC) and triangular (TC) cooperation, lack of differentiation between the regular technical cooperation programmes and programmes dealing specifically with SSC, lack of dedicated and identifiable structures to initiate, coordinate, monitor, report and evaluate SSC across programme activities, and lack of a sufficient number of dedicated resources for such activities in many organizations, lead the Inspectors to the conclusion that **the full potential of SSC and TC has not been captured. There are not enough clear legislative mandates given by the governing bodies, and where they do exist, they have**

often not been translated into robust frameworks and programmes that are permeated by the spirit of SSC, as called for in the BAPA.

174. National policies, strategies and Government support for SSC are key challenges for promoting SSC. As the main drivers of SSC, developing countries need to energize their efforts and identify, in concrete terms, the support that they require from the United Nations system. UNDP, the SU/SSC, and the organizations of the United Nations system should continue to provide assistance to Governments in this regard.

175. Most of the organizations lack a strategic framework for SSC at both headquarters and field office levels. The absence of such frameworks leads to ad hoc and reactive policies in support of SSC, rather than proactive policies and operational guidelines for implementing SSC. Staff are not adequately trained in SSC matters. Strategies and financing modalities are needed to promote TC, including through partnerships among providers of horizontal development cooperation, traditional donors and the United Nations system organizations in areas of common interest. United Nations agencies need to act beyond the traditional modus operandi that focuses on training, and be more innovative in order to link supply and demand.

176. The 2003 Revised Guidelines, which propose a common United Nations framework of indicators for measuring progress and results in implementing SSC, have not been rigorously applied by the United Nations system organizations, or even by UNDP itself, notwithstanding the fact that the contents of the guidelines were discussed thoroughly and adopted by the system as a whole. Consequently, reporting, monitoring, evaluation and knowledge management have suffered.

177. Funding has been a major stumbling block in advancing support to SSC within the United Nations system. Much higher amounts of core budgets must be devoted to SSC, and the organizations of the system need to step up their efforts to raise funds that are free from conditionalities in support of SSC. Further efforts are required to differentiate between funding for conventional technical cooperation activities, and those specifically related to SSC.

178. With a few exceptions, support to SSC at the regional and country levels has not been always effective. At the country level, few UNDAFs make reference to SSC or have a relevant specific outcome. Although the UNDG Guidance for UNDAF was updated in 2009 to include SSC as an area of work, it does not provide enough operational guidance for implementing SSC. There are no arrangements to assess UNDAFs projects and provide input for mainstreaming SSC at the country level.

179. At the regional level, the United Nations Regional Commissions could play a more effective role in advancing SSC. The absence of an effective SU/SSC representation at the regional level has resulted in lost opportunities for the UNDS in enhancing support for regional and subregional integration schemes. Consequently, the regional presence of the SU/SSC needs to be strengthened and located at the headquarters of the Regional Commissions in order to enhance its input and visibility, and create synergies. The RCMs and RDTs should be leveraged as a means of galvanizing UNDS support for SSC at the regional level. Consideration should be given to developing regional/subregional UNDAFs in addition to the country UNDAFs.

180. Opportunities gained from SSC and TC are constrained by challenges such as lack of communication, coordination, planning, designing, monitoring, evaluation, political will and strategies, in addition to the need to provide adequate non-earmarked financing through TC.

181. Fresh thinking is needed with respect to SSC governance. The intergovernmental processes dealing with SSC need to be streamlined and consideration should be given to the

working methods, mechanisms and organization of the HLC in order to provide sharper focus and elicit stronger expert participation in its work, which would lead to more tangible results.

182. The mismatch between the expanded mandate of the SU/SSC and available resources must be seriously addressed. Attention must be given to prioritizing the work and resources of the SU/SSC in order for it to be more focused and effective.

183. Last but not least, the focal point system needs to be more dynamic, and coordination should be ensured at all levels, the HLCP, regional clusters and country task forces.

Annex I. Overview of SSC/TC in the United Nations system

Organization/ Office	SSC/TC mandate		SSC/TC in programme of work at headquarters/field level			SSC/TC organizational structures	
	Legislative decision	Strategic framework	Headquarters	Field	UNDAF	Focal point	Other units that are fully involved
FAO	Approved as a component of the Special/National/Regional Programmes for Food Security (SPFS, NPFS, RPFS)	Strategic framework under Strategic objective L	By programme By subject/area	Regional office: programme as technical assistance in support of food security programmes		Integrated Food Security Support Service (TCSF)	N/A
IAEA	The Revised guiding principles and general operating rules to govern the provision of technical assistance by the Agency (INFCIRC/267); Strengthening of the Agency's technical cooperation activities (GC(54)/RES/9)	Technical cooperation strategy: the 2002 review (GOV/INF/2002/8/Mod.1); Medium-term strategy 2012-2017	Cross-cutting By programme By subject/area	Regional and country office: programme through training and expert services	x	Department of Technical Cooperation	Dept. of Nuclear Sciences and Applications; Dept. of Nuclear Energy; Dept. of Nuclear Safety and Security; Office of Legal Affairs
ICAO	Council criteria on the provision of technical cooperation provides the legal framework for SSC	N/A	By subject/area	Regional, subregional and country offices: programmes on technical cooperation		Technical Cooperation Bureau (TCB) with 4 geographical focal points	Regional Offices; Air Navigation Bureau; Air Transport Bureau; Legal Bureau; Finance Branch
ILO	Various agreements, initiatives and MoUs between ILO and Brazil to promote SSC in different sectors; Governing body decision (November 2009) endorsing technical cooperation strategy for 2010-2015	Department of Partnerships and Development Cooperation (PARDEV) Work plan for 2010/2011, includes SSC outcomes	Cross-cutting By programme By subject/area	Regional and country office: programmes on technical cooperation	x	PARDEV Working group	Informal network on SSC for exchange of good practices; participants from all ILO strategic areas
IMO	IMO Assembly resolutions A.965 (23); A.1011 (26); A.1012 (26).	N/A	Cross-cutting By programme By subject/area	Regional office: programmes on technical cooperation (host countries provide facilities as part of their in-kind support)		Technical Cooperation Division (TCD) (headquarters and field); 5 geographical focal points at headquarters	Marine Environment Division (MED); Maritime Safety Division (MSD); Legal and External Affairs Division (LED) (all involved in technical co-operation implementation)
UNDESA	Triennial comprehensive policy review of operational activities for development of the UN system (A/Res/62/208); DCF: 2005 World Summit outcome document	N/A	By subject/area			Development Cooperation Policy Branch, Office for ECOSOC Support and Coordination (OESC); DESA (headquarters-based)	

Organization/ Office	SSC/TC mandate		SSC/TC in programme of work at headquarters/field level			SSC/TC organizational structures	
	Legislative decision	Strategic framework	Headquarters	Field	UNDAF	Focal point	Other units that are fully involved
UNCTAD	Outcome of UNCTAD XII Conference/Accra Accord (TD/442)	2010-2011: South-South work is explicit in subprogramme 1, expected accomplishment (a); 2012-2013: South-South work is under the same subprogramme, but with a separate indicator of achievement	Cross-cutting, Economic Cooperation and Integration Unit playing leading role By programme	N/A	x	Unit on Economic Cooperation and Integration among developing countries	Division on International Trade in Goods and Services and Commodities has a large component of SSC work
UNDP	Buenos Aires Plan of Action (1978); New directions for TCDC (1995); Nairobi outcome document (2009); Triennial Comprehensive Policy Review (2007); Revised guidelines for the review of policies and procedures concerning TCDC (2003)	BAPA endorsed by General Assembly; New Directions report endorsed by General Assembly; Strategic plan and frameworks approved by UNDP/UNFPA Executive Board; Fourth SSC framework; Global programme; 5 Regional programmes; Country programmes	Cross-cutting, SU/SSC playing a leading role	Regional and country office: programmes	x	SU/SSC; Bureau for Development Policy; Partnerships Bureau; Executive Office	Regional bureaux; Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, International Poverty Centre in Brazil; UNDP Seoul Policy Centre (2011); Country offices
UNEP	Governing Council decisions 24/12 (February 2007); 25/9 (February 2009)	Policy guidance on SSC (to be approved by senior management team); Bali Strategic plan and Medium-term strategy 2010-2013	By subject/area	Regional office: programmes		New SSC Unit planned	
UNESCO	General Conference at its 34th and 35th Sessions; Decisions of the Executive Board at its 180th and 181st Sessions	Medium-term strategy 2008-2013 (34 C/4); Approved programme and budget for 2010-2011 (35 C/5)	By programme By subject/area	Country office: programmes		Bureau of Strategic Planning	Executive Offices of each Programme Sectors, including dedicated focal point in Education for SSC Fund in Education
UN-HABITAT	Governing Council resolution 22/9 (April 2009)	N/A	Cross-cutting By programme	Regional office: programmes		Regional and Technical Cooperation Division (RTCD)	Regional Offices for Africa and Arab States (ROAAS); Asia and Pacific (ROAP); Latin America and Caribbean (ROLAC)

Organization/ Office	SSC/TC mandate		SSC/TC in programme of work at headquarters/field level			SSC/TC organizational structures	
	Legislative decision	Strategic framework	Headquarters	Field	UNDAF	Focal point	Other units that are fully involved
UNICEF	TCPR resolution (2007)	N/A	Cross-cutting By subject/area	Regional and country office: programmes	x	Division of Policy and Practice (NYHQ)	Public Sector Alliances and Resource Mobilization Office (NYHQ) involved in fundraising with new partners; Regional offices in the Americas and the Caribbean, Asia/Pacific, Central and Eastern Europe and CSI countries; Division of Governance; UN and Multilateral Affairs (NYHQ); Programme Division (NYHQ)
UNIDO	General Conference Resolution GC.10/Res.4	N/A	Cross cutting	Country office/programmes		Special Programmes and LDC Group (SPL)	South-South Centres (India and China)
UNODC	Decision by UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND)	UNODC Rainbow Strategy	By programme By subject/area	Country office/programmes		Integrated Programming Branch (IPB), UNODC Field Offices in Kabul, Islamabad and Tehran	FRMS/HRMS + UNODC Resources Mobilization Unit (CPS); Sustainable Livelihoods Unit (SLU); Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice (CPCJ) is partially involved
UNWTO	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		No specific unit	
WB	N/A	Informal mandate requested by the Board of Directors to mainstream South-South Knowledge Exchange into WB operations	Cross cutting	Country office/programmes		Knowledge Exchange Unit (WBI)	
WFP	No specific mandate on SSC/TC MOUs and agreements with Governments and institutions	Strategic Objectives as outlined in Strategic Plan 2008 – 2013	N/A	Regional office/programmes		Monitoring and Supporting Unit based at Regional Level. Regional Office for Latin America and the Caribbean (ROLAC)	Programme Unit, Nutrition Unit, HIV Unit at regional level (LAC)
WHO	Plan of Action of the 5th Global Meeting of Heads of WHO Country Office with the Regional Directors and the Director-General. 8 November 2009, endorsed early 2010 by the Global Policy Group.	N/A	N/A	Country office/programmes		No specific unit	Dept. of Partnerships and UN Reform (HQ) deals with UN issues and is focal point for UNDP initiatives on South-South cooperation for development; Dept. of Country Focus is focal point for SSC specific to countries

Organization/ Office	SSC/TC mandate		SSC/TC in programme of work at headquarters/field level			SSC/TC organizational structures	
	Legislative decision	Strategic framework	Headquarters	Field	UNDAF	Focal point	Other units that are fully involved
WIPO	N/A	N/A	By programme	Singapore Office (WSO); Brazil Office (WBO)		WIPO Development Sector (HQ) devoted to technical assistance and capacity building in intellectual property (IP) for economic, social and cultural development	
WMO	Thirteenth World Meteorological Congress (Geneva, May 1999), Abridged Final Report with Resolutions	N/A	Cross-cutting By programme	Regional office: programmes		Development and Regional Activities Dept./Resource Mobilization Office in charge of coordinating Technical Cooperation Programme	DRA/Regional Offices

Annex II. Interviews and respondents to the JIU questionnaire

			Interviewed	Responded to questionnaire
United Nations System	JIU Participating organizations	FAO	x	x
		IAEA	x	x
		ICAO		x
		ILO	x	x
		IMO		x
		ITU		
		UNCTAD	x	x
		UNDP	x	x
		UNEP	x	x
		UNESCO	x	x
		UNFPA	x	
		UN-HABITAT	x	x
		UNHCR		
		UNICEF	x	x
		UNIDO	x	x
		UN	x	DESA, OHCHR
		UNODC	x	x
		UNOPS		
		UNRWA		
		UNWTO		x
		UPU		
		WFP	x	x
		WHO	x	x
		WIPO	x	x
		WMO	x	x
	Other UN organiz-ations	IMF	x	x
		ITC	x	x
		PAHO	x	x
		World Bank	x	x
	Regional Commissions	ECA	x	
		ECE	x	x
		ECLAC	x	
		ESCAP	x	x
		ESCWA	x	x

		Interviewed	Responded to questionnaire
Member States	Brazil	x	x
	Bulgaria		x
	Chile	x	
	China	x	
	Colombia		x
	Egypt	x	x
	Ethiopia	x	
	Guatemala		x
	India		x
	Japan	x	x
	Kenya	x	
	Panama		x
	Peru	x	
	Singapore		x
	South Africa	x	
	Thailand	x	x
Non UN Organizations	African Development Bank		x
	African Union	x	
	ASEAN	x	
	Council of Europe Development Bank	x	
	Common Fund for Commodities	x	x
	European Union (EU)	x	
	IDB	x	
	IFAD	x	x
	League of Arab States (LAS)	x	
	OECD	x	x
	OFID	x	
	Secretaria General Iberoamericana (SEGIB)		x
	South Centre	x	x
	World Trade Organization (WTO)	x	

Annex III. Overview of SSC and TC in current available UNDAFs

Member States	UNDAF period	Reference to SSC	SSC outcome	Reference to TC	SSC Pivotal Countries
Afghanistan	2010 - 2013	No	No	No	
Albania	2006 - 2010	No	No	No	
Algeria	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	
Angola	2009 - 2013	No	No	No	
Argentina	2011 - 2014	Yes, SSC included as part of Cooperation Area 4 (Institutional Development); SSC as a tool to help coordinate issues of common interest at regional level, particularly in the MERCOSUR region	No	Yes, with the participation of the Fondo Argentino de Cooperacion Horizontal	x
Armenia	2010 - 2015	No	No	No	
Azerbaijan	2011 - 2015	No	No	No	
Bangladesh	2006 - 2010	No	No	No	
Belize	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	
Benin	2003 - 2013	No	No	No	
Bhutan	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	2008 - 2012	Yes, Bolivia requested as part of requirements for the cooperation of United Nations, Joint technical assistance and strengthening South-South relationship	No	No	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	2010 - 2014	No	No	No	
Botswana	2010 - 2016	No	No	No	
Brazil	2007 - 2011	Yes, Brazil requested that SSC be adopted as an implementation mechanism, among others, particularly in the prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS and also that new SSC opportunities be identified	No		x
Burkina Faso	2006 - 2010	No	No	No	
Burundi	2010 - 2014	No	No	No	
Cambodia	2006 - 2010	No	No	No	
Cameroon	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	
Cape Verde	2006 - 2010	No	No	No	

Member States	UNDAF period	Reference to SSC	SSC outcome	Reference to TC	SSC Pivotal Countries
Central African Republic	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	
Chad	2006 - 2010	No	No	No	
Chile	2011 - 2014	Yes, as a specific outcome	Outcome 4: By 2014, the country will have strengthened cooperation with other countries in the region; strengthening exchange of experiences, knowledge of good practices and sharing lessons learned in designing and implementing policies	No	x
China	2011 - 2015	Yes, as a specific outcome	Outcome 3.3: UN in China facilitates UN-China-South trilateral partnerships and China's contribution to the achievement of the MDGs worldwide	Yes	x
Colombia	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	x
Comoros	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	
Congo	2009 - 2013	No	No	No	
Costa Rica	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	x
Côte d'Ivoire	2009 - 2013	No	No	No	
Cuba	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	x
Djibouti	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	
Democratic Republic of Congo	2007 - 2010	No	No	No	
Ecuador	2010 - 2014	No	No	No	
Egypt	2007 - 2011	Yes, SSC is emphasized as a cross-cutting issue that should be streamlined in all outcomes	No	No	x
El Salvador	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	
Equatorial Guinea	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	
Eritrea	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	
Ethiopia	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	
Gabon	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	
Gambia	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	
Georgia	2011 - 2015	No	No	No	
Ghana	2006 - 2010	No	No	No	x
Guatemala	2010 - 2014	Yes, SSC as a coordination mechanism expected to support the delivery of outputs	No	No	

Member States	UNDAF period	Reference to SSC	SSC outcome	Reference to TC	SSC Pivotal Countries
Guinea	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	
Guinea Bissau	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	
Guyana	2006 - 2010	Yes, as an implementation mechanism where opportunities for SSC will be explored, e.g., seeking assistance from Brazilian Institute for Economic Research in developing poverty maps	No	No	
Haiti	2009 - 2011	No	No	No	
Honduras	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	
India	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	x
Indonesia	2011 - 2015	Yes, SSC is specifically emphasized as a cross-cutting mechanism in implementing two outcomes; disaster resilience building and climate change. Also, noted that Indonesia has much to contribute to and gain from South-South technical cooperation, especially in the area of disaster	No	No	x
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	2005 - 2010	No	No	No	
Iraq	2011 - 2014	No	No	No	
Jamaica	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	
Jordan	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	
Kazakhstan	2010 - 2015	No	No	No	
Kenya	2009 - 2013	No	No	No	
Kyrgyzstan	2005 - 2010	No	No	No	
Lao People's Democratic Republic	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	
Lebanon	2010 - 2014	No	No	No	
Lesotho	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	
Liberia	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	
Madagascar	2008 - 2011	No	No	No	
Malawi	2008 - 2011	No	No	No	
Maldives	2011 - 2015	No	No	No	
Mali	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	
Mauritania	2009 - 2010	No	No	No	
Mexico*	2008 - 2012	Yes	Outcome 3.3.7: Regional cooperation program, environmental issues, particularly within the framework of South-South relations, aimed at extending knowledge, promoting exchange of experiences, environmental education, etc.	No	x

Member States	UNDAF period	Reference to SSC	SSC outcome	Reference to TC	SSC Pivotal Countries
Mongolia	2007 - 2011	Yes, as a specific outcome	Outcome 4: Global, regional and SSC strengthened to address cross-border social, economic and environmental concerns	No	
Morocco	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	
Mozambique	2007 - 2012	No	No	No	
Namibia	2006 - 2010	No	No	No	
Nepal	2008 - 2010	No	No	No	
Nicaragua	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	
Niger	2009 - 2013	Yes, SSC as a mechanism for partnership opportunities; international partnerships including SSC and other technical and financial partners will focus on promoting decentralized cooperation and access to international expertise	No	No	
Nigeria	2009 - 2012	No	No	No	x
Pacific Islands	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	
Pakistan	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	
Panama	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	
Papua New Guinea	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	
Paraguay	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	
Peru	2006 - 2010	No	No	No	x
Philippines	2005 - 2011	No	No	No	
Republic of Moldova	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	
Rwanda	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	
Sao Tome and Principe	2007 - 2011	Yes, SSC in terms of resource mobilization; at international level, efforts will be made to continue involving the traditional bilateral donors to the country, and to enlarge partnerships to multilateral donors and also include SSC	No	No	
Senegal	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	x
Sierra Leone	2008 - 2010	No	No	No	
South Africa	2007 - 2010	Yes	Outcome 2: Strengthening SSC by supporting South Africa within the framework of IBSA Forum		x
Sri Lanka	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	
Suriname	2008 - 2011	No	No	No	
Swaziland	2011 - 2015	No	No	No	

Member States	UNDAF period	Reference to SSC	SSC outcome	Reference to TC	SSC Pivotal Countries
Syrian Arab Republic	2007- 2011	No	No	No	
Tajikistan	2010 - 2015	No	No	No	
Thailand	2007 - 2011	Yes, SSC is seen as a cross-cutting mechanism particularly affecting human security issues in the region	No		x
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	2010 - 2015	No	No	No	
Timor-Leste	2009 - 2013	No	No	No	
Togo	2008 - 2012	No	No	No	
Tunisia	2007 - 2011	Yes, particular attention will be given to South-South partnerships, such as those with subregional countries in the framework of the Arab Maghreb Union, African Union and NEPAD	No	No	x
Turkmenistan	2010 - 2015	No	No	No	
Uganda	2010 - 2014	No	No	No	
Ukraine	2006 - 2010	No	No	No	
United Republic of Tanzania	2007 - 2010	No	No	No	
Uruguay	2011 - 2015	No	No	No	
Uzbekistan	2010 - 2015	No	No	No	
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	2009 - 2013	Yes, Venezuela envisions focus on building effective institutions, improving the capabilities and the promotion of SSC		No	
Viet Nam	2006 - 2010	No	No	No	
Yemen	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	
Zambia	2007 - 2010	No	No	No	
Zimbabwe	2007 - 2011	No	No	No	
Total = 109 countries		**17**	**5**	**2**	

** Among the 25 pivotal countries in SSC, 10 of them (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, Thailand, Tunisia) included SSC in their UNDAFs.*

Annex IV. Overview of SSC and TC in current available annual reports and medium-term plans of United Nations system organizations

Organization	Document Title	Reference code	Year(s) covered	Reference to SSC	Chapter/paragraph in document	TC reference
FAO	Medium-term Plan 2010-2013; Programme of work and Budget 2010-2011	C 2009/15	2010 - 2013	Regional collaboration and harmonization of approaches, including SSC in the implementation of international instruments and standards, as well as better use of existing information, intergovernmental platforms, fora, and knowledge management tools.	Primary Tools for achievement of the Organizational Result	None
				Intra-African Training and Dissemination of Technical know-how for Sustainable Agriculture and Rural Development with Africa-ASEAN Country Cooperation within the Framework of SSC: (USD 2.6 million SO A)	Main core trust fund projects expected to be active in 2010-11	
	Programme Implementation Report	C-2011/8	2008 - 2009	Under the National and Regional Programmes for Food Security, SSC remains an important vehicle for knowledge transfer among developing countries. By the end of 2009, a total of 39 SSC agreements had been signed and over 1,400 experts and technicians had been fielded in the framework of SPFS/NPFS and RPFS in 65 countries worldwide.	National and Regional Programmes for Food Security (NPFS and RPFS)	None
IAEA	Medium-term Strategy	No code	2012 - 2017	The Agency will actively promote South-South and North-South partnerships, information and technical exchanges and capacity strengthening initiatives by increasingly building upon the expertise available in Member States and existing Regional Resource Centres and by the promotion of networking.	Reference as part of Goal D: Providing effective technical cooperation	None
	Annual Report	GC (54)/4	2009	None	N/A	Annual Report
ICAO	Business Plan	No code	2008 - 2010	None	Strategic Result TC-1	None

Organization	Document Title	Reference code	Year(s) covered	Reference to SSC	Chapter/paragraph in document	TC reference
	Annual Report of the Council	9921	2009	ICAO increased SSC through training programmes in developing countries sponsored by governments and administered through the Technical Cooperation Bureau, confirming the high priority given by ICAO and States to the training and retention of national civil aviation personnel. Summaries of SSC and TC project achievements are provided in the Annual Report of the Council, although not specifically referred to as such	Technical Cooperation Programme Chapter and Appendix	None
ILO	Strategic Policy Framework	GB.304/PFA/2 (Rev.)	2010 - 2015	Public–private partnerships, SSC, partnerships with regional structures and national expertise and networks, all pursued in collaboration with constituents, will further enable constituents to obtain greater access to important decision-making circles	Reference to SSC in Part III: Strengthening technical capacities	None
IMO	High-level action plan of the organization and priorities for the 2010-2011 biennium	A 26/Res.1012	2010 - 2011	None	N/A	None
ITU	Strategic Plan for the Union	No code	2012 - 2015	None	N/A	None
	Progress report on the implementation of the strategic plan for 2008-2011 resolution 71)	C09/21(Rev.1)	2008 - 2009	ITU is also working with UNDP on SSC on the Strengthening of African Capacity for Cost-Effective Internet Access	Reference to SSC in para. 3.3	None
UNCTAD	Annual Report 2009	UNCTAD/DOM/2010/1	2009	Contribution of UNCTAD to a series of intergovernmental discussions on SSC and regional integration	Reference to SSC in Introduction and Trade section	N/A
UNDP	Strategic Plan	DP/2007/43	2008 - 2011	Brief overview 4 (paras.) of UNDP efforts to mainstream SSC approaches in all focus areas, including a reference to the SU/SSC	Section D on South-South cooperation in Chapter V UNDP Operations	Yes
	Annual Report	DP/2010/17	2009	Examples of SSC exchanges across all UNDP practices and regions	2 paragraphs in Section E on Cross-cutting and other UNDP contributions in Chapter III Development Results	None

Organization	Document Title	Reference code	Year(s) covered	Reference to SSC	Chapter/paragraph in document	TC reference
UNEP	Medium-term Strategy	UNEP/GCSS.X/8	2010 - 2013	Facilitating SSC as one of the key mechanisms for implementing capacity-building and technology support projects on the ground, which will entail engaging with a wide range of partners and organizations	Para. 64 (i)	None
UNESCO	Medium-term Strategy	34 C/4	2008 - 2013	SSC and triangular cooperation approaches will be distinct components of each strategic programme objective, providing a platform which enables developing countries to share their experiences and to cooperate on issues of common concern; part of a broader global partnership for development	Main programmatic features of the Medium-term Strategy for 2008-2013	Yes
	Report by the Director-General on the implementation of the Programme and Budget and on results achieved in the previous biennium 2008-2009)	184 EX/4 Draft 36 (C/3)	2008 - 2009	Good practices shared through South-South cooperation, e.g. creation of a regional framework on education for sustainable development (ESD), interregional exchanges on HIV/AIDS and education	Achievements, challenges, lessons learned in para. 224	Yes
UNFPA	Medium-term Strategy	DP/FPA/2007/17	2008 - 2011	In line with General Assembly resolution 60/212 and other resolutions relevant to SSC, UNFPA will continue to provide support to deepen, intensify and enhance South-South cooperation, including through triangular cooperation	Paras. 22, 36, 81, 90, 128, 130	Yes
	Report of the Executive Director for 2009: progress and achievements in implementing the UNFPA strategic plan	DP/FPA/2010/17	2009	UNFPA is increasingly supporting South-South cooperation; in 2009, UNFPA exceeded its strategic plan target with offices reporting implementation of 409 South-South initiatives, providing lessons learned and knowledge sharing for national capacity-building	Paras. 41, 87	None
UN-HABITAT	Activities of the United Nations Human Settlements Programme Report of the Executive Director	HSP/GC/22/2	2007 - 2008	None	N/A	None
UNHCR	Report of UNCHR to the General Assembly	A/65/12	2009	None	N/A	None

Organization	Document Title	Reference code	Year(s) covered	Reference to SSC	Chapter/paragraph in document	TC reference
UNICEF	Annual Report 2009 and Medium-term Strategy 2006-2013	E/ICEF/2010/9	AR 2009 and MTS 2006-2013	Instances of SSC noted in report; also notes that SSC needs to be improved in all areas	Paras. 144, 198, 200, 207 (e)	None
UNIDO	Annual Report	IDB.37/2-PBC.26/2	2009	UNIDO strategic long-term vision statement, adopted by the General Conference at its eleventh session in 2005, recognized SSC as an increasingly important feature of UNIDO's work	Chapter 6 on Cross-cutting programmes; Section A on South-South Cooperation	None
UNODC	Medium-term Strategy	IDB.37/2-PBC.26/2	2008 - 2011	None	N/A	None
	Report of the Executive Director	E/CN.7/2011/3-E/CN.15/2011/3	2010	None	N/A	None
UNOPS	Strategic Plan	No code	2010 - 2013	None	N/A	None
	Annual Report of the Executive Director	DP/2010/30	2009	None	N/A	None
UNRWA	Medium-term Strategy	No code	2010 - 2015	None	N/A	None
WFP	Strategic Plan	No code	2008 - 2013	None	N/A	None
	Annual Report	WFP/EB.1/2010/4/Rev.1	2009	Reference to cooperation in food security at regional level, particularly in Africa, including cooperation with ECA	Para. 51	None
WHO	Medium-term Strategic Plan	MTSP/2008–2013	2008 - 2013	None	N/A	None
WIPO	Medium-term Strategic Plan	No code	2010 - 2015	None	N/A	None
WMO	Secretariat Operating Plan	1028/2007	2008 - 2011	None	N/A	None
TOTAL Reports	**15**			**10**		**1**
TOTAL Medium-term plans	**17**			**8**		**3**

Annex V. Overview of action to be taken on JIU recommendations

JIU/REP/2011/3

		Intended impact	United Nations, its funds and programmes												Specialized agencies and IAEA														
			United Nations*	UNCTAD	UNODC	UNEP	UN-HABITAT	UNHCR	UNRWA	UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	WFP	UNOPS	ILO	FAO	UNESCO	ICAO	WHO	UPU	ITU	WMO	IMO	WIPO	UNIDO	UNWTO	IAEA	ITC
Report	For action		☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒
	For information		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Recommendation 1		e	L							E																		
Recommendation 2		e								E																		
Recommendation 3		b	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Recommendation 4		e	L																									
Recommendation 5		g	L																									
Recommendation 6		e	L																									
Recommendation 7		e	L																									
Recommendation 8		b	L																									
Recommendation 9		e	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Recommendation 10		e								E																		
Recommendation 11		a	L																									
Recommendation 12		g	E																									

Legend: **L:** Recommendation for decision by legislative organ

E: Recommendation for action by Executive Head (*in the case of the CEB, by the Chair)

▒ Recommendation does not require action by this organization

Intended impact: **a:** enhanced accountability **b:** dissemination of best practices **c:** enhanced coordination and cooperation **d:** enhanced controls and compliance **e:** enhanced effectiveness **f:** significant financial savings **g:** enhanced efficiency **o:** other

* Covers all entities listed in ST/SGB/2002/11, other than UNCTAD, UNODC, UNEP, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR and UNRWA.

Annex V

JIU/REP/2011/4

MULTILINGUALISM IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM ORGANIZATIONS: STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION

Prepared by

Papa Louis Fall
Yishan Zhang

Joint Inspection Unit

Geneva 2011

United Nations

JIU/REP/2011/4
Original: ENGLISH


MULTILINGUALISM IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM ORGANIZATIONS: STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION

Prepared by

Papa Louis Fall
Yishan Zhang

Joint Inspection Unit

United Nations, Geneva 2011



Note: All the above quotations are from anonymous staff members with the exception of the sentence in French from former Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

Arabic: Multilingualism is an advantage for all, and in particular for Arabic-speaking people.

Chinese: Chinese is the most spoken language in the world.

French: At the United Nations, French is not polished, but punished.

Russian: Multilingualism is a business card for the United Nations.

Spanish: They would like me to speak in many tongues, but I have only one!

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Multilingualism in the United Nations system: Status of implementation
JIU/REP/2011/4

This report was included in the programme of work of the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) in 2010, as per suggestions from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Board of Auditors (BoA) and the United Nations Department for General Assembly and Conference Management (DGACM), as a follow-up to the 2002 JIU report on the same subject.

Its objective is to assess the status of implementation of multilingualism across the United Nations system organizations by reviewing different aspects related to language services and uses, including access to information and the development of multilingual websites, towards ensuring parity among the official languages and the working languages of the secretariats of the organizations.

The report reviews key dimensions of multilingualism in the United Nations organizations, analysing its rationale and policy implications, and identifying effective measures to foster its implementation. The research covered the following areas: conference services, recruitment, training, outreach and institutional partnerships, among others.

Key findings and recommendations

Few organizations of the United Nations system have a formal policy on multilingualism, although the use of different languages in matters related to documentation, meetings and external communications is a general and factual reality.

In the context of economic realities and financial constraints, the trend towards "monolingualism" is far from decreasing, with the "hegemonic" use of one language, English, over the other five United Nations languages, for the sake of pragmatism. Executive heads of organizations do not always either lead by example or ensure effective monitoring, controls and compliance regarding the parity of the six official languages and the equal treatment of the working languages within secretariats, including the use of additional working languages in specific duty stations.

Within the United Nations Secretariat's departments and entities, despite significant ad hoc actions taken by DPI in specific areas, such as outreach, websites and language partnerships, the role of the Coordinator for Multilingualism is not well known; there has been no strategic plan to involve them in contributing in a coordinated way to the overall common objective.

The main challenges faced by the interpretation and translation services are, inter alia, the shortage of professional language staff, many of whom will retire in the near future, the problem of succession planning, and the related issues of the language competitive examination and roster management of successful LCE candidates.

The relevance of IAMLADP, a network of senior managers in Conference Services, in the development of good practices among its members is acknowledged at the highest management level within the United Nations system, as highlighted by the adoption of the Paris Declaration in 2010, which includes a request to the governing bodies of its member

organizations "to ensure the necessary budgetary resources in order to achieve effective succession planning, including awareness-raising, pedagogical assistance activities and respective language admission examination." The Declaration also calls for the national authorities at country level to promote the teaching of languages throughout their education systems to promote better access to opportunities of employment in international organizations.

Multilingualism and its implementation encompass many different actors. Further efforts need to be made by all stakeholders in the relevant areas for which they have a key role to play, including Member States and their representatives, executive heads of the organizations, secretariats, conference and language-related services, human resources, training, as well as public information and outreach departments.

The effective implementation of multilingualism is a collective and shared responsibility. While the research identified positive and encouraging actions being undertaken in several organizations of the system, in particular the pro-active strategies launched by DGACM through its outreach programme, the piecemeal and fragmented approach across the system should be replaced by a "One UN policy on Multilingualism", under the institutional umbrella of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB).

As part of such a policy, the following dimensions should be addressed:

- **Member States**

  Their role is crucial for adopting a clear position on multilingualism, expressed through their participation in the legislative bodies of the different United Nations system organizations, and for supporting its implementation by endorsing all the necessary measures to achieve it (recommendation 15). When creating new institutional bodies, they should plan for the resources required to address the resulting additional workload for conference services (recommendation 6). They should take their responsibilities in promoting the mandate and in ensuring the necessary resources to enable its effective implementation, in particular by supporting the development of multilingual websites in the United Nations system organizations (recommendation 12). Member States representatives should make use of all official languages at their disposal, and develop national capacities to promote language professional curricula up to the standards required by international organizations (see Chapter III, Box 1). They also have a key role to play in ensuring that succession planning be planned ahead with time-lead (recommendation 8).

- **Systemic coordination:** The organizations should establish an ad hoc coordinating working group through the CEB involving the network of coordinators for multilingualism. This working group would identify synergies for addressing common challenges related to the implementation of multilingualism and define a strategic "One UN policy on Multilingualism", so as to improve the language balance in the work of the organizations. Such a policy should take account of the recommendations issued by the International Annual Meeting on Language Arrangements, Documentation and Publications (IAMLADP) (see paras. 63 and 73), an invaluable source of expertise in the area of conference and language arrangements for international organizations (recommendations 2, 3, 4 and 5).

- **Internal coordination for multilingualism matters:** Executive heads, with the support of senior officials appointed as coordinators for multilingualism in each organization, should foster internal collaboration among the different services – clients and providers of language services – so that multilingualism is duly implemented as per the mandates emanating from Member States (recommendation

1; see also para. 22 regarding the Coordinator for Multilingualism).

- **Outreach and partnerships:** The organizations should strengthen communication towards their constituencies and use all official and working languages as per their mandates; events, such as language days, should be advertised and promoted, with the support also of other sponsors (e.g. Members States, goodwill ambassadors). Partnerships with academia to improve the language curricula and to adapt them to the needs of the international organizations should be further developed, following the example of DGACM's outreach programme. Special attention should be paid to developing multilingual websites to ensure similar content in all official languages (recommendations 12 and 13; see also paras. 179 and 189).
- **Recruitment issues and succession planning**: The organizations should pay particular attention to requiring and assessing language skills of staff-at-large, as well as of senior officials, when recruiting or appointing them (recommendation 11, see also paras. 154 and 163). The organizations should facilitate the recruitment of new language professionals and further improve the procedures related to the United Nations language competitive examinations and plan for the succession, including deadlines to ensure replacement in language services and training for future candidates in language services (recommendations 8, 9, and 10; see also para. 85). Organizations should rely on a combination of in-house and external services to provide translation and interpretation services, thus ensuring internal delivery of core services and preserving the institutional memory (see paras. 123 and 127).
- **Sectoral agreements with translators and interpreters:** The signatories parties of the International Association of Conference Translators (AITC) and the International Association of Conference Interpreters (AIIC) sectoral agreements with translators and interpreters should comply with the agreed provisions, both at Headquarters and in regional offices (recommendation 7).
- **Language-training and incentives:** The organizations should promote continuous learning to promote the career development of language staff, and language training for staff-at-large (including incentives, time, recognition of language skills in career development, prompt release of language examination results, etc.). Common frameworks across the system and the different duty stations should be established so as to deliver equivalent language training programmes and final certificates recognized all over the system, following the example of the collaboration between the French learning sections of the United Nations in New York and Geneva (recommendations 9 and 10; see also paras. 151, 168, 169 and 171).
- **Meetings and documentation**: Cooperation between submitting departments and language services in conference services providing official documentation should be improved by reinforcing compliance with existing rules in terms of submission deadlines and quality of original documents (see para. 94).
- **IT tools for improved language services**: Support should be given to the recommendation formulated by the International Annual Meeting on Computer-Assisted Translation and Terminology (JIAMCATT) to develop in-house language software and to continue the development and use of CAT tools to assist staff in their daily work (see paras. 117 and 120).
- **Language use in field activities:** Local language needs and knowledge should duly be taken into account in delivering activities in the field and in preparing related materials (recommendation 14, see para. 84).

The report contains 15 recommendations, of which 4 are addressed to the legislative

bodies of the organizations and 11 to their executive heads. It also includes a number of suggestions (in bold) that the organizations might wish to consider.

Recommendations for consideration by legislative organs

Recommendation 6

When creating new institutional bodies that would require the provision of conference services, the legislative bodies of the United Nations system organizations should plan for the budgetary resources associated with the resulting additional workload, in particular for translation and interpretation.

Recommendation 8

The legislative bodies of the organizations of the United Nations system should ensure that the necessary resources are allocated within the organizations to achieve effective succession planning and dispense targeted training to candidates to language examinations.

Recommendation 12

The legislative bodies of the organizations of the United Nations system should direct and approve the necessary support to the executive heads to develop multilingual websites in all their official or working languages, with due attention to the language specificities of the duty stations concerned.

Recommendation 15

As a matter of policy, the legislative bodies of the organizations of the United Nations system should endorse, including through budgetary channels, the arrangements required to ensure effective compliance in delivering the organizations' core work in all official and working languages.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ACC	Administrative Committee on Coordination (now CEB)
AfDB	African Development Bank
AIIC	International Association of Conference Interpreters
AITC	International Association of Conference Translators
ASG	Assistant-Secretary-General
AUC	African Union Commission
BoA	Board of Auditors
CAT	Computer assisted translation
CCAQ	Consultative Committee on Administrative Questions
CEB	United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (formerly ACC)
CEFR	Common European Framework of Reference for languages
CTBTO	Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-test-ban Treaty Organization
DCM	Division of Conference Management (UNOG)
DGACM	Department for General Assembly and Conference Management (UNHQ)
DFS	Department of Field Support (UNHQ)
DM	Department of Management (UNHQ)
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping operations (UNHQ)
DPI	Department of Public Information (UNHQ)
EC	European Commission
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ECOSOC	Economic and Social Council
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
HLCM	High-Level Committee on Management
HR	Human Resources
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IAMLADP	International Annual Meeting on Language Arrangements, Documentation and Publications
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICSC	International Civil Service Commission
IGO	Inter-Governmental Organization
ILO	International Labour Organization
ISO	International Organization for Standardization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
JIAMCATT	International Annual Meeting on Computer-Assisted Translation and Terminology

JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
LCE	Language Competitive Examination
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OHRM	Office of Human Resources Management (UNHQ)
OIF	Organisation internationale de la Francophonie
OICT	Office of Information and Communications Technology
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
PBC	United Nations Peacebuilding Commission
PCT	Patent Cooperation Treaty (WIPO)
SDLS	Staff Development and Learning Section (UNOG)
UNCITRAL	United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNESCWA	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNODC	United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime
UNOG	United Nations Office at Geneva
UNON	United Nations Office at Nairobi
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNOV	United Nations Office at Vienna
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNWTO	United Nations World Tourism Organization
UPU	Universal Postal Union
USG	Under-Secretary-General
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Objective and focus

1. Stemming from various proposals made notably by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Board of Auditors (BoA) and the United Nations Department for General Assembly and Conference Management (DGACM), the evaluation on "Multilingualism in the United Nations system organizations: status of implementation" was included in the 2010 programme of work of the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) to review different aspects related to languages services and uses within the United Nations system.

2. Based on the landmark United Nations General Assembly resolution 50/11 and subsequent ones on multilingualism, the objective of this report is to assess the status of implementation of multilingualism across the United Nations system. The review has identified different stages of definition and status of implementation within the organizations of the United Nations system and offers a detailed analysis of the different services directly related to its effective implementation: conference services, translation, interpretation, recruitment, language training, outreach and public information, among others.

3. The review analyses the policy and strategic dimension of multilingualism as the Inspectors believe that this subject requires an in-depth analysis beyond the recurrent issue of financial and budgetary constraints. At a time when the Secretary-General of the United Nations is requesting its Secretariat "to think out of the box and be innovative and creative"[1] in order to do more with less resources, an objective analysis is required to assess the pros and cons of a plural approach to the use of languages in a diverse and multicultural organization through a qualitative assessment of the issue.

4. As an update on the status of implementation of multilingualism across the United Nations system, the report will also follow up on JIU system-wide report on multilingualism (JIU/REP/2002/11) and address the issues of equal treatment and parity for the official languages and the working languages of the secretariats. It will address related issues, such as language examinations in connection with recruitment, language training and learning for staff, access to information, distribution of documents and development of multilingual websites to identify good practices and make recommendations.

B. Background

5. The imbalance among the official languages and the disparity between the working languages of the Secretariat have been a matter of concern for Member States of the United Nations, as illustrated by numerous resolutions promoting multilingualism, from the first one, General Assembly resolution 2(I) of 1 February 1946 to the latest one, General Assembly resolution 65/311 of 19 July 2011.

6. Multilingualism is an essential component of cultural diversity, a concept enshrined in the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its thirty-third session in October 2005, and welcomed by the United Nations General Assembly at its sixty-third session.[2] The organizations of the United Nations system have a collective and shared responsibility in the implementation of this core

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[1] Memorandum from the Executive Office of the Secretary-General, 7 March 2011.

[2] General Assembly resolution 63/306, para. 31.

value throughout their daily work and relations with their constituencies. As stated in the report of the Secretary-General on Multilingualism in 2006:[3]

> "An essential factor in harmonious communication among peoples, multilingualism is of very particular importance to the United Nations. By promoting tolerance, it thus ensures effective and increased participation of all in its work, as well as greater effectiveness, better outcomes and more involvement. Multilingualism should be preserved and encouraged by various actions within the United Nations system, in a spirit of partnership and communication."

7. Multilingualism literally means "use of multiple languages". In practice, the term is used when dealing with the use of more than two languages. At the United Nations, multilingualism refers to the use, in fairness and parity, to its official and working languages. The six official languages of the United Nations are Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish, while English and French are the working languages of the Secretariat. Since the creation of the United Nations, multilingualism has been a prime and recurring issue on the agendas of governing bodies of the United Nations system.

C. Methodology

8. The review covers 25 organizations of the United Nations system as well as other international organizations in order to learn from other experiences and good practices. The research was conducted between May 2010 and July 2011. In accordance with the internal standards and guidelines of the JIU and its internal working procedures, the methodology followed in preparing this report included a preliminary desk review, elaboration of questionnaires, interviews, and an in-depth analysis of data collected. Detailed questionnaires were sent to the administrative focal points for multilingualism of the participating organizations of the United Nations system as well as to other relevant stakeholders, such as language-staff associations and other international organizations with relevant multilingual dimensions.

9. The Inspectors conducted interviews at the headquarters of the organizations, at specialized language-related meetings (e.g. IAMLADP in 2010) or by videoconference. Interviews were conducted with different groups of key stakeholders, more specifically coordinators and focal points for multilingualism, public information and outreach departments, language learning services, conference services, including translation and interpretation, as well as human resources departments in 20 international organizations. Interviews were also held with representatives of international organizations, from outside of the United Nations system, such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the European Commission (EC) and the European Parliament (EP).

10. Comments on the draft report have been sought from the organizations and taken into account in finalizing the report. The research revealed common concerns across the organizations, the analysis of which helped in understanding the challenges and identifying possible measures to better implement multilingualism, in compliance with the mandates from the General Assembly and legislative bodies of other United Nations system organizations.[4] The analysis is based on data collected through questionnaires, a desk review, official figures from DGACM,[5] the

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[3] A/61/317, para. 3.

[4] See Annex I: Formal frameworks for multilingualism in the organizations of the United Nations system.

[5] A/65/122; A/65/184.

Secretary-General's biennial report on multilingualism[6] and the report on the activities of the Department of Public Information (DPI),[7] among others.

11. In accordance with article 11.2 of the JIU statute, this report was finalized after consultation among the Inspectors so as to test its conclusions and recommendations against the collective wisdom of the Unit.

12. To facilitate the handling of the report and the implementation of its recommendations and the monitoring thereof, Annex VIII indicates whether the report is submitted to the organizations concerned for action or for information. It identifies the recommendations that are relevant for each organization and specifies whether decision by the legislative or governing body of the organization or action by its executive head is required.

13. The Inspectors wish to express their appreciation to all who assisted them in the preparation of this report, and particularly to those who participated in the interviews and so willingly shared their knowledge and expertise.

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6 A/65/488.

7 A/AC.198/2011/2, 3 and 4.

II. MULTILINGUALISM: WHAT DOES IT STAND FOR?

A. Multilingualism in the United Nations system

14. As stated by DGACM, while languages are the attribute of nations, multilingualism is the attribute of the United Nations. The concept of multilingualism is understood in different ways depending on the target audience and users. Multilingualism is a means of preserving cultural diversity through the promotion of the use of different languages. According to UNESCO, experts estimate that there are currently more than 6,000 languages in the world. UNESCO has launched a specific programme to preserve "endangered languages". The preservation of institutional multilingualism in international organizations serves to promote international communication, understanding, participation and inclusion.

15. Early reference to the use of languages in the United Nations is made in General Assembly resolution 2(I), annex, paragraph 1, which states that "in all the organs of the United Nations, other than the International Court of Justice, Chinese, French, English, Russian and Spanish shall be the official languages, and English and French the working languages." The current language status was attained with the inclusion of Arabic as the sixth official and working language.[8]

16. The adoption of a mandate on multilingualism resulted from the natural evolution and continued recognition of the importance of the diversity of languages as a vehicle for representing cultural diversity within the United Nations system community. In 1995, the General Assembly adopted its landmark resolution 50/11, recalling previous resolutions on different aspects related to language use in the United Nations, and addressing them under the single umbrella of "multilingualism." It referred to multilingualism as the corollary of the universality of the United Nations. Since then, the United Nations General Assembly has regularly adopted resolutions[9] on multilingualism, and included the subject as an agenda item on a biennial basis. The latest resolution on multilingualism was adopted at the sixty-fifth session held in July 2011(resolution 65/311).

17. In reviewing the status of implementation of multilingualism across the United Nations system, the Inspectors observed a variety of situations according to the different needs of the organizations, their clients, geographical location and mandates. Annex I displays the different formal frameworks existing in the organizations. Few of them have a formal policy on multilingualism, although all take into account the use of different languages in matters related to documentation, meetings and external communications.

18. Several organizations have adopted an internal policy on multilingualism and have referred to the previous JIU report on Multilingualism (JIU/REP/2002/11) as a source of inspiration for defining specific strategies towards improved implementation of multilingualism (e.g. UNIDO, WHO and WIPO[10]). Other organizations, such as UNESCO,[11] have a long track record in promoting multilingualism, and have active policies for language preservation throughout the world. It is expected that this report and its recommendations will inspire those organizations still lagging behind in addressing the issue of multilingualism.

19. In resolution 54/64 of December 1999, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to appoint a senior Secretariat official as coordinator of questions relating to multilingualism throughout the Secretariat. In May 2008, the Secretary-General appointed then

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[8] The 1945 Charter of the United Nations provided for the authenticity of the text in five languages (article 111); Arabic was added as the sixth official and working language of the General Assembly and its Main Committees as per General Assembly resolution 3190 (XXVIII) of 18 December 1973.

[9] Resolutions 50/11, 52/23, 54/64, 56/262/, 59/309, 61/266, 63/306, and 65/311.

[10] See A/49/15, Policy on Languages at WIPO.

[11] See http://www.un.org/events/iyl/un.shtml for information on multilingualism.

Under-Secretary-General for Communications and Public Information as Coordinator for Multilingualism. The task of the Coordinator is "to harmonize the measures implemented and to propose strategies to ensure that United Nations linguistic practices are in keeping with the recommendations and provisions of the various resolutions relating to multilingualism. Among other things, the Coordinator centralizes the proposals and requests having to do with multilingualism throughout the Secretariat" (A/61/317, para. 11).

20. In practice, the Coordinator's role is not well-known within the United Nations Secretariat entities;[12] (e.g. regional commissions or UNCTAD), they have not yet perceived any significant change or received particular instructions from the Coordinator. According to DPI, some departments do not contribute as expected to the overall coordinating task, despite repeated reminders.

21. Despite commendable ad hoc actions taken by DPI in order to improve specific areas, such as outreach, websites and language partnerships, there has been no strategic plan involving all the United Nations entities for the implementation of multilingualism. The Coordinator's Compact agreement[13] with the Secretary-General does not include this task as an objective per se but rather as the expected accomplishment of one of the objectives. Reference is made indirectly to the expected accomplishment of "increased reach of public information products and services through multilingualism" as part of the overall objective of "raising public awareness of, and support for, the activities and concerns of the United Nations." However, DPI's proposed programme budget includes performance measures related to multilingualism, including the use of levels of the United Nations website, broken down by official language, as well as the number of partner broadcast stations for each of the languages in which the Department prepares audio/visual content.

22. **The Inspectors believe that the mandate on multilingualism, as formally recognized by the General Assembly through the pertinent resolutions, should be strategically implemented by the Coordinator for Multilingualism, with the support of a network of focal points, and this role should be included as a specific objective in his annual Compact agreement with the Secretary-General.**

23. Other organizations of the United Nations system have designated in-house coordinators or focal points for multilingualism. Nevertheless, with some exceptions, they are not positioned at a high hierarchical level of the organization (e.g. UNIDO), thus making difficult for them to be in a position to propose with the necessary authority concrete measures to be followed by all departments of an organization. The work of the coordinators is often an additional workload to their official duties and it is not fairly recognized or, and is not supported by the necessary resources to effectively implement any action plan in the area of multilingualism.

In order to improve coordination and effectiveness in implementing multilingualism, the Inspectors recommend the following:

Recommendation 1

The executive heads who have not yet done so should: a) appoint a senior official as coordinator for multilingualism, tasked with proposing strategic action plans for the effective implementation of multilingualism, with the assistance of an internal network of focal points within their respective organization; b) report regularly to their legislative bodies on progress achieved in this regard.

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[12] These include, inter alia, the regional commissions, funds, programmes, tribunals, peacekeeping operations.

[13] Senior managers sign annual Compact agreements with the Secretary-General, which include key objectives related to the specific mandate of their respective department.

24. There is a variety of situations regarding formal policies on multilingualism in the different organizations of the system. In 2010, WIPO submitted to its legislative body a document prepared by the Secretariat and proposing a "Policy on languages at WIPO." This document addresses all the relevant aspects of the use of languages in the organization.

25. In 2007, WHO developed a strategic Plan of action on multilingualism for 2008-2013, which was endorsed in resolutions WHA60.11 and WHA61.12.[14] The Plan covers objectives for establishing translation priorities, creating a team of multilingual web editors, promoting respect for linguistic diversity across the organization, building an institutional repository to store multilingual content online, building a database of staff language competencies, consolidating styles and terms in all official languages, ensuring high-quality language training for all staff, increasing multilingual publishing and appointing a special coordinator to oversee the implementation of the proposed actions.

26. UNIDO adopted a resolution on multilingualism (GC.13/Res.4) and has a proactive policy in this regard. The organization reintroduced full coverage of the costs of language training to its staff in 2010, while previously a cost-sharing policy had been applied.[15] This is an enabling measure to give incentives to staff to strengthen their language skills. This initiative should be encouraged and adopted by those organizations not yet covering the full language training costs for their staff.

27. FAO's language policy is currently under review. In 1999, the thirtieth session of the FAO Conference reaffirmed "the imperative of ensuring parity and balanced in the use of all FAO languages and the need for supervision of the quality of translation and interpretation. In looking forward to further improvements in the future, the Conference agreed to the need for Members to monitor progress closely through periodic follow-up and evaluation" (C99/REP, para. 94). UNHCR also has a language training policy which is currently under review to incorporate within the organization the latest developments in the field[16] and the changes in recording the language competency level of staff.

28. UNESCO has a formal policy for the implementation of multilingualism which is covered in different manuals, as well as in the rules of procedures for their General Conference, Executive Board and Secretariat. The organization is in the process of finalizing internal guidelines for the Internet website policy and creating specific rules for multilingualism.

29. These are all examples of good practices that could inspire other organizations which have not yet done so to formalize a policy on multilingualism or to promote exchanges of experiences within the system. Annex I shows the current status of formal frameworks for multilingualism in the United Nations system, based on the responses to the JIU questionnaire.

B. Status of languages in the United Nations system

30. Article 111 of the Charter of the United Nations states that the texts in Chinese, French, Russian, English and Spanish are equally authentic. This is the seminal principle underlying the evolution of language-related procedures over the years.

31. Previous JIU reports, from as early as in 1977 and more recently in 2002, were unable to determine with certainty the origin of the distinction between "official" and "working" languages

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[14] See EB121/6, Multilingualism: plan of action.

[15] This was done before the recent change of Membership at UNIDO.

[16] Use of modern technologies and social media support is also taken into account (e.g. periodic web-based seminars (webinars), podcasts, mobile phone mini lessons on vocabularies, etc.).

in the rules of procedure of the General Assembly or the other principal organs of the United Nations.[17]

32. Since then, no definition of either "working" or "official" languages has been formalized. The add-on rules on use of languages and rules of procedure have only specified different uses in different organs (see Annex II for the status of official and working languages of the secretariats of the United Nations system organizations covered by this review)[18].

33. The terminology also varies, and denominations such as "official working languages" can also be found. In practice, the difference between "working" and "official" is not clearly defined. For instance, in 1985, the Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) proposed the introduction of Portuguese as "an official working language" (ECOSOC resolution 1985/68), in consideration of "the number of States members of the Economic Commission for Africa and the growing numbers of people in those countries that use Portuguese as an official working language."

34. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) addressed the matter of the terminology "official working language" when it considered the above-mentioned resolution 1985/68.[19] On the basis of the lack of clarity and the non-existence of a category "official working language", the Committee recommended that no action be taken with regard to the resources requested for its implementation. Regrettably, Portuguese still does not appear as being any "kind" of working language of the UNECA.[20]

35. In some organizations of the United Nations system, the understanding of official and working language is opposite to the standard one (adopted by most organizations). In some cases, like at FAO[21], ICAO, ITU or WMO, the distinction between official and working languages does not exist. In general, while it is understood that working languages are a subset of official languages, there are exceptions, such as at ILO,[22] UPU and WIPO, whereby there are more working languages than official languages (see Table 1 and Annex II).

Table 1: Official and working languages at ILO

	OFFICIAL LANGUAGES	WORKING LANGUAGES
ARABIC		X
CHINESE		X
ENGLISH	X	X
FRENCH	X	X
RUSSIAN		X
SPANISH	X	X
Other: GERMAN		X

Source: Response to JIU questionnaire, 2010.

36. Based on the responses to the questionnaire and the different realities across the system, it appears that definitions relate more to the identification of which services and documents should be provided in what languages, than trying to obtain a clear definition of "official" and "working" language. Furthermore, the understanding of these concepts is not the same in all the organizations.

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[17] See JIU/REP/77/5, para. 8.

[18] DGACM notes that the original concept of "working" language was that no interpretation services were provided for that language.

[19] A/40/7/Add.5.

[20] Further references to the use of the Portuguese language within the United Nations system can be found in paragraphs 57 to 60 and 193.

[21] FAO considers all 6 United Nations languages as "languages of the organization". See FAO Basic Texts. .

[22] The International Labour Office was created in 1919, and is among the older organizations of the United Nations system. Its languages were adopted before the existence of the United Nations.

37. In order to have a "One UN" language policy, a common understanding of "official" and "working" language would help to identify their respective uses and to develop a coherent policy on the services to be provided in each of them.

In order to enhance coordination and cooperation across the United Nations system in the area of conference and language-related services, the Inspectors recommend the following:

Recommendation 2

The executive heads, through their participation in the CEB, should develop a common understanding of the differences between "official" and "working" languages as a coherent basis for better coordinating the use of languages and promoting multilingualism across the United Nations system.

38. The Inspectors found that, in practice, English and French, the working languages of the United Nations Secretariat and of almost all of the organizations of the United Nations system,[23] are not treated equally, at the expenses of the other working language. The resolutions calling for equal treatment of working languages are not properly implemented. This is a matter of serious concern which needs to be dealt with in line with General Assembly resolution 59/266, para. 6.

39. It is necessary to reinforce language skills of the staff-at-large by encouraging and giving incentives to staff who command only one working language to take language courses in order to be able to deliver their work in both working languages.

In view of fostering the effective use of French and English in the United Nations Secretariat as the working languages, as well as the use of at least two official working languages in the secretariats of other organizations of the system, the Inspectors recommend the following:

Recommendation 3

The executive heads should take further effective measures towards eliminating the current imbalance in the use of the working languages within secretariats, including among senior managers, and require all staff to develop their language skills so as to acquire good knowledge of at least a second working language.

[23] English and French are working languages of the secretariats of all the JIU participating organizations, except for IAEA, UNRWA and WFP. In addition, Spanish is a working language of 13 of these organizations (see Annex II).

C. Language diversity and multilingualism

40. Multilingualism relates to the use of several languages on an equal basis. In order for several languages to coexist, it is necessary to avoid the predominance of some languages over others.

41. Some languages are spoken by large groups of people all over the world, in different countries. One way to preserve linguistic diversity is to avoid the disappearance of languages due to their being used less and less, either because their original native speakers are disappearing or because other languages are replacing them for some purposes.

42. UNESCO has been active in promoting multilingualism and linguistic diversity. In the context of its initiative to protect endangered languages, it has developed the concept of language vitality as illustrated below:

Language Vitality



Source: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/cultural-diversity/languages-and-multilingualism/endangered-languages/language-vitality/

43. According to the concept of language vitality, no one parameter can lead to the extinction of a language, but together they constitute an indicator of the vitality of a language. While this concept was developed as a means to protect endangered languages and prevent their extinction, a similar reasoning could be extrapolated for analysing what can be done within the United Nations system to avoid the trend towards monolingualism, by increasingly imposing the use of one language as hegemony over the other five United Nations languages. Inspired by the parameters identified by UNESCO for endangered languages, JIU has associated potential actions aimed at strengthening multilingualism to the parameters for ensuring language vitality, within a broad understanding of the concept. In the context of the review of multilingualism in the United Nations system, the following parameters can be identified as areas in which action should be taken to contribute to the vitality of the six official languages of the United Nations.

Means to ensure language vitality in the United Nations system

Language vitality parameters	Examples of actions that could be taken by United Nations system organizations
Governmental and institutional language attitudes and policies, including official status and use	Effectively use all official languages in official events, in particular native speakers of these languages; secretariats should use official languages other than English whenever possible and meaningful in official meetings.[24]
Availability of materials for language education and literacy	Reinforce availability of language training material and courses in all official languages; provide incentives to staff within the organizations.
Community members' attitudes towards their own language	Pro-active attitude from representatives of Member States with regard to speaking in their own language if it is an official language of the United Nations, instead of using English. "to be better understood"
Type and quality of documentation	Preserve the necessary means to issue high-quality documentation in all official languages; encourage submission of documents in working languages other than English, in particular considering the target audience and beneficiaries.
Response to new domains and media	Develop outreach policies and social media in all official languages so as to reach a broader audience without language discrimination.

44. Instrumental in preserving cultural and language diversity in the world, UNESCO launched the International Year of Languages in 2008. The Year provided a visible platform to actively inform about language diversity and to organize events related to the importance of languages in the world.

45. Reference should be made to the constant efforts of the Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF), one of the most active actors in promoting cultural diversity and language preservation. Created in 1970, the OIF promotes cultural and outreach activities and maintains an active network of francophone countries worldwide.[25] The OIF was also instrumental in the approval process of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005),[26] a cornerstone of international law aimed at ensuring the preservation of socio-cultural diversity in the world.

46. Multilingualism has always been a matter of concern for the OIF, which has concluded 33 cooperation agreements with international and regional organizations and established permanent dialogue between the major international linguistic zones (Arabic, English, Portuguese, Spanish). While its original focus was directly related to promoting and preserving the status of the French language in the world, in recent years, its activities have broadened to encompass multilingualism. In 2010 and 2011, the OIF organized, in collaboration with the United Nations Office in Geneva (UNOG) and the multilingualism focal point, two round tables on the subject to coincide with the celebration of the French Language Day, in the context of the United Nations Language Day.

47. The 2011 seminar[27] entitled: "Multilingualism in international organizations: which investments for which objectives?" discussed, among other aspects, the question of the value of

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[24] This is in line with Resolution 56/656, para. 29: "Secretariat officials appearing before intergovernmental or expert bodies will be encouraged, when they address meetings with interpretation services, to use official languages other than English whenever possible."

[25] See http://www.francophonie.org/.

[26] See http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001429/142919e.pdf.

[27] See press release available at http://iseek.un.org/webpgdept1944_64.asp.

multilingualism. Professor François Grin, an expert on language economics,[28] shared with the audience his knowledge of the dialectic analysis of language and economics, an economic model according to which multilingualism would be an instrumental element of growth and economic development for a country. He presented a thought-provoking comment on the issue of the burden shift of costs. When an organization decreases its provision of services (e.g. documents, translation, interpretation, websites) to its Members States, the impact will be unevenly distributed, with the more severely hit being the poorer members, which are unable to pay for these services themselves.

48. The representative of Canada referred to the fact that often foreign services training in wealthier countries included intensive language courses to ensure that their diplomats would be proficient in at least one foreign language, while developing countries had less resources to provide language training to their future diplomats. Therefore, the lack of compliance with multilingualism within the United Nations system organizations would have a greater negative impact on the access to information for the delegations of developing countries.

49. Linguistic events, such as those organized by the United Nations in 2010 and 2011, in collaboration with the OIF, provide an enabling environment for monitoring language vitality in the United Nations and gauging public perception. Recently, an association of francophone journalists in Switzerland created the Observatoire des Langues[29] to monitor the use of French in United Nations Geneva-based organizations and has designated a permanent observer to the United Nations for this purpose.

50. Special reference should also be made to the institutions of the European Union, as they are by far unique examples of multilingual organizations in which language diversity is a day-to-day reality. Their experience sheds light on the complexity involved in fairly implementing multilingualism and the related political choices inherent to such a policy.

51. The European Union (EU) has a two-fold approach to multilingualism that is oriented towards the internal functioning of its institutions and, even more important, towards strengthening language knowledge and sharing as vehicles for communication and cohesion, so as to build a sense of community within Europe. In that context, multilingualism is understood more as a policy outside of the European institutions than within them, oriented towards the use of languages in the member countries for the benefit of the populations. Multilingualism is a long-term strategy for building a European identity, and the basis for a multicultural Europe where people of different countries and cultures can understand each other and move around a common shared cultural space.

52. This policy is clearly reflected in the organizational chart of the European Commission (EC) and embedded in the competencies of its Directorates General (DG) for Education and Culture, Interpretation (including training support for interpreters) and Translation. Within the European Parliament (EP), multilingualism is an integral part of the competencies of the DGs for Interpretation and Conferences (including prospecting and traineeships) and Translation. The working environment of the EC and EP[30] is by definition multilingual as they equally treat the 23 different languages of its member states, all of them being official languages.[31]

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[28] Grin, F et al., *The Economics of the Multilingual Workspace* (United Kingdom, Routledge, 2010).

[29] See http://francophonu.org

[30] For benchmarking purposes, we will limit references to these two intergovernmental fora, as they represent the largest multilingual IGOs in terms of volume of language services and size of language departments.

[31] The working languages, also called procedural languages, of the EC are English, French and German.

Initiatives related to non-official United Nations languages

53. The debate on the potential inclusion of other languages in addition to the current six official languages of the United Nations is a recurrent subject. While budgetary constraints are invoked to avoid developing further any argument about it, there is no in-depth assessment based on a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis of multilingualism, and extended language coverage, and its cost implications. In first instance, the incorporation of new languages appears essentially as a political matter. What would be the criteria? Which languages? For which services? The Pandora box remains closed until further notice.

54. Meanwhile, a piecemeal approach has been adopted by some countries which are truly interested in making United Nations documentation available in their own language, to the extent that they can afford to fund the provision of services to that effect. Certain non-official languages have been represented to some extent, on ad hoc basis, in the United Nations system, such as German, Japanese and Portuguese, among others.

German

55. DGACM at UNHQ hosts the German Translation Section of the United Nations, established further to General Assembly resolution 3355 (XXIX) of 1974. Since 1975, all resolutions and decisions of the General Assembly and the Security Council, as well as numerous other important United Nations documents, have been issued in an official German version. The Section[32] is funded through a trust fund financed by contributions from Austria, Germany, Liechtenstein and Switzerland.

56. German is also used in several other organizations of the system: at ILO, as one of the seven working languages (even before the existence of the United Nations); at WHO, where it is an official language in the regional office for Europe, and a working language of the Regional Committee for Europe, with interpretation provided at Regional Committee meetings; at WIPO, as part of its multilingual services in the context of the work developed to serve the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT); at UNOV, where language courses in German are partially subsidized for staff members; at FAO, with interpretation provided in that language for the Conference and its Regional Conference for Europe, if so requested by the German government, with a cost-sharing arrangement.

Portuguese

57. Even though it is not an official or working language of the United Nations, Portuguese is used by several organizations for specific activities, meetings and documents. This is the case at WIPO, where the 2000 session of the Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO decided to publish promotional material regarding WIPO-administered treaties in Portuguese; to develop WIPO's website to include publications in Portuguese; and to provide, as necessary, Portuguese interpretation for diplomatic conferences and for the General Assembly. The specific arrangements for the latter would be at the discretion of the Director General, who would also be encouraged to seek voluntary contributions in respect of this provision.[33] Training activities in lusophone countries can also be provided in Portuguese.

58. At ILO, one quarter of all publications is available in Portuguese. In 2007, language training for staff was expanded to include Portuguese (in addition to Arabic, Chinese and Russian, compared to previous choices on only English, French and Spanish). Facilities for translation and interpretation from Portuguese are provided for certain meetings under special funding agreements with lusophone countries.

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[32] See http://www.un.org/Depts/german/gts/fs_aboutus.html

[33] See WO/GA/26/10, Item 19 of the consolidated agenda.

59. The Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) translates website content and some documents into Portuguese and on an as-needed basis with respect to technical or development cooperation activities undertaken in lusophone countries of the region (e.g. Brazil). UNESCO is currently preparing to provide information and documents in Portuguese on its website. At FAO, Portuguese interpretation is provided at the Regional Conference for Latin America and the Caribbean, if so requested by the Government of Brazil, as well as at the Regional Conference for Africa. In such cases, the respective government and the Director-General agree on the sharing of additional costs. Generally speaking, Member Nations may request interpretation into other languages, provided that they bear the costs of such services, as agreed with FAO.[34]

60. At the country level, the Government of Angola has engaged in negotiating a host country agreement for the establishment of an Information Centre in Luanda that would strengthen the ability of the United Nations to reach Portuguese-speaking audiences in Africa.[35] Portuguese is a working language in the WHO Regional Office for the Americas and the Regional Office for Africa. WHO headquarters also runs an "ePORTUGUÊSe"[36] network, the mission of which is to strengthen collaboration among Portuguese-speaking countries, promote capacity-building of human resources for health and facilitate access to health information in Portuguese. The use of this language is also considered for specific cases of peacebuilding and reconstruction in post-conflict countries.[37]

Bangla

61. In September 2010, the Prime Minister of Bangladesh addressed the General Assembly's annual high-level segment and requesting that Bangla be included as an official United Nations language to reflect the vast number of its speakers.[38] UNESCO observes the International Mother Language Day on 21 February, which commemorates a student's demonstration in 1952 for Bangla to be made an official language of then East Pakistan.

62. The lack of a common understanding of what are the criteria for a language to be eligible as an official or working language, and the differences between the two categories do not help to define clear policies on multilingualism. Furthermore, the current status quo of languages in the United Nations does not reflect the geopolitical, socioeconomic and demographic changes that have occurred in the world since Arabic was added as the sixth official language of the United Nations almost forty years ago, in 1973. In this regard, there is a gap – a dissonance – between the commitment to preserve cultural diversity as per the UNESCO Convention on this matter and its effective translation into a stronger promotion of multilingualism within the United Nations system.

63. **In light of recommendation 2, the Inspectors propose that the Secretary-General, in his capacity as Chair of the CEB, invite the organizations of the United Nations system to undertake a self-evaluation of the status of implementation of multilingualism in their respective organization, and to regularly assess the needs of their key stakeholders, such as Member States and partner organizations (including civil society and academia).** Such a systemic exercise could be implemented by establishing clear monitoring processes within each organization to collect information on language-related services, including surveys to users, partners and universities. **The CEB Secretariat could coordinate the overall process and disseminate the results through the establishment of an ad hoc network or a working group**

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34 See FAO Manual, section 530, appendix D, Interpretation (2001).
35 A/AC.198/2011/2, part 2, para. 4.
36 See http://www.who.int/eportuguese/en/.
37 See Chapter V, para. 193.
38 See http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=36219&Cr=bangla&Cr1.

on multilingualism, similar to those existing for other systemic issues (e.g. the human resources network).

64. Many organizational regulations and rules, such as administrative instructions, are issued in two or three languages only, sometimes in English only. Those key documents ought to be translated into all six official languages in order to ensure equal treatment of languages as well as proper and uniform translation when cited in other publications. Standard operating procedures should be developed for each organization, defining documents for which translation is mandatory in all official languages. The Inspectors are also of the view that the executive heads of organizations have a significant role to play in leading by example in their respective organization, by ensuring effective monitoring, controls and compliance regarding the equitable treatment of languages. Specific events could be organized by the respective focal points in each organization, inviting staff members to contribute ideas and experiences on how to improve the implementation of multilingualism.

In order to increase effectiveness, the Inspectors recommend the following:

Recommendation 4

The executive heads of the United Nations system organizations should, in monitoring the equitable use of official languages within their respective organization, regularly assess users' needs and formulate strategies to enhance the implementation of multilingualism through the involvement of their respective coordinators for multilingualism and related network of focal points.

III. MULTILINGUALISM: STAKEHOLDERS AND PARTNERSHIPS

A. Key stakeholders

65. The implementation of multilingualism takes place through the participation of the relevant stakeholders that altogether can shape the proper environment for languages to evolve positively, on an equitable basis in compliance with the pertinent mandate.

66. As the main policy actors, Member States, through their representatives, and the executive heads of the United Nations system organizations are responsible for the definition of the mandate, the allocation of necessary resources to support its implementation, and the identification of concrete measures within the organizations aimed at preserving language diversity and ensuring the provision of high-quality language-related goods and services. In the context of the Secretary-General's reform initiative, DPI has made a proposal to launch a constructive debate with Member States to assess the true costs of multilingualism and the parity mandate, taking into account the fast-growing content on the United Nations website, most of which is being generated in English only by various departments and offices. The Inspectors concur with this view and support this proposal.

67. The implementation of multilingualism involves a variety of professionals from different areas related to language and conference services, including interpretation, translation, meetings and documentation, learning and language training, human resources, among others. It also involves external partners, such as academic institutions as providers of well-trained professionals in the area of language services.

68. Staff of the organizations can actively contribute by using different languages in their daily work and by strengthening their language skills through continuous language training. This is particularly relevant for internationally recruited professional staff, as they are subject to mobility provisions. Human resources departments and hiring managers have a key responsibility to include language skills in recruitment, promotion and career development as a parameter to be formally and effectively tested when considering future candidates.

B. Shared responsibilities

69. The effective implementation of the mandate on multilingualism to achieve the goal of a multilingual working environment providing services in all official languages and, when pertinent in local languages, is a collective and shared responsibility requiring pro-action from all the different stakeholders. In setting up partnerships to ensure the availability of high-quality professional language staff, all stakeholders – clients (countries, civil society, academia, media, etc); service providers (secretariats, field offices, peacekeeping operations, etc.); managers involved in the recruitment process; conference and language-related services; outreach and public information departments; the language community; policy-makers – have a role to play.

70. Horizontal matters, such as gender-equality and environmental policies, do not fall under one simple area of action; collaboration among different actors is required to ensure the collective achievement. Box 1 below highlights some responsibilities and potential actions of the different actors mentioned above.

Box 1: Shared responsibilities on multilingualism

Stakeholders	Responsibilities and actions
Member States	**- Establish a mandate on multilingualism and monitor its effective implementation;** **- Decide about allocation of resources to support implementation;** **- Choose their language(s) of communication and not privilege English over other official languages (contrary to current reality);** **- Use their official language in official meetings if it is a United Nations official language;** **- Support language training in their national education systems so as to promote new generations of language professionals adapted to the needs of international organizations;** **- Inform students interested in diplomatic or international civil service careers about the language requirements in international organizations.**
Executive heads	**- Define internal procedures to ensure effective implementation of the mandate and report regularly on progress made to Member States;** **- Lead by example by communicating in languages other than English in official events, if having a good command of other official languages;** **- Promote incentive measures to facilitate the development of language skills within their organization;** **- Make senior management accountable for achieving clear results with regard to language parity and equitable treatment for languages;** **- Ensure the enforcement of established agreements in language services (e.g. for organizations having ratified the agreements regarding freelance translators and interpreters).**
Managers in the organizations	**- Promote language training for staff and themselves and the use of different working languages, not only for official activities, but also in the day-to-day work of the unit, within existing resources;** **- Assess the real knowledge of language skills as required for a post, during the recruitment process;** **- Plan for multilingualism by including translation costs in project budgets.**
Managers and staff in language-related services	**- While providing quality goods and services as requested, continuously draw attention to the challenges and difficulties faced by their services, and limit quality-quantity trade-off caused by increasing resource constraints.**
Human resources departments	**- Verify compliance with language requirements in vacancy announcements and candidate competencies for posts;** **- Publicize (e.g. in the telephone directory or email signature) the languages known by staff in the organization.**
Outreach, public information, conference management and language services	**- Ensure issuance of information in multiple official languages, in particular in electronic media and public briefings;** **- Establish MoUs with academia, and partnerships with other organizations in language-related areas;** **- Maintain language-quality standards despite budgetary constraints, and request the resources necessary to maintain these standards.** **- Incorporate the results from IAMLADP annual meetings to keep improving quality, efficiency and coordination in the area of language and conference services**
Staff members at large	**- Continue to use languages other than English in their work environment, and enrol in language courses if they currently master only one official language;** **- Use computer-assisted translation when relevant and feasible in their daily work (with due caution).**
Academic institutions	**Strengthen partnerships and adjust curricula to the needs of international organizations so that there is an equilibrium in supply and demand for language services with a win-win result for both language professionals and language services.**

C. Language networks and institutional partnerships

71. Collaboration between Member States, academia and international organizations has strengthened in recent years, in particular following the launch of DGACM's University Outreach Programme.[39] DPI also has its own outreach programme.

72. Language networks and partnerships between academia and international organizations are powerful tools for the dissemination of best practices in the area of language services. They also contribute to setting up mechanisms to face the multiple challenges related to the anticipated shortfall in language professionals as part of succession planning efforts taken by some organizations to address generational replacement and the scarcity of qualified interpretation and translation candidates.[40]

International Annual Meeting on Language Arrangements, Documentation and Publication (IAMLADP)

73. Each organization or institution faces specific challenges in delivering language-related services. While part of these challenges depends on the intrinsic characteristics of the respective organization's formal framework, many others are of common concern across the United Nations system and within the international community in general.[41]

74. In 1967, the General Assembly of the United Nations requested the Secretary-General to undertake a review of the publications programme to improve coordination and identify synergies. After a series of ad hoc events, IAMLADP[42] was convoked for the first time in 1974, and further strengthened in 1994 and in 2001 to facilitate the inclusion of new members, formerly under observer status. Since 2001, membership includes intergovernmental organizations outside the United Nations system, such as the institutions of the EU (e.g. EC and EP) whose language services are among the largest in the world. Observer status had been granted, until 2006, to other national entities such as universities and government ministries, however, in 2007, IAMLADP decided to limit its membership to international organizations. Other entities, such as academic and business institutions and government ministries, are encouraged to participate in IAMLADP activities through its Universities Contact Group and JIAMCATT.[43] IAMLADP has set up working groups on practically all relevant issues of interest for identifying key challenges and opportunities in the area of language and conference services within the member organizations. In between the annual meetings, the working groups prepare, inter alia, relevant information on different topics, such as succession planning, partnerships with universities, training, language services, publications, etc.

75. The relevance of IAMLADP in the development of good practices among its members is acknowledged at the highest management level within the United Nations, given the relevance of its work to identify efficient strategies in the area of language arrangements, documentation and publication. The following objective was defined in the 2010 Senior Manager Compact agreement

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[39] For more information, see http://www.unlanguage.org/default.aspx.

[40] A significant number of organizations with regular translation and interpretation staff noted that there was no succession plan in place to address the issue of replacement.

[41] While the business sector also shares some of these problems, this review remains focused on the analysis of the United Nations system which is subject to different constraints than private business; it uses other international inter-governmental organizations as benchmarks.

[42] Further details on the history of IAMLADP can be found in "A brief history of IAMLADP," by Fermin Alcoba (former head of language services at WTO) and in the 2010 IAMLADP self-assessment paper by René Prioux (OECD language services). The name of the network changed over the years with the enlargement of its membership so that "International Annual" replaced "Inter-Agency."

[43] JIAMCATT is the International Annual Meeting on Computer-Assisted Translation and Terminology. See paras. 77 to 79.

between the Director of the Documentation Division and the Assistant-Secretary-General for DGACM:

Objective	Expected accomplishment	Performance measures
To contribute to improved integrated global management among duty stations by seeking the most cost-effective ways of delivering translation/editing services; to continue global coordination with international organizations.	Integrated global management in relevant services strengthened and established as a rule, and not an exception.	**Benchmarking/identification of good practices in conference servicing, included in the annual report of IAMLADP and its working groups.**

Source: Senior management compact for documentation services at UNHQ, 2010.

76. IAMLADP held its annual meeting, hosted by OECD, in Paris in June 2010. The agreed outcome of this meeting led to the adoption of the Paris Declaration, which includes a request to the governing bodies of its member organizations "to ensure the necessary budgetary resources in order to achieve effective succession planning, including awareness-raising, pedagogical assistance activities and respective language admission examination." The Inspectors fully endorse the IAMLADP Paris Declaration.

In order to enhance effectiveness across the United Nations system in the area of conference and language-related services, the Inspectors recommend the following:

Recommendation 5

The CEB should establish an ad hoc network or working group, involving the coordinators for multilingualism in the respective organizations, to take account of the key recommendations of IAMLADP and translate them into strategies of action for conference and language services management, so that better coordination and resources-sharing would result in significant cost savings, higher productivity and effectiveness in the work of the organizations.

International Annual Meeting on Computer-Assisted Translation and Terminology (JIAMCATT): The network on translation and terminology

77. JIAMCATT[44] is a task force of IAMLADP created in 1987 at UNOG and renamed in 2006.[45] It is a technical forum, open to language services of international organizations and national bodies to share resources and experiences in the field of terminology and translation.

78. An important area of knowledge-sharing within JIAMCATT is the increasing use of computer-assisted tools for translation (CAT). This is a field of growing importance which has introduced significant changes in the working procedures of translation services (see chapter IV.C).

79. Even in an international and polyglot environment of language experts, conflict could arise as to which language(s) to use during annual meetings. The Inspectors were stunned to learn that a formal request had been made by a representative of the African Union Commission (AUC) to the organizers of JIAMCATT 2011 for English only to be used during the annual meeting. This is emblematic of the attitudes and reactions that undermine the implementation of multilingualism.

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[44] See http://jiamcatt.org

[45] Its former name was "Joint International Annual Meeting on Computer-Assisted Translation and Terminology".

The Inspectors appreciated the constructive proposal made from within the forum about using, at no extra cost, the voluntary services of advanced interpretation students. Indeed, this would provide the students with live booth experience, and the participants with interpretation services at no cost for the organization.

Institutional partnerships

80. In order to equip professionals with the expected qualifications required by the United Nations system, DGACM launched an ambitious programme of collaboration with academic institutions in different regions of the world. The first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in April 2008 with University of Westminster, United Kingdom, and the most recent one was signed in May 2011 with Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou, China.

81. All the MoUs have the same purpose and relate to all official languages. Common training material, funding for instructors and the possibility of internships are covered by these agreements. The Universities will adapt existing training programmes or create new ones leading to a degree in conference translation and/or interpretation, aligned to the needs of the United Nations. The students will receive specific training and access to material especially designed to prepare them for the United Nations language competitive examinations.

82. A total of 19 MoUs have been signed to date, with 3 universities in Asia, 2 in Africa, 11 in Europe, 2 in the Middle East and one in North America.[46] This responds to the sustained request from Member States to the Secretary-General, through different resolutions, to take action to address the shortage of language staff in view of the massive projected retirements in these services. In particular, General Assembly resolution 64/230 requested the Secretary-General "to maintain and intensify those efforts, including the strengthening of cooperation with institutions that train language specialists, in order to meet the need in the six official languages of the United Nations."

83. Another significant project to enhance the training of interpreters in Africa was launched in Nairobi in 2010 further to a partnership agreement between the United Nations, the European Union (EU), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and University of Nairobi. The African Project, as it is known, is the result of an IAMLADP initiative in 2008 that culminated in the creation of a Master's degree in Interpretation in Africa. A milestone in the process was the first pan-African conference on the training of translators, conference interpreters and public service interpreters held at the United Nations Office at Nairobi, in February 2009. The conference adopted the Gigiri Declaration, which focuses on the achievement of the following goals: a) adoption of a broad multilingualism including all the languages used in Africa; b) establishment of a monitoring stakeholders committee to assess the implementation of the outcome of the conference; c) leading role by the AfDB in coordinating the project and preparing the feasibility study on its implementation; and d) set up of a pilot project to train multilingual conference interpreters at the University of Nairobi, with the support of the DG for Interpretation of the EC and the DG for Interpretation and Conferences of the EP. The African Project is currently in place in Nairobi, Kenya and in Maputo, Mozambique.[47] The project is expected to be launched in Ghana in 2012; it offers post-graduate academic programmes in translation and conference interpreting through a network of centres of excellence on the African continent, contributing to the creation of a new source of languages professionals from African countries, which are currently underrepresented in this professional category.

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[46] See Annex V for the list of universities that have signed MoUs with the United Nations. Other academic institutions which have not signed MoUs are also included in the language outreach portal http://www.unlanguage.org/UNTraining/Schools/default.aspx.

[47] See University of Nairobi, Kenya; see also BA programmes modelled on the African Project at Universidade Pedagógica de Moçambique, Maputo, and Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Port Elizabeth, South Africa.

84. The current outreach network launched by DGACM organized its first conference in May 2011 at University of Salamanca, Spain, where representatives of the academic institutions that have signed MoUs met with representatives of United Nations Headquarters language services, duty stations away from Headquarters and the Under-Secretary-General for DGACM. As a direct result of these newly established partnerships, interpretation, translation and verbatim reporting trainees have undertaken internships within the United Nations. Some have even passed freelance language tests and subsequently been given short-term contracts to service specific events, such as the LDC-IV Conference in Istanbul in May 2011. DGACM's pro-active outreach programme has started to yield its first concrete results.

85. A pioneer programme was launched at ECA in 1978 to create new generations of African English and French translators with a view to alleviating difficulties in finding qualified English and French translators to fill vacancies at Headquarters and in offices away from Headquarters, particularly ECA. The return on investment was worth the effort, as 50 per cent of the trainees successfully passed the LCEs and were hired as translators at the United Nations.[48] This rate is well above the average success rate of current candidates, which in most cases do not even reach 20 per cent. However, despite it being a very successful programme, it was unfortunately discontinued in 1996. **The Inspectors consider that training programmes for future candidates have proven to be effective strategies for attracting and retaining language staff, and therefore should be revived and strengthened. Training programmes should be developed, either through specific training in academic institutions or internships in language services. This would generate significant cost savings and efficiency in the medium term, by increasing the ratio of successful candidates for future language recruitment.**

86. Another fruitful training programme for Chinese translators and interpreters was set up at Beijing Foreign Studies University in 1979[49] as a joint project between the United Nations and the Chinese government to train language professionals. This programme, which existed until 1993, turned out 227 language graduates, including 106 conference interpreters, many of whom are now working for the United Nations and other international organizations, some for the Chinese Government, and a few as freelancers. Based on these experiences, it is hoped that the new momentum gained through the establishment of agreements with academic institutions covering language curricula and training in respect of all official United Nations languages will contribute to reducing the gap between demand for and supply of language professionals in the medium term. A similar programme for Russian interpreters and translators existed in Moscow until 1991.

87. DPI has also established partnership agreements, with, for example, universities in China, Belarus and Spain for pro bono translations of material for the United Nations website into Chinese, Russian and Spanish. DPI has also availed itself of the services of expert volunteers, through United Nations Volunteers, for translations into French. Another positive example is the partnership being negotiated between the ICAO and Herzen State Pedagogical University in St. Petersburg, Russia.

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[48] Official references to the programmes for English and French translators at ECA can be found in A/C.5/36/17 of 26 October 1981 and A/C.5/32/35 of 22 November 1977.

[49] See Jianzhong Xu, "Training Translators in China," in *Meta*: Translators' Journal, vol. 50(1), 2005, pp. 231-249, available at http://www.erudit.org/revue/meta/2005/v50/n1/010671ar.pdf.

IV. MULTILINGUALISM: CONFERENCE AND LANGUAGE SERVICES

A. Meetings and documentation

88. The department of conference services in each organization is responsible for the efficient provision of conference services, including timely simultaneous distribution of documents in all official languages, as well as their posting on websites. In organizations with internal language services, other services, such as translation of documents, interpretation, report and précis-writing, among others, are also provided.

89. The provision of conference services has been particularly under pressure in the last years to address concerns raised by the clients. Organizations increasingly undertake surveys on user satisfaction and try to better organize conference services in order to meet client needs. This collective work requires constructive collaboration among the different parties so as to become more efficient in both planning and delivery.

90. Further efforts should be made to improve the quality of the texts submitted to conference services departments by both Member States and author departments as input for forthcoming meetings. All parties should abide by the time limits for submission of original documents; statistics have shown a clear correlation between late submission and the lack of compliance with the issuance deadlines for official documents.[50]

91. Current United Nations Secretariat directives on distribution and issuance of documents are centred around the following four principles, with a view to responding to the requests emanating from the different resolutions on the matter from the General Assembly:[51]

- The provisional agenda of a meeting is to be issued in **all official languages** eight weeks before the opening of the session;
- All other documents for the consideration of the body are to be issued six weeks before the opening of the session, **in all official languages;**
- All language versions are to be issued **simultaneously;**
- No document is to be posted on a website until **all language versions** have been officially issued.

92. Unfortunately, these rules are not strictly applied. More often than not, the rule on simultaneous issuance and posting on websites of all language versions is infringed.[52] For instance, the JIU website does not always issue simultaneously its reports in the six official languages.[53] In this respect, **the Inspectors note that since the JIU is a subsidiary body of the General Assembly it should make use of all the official and working languages of the General Assembly, instead of English being de facto the sole working language of the Unit.**

93. Some organizations have taken specific measures to introduce a system of penalty fees payable by departments that do not comply with word limits and deadlines stated in the rules of procedures for submission of documents. While this might generate revenue, it does not resolve the structural problem. Lack of compliance with deadlines and text limits generates problems in

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[50] See A/63/119, section V.A on submission, processing and issuance of documents.

[51] For key directives on controls and limits regarding documentation and related material see General Assembly resolution 55/222, preamble and section III; General Assembly resolution 63/248, preamble and section IV; A/63/119, summary and section V; as well as A/65/122.

[52] General Assembly resolution 65/311 on multilingualism of 13 July 2011reiterates the request to the Secretary-General to ensure compliance with these rules, in keeping with section III, paragraph 5, of resolution 55/222 of 23 December 2000.

[53] In May 2011, the Arabic versions of the JIU reports from 2010 were still not available on the JIU website.

the work plan of the documentation services. ILO noted that while the introduction of the penalty scheme had some impact on the "poor services," it was not a major deterrent for departments with more available funds.

94. The systematic infringement of the rules concerning submission of documentation by many organizations of the system impedes the improvement of overall planning in conference services (documentation, translation, interpretation, etc.). Such a systematic violation of the submission rules further contributes to non-compliance with the rule of simultaneous distribution. **The Inspectors hope that the rules governing simultaneous issuance of documentation in all languages will be more strictly enforced in all cases. They encourage the submitting departments to collaborate with timely submission of original documents so that all translated versions can be made available simultaneously, in line with pertinent ACABQ recommendations, in order to ensure timely delivery, cost-effectiveness, quality and productivity with regard to documentation delivery.**[54]

95. Within the secretariats of the organizations, the substantive divisions that submit documents for translation should make further efforts to ensure that the documents submitted have been carefully drafted, with due attention to clarity of the text and complete referencing of documentation. This would save significant work for editors, and facilitate the work of translators.

96. In the United Nations Secretariat, most of the work relies on internal services and only a small proportion is outsourced to external services, mainly in the area of language services. Nevertheless, there is an increasing trend towards using translation services performed by non-regular staff.[55] In other organizations of the United Nations system where there is not enough internal capacity, editorial and other services are sometimes outsourced, as it is the case for FAO.

97. In several organizations of the United Nations system, due to budgetary constraints, a number of documents that used to be translated are now delivered in English only (e.g. ICAO, United Nations Secretariat). In particular, documents, such as draft resolutions, are not systematically translated prior to their approval, despite the fact that they are essential negotiating tools for the delegates. The value of a multilingual organization is not just a question of image, but above all of fair access to information so as to facilitate access to and participation in the decision-making processes of the legislative bodies, on equal footing. At ICAO, the Council Minutes are no longer translated, as they are oral statements exceeding the four-page limit. However, those concerned are referred to the interpretation recordings, which is a fair solution to ensuring access to information at a lower cost.

98. An essential element in providing high-quality services in the area of meetings and documentation is the role of interpretation and translation services. These are two key dimensions of the implementation of multilingualism in the work of the United Nations system organizations. These distinct areas of work (addressed in sections B and C below) share common challenges and concerns, such as namely outsourcing, recruitment and succession planning (see sections D and E). All the organizations hire freelance interpreters in order to successfully deliver requested

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[54] See A/65/484.

[55] At UNOV, approximately 65 per cent of translations are performed by non-regular staff, including 30 per cent contractual, 10 per cent off-site and 25 per cent internal temporary staff. At Headquarters, an average of 25 per cent of the translation is performed by contractual staff.

interpretation services. Reference will also be made to the professional associations, AIIC[56] and AITC[57], representing free-lance interpreters and translators, respectively.

B. Interpretation services

99. Simultaneous interpretation is at the core of the daily work of a multilingual international organization seeking to ensure fair and equitable dissemination of information to its members and interested stakeholders.

100. As in many other areas, interpretation has benefited to some extent from technological improvements, compared to its early days. Nevertheless, as one freelance interpreter stated, "there is a human limit – a physical threshold – to the potential gain in productivity in this particular profession." The development of IT tools has had a significant impact in the area of translation, in particular in automatic translation, use of terminology databases, text processing, etc. The impact in the field of interpretation is much more limited and this must be kept in mind when seeking to introduce cost-saving and efficiency strategies in this area of work.

101. The interpretation profession requires very strong language skills and specific training geared to the needs of this very demanding work. It also requires particular profiles in terms of ability to deal with the pressure and responsibility of the work, due to the real-time delivery of very sensitive information. Over the years, several health-related norms and standards have been developed to ensure that interpreters can deliver high-quality services and that their conditions of service are defined so as to preserve their physical and mental health, while satisfying client demands.

102. The early generations of interpreters worked under very difficult conditions, which resulted in various disabilities related to the inadequate conditions of the working environment (e.g. ergonomics, acoustics, downtime, etc.). Since then, different standards have been defined to ensure the quality and conditions of service for interpreters. Health-related standards resulting from efforts to improve the conditions of work of interpreters were defined by the International Organization for Standardization, with ISO standard 2603 for built-in booths, and ISO 4043 for mobile booths.[58]

103. Interpretation is not a luxury but rather a necessity to effectively deliver the work of the United Nations system organizations while preserving fair access to information in all official and working languages. The provision of mandatory interpretation varies across the system and within each organization and their different organs. While all the organizations require interpretation services, not all of them have the in-house capacity of regular staff to provide interpretation services. The United Nations requires the highest provision of interpretation services from in-house resources; thus it maintains a regular workforce in this area. Other organizations, like UNIDO or ITU, which have no in-house interpretation services, recruit short-term interpreters or use freelancers. The Vienna-based organizations (including CTBTO) avail themselves of UNOV interpretation services or use freelance interpreters.

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[56] AIIC, Association Internationale des Interprètes de Conférence. The agreement concerning conditions of employment of short-term conference interpreters can be downloaded from its website: http://www.aiic.net/ViewPage.cfm/article1988. Agreements with other international organizations are also available in the same website.

[57] International Association of Conference Translators. The agreement concerning conditions of employment of short-term translators, revisers, editors and précis-writers can be accessed at the AITC website from the page http://www.aitc.ch .

[58] See http://www.aiic.net/ViewPage.cfm/page590.htm; http://www.aiic.net/ViewPage.cfm/page587.htm.


C. Translation services

104. Translation services have always been a core service for delivering the official documentation of the United Nations system organizations. Indeed, the number of official documents to be translated has dramatically increased in the last decades, in parallel with the expansion of the mandates and organizations of the United Nations system; however, there has not been a matching increase in resources.

105. In Geneva, mandatory translation services to be provided for documents from OHCHR, the Human Rights Council and the human rights treaty organs were defined with no adequate estimation of the resources needed to effectively deliver the services without jeopardizing the other mandated work of UNOG conference services. In the conference services audit[59] put at the disposal of the Human Rights Council in 2009, OIOS concluded that "insufficient resources had been put at the disposal of the Division of Conference Management to provide conference services to the Human Rights Council while maintaining the same level of service to the Division's other Geneva-based clients."

106. In fact, the services to OHCHR, the Human Rights Council and the human rights treaty organs combined represented 60 per cent of the workload of UNOG translation services in 2010, as shown in the figures below:

INTERNAL TRANSLATION / REVISION - main users for 2010



Total: 177,823 pages (not including contractual figures of 41,283 pages)
Source: DRITS

107. The additional workload deriving from OHCHR is huge, considering that many of its documents are not subject to a page limit. It is therefore almost impossible to anticipate the planning without knowing a priori the expected number of pages of forthcoming documents. The increase in translation directly related to OHCHR is 40 per cent since 2008.[60]

In order to enhance efficiency in delivering documentation with adequate planning of translation needs, the Inspectors urge the legislative bodies to comply with the following recommendation:

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[59] See A/64/511, summary.
[60] See A/64/32 for further information.

Recommendation 6

When creating new institutional bodies that would require the provision of conference services, the legislative bodies of the United Nations system organizations should plan for the budgetary resources associated with the resulting additional workload, in particular for translation and interpretation.

108. Among the many difficulties faced by translation services in the United Nations system is the predominant use of English as the original language of texts submitted for translation, which creates an imbalance in the workload of the different linguistic sections. This is even more problematic in small organizations where translators often double as editors. During the interviews, different services suggested that it would be advisable to promote the submission of documents in official United Nations languages other than English. The Inspectors support this suggestion.

109. Translators also expressed the view that it would be better for the translation section to receive a text in the original language from authors who master other official languages. While all international civil servants are requested to have a working knowledge of English, they are not always proficient in writing it. The editorial work necessary to shape a text requires a stringent effort by the English editors.

110. In this regard, it is worth noting that SDLS in Geneva has proposed new training courses on writing skills in response to suggestions made by the editorial and translation units at UNOG. The goal of these courses is to improve the quality of original texts, so as to reduce the burden on conference services at the processing phase of the documentation. Similar initiatives to strengthen writing skills have also been implemented at UNOV and UNCHR.[61]

111. Translation is not simply a matter of transferring words from one language to another, but rather involves a significant and intangible effort to produce the final high-quality product required of the United Nations translators. Therefore, in addition to the requisite language qualifications, translators use of full range of skills to ensure that their work meets United Nations standards and the expectations of their clients. Unfortunately, the source materials with which the translators work often do not meet these standards. In the United Nations organizations, compared to other organizations, a higher need for reference and terminology checking has been detected, as too often the original texts do not contain all the references for the background documents used to produce them.

112. The above-mentioned weaknesses related to original texts heavily impact on the effectiveness and productivity of the documentation section of conference services, as they require considerable editorial and revision work to ensure the quality of the final product. Member States representatives would contribute to alleviating the workload of the editorial and translation services by limiting, to the extent possible, the length of the texts and speeches which require language services from the secretariats of the organizations, and making better use of the variety of languages at their disposal, so as to facilitate the work of précis-writers and rapporteurs.

113. As part of the measures taken within translation services to ensure consistency and, to some extent, increase productivity, translators are encouraged to use computer-assisted translation (CAT) tools with reliable translation memories. Learning to use these new IT tools diverted part of the work time of the translators, whose output is measured in very strict terms, without taking account of the time invest in training. The evolution of CAT tools has resulted in their increased

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[61] Writing for the United Nations and Writing effectively for UNHCR, respectively.

relevance in the daily work of translators, and they have become part of the standard skills within the profession.

Computer-assisted translation (CAT) for language services

114. In light of the progress made in information and communication technology tools that support language-related activities (in particular translation memories and terminology databases) and the standardization requirements for language processes among the various international organizations, early in 2000, the United Nations system organizations embarked on implementing computer-assisted translation (CAT) to deliver its languages services in a more efficient and effective manner.

115. In 2009, JIAMCATT established a Working Group on Machine Translation to discuss the practicalities of using CAT tools, and to acquaint members with the new techniques. "Computer-assisted translation techniques" is a broad term covering a wide variety of tools of diverse complexity, from basic spell-checkers (either built-in or add-on programmes) to more sophisticated machine-translation software or translation memories (such as MultiTrans and Trados), which can facilitate the work of translators in specific contexts, by recycling paragraphs, sentences and segments that have already been translated in previous documents.

116. The Inspectors observed, during their research, that the Google Translate tool was sometimes used informally in order to shorten the preliminary work by providing a first version that would save significant time in getting to the final translated version. JIAMCATT refers to this tool as "having incorporated all multilingual documentation available on the Internet – including United Nations documents – and already producing perfectly reworkable paragraphs."[62] The Google Translate tool bar has also been added to some websites (e.g. UN-HABITAT) to facilitate an initial rough translation of the website contents. The principal value of Google Translate is "gisting," that is, enabling a reader who is knowledgeable about a subject to gain a basic understanding of the source document. Google Translate can be useful for finding standard terminology, notably titles of United Nations conventions and agreements, and the names of organizational units, since most United Nations documents are indexed in this huge engine. It can also be useful if the source text has been meticulously edited in the original language and is substantially similar to past documents, as may be the case with certain resolutions or budget documents. However, in most situations where specific phrasing and terminology are not replicated in the Google Translate database and where the source-language material has not been thoroughly pre-edited, Google Translate is unlikely to produce a usable raw draft that a translator can rework.

117. In April 2010, the JIAMCATT Working Group on Machine Translation launched a survey on the use of CAT tools among JIAMCATT partners. **The Inspectors welcome the establishment of the CAT tools database by the Working Group, by which organizations can update their data online. Its use, which is currently limited to the JIAMCATT community, could be expanded to all users as a rich source of information.**

118. While it appears that CAT techniques have evolved considerably and are delivering positive results in providing a smoother environment in the translation and terminology tools context, the Inspectors noted that there was mixed feelings among the language practitioners within the United Nations, as highlighted in Table 2 below:

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[62] IAMLADP/2009/R.12, para. 8.

Table 2: Pros and cons of using CAT tools

Pros	Cons
• Gains in productivity (for both translation and terminology)	• Uneven support for the six official languages of the United Nations
• Standardization of terminology	• Individual license rights are expensive
• Recourse to terminology online is much more efficient than manual references	• Need to increase quality control; could perpetuate poor translations if no proper quality-control measures are put in place
	• Substantial indirect costs for hardware, software, continuing technical support and development

119. In this respect, computer-assisted translation systems seem to work much better in an organizational environment where a significant proportion of information in documents is "reused" year after year, thus offering the possibility of "recycling" terminology and expressions, which is often the case with annual documentation to be considered in the context of various conferences and sessions of the United Nations and the governing bodies.

120. The twenty-fourth session of JIAMCATT held in Turin, in April 2011, resulted in a number of interesting conclusions regarding the use of new IT tools in language services. **It was recommended that, when developing in-house software, JIAMCATT partner organizations should opt for open-source solutions. The Inspectors fully concur with this recommendation and wish to recall the spirit of the conclusions of the JIU report on the use of open-source software in the United Nations system (JIU/REP/2005/3). This should be further consulted with OICT, in this respect, as this office tends to choose centralized proprietary software which does not support all the official languages.**

D. Outsourcing translation and interpretation services

121. Outsourcing has been used in the past years as a way to address the lack of core in-house resources and plan for peak times by contracting freelance interpreters and translators to cover the high demand at certain periods of the year, without having to recruit regular staff for the whole year. Outsourcing has become a regular source of provision of language-related services.

122. In many organizations, outsourcing is the only resource available to provide translation or interpretation services. For instance, at UNICEF, translation into Arabic, Chinese and Russian is outsourced as there are no regular posts for these languages within the organization. At ITU, ILO,[63] WMO and many Vienna-based organizations (other than UNOV), all interpretation is outsourced or covered through short-term contracts to freelance interpreters. ILO has developed an innovative approach to secure the availability of a "pool" of freelance interpreters who are regularly hired on a short-term basis. It advocates long-term planning so as to ensure the availability of interpretation resources at the required time and makes arrangements with the external interpreters up to 18 months before the event for which interpretation is required.

123. During the interviews, the Inspectors obtained the views of the organizations concerning the pros and cons of the increased use of outsourcing for translation and interpretation services. While they all concurred that it was mainly a way to reduce service-related costs, they also pointed out that there were some negative aspects to be considered when choosing that option. In particular, in

[63] ILO has only one Chief Interpreter on staff, in charge of coordinating the provision of interpretation through freelance services.

organizations where all the language-related services are outsourced, for particular highly-sensitive and important assignments that need to be serviced internally on an urgent basis as part of the daily work of the organization, the organizations (e.g. UNIDO) have to rely on the language knowledge of internal non-language staff to deliver these services. **In this regard, the Inspectors are of the view that organizations should have at least one core unit with minimum in-house staff available to respond, on the spot, to urgent requirements, such as translation of correspondence and key short documents, for which it cannot plan for an ad hoc external recruitment.** Despite the inherent risks, outsourcing might allow, in particular cases, for more flexibility, as it makes it possible to draw on a wider range of language combinations and subject specializations and affording greater flexibility in the deployment of personnel.

124. The Inspectors also collected data to compare the cost of freelance services with the cost of regular internal language staff. While some figures were provided by the organizations and also by the kind courtesy of the AIIC, the conclusion reached is that the figures are not commensurable. No objective scientific measure of the potential financial savings associated with using freelance services can be asserted. It appears that the strategic choice of an organization should not be based merely on financial costs and savings, but rather should include consideration of other indirect costs related to the use of freelance services as well.

125. There are non-monetary indirect costs associated with the externalization of services that are not accounted for when using the simple comparison of cost per unit of translation or interpretation service. Table 3 below indicates categories of such indirect costs.

Table 3: Indirect costs (non-monetary) of externalizing language services

Administrative workload (recruitment and evaluation)	The recruitment of freelance interpreters and translators implies an added burden on HR departments as well as on language services, since the language staff have to define the substantive terms of reference, assess the skills of the candidates, as well as evaluate their performance on delivery.
Quality control / revision	External services need to be revised by internal staff; this implies less time for internal staff to deliver translation and interpretation services. Usually the most experienced staff are in charge of quality control; while reviewing external work they cannot deliver internal work.[64]
Risks - uncertainty with regard to availability	There is market competition for freelance services and they might not always be available to respond to the needs of the organizations at the desired time; poor planning can mean no interpretation services for key events. Furthermore, United Nations rates are not competitive compared to market rates; there are no built-in annual increments to partially alleviate this problem.
Loss of institutional memory	Freelance professionals service many different organizations and the knowledge they acquire in the United Nations system can be lost due to their non-institutional affiliation.

[64] See A/65/122, paras. 58, 59 and 74 concerning the specific situation at UNON, where more than 40 per cent of the translation is outsourced and requires an intensive effort by internal senior translators to ensure the revision thereof. UNON has since converted posts that were originally funded by extra-budgetary resources into regular budget posts, so as to retain experienced staff to ensure effective delivery of documents. It is expected that similar strategies will be undertaken in the budget request for the next biennium with a view to retaining experienced staff in documentation and interpretation services.

126. Undoubtedly, there are also advantages, notably in terms of flexibility to cover peak periods and lower expenditure with regard to overall staff entitlements. Nevertheless, it is difficult to determine whether it is advantageous for an organization to fully rely on external services. This might explain the current practice in most of the organizations of the system, which aim for a 70/30 percent balance, when possible, of internal and external delivery. This does not apply to organizations with no or very small language departments which fully rely on external services.

127. In view of the existing trade-offs, in order for the organizations to rely on a stable workforce to ensure enhanced compliance in terms of on-time delivery and the required quality standards of translation and interpretation services, **the Inspectors consider that the executive heads of the United Nations system organizations should have a combination of in-house and external translation and interpretation services, so as to create and maintain a stable regular internal capacity in the area of language services and preserve the institutional memory.**

Freelance interpretation and translation services: views of professional associations

128. Two professional associations represent the bulk of the language professionals community, namely AIIC for interpreters, and AITC for translators. While affiliation to these professional associations is not mandatory for the language professionals they represent, the agreements are binding to protect the rights of all freelance language professionals working for the organizations with which agreements have been signed. Active membership is not required to benefit from the conditions defined in the agreements.[65]

Freelance interpreters

129. Overall, according to AIIC, the estimated total number of conference interpreters worldwide is close to 5,000 professionals only; of these, almost 3,000 are members of AIIC.[66] The Association, which is more than 50 years old, has developed professional standards as well as a Code of Professional Ethics.

130. AIIC has signed a sectoral agreement with the United Nations common system organizations, known as the United Nations sectoral agreement, with the latest one covering the period 2007-2011. It defines the conditions of employment of short-term conference interpreters. In May 2011, negotiations for the renewal of the sectoral agreement were launched. At the end of November 2011, negotiations were still ongoing and the parties agreed to extend the current agreement until 30 June 2012.

131. The sectoral agreement is binding for most of the United Nations system organizations, as can be seen in Annex VI. Nevertheless, AIIC has reported serious failures on the part of many organizations to comply with the conditions defined in the agreement.

132. The professional associations have pointed out “frequent violations” of the terms of the agreements, as follows:

(a) Organizations subcontract services to local companies which do not abide by the contractual conditions agreed under the framework agreement between AIIC and the United Nations common system organizations;

(b) In some organizations, meetings systematically last longer than the official time, thus resulting longer work sessions for the interpreters;

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[65] See Annexes VI and VII for the parties to AIIC and AITC agreements.

[66] More detailed information and relevant documentation is available at http://www.aiic.net.

(c) Rules concerning rest time and travel conditions are not always respected.

133. Interpreters feel that they are unfairly considered as prima donnas when they defend their acquired rights. The view of AIIC, on the contrary, is that the agreements are the result of a long-term process in which the challenges and difficulties faced by the profession, in particular in terms of pressure, stress and health-related issues have been identified and recognized, including by WHO.

134. Therefore, the standards concerning the maximum duration of an interpreter's work session, conditions of the working environment (e.g. ISO standards for booths), rest breaks and travel conditions are necessary for interpreters to be able to perform as expected in delivering the best of his/her knowledge and skills in servicing the client.

Freelance translators

135. AITC, the professional association for free-lance translators, has a smaller membership than AIIC because it only represents translators who work for international organizations, whereas AIIC represents many interpreters who work in the private sector. Nevertheless, AITC has a role to play in setting professional standards and working conditions for external translation services.[67]

136. A framework agreement between AITC and CCAQ exists since 1969; its latest update was in 1991. The agreement applies to recruitment of short-term internal translators by the 15 signatory organizations worldwide, not only at headquarters but also in all the funds, programmes and secretariats, in all regional offices and field offices, and at all conference venues.[68] It does not apply to contractual translators,[69] for whom AITC has nonetheless developed guidelines for external translation services, as a reference document for these professionals. Often, translators are not purely short-term or contractual staff, but might combine these categories in delivering their services in different periods to different clients.

137. With regard to contractual translators, AITC representatives highlighted the fact that some United Nations system organizations do not realize how competitive the market is for high-quality freelance translators, and their rates are not as attractive as the remuneration offered by other organizations. Thus, the United Nations system organizations are losing out on the opportunity to secure the availability of the best freelance translators, who would prefer to work for other organizations offering a better remuneration.

138. In terms of compliance with the AITC agreement, there are alleged systematic failures to comply with the terms of the agreement. The Association reported cases of non-compliance with regard to payment of financial compensation when an organization cancels a confirmed contract less than 30 days prior to the start date of the contract. The agreement stipulates that, in such cases, financial compensation equivalent to the total net base salary applicable to the agreed contract period must be paid to the translator, unless he/she finds equivalent employment elsewhere for that period.[70]

Considering the alleged lack of compliance by many of the signatory organizations of the AIIC and AITC sectoral agreements with the United Nations system organizations, and in order to

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[67] AITC guidelines on external translation, as well as other documentation is available at http://www.aitc.ch.

[68] Short-term staff translators under the agreement are paid by the day or month. The term "translator" as used in the agreement also refers to revisers, editors, précis-writers, terminologists and report writers.

[69] Contractual translators, who are not covered by the agreement, work from home and are paid by the word.

[70] Article 9, para. (c) of the agreement.

strengthen compliance with regard to respecting the conditions set up by these agreements, the Inspectors recommend that:

Recommendation 7

The executive heads should take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance with the AIIC-United Nations agreement for interpretation and the CCAQ-AITC agreement for translation, in particular by ensuring greater awareness of these agreements at Headquarters and in the regional offices and by setting up compliance monitoring systems.

E. Demographic transition, recruitment and succession planning for language staff

139. Common challenges faced by both interpretation and translation services are the shortage of professionals, the forthcoming retirement of a significant proportion of language professionals from the regular staff in the organizations, and insufficient succession planning. In some organizations, more than 50 per cent of the language staff in these services will be retiring over the next five years. While the demographic structure of the United Nations system is impacting the totality of its services in general, in some areas, such as in language services, the impact is even harder.[71]

140. The Secretary-General's report on the pattern of conferences (A/65/122) specifically addresses the problem of succession planning, and the closely related issues of the language examination, roster management and recruitment of new staff in the language services. In response to these issues, DGACM and OHRM are closely collaborating to prepare the necessary measures to streamline the process of competitive examinations for language services, and revamp the format and assessment methods. The process takes account of the possibilities offered by a better use of new technologies, and by the establishment of partnerships with academia, so as to create tailor-made traineeship programmes to prepare future candidates for the language examinations. However, these commendable measures, and others, such as outreaching and partnerships for training language professionals, and the analysis of options to streamline the LCE process will not prevent the immediate shortage of resources in the area of language services. Nonetheless, these measures are expected to lead to improvements in the medium-term.

141. While the language competitive examination (LCE) is the natural entry point for joining the United Nations Secretariat as part of its language staff, in the past years, it has become a bottleneck, though problems vary from one language or professional group to another, as well as from one duty station to another. One common issue is insufficient awareness among training institutions and professional communities of the very high standards set by the United Nations in order to meet the demands of its Member States and ensure the highest quality language services. This problem is being pro-actively addressed by DGACM and IAMLADP through their outreach efforts. Nevertheless, in the current situation, the LCE roster does not provide enough successful candidates to replace the language staff on the way to retirement. The following data eloquently illustrates the high cost of processing the LCE and the very low rate of successful candidates, which is insufficient to adequately provide the required number of candidates to ensure a smooth demographic transition in some language services:

[71] The JIU report on age structure already addressed the issue of succession planning and demographic transition in the United Nations system (JIU/REP/2007/4). The case of language services is particularly severe.

- From 2005 to 2009, 55 language examinations were held, 38,231 applications were received; 21,830 applicants (or 57 per cent) were convoked to the written examination, of whom 1,526 (or 7 per cent) were rostered;

- In 2008, examinations for English and French interpreters yielded only three and two candidates, respectively.

- In 2009, examinations for Russian interpreters and proofreaders yielded a roster of only five successful candidates each.[72]

142. Considering that the overall vacancy rate at the four duty stations of the United Nations[73] stands at 14 per cent for interpreters and 13 per cent for translators, when projected retirements over the period 2010-2016 are factored in, total turnover will reach 43 per cent for interpreters and 40 per cent for translators. Thirteen per cent of the language staff will reach the mandatory age of separation during the period 2009-13. In absolute numbers, this means that the competitive examinations will have to produce 119 new recruits for interpretation and 217 for translation during the period in question.[74] Without improvement, the current procedure of recruitment through the LCE would not enable the organization to address in due time the necessary replacement of language staff. The Inspectors welcome the on-going efforts by DGACM and OHRM to reform the process as a matter of urgency.

143. In its current configuration, the LCE is administered by OHRM, but in practice, it relies on the collaboration of DGACM languages services to assist with the examination itself, including preparation and correction of texts. In 2009, close collaboration between the two departments during the pre-screening phase proved to be an effective approach in reducing the number of failures, by thoroughly assessing the skills and qualifications of the candidates prior to enrolling them for the final examination.

144. Owing to the difficulties of creating and maintaining a functional roster of LCE successful candidates, especially at a time of budgetary cuts, the organization increasingly opts not to replace outgoing staff. This trend has been noted not only in the United Nations system, but also in the European Commission.

145. As indicated by the high-level managers of some of the language services, even if retiring staff were replaced by recruitment of junior staff, the amount and quality of work delivered by the new staff cannot be compared, in the short term, with that delivered by the outgoing senior language staff, since the newly recruited staff will require coaching and supervision.

146. **While recognizing the on-going effort within the United Nations Secretariat, the Inspectors consider that the time has come to thoroughly rethink the process of recruitment and promotion in language services, so as to avoid a critical demographic transition at the system-wide level in the future.** If massive replacement takes place in waves, the problem will appear periodically with the same intensity unless structural measures are put in place and implemented so as to create a new and more flexible system for recruiting and retaining language staff. Taking account of the ongoing competition for these services among other international organizations, NGOs, the private sector, and the United Nations system, the latter should adopt a life-cycle approach in rethinking the whole process from recruitment to career development, promotion and anticipation of succession planning in the area of language services.

In order to enhance effectiveness in language-related services across the United Nations system, the Inspectors recommend the following:

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[72] A/65/122, para. 66.
[73] New York, Geneva, Nairobi and Vienna.
[74] A/65/122, para. 49.

Recommendation 8

The legislative bodies of the organizations of the United Nations system should ensure that the necessary resources are allocated within the organizations to achieve effective succession planning and dispense targeted training to candidates to language examinations.

147. Given the alarming shortage of language professionals, the Inspectors consider that it is urgent to learn from the past and adopt a new strategic approach for addressing the examination and recruitment policies for language services. The provision of translation and interpretation services is essential to guarantee the implementation of multilingualism within the organizations, therefore, it must be given adequate attention.

148. All stakeholders should be involved in building a strategic plan of action to ensure the provision of continued high-quality languages services. CEB should lead the process towards launching a "One UN strategic plan on multilingualism" and involve the language professional associations in the process, in particular with regard to renewing the framework agreements governing conditions of service.

In order to enhance the effectiveness of the examination and recruitment processes of language staff for the United Nations system organizations, the Inspectors recommend that:

Recommendation 9

The executive heads should prepare strategic action plans in the area of languages services to address the examination, candidate-selection and recruitment processes, and propose incentives for language career development and language staff retention, bearing in mind that Member States have different education systems and none of them shall be considered the standard one.

In order to ensure coordination within the United Nations system, the Inspectors consider that the CEB has a key role to play, and they recommend the following:

Recommendation 10

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his capacity as Chair of the CEB, should address the issues of the language examinations, recruitment and promotion in language services, career development and training for language staff, and incentives for recruiting and retaining the best language professionals, with the assistance of the coordinators for multilingualism, through the ad hoc network or working group proposed in Recommendation 5.

149. After consolidating all efforts to recruit high-quality language professionals, the organizations should give strong consideration to providing them with attractive incentives in terms of training and learning in their area of expertise. Good practices can be learned from the EC, which has put in place permanent training programmes for its language staff and incentives for them to add other languages to their language portfolio (as passive languages) over the course of their career. This practice combines motivation of language staff through incentives for continuous learning and acquisition of new language skills during their career development, with positive returns for investment for the organization through more productive language staff.

150. The Inspectors were informed about some situations in the United Nations, in which not only were staff not encouraged to strengthen their language skills by participating in expert meetings to which they had been invited, but also the hierarchy impeded their participation and

advised them to undertake these external activities, which are nonetheless directly related to their profession, during their leave time and at their own expense. The Inspectors believe that management should actively promote training and learning activities and support staff participation in external events related to their area of expertise, especially when they are at no additional cost for the organizations, other than time given to staff. Unfortunately, in-house language training does not enable the attainment of the level of language knowledge required for professional translation; therefore training in higher-education institutions is essential. In this regard, smaller language services in the United Nations system, such as at ECA, are able to provide only limited training opportunities, and funding provided for external training remains woefully inadequate. **The Inspectors are confident that the executive heads of the organizations will adopt the necessary measures for language staff to have the opportunity to participate in external activities and training up to the highest standards required to continuously upgrade their professional skills in their area of expertise.**

V. MULTILINGUALISM: OTHER DIMENSIONS

A. Language skills for a multilingual workforce: recruitment and training

151. A multilingual organization is characterized by the delivery of its daily work in a multilingual environment. The key asset of any international organization is its staff; therefore, strengthening the language skills of staff is a sine qua non condition for reinforcing the multilingual identity of any organization.

152. Language skills are a necessary component of the combination of requirements to serve in an international organization, in particular for internationally recruited staff subject to mobility provisions during their career development. While language requirements can be adjusted for locally hired staff (General Services), they should be much stricter for internationally recruited staff who should have a good command of at least two working languages, if not from the outset of their career, then during their career development and within a reasonable timeframe. The possibility for an organization to impact the effective level of multilingualism of its workforce depends on two key areas: due consideration and testing of language skills as part of the recruitment and promotion processes; and the provision of language training to staff in order for them to have good working knowledge of at least two working languages during the development of their career.

Recruitment

153. The recruitment process is critical to the design and implementation of medium- and long-term strategies concerning the desired profile of the international workforce in the organizations of the United Nations system. Unfortunately, the manner in which human resources departments – overloaded by lengthy bureaucratic procedures – deliver their work appears to be based more on a piecemeal approach than on a top-down strategy aimed at consolidating a multilingual workforce. Indeed, a coordinated effort on the part of human resources departments and the hiring managers from the recruiting departments is required to build such a workforce in the long-run. Senior managers in the organizations should provide effective support to human resources departments so that they could effectively contribute to adequately assessing the language skills of candidates at the pre-screening phase, eventually calling on the expert assistance of the language staff to effectively test candidates' language skills. The result should be accordingly reflected in the scorecard of the recruitment process, as well as included in the performance evaluation of the staff. Human resources departments could seek support from language training services to evaluate candidates' language skills, with due compensation for such services.

154. While the use of working languages other than English is becoming more frequent in the regional commissions compared to other entities of the Secretariat, the Inspectors could assert that some human resources officers in the regional commissions were unable or unwilling to work in any working language other than English. **The Inspectors are of the opinion that human resources departments should be the guiding example by recruiting human resources staff who have good command of at least two working languages of the organization**.

155. Moreover, the Inspectors noted that there is a grey area, in terms of accountability, concerning effective language testing during the recruitment process. Human resources managers see themselves as mediators who merely check the information provided by candidates against the job description, but do not effectively test their linguistic capacities. The burden of testing is therefore on the hiring departments and their recruiting panels.

156. Unfortunately, hiring departments usually include rather vague clauses concerning language skills requirements. Most often, only fluency in English is required, while any other language, in the vast majority of cases, is only either desirable or an asset, not mandatory (with few exceptions). This is even more questionable in cases of vacancies in the field in non-anglophone countries, which do not require the knowledge of another working language. Taking into account

the large number of least-developed countries (LDCs) where French, another working language of most of the United Nations system organizations, is used, one would expect that, for the benefit of the host country, international civil servants should be able to work in French as well.

157. The working languages of the United Nations organizations are not being used on equal footing, and the predominant trend is to use English, as the sole working language.[75] In this respect, the Inspectors refer to the previous JIU review on multilingualism (JIU/REP/2002/11), particularly paragraph 71, as the statement is still valid today:

> In his bulletin ST/SGB/201 of 8 July 1983, the United Nations Secretary-General restated the rules concerning the Organization's working languages and emphasized that 'each staff member should be free to use in his/her written communications either English or French, at his or her option' and that 'no impediment is to be placed by anyone to this policy', which was also to be applied to the other working languages of three of the regional economic commissions, namely Russian in the case of ECE, Spanish in the case of ECLAC and Arabic in the case of ESCWA. In another bulletin issued two years later,[19] the Secretary-General, noting that the policy referred to in bulletin ST/SGB/201 was not being fully applied, 'encouraged those staff members throughout the Secretariat whose principal language is French, or who prefer to work in that language, to use French in all official communications'.
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> [19] ST/SGB/212, 24 September 1985.

158. The Inspectors welcome initiatives taken by some organizations to establish effective collaboration between human resources departments and substantive departments. At IAEA – a highly technical and specialized agency – for example, a manager may be reluctant to discard an ideal candidate just because he/she lacks the required diversity of language skills. In such a case, a special waiver could be requested of the Director-General of the Agency, and the new staff could be given the necessary language training opportunities upon joining the organization, so that in the medium-term the staff member would be able to strengthen his/her language skills. Similar policies are in pace at UNESCO and FAO, where a new staff member who does not meet the language requirements, commits to undertake language training and to be tested within a certain period of time, so that in the long-run these skills will be acquired. On a similar ground, the WFP has also set up a human resources policy aimed at building a multilingual workforce, by requiring fluency in one of the six official languages and limited knowledge of any of the other languages.[76]

159. With regard to the language of vacancy notices, the majority of the United Nations system organizations advertise positions in English and French (see Table 4). The Inspectors note with disappointment that a significant proportion of organizations still post vacancy announcements only in English. Good practice is to be highlighted in the six organizations which post vacancies in English, French and Spanish (see Table 4 below); however they are the minority. Human resources departments have confirmed that in practice most applications are submitted in English, even in cases where the organization allows for applications to be submitted in other languages. For instance, the Inspectors noted that, in some cases, vacancy announcements for local recruitment at ECLAC in Santiago, Chile, were advertised in English only.

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[75] For example, staff are not required to know Spanish to work at ECLAC; at most, knowledge of Spanish would be considered an asset, not a mandatory requirement.

[76] WFP Human Resources Policy on Administrative Procedures for International Professional Staff (dated 09.10.2003).

Table 4: Languages used in job vacancy announcements in the United Nations system

Language(s) used in vacancy notices	Organizations concerned
English	UNFPA,* UNHCR, UNICEF, UNRWA, WFP,* ICAO, IAEA, UNIDO
English, French	United Nations Secretariat, UNCTAD, ESCWA, ESCAP, ECLAC, ECA, UNODC, UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO
English, French, Spanish	UNDP, FAO, ILO,* IMO, ITU, UNWTO*

* Field-based positions are advertised according to language specificities in the region

160. At a time of increasing budgetary constraints, and in order to respond to the Secretary-General's call to do more with less, a strategic approach would be to reinforce the language capacities of the international civil servants, so that they rely less on translation and interpretation services and can directly deliver their work in different working languages of their organizations. Again, the strengthening of these language capacities relies on two arms: (a) recruitment, when selecting new staff; and (b) training, during career development.

161. The Inspectors also observed that the demonstration-effect deriving from the example set by the executive heads of the organizations was a positive motivator for the staff-at-large to strengthen their language skills. This was noted at FAO, ILO, ITU and UNESCO. This phenomenon is also a reality in Member States in which several official languages co-exist; multilingual high-level representatives provide a positive example of equal treatment of their official languages by using them equally in national and international fora (e.g. Cameroon, Canada, Switzerland).

162. Clear responsibilities should be identified for the different actors involved in the recruitment process, namely the human resources department, hiring managers in the recruiting departments, with the possible support of language training services. Job descriptions should include stronger language requirements and language skills should be properly evaluated during the recruitment process. Furthermore, new recruitment tools, such as INSPIRA at the United Nations Secretariat, should carefully address language competencies, and the instructions for use of INSPIRA should be made available in at least the two working languages of the organization. At the present time, the manuals for applicants and hiring managers are available only in English.

163. The Secretary-General and executive heads should also be accountable for the appointment of senior managers, and take into account their language skills and suitability for the function**. In particular, the Inspectors are confident that the process for appointing senior officials for United Nations offices away from Headquarters will include a language requirement so as to ensure fluency in the language of the host country, if it is an official United Nations language. The same recommendation applies to the process for appointing senior officials, including executive heads, for the organizations of the United Nations system.**

In view of the above, and in order to enhance effectiveness in the work of the multilingual United Nations system organizations, the Inspectors recommend the following:

Recommendation 11

The executive heads should take the necessary measures to ensure that the recruitment process, including that relating to senior officials, fully and fairly addresses language requirements, so that in the medium-term, the organizations of the system could rely on a multilingual workforce that is fluent in one working language and has good knowledge of at least one other working language, with due attention to the specific needs of the duty stations.

Training

164. The development of training programmes varies across the United Nations system. Language training opportunities are offered with full or partial cost coverage, and subject to different eligibility criteria across the system.[77] As a career development tool, language training is generally administrated through the human resources services. In some organizations, language services are provided externally by language academies; in others they are offered in-house.

165. When preparing language courses, the training services take into account staff needs as well as the needs of the substantive departments.[78] Surveys have been undertaken to assess the salient needs and identify the key areas demanded by staff and management. For example, in Geneva, new courses on writing skills have been tailored to improve staff report writing. This can be seen as strengthening the capacity of staff to use their language skills to produce better quality original documents, and it will in turn alleviate the workload of editors and translators at the end of the line.

166. The responses to the recent survey undertaken by the language training services at UNOG lead to two main recommendations:

- More specific courses should be offered in English and French;
- More flexibility in class formats should be explored (evening, on-line, etc.).

167. Thirty per cent of the respondents claimed that they had not enrolled in language courses because their schedule was too busy. In a context where acquisition of language skills is not sufficiently rewarded in the overall staff performance evaluation, it is difficult to further motivate staff to strengthen their language skills. There are language incentives in place across the United Nations system; they should be systematized in terms of financial coverage of the training costs – which happens in many cases[79] – and in terms of recognition of this effort in the staff performance appraisal.

168. The United Nations has developed very rich language training programmes in the different duty stations. A problem of consistency has been noted by users of the language courses, in particular in the context of mobility. At present, the language courses at UNHQ and UNOG are not aligned due to the different course formats at the two duty stations (e.g. 1 term at UNHQ consists of 36 teaching hours compared to 48 hours at UNOG). Currently, a staff member moving from one location to another within the same organization is required to sit a new enrolment test to continue his/her language training. Harmonization efforts are being made to align the language

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[77] Depending on the duty station, training courses are also available to non-United Nations staff, such as mission representatives and spouses. An overview of language training availability and potential beneficiaries is given in Annex III, based on the responses to the JIU questionnaire and the interviews.

[78] As an example of needs assessment, see the results of the recent survey carried out at UNOG by SDLS, available at http://learning.unog.ch/Portals/0/supporting0//UNOG_Language_needs_analysis_report.pdf.

[79] See A/64/30, annex IX, Language incentives.

programmes, using the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR).[80] The CEFR is of particular interest to language professionals involved in language teaching and testing. It provides a clear framework for teaching, including learning objectives and methods, as well as the necessary tools for proficiency assessment. At UNHCR, the CEFR is already being used to determine the level of language courses – both traditional and online – and the final proficiency assessment. **The Inspectors expect a United Nations system language reference framework to be put in place, inspired by the good practice example of the CEFR, but independent of it.**

169. The Inspectors acknowledge the on-going collaboration within the United Nations Secretariat to harmonize language courses curricula so that different duty stations can offer similar training packages, thus facilitating mutual arrangements in the area of language teaching. A pioneering exercise has been undertaken to that effect by the French language training sections of UNHQ and UNOG. To foster such a process, **the Inspectors are convinced that full recognition of the professionalism of language teachers and better prospects for career development should be explored, so that the organizations can retain the best staff and reward them according to their expertise.** Currently, language training staff have little or no leeway in their career development, as they are mostly General Services staff or external consultants; those in charge of language coordination are at the P2 level at the most. **Considering that in many cases language training staff have Master's level education, or even higher, it would be advisable to review and upgrade the current status of contractual arrangements for these professionals. Hiring should also be based on qualifications and age should not be a criteria.**

170. Harmonization across duty stations could be strengthened by reconsidering the current contractual arrangements for language teachers. Since they are locally recruited, they are not subject to mobility provisions; however, facilitating the mobility of language teachers to different duty stations and system organizations would contribute to knowledge and experience sharing in the area of language training.

171. United Nations staff must pass the Language Proficiency Examination (LPE) to prove their proficiency in a language. The complex logistics of this process should be reviewed so as to facilitate its decentralization and reduce the high administrative cost. The Inspectors noted that the LPE registration period is open before the results of the previous session are issued. This leads to unnecessary double enrolment and additional administrative costs. **The Inspectors are of the view that the LPE results should be issued prior to the opening of the new enrolment period.**

B. Outreach: Websites and public information

Websites

172. Websites and social media are increasingly the ideal windows for publicizing the achievements of organizations worldwide. They are now essential tools for promoting the image of an organization, and they also provide unique opportunities for disseminating information to a larger audience. The Inspectors deplore that insufficient attention is paid to the use of websites

[80] The Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) was developed through a large consultative process by the Council of Europe. It provides the basis for mutual recognition of language qualifications, and is increasingly used in the reform of national curricula and by international consortia to the comparison of languages certificates. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe addressed a recommendation to members states on the use of the CEFR and the promotion of plurilingualism (CM/Rec(2008)7E). See http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/linguistic/cadre_en.asp.

and the dissemination of information in all official languages, or at least in the working languages of the organizations.

173. Indeed, a fully multilingual website is more the exception than the rule. While there are good examples in the United Nations system, such as the websites of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law [81] (UNCITRAL), UNESCO, WHO and the United Nations, most of the other organizations' websites are only in English.[82] Some may be multilingual at the homepage level, but the actual content of the website may differ from one language to another, and the target document at the end of the search may be only in English. WHO has a full team of multilingual web editors who edit and prioritize content specific to each language group in order to make efficient use of limited resources.

174. UNESCO's website has evolved from being mainly in English in 2004 to truly multilingual in 2010.[83] A specific contribution from Saudi Arabia over a four-year period, further to a bilateral agreement, provided the necessary resources to develop the Arabic version of the website and support translation of documents and publications. Launched in 2008, the Arabic-language site covered all major themes by 2010. The central texts of UNESCO's portal are now available in all six languages, and will soon be available also in Portuguese.

175. For subsites devoted to local country projects, efforts should be made, to the extent possible, to facilitate access to information by the direct beneficiaries of the projects, in their local language.

176. The JIU report on Management of Internet websites in the United Nations system organizations (JIU/REP/2008/6) had already noted, in 2008, that the multilingual dimension of the websites was not satisfactory, and recommended (recommendation 6) the setting up of internal ad hoc committees to deal with the implementation of multilingualism on corporate websites. Two years later, only 13 JIU participating organizations had accepted the recommendation, and only three had implemented it.[84] Some organizations, such as WHO, have already taken actions as part of its Plan of Action on Multilingualism, in part inspired by that JIU report. Many others have yet to make significant progress.

In view of the increased role of media, and in particular the use of websites, in order to enhance effectiveness of public information policies, the Inspectors recommend the following:

Recommendation 12

The legislative bodies of the organizations of the United Nations system should direct and approve the necessary support to the executive heads to develop multilingual websites in all their official or working languages, with due attention to the language specificities of the duty stations concerned.

177. In his recent report on the news services activities of DPI (A/AC.198/2011/3), the Secretary-General referred to the efforts made towards achieving the goal of multilingualism and parity of languages in the websites. To ease the burden of the costs for website development in the six official languages, a requirement mandated by the General Assembly, DPI has established

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[81] .www.uncitral.org

[82] See Annex IV.

[83] In 2003, the UNESCO General Conference adopted the Recommendation concerning the Promotion and Use of Multilingualism and Universal Access to Cyberspace, requesting Member States and international organizations to encourage the multilingual capabilities of all their media in the area of information and communication technology.

[84] Information based on internal JIU follow-up on recommendations, status of implementation, 2010.

cooperative arrangements with universities in China, Belarus and Spain for the translation of web content into Chinese, Russian and Spanish. Concerning Arabic, DPI and DGACM worked together, with the cooperation of the Arabic Translation Service, which hosted DGACM interns during the summers of 2009 and 2010. The internships enabled an increased number of web pages to being translated into Arabic. At UNIDO, ad hoc initiatives were undertaken, including assigning the translation of some parts of the website to consultants. These partnership initiatives regarding translation of website information could be emulated within the United Nations system organizations in order to progressively implement the necessary measures aiming at developing fully multilingual websites in the medium and long term.

178. In light of the increasing relevance of websites as communication tools, the Inspectors consider that the CEB, the highest coordinating body at the executive heads level, should be an example in providing information to the public in the official languages of the United Nations, or at least in the working languages of the majority of the organizations of the system.

179. **Noting that the CEB website contains information only in English, the Inspectors consider that the CEB secretariat should be given the necessary resources to develop a multilingual website and lead by example in this area, providing information in all official languages, if possible, otherwise, at least in the working languages used by most of the organizations.**

Public information and outreach

180. The image of an organization is promoted not only through its website, but also through its outreach activities. The relevant departments should be able to deliver information in languages other than English and to interact with Member States, to the extent possible, in the languages that they have chosen to receive official communications. In this regard, good practices have been observed at DPI in Geneva, which has made special efforts to recruit multilingual staff, precisely for the purpose of communicating and working in several languages.

181. Despite its critical role in outreach policies, DPI could be more responsive in supporting the initiatives of other services carrying out clearly targeted outreach activities related to multilingualism. At UNHQ, some language training services have proposed very interesting activities that could be undertaken on Language Days, which were launched after UNESCO's International Year of Languages in 2008. While many dedicated professionals make their services available for these outreach activities on a voluntary basis, they still need additional resources to support the organization of the language-related events. Unfortunately, this year, due mainly to budgetary constraints, DPI proposed to organize "virtual language days" only. DPI has also successfully worked out partnerships with Member States to sponsor Language Days. **In this context, the Inspectors are of the view that more innovative approaches should be explored, including the appointment of Goodwill Ambassadors for Multilingualism by the executive heads of the organizations.**

182. Language Day initiatives have proven to be successful outreach activities and the Inspectors consider that strong support should be given to the services organizing these events so that they are not limited to virtual activities. Some Member States have expressed their support for these initiatives, as illustrated by the following excerpt from a statement by the representative of the Russian Federation:

> "We believe that holding in 2010 of the days of each of the six official UN languages in celebration of the International Mother Language Day was successful. Diplomatic missions and United Nations Secretariat staff showed great interest to the Russian

> Language Day, marking the birthday of the great Russian poet Alexander Pushkin. This year, we plan to continue this initiative."[85]

In view of promoting language outreach activities such as the Language Days, the Inspectors recommend that:

Recommendation 13

The Secretary-General of the United Nations should actively promote the development of language-related events, such as the Language Day initiative, to increase awareness of multilingualism challenges and to disseminate information to Member States, academia and other partners, seeking, as appropriate, their support through innovative partnerships or ad hoc extra-budgetary contributions.

183. In case of scarce resources, one language event per year could be considered, not necessarily focusing only on official United Nations languages. Another possibility would be to promote one official language and one non-official language on Language Day; this would provide visibility for the achievements within the organization with regard to one official language, and provide information on other languages of the world, thereby promoting UNESCO's language vitality scheme (see chapter II).

184. DPI has made a commendable effort towards language parity through the recently introduced daily news-related video featured on the United Nations homepage, which is posted with captions in all official languages, thus improving multilingual access.

185. In 2010, DGACM and DPI merged their outreach efforts; DGACM awards prizes for each language of the Saint Jerome Translation Contest on a Language Day organized by DPI. The Saint Jerome Contest was initially limited to the translation of a passage from Spanish or French into English. However, it was expanded in 2009 to include translations into all the official languages of the United Nations, as well as into German. Such initiatives should be further strengthened and supported within the organizations.

186. As part of its outreach activities, WHO organized an exhibition on multilingualism to raise awareness among WHO staff and the public about the importance of language in achieving global health objectives. It included posters on multilingualism, video clips on the use of multilingual information in country offices and a language quiz disseminated through internal channels and via social media.

C. Multilingualism, peace and development

187. The role of the United Nations in humanitarian affairs and in contributing to resolving conflict situations is at the core of its universal mandate. In this area, the organizations of the system should make renewed efforts to facilitate access to information and to communicate with clients in the field in their own languages so as to enhance effectiveness and success of the operations. Particular attention should be paid to ensure that staff in the field can communicate in local languages with the population, during peace operations.

188. As an example of good practice, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is developing activities to improve outreach in all their working languages, and publishing a bilingual newsletter, in English and French, on a quarterly basis. In October 2010,

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[85] Statement by the Russian Federation to the 33rd session of the United Nations Committee on Information, New York, 28 April 2011.

the OIF[86] and UNIDIR signed a cooperation agreement centred around three axes of interest: research, knowledge management and sharing, and networking.

189. The relevance of using multiple languages and maximizing outreach to target audiences has been recurrently addressed in different General Assembly resolutions. In particular, in 2001, **General Assembly resolution 55/34 addressed the United Nations disarmament information programme and recommended that the United Nations website maintain an updated source of accessible information on disarmament issues and, within available resources, produce versions of the site in as many official languages as feasible (paragraph 5(b)). The Inspectors fully support this recommendation.**

190. Another core mandate of the United Nations system is its contribution to development further to the Millennium Declaration and the Millennium Development Goals. A recurrent trend in many development-related organizations is to produce their publications and prepare their projects in English only. This can lead to situations in which non-English-speaking developing countries receive technical assistance, as well as the final report of the project, which is meant to assist the country in identifying and implementing development strategies, in English only. Noting that among developing countries, the least developed countries in Africa include a significant number of francophone countries, efforts should be made to facilitate their access to information that is instrumental for their development strategies.

191. As part of the United Nations' role in preserving peace in the world, the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC), created in 2005, focuses its work on assisting in the recovery of post-conflict countries. This requires a participatory process at national level to elaborate applicable strategies, taking account of the relevant national stakeholders and their regional and international partners. To this end, effective and regular communication among all stakeholders in New York as well as at country level is a must, and might require the full use of languages other than the six official United Nations languages. For instance, within the context of the country-specific configuration for a Portuguese-speaking country in West Africa, it is vital that meetings be held in Portuguese and that all documentation be speedily translated from and into that language. In this case, a communications strategy should be developed, taking into account extra-budgetary fund-raising options, targeted to the provision of language services in the official national language so as to strengthen the effectiveness of the activities carried out at national level. The United Nations offices concerned should be equipped with the necessary facilities, such as state-of-the-art simultaneous interpretation equipment, to deliver such services.

In order to ensure a sustainable impact and effectiveness of the work of the United Nations system organizations in areas such as peacebuilding, humanitarian affairs and development, among others, the Inspectors recommend that:

Recommendation 14

The executive heads of the organizations of the United Nations system delivering work in the field in the area of humanitarian affairs, peacekeeping, peacebuilding and development activities, among others, should ensure that due attention is given to delivering their activities and related materials in all official or working languages, taking account of the local language(s) of the beneficiaries.

[86] Among 83 countries in conflict situations worldwide in 2008, 31 were francophone countries. Among the multilateral peace operations in 2009, 22 of the 51 countries and territories involved were francophone.

D. Role of Member States: enforcing equal treatment of official and working languages

192. While the implementation of multilingualism within the organizations and their respective secretariats is the responsibility of the organizations themselves, Member States should reconfirm their commitment to this policy, which reflects the foundational texts and the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations to build a United Nations serving all members on equal footing with no language discrimination. Therefore, instead of being sometimes passive observers of the loss of language diversity, Member States should more actively promote and support effective implementation of multilingualism by using the tools at their disposal through their legislative power and their budgetary support.

193. Members States should not be reticent about exercising and demanding their language rights. One example of an unacceptable situation occurred in Geneva recently when highly sensitive draft resolutions related to an ongoing conflict in a francophone country in West Africa was distributed only in English. The affected Member State did not have a French version to consider during the delicate negotiations. This should not happen in a multilingual organization that cares about peace in the world. The savings realized by not translating draft resolutions for the negotiating process would be cancelled out by the cost in human lives that could result from delays and misunderstandings due to language. Ultimately, it is a matter of incommensurable values: money versus human lives.

194. As far as multilingualism is concerned, budgetary constraints cannot be the Procrustean bed for aligning fair treatment of languages on inadequate standards and for the degradation in the quality of services due to Member States. Far from becoming a private corporation, the United Nations deals with core values of humanity, and the multilingual function is not a fashion business but a key tool for serving and servicing its stakeholders more equitably, effectively and transparently.

In order to ensure compliance with the mandate of multilingualism, the Inspectors recommend the following:

Recommendation 15

As a matter of policy, the legislative bodies of the organizations of the United Nations system should endorse, including through budgetary channels, the arrangements required to ensure effective compliance in delivering the organizations' core work in all official and working languages.

E. The way forward

Timeo hominem unius libri (I fear the man of a single book)

195. This Latin quote, attributed to 13th century philosopher, Thomas Aquinas, could not be more timely today in reflecting the United Nations' true commitment to language diversity as reaffirmed in the General Assembly's landmark resolution 50/11 of November 1995, which states as follows: "the universality of the United Nations and its corollary, multilingualism, entail for each State Member of the Organization, irrespective of the official language in which it expresses itself, the right and the duty to make itself understood and to understand others."

196. In this respect, the Inspectors acknowledge with appreciation the ongoing work and initiatives being undertaken within the United Nations by DGACM (whose Head chairs the IAMLADP network) in addressing the current challenges in the area of conference and languages

services for the effective implementation of multilingualism. While welcoming the appointment of a new Coordinator for Multilingualism, in his capacity as Head of DPI, the Inspectors are of the view that, in line with the Coordinator's mandate, strategic action plans should be promoted with the assistance of a fully fledged focal points network. Other organizations have followed suit, in paving the way for language diversity, based on ad hoc arrangements made by their executive heads, and endorsement by their governing bodies (FAO, UNESCO, UNIDO, WIPO, WHO and more).

197. Considering the recurring impediments for the full implementation of multilingualism across the system, the Inspectors stress the need for the organizations of the United Nations system:

(a) To adhere more strictly to the principles of equality in respect of the official languages and the equitable use of the working languages within secretariats, including the use of additional working languages in specific duty stations;

(b) To formally require from all staff, in the context of recruitments and promotions, a good knowledge of at least one other working language;

(c) To consistently tackle the alarming issues of the shortage of qualified interpreters and translators, effective succession planning, targeted training and career development;

(d) To establish within the CEB machinery a working group on multilingualism to develop policies and strategies of action based on the key recommendations issued by IAMLADP and the respective coordinators for multilingualism.

198. In the context of economic realities and financial constraints, Member States are the ones to ultimately answer this central question: Should the United Nations abdicate their commitment to cultural diversity within one world and succumb, for the sake of pragmatism, to the trend towards de facto monolingualism and its inherent single-thought culture, or do they truly want to stand up coherently for their valued principles in further preserving the right and duty of using a diversity of languages to serve "the Peoples of the United Nations"?

199. Multilingualism being in this regard the sole legitimate response to the rising pattern of the "*pensée unique*", the Inspectors firmly believe that the time has come for the governing bodies to "walk the talk" and take bold steps in establishing the right balance between effective implementation of multilingualism and allocation of required resources, based on the priorities of Member States as well as the strategies and practices of the secretariats across the system. Thanks to the sense of shared responsibility on the part of the main stakeholders, the executive heads should seek to launch a strategic "One UN policy for multilingualism" through the CEB, and seek matching budgetary support from their governing bodies.

Annex I
Formal frameworks for multilingualism in the United Nations system organizations (based on responses to the JIU questionnaire, 2010)

Organization	Existence of a formal framework for multilingualism	Reference documents
UN	Yes	A/RES/50/11, A/RES/52/23, A/RES/54/64, A/RES/56/262, A/RES/59/309, A/RES/61/266, A/RES/63/396
ESCWA	No, but various policies promoting multilingualism exist for different areas of work	Idem
ESCAP	Yes	Idem
ECLAC	No	Idem
ECA	No, but clauses on the working languages of the Commission exist in the Terms of Reference	Idem
ECE	Yes	Idem
UNCTAD	Yes	Communications strategy (TD/B/56/9/Rev.1)
UNDP	Yes	Rules of Procedure of the Executive Board of UNDP and UNFPA (DP/1997/32)
UNEP	Yes	ST/AI/2001/5, ST/AI/189
UNFPA	Yes	Rules of Procedure of the Executive Board of UNDP and UNFPA (DP/1997/32)
UN-Habitat	Yes	General Assembly resolutions 50/11 and 63/306
UNHCR	No. but various policies promoting multilingualism exist	IOM/033-FOM/033/2010, IOM/05-/FOM/05/2006, SAMM 3.11, A/AC.96/187/Rev.6
UNICEF	Yes	CF/AI/2000-013
UNODC	Yes	A/RES/63/306
UNRWA	Yes	Certain policies supporting multilingualism in international staff regulations and rules
WFP	Yes	Documents cited include Language Training Policy and HR Policy on admin. procedures for international P staff
FAO	Yes	Basic Texts (Rule XLVIII of the General Rules of the Organization) - FAO Administrative Manual, section 530, and Appendix D on Conference arrangements - Governing body containing the language policy (PC 81/6 - FC 92/13 of 1999) – Administrative circulars on interpretation and translation (AC 2006/13 and AC 2006/07).
ICAO	Yes	Doc 9958 – Assembly resolutions in force (Oct 2010)
IAEA	Yes	Staff Regulations 5.05
ILO	Yes	Various standing orders, information notes and office procedures
IMO	No	Rules of Procedure of the IMO Assembly, Council and Committees enshrine multilingual policies
ITU	Yes	Resolution 154
UNESCO	Yes	Administrative manual, chap. 1.9
UNIDO	Yes	IDB-36/Dec.2, IDB-38/11, GC.13/Res.4
UNWTO	No	
UPU	Yes	Administrative instruction No. 31
WHO	Yes	WHA61.12, WHA60.11, WHA50.32, WHA51-30, WHA31.13, EB105.R6, EB121/6
WIPO	Yes	A/48/26 para. 250 (following proposal PBC/15/9), A/48/11, A/48/11 Add.
WMO	Yes	WMO General Regulations (ref: Reg. 117-122)

Annex II
Official and working languages of the secretariats of the United Nations system organizations (based on responses to JIU questionnaire, 2010)

Organization	Official languages	Working languages
UN Secretariat	A C E F R S	E F
UNESCWA	A E F	A E F
UNESCAP	C E F R	E F
UNECLAC	E F S	E F S
UNECA	A E F	A E F
UNECE	E F R	E F R
UNCTAD	A C E F R S	A E F S
UNDP	E F S	E F S
UNFPA	A C E F R S	E F S
UNICEF	A C E F R S	E F S
UNHCR	A C E F R S	E F
WFP	A C E F R S	E
UNEP	A C E F S	E F S
UN-Habitat	A C E F R S	E F
UNRWA	A E	E
UNODC	A C E F R S	E F
UNOPS	A C E F R S	E F
ILO	E F S	A C E F R S G
FAO*	A C E F R S	A C E F R S
UNESCO	A C E F R S H P I	E F
ICAO	A C E F R S	A C E F R S
WHO**	A C E F R S	A C E F R S
UPU	F	F E
ITU	A C E F R S	A C E F R S
WMO	A C E F R S	A C E F R S
IMO	A C E F R S	E F S
WIPO***		A C E F R S
UNIDO	A C E F R S	E F
UNWTO	A C E F R S	E F S
IAEA	A C E F R S	E

* FAO's Basic Texts do not define the terms "official" and "working" languages, and refer only to the languages of the Organization. Other languages (e.g. German, Portuguese) are used for specific sessions.
** WHO uses all official languages as working languages of the meetings of its governing bodies. It does not define the "working languages" to be used in the secretariat, but allows each office to use the languages suitable to their location and work. WHO regional offices for example have working languages specific to their regions.
*** WIPO's constitutional texts do not define the term "official languages" and refer only to working languages. Other languages (e.g. German, Japanese, Korean) are used for specific committees.

Key: A: Arabic; C: Chinese; E: English; F: French; G: German; H: Hindi; I: Italian; P: Portuguese; R: Russian; S: Spanish

Annex III
Language training: eligibility and cost sharing

Organization	Free training provided to			Training provided on a cost-sharing basis to		
	All staff Members	Core staff	Others/Non-staff (interns, consultants, retirees, diplomats. etc.)	Staff	Others/Non-staff (interns, consultants, retirees, diplomats, etc.)	Spouses
UN		X			X	X
ESCWA		X				
ESCAP		X			X	X
ECLAC		X			X	X
ECA		X			X	X
ECE						
UNCTAD		X			X	X
UNDP		X			X	X
UNEP						
UNFPA		X				
UN-Habitat		X			X	
UNHCR				X(*)		X
UNICEF	X					
UNODC	X				X	X
UNRWA	X	X	X (family members included)			
WFP				X		
FAO	X					
ICAO				X	X	X
IAEA				X	X	X
ILO				X	X	X
IMO		X				
ITU	X					
UNESCO		X			X	X
UNIDO		X				X
UNWTO				X	X	
UPU	X					
WHO	X					
WIPO		X				
WMO		X				

(*) UNHCR has for some time implemented a cost-sharing policy as it improves commitment, not only for registration in but also for completion of language studies. In this way, the organization can provide more effective language training to a larger number of staff. In order to reach a broader audience, e-learning courses in all official languages are available to staff who do not have access to classroom learning.

Annex IV
Websites and multilingualism (JIU participating organizations)

Organization	Languages on official homepage	Additional languages
UN	A C E F R S	
ESCWA	A E	
ESCAP	E	
ECLAC	E F S	Portuguese
ECA	E F	
ECE	E	
UNCTAD	E F S	
UNDP	E F S	
UNEP	C E F S	
UNFPA	E F S	57 Country office websites: 24 English, 14 Spanish, 12 French, 2 Portuguese, 1 English/Farsi, 1 English/Arabic, 1 Japanese, 1 Russian, 1 Vietnamese
UN-Habitat	A C E S	Google translate toolbar added to site to provide several other language options
UNHCR	E	48 country websites in native language(s), including all official languages
UNICEF	A C E F S	National Committees are responsible for additional languages on country sites
UNODC	E F	
UNOPS	E F S	
UNRWA	A E	Hebrew
WFP	A C E F R S	Czech, Danish, Dutch, Finnish, German, Icelandic, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Norwegian, Portuguese, Slovak, Swedish
FAO	A C E F R S	Other languages are used locally (e.g. Italian, Japanese, Portuguese)
ICAO	E F	
IAEA	E	
ILO	E F S	
IMO	E	
ITU	A C E F R S	
UNESCO	A C E F R S	National Committees are responsible for additional languages on country sites
UNIDO	E F	
UNOPS	E F S	
UNWTO	A E F R S	
UPU	E F	
WHO	A C E F R S	Regional offices websites have additional languages (e.g. German in the Regional Office for Europe)
WIPO	A C E F R S	
WMO	A C E F R S	

Annex V
Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) between academic institutions and the United Nations

Date of MoU	University and location
24 May 2011	Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou, China
20 December 2010	American University in Cairo (AUC), Egypt
9 November 2010	University of Nairobi, Kenya
29 October 2010	Saint Joseph University (USJ) Beirut, Lebanon
27 October 2010	Damascus University, Syria
09 March 2010	Ecole supérieure d'interprètes et de traducteurs (ESIT) and Université Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris 3, France
08 March 2010	Institut de management et de communication interculturels (ISIT), France
04 March 2010	Université de Mons (UMONS), Belgium
20 January 2010	Lomonosov Moscow State University (LMSU), Russian Federation
18 January 2010	Minsk State Linguistic University (MSLU), Belarus
12 November 2009	Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), California, USA
05 November 2009	Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), Russian Federation
10 July 2009	Université de Genève, Switzerland
20 February 2009	University of Salamanca, Spain
18 February 2009	University of Bath, United Kingdom
28 August 2008	Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia, Russian Federation
05 August 2008	Shanghai International Studies University, China
05 August 2008	Beijing Foreign Studies University, China
30 April 2008	University of Westminster, United Kingdom

Annex VI
Coverage of the AIIC–United Nations Agreement (2007-2011)*
List of organizations which are party to the Agreement:

1. United Nations, including its Departments, Offices and Regional Commissions, Funds, Programmes and other entities administered by the United Nations Secretariat;
2. International Labour Organization (ILO), including its Regional Offices;
3. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO);
4. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);
5. World Health Organization (WHO), including its Regional Offices and Programmes;
6. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO);
7. Universal Postal Union (UPU);
8. International Telecommunication Union (ITU);
9. World Meteorological Organization (WMO);
10. International Maritime Organization (IMO);
11. World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO);
12. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD);
13. World Food Programme (WFP);
14. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO);
15. United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO);
16. ILO Training Centre, Turin (ITCILO);

Organizational entities to which the Agreement applies

17. Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR);
18. United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS);
19. United Nations University (UNU);
20. International Trade Centre (ITC);
21. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY);
22. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR);
23. United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC);
24. Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO);
25. Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS);
26. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis & Malaria (GFATM);
27. International Agency for Cancer Research (IARC);
28. Onchocerchiasis Control Programe (OCP);
29. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
30. World Trade Organization (WTO);
31. International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV).

* Negotiations for the renewal of the agreement were launched in May 2011. At the end of November 2011, the parties have agreed to extend the current agreement as applicable until 30 June 2012 while the process is still ongoing.

Annex VII
Organizations party to the AITC–CCAQ Agreement (ACC/1991/PER/CM/3)

1. United Nations;
2. International Labour Office (ILO);
3. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO);
4. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO);
5. International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO);
6. Universal Postal Union (UPU);
7. World Health Organization (WHO);
8. International Telecommunication Union (ITU);
9. World Meteorological Organization (WMO);
10. International Maritime Organization (IMO);
11. World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO);
12. International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD);
13. United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO);
14. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
15. World Trade Organization (WTO) (previously General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade).

Annex VIII

Overview of actions to be taken by participating organizations on the recommendations of the Joint Inspection Unit

	Intended impact	United Nations, its funds and programmes														Specialized agencies and IAEA												
		CEB	United Nations*	UNCTAD	UNODC	UNEP	UN-Habitat	UNHCR	UNRWA	UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	WFP	UNOPS	UN Women	ILO	FAO	UNESCO	ICAO	WHO	UPU	ITU	WMO	IMO	WIPO	UNIDO	UNWTO	IAEA
For action		☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☐	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒
For information		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Recommendation 1	e		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 2	c	E																										
Recommendation 3	e		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 4	d		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 5	e		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 6	e		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Recommendation 7	d		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 8	e		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Recommendation 9	e		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 10	c	E	E																									
Recommendation 11	e		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 12	e		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Recommendation 13	b		E																									
Recommendation 14	e		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 15	d		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L

Legend: **L:** Recommendation for decision by legislative organ
E: Recommendation for action by executive head
Recommendation does not require action by this organization

Intended impact: **a:** enhanced accountability; **b:** dissemination of best practices; **c:** enhanced coordination and cooperation; **d:** enhanced controls and compliance **e:** enhanced effectiveness; **f:** significant financial savings; **g:** enhanced efficiency; **o:** other

* Covers all entities listed in ST/SGB/2002/11, other than UNCTAD, UNODC, UNEP, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNRWA.

JIU/REP/2011/5

ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORKS IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

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ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORKS IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Accountability frameworks in the United Nations system
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
The United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 64/259, requested in its paragraph 4 the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) to submit to it for its consideration at the main part of its sixty-seventh session, "a comparative analysis report on various accountability frameworks in the United Nations system".[1] Accordingly, the JIU included this topic in its Programme of Work for 2011.

The objective of the present report is to map out and assess the existing (various) accountability frameworks in the United Nations system and to identify gaps where they exist. The report also analysed the components which exist in the organizations that do not possess a stand-alone formal accountability framework document. In addition, the report identified good/best practices in developing and implementing accountability frameworks/components of accountability.

The scope of the review is system-wide, covering all JIU participating organizations. The review covered United Nations Secretariat entities, offices and field locations in order to see how accountability was being operationalized away from headquarters. Two United Nations offices, namely UNOG and UNOV, one peacekeeping mission UNIFIL and two regional commissions ECE and ESCWA were interviewed for this purpose. It also sought the experiences of several other prominent international public institutions such as CTBTO, EC, IFRC, Inter-American Development Bank, IOM, OECD, OSCE, the World Bank and WTO.

The Inspector notes that accountability is complex, multi-dimensional and expectations vary and change depending on the lens through which it is viewed. The Inspector provides an illustration (below) of what makes for a robust accountability framework based on desk reviews, research, interviews and questionnaire responses and drawing on public sector frameworks such as the Global Accountability Project Framework. Through collected data, interviews and questionnaires, the Inspector identified 17 benchmarks to measure a robust accountability framework based on transparency and a culture of accountability. Measurement of implementation of the framework would need to test whether the benchmarks are being implemented effectively and efficiently and assess their impacts. The present review does not delve into the implementation of the framework. The Inspector recommends follow-up studies to test the implementation of the benchmarks proposed in this report.

[1] Resolution 64/259, para. 4.



Main findings and conclusions

The Inspector found that seven United Nations organizations possess a stand-alone formal accountability framework (ILO, United Nations, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNOPS, WHO). Three Secretariat entities ECE, UNEP and UNHCR) possess a programme level accountability framework. Other United Nations system organizations have various key components of accountability to varying degrees, several of them with strong internal control systems or components in place. The Inspector concludes that accountability goes beyond a robust internal control system. Accountability should encompass issues such as identifying the political covenant with member States, recourse for key stakeholders to complaints and response mechanisms, transparency within organizations to member States, beneficiaries and the general public and a strong culture of accountability.

The stand-alone accountability frameworks are comprehensive although more work could be done in the area of information and communication, especially in the internal and external communication and complaints and response mechanisms to member States, donors, beneficiaries and the public. The stand-alone accountability frameworks of the United Nations, UNDP and UNICEF include a political covenant with member States. All of these frameworks include some elements of internal control mechanisms with the most comprehensive internal control elements found in the ILO and UNOPS frameworks. Missing from the frameworks of the United Nations, UNFPA and WHO was identification of a culture of accountability as a fundamental pillar of accountability. The ILO framework included reference to a culture of accountability without a clear description of what this entailed. With the exception of the United Nations, these organizations had no reference to transparency nor identification of management leadership in accountability. United Nations, UNDP and UNICEF were good examples in the area of transparency and management responsibility for organizational accountability. The Inspector recognizes that the accountability framework of the United Nations Secretariat includes most of the key components that must

be part of an accountability framework.

In organizations that did not possess a stand-alone accountability framework the Inspector found that most had elements of an internal control system in place and that this was not the weakest area in accountability. For these organizations further work is needed to define and develop a formal accountability framework, inspired by the benchmarks identified in this report, and to further develop in the area of clarity of responsibility/delegation of authority and complaints and response mechanisms.

In all of the organizations interviewed the study identified a gap in perception between the staff perception of the strength of their culture of accountability and management leadership and management's view on the culture of accountability. The review concluded that transparency and a culture of accountability were a necessity for the framework to move from paper to implementation.

A culture of accountability is nascent in most United Nations system organizations and needs further efforts to reach maturity. Consistent application of discipline and awards are needed in addition to training and ownership; the United Nations system lacks a comprehensive system of motivation and sanctions. The system of sanctions is stronger than the system of motivation, awards and rewards. There is a need to develop a stronger system to ensure personal accountability. However the Inspector concluded that the culture will only reach full maturity when the senior managers set the tone at the top, bolstered with examples for all to see of holding themselves accountable.

Staff must first be granted responsibility and authority to carry out their assigned duties in order to be held accountable. In some organizations these are not aligned, leading to incoherence and confusion resulting in a blurring of the accountability line. This is a challenge, especially for organizations with a decentralized/field structure where delegation of authority may differ per subject area.

Overall the United Nations system organizations need to put more efforts into the complaints and response mechanisms, especially in opening up their channels of communication to receive complaints/concerns from the general public, and stakeholders such as beneficiaries. The establishment of credible channels such as ombudsperson and mediator would further cement internal controls.

Against this background the report contains seven recommendations: two addressed to legislative bodies and five to the executive heads as follows:

Recommendations for consideration by legislative organs

- **Recommendation 2: The legislative bodies of United Nations system organizations, which have not yet done so, should take decisions based on a results-based management approach, and ensure that the necessary resources are allocated to implement the organizations' strategic plans and results-based management.**

- **Recommendation 7: The General Assembly and other legislative bodies should request their executive heads to undertake a follow-up evaluation on the implementation of the relevant accountability frameworks/systems for their consideration in 2015.**

Recommendations addressed to the executive heads

- **Recommendation 1: Executive heads of United Nations system organizations that have not yet developed stand-alone accountability frameworks should do so as a matter of priority inspired by the benchmarks contained in this report.**

- **Recommendation 3: Executive heads should incorporate evaluation, including self-evaluation results, in their annual reporting to legislative bodies.**

- **Recommendation 4**: **Executive heads of organizations which have not yet done so should inform their staff members of their decisions on disciplinary measures imposed on staff by publishing lists (in annexes to the annual reports and on a website) describing the offence and measures taken while ensuring anonymity of the staff member concerned.**

- **Recommendation 5: Executive heads should instruct their human resources divisions to put mechanisms in place for recognizing outstanding performance by developing creative ways and means to motivate staff through awards, rewards and other incentives.**

- **Recommendation 6: Executive heads should develop and implement an information disclosure policy to heighten transparency and accountability in their respective organizations as a matter of urgency in the event that they not have already done so and report to the legislative bodies accordingly.**

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ASG	Assistant Secretary-General
BOA	Board of Auditors
CAO	Compliance Advisor Ombudsman
CEB	Chief Executive Board
COSO	Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
CTBTO	Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization
EC	European Commission
ERM	Enterprise Risk Management
ERP	Enterprise Resource Planning
ESCWA	United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia
FDS	Financial Disclosure Statement
FRR	Financial Regulations and Rules
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GAP	Global Accountability Project
HLCM	High Level Committee on Management
HR	Human Resources
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICIM	Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism
ICSC	International Civil Service Commission
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Crescent Societies
ILO	International Labour Organization
ILOAT	International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal
IMO	International Maritime Organization
INTOSAI	International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPSAS	International Public Sector Accounting Standards
ITC	International Trade Centre
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
RBM	Results-based management
SRR	Staff Regulations and Rules
UBRAF	Unified Budget, Results and Accountability Framework
UNAIDS	Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDT	United Nations Dispute Tribunal
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme

UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOG	United Nations Office at Geneva
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNOV	United Nations Office at Vienna
UPU	Universal Postal Union
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees
UNWTO	World Tourism Organization
USG	Under-Secretary-General
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background

1. The evolution of the definition and framework on accountability finds its origins in General Assembly resolution 48/218 B when the Joint Inspection Unit presented its report on "Accountability and Oversight in the United Nations system",[2] which concerned mainly the oversight functions in the system at that time. The said resolution[3] called for a consolidation of oversight functions in audit, evaluation, inspections and investigations. Since then the system has slowly built up various components relating to accountability over the years, notably in the following reports and resolutions: A/60/312, A/60/883 and Add.1 and 2, A/60/846/Add.6, A/62/701 and Corr.1 and Add.1; resolutions 60/1 and 61/245.

2. Following a 2005 report by the Secretary-General reviewing existing mechanisms of accountability and oversight and suggesting reform measures to strengthen accountability,[4] the General Assembly has been requesting further reports on the progress of implementing those measures as well as on the Secretariat's accountability framework, enterprise risk management and internal control framework, and results-based management (RBM) framework.[5] The reports were submitted by the Secretary-General in 2006 and 2008 respectively,[6] and a definition of accountability was proposed in 2006.[7]

3. The General Assembly further requested the Secretary-General in resolution 63/276 to submit a comprehensive report on accountability.[8] In response to the resolution a report was submitted to the General Assembly at its sixty-fourth session entitled "Towards an accountability system in the United Nations Secretariat".[9]

4. The report of the Secretary-General includes eight recommendations for strengthening accountability in the United Nations Secretariat in addition to a definition of the term "accountability".

5. In considering the said report, the General Assembly adopted resolution 64/259, which stated in its paragraph 4 "*Requests* the Joint Inspection Unit to submit to the General Assembly, for consideration at the main part of its sixty-seventh session, a comparative analysis report on various accountability frameworks in the United Nations system."[10] Accordingly, JIU included this topic in its Programme of Work for 2011.

6. In his report A/64/640, after having considered definitions provided by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Secretary-General came forward with a definition. However that definition was deemed to be insufficient by the General Assembly. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ) noted in its

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[2] JIU/REP/93/5.
[3] Resolution 48/218 B.
[4] A/60/312.
[5] Resolutions 60/1 and 61/245.
[6] A/60/883 and Add.1 and 2 and A/62/701 and Corr.1 and Add.1.
[7] A/60/846/Add.6.
[8] In the French version of the text 'accountability' was translated as *le principe de responsabilité*. The Inspector believes '*la redevabilité'* to be the more accurate terminology in French.
[9] A/64/640 of 29 January 2010.
[10] Resolution 64/259 para. 4.

report A/64/683 that the definition provided by the Secretary-General lacked clarity and the Board of Auditors (BOA) remarked that it lacked reference to efficiency, effectiveness and timeliness as well as the role of the oversight bodies. ACABQ members were concerned by the following phrase in the definition, "... subject to the availability of resources and the constraints posed by external factors".[11] The Advisory Committee articulated that it would be further desirable if there was to be a common definition of accountability for all entities under the authority of the Secretary-General. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) pointed out the lack of reference to personal responsibility for results. In addition JIU drew attention to the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) definition. Having considered the ACABQ report and the report of the Secretary-General,[12] the General Assembly adopted resolution 64/259 which defined accountability in its operative paragraph 8 as follows:

> Accountability is the obligation of the Secretariat and its staff members to be answerable for all decisions made and actions taken by them, and to be responsible for honouring their commitments, without qualification or exception.
>
> Accountability includes achieving objectives and high-quality results in a timely and cost-effective manner, in fully implementing and delivering on all mandates to the Secretariat approved by the United Nations intergovernmental bodies and other subsidiary organs established by them in compliance with all resolutions, regulations, rules and ethical standards; truthful, objective, accurate and timely reporting on performance results; responsible stewardship of funds and resources; all aspects of performance, including a clearly defined system of rewards and sanctions; and with due recognition to the important role of the oversight bodies and in full compliance with accepted recommendations.

7. The Inspector notes that the definition of accountability approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 64/259 includes the core elements proposed by the Secretary-General in A/64/640; the most notable difference between the definition of accountability proposed by the Secretary-General in A/64/640 and that adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 64/259 is the condition in A/64/640 that "[a]ccountability is the obligation of the Organization … subject to the availability of resources and the constraints posed by external factors"[13] versus the language in resolution 64/259 that, "[a]ccountability is the obligation of the Secretariat … without qualification or exception".[14]

8. Accountability frameworks bring together many components of an organizational framework which has been addressed by JIU reports in the past. In 1995, JIU issued a report entitled "Accountability, Management Improvement, and Oversight in the United Nations system" (JIU/REP/95/2). More recently, the Unit has reviewed and issued the following reports: "Oversight Lacunae in the United Nations system" (JIU/REP/2006/2), the series on results-based management (JIU/REP/2004/5-8 and JIU/REP/2006/6), "Selection and conditions of service of executive heads in the United Nations system organizations" (JIU/REP/2009/8), "Ethics in the United Nations system" (JIU/REP/2010/3), "The audit function in the United Nations system" (JIU/REP/2010/5), "Review of Enterprise Risk Management in the United Nations system: benchmarking framework" (JIU/REP/2010/4), "Transparency in the selection and appointment of senior managers in the United Nations Secretariat" (JIU/REP/2011/2) and "The investigation function in the United Nations system" (JIU/REP/2011/7) which provides input to the present mandated report.

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[11] A/64/683, para. 10.
[12] "Towards an accountability system in the United Nations Secretariat", A/64/640.
[13] A/64/640, para. 10, definition of accountability.
[14] Resolution 64/259, sect. A, para. 8, definition adopted by the General Assembly.

B. Objectives and scope

9. The objectives of the mandated comparative analysis of the accountability frameworks were to map out and assess the various existing accountability frameworks in the United Nations system and to identify gaps where they exist. This evaluation also analyses the enabling environments in different organizations, funds and programmes that may contribute to fostering a strong accountability culture, or alternatively discourage this. In addition, the report identifies good/best practices in developing and implementing accountability frameworks.

10. The report provides recommendations to United Nations system organizations on accountability frameworks. The findings of this report should assist the key stakeholders and managers in making further decisions for developing, strengthening or implementing accountability frameworks/policies.

11. The scope is system-wide, covering all JIU participating organizations.[15] The review covered United Nations Secretariat entities, offices and field locations in order to see how accountability was being operationalized away from headquarters. Two United Nations offices, namely the United Nations Office at Geneva (UNOG) and the United Nations Office at Vienna (UNOV), one peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and two regional commissions, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), were interviewed for this purpose. The present analysis also sought the experiences of several other prominent international public institutions such as the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), the European Commission of the European Union (EC), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the International Federation of Red Cross and Crescent Societies (IFRC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO).

C. Methodology

12. The methodology for this review consisted of a preliminary desk review which included a review of publicly available documentation on accountability frameworks as well as research materials from past related JIU reports, General Assembly documents related to accountability, organizations' internal document and policies, and relevant oversight reports (BOA, OIOS). Questionnaires were sent to all JIU participating organizations. On the basis of the responses received the Inspector conducted interviews with officials of selected participating organizations in person, or via video and telephone conferences.

13. The Inspector also conducted interviews with key officials of several other international organizations, including EC, IDB, IFRC, IOM, OECD, OSCE, Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), the World Bank and WTO. The Inspector does not cite information sources, where appropriate, to protect the confidence interviewees entrusted to him during the interviews.

14. The present report identifies benchmarks for a robust accountability framework. These were developed from the JIU report, "Results-based management in the United Nations in the

[15] The United Nations, its subsidiary bodies, entities, funds and programmes, specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

context of the reform process"[16] which identified nine benchmarks on RBM, eight benchmarks on delegation of authority, eight on accountability and eight on performance management. The study was inspired by and in some cases benefited from these benchmarks. Others were identified through an impact analysis starting with the question, "*if an organization was accountable at all levels which practices/institutions would be in place?"* Necessary components were added to complement the RBM benchmarks. After each benchmark the Inspector identifies the tools that support its implementation.

15. Comments from participating organizations on the draft report were taken into account in finalizing the report. In accordance with article 11.2 of the JIU Statute, this report has been finalized after consultation among the Inspectors so as to test its conclusions and recommendations against the collective wisdom of the Unit. The Inspector wises to express appreciation to all those who assisted him in the preparation of this report and to those who participated in the interviews and so willingly shared their knowledge and expertise.

16. The present analysis focuses on minimum pillars and benchmarks needed for a robust accountability framework. The measurement of implementation of the framework would need to test whether the benchmarks are being implemented effectively and efficiently and assess their impacts. The present review does not delve into the implementation of the framework. Thus the Inspector recommends follow-up studies to test the implementation of the benchmarks proposed in this report.

17. The Inspector was informed of many recent developments and practices in the field of accountability. It is not possible to include all of the good practices that the Inspector came across through his interviews; only the most visible among many good practices are included in the present review.

18. To facilitate the handling of the report, the implementation of its recommendations and the monitoring thereof, annex II contains a table indicating whether the report is submitted to the organizations concerned for action or for information. The table identifies recommendations relevant for each organization, specifying the relevant addressee for considerations.

[16] JIU/REP/2006/6.


II. COMPONENTS OF A ROBUST ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK

A. Key elements of an accountability framework

19. Figure 1 below illustrates how the Inspector views the minimum requirements for an accountability framework. It is acknowledged that organizations have organized their frameworks in a myriad of ways. The report is not endorsing a particular model but merely using the illustration to articulate his vision of a robust accountability framework.

20. The following presentation of an accountability framework is based on good/best practice identified through questionnaire reviews, interviews, open source material available and documents sent by interested organizations. Relevant principles and benchmarks from the Global Accountability Project (GAP) framework have also been considered as far as they were coherent with United Nations system particularities.[17] This presentation of a framework is based on the assumption that a strong accountability framework can only be implemented if it has integrated proactive and reactive systems, transparency and a strong culture of accountability as the common basis for these. Proactive elements include internal controls and the RBM system providing more accountability of the organization to the member States. The reactive element comprising formal and informal[18] response mechanisms would act as a failsafe, a last resort mechanism to apply accountability when everything else has failed.

Figure 1



The pyramid structure delineates the hierarchical relationship between member States, organizations and the staff.

[17] The Global Accountability Framework was developed by the One World Trust under the Global Accountability Project (www.oneworldtrust.org). The Global Accountability Framework was developed on the basis of five years of empirical research and consultations with a wide variety of stakeholders.

[18] Here informal and formal are defined from a legal perspective rather than whether the structures in place are formal or informal.

21. First and foremost the accountability relationship must be a mutual one with accountability *to and of* member States which provide to the organization the institutional mandates, priorities/guidance and the resources to implement those priorities. Member States provide oversight over the organizations through oversight mechanisms such as external audit, the Board of Auditors and JIU. The organization which shares the place at the top of the pyramid is responsible for strategic planning and programming based on member States' guidance and priorities and for the delivery of those results through the principle of stewardship of the resources, evaluations to ensure their activities are feeding into better delivery and achievements and reporting through evaluations on operational, administrative and financial matters. Although the Inspector understands member States' dissatisfaction with the caveat given in the Secretary-General's definition of accountability (referenced above) he notes that the organization can only be held responsible for delivering results by mutual agreement with the member States which entrust the resources to the organizations to implement the mandates. Without this mutual and political agreement the accountability will be dysfunctional from the outset. This relationship must be based on mutual agreement and political will. Internal controls, illustrated by the second circle, are then needed to ensure that organizations have policies, rules, procedures and the environment in place so that the organization is delivering its strategic plans and mandate in line with the principles of stewardship, ethical standards, regulations and rules. Internal control[19] should consist of:

Internal Control Components	Tools to support implementation
Control environment: sets the tone of the organization, influencing the control consciousness of its staff. It is the foundation for all other components of internal control, providing discipline and structure.[20]	Staff regulations and rules, human resources (HR) policies, sanctions and discipline, ethics and standards of conduct, whistle-blower and anti-fraud policies, integrity, management philosophy and operating style, the way management assigns responsibility and authority and development of its staff (culture of accountability).
Risk assessment: process of identifying and analysing relevant risks to the achievement of the entity's objectives and determining the appropriate response.[21]	Risk register, risk assessment, action plan to mitigate risks, enterprise risk management (ERM).
Control activities: policies and procedures established to address risks and to achieve the entity's objectives. Control activities must be appropriate, function consistently according to plan throughout the period, and be cost effective, comprehensive, reasonable and directly relate to the control objectives.[22]	Delegation of authority and management responsibilities, letter of representation/assurances, financial disclosure, conflict of interest.

[19] Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) internal control framework from "Guidelines for Internal Control Standards for the Public Sector," International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI). INTOSAI define internal control as, "…*an integral process that is effected by an entity's management and personnel and is designed to address risks and to provide reasonable assurance that in pursuit of the entity's mission, the following general objectives are being achieved: executive orderly, ethical, economical and efficient and effective operations, fulfilling accountability obligations, complying with applicable laws and regulations, safeguarding resources against loss, misuse and damage*." p. 6 of above mentioned guidelines.
[20] INTOSAI guidelines p. 17.
[21] Ibid., p. 22.
[22] Ibid., p. 28.

Internal Control Components	Tools to support implementation
Information and communication: full recording, classification and documentation of transactions and events. The information should be identified, captured and communicated to staff within a fixed time frame that enables staff to carry out their internal control responsibilities. It should not only include internal data but also external events and activities that affect decision-making.[23]	Enterprise resource planning, annual reports on finance, oversight, operations/implementation etc. Information disclosure policy.
Monitoring: assesses the quality of the organization's performance over time. Monitoring should ensure that audit findings and recommendations are adequately and promptly resolved.[24]	Internal audit, inspections, feedback and implementation of audit/inspection recommendations, performance assessments, 360-degree feedback on performances, senior compacts (if applicable), scorecards.

22. The third circle in the illustration above (figure 1) entitled, "Complaints and Response Mechanisms"[25] represents the last resort when the established internal controls have failed. They are the channels developed by the organization that enable member States, stakeholders, staff members and beneficiaries to file complaints on issues of non-compliance or against management decisions and actions. Response mechanisms are equally important in ensuring that not only do member States, staff, stakeholders, beneficiaries, and staff have the possibility to file complaints and raise concerns, but that these are also properly reviewed and acted upon within established timelines and mechanisms.

23. These components must be embedded in the pillars of an accountability culture: transparency and a strong culture of accountability. An accountability framework can only be as effective as the organization's culture of accountability and commitment to transparency. The organization management must be committed to support and develop the culture. The following basic assumptions should guide the enforcement of any accountability framework inside the United Nations system. Hence, the **Inspector concludes that an accountability framework should be based on transparency and has to be supported by a strong culture of accountability.**

B. Pillars of accountability

a. Transparency

24. Transparency is a fundamental pillar, together with the culture of accountability. It refers to an organization's openness about its activities, providing information on what it is doing, where and how this takes place, and how it is performing. Implementation of RBM is clearly a step towards greater transparency throughout the United Nations system. Transparency also enables stakeholders (member States, staff, beneficiaries from aid agencies, and the general public) to identify whether an organization is operating according to the law, whether it is conforming to relevant standards and how its performance relates to targets. In turn, this enables stakeholders to make informed decisions and assess choices made by the organization.[26]

[23] INTOSAI guidelines p. 36.
[24] Ibid., p. 40.
[25] Global Accountability Report 2007 Global Accountability Framework, One World Trust p. 11.
[26] Global Accountability Report 2007 Global Accountability Framework, One World Trust.

25. Transparency not only relates to information being available inside (e.g. via knowledge management systems, intranet) but to outside the organization (via website and social networks, and external and public relations). The organization must actively disseminate information to relevant stakeholders. In other words, it should take a proactive approach to information and not release it only if requested by a stakeholder.

26. As a general principle information should be freely available to everyone, except in very specific cases where the nature of the information prohibits its widespread circulation inside and/or outside the organization (e.g. personnel files, internal memorandums, investigation files,).[27] This highlights the need for a comprehensive policy on information disclosure, including justification of any exceptions to full disclosure and – as already mentioned in recommendation 2 of the JIU report on knowledge management in the United Nations system[28] a clear and unified system for classifying the organization's internal documents in an organized way (Knowledge Management System). The following transparency pillar is discussed in further detail under 'Internal controls: information and communication' section.

b. Culture of accountability

27. The JIU RBM report identified this very important cultural issue in its benchmark 3, "[a]ccountability is applicable at all levels, from top down. The executive heads and the heads of major organizational units are therefore the first to be held accountable for the results that they are expected to deliver."[29]

28. This culture is only partially related to tools or systems (control mechanisms); it is mainly modelled by humans and their behaviours and interactions. The tools and systems are only a means to ensure compliance and to provide a strong control environment for accountability. Accountability frameworks and underlying systems are necessary but not sufficient for accountability to be a value lived and implemented by 100 per cent of the staff. It should therefore not be taken for granted that organizations which have a perfect accountability framework are able to implement it effectively. An organization with a framework or many of the accountability components may be an organization with no effective accountability if it lacks a culture of accountability.

29. A system-wide and in-depth analysis of the culture of accountability would go beyond the scope of this report. Since accountability is primarily a cultural issue, it strongly relies on perception by the staff at all levels of the hierarchical pyramid. Therefore, a comprehensive staff survey would be needed to assess its strong and weak points.

30. However, some general guidelines are needed on managerial and staff behaviour regarding accountability. They should be regarded as common principles guiding general decision-making and specifically targeting employment policies, performance assessments, ethics policies, rewards and sanctions mechanisms inside organizations.

31. The Inspector has identified five key principles (factors/behaviours) that help describe and guide a culture of accountability in any organization. These are based on the JIU report, "Results-based management in the United Nations in the context of the reform process."[30] These principles are:

[27] UNICEF suggested to the Inspector that Internal Audit Reports should be subject to full disclosure.
[28] JIU/REP/2007/6.
[29] JIU/REP/2006/6 para. 96.
[30] JIU/REP/2006/6 as outlined in Section III Accountability.

Five key principles for accountability:

1. **Leading by values and examples - accountability as a top priority in day-to-day operation and evidenced by high standards of integrity of senior management.**
2. **Leading by information and communication - accountability through transparent decision-making.**
3. **Leading by motivation - accountability through recognition of staff achievements.**
4. **Leading by guidance and discipline - a zero-tolerance policy for unacceptable behaviour at all levels.**
5. **Leading by participation - an open dialogue should encourage mutual accountability.**

1: Leading by values and example - accountability as a top priority in day-to-day operation and evidenced by high standards of integrity of senior management

32. Leading by values is the basis for all other key competencies of a manager. The value of accountability should be the number one priority in every aspect of the organization's/division's/work unit's day-to-day operation. Through their decisions, the managers have to put the emphasis on accountability. In the event of a conflicting decision, accountability should always come first. This also underlines the need for a strong accountability framework, but also for a strong culture of compliance, personal integrity and accountability.

33. In any organization, behaviour of leaders automatically trickles down the hierarchical levels. Effectively the tone from the top has to be unambiguous and every manager should abide 100 per cent by the regulations, rules and policies. **The Inspector suggests that the United Nations system organizations clearly identify accountability as a core value and not just a core competency**.

2: Leading by information and communication - accountability through transparent decision-making

34. Information and communication are a crucial component of a positive culture of accountability. Management should exert every effort to close the existing information gaps between hierarchical levels, divisions and work units of their organization. In terms of management skills and organizational culture, accountability is fostered by transparent decision-making processes. Staff and other stakeholders have to be informed about the process leading to decisions and its outcomes and perceive the process to be transparent. Lack of information and communication can seriously handicap an organization's effectiveness.

3: Leading by motivation - accountability through recognition of staff achievements

35. Accountability and integrity have to be permanently mutually supported and encouraged by real or psychological incentives. Short-term advantage and opportunity often prevail over the long-term perspective. Thus, continuous and strong positive reinforcements are needed to overcome this bias. There is always a need to encourage accountability and to motivate staff to act in an accountable way. Simple recognition can lead to increased staff accountability. Awards and rewards can supplement this, but their impact is limited in time and duration. Continuous recognition by supervisors and colleagues is the key to increased awareness of accountability issues.

4: Leading by guidance and discipline - a zero-tolerance policy for unacceptable behaviour at all levels


36. In order for the staff to perceive accountability as being one of the United Nations core values, management has to provide strong guidance first. Acceptable behaviour should be highlighted and the reasons for classifying some behaviours as not acceptable should be explained. The Staff Regulations and Rules (SRR) must be complemented by an explanatory section/separate document highlighting the types of sanctions practised for certain kinds of misbehaviour. Sanctions should be carried out in an equal, systematic and transparent way from the top. All sanctions should be properly justified and executed with a thorough follow-up. **This should be corroborated by the Secretary-General's annual reports on disciplinary matters and alleged unlawful behaviour and interviews conducted with management and staff representatives of United Nations organizations. Effective sanction mechanisms would deter every hierarchical level in the organization from engaging in non-accountable activities.**

5: Leading by participation - an open dialogue should encourage mutual accountability

37. Participation is key to accountability because it transforms the accountability principle from a personal ethical guideline to a collective tradition, setting the basis for a shared culture of accountability. Ownership is then not only in the hands of management, but on every level. Staff participating in setting up such a culture should feel rewarded and their expertise can be used to improve existing systems. Their experience sheds a different light on existing practices. Management openness to feedback/complaints and the valuing of participation from member States, staff and the general public is important and sets the tone of the culture of accountability. Some organizations, including UNDP, state that they carry out regular and systematic surveys of development activities, staff perception and client satisfaction to continuously receive feedback with a view to improving current practices. This – if complemented by effective awards and rewards mechanisms – constitutes a great opportunity to initiate cultural change.

38. Figure 2 is an illustration of the components described above, including details of the specific pieces that make up each component.


Figure 2


Political Covenant with the Member States
Orientation
Member States
• Give a clear mandate
• Release the resources
• Set priorities
• Provide guidance
• Oversight
Secretariats
• Strategic Planning
• Reporting through RBM
• Stewardship of the funds
• Evaluation
Reporting
Internal Controls
Control Environment
Monitoring
Information & Communication
Control Activities
Risk Assessment
Culture of Accountability and Transparency
Complaints & Response Mechanisms
Informal mechanisms
• Ombudsperson
• Mediator
• Staff Council
Formal mechanisms
• Investigations
• Procurement Challenges
• Beneficiary Complaints (if applicable)
• Administration of Justice : JABs, access to a tribunal, UNDT, UNAT, ILOAT

III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONS' ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORKS/COMPONENTS MEASURED AGAINST THE BENCHMARKS

A. Accountability component: mutual accountability – political covenant with the member States

Figure 3



39. As outlined in the diagram above, the starting point of accountability in United Nations system organizations is mutual agreement on the strategic plans of the organization and the member States' political will to provide the resources necessary for the delivery of those results. Member States are also responsible for providing a clear mandate and setting priorities for the organization. Member States also play a role in oversight matters through entities such as the Board of Auditors and the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU); furthermore, as noted in the JIU report, "Selection and conditions of service of executive heads in the United Nations system organizations",[31] member States are also responsible for performance assessment of the executive heads. The Inspector realized that few organizations had included this in their frameworks or internal documents. Although acknowledged in interviews, many organizations seem to shy away from including this in writing. The United Nations, UNDP, UNICEF and World Food Programme (WFP) have all put political agreement or "covenant" with member States at the centre of their accountability architecture. **This is commendable and the Inspector recommends that organizations which have not yet developed an accountability framework emulate United Nations, UNDP, UNICEF and WFP practice on including a political covenant in their frameworks.** Interestingly, as it is, IFRC, IOM, UNAIDS, UNDP and Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have included their accountability towards beneficiaries as an explicit stakeholder in the accountability of the organization.

[31] JIU/REP/2009/8. See paras. 11, 117, 118-120.

40. The following benchmarks have been identified as a measurement of the accountability framework in this area. These benchmarks are valid for the organization. Member States' responsibilities and engagement are not explicitly assessed in this report since this would go beyond its scope. However such references are mentioned indirectly where applicable. The Inspector would like to flag the issue of member States' accountability on oversight as an issue that bears further discussion.

Benchmark 1: A clear framework for accountability is in place, including a definition thereof and clarity of responsibility for the overall implementation of the framework, linking all components together.

Tools:

a. Framework policy document
b. Definition of accountability
c. Roles and responsibilities of senior management, line department and staff
d. Policy document available on the website and for staff
e. Framework contains key components of accountability

Strengths of existing frameworks

41. Through the questionnaire responses and interviews, varying degrees of practice on the issue of an accountability framework policy or document were found. ILO, UNDP,[32] UNFPA, UNICEF, UNOPS and World Health Organization (WHO) all have an explicit stand-alone accountability framework document. In addition, under the United Nations Secretariat umbrella, some secretariat entities, ECE,[33] UNEP[34] and UNHCR[35] have developed a specific accountability framework for their internal use. With the exception of that of WHO, all of the frameworks contain a clear definition of accountability. The United Nations[36] has proposed through the Secretary-General's report[37] an accountability framework which was taken note of by the General Assembly in A/RES/65/259. The United Nations has included the accountability framework on its website "Accountability A to Z" and the framework is widely communicated to staff members. A website analysis of the organizations listed above found that ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, and UNOPS had an accountability web page for the public. The UNOPS accountability framework was accessible on this page.[38] **The Inspector encourages organizations to put the said document on a dedicated page on their websites and intranet to enhance transparency of the organization to the public stakeholders.**

42. Further, in many of the organizations mentioned above, staff members interviewed professed varying degrees of awareness on accountability. Some staff members inquired about "accountability." **These organizations should make the framework accessible and executive heads should call town hall meetings to regularly discuss accountability issues with staff with a view to creating an enabling environment for the culture of accountability.**

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[32] UNDP has an accountability system which comprises the accountability framework and oversight policy.
[33] ECE developed an accountability framework in response to an OIOS recommendation. The framework was adopted on 7 October 2011.
[34] The UNEP framework is a programme framework which contains elements only pertaining to its programmatic work as they would fall under the scope of the United Nations Secretariat's framework.
[35] The UNHCR Global Management Accountability Framework maps accountabilities, responsibilities and authorities across the entire organization at the country, regional and headquarters levels for 11 key areas of UNHCR work. They also have in place a complaint system for their beneficiaries. They also fall under the overall United Nations Secretariat framework. It is thus not treated as a separate framework in this report.
[36] This framework would cover UNODC and ITC as reported by these organizations.
[37] A/64/640.
[38] By searching on the website one could find the UNFPA framework amongst the governing body and legislative body documents.

43. The existing frameworks are comprehensive and well thought out. The process of developing these frameworks was through dialogue, discussions and participation from all sectors of the organizations, including staff members.

44. Some of these framework documents have been presented and endorsed by their legislative bodies (UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and UNOPS). It should be noted that a comparison was conducted against the accountability framework documents of the organization and any annexes listed in the framework only. This means that some organizations may have the elements considered as key components/benchmarks in place but that they are not reflected in their accountability framework document. This "tick-box" approach does not necessarily reflect the **level of implementation** of the different components in place, nor does it represent a precise measurement of the culture of accountability across the organizations.

45. The accountability frameworks of UNDP, UNFPA and UNOPS, at the request of their Executive Board, were aligned, and utilized harmonized definitions although the completeness of the frameworks varies amongst the three organizations. The UNICEF framework is similar to those of UNDP and UNOPS and uses the same harmonized definitions. Despite the statement in the UNDP framework that the definitions are harmonized[39] with UNFPA and UNOPS, UNFPA used a different definition for accountability from the organizations mentioned above (see annex I for a list of definitions as found in the frameworks).

46. Few of the frameworks made explicit reference to a culture of accountability, that is, transparency and information disclosure to the public and to beneficiaries/stakeholders. The UNDP and UNICEF frameworks are good examples of strong language on the culture of accountability, whereas UNOPS and the proposed United Nations framework pay limited attention to transparency which could be strengthened. UNOPS has an information disclosure policy but does not mention the culture of accountability or the importance of management leadership in accountability whereas the proposed United Nations framework describes accountability and the role of senior management in embedding the culture in the organization but lacks reference to an information disclosure policy.

47. In the area of political covenant with member States (top circle of the Inspectors' illustration of key components of an accountability framework) UNDP, UNICEF and the proposed United Nations frameworks provide a clear definition of accountability and a framework for its implementation. Their frameworks all mention the role of member States and the fact that RBM must align unit and individual work plans. Further, the role of evaluations in these frameworks is prominent as well as the necessity to communicate its results to the member States, general public and other stakeholders. The ILO accountability framework lacked a mention of the accountability of the tripartite partners and did not refer to communication to the public on the results of the organization although in practice ILO does have an established reporting process. The frameworks of UNOPS, UNFPA and WHO were found to have significant weaknesses in this area, particularly on accountability of the member States and communicating the outcomes of the organizational activities and results to the public and other stakeholders. Further, WHO did not have a clear definition of accountability in its framework.

48. Two organizational frameworks were found to have strong internal control systems as documented in the framework. The proposed United Nations framework and the UNOPS

[39] The UNDP Accountability System – Accountability Framework and Oversight Policy DP/2008/16/rev.1, paras. 2-3.

framework had most of the internal control components/benchmarks as identified by the Inspector. Neither framework mentioned the internal certification/letters of assurance benchmark, although the United Nations[40] has such a system in place. ILO also scored highly on internal controls but lacked information on internal and external information mechanisms. Interestingly, the United Nations included references to both awards and disciplinary measures in its proposed framework as an important aspect of accountability. Other frameworks mention sanctions and discipline but did not recognize the importance of an awards system to motivate staff members. The proposed United Nations framework is unique in its inclusion of both rewards and discipline. **The United Nations is also the only organization to have included in its framework a system of senior compacts with the Secretary-General to hold senior management accountable for the results achieved/not achieved**.

49. The comparison of the "complaints and response" benchmarks against the seven frameworks concluded that none of the organizations had the full range of complaints and response components in their frameworks. Only ILO, WHO and the proposed United Nations accountability frameworks mention the non-formal complaints system (mediator, ombudsperson, ethics) and only the ILO and the United Nations[41] frameworks partially mention formal mechanisms such as the Administration of Justice. ILO makes reference to investigations in its framework but did not mention an investigation function/office explicitly as part of its accountability framework, and none of the frameworks mentioned a procurement challenge mechanism nor whether the general public, including the beneficiaries, had recourse to any complaints mechanisms.

50. As can be seen, the strengths of most of the frameworks mentioned above are in the area of internal controls. UNDP[42] and UNFPA have separate internal control documents which are not annexed to its main framework document. All components related to accountability should be easily referenced from the main document.

Weaknesses

51. **Current weaknesses can be seen in a lack of reference and acknowledgement of the importance of a culture of accountability;** that is, an explicit acknowledgement that a framework on paper is not enough and that organizations, and especially their senior managers, must live up to accountability and lead by example. The Inspector found throughout the interviews that, compared to managers, staff members held a poor perception of the strength of the culture of accountability in their organizations as evidenced by the ratings given by them during the interviews. In general the staff rated the culture of accountability between 0 and 2 (from 1 to 4, with 4 being the best) whereas managers gave the culture a rating between 2 and 3.5. The Inspector believes this is an indicator of the perception staff have of the tone at the top and of the culture of accountability (or lack thereof) of their senior managers.

52. **The transparency indicator was evidenced by whether an organization possesses an explicit information disclosure policy.** The area that requires further work is the component of 'Complaints and Response'. When internal controls fail within an organization there must

[40] The letters of assertion are included in the Senior Managers' Compacts with the Secretary-General.
[41] In paragraphs 77-92 of A/64/640 the United Nations framework mentions ombudsman, administration of justice, informal systems of mediation and dispute resolution, formal system of internal justice, tribunals, Office of Legal Affairs and management evaluations. It does not mention mechanisms such as procurement challenges and, beneficiary complaints mechanisms.
[42] The UNDP internal control framework has been revised to better align with COSO and is available on the intranet.

be a mechanism that allows staff, the public, third parties and beneficiaries to submit their grievances/complaints to the organization with a guarantee of confidentiality. An organization cannot profess itself to be accountable to stakeholders if the only recourse for stakeholders to voice their opinion is through legislative bodies. Organizations such as UNDP and UNICEF have strong complaints and response mechanisms in place but they are not necessarily reflected in their accountability frameworks. The Inspector fully acknowledges that UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, and UNOPS can be considered good examples in the United Nations system in the field of accountability and that their frameworks may not necessarily reflect recent extensive efforts made in implementing accountability measures. **It is recommended that the respective accountability frameworks be updated to truly reflect all the good initiatives taking place within the organizations.** The United Nations, as a relative newcomer to accountability frameworks, made a step forward by incorporating the lessons of the other organizations and reflecting on how to improve upon the framework of its predecessors. **The Secretariat should prepare its next version of the accountability framework to include in it a more powerful message on its commitment to transparency and to include components on how it would consider complaints from stakeholders and respond to them.**

53. Other organizations have informed the Inspector that they have various components of an accountability framework or internal control framework. **The Inspector commends such efforts but feels that improvements should be made, as accountability goes beyond solely financial or internal controls.** A formal framework should be established in one official document that first defines what accountability means to the organization and that brings together all components of accountability so that it can be better communicated to staff and stakeholders. The frameworks should show how they fit and link together. Although this may be a paper exercise, it is worthwhile not only to show the links between the components but as a communication tool to staff members. Below is a summary of the various frameworks/components in place in organizations not having an official documented accountability framework.

JIU participating organizations without a formal accountability framework[43]

	Components in place	Missing elements of accountability
IAEA	Draft accountability framework. Policies on delegation of authority, financial disclosure, performance assessment and management, reporting mechanisms, standards of integrity and ethical conduct, RBM, administration of justice and oversight.	Clarity of responsibility, cost benefit considerations for investment decisions, ERM, standards of personal accountability, no procurement challenge mechanism or beneficiary/public complaints system.
ICAO	No framework but has following components: delegation of authority, financial disclosure, performance assessment and management, reporting mechanisms, standards of integrity and ethical conduct, RBM and budgeting, administration of justice and oversight.	Clarity of responsibility, cost-benefit considerations for investment decisions, ERM, standards of personal accountability, no procurement challenge mechanism or beneficiary/public complaints system.
ITU	No framework but components such as clarity of responsibility, delegation of authority, cost-benefit considerations for investment decisions, financial disclosure, performance assessment and management, standards of integrity and ethical conduct, ERM, RBM, administration of justice and oversight, standards of personal accountability.	No procurement challenge mechanism or beneficiary/public complaints system.

[43] The Inspector determined the formal accountability frameworks through desk review and on the basis of questionnaire responses from the organizations themselves. Only organizations which responded to the JIU questionnaire are listed below.

	Components in place	Missing elements of accountability
FAO	Not yet developed but elements are being implemented on strategic frameworks, operational work planning, monitoring and reporting, performance assessment and management, ERM, standards of conduct, anti-fraud, administration of justice, delegations of authority and financial disclosures.	Clarity of responsibility and standards of accountability, RBM, cost benefit considerations for investment decisions (under preparation), ERM (under preparation) and standards of personal accountability, ethics office, no procurement challenge mechanism or beneficiary/public complaints system.
UNAIDS	Unified Budget, Results and Accountability Framework (UBRAF), which includes goals, targets and results, with indicators to measure and show progress. The framework is an RBM instrument and not an accountability framework as described by JIU.	For many of the components UNAIDS follows the WHO policies but not the WHO accountability framework. No procurement challenge mechanism or beneficiary/ public complaints system.
UNESCO	UNESCO has an internal control policy, established tables of delegated authority, RBM, performance evaluation, oversight committees, an ethics function, financial disclosure policy and a whistle-blower policy.[44] There is a covenant with member States on the strategic framework.	No procurement challenge mechanism or beneficiary/public complaints system.
UNIDO	An internal control framework and policies on: delegation of authority financial disclosure, performance assessment and management, reporting, standards of integrity and ethical conduct, RBM, Administration of Justice and oversight, standards of personal accountability.	ERM is under development, no beneficiary/public complaints system.
UNWTO	Second draft of White Paper describes organizational components linked to accountability but no formal accountability framework. Has alignment of framework with organizational goals, clarity of responsibility, delegation of authority, performance monitoring, reporting mechanisms, standards of integrity and ethical conduct, RBM, administration of justice, internal oversight.	Cost-benefit considerations for investment decisions, financial disclosure, ERM, standards of personal accountability, no procurement challenge mechanism or beneficiary/public complaints system.
UPU	No framework but has the following: clarity of responsibility, delegation of authority, financial disclosure, performance assessment and management, reporting, standards of integrity and ethical conduct, ERM, RBM, administration of justice and oversight.	Cost-benefit considerations for investment decisions, standards of personal accountability, complaints and response mechanisms, beneficiary/public complaints system.
WFP	Internal control framework based on COSO model. There is a clear conceptual framework for strengthening managerial control and accountability.	Definition of accountability and how the components fit together No systematic beneficiary/public complaints system.
WIPO	Development of a comprehensive accountability framework is to be addressed as part of its Strategic Realignment Programme. Clarity of responsibility, delegation of authority, cost-benefit considerations for investment decisions, financial disclosure, performance assessment and management, standards of integrity and ethical conduct, ERM, RBM, administration of justice and oversight, standards of personal accountability.	No procurement challenge mechanism or beneficiary/public complaints system.
WMO	No formal accountability framework exists but there are policies relating to clarity of responsibility, delegation of authority, cost-benefit considerations for investment decisions, financial disclosure, performance assessment and management, standards of integrity and ethical conduct, ERM, RBM, administration of justice and oversight, standards of personal accountability.	No procurement challenge mechanism or beneficiary/public complaints system.

54. The organizations without a framework are lacking in the area of mutual accountability and in the complaints and response mechanism area. This is similar to the weaknesses seen in organizations that do have an accountability framework.

[44] UNESCO Presentation to RIAS, 5th Annual Meeting, 42nd Plenary, 22 September 2011, Paris. Slide 3.

55. WFP deserves special mention for having a strong internal control framework which covers many of the aspects of the key accountability components identified. This should be packaged in a way that would facilitate sharing and communicating its accountability structure to the staff and the outside public. The accompanying "Managers' Guide to Internal Control[45]" is also a commendable document which includes a strong emphasis on the culture of accountability and the need for managers to take the lead in setting the tone at the top.

The implementation of the following recommendation will ensure enhanced accountability:

Recommendation 1: Executive heads of United Nations system organizations that have not yet developed stand-alone accountability frameworks should do so as a matter of priority inspired by the benchmarks contained in this report.

Benchmark 2: RBM is operational and coherent with organizational mandates and objectives, and cascades down into unit and personal work plans.
Tools:

a. Strategic plans
b. Unit work plans
c. Personal work plans

56. The above benchmark encompasses the benchmarks proposed by the 2006 JIU report.[46] RBM is defined as "a management approach aimed at changing the way organizations operate, with improving performance (achieving results) as the central orientation".[47] RBM is the essential tool to support mutual accountability between member States and organizations. RBM brings together the priorities, resources, strategic planning and stewardship of funds. The 2006 JIU report on RBM found that "[a]nother major methodological shortfall in the implementation of RBM is that the objectives set at the top of the Organization are not linked to those at lower levels…".[48] **Coherence should be established between the highest objective down to those in individual staff work plans, otherwise there can be no personal accountability.** Each staff member, no matter where in the organizational structure, should have a clear idea of how his/her work supports the highest organizational objectives, what she/he is expected to deliver and the timeframe in which she/he is expected to deliver outputs.

57. Most organizations surveyed reported that RBM was in place or in the process of being implemented. Some organizations informed the Inspector that implementation of RBM and its linkages to performance management have just started. This is an excellent initiative and implementation linkages should be sought without delay. **However, many respondents informed the Inspector that resource constraints continued to be an obstacle for its full implementation. Both organizations and member States remain committed to continuing implementation of RBM in order not to lose the momentum gained**.

[45] Managers' Guide to Internal Control WFP's Guide to Internal Control for Managers by Resource management and Accountability Department, May 2011.
[46] This benchmark has compressed benchmarks 2, 4, 5 and 8 proposed by the JIU review on RBM 2006 for the purpose of the accountability review. The benchmarks in the JIU review JIU/2006/6 remain valid.
[47] JIU RBM Report (JIU/REP/2006/6).
[48] "Results-based management in the United Nations in the context of the reform process." (JIU/REP/2006/6, p. 9, para. 39).

58. The Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) review on results-based management[49] concluded the following: "OIOS concludes that although aspirational results are utilized to justify approval of budgets, the actual attainment or non-attainment of results is of no discernible consequence to subsequent resource allocation or other decision-making and that "the "culture" of the Organization will not be changed by data collection efforts of "practitioners" within the Secretariat. If results actually produced do not guide General Assembly decision-making and if simultaneously there is no relaxation of process controls, results-based management will continue to be an administrative chore of no real utility." UNRWA further noted that for the success of RBM it was necessary to gain buy-in from all stakeholders. These highlight the importance of the role member States play through the legislative bodies to ensure that required resources are allocated for the priorities they identify. In this case RBM can fulfil its true purpose.

The implementation of the following recommendation will contribute to enhanced efficiency.

Recommendation 2: The legislative bodies of United Nations system organizations, which have not yet done so, should take decisions based on a results-based management approach and ensure that the necessary resources are allocated to implement the organizations' strategic plans and results-based management.

59. The organization is responsible for continuously evaluating its processes, activities and achievements in order to provide credible information on its efficiency, effectiveness and impact of their activities. Evaluation findings, conclusions and recommendations should be fed back into the planning loop to ensure that the organization is constantly learning and improving planning, design and processes for maximum efficiency and effectiveness. All organizations should have a designated evaluation function with a clear evaluation policy providing direction on evaluations. The evaluation policy should cover both independent and self-evaluations. Self-evaluations are an important managerial tool as important as independent evaluations. Organizations should strive to create a culture where evaluations are seen as learning tools supporting the achievement of the organizational objectives.

Benchmark 3: Organizations conduct credible, utilization-focused evaluations and communicate the findings, conclusions and recommendations to stakeholders.
Tools: Evaluation function exists, whether as an independent office, part of oversight or other planning, management units or unit work plans.

60. In 2007 the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) conducted a survey of the evaluation functions and policies in the United Nations system organizations. The study found that FAO, IFAD, ILO, UNCTAD, UNEP, UNESCO, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNIDO, United Nations, UNODC, WHO, WIPO, WMO have a centralized evaluation function. The study further found that ICAO, IAEA and UPU have an evaluation function embedded within management and operational structures.[50] IMO, ITU and UNWTO were found not to have an evaluation function in place.

[49] "Review of results-based management at the United Nations" (A/63/268, p. 2, section C).
[50] United Nations Evaluation Group Evaluations in the United Nations system (UNEG/REF(2007)3, para. 16, p. 5).

<u>Benchmark 4</u>: Organizations have an effectively implemented established information disclosure policy whereby the results of the organization's activities are communicated regularly to legislative organs, member States and other stakeholders, including donors, beneficiaries and the general public.

Tools:

a. Information disclosure policy
b. Consolidated annual financial reports
c. Programme results
d. Evaluation and audit results

61. The organizations have a responsibility towards member States, stakeholders, donors and beneficiaries as well as the general public to whom organizations are stewards of their funds to report not only on what the organizations have achieved with their resources but how this was done. This in many United Nations system organizations takes the form of annual reporting to the legislative bodies. The organizations should also transparently report on the findings, conclusions and recommendations of audits and their follow-up on recommendations provided by internal and external oversight. It is worth noting that JIU is mandated, in conformity with its Statute, to undertake, inter alia, United Nations system-wide evaluations, together with inspections and investigations.[51]

62. The review found that organizations possess strong reporting mechanisms for reporting to their legislative bodies and that there are no identifiable gaps in this area. The level of information and types of reports that are communicated differ from one organization to another and by preference of certain donors. With the implementation of International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) norms, organizations will be reporting on annual financial statements. The Inspector was informed that, although independent evaluations may be distributed widely, there was a perceived gap in the wide distribution of self-evaluation reports. ESCWA started to publish an Annual Report on Evaluation in April 2011. The report analyses discretionary self-evaluations undertaken during the year and makes recommendations for the enhancement of performance at the organizational level. WFP provides a separate report on evaluations, including self-evaluation results, to its executive board and ILO reported that they intend to publish the findings of self-evaluation reports to the Evaluation Advisory Committee and to its Governing Body.[52]

The implementation of the following recommendation will ensure greater controls.


Recommendation 3: Executive heads should incorporate evaluation, including self-evaluation results, in their annual reporting to legislative bodies.

[51] Chapter 4 of the JIU Statute.

[52] Results Based Strategies 2011-2015 Evaluation Strategy Strengthening the Use of Evaluations GB.310/PFA/4/1 (REV1). March 2011 Governing Body 310 Session. para. 21.

B. Accountability component: internal controls

Figure 4



63. Internal controls are developed by the organization to ensure not only that results are achieved but that they are achieved in line with organizational regulations and rules, policies, and ethical and integrity standards. As shown above, internal controls are made up of five components.

Internal control component: control environment

64. The first of these components, the **control environment,** sets the tone of an organization, influencing the consciousness of its staff members. It is where the standards for behaviour/performance are spelt out with awards for good behaviour/performance and discipline for poor ones. Administrative processes such as human resources policies fit under this section. The control environment supports the enabling of a culture of accountability in the organization.

65. This section on control environment consists of five benchmarks dealing with ethics and integrity, discipline and awards, and human resources policies.

a. Ethics and integrity

The following benchmark aims to focus on general ethics and conduct of staff.

Benchmark 5: Ethical conduct, standards of integrity, anti-corruption and anti-fraud policies are in place and enforced.

Tools:

a. Staff regulations/code of conduct for staff members, including harassment
b. Ethics function
c. Gifts, favours and hospitality policy
d. Protection against retaliation for reporting wrongdoing (whistle-blower policy)
e. Outside activities policy (conflict of interest)
f. Anti-fraud and anti-corruption policy
g. Training

66. The main reference document for staff code of conduct is the "Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service"[53] of the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC). The Code established and endorsed in 2001 does not include accountability issues but touches on important cultural elements of accountability such as openness and transparency when dealing with external stakeholders. The code of conduct includes specific standards on harassment, conflict of interest, outside activities, gifts, favours and hospitality.

67. The JIU report on "Ethics in the United Nations system"[54] found that IAEA, ICAO, IMO, UNIDO, UNWTO, WHO, and WIPO[55] did not possess an ethics function with an ethics policy. This is an important function which is often tasked by the organization to deal with claims of retaliation for reporting wrongdoing. Since the issuance of the above-mentioned report, ICAO, UNIDO, WIPO and WHO have established an ethics function. **The Inspector reiterates the recommendation made in the JIU Ethics report that "legislative bodies should direct their respective executive heads to put forward proposals for the establishment of an ethics function in line with the JIU suggested standards".[56]**

68. All participating organizations have a gifts, favours and hospitality policy in place, although such policies differ between organizations that have a zero-tolerance policy and those that have a policy which allows staff members to accept gifts of a nominal value. The JIU Note entitled "Procurement Reform in the United Nations system organizations"[57] found that the definition of nominal value diverged greatly, with the lowest value being US$20 up to SwF 300 for UPU. **The Inspector recommends that the United Nations system organizations should harmonize the definition of the gifts, favours and hospitality policy in order to ensure coherence.**

69. Regarding the existence of a policy protecting individuals from retaliation for reporting misconduct or supporting an investigation: CTBTO, ICAO, ILO, FAO, United Nations, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNOPS, UPU, WFP, UNRWA, WHO, and UNHCR have a whistle-blower protection policy.[58] However, interviews indicated that the effectiveness of the policy was in question especially from the perspective of the staff. When managers were asked about the whistle-blower policy and any identified weaknesses most of them stated that the number of complaints the investigation function received since the introduction of the whistle-blower policy was an indicator that the policy was working well. However, staff council/union members' answers varied. The majority of staff council representatives interviewed informed the Inspector that the policy was in place but was either unknown to staff or staff were hesitant to whistle-blow due to the question of confidentiality in the investigation processes. Further, they stated that the policy did not take into account soft retaliation measures which could be inflicted on the staff concerned in subtle ways, at times years after the reporting had taken place.

70. A more worrying issue was the lack of recourse once retaliation had taken place. There have been several high profile cases within the United Nations system where individuals who reported wrongdoing were sanctioned by being dismissed or their contracts not renewed or not promoted. These high profile cases show that once the retaliation has occurred the organization would not do much to correct and/or reverse them. The administrative tribunal

[53] January 2002. The previous version, Standards of Conduct in the International Civil Service, was prepared in 1954.
[54] Ethics in the United Nations system (JIU/REP/2010/3).
[55] WIPO informed the Inspector through the questionnaire (March 2011) that a Code of Ethics was in progress.
[56] Ethics in the United Nations system (JIU/REP/2010/3, p. 4) and the suggested standards can be found in Box 1 of the same page.
[57] Procurement Reform in the United Nations system organizations (JIU/NOTE/2011/1).
[58] WIPO informed the Inspector that it is currently working on establishing a whistle-blower policy.

concerned has awarded monetary compensation to individuals. However, thus far not one single staff member has been reinstated; showing that once the work environment has deteriorated it is not possible to reinstate the staff member. Unfortunately these high profile cases are well known by the staff members and seem to be serving as a bad example and implicit warning of what will happen if a staff member does report misconduct. **The Inspector was troubled by the perspectives of the staff members and suggests oversight bodies to look into the effectiveness of the whistle-blower policies and take a hard look at how the mechanisms behind the policy could be strengthened with a view to guaranteeing the independence and, transparency of investigations in retaliation cases (without jeopardizing anonymity) and to ensuring consistency in its application.**

71. Outside activities or conflict of interest policies exist in almost all the United Nations organizations interviewed. They refer to conflict of financial interests as well as declaration of any outside activities that may conflict with codes/standards as an international civil servant. It is to be noted that no real issues in the context of accountability were raised by the organizations' officials on this topic.

72. The Inspector was surprised however to learn about the dearth of organizations with an anti-fraud/anti-corruption policy in place. FAO, ILO, ITC, ITU, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, UNIDO, UNOPS, WFP and WHO all have a stand-alone anti-fraud policy in place. United Nations, UNEP, and UNODC do not have a formal anti-fraud policy but have many of the elements of such a policy. UNESCO and WIPO informed the Inspector that they are currently in the process of developing such a comprehensive policy. **The Inspector suggests that executive heads of organizations which do not have such a consolidated policy develop one at an early date.**

73. Although it was found that UNHCR did not have one comprehensive anti-fraud policy, it is noted here for good practice for its commitment to accountability towards its beneficiaries by having developed specific anti-fraud guidelines and policies on resettlement fraud, registration of refugees and other persons of concern, and in areas related to administration (supply, human resources, finance, etc.).

Good Practice: UNHCR Anti-fraud on Resettlement:[59] Anti-fraud guidelines and policies on the consequences of resettlement fraud have been identified as one of the important developments and issues to be included in the revised Resettlement Handbook.[60] It is an awareness-raising tool to detect symptoms or "red flags" that may indicate the presence of fraud and pursue these until fraud is proven or otherwise. UNHCR has established a policy to safeguard the integrity of the resettlement programme and of UNHCR operations in general by enhancing the effectiveness of the response to resettlement fraud perpetrated by refugees.[61] The policy is intended to bring about a deterrent and preventative effect to fraud as well as to ensure that persons not eligible for resettlement do not benefit from this durable solution. It also seeks to systematize and bring consistency to the sanctions currently being taken in the field.

[59] 2010 Resettlement Fraud: A Tool to Help Offices Assess Their Exposure and Vulnerability (Annex 3 to the 2008 Baseline Standard Operating Procedures on Resettlement).
[60] 2011 Revision of the 2004 UNHCR Resettlement Handbook.
[61] 2008 Policy and Procedural Guidelines: Addressing Resettlement Fraud Perpetrated by Refugees.

b. Discipline and awards

<u>Benchmark 6:</u> Failure to comply with enforced policies/regulations results in clear consequences. Sanctions shall be clear and proportional and implemented at all levels. In addition, outstanding performance should be acknowledged by recognition/awards/rewards.

Tools:

a. Policy documents on sanctions and disciplinary action
b. Publication in annual reports of sanctions imposed by the Executive Head
c. Awards/rewards programmes decided by committees/panels based on clear criteria
d. Publication of the names of staff members receiving awards and rewards

74. One very simple and outward sign of accountability is to discipline/sanction staff who fail to abide by the policies and mandates of the organization. All United Nations system organizations under the scope of the present review informed the Inspector that they have procedures and guidelines for disciplinary action. However a common complaint, in some cases amounting to despair, echoed by many interviewees was that the United Nations system as it currently stood had neither an effective "carrot" nor "stick" to motivate and/or deter staff. This benchmark makes for an interesting case study to illustrate that such a policy may be in place in theory but it is not functioning in practice.

75. Regarding disciplinary sanction practices, this study noted that in some organizations, although guidelines existed on paper, there have been no disciplinary cases or a limited number of measures imposed on staff in the last 3-5 years. Without the "stick" it would be difficult for organizations to hold staff members accountable and it would be difficult for managers to communicate to the staff that the management takes misconduct seriously. Various reasons were mentioned for why some organizations never or rarely imposed sanctions on staff members. The first was that the United Nations Dispute Tribunal (UNDT) and the ILO Administrative Tribunal (ILOAT) required a high burden of proof on par with criminal cases.[62] A second reason often noted by the interviewees was the perception that the management would allow those accused of misconduct to "resign" or "retire". The perception of staff was often that the higher the position held, the more staff was protected and able to avoid formal disciplinary measures. Staff members informed the Inspector of various anecdotal cases of unfairness as to how sanctions were imposed at various staff levels. It was found that some organizations, such as UNDP, take these matters somewhat seriously. **The Inspector concludes that a future evaluation of the effectiveness of accountability frameworks/components should analyse the disciplinary actions of organizations by grade level.**

76. In some cases the misconduct is serious enough to warrant referral to the national authorities for criminal misconduct prosecutable under national laws. The Inspector was informed that the Secretariat's Office of Legal Affairs covering all United Nations funds and programmes[63] had referred 23 cases, of which two-thirds were staff misconduct, to the national authorities. A specialized agency stated that it had not referred any cases to national authorities in the past five years despite having grounds to do so. The reason for non-referral was given as the issue of immunity. **The Inspector is of the opinion that this is not an obstacle: if the relevant national laws exist, immunity can and should be lifted.** Another stated that there have been cases of fraud but that the monetary loss was too slight to warrant a referral to national authorities and was not worth the potential threat to the immunity of the organization. Thus they had preferred to handle the situation within the organization.

[62] FAO drew the attention of the team to the fact that their review of ILOAT case law revealed that it does not tend to be more favourable to plaintiffs than to organizations.
[63] Covers UNDP, UNHCR, UNOPS and UNFPA amongst others.

77. Even in cases where national referrals occurred, the follow-up by some national authorities was found to be poor. The organization in such cases could dismiss the staff member but could do nothing further. As the document, "Practice of the Secretary-General in disciplinary matters and possible criminal behaviour", 1 July 2010 to 30 June 2011 notes, "…eight cases involving credible allegations of criminal conduct by United Nations officials or experts on mission were referred to Member States. The Secretary-General is not aware of any action taken in respect of such cases by the Member States concerned."[64] **In this context the Inspector invites member States concerned to play their part in the creation/upholding of a culture of accountability. It was at the urging of the General Assembly that all staff members are kept informed of the examples of misconduct. Member States then must also uphold their side of the accountability. As long as staff continue to see examples of exceptions and unfair application of disciplinary measures, the culture of accountability within an organization will remain fragile.**

78. Although due to the scope of the present review the Inspector is unable to confirm with quantitative statistics whether these perceptions are true, the perception alone can be considered damaging to the culture of accountability. It is noted that the views above were shared almost universally by organizations' staff representatives. As for the culture of accountability and staff members' feeling accountable at the personal level, the perceptions above are an indication of a serious lack of accountability in some United Nations organizations.

79. One way to alleviate the negative perception of staff members regarding fairness of disciplinary measures is to annually publish a list of all formal disciplinary actions imposed on staff. The list should protect the confidentiality of the person in question but be clear about the sanctionable offence committed, grade level of the staff if possible and the sanction imposed. Such a list serves four purposes: (1) transparency is enhanced within the organization and clarifies to staff that sanctions are imposed at all levels (or not); (2) it shows that sanctions are proportional to the misconduct and do not relate to the position held in the organization; (3) the list constitutes an awareness-raising tool for staff with regard to sanctionable offences; (4) assistance in setting the level of sanction based on past precedents. Proportionality must be maintained.

80. As examples of good practice,[65] FAO, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, the United Nations and WFP are to be commended for ensuring that the executive head's practices in disciplinary matters are published and thus known to all staff. The United Nations at the request of the General Assembly in resolution 59/287, paragraph 17, through information circulars publishes a list of sanctions imposed by the Secretary-General by type of misconduct with a short description of the offence and the exact discipline imposed. This is an example that should be emulated. Such a list should be available to the legislative bodies.

81. The Inspector was informed by UNDP officials that they plan to go further than the current practice of publishing sanctions on the intranet and to make these truly public by publishing a list on the website. The legal department in UNDP has agreed that this list should include not only disciplinary measures but also information on those found to have committed misconduct and resigned (currently this does not appear on any of the published lists, with the exception of WFP, and is not counted as a disciplinary action) and that the list would include non-staff such as contractors and consultants. **The Inspector holds the commitment of UNDP to transparency and openness on this issue as a beacon which other organizations**

[64] ST/IC/2011/20, para. 72.
[65] The organizations mentioned, with the exception of UNHCR, publish this information annually. UNHCR publishes the information biannually.

should follow. ILO informed the Inspector that it considered the publishing of such lists to risk compromising the duty of the organization to its staff members in relation to respect for their dignity and related duty of confidentiality. As the Inspector calls upon organizations to ensure anonymity of those sanctioned in the lists the Inspector questions this viewpoint, which is contrary to the trend practised by organizations which aspire to transparency at all levels of the organization.

The implementation of the following recommendation will enhance dissemination of best practice and enhance controls and compliance.

Recommendation 4: **Executive heads of organizations which have not yet done so should inform their staff members on his/her decisions on disciplinary measures imposed on staff by publishing lists (in annexes to the annual reports and on a website) describing the offence and measures taken while ensuring anonymity of the staff member concerned.**

82. One manifestation of personal accountability is encouraged by awards/rewards/ motivational tools and heightened by a disciplinary/sanction mechanism. Interviewees lamented that there was no tangible way to motivate staff through awards/rewards in the United Nations system. The Inspector was informed by the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC) that it was looking into this issue, which would cover the whole of the United Nations system.[66]

83. Some rewards do exist in the form of a step increase or accelerated personal promotions. However the Inspector learned from the interviews that the step increase which may have been used by some organizations as conditional on good performance has been corrupted in practice as an automatic annual increase.[67] Personal promotions were rarely used in the system and HR managers and staff representatives informed the Inspector that there was a quota imposed in some cases of only two personal promotions a year. In the absence of such formal rewards for excellent performance, ad hoc motivational tools were used by some organizations. ITU and WFP had pilot tested bonuses given to staff members with exceptional performance; however they found that this was resource heavy and that it demoralized other staff members. In both cases the bonus scheme has been abandoned or its continuation is under discussion. The Inspector found the practice of UNRWA on this issue to be an example of good practice. The agency has addressed the idea of recognizing outstanding performance (with both monetary and non-monetary rewards and awards) and has established guidelines on rewards and recognition which are incorporated in its human resource policy framework.

84. The most utilized "soft" reward was training opportunities to staff members. There were various examples given of organizations which granted staff members with exceptional performance to get on-the-job training by going to a field office for some weeks or special mission opportunities for professional development. The Chief Executive Board (**CEB) through the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) should come up with an awards/rewards mechanism applicable to the system. However, the Inspector cautions**

[66] The ICSC 2011 Annual Report (A/66/30) proposed a new framework promoting "a 'culture of appreciation' that would encourage staff members to recognize colleagues for outstanding work or behaviour. It outlined ways of rewarding staff that organizations could adapt to suit their own organizational culture and needs. As requested by the Commission, there were proposals concerning guidelines for the use of merit steps to reward exceptional performance" (p. 23).

[67] UNAIDS informed the Inspector that it exercises the discretion to withhold within-grade increments to under-performing staff members.

against using formal training as a blanket "reward", since staff members are already entitled to a certain number of training days per year. Training opportunities should not become an award offered only to those with exceptional performance. The Inspector was informed of awards granted to staff members who exceeded performance expectations or who excelled in innovation or team work. PAHO, UNIDO, United Nations and WFP all had awards mechanisms that recognized individual staff or team excellence. The more sophisticated award programmes have specific criteria, a committee to make the award decisions and a formal award ceremony broadcast live to all offices and field locations. The Inspector recognizes that organizations are having to implement such motivational measures under harsh resource constraints and commends the creative initiatives taken by these organizations.

The implementation of the following recommendation will enhance dissemination of best practice.

Recommendation 5: Executive heads should instruct their human resources divisions to put mechanisms in place for recognizing outstanding performance by developing creative ways and means to motivate staff through awards, rewards, and other incentives.

c. Human resources policies

85. In order to maintain an environment where internal controls are respected and to showcase the management's philosophy on accountability, strict policies on recruitment and staff selection are needed. There are a myriad of human resource policies in place within the United Nations system's organizations. Those which concern the control environment are related to job descriptions and work plans which lead to performance assessments and therefore allow individuals to be held accountable. A second set of policies under this component are those on recruitment, which allow the enabling environment to ensure that staff are selected and recruited according to established procedures.

Benchmark 7: All staff can be held accountable for their work on the basis of up-to-date written job descriptions accurately reflecting their actual work.

Tools:

a. Job description for all staff
b. Coherence between job description and day-to-day work

86. Written job descriptions are a prerequisite to ensure that staff are recruited for the proper posts and that, once recruited, staff members know what they are responsible for. The personal work plan should be based on the unit work plan and must be in line with the job description. If staff members are assigned tasks not in line with their job descriptions then they cannot be held accountable for those tasks. The work plan, performance assessment (discussed under the component on Monitoring below) and the job descriptions are the framework within which an individual staff member shall be found responsible and accountable.

87. The review found that not all organizations require new vacancies to be advertised and accompanied by either a tailored or generic job description at all levels, with the exception of IAEA, whose officials stated that some top managers' posts do not have a written job description. The Inspector finds that it is a good practice to require a job description for recruitment processes. However organizations must not look at job descriptions as a one-off event, rather job descriptions need to be continuously updated for long-serving staff members

as well. Following current practice in the United Nations system organizations, a staff member only receives a job description when recruited, or after applying for a new position. However, what of long-serving staff members who were subject to lateral mobility and received their job descriptions 7-10 years ago? Technological advances may have made some of their tasks obsolete or they have upgraded their skills to keep pace with changes, but have their job descriptions been updated to reflect this situation? **The Inspector calls on human resource managers to reflect on this issue and encourage a more proactive approach to issuing updated job descriptions that accurately reflect the activities the staff member actually engages in as appropriate.**

88. Although staff members may possess a fairly up-to-date job description, there must be coherence between what the job description lists and their day-to-day work. In certain organizations working in conflict/humanitarian operations, priorities and objectives are subject to short-term changes. How do organizations reflect such changes in the work of the staff member? Some organizations noted that they have a budget which covers such emergencies and that their objectives were worded in general terms such that a revision of work plans was not required. From the interviewee responses it did not seem that organizations had found a solution to making sure the job descriptions and the work plans were aligned with the shifting priorities of the organizations. This will be explored further in the Monitoring component below.

Benchmark 8: Concretization of policies on selection, recruitment and post-employment.
Tools:

a. Recruitment policy restricting hiring of family members and relatives
b. Post-employment restrictions for staff who retire/resign from the organization

89. In its Programme of Work 2011, JIU is conducting a follow-up on the implementation of the benchmarking framework for the selection and recruitment of staff in the organizations of the United Nations**.** The review has preliminarily indicated that policies on recruitment, placement and promotion do exist in most organizations, while efforts to assess, update and harmonize these policies are ongoing broad issues being addressed by ICSC, CEB HR Network and JIU as well as OIOS (regarding the United Nations Secretariat, funds and programmes staff) and other oversight bodies.[68] In the report "Transparency in the Selection and Appointment of Senior Managers in the United Nations Secretariat",[69] the Inspectors, "…found that a whole group of vacancies for senior field-based positions is not advertised and there are no vacancy announcements or notes verbales sent to member States".[70] The said report recommended to the General Assembly that it should "direct the Secretary-General to follow proposed guidelines in selecting and appointing senior managers in tandem with the process outlined in the Secretary-General's accountability report".[71] Here is an example of how setting the tone at the top would strengthen the overall culture of accountability, including at the bottom, and set the example of how all recruitment within an organization should take place in respect of the provisions of articles 100 and 101 of the United Nations Charter and Staff Regulations and Rules.

90. The Inspector was informed of several examples where in the absence of (or despite) a post-employment restriction policy on staff who have retired or resigned from the

[68] Terms of Reference Follow-up on the implementation of the benchmarking framework for selection and recruitment of staff in the organizations of the United Nations.
[69] Transparency in the selection and appointment of senior managers in the United Nations Secretariat (JIU/REP/2011/2).
[70] Ibid., para. 57, p. 15.
[71] Ibid., Recommendation 2, p. 24.

organization, these staff members come back to the organization and are placed in the direct line of accountability. This is detrimental to more junior career-minded staff members who are motivated to work for recognition and promotion, but it also places retirees with "nothing to lose" in the direct accountability line. In the words of one of the interviewees, "they are putting in place retired officials in the accountability line who have nothing to lose and who have nothing to gain and they can just walk away when something goes wrong. We have had directors, who retired in […] who then come back as P-4s or who takes lead [sic] on investigations and this has a detrimental effect on the psyche of career-minded professionals".[72] Post-employment restrictions are currently being used by organizations only for procurement staff, to support prevention of procurement irregularities. The JIU note, "Procurement reform in the United Nations system",[73] found that "[o]nly a few of the organizations have put in place clear policy instructions on post-employment restrictions of staff".[74]

Internal control component: risk assessment

91. The second internal control component is risk assessment. Risk assessment within the United Nations system takes the shape of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM), which is defined as "an organization-wide process of structured, integrated and systematic identification, analysis, evaluation treatment and monitoring of risks towards the achievement of organizational objectives."[75] The JIU report entitled "Review of Enterprise Risk Management in the United Nations system: benchmarking framework" concluded that "the United Nations system organizations are at the beginning stages in terms of the adoption and implementation of ERM. Many organizations are either preparing policy and framework documents or undertaking pilot/first phase exercises."

Benchmark 9: Organization has a formal policy on ERM to be implemented with a coherent methodology.

Tools: Risk analysis conducted for each unit/project/process and an organizational risk plan exists

92. As found in the JIU report on ERM in 2010 the practice of ERM cannot yet be considered mature within the United Nations system; however it is presented here as a benchmark for testing the strength of future accountability frameworks. ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, United Nations, UNOPS and WFP have made tremendous efforts to introduce risk management and some of these notable examples are listed here for knowledge sharing to other organizations planning ERM exercises. CTBTO, FAO, ITU, UPU, WHO and WIPO were working on an ERM system and a proposal or policy was in a draft stage. UNWTO stated that the issue of ERM had been reviewed by the Secretariat but it was concluded that it would not be cost-effective for UNWTO to have a formal ERM system. Instead UNWTO reviews significant risks in activities but not through an ERM system.

Good Practices:

WFP established and approved an ERM policy in 2005. ERM is based on a framework and implemented at two levels: observation level and decision-making level. A risk register is used to record risks as they are observed. There are three intermediary stages to consolidate and analyse all their reported risks at the observation level. The risk management focal points escalate the risks to the risk management coordinators, who conduct a portfolio view analysis of risks and deal with risks escalated to the corporate level. Finally, there is an executive management council responsible for

[72] Interviewed by the Inspector. Source is anonymous to protect interviewees' identity.
[73] JIU/NOTE/2011/1.
[74] Procurement reforms in the United Nations system (JIU/NOTE/2011/1), chapter on Ethics Management and Vendor Issues, para. 169.
[75] COSO, Enterprise Risk Management Framework-Integrated Framework, appendix E, as it appears in the Review of Enterprise Risk Management in the United Nations system: benchmarking framework (JIU/REP/2010/4 JIU).

aggregating risks at a corporate level and providing information and analysis for the Executive Management Council (EMC). The process of escalation only occurs when the office entity which observed the risk does not have the capacity and the delegated authority for taking decisions on the risk response (mitigation actions).

The United Nations Secretariat has named a focal point responsible for developing the ERM policy document, methodology and accompanying manual. They are currently implementing two pilot ERM assessments in two selected departments of the Secretariat and lessons learned from the pilots will inform the Secretary-General's report on accountability.

Internal control component: control activities

93. This component encompasses all the policies and procedures established to address risks and to achieve the organizations' objectives. They help in ensuring that management directives are carried out and necessary actions are taken to address risks to the achievement of the organization's objectives. Control activities include approvals, authorizations, and reconciliations, review of operating performance, security of assets and segregation of duties. Translated into the context of accountability, this includes systems and frameworks enabling the organization to effectively control the implementation of the accountability control environment. The main risk addressed here is non-accountable behaviour or lack of accountable behaviour.

94. The section on control activities consists of three benchmarks dealing with chain of command and delegation of authority, financial regulations and rules and anti-fraud mechanisms, and internal certification of unit results by all managers on the exercise of internal controls.

Benchmark 10: The chain of command and delegation of authority are aligned, clear, coherent and integrated into existing enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems.

Tools:

a. Clear definition of delegation of authority
b. Coherence between management line and delegation of authority and clear reporting lines
c. Delegation of authority built into existing ERP systems

95. These control activities are built around the central concept of delegation of authority. In order to avoid micro-management, delegation of authority has to be clearly delineated in all organizations. Real delegation of authority requires an effective devolution of decision-making powers, and should not merely be a decentralization of administrative tasks. JIU has already insisted on this aspect in "Delegation of authority and accountability (part II): series on managing for results in the United Nations system" (JIU/REP/2004/7).[76] Clear descriptions of who is responsible for what and what thresholds are required to escalate a decision to the top of the hierarchical chain are prerequisites for clear delegation of authority. Regulations, rules and decisions establishing delegation of authority should clearly indicate who is accountable at each step of the organization's activities.

96. Regarding the delegation of authority, it was realized during the interviews that many interviewees perceived a mismatch between authority and responsibility. This may be the case when a staff member has many responsibilities or duties, but not enough delegated authority to decide. In this case, the decision-making process is considerably slowed down since the staff member has to escalate the matter – sometimes through multiple management layers – for a decision to be taken. This often results in frustration and demotivation. However the

[76] See JIU/REP/2004/7, p. 2, para. 8.

opposite can also be true, when in some cases managers circumvent their assigned decisional authority in order to speed up some processes. In the Inspector's opinion, these behaviours are a symptom of poorly set-up delegation of authority policies. **No authority should be entrusted to a staff member without responsibility and accountability.**

97. Another issue raised by most participating organizations was the fact that many staff members lacked proper training to know how, when, and where to ask for permission to perform a duty. This is mostly the case for younger professionals (for instance P-2 or P-3 certifying officers), who sometimes fear the amount of authority suddenly invested in them. Some interviewees also felt that management are not supportive enough to back up those young professionals in the event of a decision being challenged and that the current culture of compliance-based accountability paralyzed staff from taking what may end up being the wrong decision.

98. **For the United Nations, delegation of authority constitutes the basis of accountability, and every audit undertaken by OIOS includes a part where proper delegation of authority is verified and assessed. OIOS also identified an increased need to evaluate and monitor delegation of authority in a more consistent and systematic way.**

99. During the interviews, two departments in the United Nations Secretariat strongly advocated the need for a coherent approach to delegation of authority. They provided the Inspector with multiple examples of where the managerial chain of command is not aligned to the delegation of authority and caused many problems in terms of the achievement of the Senior Compacts. This example clearly illustrates the fact that all elements of an accountability framework are intertwined and need to be adapted to each other.

100. PAHO set up a working group to define a clear delegation of authority system through an internal memorandum, which would clarify the role of representatives who control over 70 per cent of finances. The draft template submitted by PAHO is an excellent step forward since it mentions explicitly higher accountability as an underlying principle ("chain of accountability") and establishes "standardized definitions, roles and responsibilities that are to be applied consistently in accordance with the approved policies at all times".[77] Also, authority and responsibility, the two sub-elements of accountability, are mentioned. The definition of responsibility may be too general: this is work in progress and will need further refining.

101. The great organizational complexity of most organizations in the United Nations system, its necessary shift to a more decentralized matrix-structure and combining accountability with multi-agency programmes or projects makes delegation of authority a complex matter. Nevertheless, and as far as accountability is concerned, **there is a need to stress that clearly defined hierarchical lines of authority through a coherent delegation of authority mechanism are key to holding managers and staff accountable**. Otherwise accountability becomes diluted and eventually completely lost, which in turn has a negative effect on staff motivation. Ideally, delegation of authority should be aligned to the direct chain of command.

Good Practice: WHO has fully integrated its delegation of authority mechanisms into its ERP system, even down to the level of multiple sub-delegations. This provides for a very tight control of every step of not only procurement and investments, but also for every step of project management, including human resources decisions.

[77] Draft Delegation of Authority Template for PAHO representatives submitted to the Inspector.

The following benchmark focuses on financial aspects such as corruption and anti-fraud.

Benchmark 11: Financial regulations and rules (FRR) in the United Nations system organizations should embody anti-fraud and financial misconduct policies and are implemented practically.

Tools:

a. FRR
b. Conflict of interest statements
c. Financial disclosure statements
d. Anti-fraud policies

102. Anti-fraud and conflict of interest policies have already been mentioned in the section related to the control environment. The control activities implementing aforementioned policies are the conflict of interest statements and the financial disclosure statements (FDSs), as well as, in a broader sense, compliance with FRR.

103. While many JIU participating organizations have not implemented an anti-fraud policy, they all acknowledged that they had at least some components of it. United Nations officials stated that anti-fraud was implemented through Secretary-General's bulletins covering various aspects of an anti-fraud policy, mainly document ST/SGB/2005/19 on financial disclosure and declaration of interest statements that covers all staff members from D-1 and above, as well as staff members that have financial responsibility.

104. As found by the JIU Ethics report,[78] when there is an ethics office in place, FDS are often administered by it directly. This is for instance the case at the United Nations, UNDP and WFP. This was identified as best practice, because the ethics office should not only be an informal response mechanism to fraud and other mismanagement issues but also a proactive actor, fully integrated into the organization's daily work. It should not only be enabled to draft policies, but also to enforce them.

105. Some interviewees confessed that, while financial disclosure and/or conflict of interest statements were duly completed by most of the staff required to do so, there was almost no vetting of those statements taking place at any point. So there is no reliable means for the organization to actually detect a priori any conflict of interest. In some organizations the conflict of interest and FDS were only taken out of the drawer and analysed during an investigation, when they were sometimes used as supporting evidence for fraud cases.

106. The Inspector is fully aware that FDS and conflict of interest statements cannot fully prevent fraud, since a declaration – if not fully vetted – depends on its author's honesty. Financial disclosure and conflict of interest statements should be viewed as a measure to mitigate the risk for organizations and increase the risk for staff trying to engage in fraud of being held accountable.

107. **The Inspector suggests that the JIU participating organizations which have not yet, or only partially, implemented financial disclosure and conflict of interest policies should do so expeditiously.**

108. In some organizations huge discrepancies exist between management and staff perception regarding investigations on fraud and corruption. The ramifications of some cases have even led to investigators uncovering entire networks of embezzlement schemes, going up to politically appointed posts and taking place with the involvement of some member

[78] Ethics in the United Nations system (JIU/REP/2010/3).

States' representatives. While management – with some notable exceptions – consistently minimized the impact of such cases and pointed out that investigations had been conducted according to relevant standards, staff representatives mentioned that, for some serious cases, investigation reports were shelved by some executive heads, or staff members blowing the whistle seriously threatened with non-renewal of contract or other forms of indirect (soft) retaliation. Executive heads always have to strike the balance between protecting the organization's reputation and holding staff engaged in wrongdoing fully accountable for their actions. But in cases where criminal activities come into play, accountability should always be the guiding principle.

109. This is corroborated by the low rankings given by interviewees on their rating of the culture of accountability versus the accountability frameworks. In other words many staff believe that the accountability framework or components are in place but that their implementation as evidenced by the culture in which accountability is applied is weak.

Benchmark 12: Managers attest to compliance with internal controls within the framework of their delegation of authority.
Tool: Letter/form of representation/assurance/attestation submitted annually to the executive head

110. It has been brought to the attention of JIU that EC, ILO, OECD, United Nations, UNESCO and WFP include in their internal controls framework a very strong component to increase accountability of managers. The letter of assertion is a central pillar of accountability for OECD and WFP. In the United Nations through the senior managers' compacts, which are signed annually with the Secretary-General, each senior manager pledges to exercise delegated authority in compliance with the regulations, rules and all relevant policies and guidelines, including appropriate monitoring of staff working under his/her supervision to whom such authority may be further delegated. With the implementation of enterprise risk management, the Secretariat intends to strengthen this assurance by requiring, as part of the senior managers' compacts with the Secretary-General, that each senior manager annually confirm through a Certification Report the establishment and maintenance of a strong internal control environment as a result of the risk assessment process. OIOS informed the Inspector that they are of the opinion that the present JIU report gives too much weight to the Secretary-General's compact in presenting it as a letter of management assertion.

111. The Inspector learned and agrees with OECD, the United Nations and WFP that letters of assertion are a very powerful tool to push accountability down the management line. With this system managers have to demonstrate that they have complied with every applicable regulation and rule. Internal audit can then verify under which conditions the letters have been signed and how significant the controls put in place by managers really are. OECD goes even further by trying to implement ownership of risk management in the letters of representation. The Inspector finds this letter of assertion to be a strong tool which allows organizations to hold one individual accountable for actions conducted under his/her delegated authority.

112. The present report acknowledges that the letter of assertion is a very compliance-based tool for increasing management accountability. As stated above, accountability has to be fostered by compliance-based mechanisms together with incentives and rewards; compliance being the minimum standard every manager would have to adhere to. The United Nations senior managers' compacts (Under Secretary-General (USG) and Assistant Secretary-General (ASG) levels) already reflect this effort. This element of accountability should be considered as one of the benchmarks for a functioning accountability framework. It has the merit of being transparent, clearly structured and verifiable by internal and external audit. It can also be linked to management compacts and performance appraisals.

Internal control component: information and communication

113. In order for organizations to be accountable they must have a system in place to document and produce reports on operations, finance and non-financial and compliance-related information. In recent years this has been embodied in the form of ERP systems. However, the system of documentation and information dissemination is not limited to an ERP system. There must be transparency of the information being generated both within and outside the organization.

Benchmark 13: Staff at all levels have access to relevant, reliable information that supports decision-making in line with their delegated authorities and the organization has an internal and external communication system.

Tools:

a. ERP system or similar in place to capture and document relevant information
b. Internal communication channels are fully exploited
c. Information disclosure policy in place

114. United Nations system organizations are at various stages of ERP implementation. The implementation of ERP is not uniform in some organizations where ERP only covers headquarters and thus organizations continue to have a fragmented approach to generating comprehensive reports on the overall organization. The Inspector recognizes that ERP is an expensive tool and that it is not for all organizations, especially smaller ones that are unable to justify such costly investments. As long as a system is in place in which information is captured and documented, on the basis of which reliable reports are made for staff and legislative bodies, it should be considered as sufficient.

115. The existence of ERP or other similar systems however is not enough to ensure that information is widely disseminated in a coherent manner. It is important for executive heads to establish clear channels of communication at all staff levels to communicate new revisions to procedures, processes and information that may affect the ability of staff members to carry out their responsibilities. It is regrettable that some executive heads do not regularly meet with the staff members. Although executive heads meet with their senior management group, it was rare for some of them to meet with all staff members in a town hall format or through video conferences with the field. Many staff council representatives also reported that they had not met with their executive heads for several years. The presence and communication of the executive head with staff members is part and parcel of the culture of the organization. More efforts should be made by the executive heads to make time available to meet with the staff of their organizations.

116. Communication to external parties is not limited to presenting annual reports to the legislative bodies; rather the Inspector takes a more expanded view on this issue and sees external communication as being towards all stakeholders, including member States, beneficiaries, the general public and the media. In order to ensure transparency in communication to the public to which the United Nations organizations are stewards of resources, the Executive head must ensure that there is an information disclosure policy in place. An information disclosure policy must contain:[79]

- ✓ A detailed list of the type of organizational documents that should be made public and narrow conditions for non-disclosure, such as beneficiary data and information.[80]

[79] From the Global Accountability Report, Transparency, Chapter 6.1 p. 22-23.

- ✓ A process for external parties for requesting documents, a timeframe for the request to be treated, and how to appeal if a request is denied.

117. **ILO, UNDP, UNEP, UNICEF, UNOPS and WFP have an information disclosure policy which contains the above-mentioned points. The Inspector would like to invite these organizations to set the transparency bar higher by publishing a list of denied requests and reasons or at a minimum, as is current UNDP practice, put in place a policy and procedure for managing appeals against decisions not to disclose information.**

The implementation of the following recommendation will enhance transparency and dissemination of best practices.

Recommendation 6: The Executive heads should develop and implement an information disclosure policy to heighten transparency and accountability in their respective organizations as a matter of urgency in the event that they have not already done so and report to the legislative bodies accordingly.

Internal control component: monitoring

118. Bringing the internal control circle to a close is the monitoring component. Organizations must be committed to monitoring the other four components of their internal control and assess the quality of performance and compliance. Monitoring activities consist of internal audit, inspections and performance assessments of staff at all levels, 360-degree performance assessments, tools such as scorecards and senior compacts for managers.

Benchmark 14: Executive heads, senior managers and staff members' performance is monitored and corrective action taken as necessary.

Tools:

a. Performance assessments for all staff levels including 360-degree feedback
b. Senior compacts or scorecard-type tools
c. Corrective measures for non-performing assets

119. The personal work plan is what makes staff members accountable for delivery of certain outputs and behaviours/competencies. All organizations have a performance assessment mechanism in place for staff members. Some organizations have differentiated the performance assessment requirement for regular fixed-term staff from temporary or project staff. For the latter in many cases the Inspector found that it was voluntary for managers to conduct a performance assessment. Most organizations did not require a periodic performance assessment for consultants, relying rather on end-of-project/assignment evaluations. Most of the performance assessment systems consist of a work plan with objectives and goals/outputs, competencies which the staff member would like to develop or are required, a mid-point review with the supervisor, and a final end-of-cycle evaluation.

120. Only a handful of organizations informed the Inspector that they use a 360-degree performance assessment tool within the performance assessment mechanism[81] which allows supervisees to assess the managerial competencies of their supervisor. The United Nations is pilot testing a new assessment tool whereby a supervisor with at least three supervisees can ask them for an assessment of his/her managerial skills and which also includes a voluntary peer review system. FAO, UNHCR, UNRWA and WFP also include 360-degree performance assessments as a tool for managers to obtain feedback on their managerial strengths and

[81] The Inspector understands that 360-degree performance evaluations can take place in the context of a management development training programme. This is not what is meant here.

weaknesses. **The Inspector suggests that in organizations where 360-degree performance assessment is not required, senior managers should voluntarily opt to be assessed not only by their supervisors but also by their peers and supervisees.**

121. Almost universally, performance assessments were not being effectively used in the organizations and there was a high degree of dissatisfaction voiced in this regard by staff representatives. Certain interviewees questioned the use of performance assessments as both a capacity development and an "accountability" tool. Staff were alarmed, it was noted, at the prospect of listing their development needs, lest this be seen as indicating a lack of capacity and could be used against them. Others mentioned the fact that managers did not complete the performance appraisals of their staff, the low quality of the performance assessment narratives, and mobility of staff, affecting fair assessments. Managers of some organizations reported that there was a lack of courage by many managers to write assessments which reflected the true performance rating for fear of staff contesting the assessment, which might trigger long tribunal discussions. Officials of one organization noted that the United Nations system was founded on a culture of consensus, whereby decisions are made in committees and groups and that this had weakened staff morale to be able to frame their work at the individual responsibility and accountability level. If the culture of consensus and fear of tribunal appeals paralyzes managers from making truthful assessments of staff members, it becomes difficult to remove non-performing staff members from duty. Some managers also explained that currently there was no possible action that could be taken against non-performing staff. If staff had poor ratings managers either have to dismiss them (which was found to be difficult) or tolerate their continued employment**. The area of performance assessments is one of the biggest weaknesses identified by the Inspector in the accountability architecture.**

122. There are good examples from UNFPA and UNHCR of attempting to overcome this obstacle. UNFPA has implemented a policy for the dismissal of non-performing staff members. This good initiative consists of allowing the organization to dismiss a staff member after three continuous years of under-performance or after two years of dissatisfactory service. UNFPA began implementing the said policy three years ago and informed the Inspector that it is now coming to the end of the third year, when staff members concerned would become "eligible" for dismissal. It informed the Inspector that it has dismissed one staff member thus far and that the case is currently being considered at the tribunal.

123. **UNHCR has a good practice in the field of performance assessments and non-performance. As a first step the Performance Management Unit, which oversees performance appraisals, monitors not only compliance with the appraisal process but also the standards and quality of appraisal reports. It has the authority to return appraisals to supervisors who do not comply with the expected standards. The appraisals are actively used as a tool for assignments, contract renewal and promotions. When non- or underperforming staff do not improve their performance, the director of human resources has the authority to impose administrative measures as a consequence of their underperformance. The relevant administrative measures are: non-granting of a within-grade salary increment (step increase), reassignment to a more suitable position and termination for unsatisfactory service.**

124. With regard to performance assessments for executive heads, none of the organizations has as yet initiated any assessment mechanism.[82] Executive heads are accountable to the

[82] See also "Selection and conditions of service of executive heads in the United Nations system organizations" (JIU/REP/2009/8, chap. 3, sect. D).

governing and/or legislative bodies. It was stated that, if there was dissatisfaction with their performance, this would be communicated through these bodies. The United Nations has the best practice in assessments for senior managers. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon[83] stated in the 2011 Senior Compacts Signing Ceremony that: "Accountability should be second nature to all of us. It is nothing to fear, nor is it something to be viewed solely in terms of compliance, as something we are obligated to do. Rather, at its best, accountability is a concept that can help us to uphold the highest standards of excellence for which we strive every day." The Secretary-General enters into annual "Compacts" with senior managers (heads of departments and offices, heads of peacekeeping missions, and special representatives of the Secretary-General) which state their objectives and expected outputs. These Compacts set specific programme objectives and managerial targets, including a Human Resources scorecard. For each manager the Compact includes the key objectives related to the specific mandate of each of the departments and ensure they are aligned to the objectives in budget documents. A Management Performance Board reviews the Compacts annually and reports to the Secretary-General on the managers' performance. A letter stating the managers' achievements and shortcomings is sent to the managers and each manager then prepares an action plan to take any corrective action required. The mechanism also helps in knowledge-sharing across the organization as innovative and creative ideas are shared with other managers. **This is a good practice in the United Nations system. In order to raise the bar even further the Inspector suggests that the Management Performance Board clarify what action can be taken with regard to managers who continue to under-perform (as in the case of individual staff members) vis à vis their stated targets.**

<u>Benchmark 15:</u> Recommendations of oversight bodies/internal audits and evaluations are tracked, implemented, and if not, clear justification should be provided.

Tools:

a. Information disclosure policy
b. Reporting on external and internal oversight recommendations
c. Tracking recommendations of internal and external audit, oversight bodies and internal, independent and self-evaluations

125. In United Nations system organizations, internal oversight mechanisms usually take the lead in monitoring compliance, effectiveness of processes and operations and performance of specific units/departments and programmes. The 2010 JIU report, "Audit Function in the United Nations system"[84] identified

> the major challenges/constraints faced by **internal audit/oversight** heads as: the follow-up and implementation of audit recommendations; resources; auditing the "One United Nations"; coordination with other oversight bodies; and independence. Additional constraints relate to the authority, centralization/decentralization, structure, planning, reporting and quality assessment of the internal audit activity and the performance and competence of internal auditors. Other challenges identified were, inter alia, the lack of accountability and sanctions against those who are responsible for the non-implementation of audit recommendations.[85]

126. In line with the JIU Audit Function report findings, similar challenges were identified specifically in the area of follow-up and implementation of the audit recommendations. The review enquired from organizations whether they had a follow-up mechanism in place for tracking the status of implementation or recording why a recommendation was not approved/accepted and, to take it even a step further, to see whether the recommendations

[83] From 2011 Senior Compacts Signing Ceremony.
[84] Audit function in the United Nations system (JIU/REP/2010/5).
[85] Ibid., Executive Summary.

were assigned to specific individuals who would be held accountable for the status of that recommendation's implementation. ICAO, ILO, ITU, UNDP, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNOPS and WFP reported that they have in place a mechanism to link the findings of oversight bodies with individual performance. The United Nations senior managers reported that they are putting forward such a proposal in the Secretary-General's next report on accountability to be submitted to the next session of the General Assembly. The Inspector was informed of various mechanisms and systems and shares below two good practices among these:


Good Practices:

United Nations: although the Secretariat informed the Inspector that it was drafting a proposal for the 67th session, the Inspector finds that the Senior Compacts already includes elements of linking the oversight recommendations to individual/senior manager performance. The current compacts include the objective of implementing recommendations accepted by management with targets to measure success criteria. The recommendations would then be assigned from the senior managers to line managers and cascade down to individuals so that an individual can be held responsible and accountable for their implementation.

WFP: Since 2010 the unit responsible for analyzing all reports of oversight bodies and recommendations provides information to all managers on outstanding recommendations, statistics on implementation and reminders. The line managers can then take into account and assign recommendations to individual managers and, when assessing their performance, take into account the status of implementation of recommendations. This has resulted in a strong follow-up culture with regard to internal audit recommendations. In 2010 53 per cent of medium-risk and 90 per cent of high-risk audit recommendations were closed and detailed action plans to monitor high-risk recommendations were developed.

C. Accountability component: complaints and response mechanisms

Figure 5:



127. Enabling staff and stakeholders to seek and receive responses for grievances and alleged harm is a critical aspect of accountability. This is the mechanism through which stakeholders can hold an organization to account by querying a decision, action or policy and receiving an adequate response to their grievance. Transparency, internal controls and evaluation processes should be used to minimize the need for complaint mechanisms. Complaints and response mechanisms should be seen as a means of last resort for stakeholders to hold the organization

to account and for organizations to become aware of an issue that requires a response. It constitutes the reactive part of an accountability framework.

128. In terms of accountability, the main stakeholders who would have to file complaints are the staff members of organizations. Access to independent formal and informal grievance procedures inside the organization is inter alia key to rigorous accountability. If staff feel that the grievance procedures are not working or not independent enough, they will not use them, nor will they blow the whistle in the event of misconduct for fear of retaliation.

129. For some organizations, other stakeholders are the beneficiaries of the organization's work. **Some excellent examples were identified of very well structured beneficiary complaints mechanisms, which are outlined in this section.**

130. Effective complaints and response mechanisms should comprise a two-tier system:

a. The first tier is informal. It is often implemented through mediation mechanisms, or an ombudsperson. This is very important when linked to an accountability framework, since it can proactively help in resolving conflicts or situations of misunderstanding between staff and management. It can create a culture of dialogue and prevent the occurrence of potentially damaging issues for the organization. More than conflict resolution, the first tier strongly contributes to conflict prevention.

b. The second tier is based on due process, access to legal representation, to a tribunal, to a fair trial, to appeals and more generally an organization's internal justice system. It also consists of an organization's framework of internal regulations and rules (circulars, bulletins, management notes, etc.) which describe in a more or less structured way the procedures applying to this form of response mechanism.

Benchmark 16: Staff members have recourse to non-formal complaints mechanisms.
Tools:

a. Procedures for non-formal grievances/rebuttals are outlined in a policy document and or handbook
b. A mediator or ombudsperson function is in place

131. Regarding non-formal grievance procedures, the JIU team encountered a variety of implementation levels throughout the United Nations system. Some interviewees did not feel comfortable in setting up non-formal grievance mechanisms, since this would possibly increase the number of petty cases to be dealt with. They also stressed the fact that ombuds services and mediation are very culturally specific (mostly Anglo-Saxon) and would therefore not be applicable to certain duty stations. Also, in times of budgetary constraints, it is very difficult for some organizations to plan for an ombudsperson or mediation mechanisms.

132. Some staff representatives were also very doubtful about the installation of such mechanisms. From their point of view it would weaken the position of staff, who would then have to overcome two different barriers to bring up their case against the organization. They fear that informal mechanisms would become a safeguard for management to discourage staff from bringing a case to the formal level of complaints.

133. The above-mentioned facts are acknowledged, however a well-functioning ombuds or mediation structure inside an organization would help in resolving some smaller issues in staff-management relations. Of course, the ombudsperson has to undergo a very strict selection process and has to be an example in terms of personal integrity and independence from pressure. WFP and the World Bank are two examples worth mentioning in this report, since they have both established ombuds and mediation mechanisms.

134. The World Bank goes even further by having established a special "Compliance Advisor Ombudsman" (CAO) in order to respond quickly and effectively to beneficiary complaints. It reports directly to the President and Board of the World Bank Group. The annual report for 2010[86] is very comprehensive and discloses every case of beneficiary complaint opened by CAO during the year and its status (assessed, settled, ongoing or transferred to compliance). **This practice is an excellent example of the principle of transparency and creating a stronger sense of accountability towards beneficiaries.**

135. In the United Nations, ombudsperson and mediation systems are already in place. The United Nations Ombudsman and Mediation Services are available to United Nations staff world-wide through regional representations.[87] However staff in some regions would have to travel or seek advice from the ombudsperson via phone or e-mail, which is not an appropriate way to deal with confidential and/or personal information. As evidenced in the Report of the Secretary-General on "Activities of the Office of the United Nations Ombudsman and Mediation Services" (A/65/303)[88] and its final paragraph of the document "Building credibility and trust through success", "staff are more likely to be comfortable raising sensitive, potentially serious, issues when they have a direct personal connection with someone and not just a voice at the end of a phone line, or worse, on the other end of an e-mail communication. The credibility of the office would be reinforced through demonstrating this level of commitment to the staff and helping to resolve workplace issues."

136. In the light of the recent "Report of the Office of the Ombudsman for the United Nations Funds and Programmes", staff and management of participating funds and programmes (UNDP and the associated funds, UNFPA, UNICEF and UNOPS) are encouraged to contact this office, since they are a valuable resource to accompany change management processes. According to this same report it is disappointing that the Ombudsman continues "to receive information from visitors across the organizations suggesting that some very senior representatives of management continue to dissuade staff from contacting the Ombudsmen and even threaten punitive action should they do so".[89]

137. This direct or indirect retaliation does not only seem to take place in the case of whistle-blowing as mentioned earlier in this report, but also in some minor cases of bad staff-management relations. In one example which was provided to the Inspector, staff even used false identities to contact the ombudsperson because they were scared of retaliation. **In the Inspector's opinion, this is an example of confusing the role of the ombudsman and the ethics office. The latter is mandated to perform protection from retaliation.**[90]

138. The Ombudsperson, Mediation and Ethics functions are quite new inside the United Nations system and it will take some time for them to become a recognized cogwheel of accountability in the system. It is therefore all the more vital that all participating organizations promote them and give them more visibility by providing them with a clear outline of roles and responsibilities and communicate their presence inter alia through town-hall meetings or information leaflets.[91]

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[86] "The CAO at 10 – Annual Report FY 2010 and review FY 2000-10", World Bank Group.
[87] http://www.un.org/en/ombudsman/contact.shtml.
[88] http://undocs.org/A/65/303.
[89] "Report of the Office of the Ombudsman for the United Nations Funds and Programmes" for 2010.
[90] The Inspector would like to point out that some organizations which will remain anonymous in this report mentioned that fear of retaliation is in fact a reality.
[91] WFP for example has issued a very short leaflet outlining the differences between mediation and ombudsman roles. ILO which established an ethics office and an Office of Mediator has issued "Principles of Conduct for Staff of the ILO" and "The Ethics Office: an Introduction".

<u>Benchmark 17</u>: Staff members, consultants, non-staff, stakeholders/beneficiaries and vendors have recourse to formal complaints mechanisms and organizations have mechanisms to respond to such complaints.

Tools:

a. Investigation function, hotlines, complaints forms etc. for staff and external
b. Grievance mechanisms: United Nations Dispute or ILO Administrative Tribunals
c. Procurement challenges

139. In United Nations organizations staff members who notice failures in internal control are obliged to report such failures and misconduct. Audits and inspections may also bring to light allegations of misconduct. Where the staff members bring such claims varies from organization to organization and is dependent on what kind of claim is being brought forward. Many of the officials interviewed stated that cases of fraud and financial misconduct were investigated by the formal investigation function (where it exists). Harassment and sexual harassment were dealt with by human resources and peer panels. Allegations of retaliation for whistle-blowing were under the scope of the ethics office. Most of the big United Nations organizations possess an investigation function (FAO, IAEA, ILO, United Nations, UNDP, UNESCO UNFPA, UNICEF,[92] UNIDO, UNHCR, UNOPS, UNRWA, WHO, WFP, WIPO) with great variation in the number of investigative staff ranging from one (ILO, UNESCO, WIPO, UNIDO, IAEA, UNRWA) to 93 professional staff in investigations in the United Nations. It is worth mentioning that JIU, as the only independent and external oversight body in the United Nations system, is mandated to perform an investigation function.[93] From an accountability perspective it is important that coherence in investigations is established within organizations to heighten the investigative powers and capacity and ensure due process to staff under investigation. It also strengthens the credibility of investigations, which has a direct impact on the culture of accountability. The investigation function is subject to another review by JIU.

140. When staff members feel that they have been treated unfairly and improperly, or have been the subject of a poor performance assessment, disciplinary or administrative measures, they should have recourse not only to the non-formal dispute resolution systems mentioned above but also to formal dispute mechanisms. The United Nations system organizations are members of either the United Nations Dispute Tribunal (UNDT) or the ILO Administrative Tribunal (ILOAT). Staff members follow established procedures to bring their cases either to ILOAT or UNDT. Staff members and organizations under the jurisdiction of UNDT[94] have a

[92] In UNICEF its Investigation Unit carries out all internal investigations including harassment and sexual harassment investigations.

[93] Chapter 4 of the JIU Statute.

[94] United Nations Secretariat, Peacekeeping and Political Missions, United Nations Offices Away From Headquarters, United Nations Regional Commissions, International Criminal Tribunals, Funds, Programmes, and Other Entities: International Computing Centre (ICC), International Trade Centre (ITC), Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), Secretariat of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), Secretariat of the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), Secretariat of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat), United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD), United Nations System Staff College (UNSSC), United Nations University (UNU), United Nations Volunteers (UNV), United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) (local staff administered by UNDP), UN-Women.

second level forum in the form of an Appeals Tribunal. Staff and organizations under the jurisdiction of ILOAT have narrow possibilities for a review of judgments rendered and it is noted[95] that reviews occur only under exceptional circumstances. The scope of both of these tribunals is limited to staff members and those that have a contractual relationship with the organization if the contract includes such clauses and would not include volunteers, interns and in some cases contractors if their contract does not include such clauses.

141. In the case of contractors in a procurement dispute several organizations (United Nations, UNDP, UNOPS, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, and UNRWA) have established a complaint mechanism known also as procurement challenges or bid protests. This allows vendors who were not awarded a contract to challenge the decisions taken. The JIU Note on Procurement found that, "… most United Nations organizations lack a formal mechanism that allows vendors to challenge their procurement decisions … in the absence of such formal mechanisms the organizations are exposed to the risk of being perceived as partial, handling complaints … depending on who the complainant is".[96] For the sake of transparency it is important that organizations, especially those with high procurement volumes, establish a formal mechanism to allow vendors to challenge procurement decisions.

142. Few organizations have an explicit policy and mechanism to allow beneficiaries/stakeholders to lodge complaints against the organization. Many organizations do have anonymous hotlines (telephone, fax or email accounts) which are available through their public website. However, the Inspector finds that this method may not reach a large number of beneficiaries who may not have access to any communication tools over the internet. **In this area there are good practices in IDB, UNHCR and World Bank which have proactively included a complaints mechanism for their beneficiaries/stakeholders**.

143. UNHCR has placed accountability towards protected persons or persons of concern at the heart of its accountability framework. This is reflected in making sure that beneficiaries (concerned persons) also have access to complaints and grievance procedures. Of the 814 complaints received by the UNHCR Inspector General's Office in 2009-2010, 504 were from refugees and other protected persons.[97] The Inspector General attributes the rise in complaints from refugees to its online complaint system. UNHCR officials reported that the number of complaints from refugees continues to rise. UNHCR officials informed the Inspector that they are working on a system which would allow them to provide information back to the refugees on how their complaints were treated and the outcome. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) is pilot testing a beneficiary complaints mechanism in Haiti with a view to eventually widening the scope worldwide.

144. **The World Bank set up its Inspection Panel in 1993 to receive complaints** from individuals and communities who feel that they were being affected by World Bank projects or concern about World Bank conduct. The individuals and communities can expect mediation or settlement of their complaints by making use of this mechanism. **The Inspector particularly appreciates the information pamphlet developed by the World Bank in 12 languages for distribution in the communities where projects are implemented. This is a**

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[95] Neither Statute nor Rules provide for the review of judgments: according to Article VI(1) of the Statute they are "final and without appeal". They are thus binding on the parties under the res judicate rule. Yet the Tribunal has a limited power of review which the case law defines. Since review is a quite exceptional process, it will exercise its power only in narrowly defined circumstances. From http://www.ilo.org/public/english/tribunal/advice/index.htm.

[96] Procurement reforms in the United Nations system (JIU/NOTE/2011/1), section on Ethics Management and Vendor Issues-Procurement Challenge/Bid Protest System.

[97] Report on Activities of the Inspector General's Office, Report of the Inspector General (A/AC.96/1089), July 27, 2010.

best practice that recognizes that not all beneficiaries would have access to internet websites to be informed of this process and to send in their complaints. Interestingly in a self-evaluation type retrospective of its inspection panel the World Bank noted that the introduction of the inspection panel had not only led to providing individuals affected with a voice but that the Bank staff now pay, "… greater attention within the Bank to compliance with policies and procedures, to supervision, and to how work is done…".[98] This seems to imply that being accountable to the outside world causes staff to feel more accountability than when they are immune to any external complaints. **The World Bank is one of the leading examples in accountability and the various multi-lateral development banks all now have similar mechanisms in place.**

145. **The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) established an Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism (ICIM) in February 2010** following a request from its Board of Executive Directors for **an enhanced mechanism to incorporate the lessons learned** from the complaints received as well as from the accountability mechanisms of other institutions. **ICIM is an independent forum and process to address complaints from communities or individuals who allege that they are or might be adversely affected by IDB-financed operations**. ICIM reflects an institutional commitment to accountability, transparency and effectiveness. In keeping with its commitment to transparency, **IDB goes further and publishes the complaints received (in summary form and protecting confidentiality, if requested) and the organization's response to the complaints[99] on the IDB website.**

146. **The Inspector believes that the cases presented are exceptionally good practices promoting transparency and accountability of the organization not just to the traditional partners but also to their beneficiaries. The Inspector recognizes the cost and resource implications of such mechanisms and measures but would like to recommend to organizations with direct beneficiaries to open their line of communication to their beneficiaries and allow complaints to be made in the true spirit of accountability and transparency.**

[98] The Inspection Panel at 15 Years, p. 110, Inspection Panel World Bank 2009.
[99] See http://www.iadb.org/en/mici/registry-of-cases,1805.html for a registry of cases and their status.

IV. CONCLUSIONS: STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES AND THE WAY FORWARD

147. The review found that for the most part organizations possessed many of the components that make up accountability within an organization. The Inspector finds that huge strides have been made in the last few years and applauds organizations that have taken a proactive attitude towards accountability by developing frameworks and internal policies and guidelines.

148. From a system-wide perspective, similar to the strengths and weaknesses seen for the seven accountability frameworks identified earlier in the report, the system has shown its strength in the areas of internal controls such as control environment and monitoring. Although not all organizations have a formal internal control framework in place,[100] most of the organizations have the basic elements that make up internal controls. There have been advances but more work could be done in the area of risk assessment, information and communication, especially in the area of internal and external communication and complaints and responses, especially of a formal nature.

149. Control activities, especially in the area of alignment between delegation of authority and management responsibilities, could be further improved across the system. In order for accountability to exist a staff member must first be granted responsibility, authority to carry out the assigned duties and finally be held accountable. **If these are not aligned, as the Inspector noted in the report above, there is incoherence and confusion, leading to blurring of the accountability line.** This is seen as a particular weakness in organizations with a big field/decentralized structure where delegation of authority may differ per subject area. Resources continue to be a challenge to the system in implementing these accountability measures. The Inspector also recognizes that the culture of an organization cannot be changed overnight. Without consistent application of discipline and motivation, including rewards, the organizations are currently relying on staff members' personal integrity and ethics to ensure compliance with their internal control regulations and rules. The culture of accountability starts with training and ownership but can only be rigorous with managers setting the tone at the top, bolstered with examples of holding themselves accountable.

150. **The Inspector is heartened to learn that, despite resource constraints, organizations have implemented innovative and creative ways to motivate staff and show their commitment to a culture of accountability. These efforts are recognized and applauded.**

151. Within the limited resources available to the JIU team, the review presented 2 pillars, 5 principles and 17 benchmarks to measure the strength of accountability in an organization and the minimum standards for an accountability framework. The evaluation also identified tools to support the implementation of the standards. The Inspector hopes that these will serve the organizations that are developing accountability frameworks and those which are updating their existing frameworks.

[100] FAO survey to 23 Representatives of Internal Audit Services (RIAS) (16 respondents) found that five agencies fully implemented a formal internal control framework, five are in the process of doing so and six do not yet have plans for implementing a formal mechanism. All agencies which have adopted a formal framework are following the COSO framework. FAO presentation to the 42nd Plenary RIAS meeting 22 September 2011. WFP has formally issued an Executive Director's Circular regarding the Internal Control Framework.

152. The Inspector reiterates that moving accountability from theory to practice requires a strong culture of accountability and commitment to transparency. The present review was mandated to provide a comparative analysis of accountability frameworks/components and was unable to delve into actual empirical experience which would have required more resources and time. The Inspector believes that, to measure the true state of accountability inside an organization, it would be appropriate to conduct an in-depth evaluation on the effectiveness of the accountability framework by measuring how far each of the standards/benchmarks is being implemented. Perceptions forming a large part of culture of accountability, such evaluations should be accompanied by in-depth staff and management surveys. Given the degree of scepticism prevailing and the fact that many of the organizations have never evaluated their accountability frameworks, in part because they are too new, although certain elements such as internal controls are regularly reviewed by internal audits, the Inspector recommends that there should be an evaluation during the next 2-3 years for those organizations which already have an accountability framework and a timeframe of at least 5-6 years for those currently without one in order to test the maturity of the frameworks. Such evaluations should be undertaken by each organization and reported to the legislative bodies as a first step to harmonizing the frameworks through the High Level Committee on Management (HLCM) of the Chief Executive Board (CEB).

The implementation of the following recommendation will enhance coordination and cooperation among the United Nations system organizations.

Recommendation 7: The General Assembly and other legislative bodies should request their executive heads to undertake a follow-up evaluation on the implementation of the relevant accountability frameworks/systems for their consideration in 2015.

Annex I Definitions of accountability from organizational accountability frameworks

• ICSC	• A framework for Human Resource Management Glossary definition of Accountability, August 2001, p. 20: *"Concept which implies taking ownership of all responsibilities and honouring commitments; delivering outputs for which the staff member has responsibility within prescribed time, cost and quality standards; operating in compliance with organizational regulations and rules; supporting subordinates, providing oversight and taking responsibility for delegated assignments; taking personal responsibility for personal shortcomings and, where applicable, those of the work unit."*
• ILO	• Paragraph 9 of IGDS No. 195 notes that ILO framework is based on core principles which inform all accountability policies, *"which are clarity of responsibility; alignment of accountability with organizational–wide goals; delegation of authority; cost-benefit considerations; performance monitoring and reporting, and the highest standards of integrity and ethical conduct."*
• United Nations	• a. A/64/640 Secretary-General's proposed definition, "*Accountability is the obligation of the Organization and its staff members to be answerable for delivering specific results that have been determined through a clear and transparent assignment of responsibility, subject to the availability of resources and the constraints posed by external factors. Accountability includes achieving objectives and results in response to mandates, fair and accurate reporting on performance results, stewardship of funds, and all aspects of performance in accordance with regulations, rules and standards, including a clearly defined system of rewards and sanctions*." b. A/RES/64/259 General Assembly decides that accountability should be defined as follows: *"Accountability is the obligation of the Secretariat and its staff members to be answerable for all decisions made and actions taken by them, and to be responsible for honouring their commitments, without prequalification or exception. Accountability includes achieving objectives and high-quality results in a timely and cost-effective manner, in fully implementing and delivering on all mandates to the Secretariat approved by the United Nations intergovernmental bodies and other subsidiary organs established by them in compliance with all resolutions, regulations, rules and ethical standards; truthful, objective, accurate and timely reporting on performance results; responsible stewardship of funds and resources; all aspects of performance, including a clearly defined role of the oversight bodies and in full compliance with accepted recommendations."*
• UNDP	• "*Accountability is the obligation to (i) demonstrate that work has been conducted in accordance with agreed rules and standards and (ii) report fairly and accurately on performance results vis-à-vis mandated roles and/or plans*." DP/2008/16/rev.1 The UNDP accountability system. Accountability framework and oversight policy.[101]
• UNFPA	• UNFPA Accountability Framework DP/FPA/2007/20, para. 3: "*Accountability is the process whereby public service organizations and individuals within them are held responsible for their decisions and actions including their stewardship of public funds, fairness, and all aspects of performance, in accordance with agreed rules and standards, and fair and accurate reporting on performance results vis-à-vis mandated roles and/or plans. In other words, it means that those in charge of UNFPA programmes, activities and guidance are held accountable for efficient and effective management*."

[101] The framework states that UNDP, UNFPA and UNOPS have agreed that the harmonization of the definitions should be based on authoritative sources and that the key definitions, including that of accountability, are harmonized with UNFPA and UNOPS at the request of the Executive Board. DP/2008/16/Rev.1, para. 2 and para. 3. As can be seen above however, UNFPA does not use the harmonized definition in its framework.

• UNICEF	• Report on the Accountability system of UNICEF E/ICEF/2009/15, para. 2: "*(a) Accountability is the obligation to demonstrate that work has been conducted in accordance with agreed rules and standards, and that performance results have been reported fairly and accurately."*
• UNOPS	• DP/2008/55 para. 16: *(b) Accountability means the obligation to (i) demonstrate that work has been conducted in accordance with agreed rules and standards and (ii) report fairly and accurately on performance results vis à vis mandated roles and/or plans.*
• WHO	• No clear definition of accountability.

Annex II

Overview of action to be taken by participating organizations on JIU recommendations
JIU/REP/2011/5

		Intended impact	United Nations, its funds and programmes												Specialized agencies and IAEA													
			United Nations*	UNCTAD	UNODC/UNOV	UNEP	UN-Habitat	UNHCR	UNRWA	UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	WFP	UNOPS	UNAIDS	ILO	FAO	UNESCO	ICAO	WHO	UPU	ITU	WMO	IMO	WIPO	UNIDO	UNWTO	IAEA
Report	**For action**		☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒
	For information		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Recommendation 1		**a**											E		E		E	E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 2		**f**	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Recommendation 3		**d**	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 4		**d**									E			E	E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 5		**b**	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 6		**b/ o**	E	E	E		E	E	E		E				E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 7		**c**	L																									

Legend: **L:** Recommendation for decision by legislative organ
E: Recommendation for action by executive head
: Recommendation does not require action by this organization

Intended impact: **a:** enhanced accountability **b:** dissemination of best practices **c:** enhanced coordination and cooperation **d:** enhanced controls and compliance **e:** enhanced effectiveness **f:** significant financial savings **g:** enhanced efficiency **o:** other

* Covers all entities listed in ST/SGB/2002/11 other than UNCTAD, UNODC, UNEP, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNRWA.

JIU/REP/2011/6

BUSINESS CONTINUITY IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

Prepared by

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Joint Inspection Unit

Geneva 2011

United Nations

JIU/REP/2011/6
Original: ENGLISH

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United Nations, Geneva 2011

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Business continuity in the United Nations system
JIU/REP/2011/6

Objective

The objective was to review: (a) the existence of business continuity strategies/policies and plans within the United Nations system organizations, identifying commonalities and differences; (b) experiences and best practices relating to their implementation; (c) the liaison and coordination mechanisms among the United Nations organizations in the field of emergency preparedness and business continuity; (d) the functioning and staffing of specialized preparedness and business continuity units for emergency management, including their financing frameworks and funding mechanisms for their operation.

Main findings and conclusions

The report contains nine recommendations, one of which is addressed to the legislative bodies of the United Nations system organizations, seven to their executive heads, and one to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his capacity as the Chairman of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB). Lessons learned from real life events experienced by the United Nations system organizations are offered in chapter IV.

The general level of business continuity preparedness in the United Nations system organizations is well below the recommendations of the relevant international standards. A handful of organizations have started business continuity implementation in a comprehensive way while most organizations are just recognizing it as an issue that needs to be addressed. Only a few organizations have an approved business continuity policy and plan. This results in a lack of knowledge throughout an organization about the purpose of business continuity management and intentions of senior management, which further leads to inadequate political and financial support of Member States.

Different elements of business continuity are handled in isolation rather than holistically. Often, criteria for prioritizing critical functions and staff performing them are missing, resulting in a large number of activities deemed to be critical. In virtually all organizations, recovery time objectives tend to be unrealistically short and when resumption of activities depends on information and communication technology, usually there is an expectation gap between the requirements stated in the business continuity plans and what the information and communications technology (ICT) offices can deliver.

In order to improve the low level of business continuity management in the United Nations system organizations, stronger senior leadership commitment and support of the Member States is required; dedicated human and financial resources need to be allocated; business continuity policies/strategies and plans should be developed and responsibility for implementation of the approved policies/strategies should be assigned. Business continuity plans should be based on risk assessments, identified critical functions and recovery time objectives (**Recommendations 1 and 3**).

Organizations which have dedicated units/persons for management of business continuity have more evolved business continuity management activities. The business continuity

function is housed in different parts of each organization, largely depending on where business continuity as a concept originated. Placing it within security or information technology often results in a piecemeal approach with a heavy focus on that aspect of business continuity. In order to achieve overall coherence in business continuity, business continuity managers should be placed in the office of the executive head or the executive office for management (**Recommendation 2**).

Most organizations lack the human and financial resources at their headquarters to provide adequate guidance and technical assistance in the implementation of business continuity to their field offices. The guidance provided is sometimes prescriptive and bureaucratic, adding more complications than assistance. Cooperation among United Nations entities in the field in terms of business continuity is not very close, although they mostly face the same risks, the impacts of which could be handled jointly and locally. Interaction and exchange of experiences and lessons learned among the United Nations organizations should be improved.

The scope of business continuity plans should be organization-wide and field offices should be provided with tailor-made guidance from their headquarters. There should be a mechanism of overview and control in place to ensure coherence and interoperability of the field offices' business continuity plans with their headquarters and with the United Nations country team. The resident coordinators should overview the knowledge sharing, cooperation and complementarity of business continuity preparedness of the United Nations organizations in their duty stations (**Recommendations 4 and 5**).

Insufficient assignment of responsibility and lack of accountability are damaging successful implementation. Unless a person(s) is held accountable for the ongoing exercise, maintenance, review and update of a business continuity plan, the process will not be kept alive. These tasks should be included in the job descriptions and performance evaluations of line managers and business continuity coordinators (**Recommendation 6**).

General awareness of United Nations staff of business continuity is low. Critical staff are generally able to perform their tasks, mostly through regular telecommuting. However, there are no business continuity career or training programmes offered, even for business continuity managers. Organizations should ensure that business continuity training is incorporated in staff development and induction courses for all staff and that periodic training is provided to critical staff as an integral part of business continuity management (**Recommendation 8**).

Inter-agency cooperation on business continuity issues is weak and of an ad hoc nature. There are economies of scale to be gained from mutual backups, a common approach to business continuity, interoperability of the organizations' business continuity plans, exchange of knowledge and expertise within the system etc. For this, more organized system-wide cooperation and harmonization of practices are required and can be discussed within the HLCM/CEB forum **(Recommendation 9).**

Recommendation for consideration by legislative organs

Legislative bodies of the United Nations organizations should, on the basis of the executive heads' budget proposals, provide the necessary financial and human resources for the implementation, continuous monitoring, maintaining and updating of the approved business continuity plans developed on the basis of the business continuity (BC) policy/strategy of the organization (Recommendation 7).

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ABBREVIATIONS

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
BC	Business continuity
BCM	Business Continuity Management
BCMU	United Nations Secretariat: the Business Continuity Management Unit
BCP	Business Continuity Plan
B-GAN	Broadband Global Area Network
CEB	United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (formerly ACC)
DFS	Department of Field Support (UNHQ)
DM	Department of Management (UNHQ)
DPA	Department of Political Affairs (UNHQ)
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNHQ)
DR	Disaster Recovery
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
DRP	Disaster Recovery Planning
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ERM	Enterprise Risk Management
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
HLCM	UN System High-level Committee on Management
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICT	Information and communication technology
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IT	Information technology
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
RTO	Recovery time objective
SARS	Severe acute respiratory syndrome
SEPT	Senior Emergency Policy Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme

UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICC	United Nations International Computing Centre
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNLB	United Nations Logistics Base
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNWTO	World Tourism Organization
UPU	Universal Postal Union
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WHO/Europe	World Health Organization Regional Office for Europe
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

I. INTRODUCTION

1. As part of its programme of work for 2011, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) conducted a review of business continuity in the United Nations system organizations. JIU has not reviewed the subject matter before. The proposal for the review was submitted by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and supported by 12 United Nations system organizations. The real-life events such as the ones described below are the main reason for the high level of interest in this topic.

2. On Saturday, 27 February 2010, at around 3:00 a.m. local time, Chile was hit by an 8.8 magnitude earthquake. Although the centre of the earthquake lay south of the capital, the impact was felt considerably in Santiago as well. As a result, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) premises suffered some damage, especially the older part of the building where approximately 300, or 50%, of all ECLAC work stations were located. Consequently, ECLAC had to set up temporary work spaces for 300 staff.

3. In Cairo, during the Egyptian "Arab Spring", mobile telephone communication was cut off from 28 to 29 January and internet communication was blocked from 28 January to 2 February 2011. Text messaging was possible in certain places as soon as the mobile network was back on, while in other places, difficulties existed for another 2-3 weeks. Loss of communication traumatized people. Staff were unable to go to their offices due to the curfew and the security situation. The Resident Coordinator, as the Designated Official for Security, based on advice from United Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), decided that non-essential staff and family members should be evacuated.

4. In the past year, areas of Copenhagen have been affected by three floods: in August 2010, on 2 July 2011 and 14-15 August 2011. The flood of 14-15 August 2011 was far more serious than the previous two. The equivalent of more than one month's rainfall fell in two hours. This caused a serious leak on the roof of UN House, which resulted in the flooding of two floors. The severity of the flooding was such that the disaster management company assessed that return to the affected floors would not be possible for at least two months. The heavy rains also caused repeated sewage floods which greatly affected the WHO/Europe office situated in a different building.

A. Objective

5. United Nations system organizations provide essential services for people in different parts of the world. Business continuity and within it emergency preparedness and disaster recovery are issues of growing importance given the circumstances in which the United Nations organizations operate and their reliable, continuous, uninterrupted operation is an important element of the public image of the United Nations system.

6. Business continuity management essentially provides a framework on the basis of which an organization builds its resilience and facilitates the continuation of its operations in the event of disruption of business activities. To minimize the impact of disruptions, in recent years, several United Nations organizations have started developing business continuity plans for their headquarters and centres away from headquarters, including country offices. These plans are aimed at ensuring that United Nations funds, programmes, specialized agencies and IAEA are able to function and fulfil their respective mandates in all circumstances.

7. General Assembly resolution 63/268 stressed the need for a coordinated approach to business continuity management between the United Nations Secretariat, offices away from

Headquarters and the regional commissions, including systematic support, appropriate coordination structures and regular consultations between the business continuity management focal points in New York and in other duty stations. It further stressed the need for the Secretariat to draw upon the experiences of other United Nations entities and to coordinate with host country authorities in formulating the business continuity strategy. The General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to strive for economies of scale through coordination among organizations within the United Nations system on relevant issues.

8. The objective was to review: (a) the existence of business continuity strategies/policies and plans within the United Nations system organizations, identifying commonalities and differences; (b) the experiences and best practices of their implementation; (c) the liaison and coordination mechanisms among the United Nations organizations in the field of emergency preparedness and business continuity; (d) the functioning and staffing of specialized preparedness and business continuity units for emergency management, including their financing frameworks and funding mechanisms for their operation.

B. Scope

9. The review covered JIU participating organizations. In accordance with the internal standards and guidelines of JIU and its internal working procedures, the methodology followed in preparing this report included a preliminary review, questionnaires, interviews and in-depth analysis. Detailed questionnaires were sent to all participating organizations. The Inspectors regret that eight organizations did not provide a response to the JIU questionnaire despite repeated requests (UNODC, UNEP, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, ILO, WMO, IMO, UNWTO). On the basis of 17 responses received, the Inspectors conducted interviews in person or through videoconferences with officials of the participating organizations as well as the Secretariat of CEB. Comments from participating organizations on the draft report have been sought and taken into account in finalizing the report.

10. In accordance with article 11.2 of the JIU statute, this report has been finalized after consultation among the Inspectors so as to test its conclusions and recommendations against the collective wisdom of the Unit.

11. To facilitate the handling of the report and the implementation of its recommendations and the monitoring thereof, annex III contains a table indicating whether the report is submitted to the organizations concerned for action or for information. The table identifies those recommendations relevant for each organization, specifying whether they require a decision by the organization's legislative or governing body or can be acted upon by the organization's executive head.

12. The Inspectors wish to express their appreciation to all who assisted them in the preparation of this report, and particularly to those who participated in the interviews and so willingly shared their knowledge and expertise.

C. Background

13. Business Continuity Management is defined as "a holistic management process that identifies potential threats to an organization and the impacts to business operations that those threats, if realized, might cause, and which provides a framework for building organizational

resilience with the capability for an effective response that safeguards the interests of its key stakeholders, reputation, brand and value-creating activities.[1]"

14. Business Continuity Management (BCM) is strongly related to crisis and incident management, and emergency planning. These approaches however are linked to a specific incident type or an event and do not suggest an organization-wide multi-hazard approach to dealing with threats that might cause them. For example, with H1N1 influenza, officials around the world, not just in the United Nations, adopted specific measures, (quarantining flu-stricken employees, providing contamination prevention information etc.); but their measures would not have ensured the organization's ability to continue with its operations if a significant percentage of its employees had become sick.

15. Business Continuity Management evolved from Disaster Recovery Planning (DRP) related to information and communication technology (ICT). The best known DRP exercise was the expectation of the millennium bug (Y2K). The effort to codify disaster management during the preparation for Y2K resulted in several standards, which focused exclusively on ICT management and systems recovery. Disaster Recovery Planning resulted in the formation of professional societies, institutes and professional accreditation programmes. Soon it became clear that entire organizations, not just their data, needed protection, because information technology (IT) continuity does not warrant business continuity; it is a subcomponent of BCM, but it does not guard against non-IT threats.

16. The continued occurrences of major disruptive events, such as natural disasters and terrorist attacks, widened the scope of disaster and contingency planning to continuity planning first in the private sector and later in the public sector. Several major standards on business continuity were developed. Today, business continuity is largely defined by the following internationally used standards, all of which offer a definition of business continuity management based on the definition from BS 25999:

(a) BS 25999, Business Continuity Management, Part One: Code of Practice (2006) and Part Two: Specification (2007)[2]

(b) ISO 22399, Societal security – Guideline for incident preparedness and operational continuity management (2007)[3]

(c) ASIS SPC.1-2009, American National Standard, Organizational Resilience: Security, Preparedness, and Continuity Management Systems – Requirements with Guidance for Use (2009)

(d) ASIS/BSI Business Continuity Management Standard, Requirements with Guidance for Use (2010)[4]

17. Business Continuity Management exists within the larger context of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM); however, unlike ERM, which identifies, assesses, evaluates, prioritizes and controls risks across an organization, BCM deals with the consequences of business interruption. Usually, interruptions are caused by low likelihood, high impact risk of a

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[1] BS25999-1, British Standards Institute, Code of practice for business continuity management.
[2] A Management Guide to Implementing Global Good Practice in Business Continuity Management, by the Business Continuity Institute is based on BS 25999.
[3] ISO 22301, Societal security – Business Continuity Management Systems – Requirements is a new standard under development expected to be published in 2011.
[4] Based on BS 25999 Part 1 and 2.

catastrophic nature (so-called black swans). Managers realized that scenario analysis, which leads to development of pre-designed response activities, can help in dealing with the aftermath of increasingly frequent natural disasters, pandemics, utility outages, unavailability of data, information and communication means etc.

18. The field of BCM is constantly evolving; some practitioners are already dealing with organizational resilience, which they view as a larger concept. For them, business continuity is a response planning mechanism that concentrates on recovery of business operations, so it is reactive, while organizational resilience incorporates procedures and processes to reduce the risk of disruptive events actually happening, so it is proactive.

19. For the purpose of this report, the Inspectors do not wish to advocate usage of one standard over the others or to focus on the difference between business continuity and organizational resilience. The Inspectors are pleased that some organizations are embracing the concept of organizational resilience; however, the fact is that most United Nations organizations are just recognizing the importance of business continuity planning and are at the very beginning of the process. In the Inspectors' opinion, those organizations should put the basics in place first: business continuity practices in an organization have to reach a certain level of maturity before an organization can plan for strengthening its resilience. In reaching this stage, any BCM related standard coupled with the experience of other United Nations organizations will offer a good stepping stone.

D. Business Continuity in the United Nations

20. The Chief Executive Board for Coordination, in its Conclusions of the fourth session of the High-level Committee on Management[5] stated that planning for Y2K and the events of 11 September 2001 had brought to light a number of concerns relating to organizations' preparedness to meet emergencies and to put business back on track after catastrophic events. The report identified the United Nations Secretariat, UNICEF and UNDP as organizations which had advanced furthest in terms of emergency preparedness.

21. Attacks against the United Nations began to become more frequent in the new millennium. The tragic events in Baghdad and Algiers contributed to the introduction of robust security standards within the United Nations system. The threats of SARS and avian influenza clearly showed the need for pandemic preparedness. These tragedies and crises, together with a resurgence of natural disasters, exposed the organizations' vulnerabilities and resulted in first attempts to deal with business continuity in the United Nations. A brief system-wide survey carried out by CEB in October 2007 on the existence, content, structure and types of scenarios covered by the Business Continuity Plans for Financial Operations[6] showed that emergency preparedness and business continuity plans for financial operations had been developed by most organizations in an effort to address a pandemic situation (United Nations Secretariat, ILO, UNESCO, WHO, UNDP), and by some to address different levels of emergency (UPU, IAEA and UNFPA). Only UNICEF appeared to be on the way to developing a full business continuity plan.

22. The General Assembly noted a piecemeal approach to business continuity in initial reports of the Secretary-General[7] and requested a comprehensive review covering all business continuity activities, including those related to pandemics and other kinds of emergency

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[5] CEB/2002/5
[6] CEB/FB/2007/INF.1
[7] A/62/328,

planning and disaster recovery and business continuity in the area of ICT (A/62/7/Ad.2 and A/RES/62/238).

23. The more frequent occurrences of utility outages, natural disasters, bomb attacks on United Nations offices, H1N1, etc. showed that focus on pandemic preparedness, security or financial operations only was not sufficient and that business continuity management involved a holistic, multi-hazard approach. Today, generally speaking, United Nations organizations increasingly recognize the importance of business continuity planning, but it still remains a challenge for most of them to position it as a valuable part of organizational governance. Organizations have not yet moved from managing business continuity as a programme to embedding it into everyday managerial culture.

24. The degree to which BCM in the United Nations system organizations exists is very varied. Based on the responses received and interviews carried out by the Inspectors, it is evident that large organizations, or organizations with operational or verification type of activity (United Nations Secretariat, UNICEF, UNDP, WFP, UNOPS, IAEA) are at a more advanced stage of business continuity management than others. Small organizations and organizations with normative mandates are less developed in BC terms. A number of organizations are in the process of formulating their business continuity approach and basic structure of its management (FAO, UNFPA, WIPO, UNIDO, ICAO).

25. The fact that an organization does not have a formal business continuity management programme in place does not mean that important elements of business continuity do not exist. Security of personnel and premises and emergency notification systems in all organizations received attention through the United Nations security systems and standards. Medical emergency preparedness became important with pandemic threats. Information and communication technology has well established backup procedures and disaster recovery plans due to the nature of the services they are providing and generally accepted best practices in that field. However, all these initiatives exist in isolation, without overall coherence. The aim of business continuity management framework is to ensure that all individual initiatives complement and strengthen each other.

26. The Inspectors asked all participating organizations to perform a self-assessment of how mature their BCM programmes are. Based on the results in annex I it is evident that only a few of the organizations have a comprehensive framework for BCM in place and have started its implementation. The United Nations Secretariat assessed itself at the highest level of maturity, meaning that their BCM is managed. UNFPA, UNICEF, UNOPS and UNIDO evaluated their BCM as incomplete, while UNDP, WFP, FAO, UNESCO, ICAO, WHO, ITU, WIPO, UPU and IAEA are at an interim stage. The Inspectors believe that these assessments in some cases are overstated compared to the Inspectors' findings from interviews with the officials of these organizations. Furthermore, the Inspectors have reason to believe that the organizations which did not respond to the questionnaire have either limited or unmanaged BCM.

II. BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME

A. BUSINESS CONTINUITY STRATEGY AND POLICY

Recommendations from international instruments[8]

27. The BCM policy is the key document that sets out the scope and governance of the BCM programme and reflects the reasons why BCM is being implemented. It provides the context in which the required capabilities will be implemented by BCM teams and identifies the principles to which the organization aspires and against which its performance can be audited. It is a short, clear and to-the-point statement signed by the most senior management, which drives the BCM programme. It provides a high-level overview of BCM objectives and expectations.

28. The BCM policy is owned by the most senior management of the organization; it is driven from the top, strategic level. To be effective, the policy has to be communicated to the entire organization and its stakeholders. To ensure that the policy is aligned with management's strategic vision and the organization's goals, it should be reviewed on an ongoing basis. Having a BCM policy is a foundation for successful BCM. It provides motivation for middle management and staff to complete the necessary activities.

Situation in the United Nations system organizations

29. Among the United Nations system organizations, there are just a handful which have an approved BC policy or strategy: United Nations Secretariat, UNDP, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNOPS, FAO, UPU and WHO. Some of the approved policy documents are not complete, do not contain all of the above-mentioned essential elements and communication to or involvement of the stakeholders is rare. There are organizations, such as WFP, IAEA, and WIPO, which are developing BCM, but do not have an approved policy document. The Inspectors found that not having a policy statement results in lack of information and knowledge throughout an organization about the intentions and purpose of BCM. This further results in inadequate political and financial support of Member States and insufficient attention on the part of middle management.

30. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of business continuity management programmes across the United Nations system organizations.

Recommendation 1

The Executive Heads of the United Nations system organizations who have not done so yet should develop business continuity policy/strategy, including the assignment of business continuity management with responsibility for implementation, to be submitted for information to the legislative bodies.

[8] The Good Practice Guidelines 2010, A Management Guide to Implementing Global Good Practice in Business Continuity Management, the Business Continuity Institute; http://www.thebci.org/gpg.htm

B. BUSINESS CONTINUITY MANAGEMENT

Recommendations from international instruments[9]

31. Clearly defined roles, responsibilities and authorities to manage the BCM programme and process throughout the organization are established in the BCM policy. A member of senior management should be given overall accountability for the organization's overall BCM capability. This will ensure that the BCM programme is given an appropriate level of importance within the organization.

32. Business Continuity Management is an iterative process, which needs to be actively managed. Initially, BCM can be managed using a programme management approach, but as BCM matures, it should be embedded in the organization's managerial culture. Implementing a BCM programme involves: raising awareness in the organization; collecting various data to determine the activities which need to be continued to support organizational objectives; developing plans to respond to and measures to mitigate the impact of incidents that might occur; and exercising contingency plans. Additionally, in the case of organizations with field offices, coordination and overview of BCM activities of those offices is necessary.

33. A critical success factor in the management of BCM programmes is dedication of human and financial resources. The senior management of an organization should appoint a competent person/team/unit to lead, oversee and manage the programme and they should ensure that adequate financial resources are provided to them. Equally critical is the placement in the organizational structure.

34. Whether the BCM function will be the responsibility of a whole unit, small team or a part-time/full-time individual depends on the size of an organization. The roles and responsibilities of these individuals should be included in their job description and their performance evaluated in the appraisal process. They should have appropriate training and in the case of large organizations, professional certification may be desirable.

Situation in the United Nations system organizations

35. There is a very mixed picture regarding the assignment of responsibility for management of BCM programmes in the United Nations system organizations. There are organizations which have a dedicated person or unit, some where a dedicated person performs BCM related activities in conjunction with other responsibilities, some that have a person appointed on a provisional basis, others that are in the process of making the appointment, and others that do not have anyone assigned for this purpose.

[9] *Ibid.*

Dedicated person/unit	United Nations Secretariat: the Business Continuity Management Unit (BCMU) situated in the office of the Assistant Secretary-General for Central Support Services, Department of Management, comprises a P5 Chief, P4 BC Specialist and G5 Administrative Assistant[10]
	UNICEF: a P4 Business Continuity Manager, situated in the office of the Director of Emergency Programmes, was until September 2011 supported by a P2 BC Analyst and GS-4 Administrator
	UNDP: a P4 BCM Advisor is placed in the Security Office/Bureau of Management reporting to the Director of Security Office, Bureau of Management
Part-time responsibility	UNFPA: a P5 Senior Adviser, Enterprise Risk Change Management and Business Continuity, is responsible for the development of the BCM programme
	UNIDO: a P5 Senior Security Coordinator is responsible for BCM
	UNOPS: a P5 Chief of Security through a D1 Director of Corporate Support Group reports to the Executive/Deputy Executive Director
	UPU: a P5 Postal Security Manager is responsible for BCM
	WHO: One technical officer is in charge of BCM on a short-term, part-time basis
	IAEA: Central Security Coordinator, P5, situated in the office of the Deputy Director General of Management, is tasked with the establishment of an overall IAEA disaster recovery/business continuity plan. Additionally, a cost-free P4 expert is soon to be hired
	WIPO: a D level Chief Information Officer is responsible for developing BCP with the involvement of a part-time consultant
	ITU: a P3 Executive Officer, in the Office of the Secretary-General, is in charge of reviewing the ERM & BCM processes
Provisional appointment	WFP: A senior BCM consultant was hired to work with a BCM Working Group, comprising the BC focal points from each of the WFP HQ Divisions, on the formulation of a BCM Programme. The Working Group is chaired by the Director of Emergencies.
	FAO: Internal Audit is the initial catalyst for BC activities at FAO, which will, after putting in place a BC mechanism, transfer the responsibility for BCM to a new unit to be created or an already existing one.

[10] Additionally, Departments for Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support (DPKO/DFS) within the Office of the Under-Secretary-General, have a P4 Organizational Resilience Officer, who is supported by one Administrative Assistant in conducting business continuity functions. They report to a P5 Focal Point for Security.

36. When the above table is compared with the self-assessments in annex ii (albeit overstated as already earlier noted) it is evident that organizations which have dedicated units/persons for management of BCM programmes have more evolved BCM activity than organizations which do not. When responsibilities and accountability are clearly defined, individuals have a strong sense of ownership of the activities they are required to perform.

37. The Inspectors noted that in most organizations, business continuity related issues are still dealt with in silos; for example, IT deals with business continuity in isolation from security, finance, emergency planning etc. This is mostly due to lack of a comprehensive vision and insufficient knowledge about an integrated approach to BCM.

38. The placement of a BCM manager in an organization is equally varied. It partly depends on how BCM came to be introduced: if the catalyst has a security/IT/risk management background, often that individual becomes the BCM manager and the responsibility is placed in the office that that individual already professionally belongs to. The Inspectors found that the BCM manager's role could be influenced by his/her background and experience as well as by his/her placement in the organizational structure; BCM managers might see security/IT/risk management as the key issue and neglect others. Furthermore, their direct responsibility in security/IT/risk management does not extend to the entire organization. This may be an issue for sustainability of the BCM programme.

39. The Inspectors found that when BCM managers are placed in the office of the Executive Head or the Deputy for Management and Administration, it is easier to achieve overall coherence and harmonization of different components of business continuity. Placing BCM in the office of the Executive Head also sends a message from the top about the importance the senior management gives to BCM.

40. All those interviewed by the Inspectors agree that the commitment of higher management is crucial for successful implementation of BCM in any organization. The importance of BCM in organizational governance increases when there are events that obviously show its benefits (see the case studies of Santiago de Chile, Cairo and Copenhagen in paragraphs 98-110), but the commitment is more challenged when operations run without unplanned interruptions for a longer period. In such circumstances outside impetus such as stronger formulation of member States expectation or system-wide managerial "messages" from the CEB machinery contribute to increasing commitment by high-level leadership to BCM. The history of the evolution of particular elements of the business continuity shows that when such impetus existed (e.g. security aspect of the BC, pandemic preparedness) it resulted in high responsiveness of the leadership of the individual organizations of the United Nations system. **In the Inspectors' view, in order to improve the low-level BCM situation in United Nations system organizations, stronger senior leadership commitment and support of Member States is required; such outside impetus is needed to stimulate changes towards a holistic handling of BCM.**

41. The commitment of management or lack thereof is at its most obvious in the budgetary proposals made to the governing bodies. Most organizations manage to finance BCM activities through ad hoc budgetary decisions and not through approved budgetary allocations. However, BCM constantly competes with other organizational priorities and if an organization does not have to deal with any incidents for a long time, it is easy for the management to forget about the value of BCM. BCM is one of the first items to experience budget cuts, especially during a period of reducing management-related expenditure reductions due to budgetary restraints. It is reflected in the fact that, besides the United Nations Secretariat, which has a dedicated BCM Unit and budget comprising mostly staff costs, only IAEA, ITU, UNOPS and WFP have proposed budget allocation for BCM in their

2012-2013 budget proposals. However, the Inspectors find it contradictory that most organizations they visited reported commitment by senior management to BCM.

42. The Inspectors find this alarming. They would like to point out that successful implementation of BCM does not require a significant investment (except for IT investment, which is not usually budgeted as a BC allocation). The investment is larger at the beginning of BCM implementation and more so in terms of staff time than monetary investment. However, small but sustainable financial resources are necessary to perform the required activities of testing, updating and monitoring. If the investment is not sustained, the BCM programme will suffer in quality, or completely end, which would mean that the human and financial resources already invested would be wasted (see recommendation 7).

43. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance control and compliance with business continuity policies/strategies of the United Nations system organizations.

Recommendation 2

Executive Heads should place business continuity management in the office of the executive head or the executive officer for management.

C. BUSINESS CONTINUITY PLANNING

Recommendations from international instruments[11]

44. The BC Plan is a central pillar of BCM. It is a documented collection of procedures and information that have been developed, compiled and maintained in readiness for use in an incident, to enable an organization to continue to deliver its important and urgent activities at an acceptable predefined level. The term Business Continuity Plan implies having a single document, but in practice, it usually consists of multiple plans corresponding to five stages of the BC cycle: emergency response, incident management, continuity, recovery and resumption.

45. Traditionally, organizations used to have a Crisis Management Plan, Security Plan, IT Disaster Recovery Plan, Medical Response Plan, Pandemic Plan etc. The Business Continuity Plan comprises these individual plans, which need to be integrated and viewed holistically in order for an organization to be able to deal with the multitude of risks it faces.

46. Before the BC Plan can be developed, the senior management of the organization has to take a position, on the basis of the organizational strategy, on which services or products of the organization are to be delivered as a priority in the event of interruptions, so that the organization is capable of fulfilling its mandate. This is followed by identification of the business units and activities which support delivery of those services/products. This will determine the scope of BCM. Limitation of BCM scope is a strategic decision. If a particular service/product is chosen to be continued, then it is necessary to ensure that various activities supporting its delivery can be continued or recovered within required timescales. Dependencies on suppliers and partners should also be considered.

47. The purpose of the process, called Business Impact Analysis, is to document, for each critical activity, the impact over time that would result from its loss or disruption and the maximum amount of time that an organization can afford to exist without that activity, i.e. the time within which the activity has to be resumed, the so-called recovery time objective (RTO).[12] Furthermore, the critical staff necessary to perform critical activities are to be identified and adequately trained on the use of the BC Plan and any accompanying software and equipment.

Situation in the United Nations system organizations

48. Of the United Nations system organizations, only a few have developed, approved and signed BC Plan: the United Nations Secretariat, UNOPS, UNICEF, UPU,[13] IAEA and FAO. Several organizations have their plans drafted, but not yet approved or are working on the development of their BC Plans: OHCHR, UNDP, WFP, UNESCO, WIPO, UNIDO, WHO, UPU, ICAO and UNFPA.

49. The Inspectors became aware of efforts by some organizations which are in the early stages of BCM development to benefit from the experience and knowledge of organizations which are in the more advanced stages. For example, WFP, FAO and ICAO are consulting with the United Nations Secretariat in their BCM development process. These relationships

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[11] *Ibid.*

[12] RTO is usually measured in hours, i.e. activities to be resumed in 0-4, 4-24 hours.

[13] The UPU business continuity plan was approved by their governing body in 2010; however, the plan has not yet been signed or entered into force.

depend on personal and informal contacts; however, there are no formal channels of communication for exchange of practices; the existing relationships have weak institutional frameworks. The need for enhanced cooperation among the United Nations system organizations was highlighted to the Inspectors in each interview. (see more details in paragraphs 111-116)

50. The Inspectors reviewed multiple BC plans and noted that organizations often assess common risks when identifing critical functions and determining the RTOs. This implies that having a forum in which organizations could share and compare their assessments and templates would be beneficial.

51. Many organizations already have an established risk management function, and maintain a corporate risk register, so threat assessment may already be available. However, the Inspectors noted that risk assessments for BC purposes are often not handled within the already existing risk management frameworks of the United Nations organizations. In some organizations, the Inspectors were informed that services of consultants would be procured for this purpose, although these organizations already have an established risk management function. The Inspectors are not only concerned about the cost of such services, but the quality of products that some consultants deliver based on their limited understanding of the United Nations operating environment. **The Inspectors stress that internal organizational expertise should be used first and that it should be complemented with the knowledge already existing in the United Nations system**.

52. While there is no prescribed frequency for performing risk assessments for BC purposes, the Inspectors are concerned that many organizations rely on their initial assessment although the environment in which they operate has changed. If the risk assessment is not performed periodically, the recovery and resumption strategies put in place for critical activities based on the outdated risk assessment can become ineffective.

53. The Inspectors found in several organizations that criteria for prioritizing the critical functions and the staff performing them are missing, resulting in a large number of activities/staff deemed to be critical. Criticality is often taken out of context and misinterpreted: i.e. if one is deemed not to be critical, this might result in budgetary cuts. Because of this, recovery time objectives are frequently too short; for example, in several organizations, recovery of the management of duty travel (not medical, emergency or evacuation travel, but regular duty travel) or performance of oversight activities are stated as critical, to be achieved in 0-4 hours after an incident, whereas, clearly, the reputation of any of the United Nations organizations would not be at risk if these activities were not resumed in the first four hours.

54. Virtually all activities rely on software applications, which means that for performance of activities required to be resumed in 0-4 hours, the related applications need to be available immediately; usually this also means that remote access to those applications is required. The Inspectors observed two issues: (a) some processes can be executed using manual workarounds, however, workarounds are not considered by many organizations; (b) in almost all organizations that have their BC Plans drafted there is an expectations gap between what the users state as required and what their ICT offices can deliver. The Heads of ICT offices in virtually all organizations emphasized that reconciliation between expectations and ICT capabilities has to be performed, meaning that further integration of their IT business continuity and disaster recovery plan and BC Plan for the organizations is necessary.

55. In many organizations, the senior management has not decided which organizational services/products have to be delivered under all circumstances. As a result, middle and

operational management are making this decision on their own, making it more of a bottom-up then top-down approach. Strong corporate-level priority setting is missing and causing excessive and contradictory selection of critical activities/staff/applications from different units in an organization. It is important to understand that, theoretically, all functions could be treated as critical, all activities could be resumed in the first four hours, and all applications could be made available immediately. This would, however, have prohibitive cost implications. This is precisely why activities, staff and applications performing and supporting them need to be prioritized.

56. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of business continuity planning in the United Nations system organizations.

Recommendation 3

The Executive Heads of the United Nations system organizations who have not done so yet should develop and approve a documented business continuity plan based on a risk assessment, identified critical functions and recovery time objectives.

Geographical scope of a Business Continuity Plan

57. The United Nations Secretariat's Policy Statement on Business Continuity Management applies to all departments, offices and units of the United Nations Secretariat, offices away from Headquarters and regional commissions in Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi, Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Beirut and Santiago. BC Plans exist at departmental level and are overseen and monitored by the Business Continuity Management Unit. However, the BC Plans in the regional commissions and offices away from Headquarters are very uneven and inconsistent. The Inspectors noted that for effective BC activity in locations away from headquarters, cooperation with BCMU in New York, and also with other United Nations entities in the duty station is required. The major obstacle to this cooperation is different levels of BCM development in organizations at the same duty station, the inadequacy of allocated human resources and lack of professional contact among the organizations. **In the Inspectors' view, dedicated human and financial resources need to be allocated; interaction and exchange of experience and lessons learned among the United Nations organizations should be improved.**

58. The Departments of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Field Support (DFS) (United Nations Secretariat) have commenced a long-term programme of developing business continuity capabilities in peacekeeping and political missions. They have established a small, two-person team, which apart from covering their salaries, does not have a budget. The unit operates like a service provider: the team's activities are financed by DPKO and Department of Political Affairs (DPA) missions for which they provide training and support on BC issues. The Inspectors noted close cooperation between the DPKO/DFS team and BCMU/DM. Large missions take the DPKO/DFS team to their sites to assist and facilitate the missions in developing their BC plans and to deliver BC-related training to their personnel. The plan development and training always includes mission staff, police and military components. For smaller missions, group training is organized once a year at UNLB in Brindisi. Training is evaluative and each mission's BC focal point is required to draft the BC Plan for his/her mission upon completion of the course. Subsequently, missions' BC focal points receive support from the team in establishing, monitoring and updating their BC capacity in the field.

59. The Inspectors would like to see other parts of the United Nations Secretariat, which also have field presence, benefiting from this training, namely OCHA, OHCHR, UNHCR and UNRWA. Furthermore, when training in large missions is organized, other organizations

present in that location could be included, for instance when training is delivered at MONUSCO, all agencies present in the DRC should be invited to participate, at least as observers. Sharing knowledge and experience not only helps with the establishment of business continuity in different parts of the organization, but also promotes the use of similar approaches and practices.

60. UNICEF, UNDP, WFP, UNOPS and WHO are also organizations with BC Plans for field offices. **In some cases, there is a weak link between the BC Plans of headquarters and field offices and also unclear division of responsibility between the headquarters and the field.** Organizations which have a significant number of large field offices usually lack human and financial resources at the headquarters to provide adequate guidance or technical assistance to them. In the case of UNICEF and UNDP, there is one BCM manager who simply cannot be stretched far enough to assist and perform technical overview of BCM work at a large number of field offices. Organizations whose field offices are small usually do not provide any guidance from headquarters to them and leave them to work out their BC capability with United Nations country teams (i.e. UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, FAO). The latter approach raises questions concerning the viability of a genuine BC Plan covering the organization as a whole.

61. The Inspectors also noted that sometimes the guidance provided to field offices is so prescriptive and bureaucratic that it makes the implementation of BCM for field offices more complicated. It becomes a burden, an exercise that has to be performed to satisfy the headquarters, rather than a practical tool that the office could use in case of an incident. **The Inspectors are of the opinion that, while guidance and technical assistance are necessary, the size of the office and the local conditions in which it operates should be considered. The headquarters should allow some flexibility for field offices to be able to use BCM to their advantage**.

62. During their interviews with country and regional offices of some organizations, the Inspectors noted that the cooperation among the United Nations entities in the field in terms of business continuity is not very close, yet they all face risks of largely the same incidents, the impacts of which could be handled jointly and locally. United Nations country teams cooperate well in the field of security and safety aspects of crisis management, but the Inspectors think that their cooperation should be enhanced and improved in other areas of business continuity. **Resident Coordinators should play a catalytic role in creating a forum for cooperation of BC focal points of all organizations at the duty station.**

63. In a few cases, the Inspectors noted that BC Plans cover the risks associated with major partners and suppliers. Business continuity literature suggests that this be done and the Inspectors agree that partners and suppliers should be considered, i.e. in terms of procurement or by organizations which rely heavily on outside partners. For example, WFP operates in emergency situations due to the nature of their primary business. In order to provide their services, they depend on and interact with a number of partners in the field. They realize that their business continuity plan cannot be solely internally focused, because their operational continuity is dependant on cooperation with others. Inspectors were pleased to note that WFP organized a meeting with all its partners in May 2011 to discuss field interdependency.

64. The implementation of the following recommendations is expected to enhance coordination and cooperation within and across the United Nations system organizations.

Recommendation 4

Executive Heads should ensure that the scope of business continuity plans of the United Nations system organizations includes their field offices. Overseeing and control mechanisms should be in place to ensure the coherence and interoperability of the business continuity plan with the headquarters and the United Nations country team, where appropriate.

Recommendation 5

The Secretary-General should ensure that the Resident Coordinators oversee business continuity preparedness of the United Nations organizations present in their duty station with a view to enhance knowledge sharing and identify possible areas of cooperation and complementarity.

Implementation of business continuity plan

65. There are not many United Nations system organizations which have reached the level of implementation of an approved and comprehensive business continuity plan. Inspectors found very little documentation on the experiences of the implementation of BC Plans and naturally it was subject to very few audits, mainly carried out at UNDP, the United Nations and UNESCO. Due to limited resources, the Inspectors were unable to gain in-depth insight into the implementation at the level of individual organizations or field offices, but the issues the organizations/field offices were facing are described below:

(a) Maintaining the interest and awareness of staff and middle management to continue working on BCM, especially in places where no incidents have occurred for a long period of time.

(b) Lacking human and financial resources to sustain operability of the previously developed and approved BC plan.

(c) Developing long, detailed and bureaucratic BC plan templates, which are not user friendly, especially for small offices in large organizations.

(d) Missing or insufficient control and accountability for BCM activity.

(e) Lacking clear oversight responsibilities for BCM activities in the field offices.

(f) Lacking continuous or periodic training of staff.

(g) Experiencing planning fatigue in offices away from headquarters and the field because BCM activities are not handled in a comprehensive way (emergency plan, security plan, IT BC/DR plan, pandemic plan etc.)

(h) Not deciding on alternate locations or devolution/transfer of business processes, in particular for major emergency situations.

D. EXERCISE, MAINTENANCE, REVIEW AND UPDATING

Recommendations from international instruments[14]

66. A series of exercises are recommended under all business continuity standards to ensure that the business continuity management programme and plan are operational. When deciding on the frequency or type of exercise to perform, consideration should be given to the complexity of the organization and its plan, and the complexity, risk and cost of performing an exercise. Without exercises however, an organization cannot say whether its BCM capability is reliable.

67. Regular maintenance will ensure that the organization remains ready to manage incidents despite constant changes in personnel and the circumstances and environment in which an organization operates. BCM maintenance should be a part of an organization's normal management process. The process should include identifying changes in critical activities and processes that support them, technology, people, and general operating environment.

68. It is a good practice to have a schedule of frequency for how often each part of the BC Plan needs to be updated: monthly, quarterly, annually etc. Maintenance is also required any time a major change occurs, after an exercise or after an audit recommendation. A review of a BCM programme can be performed through a self-assessment or an audit. Whichever type of review is conducted, it should start with the BCM Policy. Since exercise, maintenance, review and updating ensure that the BCM capability is reliable, adequate personnel should be assigned responsibility for it and should be held accountable for it.

Situation in the United Nations system organizations

69. Given that most organizations in the United Nations system are at the beginning of BCM, the activities described above are more plans for the future rather than something that has already been achieved. However, one can look at previously developed programmes such as those developed for avian flu and pandemics to see that generally maintenance, review and updating were not given adequate attention or resources. By letting these plans become outdated they were allowed to become obsolete and this basically resulted in a longer term waste of the originally invested resources.

70. The Inspectors noted similar problems in the case of BC Plans: they saw plans with outdated lists of staff and their contact information, which reflected the old rather than the current organizational structure. This is also evident from the findings in audit reports (UNDP, UNESCO) which recommend that management ensure ongoing exercise, monitoring, and oversight.

71. The United Nations Secretariat Headquarters, UNICEF and UNDP field offices the Inspectors visited put in considerable efforts to regularly test and update their BC Plans. A series of exercises, trials and simulations is being planned and performed at different levels. At the same time, it is to be noted that at some headquarters and a large number of field offices, previously approved BC Plans were not implemented or updated. The UNDP audit report prepared in 2010 stated that this is the case in more than 50% of the field offices in Africa.[15]

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[14] The Good Practice Guidelines 2010

[15] UNDP, OIA report 2010, issue 11, Corporate issues: weaknesses in business continuity management

72. The IAEA BC Plan includes a clearly defined schedule for the update process, detailing every critical update to be undertaken in a year, a time frame and standard procedures according to which updates should be performed. Although no regular updates had been performed since the approval of the plan, the Inspectors consider that this document could be a useful tool for other organizations when they embark on the development of their own procedures for reviewing and updating their BC Plans. As the BC Plans will be implemented in a growing number of organizations, the BCM managers and the internal audit should have a closer look into this area.

73. In addition to budgetary difficulties, inadequate assignment of responsibility is also a reason for lack of implementation. Experience has shown that unless a person(s) is held accountable for the ongoing exercise, maintenance, review and update of the BC Plan, it will not be performed regularly. These tasks should be included in the relevant job descriptions and personal appraisal system of line managers and the BC coordinators at different levels. The availability of human resources and their accountability is of key importance.

74. The implementation of the following recommendations is expected to enhance accountability and efficiency of business continuity management programmes across the United Nations system organizations.

Recommendation 6

Executive Heads should ensure that business continuity planning and implementation form part of accountability and performance evaluation of line managers.

Recommendation 7

Legislative bodies of the United Nations organizations should, on the basis of the executive heads' budget proposals, provide the necessary financial and human resources for the implementation, continuous monitoring, maintenance and updating of the approved business continuity plans developed on the basis of the organization's BC policy/strategy.

E. TRAINING

Recommendations from international instruments[16]

75. Professional literature on business continuity highlights the importance of the human factor for successful BC in any organization. As one of the first considerations in developing a BCM culture, organizations need to assess the level of awareness of BCM and compare it to the desired level to identify the training needs for the staff at large. There should be a hierarchy for delivering training to different groups of staff. Staff with no particular responsibility for BCM do not need the same level of training as critical staff. The more understanding of BCM and its benefits senior management has, the more appetite they will have for it and the more likely it is that they will actively support its implementation.

76. BCM managers should benefit from continued professional development. As awareness about BCM in an organization increases, BCM managers will be facing increased. These demands have to be met with an appropriate response. Additionally, BCM is developing relatively fast. There are always new lessons to be learned from the industry and BCM managers should have access to them.

Situation in the United Nations system organizations

77. Across the United Nations, it appears that awareness is higher in offices that have been affected by man-made and/or natural disasters which have interrupted activities. Awareness also appears to be stronger in field locations than in headquarters offices. This is likely because headquarters offices are principally in locations considered less exposed to risk. As seen in different cases, however, these offices are not immune to interruptions, e.g., earthquake, storms and power outages in New York; power outage in Vienna; heavy rainfalls and floods in areas of Copenhagen, to name just a few.

78. Presently, the United Nations staff at large are mostly aware of security and safety issues, but there appears to be low awareness of business continuity. Further efforts are needed in this regard. The Inspectors think that it is possible to complement methods of raising security and safety awareness with a BC related component. Organizations which are just developing their BC Plans and those which are in the process of updating theirs should include methods and techniques for increasing BC awareness. This can be done through inclusion of a BCM component in induction training and periodic refresher courses. This is already done in some organizations, but the Inspectors noted that no organization measures the level of its staff's awareness. The Inspectors did not find any sign of BC related training in the activity of career or training programmes which are offered in major United Nations centres. Training and raising awareness does not need to be confined only to the traditional teaching methods. Sharing knowledge via internet and intranet sites, internal and external training, newsletters and e-learning, workshops and performance of BCM exercises are just some of the forms in which education on BCM can be delivered.

79. The Inspectors found that at the time of adoption of a BC Plan, the critical staff identified were generally prepared to perform their tasks in the post-crisis period. Most of their training and practice takes place through telecommuting. However, as the Inspectors noted previously, maintenance and updating of BC plans is an issue. With frequent staff changes, different persons from those noted in the actual plan perform the critical functions. Part of the review

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[16] *Ibid.*

and updating process should be not only to update the names of critical staff but to address their preparedness to perform their functions. There should be clear accountability for ensuring that happens.

80. The Inspectors noted that there is a lack of continued training for BC managers. Considering that an increasing number of the United Nations system organizations are developing and implementing BCM, having a common approach to training of BCM managers is of great importance. The United Nations Secretariat generously transfers its knowledge to BC managers in other organizations. It is working with the World Bank on developing e-modules for BCM (BCM for managers, BCM for staff, BCM for procurement etc). All of these materials are being developed with an agency-neutral approach so that they can be used by others. However, there is no awareness about these initiatives in the system. Against this background, the Inspectors think that a more formal inter-agency cooperation structure would provide a forum where such initiatives could be discussed for the benefit of the United Nations system organizations (see recommendation 9).

81. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the efficiency of BCM programmes across the United Nations system organizations.

Recommendation 8

Executive Heads should ensure that business continuity training be incorporated in the career and staff development courses, including induction training, and that periodic training be provided to critical staff in the organizations as an integral component of business continuity management.

III. SAFETY AND SECURITY AND ICT ELEMENTS OF BCM

Safety and security and business continuity

82. Safety and security services play an important role in business continuity management, in particular in the first phase of incident management. Their role is absolutely essential in protecting human life and assets, emergency preparedness, evacuation, and operation of the emergency notification systems. The foundations of the United Nations security system are Minimum Operating Security Standards, Minimum Operating Residential Security Standards and the system of Designated Officials. There is an established Inter-Agency Security Management Network under which security issues, policies, procedures and practices are reviewed and monitored. Their activities, coupled with the safety and security circumstances under which United Nations organizations operate, has resulted in the allocation of significant financial and human resources and cooperation among the practitioners in different duty stations.

83. The Inspectors noted that the safety and security side of business continuity activities is well organized, documented and communicated to the staff even in the organizations in which BCM has not been developed. This might be the reason why in some organizations the office in charge of safety and security has been made responsible for BCM (UNDP, UNIDO, UNOPS, UPU, and IAEA). Notwithstanding the importance of safety and security in BCM, a business continuity management programme has a significantly wider scope. Therefore, it is difficult to handle the non-security related aspects of BCM if BCM is managed from the office in charge of safety and security. The same is true for ICT services, which is a host for BCM in some organizations.

84. The Inspectors are of the view that BCM should not be handled by security or ICT services; however, BCM should work closely with security and ICT services (see paras. 36-38 and recommendation 2).

Information and communication technology and business continuity

85. Continuity of services provided by information and communication technology is an important part of an organization’s overall business continuity capability. Although it is necessary to have a separate IT business continuity/disaster recovery plan (IT BC/DR), this forms a part of the overall BC Plan of an organization. Organizations rely more and more on availability of IT applications, information, and data in order to perform their activities. An organization is more resilient if it does not lose its information or data or access to it during disruptive events, which is why more resources are invested in IT today than before.

86. As usage of information technology has developed in the United Nations system organizations so has the attention paid to IT BC/DR. Significant investments were made, although in some organizations, important planned measures were postponed or suspended due to budgetary constraints. The creation of ICT Network under the UN System High-level Committee on Management (HLCM) is also a sign that the significance of information technology has increased in the United Nations. **The Inspectors think it would be important for this network to discuss and identify best IT BC/DR practices.**

87. Once an organization’s requirements have been identified, ICT can consider whether it can provide this service and at what cost. It is important to determine what infrastructure supports which applications and which applications support which business processes. When critical business processes are determined, the recovery time objectives can be determined.

Some of the most important practices in ICT which have a direct impact on business continuity are as follows:

Keeping backups and a secondary data centre

88. It is often wrongly thought that once an organization determines which information is needed in the first 24 hours after an interruption occurs and action is taken to have it backed up, that this information is available in less than 24 hours. Having a backup of vital information and having quick access to it are two different issues.

89. Standard backup procedures are in place in most United Nations organizations; there are application backups, incremental daily data backups, full weekly backups, and primary and secondary data centres. From an information security point of view the links can be encrypted at low cost, which was not possible before. Access to a viable secondary site is critical to ensure data replication and recovery. The best practice is to have the secondary data centre geographically distant from the primary. There are organizations which do not have a secondary data centre, because they consider that building one would be a significant investment. Instead, they use the United Nations International Computing Centre (UNICC).

90. The Inspectors raised the question of whether all United Nations organizations should use UNICC: the views of ICT professionals are divided. Some think that if everyone were to use UNICC the exposure of the entire system to the risk of being dependent on the same service provider would be high. Others feel strongly that UNICC should be used by all because it is a private United Nations cloud which provides for confidentiality and diplomatic immunity for data. The latter group argues that, in view of the cost of the service that UNICC provides and of the cost of that service being organized internally by each United Nations entity, no single entity would be able to achieve the same level of service in accordance with the rules of best practice at the same cost as UNICC. Regardless of which solution an organization favours, maintaining data and personnel in the same location increases the security risk.

Inexpensive and reliable connectivity (communication system)

91. During the Egyptian “Arab Spring”, mobile telephone communication was cut off for one day and the internet was blocked for almost a week. For a while, landlines were the only form of communication. VHF radios were relied on for some time, but this radio system, because it is linked to the police and military, was cut off too. Critical staff in some organizations were provided with USB modems, but since these modems use the GSM network, like mobile phones, there was no connectivity. Some organizations used V-Sat equipment, others relied on the Broadband Global Area Network (BGAN). Those who had it realized how important this investment was.

92. All organizations affected by the above events realized that, technologically speaking, there are solutions for establishing communication capabilities independent of the host government; the question is how much they cost. In the Inspectors’ view, all organizations need to consider the risk of total communication shutdown and determine how they would deal with it. Egypt-based United Nations system organizations, through their local ICT network, are developing a proposal for their senior management team for an inter-agency communication solution. They believe that a common solution would offer economies of scale and that by combining their resources and assets they can improve the situation for everyone. The Inspectors encourage such initiatives in other duty stations.

Remote connectivity

93. Working and access to information and data independent of location is key to continuity of operations. Most United Nations system organizations are using telecommuting for everyday work. In some organizations, this capability was developed because of work-life balance policies or because of the need to deal with influenza threats, in others simply because organizations outgrew their working space, but all of them use it for business continuity purposes. In the Inspectors' view, this is one area where the most impressive development had taken place.

94. In virtually all organizations, employees are able to access their e-mail accounts via webmail if they have connectivity to the internet. Most organizations provide Citrix licenses or similar solutions to their critical staff to access their desktops and applications. The Inspectors were told that once an organization changes the method of charging for the cost of Citrix licenses the demand for them reduces, i.e. when the cost is included in the budget of ICT offices, the demand for them seems to be higher than when the cost is charged directly to the offices which are using them. The Inspectors recognize that the budgetary modalities should promote the efficient use of operational resources but point out that a situation should be avoided whereby operational or budgetary considerations are implemented without examination of the impact of these measures on the BC capability of the organization.

95. Organizations need to ensure that their critical staff know how to connect remotely to their systems in the occurrence of an event that would warrant this. The solution is to use them frequently. Telecommuting is a good way to achieve this. Additionally, an exercise during which all critical staff would be telecommuting at the same time should be performed to stress-test the systems. Some organizations simply test remote connectivity to their e-mail system. This is not enough. The exercise should require that critical staff access all applications and perform all of the tasks they would be asked to perform in a real-life situation in order to identify and resolve any issues. It is imperative that all levels of staff participate in this exercise. The Inspectors were told that the highest levels of management most often do not have the time for exercises, which is unfortunate, given the level of involvement that would be required from them in a real-life situation.

96. Generally speaking, people telecommute whenever they are travelling on business. The benefits of telecommuting are indisputable. The United Nations organizations located in New York frequently experience so-called "snow days" when staff are advised to stay at home. This is just one example of when telecommuting is used in New York and reportedly it is working well for all New York-based organizations. Rome-based organizations have had similar experiences during events causing considerable traffic problems., In the past year, Copenhagen has had three floods due to heavy rainfalls and each organization affected relied on telecommuting until alternative solutions could be found. In Cairo, once connectivity was regained, staff were advised to work from home due to security concerns. In Santiago de Chile, remote working capability was used by ECLAC in the first days after the earthquake.

97. Telecommuting assumes that a telecommuter has the necessary equipment. Some organizations are moving towards using laptops with docking stations instead of desktops, others allow for the staff to use their personal equipment from home. There are pros and cons to each approach and each organization has to determine for itself which is the most suitable for its purposes. **It is the Inspector's view that when an organization is deciding on its IT development projects, including remote connectivity and procurement of hardware, BC related aspects of these decisions should be considered.**

IV. LESSONS LEARNED FROM REAL LIFE INCIDENTS

98. In addition to simulations, exercises and tests that should be performed on a regular basis in order to improve the BC Plan, real-life events offer the best possible potential for lessons learned. Documented lessons learned are a valuable source of information for organizations which are less advanced in BCM and for organizations which face similar risks. The Inspectors interviewed representatives of the organizations affected by the following events.

Earthquake in Santiago de Chile

99. ECLAC invested in pandemic preparedness, which was later expanded with the assistance of BCMU into comprehensive BC preparedness. Just a couple of weeks **before the earthquake, BCMU visited ECLAC to assess the level of BC preparedness. They assisted ECLAC in conducting a crisis response and a telecommute test with critical staff.** After-earthquake response was considered good from the business continuity point of view. The fact that the BC Plan existed and included a pre-designed scenario on action to be taken, and that the training of critical staff was conducted, contributed significantly to the adequate response of management and critical staff and to the quick resumption of ECLAC activities. The Crisis Management Team and the Security Management Team had their first meetings within 10 hours and the necessary decisions on the safety and security of the premise and assets were taken. Critical staff (i.e. IT, procurement, transportation and financial services) started working remotely and from the provisional alternative working spaces. After 48 hours ECLAC was able to start humanitarian relief, including providing some support to the host country. The following are some of the lessons learned from experience:

(a) The Crisis Management Team needs to quickly agree during the first hours of a crisis on who should be allowed on the premises that are otherwise closed for normal business and the decision needs to be clearly communicated to everyone involved, to avoid for example sending away important external personnel.

(b) Having an internal and external communication strategy and ensuring that staff are familiar with the communication protocol is essential.

(c) Cell phones and/or landline service will likely be unavailable or inconsistent; alternative strategies are required and various means of communication (social media, private e-mail, MSN Messenger, Skype, etc.) should be used.

(d) Staff should be proactive in reporting back to their organization to enable all staff to be quickly accounted for.

(e) Roles and responsibilities of staff holding key administrative and support functions should be clearly defined in the business continuity plan and/or crisis management manual to avoid duplication of efforts and confusion.

(f) Mainstreaming of telecommuting practices throughout the organization, including usage of laptops with docking stations instead of desktops, implementation of paperless processes, and storing of critical documents on shared drives greatly facilitates business continuity.

The Egyptian Arab Spring

100. The BC preparedness of the offices of United Nations organizations in Cairo varies. UNDP, WFP and UNICEF offices in Cairo had BCP plans but not all of them had been tested

by the time of the events. The WHO Regional Office has not finalized its BC Plan yet although certain elements of it were in place. The duty station level of coordination basically covered the safety and security aspects based on crisis management by DSS while the other critical functions and processes were handled individually by each organization. After the evacuation, which was organized and executed without major problems, the critical staff continued to work reduced hours (due to the curfew) in their offices in Cairo and after the reestablishment of the IT connectivity from their homes. The necessary managerial decisions to minimize the impact of the events were taken but in some organizations ad hoc decisions were required since there were no planned scenarios in all offices. The interviewees did not report major difficulties to the Inspectors in performing the limited scope of critical functions; even some of the evacuated staff could work remotely. Staff mentioned that the main issue was the interruption of communication between the United Nations offices and limited pre-designated backup among them for continuation of certain functions.

101. The following are lessons learned communicated to the Inspectors in interviews with Cairo-based agencies:

(a) Not having cash on hand was the biggest challenge. The banks closed for a while and when they opened again, they limited the amount of cash each person/organization could take out at one time. Cairo-based organizations are now looking at a solution that will satisfy frequent audit recommendations that not too much cash is kept idle, but also to have enough on hand should a similar situation occur.

(b) Connectivity was an issue for most organizations because they relied on local suppliers. Backup communication systems should exist, but this does not mean that each agency has to have independent capability. United Nations country teams should have a United Nations-wide solution, so that all agencies can benefit from each other's capabilities and assets.

(c) When all other communication fails, face-to-face communication through the established system of wardens is the only way to account for staff and to keep in touch.

(d) Devolution plans may well be in place, but the most important thing is that the people who are assuming the functions of the affected office need to know what to do and do not need to be told that they need to assume them. This is because the affected office could be in a complete blackout, unable to communicate, and the people assuming their functions will have only the broadcast news to act upon.

(e) Having access to critical documents is vital. All critical documents need to be available in electronic format and stored on shared drives at an off-site location.

Floods in Copenhagen

102. The floods affected each organization differently. The UN House in Copenhagen hosts 5 different organizations with 427 staff: UNDP (175), UNFPA (56), UNOPS (187), WFP (6) and IOM (3). WHO and UNICEF have their offices in another location.

103. UNDP had to relocate while the other organizations were less affected or not affected at all. UNDP in Copenhagen provides, inter alia, human resources services to 5,000 staff around the world; therefore, constant ability to communicate with the rest of the world is of critical

importance. Relocation meant physically moving 75 landlines. Because there was no other solution, while these lines were being relocated, all 75 were diverted to one telephone in one meeting room, which meant that only one call at a time could be handled. Private numbers of individuals working from home could not be given out due to privacy rules. Skype was used as an alternative way of communicating.

104. At UNDP, services were seriously slowed down and delayed, but due to the remote working capability of the staff there was no major interruption of services and work could be continued from home and from the provisional alternate location. The alternate location was not pre-designated; it was provided through an ad hoc decision by the insurance company liable for the UN House. Post-crisis experience shows that more attention needs to be paid to handling the psychological impact on staff.

105. The WHO Copenhagen office (WHO/Europe) is located in the vicinity of a sewage pumping station, which was built four-five years ago. In the last year, when there were heavy rains, WHO/Euro experienced three sewer floods. The floods were of major proportions: offices in the basement and ground floor were flooded, cars in the parking lot were completely covered in water and destroyed. Sewer floods are not only unpleasant and a health hazard, but since sewage waters contain heavy chemicals, they cause rapid corrosion of electrical installations and any metal infrastructure.

106. At the time of the first flood on 14 August 2010, the WHO office had no BC plan and needed to rely on improvised action. The lack of pre-designed scenarios and procedures in spite of the high morale and professionalism of the staff greatly impacted WHO/Europe operations. Major difficulties arose from the lack of updated chain of command, collapse of communication system, lack of updated emergency contact details (staff, HQ and host country), weak IT capability in emergency situations, lack of accessible documentation on electrical and other infrastructure of premises and lack of allocated financial resources.

107. After the first flood it was decided that development of a BC Plan for WHO/Europe was necessary. The established working group developed a comprehensive plan which contains immediate actions and tasks to be performed in the framework of the future implementation of the BCP, including scenarios for different types of interruption. This work was still ongoing when the WHO/Europe Office was flooded for the second and third times. During the interviews, the Inspectors were informed that the preparedness and the response of the management and the staff were significantly better compared to the earlier situation although the magnitude of the disaster was greater. The existence of a pre-designed scenario, the improved emergency response capability (i.e. updated notification change, improved IT connectivity, and clear prioritization of the critical processes), increased awareness and, obviously, the previously gained practical experience ensured a better response to the disruption of activity although the BC Plan was not yet finalized and its comprehensive implementation could not be started. The Inspectors noted the determination of management to continue strengthening their BCM, including the allocation of financial and human resources.

108. The following are lessons learned communicated to the Inspectors in interviews with Copenhagen-based agencies:

(a) Having a BC Plan is imperative. Training the staff on BC is essential. Having simple one page checklists that can be used in a crisis is practical and helpful.

(b) An updated chain of command has to exist. When an event occurs quick decisions need to be made and the person making the decisions has to be empowered and not second guessed.

(c) The importance of ICT is significantly greater than imagined when just planning and preparing for an event.

(d) Investing in a "Single Number Reach" telephone system would allow staff to redirect their incoming calls to multiple phone numbers, which would be invisible to the caller, i.e. staff could divert their work calls to their home or mobile numbers making it easier for customers to contact them without publicizing their private numbers.

(e) Most of the United Nations organizations are to move into a new centre in 2013 which is now already under construction. It is therefore timely to initiate inter-agency consultation of the organizations concerned on BC related issues for the new premises.

109. The Inspectors found that after Santiago and Copenhagen events, experience, reaction and lessons learned were analysed and partly incorporated into the business processes and/or BC plans. At the same time, no specific funding is planned for maintenance and updating of BC plans in Santiago. In Cairo, there were no reports on lessons learned four months after the events. Professionals from different networks (IT, finance, security) discussed the experiences among themselves, but no decisions on the required changes to BC plans were made.

110. The Inspectors are disappointed that in some cases lessons learned are not documented, because they will fade with the passage of time. **When a BC plan has to be activated, the experience, reaction and lessons learned have to be reviewed and analysed by the Executive Heads and Resident Coordinators with a view to improving the BC plan and future BC capability at headquarters and at country level**.

V. INTER-AGENCY COOPERATION

111. Inter-agency cooperation is an absolute necessity if the United Nations system organizations want to optimize the cost and achieve a reasonable level of business continuity. Certain elements of business continuity plans may differ from one organization to another given their specific mandates and the types of activities they perform. However, close programmatic cooperation of the United Nations organizations and their interdependence call for a common approach. Working together may result in economies of scale. Furthermore, if different organizations approach business continuity in a similar way they will be able to serve as a backup for each other for business continuity purposes.

112. The Inspectors found that only very initial attempts were made to deal with business continuity on a system-wide basis. With the exception of the work of security and ICT networks and the CEB survey on business continuity plans for financial operations, there were no other initiatives towards institutionalizing inter-agency cooperation.

113. Cooperation among BCM units at headquarters level varies from duty station to duty station. There is a Senior Emergency Policy Team (SEPT) in New York comprised of Executive Heads of New York-based funds and programmes. Their interaction in essence is inter-agency coordination and cooperation. The contacts at the level of BCM managers, however, are loose. This is possibly caused by the different levels of maturity of BCM in these organizations. UNICEF and the United Nations Secretariat regularly cooperate, but the involvement of UNDP and UNFPA is weak. UNFPA recently drafted its BC Plan based on the templates developed by the United Nations Secretariat, but it is too early to judge whether this interaction will last. The major obstacle for close cooperation of UNDP with others is the uncertainty and hesitancy on how to handle BCM in UNDP HQ. In other duty stations, such as Geneva and Vienna, inter-agency cooperation is limited mainly to security aspects. Although informal contacts regarding business continuity exist, long-lasting cooperation needs a driving force.

114. In recent years, BCMU/United Nations Secretariat has provided technical assistance with business continuity planning upon ad hoc request to FAO, WFP, WHO, and ICAO. This was achieved through sharing their knowledge and templates. This helped with developing a similar BCM approach in some cases and it was a generally inexpensive way of providing initial training to BCM managers in those organizations. UNICEF and the United Nations Secretariat are developing good practice guidelines for the United Nations system organizations. The Inspectors commend these efforts, but recognize that they are personality driven without strong institutional backup; therefore they do not cover all United Nations system organizations.

115. The Inspectors think that it is in the interest of the United Nations organizations to establish a forum to discuss and strengthen common approaches to BCM. Possible frameworks for such cooperation can be developed under harmonization by HLCM of business practices. Some of the benefits would be:

(a) Raising awareness of higher leadership and stakeholders about BCM;

(b) Improving and sharing the knowledge of the early implementers of BCM with beginners;

(c) Developing a common BCM approach which will enable organizations to help each other in crisis situations, especially in the field, and developing

common best practice guides, templates, maturity models, training modules etc.

(d) Providing a platform for common thinking on the future orientation of BCM in the United Nations system, i.e. building a resilient organization

116. The implementation of the following recommendations is expected to enhance the coordination and cooperation of BCM programmes across the United Nations system organizations.

Recommendation 9

The Secretary-General, in his capacity as the Chairman of CEB, should direct that business continuity issues be put on the agenda in the harmonization of business processes of the framework of HLCM/CEB with the aim to develop and approve maturity models for business continuity preparedness, business continuity plan templates, and good practice guidelines designed for the United Nations organizations.

Annex I

Overview of the BCM in the United Nations system organizations based on the responses to the questionnaire

Organization	BC Policy approved	BC Plan		Scope of the Plan includes locations away from HQ	Processes for maintenance and update of BCM are in place			
		Approved	Under development		Exercise	Maintenance/ Update	Training of critical staff	Training of all staff
United Nations Secretariat	√	√		√	√	√	√	√
UNDP	√		√	√	√	√	√	√
UNOPS	√	√		√	√	√	X	√
UNFPA	X		√					
UNICEF	√	√		√	√	√	√	X
WFP	X		√	√	√	√	X	X
FAO	X	√		X	√	√	√	X
UNESCO	X		√	X				
ICAO	X		√		X	X	X	X
WHO	√		√	√				
UPU	√	√		X	X	X	X	X
ITU	X							
WIPO	X		√					
UNIDO	√		√					
IAEA	X	√		√	√	√	X	√

√: Yes, X: No

Annex II
Self-assessment of business continuity maturity by organizations

Level of Maturity	Description	United Nations	UNRWA	UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	WFP	UNOPS	FAO	UNESCO	ICAO	WHO	UPU	ITU	WIPO	UNIDO	IAEA
Managed	Processes and procedures standardized, fully compliant, undertakes training and testing, fully funded. Key threats and risks identified. Fully supported by management and all information up to date.	√															
Incomplete	Business Continuity Management (BCM) and Disaster Recovery (DR) fully integrated into business, fully funded, regular Business Impact Analysis (BIA) & Risk Assessment (RA) is undertaken, DR processes included in IT projects, training and testing undertaken, small silos of information. Awareness increasing.				√	√		√								√	
Interim	General recognition of need for BC&DR, initial planning being undertaken. Awareness beginning to increase, limited funding. Starting to identify threats, Risk Analyses, some support from Chief Information Officer.			√			√		√	√	√	√	√	√	√		√
Limited	Low recognition of BC and DR plans. Minimal action. Limited support by management, no funding. Only general backup plans, little training or information, silos of information. Vulnerable.		√														
Unmanaged	Lack of processes, minimal level of awareness, no centralized approach, no funding, no training, no risk management, BC not recognized and /or supported by Management, limited compliance.																

Remarks of the organizations on their self-assessment

- UNDP: Overall BCM is between Incomplete and Interim. ITDR is more advanced in terms of standardized processes and procedures.
- UNOPS: Given its recent development, still require the “training and exercise” component.
- UNICEF: As an organization, UNICEF is increasingly operating in an environment that is experiencing a series of global crises such as have not been experienced in living memory. The organization is now coming to terms with new global threats including food uncertainty, energy

security, mass migration and climate change. The challenge for BCM within UNICEF will be to try and maintain the correct level of capacity and resources to take forward the Business Continuity Management programme in order to enable the organization to become more resilient. This is not an easy task as, in common with many other organizations, funding is still tight due to the consequences of the worldwide financial crisis. The priority for UNICEF's organizational resources will, of course, remain to ensure that our core commitments to the children of the world are fulfilled. In spite of these constraints UNICEF has still been able to make some limited progress and move forward with BCM.

- WFP: WFP has made significant advances in operational and contingency planning. It is now moving towards a more coherent business continuity strategy and the notion of organizational resilience.
- FAO: FAO is in the final stages of implementing a BC management process. Once the Framework Plan and new responsibilities are formally approved, we expect to progress quickly to the next levels.
- WHO: General recognition of need for BC&DR, initial planning being undertaken. Awareness beginning to increase, Funding not yet identified, therefore not allocated. Starting to identify threats, Risk Analyses, Clear support of DAF and IT.
- UPU: Need to bring documents and training to UPU staff. Funding for training will need to be identified.
- IAEA: IAEA has expended considerable effort and resources in the area of Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery. An overall IAEA plan and Department-specific sub-plans exist that would guide IAEA in the event of a disaster. In particular, the IT components of DRI have been actively updated and strengthened in recent years. In the coming year, IAEA is undertaking a renewal of its overall business continuity planning; this renewal effort will be informed by lessons learned in previous planning efforts, including the following lessons learned:

  - The governance model for business continuity will include the update and refresh mechanism for the plan itself, thus avoiding the "create/stabilize/get out-of-date/recreate" cycle of previous Business Continuity planning.

  - Assignment of long-term "ownership" for the BCP to an organizational entity (a position, not a person) should be part of the overall governance improvement, to ensure that updates of the BCP continue even after the departure of any specific individual.

  - IAEA needs to ensure that appropriate funding for BCP is secured to complete the renewal project and, in particular, to maintain the BCP, including periodic tests and updates.

ANNEX III

Overview of action to be taken by participating organizations on JIU recommendations
JIU/REP/2011/6

		Intended impact	United Nations, its funds and programmes											Specialized agencies and IAEA												
			CEB	United Nations*	UNODC	UNEP	UN-Habitat	UNHCR	UNRWA	UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	WFP	UNOPS	ILO	FAO	UNESCO	ICAO	WHO	UPU	ITU	WMO	IMO	WIPO	UNIDO	UNWTO	IAEA
	For action		☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒
	For information		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Recommendation 1		**e**		**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**
Recommendation 2		**d**		**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**
Recommendation 3		**e**		**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**
Recommendation 4		**c**		**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**
Recommendation 5		**c**		**E**																							
Recommendation 6		**a**		**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**
Recommendation 7		**g**		**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**
Recommendation 8		**g**		**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**
Recommendation 9		**c**	**E**																								

Legend: **L:** Recommendation for decision by legislative organ
E: Recommendation for action by executive head
Recommendation does not require action by this organization

Intended impact: **a:** enhanced accountability **b:** dissemination of best practices **c:** enhanced coordination and cooperation **d:** enhanced controls and compliance **e:** enhanced effectiveness **f:** significant financial savings **g:** enhanced efficiency **o:** other

* Covers all entities listed in ST/SGB/2002/11 other than UNODC, UNEP, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNRWA.

JIU/REP/2011/7

THE INVESTIGATION FUNCTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

Prepared by

M. Deborah Wynes
M. Mounir Zahran

Joint Inspection Unit

Geneva 2011

United Nations

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Original: ENGLISH

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The investigation function in the United Nations system
JIU/REP/2011/7

This review follows up on two previous JIU reports on oversight, "Strengthening the investigations function in United Nations system organizations" and "Oversight lacunae in the United Nations system". The objective of the review is to provide recommendations leading to system-wide coherence and harmonization among the oversight mechanisms of the United Nations system in discharging their responsibilities with regard to investigations.

Main findings and conclusions

Significant progress has been made in strengthening the investigation function in the United Nations organizations in the past decade. However, notwithstanding the overall progress achieved, problems remain.

The Inspectors found that in a number of United Nations system organizations responsibility for investigations continues to be fragmented. As a result, investigations are being conducted by non-professional investigators and/or entities. Some of the most serious consequences of a fragmented function are that the individuals conducting the investigation are not independent but are a part of management and that there is an uneven application of investigation standards within the organization.

Problems remain also with the independence of the internal oversight entities in discharging the investigation function:

- No oversight entity is free to decide its own budgetary requirements; the budget remains the subject of scrutiny and control by functional managers and ultimately by the executive head.
- The heads of internal oversight entities do not enjoy full operational independence as they do not exercise full managerial responsibility and control over their human resources.
- There is a risk, because of mobility issues, that investigators could be negatively influenced or even manipulated in performing their duties by individuals who may become their direct supervisors or play a role in their future career advancement.
- In some organizations no investigation can be opened in the absence of the executive head's explicit approval or specific instruction.

In managing investigations, the Inspectors found that:

- Other entities in the organizations where the function is fragmented do not apply the same professional standards and guidelines to the investigations they are conducting.
- Although all the organizations' internal oversight entities rely for guidance on the Uniform Guidelines for Investigations, the manuals and methods used vary significantly from organization to organization.
- There is no institutionalized forum on the discharging of the investigation function in the United Nations system.
- There is no separate allocation for investigations in the oversight budget of some

organizations.

- The majority of organizations lack consistent and effective follow-through on the investigations conducted.

Recommendations

Most of the recommendations are for the executive heads to implement and address the problems found by the Inspectors. Of particular note is the recommendation addressed to the United Nations Secretary-General requesting that he establish an inter-agency task force under the auspices of CEB that will develop options for the creation of a single United Nations system Investigation Unit by the end of 2013 for presentation to legislative bodies. This ultimate consolidation of the investigation function into a sole United Nations entity would benefit small agencies without investigative capacity, harmonize business practices, result in common standards and procedures in conducting investigations, resolve independence issues, result in hiring only professional investigators, allow staff promotion opportunities as well as address fragmentation issues, etc. The Inspectors recognize that this will be a difficult and very complex undertaking but are confident that, if addressed positively by all parties, attendant problems can be overcome and the benefits to the organizations and their staff will be significant.

Recommendations for consideration by legislative bodies

- **The legislative bodies of United Nations system organizations which have not yet done so should direct their executive heads to ensure that internal oversight entities or investigation units are authorized to initiate investigations without the executive head's prior approval**.

- **The legislative bodies of United Nations system organizations should review the adequacy of resources and staffing of the investigation function on the basis of the recommendations of the respective audit/oversight committees either annually or biennially depending on the organizations' budget cycle.**

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ABBREVIATIONS

AUD	Office of the Inspector General
CEB	United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination
CII	Conference of International Investigators
DFS	Department of Field Support
DIOS	Department of Internal Oversight Services
DM	Department of Management
DOS	Division of Oversight Services
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSS	Department of Safety and Security
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IAIG	Internal Audit and Investigations Group
IAOD	Internal Audit and Oversight Division
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IGO	Inspector General's Office
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
IOO	Internal Oversight Office
IOS	Internal Oversight Services
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
OAI	Office of Audit and Investigations
OHRM	Office of Human Resources Management
OIA	Office of Internal Audit
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
OS	Oversight Service
PPS	Professional Practices Section
SRR	Staff Regulations and Rules
TCC	Troops Contributing Country
UNAT	United Nations Appeal Tribunal
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDT	United Nations Dispute Tribunal
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNOPS	United Nations Office of Project Services
UN-RIAS	Representatives of internal audit services of United Nations organizations
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNWTO	World Tourism Organization
UPU	Universal Postal Union
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

I. INTRODUCTION

1. As part of its programme of work for 2011, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) conducted a review of the investigation function in the United Nations system. The review, suggested by both the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and JIU, follows up two previous JIU reports on oversight "Strengthening the Investigations Function in United Nations System Organizations"[1] and "Oversight lacunae in the United Nations system".[2] The investigation function serves as an important component of internal oversight contributing to the system of governance established by Member States. It also forms a critical component of accountability frameworks as it is an integral part of the formal mechanism to assure individual and organizational integrity as well as accountability for decisions taken, actions or omissions committed.

2. The objective of the review is to provide recommendations leading to system-wide coherence and harmonization among the oversight mechanisms and actors of the United Nations system organizations in discharging their responsibilities with regards to investigations. The review covers the United Nations, its funds and programmes, the United Nations specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In accordance with the internal standards and guidelines of JIU and its internal working procedures, the methodology followed in preparing this report included a preliminary desk review, questionnaires, interviews and in-depth analysis. Detailed questionnaires were sent to participating organizations. On the basis of the responses received, the Inspectors conducted interviews with officials of participating organizations and also sought the views of a number of other international organizations and private sector experts.

3. In contrast with the oversight lacunae report, the Inspectors have not indicated whether the JIU suggested standards have been met by those organizations that have established an investigation function. Based on interviews and further research, the Inspectors concluded that defining a common standard now is problematic given the nature and complexity of the investigation function in the United Nations system organizations, current caseloads, the very different business practices among the agencies and the still-evolving function in many organizations. At this stage, there is no "one size fits all". The Inspectors acknowledge the "spikes" in the caseloads over the last several years due in large measure to the increased emphasis by organizations on encouraging reporting of suspected wrongdoing. The Inspectors are hopeful, however, that there will be an eventual decrease in investigation caseloads with the institution/reinforcement of accountability frameworks, the establishment of ethics offices, and better dissemination of codes of conduct and staff regulations and rules (SRR) contributing to an enhanced awareness by all staff of what constitutes acceptable conduct.

4. As normal practice, comments from participating organizations on the draft report have been sought and taken into account in finalizing the report.

5. In accordance with article 11.2 of the JIU statute, this report has been finalized after consultation among the Inspectors so as to test its conclusions and recommendations against the collective wisdom of the Unit.

6. To facilitate the handling of the report and the implementation of its recommendations and the monitoring thereof, annex IV contains a table indicating whether the report is submitted to the organizations concerned for action or for information. The table identifies those recommendations relevant to each organization, specifying whether they require a

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[1] JIU/REP/2000/9.
[2] JIU/REP/2006/2.

decision by the organization's legislative or governing body or can be acted upon by the organization's executive head and the internal oversight and/or investigation unit head.

7. The Inspectors wish to express their appreciation to all who assisted them in the preparation of this report, and particularly to those who participated in the interviews and so willingly shared their knowledge and expertise.

II. DEFINITIONS

A. Investigation and types

Investigation is a legally-based and analytic process designed to gather information in order to determine whether wrongdoing occurred and if so, the persons or entities responsible.[3]

8. Paragraph 2 under "General Principles" of the Uniform Guidelines for Investigations, which apply to all investigations conducted in the international public sector,[4] stipulates that the purpose of an investigation is to examine and determine the veracity of allegations[5] of corrupt or fraudulent practices as defined by each institution including with respect to, but not limited to, projects financed[6] by the organization, and allegations of misconduct on the part of the organization's staff members. All United Nations system organizations characterized investigations as administrative fact-finding exercises, with some considering the terms "investigation" and "fact-finding" as synonymous.

9. Most United Nations system organizations undertake **Reactive** investigations which are instigated in response to reports of allegations or incidents. Some conduct **Proactive** investigations which entail analysis and testing of situations and operations to identify areas of risk for the purpose of developing or improving measures and systems of control that would pre-empt wrongful acts.[7] At the recently concluded 12th Conference of International Investigators (CII), it was acknowledged that agencies should put more emphasis on conducting proactive investigations as a preventative measure. Many shared the opinion that relying only on the reporting of an allegation for initiating an investigation is not an effective strategy. Improved information flow, identifying and monitoring allegation patterns, red flags, and actors in particular sectors, regions or countries, may result in indications of wrongdoing, calling for proactive investigation. The Inspectors agree that more emphasis and attention should be devoted to such investigations.

10. The Inspectors learned that internal investigations are considered as "preliminary" in the framework of the internal justice system, mainly vis-à-vis the disciplinary process, because they are conducted before a formal charge is brought. However, the term "preliminary" also has another meaning: it is used to distinguish an early phase of investigative steps referred to variously as a "preliminary assessment", "preliminary review", or "inquiry", before it is decided whether a full or formal investigation should be undertaken. During this preliminary stage, the internal oversight entity assesses whether the reported allegations provide enough or credible indications to launch a full or formal investigation. Many cases stop and are closed with the completion of the preliminary assessment when the findings indicate there is no prima facie case.

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[3] "Uniform Guidelines for Investigations" endorsed at the 4th Conference of International Investigators (CII), Brussels, Belgium, 2003, section II "Terms used", p. 3.

[4] Pursuant to JIU/REP/2000/9 recommendation 1 for developing and adopting a common set of standards and procedures for conducting investigations in United Nations system organizations, the 4th CII endorsed "Uniform Guidelines for Investigations" in 2003, which were revised by the 10th CII in 2009 (2nd edition).

[5] This may include indicators of fraud or corruption.

[6] This may be applicable to projects executed or implemented by the organization.

[7] JIU/REP/2000/9, para. 11.

B. Scope and nature of an investigation

11. While most participating organizations' definitions of investigation use the term "wrongdoing" to characterize misconduct, the "Uniform Guidelines for Investigations" stipulates that the role of the Investigative Office is to examine and determine whether "Misconduct" occurred; moreover, they define **misconduct** as:

A failure by a staff member to observe the rules of conduct or the standards of behaviour prescribed by the Organization.[8]

12. A staff member's failure to comply with administrative norms of the organization may take several forms; it may be behavioural or related to fraud or other financial irregularities (including corruption, procurement violations etc.). Moreover, due to the nature of their operations some organizations have expanded the scope of their investigations to include also individuals and/or entities with different types of contracts and partnerships with the organization. For example, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Office of Audit and Investigations (OAI) may assess and conduct investigations into allegations of fraud and other financial irregularities, committed by contractors, implementing partners and other third parties, deemed to be detrimental to the organization. OIOS may, as appropriate, investigate the misconduct of Troop Contributing Country (TCC) personnel within peacekeeping or special political missions, in the event that the national Government is unwilling or unable to conduct an administrative investigation into a case of alleged serious misconduct involving troop personnel. [9]

13. If the investigation findings conclude that there may have been a violation of criminal law, the investigation results may be communicated and shared with the competent national authorities where the alleged crime took place. The decision to refer the investigated case or not to national authorities lies with the executive heads; in the case of the United Nations funds and programmes, the decision rests with the United Nations Secretary-General.

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[8] "Uniform Guidelines for Investigations", 2nd edition (10th CII, Dead Sea, Jordan, 2009), para. 11, footnote 5, stating that the definition for the organizations of the United Nations system is stipulated in Staff Rule 110.1: "*A failure by a staff member to comply with his or her obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, the Staff Rules or other relevant administrative issuances or to observe the standards of conduct expected of an international civil servant.*"

[9] A/61/19 (Part III), Article 7 quarter, para. 3 (a), p. 3.

III. STRUCTURE OF THE INVESTIGATION FUNCTION

A. Responsibility and authority for investigation function

14. The increased importance, cost and complexity of United Nations activities since the mid-1990s, coupled with an emphasis on the responsibility for staff and all stakeholders to report fraud, corruption and misconduct, has led most United Nations organizations to take significant steps to establish or build upon their internal investigation functions. The United Nations OIOS was established in 1994 with a mandate to, inter alia, conduct investigations. A number of United Nations Funds and Programmes have established their own internal oversight entities and have created separate investigation units within their oversight services. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) have created investigator posts within their internal oversight entities. With the exception of the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), which has yet to establish an internal oversight entity, most of the specialized agencies and IAEA now have specific authorized investigation functions, with the International Labour Organization (ILO), Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) having established separate investigation units within their internal oversight entities. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) have a dedicated investigator post within their oversight entities.

B. Problems of fragmentation

15. The earlier JIU report on strengthening the investigation function found, as confirmed by the oversight lacunae report, that despite increasingly clear mandates assigning the investigation function to internal oversight entities, few United Nations system organizations had placed full responsibility for the investigation function in these oversight entities.

16. Reviewing the situation six years on, the situation has improved; many organizations have now consolidated responsibility for the investigation function in one single entity, i.e., the respective internal oversight entity which is formally mandated to conduct investigations in the organization. UNDP, UNICEF, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UNOPS, and the World Food Programme (WFP) have a consolidated investigation function. The World Health Organization (WHO) has recently subsumed harassment cases within its Internal Oversight Services (IOS). WHO officials reported that previous authority allowing the Heads of Regional Offices to conduct investigations has been rescinded, with agreement that all misconduct investigations will be undertaken by or under the leadership of IOS.

17. In the United Nations many actors share responsibility for investigations: OIOS, security services, heads of offices and programme managers, and the Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM). In response to a request by the General Assembly to look into this matter, a task force was set up to "review the types of investigations being conducted in the Secretariat; make suggestions on the need to improve systems; examine steps that would be required to implement change; and prepare the terms of reference that had been requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 62/244"[10] regarding a comprehensive review of the investigation function in the United Nations.[11] The review is ongoing and OIOS is conducting

[10] Report of the Independent Audit Advisory Committee on the Activities of the Independent Audit Advisory Committee for the period from 1 August 2010 to 31 July 2011 (A/66/299), para. 44.
[11] A/62/582.

an assessment quantifying how such a consolidation can be translated into figures and caseload, prior to deciding on its feasibility.

18. The main argument heard from both management and investigators defending fragmentation in their respective organizations, particularly in cases where workplace harassment and abuse of authority cases are assigned to lay panels set up mainly by the human resources entities, is that these cases are never purely harassment cases: they are mostly interpersonal and performance-wrapped cases, which surface as problems only when underperformance becomes an issue. Some organizations argue that these are simply "workplace grievance issues" which need to be sorted out by the parties concerned and not by professional investigators. Some supporters of such arrangements find sufficient the two-day training on investigations provided to regular staff members who volunteer to become members of these panels, especially if they have relevant professional backgrounds or functions, e.g., legal. The Inspectors strongly disagree and believe that the alleged victims, the organization as a whole and staff suspected of such wrongdoing should benefit from a professional and thorough investigation by competent and trained investigators; a two-day training workshop, possibly held years before, is not at all sufficient and does not ensure an informed, fair and impartial investigation. Moreover, having management conduct investigations is problematic, as ultimately they are responsible for defending the interests of the organization, not the individual.

19. Allegations relevant to personnel matters, such as promotions, contract renewals, allowances (except for entitlement fraud), etc., are management, not misconduct, issues and therefore should not rise to the level of a formal investigation. Instead they should be examined through informal mechanisms available for such types of conflict: ombudspersons, arbitrators, staff counsellors, mediators, etc. Should the issue not be resolved through these informal mechanisms, with one party raising the spectre of serious misconduct, then and only then, the Inspectors believe, should the matter be referred for formal investigation.

20. All interviewees agreed that "routine" investigations stemming from safety- and security-related matters, e.g., traffic tickets, lost badges, minor theft, protection issues, safety and security of premises, staff and property, belong to the safety and security services. As the first United Nations officials on the scene, security officers normally undertake an initial fact-finding "investigation" to make a preliminary assessment of the situation. If during the initial fact-finding indications emerge that serious misconduct may have occurred, security officers are instructed to inform their respective internal oversight entities that a formal investigation is warranted; such an investigation should then be undertaken by the oversight entity, not the security services. In the United Nations Secretariat, however, the Inspectors found that security officers in the field were asked to conduct full formal investigations into serious misconduct cases, independently of OIOS, when OIOS did not have the resources or time to do so.

21. In view of the seriousness of the investigative process and its decisive role in the administration of internal justice, staff members view the discharge of the investigation function to be of great importance. They have expressed the wish that all be treated equally and face the same investigation standards, and that misconduct cases should be dealt with by professional investigators. They are concerned, as are the Inspectors, that **investigations conducted by non-professional investigators and/or entities which are not independent but are part of management, can result in conflicts of interest, information not being handled properly, an uneven application of standards, and problems with due process, as well as cases being "dropped" or taking undue time to complete.**

22. Further, some staff have mentioned as an obstacle to equal treatment the role that staff seniority, category and level play in some organizations in the screening and prioritizing of a case at the intake stage. The significance accorded to seniority in either classification or

prioritization of a case and its subsequent investigation by professional investigators is perceived by staff as discrimination and privileged treatment of senior professional staff vis-à-vis other categories and levels. The argument offered in defence of the distinction made is that with seniority come higher authority, responsibilities and thus higher risks for the organization. The Inspectors are not convinced by this distinction and believe that all staff should be treated equally.

23. The Inspectors believe that the argumentation for consolidating investigations in the internal oversight entity is compelling and that this should be done urgently in the interests of fairness to all staff and stakeholders in the conduct of formal investigations. As and where appropriate, changes to administrative issuances, existing regulations etc. will be required. The Inspectors fully understand that the requisite resources must be provided to effect any such consolidation.

24. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of the investigation function in United Nations system organizations.

Recommendation 1

Executive heads who have not yet done so should direct that all investigations be consolidated in the internal oversight entity of each organization. Requisite resources (human and financial) should be provided for the effective discharge of the investigation function on the basis of the recommendations of the organization's audit/oversight committees.

IV. INDEPENDENCE OF THE INVESTIGATION FUNCTION

A. Problems with internal oversight budget approval

25. The Inspectors continue to believe that the internal oversight entities themselves should formulate their own draft budgets, on the basis of their professional judgement, as to the resources needed for audit, inspection, investigation and evaluation. These estimates, unchanged by the executive head, should form part of the executive heads' overall proposals to the legislative body. As currently set up, no oversight entity is free to decide on its budgetary requirements; oversight entities are subject to the same budget policies as any other entity within the Secretariats. The Inspectors believe this seriously compromises the independence of the oversight function, including investigations. As noted in the oversight lacunae report, *"budgetary requirements of the internal oversight unit remain the subject of scrutiny and control by managers in other functional areas such as budget and finance, and ultimately by the executive head."*[12] Despite the establishment in a number of organizations of audit/oversight committees which make recommendations to the governing bodies on the level of resources necessary for internal oversight, it remains the prerogative of the executive heads to determine the resources for internal oversight that will be included in the budget request.

26. **The Inspectors recall recommendation 9 of the oversight lacunae report, which called on the legislative bodies of each organization to *"decide that the proposed budget of the internal oversight entity should be drawn up by the entity itself and submitted to the audit/oversight committee, together with any comments of the executive head, for review and transmittal to the appropriate governing body."* The Inspectors urge the legislative bodies to act expeditiously to approve, and the executive heads to implement, the said recommendation.**

B. Problems with hiring and firing of internal oversight staff

27. The internal oversight entities are conceived as entities designed to provide independent, objective assurance and assist the executive heads in fulfilling their internal oversight responsibilities. They exercise operational independence, while remaining under the functional authority of the executive heads of each organization.

28. The Inspectors note that the heads of internal oversight do not exercise full managerial responsibility and control over their human resources and thus do not enjoy full operational independence in practice. In its report "The Audit Function in the United Nations system", the Inspectors noted a number of cases of interference in the staff selection process for the internal oversight function.[13] They felt that *"…the selection and promotion of audit staff must be run independently, but fairly and transparently, from the administration and management of the organization, albeit respecting the organizations' established policies."* They recommended that the audit/oversight head be entrusted with full authority to select and appoint his/her staff. The argumentation/recommendation is not limited to the audit staff but is in fact applicable to the selection and promotion of all staff of the internal oversight entity, i.e., the investigation, inspection and evaluation staff as well.

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[12] JIU/REP/2006/2, para. 38.
[13] JIU/REP/2010/5, para. 54.

29. The Inspectors note that this recommendation is the same as that in the JIU report on the Audit Function,[14] but geared to investigators. In the Note by the Secretary-General transmitting to the members of the General Assembly his comments and those of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) on the Audit Function, "…agencies suggested that audit recruitment, transfer and promotion actions should be subject to the same controls used to achieve the objectives for all other staff members … The controls **should be designed** [emphasis added] with due regard for selection of auditors and other categories of staff in functions that are independent of the rest of the organization."[15] **The Inspectors conclude that this is an inherent recognition of the need to redesign existing controls to take into account the need for independence of the internal oversight function and by extension, in the Inspectors' view, non-interference in this function by management.**

30. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of the investigation function in United Nations system organizations.

Recommendation 2

Executive heads of United Nations system organizations should ensure that investigation staff are selected in accordance with staff regulations and rules, on the basis of merit, professional investigator qualifications and experience as the main selection criteria. These staff should be selected independently of management and administrative influence, so as to ensure fairness and transparency, increased effectiveness and independence of the investigative function.

C. Problems with mobility

31. The Inspectors found no restrictions that would preclude staff members of the internal oversight entities from applying for, and being accepted if qualified for, positions in different occupational groups and career paths within the organization where they serve as investigators. Most of those interviewed felt that the unrestricted ability of investigation staff to move to other functions within an organization was problematic, as it could affect their objectivity and impartiality in discharging their responsibility in internal investigations. There is a risk that investigators may be negatively influenced or even manipulated in performing their duties by individuals who may become their direct supervisors or play a role in their career advancement in the future.

32. The problem is exacerbated in those organizations with mandatory mobility policies. UNHCR operates under a mandatory rotation scheme for all staff, including its Investigation Service, except for the post of "Senior Investigation Specialist", a position created to, inter alia, train rotating staff into the Inspector General's Office (IGO) investigator positions. The Inspectors note that such training cannot and does not substitute for the need for the investigation function to be staffed by fully trained professionally qualified investigators. Some UNHCR staff believe that the IGO cannot be considered an independent entity as long as its investigators are regular UNHCR staff members, who rotate among the colleagues they were investigating and interviewing during their service with IGO; this makes them vulnerable and subject to various influences at many levels. WFP also has a mandatory rotation policy but has excepted investigators from mandatory rotation by exceptionally

[14] JIU/REP/2010/5, recommendation 4, p. 14.
[15] A/66/73/Add.1, para. 9.

applying to them an "extended mobility status" arguing that these positions require highly technical or specialized qualifications.

33. The Inspectors believe mobility of investigators should be encouraged via transfers or secondments to the investigative services of the various United Nations system organizations.

34. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of the investigation function in United Nations system organizations.

Recommendation 3

Executive heads should discontinue mobility for investigators within the same organization and encourage the transfer and/or secondment of investigative staff to the investigative services of other United Nations system organizations.

D. Executive heads and the investigation function

35. The Inspectors believe another key element of independence is the right of the head of the internal oversight entity to have unfettered access to the external auditors, the independent audit/oversight committees, and the relevant legislative bodies. This reporting/access is particularly important should major disagreements occur between the internal oversight entity and the executive head with respect to investigation findings. The Inspectors found that executive heads are able to make use of the investigation reports' findings, conclusions or recommendations in the way they judge best, which, in a worst case scenario, could include concealing evidence and/or burying the findings. The remedy proposed is for the head of the oversight entity to report any disagreement he/she may have with the executive head to the audit/oversight committee in addition to reflecting it in his/her annual report to the governing bodies. Audit/oversight committees may take note of such a disagreement and, while they cannot compel the executive head to take any action, they may nevertheless also report the disagreement, through their own reports, to the governing body themselves, thereby placing the responsibility for action squarely on the Member States. In all organizations the fact-finding investigation is a separate activity from the decision to charge or decide on an appropriate sanction. This may involve decisions being made or influenced by individuals other than the executive head. Full reporting on the results of investigations substantiating misconduct along with action taken by management to address the misconduct (i.e., sanctions) should be reported to governing bodies.

36. With specific respect to investigations regarding executive heads, such matters should preferably be referred to a separate entity for an independent investigation, e.g., the JIU. Regarding the disposition of the investigation, an example of best practice is the WIPO draft Investigation Section Policy of August 2010, paragraph 23, which states that: "*Should the investigation concern the Director General, the final report shall be submitted by the Director, IAOD, to the Chairman of the WIPO Assemblies, for any action deemed appropriate, and copied to the Chair of the Audit Committee and the External Auditors of the organizations.*" **The Inspectors believe all organizations should adopt, as appropriate, a similar policy**.

37. The Inspectors are aware of only two United Nations organizations, UNESCO and the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), where no investigations can be opened in the absence of the executive head's explicit approval or specific instruction. The Inspectors can find no justification for this and consider it an unacceptable and most serious impediment to the independence of the function for both organizations. While to date neither organization's

executive head has exercised this particular authority, the problem should be corrected urgently given the very obvious implications of what it entails or might entail.

38. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of the investigation function in United Nations system organizations.

Recommendation 4

The legislative bodies of United Nations system organizations which have not yet done so should direct their executive heads to ensure that internal oversight entities or investigation units are authorized to initiate investigations without the executive head's prior approval.

V. MANAGING INVESTIGATIONS

A. Policies and Procedures

39. The heads of the internal oversight entities and of separately established investigation units have responsibility for managing the overall investigative workload for which they are responsible. Clear policies and procedures are essential as is the necessity for providing investigators with the tools necessary to do their job. All United Nations system organizations surveyed felt they had the necessary tools. But the policies, procedures and operational practices within and among organizations differed significantly.

40. Some of the larger United Nations system organizations have intake committees designed to determine the workload priority. Others, given their size and staffing, do not, and these activities are performed by the head of the internal oversight entity. The OIOS also has a Professional Practices Section (PPS) to assure the quality of the resultant investigation (see para. 65 below).

41. Most organizations have hotlines, some of which are outsourced on a 24/7 basis and are capable of responding in a variety of languages, while other organizations have none. Some organizations clearly indicate where and how to report wrongdoing on their websites, others do not. Very few internal oversight entities post the investigation process on their website, explaining it in a concise manner, so staff members can be informed at a glance.

42. One large organization has cameras installed throughout its internal oversight office. This is a major deterrent to staff wishing to report and discuss wrongdoing with the investigators. **The Inspectors believe the cameras should be deactivated during business hours**.

43. All United Nations system organizations' internal oversight services rely on the Uniform Guidelines for Investigations adopted and updated at the 4th and 10th Conference of International Investigators respectively, to guide and orient their investigative work.[16] These guidelines, however, are broad and principle based. Most organizations have promulgated investigation manuals based on the guidelines and reflecting the policies and procedures established by the organizations. The manuals regulate the intake of cases, explain case management and prioritization criteria used, investigation methods, workflow and evidence handling, i.e., the entire investigation process (from the reporting of an allegation to the closure of a case) as well as a staff member's rights and obligations vis-à-vis a formal investigation. The manuals serve as guidance not only to the investigators but also to the other parties of an ongoing investigation in an organization.

44. Professional guidelines on how to treat sources of information, subjects and witnesses, or the handling, storing and safeguarding of evidence, have been introduced in most, but not all, internal oversight entities; for investigations conducted by other entities within an organization, the same professional standards are not observed and there is no quality assurance.

45. Of particular importance is the need for internal oversight entities, as well as others conducting investigations, to follow closely the jurisprudence of the administrative tribunals as regards due process, due diligence, burden of proof issues and other issues related to carrying out investigations. A number of organizations expressed concern, however, that the process for documenting United Nations Dispute Tribunal (UNDT) and United Nations Appeal Tribunal (UNAT) judgements is not effective. As there is no capability for sorting

[16] "Uniform Guidelines for Investigations" (4th CII, Brussels, Belgium, 2003).

UNDT and UNAT judgements by subject, considerable time and effort must be spent within and among United Nations organizations reviewing individual tribunal judgements, which wastes resources. The Inspectors raised this issue with a registrar of a United Nations dispute tribunal, who acknowledged that there was room for improvement. As UNDT and UNAT are still in their infancy, their emphasis has been on clearing the backlog of cases inherited from the old United Nations Administration of Justice system. **The Inspectors call upon all United Nations administrative tribunal registrars to consider how best to accommodate organizations' needs with regard to documenting tribunal judgements, with a view to ensuring more transparency and accessibility to United Nations tribunals' jurisprudence.**

46. While this review does not focus on internal operational policies and procedures for actually conducting investigations, the Inspectors nevertheless feel compelled to flag a major concern raised by staff representatives in interviews for this report – that of how interviews are conducted. Most investigation procedures call for two investigators to interview a sole staff member. **Staff indicated that they would like an observer or representative of their choosing to be present during interviews**. Many investigators agreed with this, yet few internal oversight entities allow the presence of an observer. Where an observer is allowed, in most cases this is an option decided by the investigator and not by the subject of the investigation. Staff and also many investigators felt that audio- or preferably video-recording of interviews should be the norm and could possibly substitute for having staff representatives or even two investigators present. The Inspectors agree.

47. In the JIU 2000/9 report the Inspectors observed the need for frequent and organized interaction among United Nations system organizations with respect to investigations. They indicated that such cooperation could include the development of common standards and procedures for conducting investigations, the sharing of expertise to be drawn upon when advice or assistance is required, the sharing of methodologies, developing joint training opportunities, exchanging personnel (e.g., on secondment) leading to a system-wide approach to investigations and the undertaking of joint investigations, especially for multi-agency field-based activities. The Inspectors believe these observations remain relevant and would also note the importance of identifying cases of common interest, particularly when multiple agencies are investigating the same vendor or issue in a country.

48. The Inspectors note that in 2011 an informal forum was held the day before the annual Conference of International Investigators at which United Nations system organizations' heads of oversight entities met to discuss mutual issues of concern. The Inspectors believe this excellent practice should be institutionalized as a sub-group of the Conference of International Investigators (UN-CII), whose membership would consist of the heads of the internal oversight entities and their senior professional investigation practitioners. This would be similar to the United Nations internal audit forum (known as UN-RIAS) which was established in the framework of the Representatives of the Internal Audit Services (RIAS).[17] UN-CII would deal with matters of specific concern to their members and the United Nations system, and work on harmonization of the investigation functions as well as issues noted throughout this report.

49. Implementation of the following recommendation is intended to result in the dissemination of best practices and enhanced coordination and cooperation.

[17] Representatives of Internal Audit Services of the United Nations system organizations, Multilateral Financial Institutions and Other Associated Intergovernmental Organizations.

Recommendation 5

The Conference of International Investigators should establish a United Nations system sub-group, similar to that of UN-RIAS.

B. Budget and staffing of the investigation function

50. The adequacy and efficiency of the internal oversight services depend on the commitment of both the executive heads and the Member States and the resources they make available to the internal oversight entities.

51. Adequate staffing calls for adequate resources to be allocated to the investigation function. In 2010, the level of the internal oversight budget in relation to the total budget in each organization ranged from a high of 1.2 per cent (WMO) of the total budget down to a low of 0.04 per cent (UNWTO). Furthermore, the level of the investigation function's separate budgetary allocation in relation to the total oversight budget in each of the internal oversight entities ranged from a high of 38 per cent (WFP) down to 6.7 per cent (UNESCO); while in seven large United Nations system organizations with dedicated professional investigations capacity, there was no separate budgetary allocation for investigations (UNICEF, UNHCR, UNRWA, ILO, FAO, WIPO, UNIDO). (Annex III). The percentages are not comparable as some internal oversight services include evaluation, others do not, and some investigation functions are currently fragmented in some organizations.

52. The Inspectors have made clear their view of the need to consolidate all investigations within each organization's internal oversight entity. One way to capitalize the consolidation is to transfer to the internal oversight entity resources currently allocated to or utilized for investigations by other entities in the organizations. But presently this is problematic as the Inspectors were informed that where multiple actors conduct investigations, no statistics are kept as to human and financial resources allocated to various investigative activities throughout the organization. Thus, the overall cost and caseload of investigations in many organizations is unknown and quite likely badly underestimated. In the United Nations a study is currently under way to identify resources used elsewhere in the organization and it remains to be seen whether a fully staffed OIOS Investigations Division could accommodate the additional workload within existing resource levels, particularly once planned efficiency measures have been implemented.

53. The Inspectors continue to believe that it is difficult to justify an investigative capacity for some of the very small organizations, and suggest that a joint or shared investigations unit could be established, for example, for UPU, ITU, WMO, IMO, ICAO and UNWTO. Alternatively these organizations could "in-source" this function to any other organization willing and able to provide investigation services for them.

54. Having examined organizations' internal investigations caseloads, and recognizing the rapidly evolving investigatory environment – at headquarters, regions and field duty stations – as well as the increasing complexity of the cases, the Inspectors believe the staffing standards of 2006 need to be revisited. The Inspectors recognize that there have been, and that there will continue to be for the foreseeable future "spikes" in the investigation caseload, not least resulting from an increased awareness of and emphasis on the reporting of suspected wrongdoing. With the institution/reinforcement of accountability frameworks, the establishment of ethics offices, better dissemination of the code of conduct, staff regulations and rules, the Inspectors are hopeful that investigative caseloads will decline in the long run. However, for the present, it is important that adequate and appropriate resources be devoted

to this ever-increasing function. The Inspectors conclude that legislative bodies should review the adequacy of resources and staffing standards, including the use of consultants, for the investigative function, on the basis of the recommendations of the respective audit/oversight committees on an annual or biennial basis depending on the organizations' budget cycle.

55. Implementation of the following recommendation is intended to result in enhanced controls and compliance.

Recommendation 6

The legislative bodies of United Nations system organizations should review the adequacy of resources and staffing of the investigation function on the basis of the recommendations of the respective audit/oversight committees either annually or biennially depending on the organizations' budget cycle.

C. Competence of investigators

56. One of the objectives of the review was to see whether the organizations' capacity to conduct investigations has been strengthened and improved during the last decade. The Inspectors are pleased to note that significant progress has been made, with the gradual establishment of separate investigation units within the internal oversight entities. Also, the functional title "Investigator" (or similar), which was a rarity 11 years ago, has expanded and is now broadly used in job descriptions and/or job classifications.

57. As of 2011, six out of the 21 Secretariats reviewed (ICAO, UPU, ITU, WMO, IMO, and UNWTO) do not have an investigator post. Fifteen organizations recruit and employ staff members with the functional title "Investigator". The vast majority of "Investigator" job descriptions in these organizations specify an advanced university degree in law or a related discipline as the minimum education requirement for the professional investigators they hire.[18] Most of these job descriptions make clear reference to investigatory training and experience, including in law enforcement or other legal activities.

58. Five organizations list additional requirements needed, but these more closely fit the profile of a professional "Auditor", such as studies in accounting and auditing, or certifications that only a qualified auditor normally acquires. One organization confirmed that the investigator they hired as the chief of their investigation division is not a professional investigator, but a chartered accountant who is studying to obtain a certified fraud examiner qualification. A sixth organization omits any mention of a need for a university degree in law or investigative work experience for the head of unit, while among the competencies it is clearly stated that the incumbent will have to provide technical advice in this area to his/her supervisees.

59. While acknowledging that there is some overlap between the role of the investigator and auditor there remain very important differences and the training for each is quite different. Investigators look at the responsibility of individuals and gather evidence forensically to form the basis of disciplinary, administrative or criminal action while auditors look at systems and processes. Investigators identify and obtain all relevant information and evidence to establish facts relevant to an allegation, resulting in the facts being confirmed or refuted. The investigation process uses forensic methodology allowing evidence gathered to be relied upon

[18] Alternatively, a first level university degree in combination with qualifying experience in lieu of the advanced degree.

by a United Nations system administrative tribunal, a national court or other decision maker and as a properly evidenced basis for administrative or other action to be initiated. The investigation is also conducted in such a way as to comply with procedural fairness, confidentiality and other generally accepted best practice principles. The skill set for investigators in international organizations is normally acquired through law enforcement experience or a legal education.

60. Auditors perform a systematic process of objectively obtaining and assessing information relating to financial or other systems and processes to provide a reasonable level of assurance as to the existence, adequacy and effectiveness of controls. Auditors usually have an educational and training background in finance, accounting or business administration in general.

61. While some auditors/accountants continue to see audits and investigations as synonymous, most accepted the differences between the two functions and acknowledged the need for the investigation function to be staffed by professionally qualified investigators. The Inspectors agree.

62. Internationally there are not as yet any effective training courses to equip someone without prior experience for the role of investigator. More training opportunities should be sought on a regular basis covering all types of cases encountered by organizations: workplace harassment, abuse of authority, sexual exploitation and abuse, technical procurement issues, corruption, fraud, IT issues etc. A number of those interviewed suggested that courses leading to a professional certification for investigators should be developed and that the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA) might be a place to start. The Inspectors agree and would suggest that this could be a topic for discussion at the annual Conference of International Investigators, which provides an excellent opportunity for face-to-face interactions and a platform for exchange of ideas for the community of professional investigators.

D. Need for centralized follow-up and monitoring of investigation reports

63. With the completion of an investigation, the issuance of a report with findings, conclusions and/or recommendations, and the submission thereof to the competent authorities, all internal oversight entities cease any further action. Responsibility for taking appropriate action emanating from the investigation report shifts to programme managers in some cases, or human resources, legal and/or the executive head to determine what action is to be taken, including administrative or disciplinary measures to be imposed. The Inspectors, particularly in agencies where investigations are conducted by multiple actors, could find no centralized authority tasked with monitoring and following up investigation reports to see if action was taken and if so, whether the action was proportional to the "offence". The Inspectors believe this is a major lacuna which should be corrected as it can and does lead to cases not being acted upon, intentionally or not. It may also lead to unequal treatment of staff who commit similar offences but do not receive similar sanctions. **The Inspectors conclude that a focal point should be designated and tasked with this responsibility for the organization as a whole.** The focal point will be required to sign an oath of confidentiality. Regardless of where the focal point is located, it will be imperative that he/she works in close cooperation with human resources, legal services, the internal oversight entity and other offices as appropriate. Monthly status reports should be sent to the internal oversight entity and other parties concerned, bearing in mind the requirement to be bound by confidentiality agreements. The focal point would also be responsible for ascertaining that the investigation results, along with action taken by management to address the misconduct (i.e., sanctions) are posted on the organization's website for the information of all staff in a manner that respects the confidentiality of those involved.

64. Implementation of this recommendation is expected to result in enhanced controls and compliance.

Recommendation 7

Executive heads should designate a central focal point to monitor the implementation and follow-through of all investigation reports within their organizations.

E. Quality assurance of the investigation function

65. In most organizations, the responsibility for monitoring and providing quality assurance for investigations conducted and reports produced rests with the director of the internal oversight entity. In OIOS, draft investigation reports are submitted to its Professional Practices Section (PPS) for quality assurance. Each report is assigned both to a screener, who ensures the report conforms to report writing guidelines, and to a reviewer, for editorial, factual and legal review. However, for investigations conducted by others in the United Nations Secretariat, for example by sexual harassment panels, there is no quality assurance or review. The Inspectors would like to see professional practices sections in all organizations but recognize that at present it is not feasible given human and financial resource constraints.

66. The Inspectors consider it a necessity to have a formal quality assurance and improvement programme, i.e., an ongoing and periodic assessment of the quality of the investigative activity or function in all organizations. **The Inspectors reiterate JIU recommendation 13 of the oversight lacunae report, that "the legislative bodies in each organization should direct their respective executive heads to ensure independent quality assessment, for example through peer review, of the internal oversight entity, at least once every five years".**

F. Relationship of the investigation function to audit/oversight committees

67. The role of the audit/oversight committee was discussed extensively in the JIU report on The Audit Function in the United Nations system, as well as in the oversight lacunae report, which proposed a model for external oversight boards for United Nations organizations that would oversee the performance of all internal oversight functions. The main focus of the audit/oversight committees established to date has been on audit activities, although they are increasingly addressing other oversight functions. The terms of reference (TOR) of some committees, however, make no reference at all to the investigation function. Instead they call for review, inter alia, of financial statements, significant financial reporting policy issues, and the adequacy of internal controls and risk management systems. **The Inspectors believe that there is a need to revise and update the TORs to specifically incorporate their responsibilities for all elements of internal oversight**. While these committees do not set standards, but rather review what the standards should be, they can and in fact do provide valuable and very pertinent advice and guidance on the effectiveness of oversight activities, including the investigation function.

VI. ONE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM INVESTIGATION UNIT

68. The issues identified in this report are many: a wide disparity of resources available for investigative functions/activities, vague or non-existent standards in some organizations, lack of consistent policies and procedures, a lack of professional investigators, the fragmentation of investigative responsibility in many agencies, a lack of independence, the lack of training, and no consistent follow-up or monitoring of investigation reports. All these issues result in a fundamental disservice to and an uneven application of investigative policies and practices within and among agencies for all stakeholders in the United Nations system: stakeholders who are entitled to and should be accorded the same rights across the system.

69. The Inspectors believe that the roots of many of the issues lie in organizational "cultures", and result from a limited interest on the part of some in top management as well as entrenched bureaucracies resistant to change. Member States also bear some responsibility in not providing needed resources as investigation activities may not be high among their funding priorities.

70. The observations and recommendations suggested to address these issues will provide a stop-gap measure only. Recommendations will be implemented piecemeal within and among agencies and the disparities across the board will remain: staff and all stakeholders will continue to be treated unequally throughout. The Inspectors believe that there is a need for a comprehensive system-wide solution that will solve most of these problems for the longer run and one which will pertain equally to all and is in keeping with the spirit of "One UN".

71. **The Inspectors believe the solution lies in consolidating all investigative functions/activities into one jointly funded independent entity serving all United Nations system organizations**. From an administrative and substantive standpoint, the benefits are clear and have been referred to above: benefit to small agencies without investigative capacity, harmonization of business practices, common standards and procedures in conducting investigations, specialized expertise to handle most problems that arise, professional investigative staff, staff promotion opportunities, etc. The Inspectors understand that it will be necessary to change existing regulations and rules to accommodate such a change. The Inspectors envisage current investigation staff being transferred to the new entity. In the short run those undertaking the investigations should be familiar with their respective organizational mandates, risks, partners, etc. Though not insurmountable, the details of such an undertaking would be very complex.

72. The Inspectors believe a joint task force composed of professional investigative practitioners from all United Nations system organizations, assisted by legal and other representatives as necessary, should be established to consider how best this can be accomplished and how, operationally, such an entity would serve the needs of all stakeholders and the system as a whole. The joint task force should be convened under the auspices of CEB and should come up with its findings, conclusions and recommendations by no later than the end of December 2013 for presentation to the legislative bodies.

73. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of the investigation function in United Nations system organizations.

Recommendation 8

The Secretary-General, under the auspices of CEB, should set up an inter-agency task force that will develop options for establishing a single consolidated United Nations system Investigation Unit by the end of December 2013 for presentation to the legislative bodies.

Annex I

Authority and scope of the investigation function

Organization	Formal investigation function (Yes/No)	Authority mandating oversight entity to conduct investigations	Scope of function	Other entities conducting formal investigations*
UNITED NATIONS, ITS FUNDS AND PROGRAMMES				
United Nations	Yes	OIOS: - A/RES/48/218 B (12 August 1994) and - ST/SGB/273 (7 September 1994)	- Violations of the United Nations regulations, rules and relevant administrative issuances. - Fraud and corruption involving United Nations contracts or other agreements. - Under restricted procedures as mandated by A/61/19 (Part III), improper conduct of Troop Contributing Country (TCC) personnel within peacekeeping and special political missions - OIOS mandate extends to all categories of staff including United Nations staff members, United Nations volunteers, contractors, military observers and civilian police personnel.	- DM/ OHRM: has a very limited investigative function for harassment, sexual harassment and abuse of authority complaints where the allegations are directly against a Head of Office or Department; - Heads of Office and Programme Managers: set up *ad hoc* panels of staff (handled by OHRM) for investigation of routine misconduct cases, including harassment, sexual harassment and abuse of authority. OHRM holds a list of staff trained by OIOS to conduct harassment/abuse of authority investigations. (ST/AI/371 and its amendment; ST/SGB/2002/7, ST/AI/2004/3 and ST/SGB/2008/5) - DPKO/ DFS: (a) Boards of Inquiry: investigate responsibility for field missions property and protection of field mission and its staff members; their findings may indicate misconduct (SOP 1 March 2011); (b) Field Missions' Safety and Security Services (SSS) Special Investigation Units (SIU): investigate routine misconduct; occasionally, they are entrusted with serious misconduct cases (mandated by G.A. resolutions on the Field Mission concerned). - DSS: (a) United Nations Headquarters Special Investigation Unit; (b) Offices away from Headquarters (OAHs), Regional Commissions. (ST/SGB/1998/11)

Organization	Formal investigation function (Yes/No)	Authority mandating oversight entity to conduct investigations	Scope of function	Other entities conducting formal investigations*
UNDP	Yes	OAI: - Charter of the Office of Audit and Investigations - UNDP Legal Framework for Addressing Non-Compliance with United Nations Standards of Conduct - Protection against Retaliation Policy	- Allegations of misconduct, such as fraud, theft and embezzlement, corruption, abuse of privileges and immunities, sexual exploitation and sexual abuse, workplace harassment and abuse of authority, retaliation on whistleblowers, or other acts or omissions in conflict with the general obligations of staff members that involve UNDP staff and other personnel; - Allegations of fraud and other financial irregularities committed by contractors, implementing partners and other third parties, deemed to be detrimental to UNDP	
UNFPA	Yes	DOS: - UNFPA Fraud Policy; the Charter of the Division for Oversight Services; -the Division for Oversight Services Terms of Reference	- All allegations of misconduct except abuse of authority and harassment	- Human Resources: abuse of authority, harassment or sexual harassment
UNICEF	Yes	OIA: - OIA Charter of Authorities and Responsibilities of 12 April 2011	- Suspected or known fraudulent activities following the *Procedures for Reporting and Addressing Complaints and Allegations of Fraud, Corruption and Other Misconduct Involving UNICEF Staff*, including harassment, sexual harassment and abuse of authority	
UNHCR	Yes	IGO: - UNHCR Inter-Office Memorandum 054/2005 of 3 November 2005 on the role and functions of the	- Possible misconduct involving any person having a direct link with UNHCR, including staff members, consultants, interns and persons deployed to UNHCR offices under	

Organization	Formal investigation function (Yes/No)	Authority mandating oversight entity to conduct investigations	Scope of function	Other entities conducting formal investigations*
		IGO	agreements with third parties, and UNHCR implementing partners	
UNRWA	Yes	DIOS: - Organization Directive 14	- All allegations and complaints about possible violations of the Agency's regulations, rules and other pertinent administrative issuances, fraud, theft, misconduct, mismanagement, corruption, misappropriation, waste of resources and abuse of authority irrespective of their origin or initial point of receipt within the Agency	- Field Directors: routinely assign the investigation of allegations of misconduct to non-professional staff employed in other functions within those fields. These individuals come from a variety of backgrounds. There are no terms of reference for these individuals.
UNOPS	Yes	IAIG: - Internal Audit and Investigations Group Charter, para. 6	- Misconduct, such as mismanagement, fraud, corruption, retaliation on whistleblowers, abuse of authority, sexual harassment, workplace harassment, violation or wilful disregard of UNOPS regulations, rules and other administrative instructions (including the Standard of Conduct for the International Civil Service), that involve UNOPS personnel, contractors and other applicable persons, in accordance with relevant Organizational Directives	
WFP	Yes	OS: - Financial Regulation 12.1; - Charter of the Oversight Services Division (OS) (Executive Director's circular 2005/007 of 28 July 2005) - Charter of the Office of Inspections and Investigations (OSI) (issued as an internal administrative	- Allegations of irregularities (fraud, waste, malfeasance, abuse of authority, etc.)	

Organization	Formal investigation function (Yes/No)	Authority mandating oversight entity to conduct investigations	Scope of function	Other entities conducting formal investigations*
		memorandum is aligned with the OS Charter)		
SPECIALIZED AGENCIES AND IAEA				
ILO	Yes	IAO: - Staff regulations Financial rules - IAO Audit Charter	- Fraud, presumption of or attempted fraud	- Human Resources: "workplace grievances" to include misconduct, harassment, abuse of authority, sexual harassment
FAO	Yes	AUD: - Charter for the Office of the Inspector General (FAO Manual Section 107); - Policy on fraud and improper use of the Organization's resources (Administrative Circular 2004/19); - Whistleblower Protection Policy (Administrative Circular 2011/05)	- Allegations of violations of FAO Rules and Regulation, i.e., fraud and unsatisfactory conduct by staff, as well as fraudulent and corrupt activities by third parties involved in programmes and operations of the Organization; - Since January 2011, the Office is also responsible for conducting preliminary reviews and full investigations into alleged retaliation; - Allegations of medical insurance fraud.	- Human Resources: allegations of harassment, including sexual harassment, which cannot be resolved through an informal process; - The medical insurance commercial provider's investigation unit: conducts its own investigations into cases of possible medical insurance fraud by FAO staff members, and its reports are forwarded to the Office of the Inspector General (AUD). AUD will treat the reports from the medical insurance provider always as preliminary reviews and will always conduct investigative actions in accordance with FAO policies.
UNESCO	Yes	IOS: - Administrative manual 1.6 - Human Resources Manual 18.3 "Whistleblower protection policy"	- Misconduct, including unlawful, unethical and wasteful conduct (e.g., fraud, corruption, embezzlement, theft, discrimination, harassment, abuse of authority, conflict of interest, mismanagement or waste of resources etc.)	
ICAO	No	EAO: - Charter for the Evaluation and Internal Audit Office of June 2009	- Misconduct of a financial nature	- The Ethics Officer (a new post which has yet to be formally established and filled) will receive and review all reports of misconduct, and decide whether an investigation is warranted; and which would be the appropriate office to conduct it (appointing an ad hoc investigation committee). (ICAO Framework on Ethics coming into effect on 1 January 2012; approved by the Council in June 2011)

Organization	Formal investigation function (Yes/No)	Authority mandating oversight entity to conduct investigations	Scope of function	Other entities conducting formal investigations*
				- If necessary, the investigation could be outsourced
WHO	Yes	IOS: - Financial Rule XII, 112.1	- Administrative internal investigations	
UPU	Yes [a]	Internal Audit: - Charter of Internal Audit annexed to the UPU financial regulations	- A wide scope: covering HR issues to finance related matters, and any other activities under the International bureau mandate	
ITU	Yes [b]	Internal Audit: - ITU internal audit charter (Service Order 10/99 of 8 June 1999); - ITU Policy for the protection of staff against retaliation for reporting misconduct (Service Order 11/04)	*"The Internal Auditor is responsible for performing independent audits, inspections, investigations and other oversight work to ensure the effective, efficient and economical management and use of the financial, human, technological and intangible resources of ITU."*	- The Commission of inquiry: is responsible for conducting confidential and independent reviews of claims of harassment and abuse of authority. (ITU policy on harassment and abuse of authority; Service Order 05/05 of 16 March 2005); - The Secretary-General has the authority to set up *ad hoc* investigations committees, for matters not obviously falling under the scope of responsibilities of the above-mentioned mechanism.
WMO	Yes [c]	IOO: - Financial regulation 13.8	- Fraud, waste, mismanagement, misconduct, significant fraudulent activities	- Joint Grievance Panels: investigate misconduct, sexual harassment, harassment, abuse of authority (Service Note No. 26/2003)
IMO	Yes [d]	IOS: - Financial Rules and Regulations: Terms of reference of the Internal Oversight Section; - Policy and Procedures on the Prevention and Detection of Fraud and Serious Misconduct (appendix F to the Staff Regulations and Rules)	- Allegations of wrongdoing which involve violations of the Organization's rules, regulations, and pertinent administrative issuances, and acts of mismanagement, misconduct, waste and abuse of authority by staff	- Administrative and/or Legal Affairs and External Relations Divisions: The Secretary-General may request their Directors to assume the responsibility assigned to IOS in cases where a staff member of IOS is the subject of the investigation or the nature of the case warrants significant administrative and/or legal intervention to establish the facts
WIPO	Yes	IAOD: - Internal Oversight Charter, 2010 (Financial Regulations and Rules, Annex 1); - Investigation Section Policy, August 2010 (Draft)	- Wrongdoing and misconduct	

Organization	Formal investigation function (Yes/No)	Authority mandating oversight entity to conduct investigations	Scope of function	Other entities conducting formal investigations*
UNIDO	Yes	IOS: - Internal Oversight Services Charter (April 2011) DGB/(M).92 Rev.2 - Financial Rules and Regulations, Rule 109.1.15; - Policy on fraud awareness and prevention (D-G Bulletin 6 June 2005)	- allegations, fraud, misconduct, unethical behaviour and possible violations of regulations, rules and administrative instructions, as detailed in Policy on Fraud Awareness and Prevention	- Administration: where "there is an indication of breach of conduct, it is incumbent upon the Administration to follow up with the necessary enquiries and, in the course of doing so, to talk to the staff member concerned." (Administrative Circular on disciplinary measures no. 87, UNIDO/DA/PS/AC.87, of 28 May 1992)
UNWTO	No [e]			
IAEA	Yes	OIOS: Office of Internal Oversight Services Charter	- irregularities and reports of alleged violations of the Agency's regulations, rules, policies and administrative issuances involving Agency staff members and persons or entities with a contractual or other relationship with the Agency	- Human Resources: cases in accordance with the Staff Regulations and Rules Appendixes E and G

* Independent of the formal investigation function or overall internal oversight function in an organization; with the exception of the security services, which investigate only security-related incidents in each organization.

[a] Previously co-located with Internal Audit; currently, on a case-by-case basis, investigations may be outsourced to an international private company hired for audits or "insourced" to OIOS.

[b] Co-located with Internal Audit Unit and the Ethics Office.

[c] Currently co-located with the Ethics Office in the Internal Oversight Office; corrective action is reportedly under way.

[d] If required, the Internal Oversight Services may hire investigation experts familiar to the United Nations system internal investigations as consultants.

[e] No internal oversight function: the investigation function could be deployed through external support (outsourced).

Annex II

Data on internal oversight entities' investigation cases closed in 2010

A: Number of cases closed after a preliminary assessment/review
B: Number of cases closed after a full investigation
Total: The total number of cases per category of misconduct

United Nations, its funds and programmes																								
Organization	**UN**			**UNDP**			**UNFPA**			**UNICEF**			**UNHCR**			**UNRWA**			**UNOPS**			**WFP**		
Category of misconduct: • Sub-category of misconduct	**A**	**B**	**Total**	**A**	**B**	**Total**	**A**	**B**	**Total**	**A**	**B**	**Total**	**A**	**B**	**Total**	**A**	**B**	**Total**	**A**	**B**	**Total**	**A**	**B**	**Total**
Financial irregularities:			**227**			**102**			**32**			**24**			**37**			**14**			**9**			**22**
• Fraud (incl. entitlement, financial, medical insurance)	_	_		11	4		_	1		2	8		9[5]	13[5]		2	1		_	_		2	5	
• Misuse of resources	20[1]	5[1]		11	2		_	_		_	2		_	1		1	3		_	_		_	_	
• Procurement: fraud, collusion	19	30		36	12		_	25		_	_		_	1		1			3	_		1	5	
• Theft and embezzlement	_	_		8	5		_	_		2	8		3	3		_	5		4	1		2	7	
• Financial disclosure requirements' failure	_	_		_	_		_	_		_	_		_	_		_	_		_	_		_	_	
• Misrepresentation, forgery and false certification	_	_		9	4		_	_		_	2		2	2		_	1		_	_		_	_	
• Other	132	21		_	_		_	6[4]		_	_		3	_		_	_		1	_		_	_	
Workplace harassment/abuse of authority:			**8**			**34**			**4**			**6**			**38**			**32**			**2**			**19**
• Abuse of authority	_	_		11	2		_	_		_	2		9	7		5	7		2	_		3	1	
• Sexual harassment	7	1		_	_		_	1		_	2		1	1		3	2		_	_		1	4	
• Workplace harassment / discrimination	_	_		20[3]	1[3]		_	3		2	_		10	10		7	8		_	_		4	6	
Improper recruitment/personnel cases	141	68	**209**	27	2	**29**	_	2	**2**	_	_	**0**	_	_	**0**	15	5	**20**	_	_	**0**	_	_	**0**
Retaliation against whistleblowers	_	_	**0**	2	3	**5**	_	_	**0**	_	_	**0**	1	_	**1**	_	_	**0**	_	_	**0**	_	1	**1**
Other allegations:			**152**			**56**			**5**			**15**			**37**			**175**			**4**			**74**
• Assault and threats	_	_		8	3		_	_		_	_		_	3		7[6]	44[6]		_	_		_	_	
• Failure to comply with local laws	_	_		5	2		_	_		_	_		1	3		9	12		_	_		_	_	
• Sexual exploitation and sexual abuse	43	47		5	4		_	_		_	_		3	1		5	8		_	_		_	_	
• Other failure to comply with obligations	_	_		13	5		_	5		_	5		13	8		32	58		_	4		_	_	
• Other	54[2]	8[2]		_	11		_	_		7	3		4	1					_	_		49[7]	25[7]	
Grand total	416	180	**596**	166	60	**226**	0	43	**43**	13	32	**45**	59	54	**113**	87	154	**241**	10	5	**15**	62	54	**116**

Specialized agencies and IAEA																								
Organization	**ILO**			**FAO**			**UNESCO**			**ICAO**			**WHO**			**UPU**			**ITU**			**WMO**		
Category of misconduct: • Sub-category of misconduct	**A**	**B**	**Total**	**A**	**B**	**Total**	**A**	**B**	**Total**	**A**	**B**	**Total**	**A**	**B**	**Total**	**A**	**B**	**Total**	**A**	**B**	**Total**	**A**	**B**	**Total**
Financial irregularities:			**12**			**47**			**21**			**0**			**9**			**0**			**1**			**3**
• Fraud (incl. entitlement, financial, medical insurance)	1	_		2	4		3	_					2	4					_	_		_	_	
• Misuse of resources	5	2		3	_		_	1					2	1					_	_		_	_	
• Procurement: fraud, collusion	1	_		16	3		9	1					_	_					_	1		_	1	
• Theft and embezzlement	_	2		1	_		1	2					_	_					_	_		1	_	
• Financial disclosure requirements failure	_	_		_	_		_	_					_	_					_	_		_	_	
• Misrepresentation, forgery and false certification	1	_		_	2		4	_					_	_					_	_		_	1	
• Other	_	_		7	9		_	_					_	_					_	_		_	_	
Workplace harassment/abuse of authority:			**2**			**7**			**5**			**0**			**13**			**0**			**0**			**1**
• Abuse of authority	_	_		4	2		_	_					_	_					_	_		1	_	
• Sexual harassment	_	_		_	_		1	2					3	1					_	_		_	_	
• Workplace harassment	2	_		1	_		2	_					6	3					_	_		_	_	
Improper recruitment/personnel cases	**_**	**_**	**0**	**_**	**_**	**0**	1	**_**	**1**			**0**	1	**_**	**1**			**0**	**_**	**_**	**0**	**_**	**_**	**0**
Retaliation against whistleblowers	**_**	**_**	**0**	**_**	**_**	**0**	**_**	**_**	**0**			**0**	**_**	**_**	**0**			**0**	**_**	**_**	**0**	**_**	**_**	**0**
Other allegations:			**0**			**19**			**6**			**0**			**8**			**0**			**0**			**0**
• Assault and threats	_	_		_	_		_	3					_	_					_	_		_	_	
• Failure to comply with local laws	_	_		1	1		_	_					1	1					_	_		_	_	
• Sexual exploitation and sexual abuse	_	_		_	_		_	_					_	_					_	_		_	_	
• Other failure to comply with obligations	_	_		1	1		_	_					3	3					_	_		_	_	
• Other	_	_		15	_		2	1					_	_					_	_		_	_	
Grand total	10	4	**14**	51	22	**73**	23	10	**33**	0	0	**0**	18	13	**31**	0	0	**0**	0	1	**1**	2	2	**4**

Specialized agencies and IAEA (cont'd)																
Organization	**IMO**			**WIPO**			**UNIDO**			**UNWTO**			**IAEA**			
Category of misconduct: • Sub-category of misconduct	**A**	**B**	**Total**	**A**	**B**	**Total**	**A**	**B**	**Total**	**A**	**B**	**Total**	**A**	**B**	**Total**	
Financial irregularities:			**0**			**2**			**7**			**0**			**11**	
• Fraud (incl. entitlement, financial, medical insurance)				_	1		2	1					_	_		
• Misuse of resources				_	_		_	_					1	1		
• Procurement: fraud, collusion				_	_		2	_					_	2		
• Theft and embezzlement				_	_		_	_					_	1		
• Financial disclosure requirements failure				_	_		_	_					_	1		
• Misrepresentation, forgery and false certification				_	_		_	_					_	1		
• Other				_	1		2	_					2	2		
Workplace harassment/abuse of authority:			**0**			**4**			**2**			**0**			**5**	
• Abuse of authority				2	_		2	_					_	1		
• Sexual harassment				_	_		_	_					_	1		
• Workplace harassment				1	1		_	_					2	1		
Improper recruitment/personnel cases			**0**	1	_	**1**	_	_	**0**			**0**	1	1	**2**	
Retaliation against whistleblowers			**0**	_	_	**0**	1	_	**1**			**0**	_	1	**1**	
Other allegations:			**0**			**16**			**54**			**0**			**4**	
• Assault and threats				_	_		1	_					_	_		
• Failure to comply with local laws				_	_		_	_					_	_		
• Sexual exploitation and sexual abuse				_	_		_	_					_	_		
• Other failure to comply with obligations				_	_		1	_					1	_		
• Other				6	10		52	_					2	1		
Grand total	0	0	**0**	10	13	**23**	63	1	**64**	0	0	**0**	9	14	**23**	

[1]Includes inventory/ assets
[2]Includes programmatic allegations
[3]Harassment cases include sexual harassment cases
[4]Includes violations of Financial Rules and Regulations
[5]Includes Refugee Status Determination/ Resettlement (RSD/RST) fraud cases
[6]Includes corporal punishment by teaching staff on school pupils
[7]Includes food diversion.

Annex III

Budget and staffing resources in 2010 for investigations[1]

Organization	Managed resources (Millions of US dollars)*	Internal oversight entity budget (Millions of US dollars)*	Investigation budget (Millions of US dollars)*	Professional staff dedicated to investigations (vacancies)	Remarks
UN	*not provided*	52.9	14.7	70 (27)	Professional staff include OIOS resident investigators assigned to DPKO/ DFS missions
UNDP	*not provided*	13.4	2.2	7	Two staff are involved in case assessment
UNFPA	783.0	5.1	0.8	3	
UNICEF	4 563.0	8.0	No separate allocation	2	Approximate cost of investigation budget is US$ 0.5*
UNHCR	1 903.5	4.6	No separate allocation	5	
UNRWA	863.9	2.0	No separate allocation	1	The USG earmarked funds for one additional investigator post (under recruitment)
UNOPS	1 390.5	2.0	No separate allocation	1	US$ 0.2* were allocated for the salary of dedicated investigator, whose work was supplemented by the use of consultants, as well IAIG auditors and Director
WFP	4 200.0	6.3	2.4	10 (1)	
ILO	608.8	1.8	No separate allocation	1	Investigations are conducted by a Certified Chartered Accountant; professional staff are supplemented by auditors
FAO	1 133.0	5.3	No separate allocation	4	US$ 1.0 * allocated for salaries of staff assigned to the Investigations Unit
UNESCO	326.5	3.0	0.2	1	IOS auditors routinely assigned to supplement investigative capacity
ICAO	235.0	0.8	No separate allocation	0	
WHO	2 150.0	3.9	0.5	1	Additional 0.25 FTEs auditor support
UPU	27.5	0.2	No separate allocation	0	Investigations may either be outsourced to an international private company hired for audits or “in-sourced” (OIOS)

Organization	Managed resources (Millions of US dollars)*	Internal oversight entity budget (Millions of US dollars)*	Investigation budget (Millions of US dollars)*	Professional staff dedicated to investigations (vacancies)	Remarks
ITU	196.0	0.5	No separate allocation	0	Investigations conducted by auditors
WMO	99.3	1.2	No separate allocation	0	Investigations conducted by auditors
IMO	91.0	0.03	No separate allocation	0	Investigations may be conducted by consultants
WIPO	340.6	2.0	No separate allocation	1	Approved additional investigator post in 2011 (under recruitment)
UNIDO	281.9	0.6	No separate allocation	1	Approximate cost of investigation budget is US$ 0.2*; professional staff is supplemented by auditors
UNWTO	22.1	0.01	*Not applicable*	0	Creation of internal oversight function through additional staff seen as unaffordable and unnecessary for a small organization
IAEA	506.4	2.5	0.2	1	The Director General approved additional investigator post in 2011 (under recruitment)

1 Excluded budget and staffing resources for investigations conducted outside the internal oversight entity.
***** All resources/ budgets converted to United States dollars. The conversion rates are US$ 1= SwF 0.90, US$ 1= € 0.74, US$ 1= £ 0.64.

Annex IV

Overview of action to be taken by participating organizations on the recommendations of the Joint Inspection Unit
JIU/REP/2011/7

			United Nations, its funds and programmes								Specialized agencies and IAEA												
		Intended impact	United Nations*	UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	UNHCR	UNRWA	UNOPS	WFP	ILO	FAO	UNESCO	ICAO	WHO	UPU	ITU	WMO	IMO	WIPO	UNIDO	UNWTO	IAEA
Report	For action		☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒
Report	For information		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Recommendation 1		**e**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**
Recommendation 2		**e**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**
Recommendation 3		**e**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**
Recommendation 4		**e**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**
Recommendation 5		**b c**	**I**	**I**	**I**	**I**	**I**	**I**	**I**	**I**	**I**	**I**	**I**	**I**	**I**	**I**	**I**	**I**	**I**	**I**	**I**	**I**	**I**
Recommendation 6		**d**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**	**L**
Recommendation 7		**d**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**
Recommendation 8		**e**	**E**																				

Legend: **L:** Recommendation for decision by legislative organ
E: Recommendation for action by executive head
I: Recommendation for action by the head of internal oversight/investigation unit
▒: Recommendation does not require action by this organization

Intended impact: **a:** enhanced accountability **b:** dissemination of best practices **c:** enhanced coordination and cooperation **d:** enhanced controls and compliance **e:** enhanced effectiveness **f:** significant financial savings **g:** enhanced efficiency **o:** other

* Covers all entities listed in ST/SGB/2002/11 other than UNHCR, UNRWA.

Annex IX

JIU/REP/2011/8

REVIEW OF MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (UNESCO)

Prepared by

Enrique Roman-Morey
Mohamed Mounir Zahran

Joint Inspection Unit

Geneva 2011

United Nations

JIU/REP/2011/8

Original: ENGLISH

REVIEW OF MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (UNESCO)

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United Nations, Geneva 2011

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Review of management and administration in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

JIU/REP/2011/8

Background

This "Review of management and administration in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)" is one of a series of reviews of participating organizations undertaken by the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU). It follows up on the first JIU report on the Organization issued in 2000, almost all of the recommendations from which have been implemented by UNESCO.

The objective of the review was to assess and identify areas for improvement in the management and administration of the Organization. This review was conducted in a fast-changing management environment further to the appointment in 2009 of a new Director-General, the 2010 Independent External Evaluation (IEE) and subsequent follow-up action taken during its General Conference in 2011.

This report was prepared by Inspector Roman Morey. However, further to his resignation in October 2011 to take up his appointment as permanent representative of Peru to the United Nations, Inspector Zahran agreed to act as co-author of the report and present it to UNESCO.

In the last two years, many management initiatives aimed at reforming UNESCO and increasing its organizational effectiveness have been launched under the leadership of the present Director-General and her team. The Inspectors welcome the rationale for these and their strategic orientation. These efforts have been made in a difficult context and require long-term commitment for effective implementation. The present report analyses how UNESCO is performing on parameters commonly used in modelling change management such as vision, leadership, action plan and communication.

The report also provides an update on how reform is perceived as well as on results already achieved and intends to offer some food for thought for the future.

The Inspectors make two recommendations to the UNESCO governing bodies and six to the Director-General as executive head of the Organization.

Main findings and conclusions

UNESCO has made strides forward in a number of areas: the early adoption of IPSAS, the development of a comprehensive oversight framework and attention to risk management. The development of results-based management (RBM) has also been high on the agenda for over a decade. The Inspectors commend this strong commitment to results while, at the same time, encouraging the secretariat to continue efforts such as the improvement of the information management system, the fine-tuning of results-oriented objectives and indicators and dedicated training sessions.

More progress should be made in the area of human resources management. While the human resources policy framework has been reinforced, there is a need to ensure consistency in implementation. Issues such as career management, managerial accountability and the relationship with senior managers continue to require some attention. This situation should be addressed to avoid frustration that may impact on organizational effectiveness.

The Inspectors agree with the IEE, as well as many internal and external stakeholders, that the governance arrangements hinder the effective performance of the institution and that they need further improvement. Building on the IEE recommendations, the Inspectors

encourage member States and the UNESCO secretariat to continue to review the governance framework, to streamline governance arrangements and to improve governance dynamics among UNESCO organs, as a matter of priority, as this is vital for the effective functioning of the Organization.

The review confirmed that UNESCO is facing many challenges and that serious efforts are being made to address these: the streamlining of governance arrangements; the urgent need to develop a more strategic positioning and related prioritization of programmes and activities; a change in organizational culture; the restructuring of the field network and the replacement and adaptation of the workforce due to retirement forecasts. Many of these are interrelated. The Inspectors draw attention to the fact that the sequence of change and the buy-in and full commitment from all stakeholders are key ingredients for success. The ongoing debate on the focus of UNESCO (and related prioritization of its programme activities) is pivotal as it has an impact on many other aspects. This should therefore be tackled as a matter of priority.

Concrete implementation of reforms will require continuous commitment, not only from executive management but from all parts of the Organization. UNESCO should increase its efforts to involve all parts of the institution in order to secure the success of the reform process. The Inspectors recommend enlarging the committee steering the change management process and placing the process under a full-time senior change manager to ensure full coordination and progress of change management in line with the Senior Management Team's mandate and responsibilities. Communication on reform also appears as a key area to be further developed, reaching out to all staff members at all levels and in all locations.

This is the time to invest more rather than less in reform efforts. While there is little immediate prospect of increasing the Organization's budget, given the current global financial situation and the recent decision of a member State to withhold funding and overall trends, the Inspectors recommend that UNESCO establish a dedicated reform trust fund based on a strategic reform initiative with clear benchmarks and results.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADG	Assistant Director-General
ADG/ADM	Assistant Director-General for Administration
ADG/AFR	Assistant Director-General for Africa
ADG/BSP	Assistant Directors-General of the Bureau of Strategic Planning
ADG/ERI	Assistant Director-General for the Sector for External Relations and Information
ADM	Administrative Commission
ALD	Appointment of Limited Duration
ASPAC	The Asia and Pacific group of States
BFC	Bureau of Field Coordination
BSP	Bureau of Strategic Planning
CAP	Consolidated Appeal Committee
CEB	United Nations Chief Executives Board for Coordination
CIO	Chief Information Officer
CISS	Committee on Information Systems and Services
CSC	Corporate Services Committee
DDG	Deputy Director-General
DG	Director-General
DIR/ODG	Director of Director-General Office
EB	Executive Board
EMC	Executive Management Committee
ERI	Sector for External Relations and Information
ERP	Enterprise Resource Planning system
FABS	Finance and Budget System
GRULAC	The Latin American and Caribbean Group of States
ICT	Information and Communication Technologies
IEE	Independent External Evaluation
IOS	Internal Oversight Section
IPSAS	International Public Sector Accounting Standards
IT	Information Technology
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
LMDP	Leadership and Management Development Programme
MLAs	Main Line of Actions
NGO	Non-governmental organization
OAC	Oversight Advisory Committee
PMC	Programme Management Committee
PRX	General Questions, Programme Support and External Relations Commission
RBM	Results-based management
RMC	High Level Committee on Risk Management
SC	Service Contract
SISTER	System of Information on Strategies, Tasks and the Evaluation of Results
SMT	Senior Management Team
SSA	Special Service Agreement
STEPS	System to Enhance Personnel Services
WGIEE	Working Group on the Report on the Independent External Evaluation
XB	Extra-budgetary
ZNG	Zero Nominal Growth
ZRG	Zero Real Growth

I. INTRODUCTION

1. As part of its programme of work for 2009, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) conducted a review of management and administration in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).[1] This report is one of a series of reviews of participating organizations undertaken in recent years. After being informed of an Independent External Evaluation (IEE) process decided by the UNESCO General Conference in 2009[2] and in order to avoid duplication, the Inspectors postponed the completion of their review until after the publication of the IEE report. While the evaluation document presented at the 185th session of the Executive Board[3] (October 2010) did not examine the Organization's internal functioning or management as such, it was taken into consideration in finalizing this review.[4] As requested by UNESCO, this report should be seen as complementary to the external evaluation, therefore does not address the full range of issues as it normally would.

2. The preamble to the UNESCO Constitution sets out its purpose as "advancing, through the educational and scientific and cultural relations of the peoples of the world, the objectives of international peace and of the common welfare of mankind". The Medium-term Strategy 2008-2013 states its main functions as:[5] (a) a laboratory of ideas; (b) standard-setting; (c) a clearing-house, (d) a capacity-builder in member States in UNESCO's field of competence and (e) a catalyst for international cooperation. UNESCO thus combines its role in international intellectual cooperation in education, science and culture with activities supporting national governments in their projects and programmes for development. The 2010-2011 UNESCO regular budget resources amounted to about 650 million USD per biennium, complemented by roughly the same amount of voluntary contributions. To fulfil its mandates, UNESCO relies on its secretariat, composed of its headquarters in Paris and its field presence worldwide (field offices and various categories of institutes), complemented by a vast network of entities such as national commissions, clubs, chairs and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

3. The current UNESCO Director-General took office in November 2009 with an ambitious agenda to revitalize UNESCO that created high expectations among all UNESCO stakeholders: member States, staff members, external partners, etc. A number of initiatives to improve governance, executive management and management practices emerged. These were concomitant with the first steps to follow up on the recommendations contained in the Independent External Evaluation. This JIU review was therefore conducted in a transitional and fast-changing management environment. The Inspectors have been closely following these processes in order to avoid this report's recommendations being obsolete or overtaken by events. The report offers an assessment of change management initiatives, of their actual or potential effects, and how these efforts are perceived in the Organization.

A. Objectives and scope

4. This review follows up on the recommendations made in 2000 and identifies the remaining challenges in the following areas: governance, executive management, organizational structure and decentralization, administration, strategic planning and

[1] The Unit issued an initial report on UNESCO under JIU/REP/2000/4.
[2] UNESCO General Conference resolution 35/C 102.
[3] 185 EX/18 and IOS/EVS/PI/107, "Independent external Evaluation of UNESCO, Final Report".
[4] Of the six focus areas, two were of interest for the JIU review: (a) the division of competences between the governing bodies and the secretariat and (b) the coherence between the sectors of the Secretariat.
[5] UNESCO Medium-Term Strategy, 34 C/4.

budgeting, human resources management and oversight.[6] Another objective is to pinpoint good practices and share them with other United Nations system organizations.

B. Methodology

5. In accordance with the JIU internal standards and guidelines, the methodology followed included:

- A desk review and an in-depth content analysis of the General Conference and the Executive Board parliamentary documents as well as of UNESCO secretariat internal documentation;
- Interviews with the Director-General, the outgoing and current deputy Director-General, with UNESCO officials representing the main corporate management functions based at Paris Headquarters, and with the heads of several substantive sectors of the secretariat;
- Interviews with ambassadors/heads of various delegations of member States, including some members of the Executive Board; discussions with the Chairperson of the Executive Board and the Chairperson of the ad hoc working group on the report on the independent external evaluation (WGIEE);
- Funding constraints imposed limitations concerning the coverage of field entities. Field visits were made to the Havana Office and Regional Bureau for Culture for Latin America and the Caribbean, and to the Santiago de Chile Office and Regional Bureau for Education in the same region, to record the views of officials and staff deployed in the field as well as to meet with relevant host country authorities. Targeted questionnaires were sent to chiefs of field offices and interviews were conducted with some field entities (e.g. Addis Ababa Liaison Office, offices in Dakar and Beirut);
- Data collection and consolidation focusing on budgetary and financial figures and human resources figures as provided by the UNESCO secretariat;
- While ensuring full confidentiality, UNESCO shared the aggregated results of its internal Global Staff Survey (2010). In addition, the Inspectors circulated an online staff survey to seek the opinions of UNESCO employees on the reforms and the changes in management. A total of 1,272 persons participated in the JIU online survey, of which roughly 20 per cent were short-term staff or non-staff personnel. The survey took place after a number of changes had been introduced by the UNESCO secretariat. Details are presented in Annex I.

6. In accordance with the JIU statute, this report has been finalized after consultation among the Inspectors so as to test its conclusions and recommendations against the collective wisdom of the Unit. The UNESCO secretariat provided factual and substantive comments on the draft report that were taken into account in finalizing the report.

7. To facilitate the handling of the report and the implementation of its recommendations and the monitoring thereof, Annex III contains a table specifying those recommendations that require a decision by the UNESCO legislative/governing bodies and those that can be acted upon by the Director-General.

8. The Inspectors wish to express their appreciation to all who assisted them in the preparation of this report, particularly to those who participated in the interviews and so willingly shared their knowledge and expertise.

[6] Findings and recommendations made by the Inspectors in 2000 are included in the narrative when deemed relevant. In 2000, the UNESCO Director-General endorsed JIU recommendations with specific comments and reservations as indicated in document 160 EX/41.

II. GOVERNANCE

9. The basic texts of UNESCO define the role and responsibilities of the General Conference, the Executive Board and the secretariat. Governance arrangements are usually referred to as the "relations between the three organs of UNESCO". The UNESCO Constitution was carefully designed to serve the purposes of the Organization and is based on a "one-country one-vote" principle. However, over the years, the many competing demands and additions have put pressure on the existing governance structure, resulting in a de facto dual governance structure with duplication, overlap and overemphasis on multi-tier processes. The General Conference, the Executive Board and the secretariat have spent significant amounts of time, and resources, on debating, reflecting and reporting on governance issues over the years. An analysis of the abundant parliamentary literature shows difficulties and a number of concrete solutions were found. However, the implementation of advocated improvements was too often limited to ensuring streamlining of the existing governance arrangements rather than addressing the real changes needed.[7]

10. In 2010, the IEE commented extensively on governance issues and again pointed out that the governance framework needs more effectiveness. The IEE stressed the risks of duplication, disconnection and blurred lines of responsibility between the three UNESCO organs. The Inspectors support the call of the IEE for reform and recognize that efforts are under way to address this issue. They therefore only provide comments in this section of the report. Building on the IEE and its follow-up mechanisms, UNESCO has now reached the point at which to take decisive steps to strengthen and enhance the coherence of its governance arrangements, as acknowledged by members of WGIEE[8] as well as by its senior officials.[9] Reforming governance arrangements is a sensitive process for all multilateral organizations. Nothing can be accomplished without strong support from the member States on the matter. During the work of WGIEE, member States seemed ready to discuss the relevance of current institutional arrangements. Some proposals represent positive steps towards change and improvement: for example the merging, on an experimental basis, of the Administrative Commission (ADM) with the General Questions, Programme Support and External Relations Commission (PRX) of the General Conference, and the suspension, on an experimental basis, of the Group of Experts on Financial and Administrative Matters of the Executive Board.

11. In the Inspectors' opinion, more changes might be needed to achieve greater governance effectiveness. Member States of UNESCO should therefore continue to build on the current momentum and pursue their efforts to streamline the governance arrangements. Many options can be envisaged, each of which has political and financial dimensions. Special attention should be given to the current governance arrangements and their periodicity. For example, in order to reduce its burden and the length of the session, the General Conference could adopt an agenda whereby it would focus alternately on strategic debates (aligned with each new programming cycle) and on administrative and budgetary issues. The reduction to only one Executive Board session per year, preceded by a session of the proposed ad hoc group to prepare substantive matters, should also be considered.

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
[7] See for example: 167 EX/13 (2003), 180 EX/INF.3, 29 C/Resolution 87, 33 C/Resolution 92, 35 C/43.

[8] See 186 EX/17: notably by (a) strengthening the role of the General Conference in strategic policy formulation and priority setting, (b) strengthening the monitoring role of the Executive Board in the execution of UNESCO programmes, including follow-up to the recommendations of all evaluations and to improving the quality and relevance of decisions and ensuring substantive evidence-based information for the General Conference and Executive Board discussions.

[9] The complexity of the governance architecture and the respective roles of the governing bodies were also discussed during the Senior Management Team (SMT) retreat in 2011.

12. The complexity of governance is derived from the constitution of UNESCO and from other legal texts. As illustrated by Figure 1, the heavy institutional machinery creates the conditions for duplication, ineffective working methods and compartmentalized processes.

Figure 1: UNESCO Governance Framework



13. In terms of governance dynamics, the Inspectors welcome the proposal to set up a joint mechanism consisting of member States and the UNESCO secretariat to review the interactions between the governing bodies and the secretariat as well as their working relationship.[10] Several proposals emanating from the IEE follow-up exercise aim to increase communication between the secretariat and member States. It is a positive development since reviewing UNESCO governance should indeed be a common endeavour. It is also a prerequisite for concretization of reform efforts.

14. The current situation calls for improvement. Interviewees pointed out the need for more communication between member States and the UNESCO secretariat. Communication efforts should focus on better understanding the respective constraints and objectives. On the one hand, the UNESCO secretariat seeks more strategic guidance from member States but, on the other hand, considers some of their requests to amount to micromanagement. Member State representatives requested better information so as to enhance the decision-making process. They shared their concerns with the Inspectors regarding the perceived absence of consultation and transparency at various levels of UNESCO, within UNESCO or between UNESCO and member States. As communicated to the Inspectors, the new initiative of the Director General to hold more frequent information meetings was welcomed by permanent delegations.

[10] 186 EX/17.

III. MANAGEMENT

A. Executive management

15. The 2010 Independent External Evaluation was conceptualized as a "strategic and forward-looking" exercise to position UNESCO to meet its future needs and challenges. The efforts of UNESCO developed around the follow-up to the IEE conclusions and recommendations to improve the Organization's governance and effectiveness via a change management process. Similar exercises undertaken by other United Nations organizations show that such exercises have long-term implications.

16. The IEE recommendations were broad and significant in scope. Member States and the UNESCO secretariat embarked on a series of follow-up exercises. The first round lasted from December 2010 to May 2011 when the UNESCO secretariat and the WGIEE worked in parallel to formulate proposals following the IEE recommendations. Both parties presented separate reports that were consolidated into one Executive Board document for its May 2011 session. The reports put forward a number of proposals. The outcome of the WGIEE contained action-oriented recommendations; most of them were endorsed by the Executive Board in May 2011 and by the General Conference in November of the same year. The majority of the preoccupations of member States were echoed by the Director-General's report presented to member States.

17. **The Inspectors agree with many interviewees that the establishment of the WGIEE was a positive development that created a forum to openly tackle some of the key issues. However, the IEE follow-up process has to be more effectively coordinated in the future and should ensure greater interaction between member States and UNESCO officials.** As stated by the Director-General, "Reforming UNESCO is a shared responsibility between the Governing Bodies and the Secretariat and will be a long-term process requiring a sustained and coordinated set of actions."[11] The Deputy Director-General provided liaison between the UNESCO secretariat and WGIEE. While UNESCO secretariat officials participated as observers at some WGIEE meetings held in 2011, the level of communication seems to have been below expectations as some member States candidly informed the Inspectors that the content of the secretariat's report (presented to Executive Board session in May 2011) had been "totally new to them". The Inspectors believe that the Director-General and the Executive Board should implement cooperation and information-sharing processes to follow up on the IEE. In that spirit, during the Executive Board meetings in late 2011, follow-up measures with action points formulated by WGIEE and the Director General, together with a timetable for implementation, were discussed in detail and subsequently endorsed by the General Conference.

18. Since the issuance of the JIU report in 2000, UNESCO has undergone an ongoing programme of management reforms aimed at "rethinking UNESCO's priorities and refocusing its action, streamlining its structures and management procedures, re-motivating its staff and rationalizing its decentralization policy".[12] In the last decade, standardized reports on UNESCO reform such as staff policies and the decentralization process have been presented to governing bodies. Despite some progress, both the IEE and JIU found that progress was limited and incomplete in a number of areas. The IEE highlighted as the remaining difficulty in these areas the need for a "one UNESCO" functioning in a less compartmentalized manner and in partnership with other organizations.

19. Since July 2010, under the leadership of the current Director-General and a new senior management team, management reforms and organizational restructuring have been announced, both for headquarters and for the field. There are many challenges ahead: the streamlining of governance arrangements and the urgent development of a strategic

[11] 186 EX/17 Part 2.
[12] 159 EX/5.

positioning and related programmes and activities are the priority. The need to change the organizational culture; the restructuring of the field network and the replacement and the adaptation of the workforce in line with retirement forecasts are examples of necessary undertakings.

20. **Many of these initiatives are interrelated. The Inspectors draw attention to the fact that the sequence of change is a key element for success. The debate on the future focus of UNESCO (and related prioritization of its programme activities) is the most strategic as it will have an impact on many other aspects. It should therefore be tackled as a matter of priority.**

21. In May 2011, in her remarks introducing the proposal for the 2012-2013 programme budget, the Director-General recognized that the net effect of the changes and improvements already made remains to be seen but stated her conviction that the "message of renewal and change sent within the Organization and towards its partners" was correct.[13] Member States' representatives concurred in their discussions with the Inspectors that signals from the new administration were positive, but also recognized that implementation should be more visible. "The momentum for reform and for change is there but the window for reform is not extensible". UNESCO has thus entered into a transitional and critical period.

22. The JIU survey indicates that many UNESCO employees were sceptical of the benefits of the reform. Interviews and opinions collected from the survey tend to show a divided house on the assessment of reform initiatives. While the assessment made by the directors of the Organization is more positive, almost half question reform benefits. One can also note that one third of respondents do not express any opinion, which may indicate that the results of reforms are unclear to them or be evidence of a general feeling that reform has yet to prove itself.

Table 1: Views of UNESCO employees on the reform process and change in management (in percentages)

Q. The comprehensive reform process undertaken since the arrival of the new management team has been beneficial to UNESCO					
	Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**	**Do not know**
All employees	5.2	30.2	22.8	6.6	35.2
Directors and above	14.3	40.5	31	4.8	9.5
International professionals	6.1	30.8	27	7.9	28.3
Headquarters staff	6.1	25.8	29.8	9.7	28.7
Field staff*	4.2	35.1	15	3.2	42.5
Q. Current management changes contribute to improving internal efficiency at UNESCO					
	Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**	**Do not know**
All employees	4.6	32.9	25.9	6.8	29.8
Directors and above	11.9	40.5	33.3	4.8	9.5
International professionals	4.3	30.1	29.7	9.4	26.5
Headquarters staff	4.4	28.7	32.6	9.9	24.5
Field staff*	4.9	37.6	18.4	3.4	35.7

*Source: JIU survey 2011. *In this report, field staff includes all staff deployed outside Paris headquarters*

[13] 36 C/5, Draft resolutions 2012-2013, Volume 1.

B. Change management process

23. The analysis of the change management process at UNESCO, based on commonly used criteria[14], shows a mixed picture.

Necessity for change

24. The necessity for change is well recognized and accepted by member States and UNESCO senior officials, confirming the findings of the IEE. Some interviewees even said that "it was a matter of survival in the long-term". Member States seem conscious of the need to reposition UNESCO and to change several aspects of its functioning.

Vision for change

25. The Director-General's vision for change is an essential driver for real change at UNESCO. The IEE showed the challenges of building the vision of the future UNESCO, in particular the difficult task of defining the "comparative advantage" of UNESCO. The vision for change is directly related to better defining the Organization's focus and priorities, which is a medium-term endeavour that requires not only taking stock of the current situation and achievements, but also identifying the areas in which UNESCO can make a difference to the benefit of its member States.

26. The main directions are generally agreed upon, namely: increased focus on the Organization's strengths; partnerships with other United Nations system organizations/entities; and bringing the Organization closer to the field and to the needs of member States. The role of member States is critical in achieving these objectives by providing strategic guidance via the governing bodies, notably via the General Conference.

27. Since her appointment, the current Director-General has made strong statements regarding her vision for reforming the Organization and its functioning from the management point of view to focus on "streamlining and making organizational structures more responsive". Her stress on the need for being "less costly and bureaucratic and doing more for less, ensuring full transparency, introducing new working methods, and bringing UNESCO closer to the field" is appropriate and much needed. As mentioned above, the implementation and, more importantly, the results of these measures are a work in progress and not yet evident to all stakeholders. The Director-General proposed that a number of actions be monitored to allow the proper oversight of governing bodies. This is a step in the right direction: more indicators for assessing change must be developed and shared with member States so as to put them in a better position to assess the impact of measures taken and exercise the required guidance.

Leadership

28. The UNESCO senior leadership team appears committed to supporting the Director-General in transforming the Organization. Interviews with senior managers underlined that the team of ADGs is strongly supportive of her vision and agenda.

29. There is a consensus amongst the Director-General, WGIEE and the nine international experts (see para. 32) on the need for a change management group to lead the Organization through this challenging process. The Director-General stated that she assumes full leadership of the change management process, in close cooperation with her Senior Management team (SMT). She also stated that the SMT should act as a steering group through the Programme Management Committee and the Corporate Services Committee, under the guidance of the Deputy Director-General.

[14] Change management is defined as a structured approach to help individuals, teams, and organizations transitioning from a current state to a desired future state. In this section, the Inspector refers to the model developed by Oxford Change management (http://www.oxfordchange.com/welcome).

30. Change management has become part of the SMT mission in addition to many other equally pressing issues. The Inspectors' opinion on this matter is that, while high level engagement is critical for the success of any change management initiative, it should be recognized that leading and implementing reforms simultaneously are quite challenging tasks in any organization. For this reason, other organizations (for example FAO and UNICEF) have set up temporary change management offices to ensure coordination and communication on the matter. Furthermore, the mission of the change management group is broader than that of a senior management committee. It must ensure corporate buy-in and the commitment for change throughout the Organization. It is its responsibility to ensure that change is explained, understood, accepted and embraced by UNESCO at large. This does not in the eyes of the Inspectors minimize the role of the SMT as a driver for change; it rather strengthens its strategic leadership. During the review, the UNESCO secretariat pointed out its fundamental difference of view on the matter, quoting other research papers on change management that were not arguing for a separate Change Management Office.

31. **In the opinion of the Inspectors, the composition of a change management group should ideally go beyond the SMT and include heads of substantive sectors or divisions and also staff at various levels, staff representatives and representatives of field offices and Institutes, as well as representatives of major UNESCO partners.** These resource officials should be partly released from their regular tasks to enable them to provide useful contributions. Lessons learned from other organizations that have gone through a similar process indicate that change management requires dedicated full-time leadership in order to oversee the many aspects of change resulting from initiatives. Thus, the group should be placed under the guidance of a specific full-time change manager with a temporary mandate of two years to launch and support the initial steps of the process. This involves most notably coordinating the in-house change management process, keeping all stakeholders informed and involved and monitoring a rigorous implementation plan. The change manager should be part of the SMT and should regularly report back to the Organization's senior officials and solicit their involvement as required. **The Inspectors are aware of the financial implications entailed by this scenario but consider it as essential to ensure a more integrated approach for change and corporate buy-in of reform efforts.**

32. The Director-General also gathered nine independent international experts and organizational change into a Senior Expert Group on Reforms tasked to advise her on change management and related issues. While the timing of the first meeting of the group did not seem fully appropriate (March 2011, at a time when the WGIEE was finalizing its recommendations), there is benefit to be derived from an external assessment on change management initiatives and their implementation, if comments provided are specific and actionable.

The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to improve the effectiveness of the change management process.

Recommendation 1

The Director-General should create a dedicated and broadened change management group to be responsible for the change management process. It should be led by a full-time senior change management focal point who would drive the process within a two-year time frame.

Action plan

33. The Executive Board (186th and 187th sessions) welcomed the Director-General's action plan to follow up on the IEE. The directions set are positive and ambitious for the future of UNESCO and when put into practice will represent major changes in the way UNESCO conducts business. The Inspectors welcome the fact that the plan presented at the 187th session of the Executive Board includes a timetable for implementation. As stated before, the sequence of change is a key parameter and is therefore crucial for success.

Communication

34. Clear and transparent communication is an essential part of the change process. In managing change, research shows that communication eases the process, decreasing uncertainty and hence anxiety among staff and managers. The Inspectors reviewed some of the Director-General's notes and acknowledged efforts to explain the context and the rationale for management decisions. However, the Inspectors felt that such documents should be more explanatory. Communication should also stress the new perspectives together with the ways in which change will affect current positions or procedures. This aspect of change is always difficult for staff and managers and can affect staff motivation.

35. Communication to member States about the reform process has been significant and appreciated by them. However, within the secretariat, one-sided communication risks not bringing on board staff, who represent important actors in change management. The UNESCO Global Staff Survey showed that, in general, communication between management and employees is perceived as unsatisfactory. Responses to the JIU survey confirm that communication has been neither sufficient nor very successful: fewer than 40 per cent of respondents stated that the agenda and the objectives of the management team are clear to them. The same percentage feel regularly informed about reform efforts, corporate objectives and priorities. The Inspectors were informed that the Director-General has held two town hall meetings that were broadcast online. The UNESCO secretariat believes that it contributed to improved communication with all staff. At the time of the JIU survey, indeed, the responses filtered by categories of staff indicated a need for better explanation of the reform process in order to gain more in-house support. **This needs to be an ongoing process.**

Table 2: Views of various categories of UNESCO employees on communication concerning reform efforts undertaken since 2009 (in percentages)

Q. The agenda and objectives of the current management team are clear to me					
	Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**	**Do not know**
All employees	3.8	32.8	35.2	10.8	17.4
Directors and above	16.7	38.1	40.5	4.8	0
International professionals	4.7	32.1	39.6	14.6	9
Headquarters staff	4.2	30.2	41	13.1	11.6
Field staff	3.4	35.7	28.8	8.2	23.9
Q. UNESCO senior management has informed staff of the rationale behind the current reform initiatives and regularly updates them on progress in their implementation					
	Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**	**Do not know**
All employees	2.9	28.6	39.4	10.7	18.4
Directors and above	4.8	38.1	45.2	7.1	4.8
International professionals	3.1	27.4	44.7	13	11.7
Headquarters staff	1.9	27.9	44	11.2	15
Field staff	4	29.4	34.2	10.1	22.2

Source: JIU survey 2011

Engagement

36. For a successful change management process, the engagement of staff members at all functions, levels and locations is essential. The task forces on reform created by the Director-General provided an opportunity for staff to engage and to contribute their views in several areas. To secure support and further engagement, the follow-up given to such initiatives is crucial to show that contributions and suggestions are taken seriously into consideration. However, the Inspectors noted that some staff were unable to see clearly how their contribution was utilized.

37. The UNESCO Global Staff Survey showed strong support for the Organization's objectives among its staff, and a strong belief in their contribution towards achieving these objectives. But at the same time, the results of the JIU survey highlight the feeling of disconnection among all categories of UNESCO employees with regard to the management reform process, with fewer than 10 per cent feeling involved and more than two thirds feeling not involved. The process must be more inclusive, in particular of the field workforce. When the Inspectors talked to some field-deployed staff, they were not always aware of ongoing reform measures, their rationale and their potential effects. There is an urgent need to reconnect staff at large with the ongoing process. The JIU survey also confirms that staff would like to be more involved in the debate on ways and means to improve internal processes.

Table 3: Views of various categories of UNESCO employees regarding their involvement in the management reform process (in percentages)

Q. Do you feel involved in the management reform process at UNESCO?			
	Yes	**Somewhat**	**No**
All employees	8	26.4	65.6
Directors and above	21.4	40.5	38.1
International professionals	8.8	28.3	62.9
Headquarters staff	11.8	25.8	62.4
Field staff	3.8	27.1	69.1

Source: JIU survey 2011

38. The involvement of senior and mid-level managers is another necessary condition for success. UNESCO may encounter some difficulties with this, as it requires a shift in organizational culture which has been in place for years. The SMT noted that "some contributions provided by heads of some substantive sectors were short of expectation containing statement of intention that were not addressing actions and specific modalities for achieving results". Such participation continues to be reflective of silo-culture from various substantive sectors and was lacking an integrated and strategic vision for UNESCO as a whole ("One UNESCO").[15] The JIU survey shows that almost half the directors consider that the agenda and objectives of the current management team are unclear and barely 50 per cent see the benefits of reforms currently under way.

C. Senior management committees

39. In 2010, the Director-General established a Senior Management Team (SMT) supported by three management committees: the Executive Management Committee (EMC), the Programme Management Committee (PMC) and the Corporate Services Committee (CSC), each with specific responsibilities. These committees replaced the previous senior managerial arrangements based on the college of ADGs and the Directorate. The goal was to enhance the effective and collegial leadership of UNESCO and to improve cohesion at senior level. UNESCO executive management is satisfied that these arrangements provide an effective forum for strategic and operational information sharing, consensus building and decision-making.

[15] SMT minutes, January 2011.

Box 1: Responsibilities of management committees

The Senior Management Team (SMT) chaired by the DG and composed of the DDG, all ADGs and the Directors of the Central Services. It meets every two months for an information/consultation session. Additional meetings may address substantive discussion on the leadership, overall strategic reflection, initiatives to strengthen UNESCO and overall organizational performance and cooperation.

The Executive Management Committee (EMC) comprises the DG (as chair), the DDG, the Assistant Directors-General of the Bureau of Strategic Planning (ADG/BSP) and of the Sector for External Relations and Information (ADG/ERI) and the Director of Director-General Office (DIR/ODG). This Committee advises the DG on key strategic matters, on the organizational structure, on governance and key choices on the use of resources and other important operational issues.

The Programme Management Committee (PMC) comprises the DDG (as chair), the ADG/BSP, all Programme Sector ADGs, ADG/ERI, the Assistant Director-General for Africa (ADG/AFR), the Director of the Bureau of Field Coordination, the DIR/ODG, the Director for Gender Equality (DIR/ODG/GE) and two Field Office/Category I Institute Directors. The Committee coordinates and monitors overall programme implementation and promotes intersectoral dialogue and initiatives (at headquarters and in the field) to ensure the coherence and integration of all UNESCO programmes and to align programmes and resources with its strategic priorities, to oversee programme performance, and to draw on lessons learned during the implementation process.

The Corporate Services Committee (CSC) comprises the DDG (as chair), the ADG/ADM, the ADG/ERI and all UNESCO corporate service heads. This Committee coordinates the streamlining of corporate service operations and procedures and ensures that integrated, timely and coherent support is provided to programme sectors and field offices, while ensuring continuous improvement in processes and procedures.

Source: DG/Note/2010/43

40. The Inspectors analysed the available minutes of the meetings of the Directorate (2008-2009) and the SMT (2010-2011). The comparative content analysis shows that the substantive content of the meetings has improved. SMT now focuses less on the preparation of governing bodies' sessions and more on management issues, therefore increasingly providing a forum for strategic discussions, information sharing, consensus building and decision-making. While the UNESCO executive management believes that the SMT has become a more effective forum, this is not yet fully recognized by staff members and will need to be better communicated. As acknowledged during the SMT retreat in February 2011, "further improvement is still possible and should be accomplished when senior committees are at cruising speed". The Inspectors wish to point out the following:

- The absence of minutes for some meetings and the absence of recording of any decisions in the minutes provided;
- The lack of consistent participation at the highest levels. The records show that the participation of ADGs of substantive sectors is uneven;
- The lack of focus of the meetings. Chairs of the committees should make sure that meetings remain focused within their scope. For example, from information received, as of November 2011 the CSC has held only five meetings and tackled some issues not directly related to its mandate.

41. As indicated by the JIU survey, the existence and functions of the new committees remain unclear to staff members, in particular in the field. More worrying is that only 32 per cent of directors responding to JIU consider that these committees have improved executive management.

42. As stated in DG/Note/10/43, one of the first tasks of the PMC and the CSC was to review and assess the rationales and the work of all standing or ad hoc UNESCO bodies (task forces, permanent management committees, task teams, steering committees, administrative groups, etc.) and to decide whether their work can be integrated into that of the newly established committees. The Inspectors regret that this simplification exercise has not yet

been fully completed, possibly creating confusion in individual mandates and responsibilities at a time of intense management reform.

The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to improve the efficiency of the Organization's activities.

Recommendation 2

The Director-General should issue a DG/Note clarifying further the mandates and responsibilities of the existing management structures and their interaction with the senior management committees as part of the delegation of authority.

D. Other management issues

Enterprise risk management (ERM)

43. In 2008, a High Level Committee on Risk Management (RMC) was established, thus making UNESCO one of the first United Nations system organizations to tackle risk management organization-wide. It is composed of top officials and managers serving on a rotational basis. A review of the minutes of the eight meetings held in 2008 and 2009 reveals that the RMC focused its work primarily on resources, staffing, partnerships and inter-sectorality. The RMC succeeded in identifying and thoroughly discussing some main corporate risk areas, but rarely came up with actionable decisions. There is a need to bring the RMC closer to other strategic internal bodies and to take full advantage of its work.

44. The RMC should continue to develop a comprehensive risk management framework for UNESCO based on the identification, prioritization, management and monitoring of risks for the Organization, including those that are strategic, financial, and operational or affect the reputation of UNESCO. The RMC should devote a specific session to internal risks associated with the change management process.

Control mechanisms

45. UNESCO is making an effort to strengthen internal controls and to enhance standards of conduct within the Organization at all levels. The Inspectors wish to underline the following:

- The establishment of the Ethics Office in 2009, which has been functioning since September 2010. The Ethics Adviser (D-1) reports directly to the Director-General. In line with the JIU recommendation on the subject,[16] the Ethics Office annual report is circulated to the Executive Board. Training sessions are mandatory for all staff;
- The adoption of a whistleblower policy (2010) and the review of the anti-harassment policy (2010) are also positive developments, in particular since several comments made to the Inspectors suggest a climate of mistrust within the Organization;
- The preliminary development of a financial disclosure policy as part of a comprehensive policy on conflict of interest. It should be finalized as a priority, as many United Nations system organizations have already adopted and implemented such a policy;
- The consolidation of the UNESCO administrative and human resources manual available online has been positively recognized as a useful tool. However, some interviewees and respondents to the JIU survey questioned the effective application of the rules and procedures contained therein;
- The procedure for self-assessment for some senior managers, based on personal attestation and questionnaires, has inherent and well-recognized limitations, but is nonetheless welcome. It should be complemented by a proper monitoring mechanism to avoid becoming a bureaucratic exercise with limited added value;

[16] JIU/REP/2010/3, "Ethics in the United Nations system".

- The adoption of International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS): UNESCO is one of the first United Nations organizations to successfully produce its financial statements and accounts under IPSAS for the year 2010.

46. These improvements are welcome, but require effective implementation and specific evaluations of how they actually contribute to their respective stated objectives. Responses to the JIU survey confirmed that these measures are recognized as positive, but also suggested that better information for employees is needed to increase full awareness and allow them to take advantage of them, in particular at field level.

Organizational structure

47. The 2000 JIU report found that the UNESCO organizational structure was "far too complex and fragmented and involves many overlapping lines of authority". It recommended that the structure be streamlined and that a strategic plan be developed for delegation of authority. The organizational structure, in particular within substantive sectors, has been modified a number of times in the last decade. The Inspectors concur with the External Auditor in stating that constant restructuring is not an effective management attitude.

48. Annex II presents the UNESCO organizational structure as envisioned for 2012-2013[17]. It reflects the diversity of UNESCO mandates, notably through its five substantive sectors as main pillars. The structure remains highly thematically fragmented implying a silo effect and compartmentalization of substantive activities rather than cross-cutting programming. As one high-ranking UNESCO official candidly remarked, "one UNESCO is still to be created" by increasing cooperation and cohesion between all substantive sectors. The JIU survey also highlighted some reservations concerning the adequacy of the organizational structure to achieve the mandates.

Table 4: Views of various categories of UNESCO employees regarding the organizational structure (in percentages)

Q. In your opinion, is the current structure of UNESCO overall adequate to help the Organization achieve its mandate?				
	Yes	**Somewhat**	**No**	**Don't know**
All employees	14.5	44.5	28.1	13
Directors and above	17.9	43.6	33.3	5.1
International professionals	11	44.4	35.2	9.4
Headquarters staff	13.8	43.7	30.3	12.2
Field staff	15.2	45.5	25.6	13.8

Source: JIU survey 2011

49. The UNESCO secretariat at headquarters is composed of more than 20 different entities, substantive sectors, main corporate divisions (bureaux) or the category 1 Institutes and other entities enjoying various levels of autonomy, sometimes significant. As of July 2011, 16 different entities report to the Director-General and her Office, making a strong and experienced support team necessary to provide an appropriate level of advice and guidance for fast and informed decision-making at high levels of the Organization. Within sectors some entities, such as the World Heritage Centre or the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (having their own boards for internal governance as described by the IEE) enjoy a certain degree of autonomy.

50. There are persistent difficulties caused by the structure in terms of overlapping roles and functions due to the decentralization and devolution of a number of support functions to the sectors and field offices, as identified during the SMT retreat in 2011. Each sector has its own executive office which takes care of some management, administrative, financial and other support functions within their individual areas of authority and under the oversight of the

[17] See Annex II.

related headquarters entity (procurement, human resources, IT, etc.). This is not unusual in United Nations organizations but it requires intense and timely coordination.

51. The UNESCO Global Staff Survey emphasized the difficulties associated with knowledge-sharing between sectors and bureaux. The findings of the JIU survey confirmed that better communication mechanisms for knowledge-sharing and in-house cooperation are a matter of concern.

Table 5: Views of various categories of UNESCO employees on coordination and cooperation between UNESCO entities (in percentages)

Q. Based on your personal experience, how satisfactory is coordination and cooperation in the following case?					
	Very satisfactory	**Satisfactory**	**Unsatisfactory**	**Very unsatisfactory**	**Do not know**
Across your sector	10.2	48.9	27.7	8.6	4.6
Between sectors	1.8	27.9	44.5	13.3	12.4
Between headquarters and field offices	4	32.1	32	11.8	20.1
Between headquarters and Institutes	2	21.5	21.3	8.7	46.5
Between field offices	2.1	22.6	20.9	6.9	47.5
Between field offices and Institutes	1.9	20.7	18.2	7.1	52.1

Source: JIU survey 2011

52. Significant restructuring has occurred since 2009. The Inspectors are generally in agreement with the rationale as described in Table 6. The gains in effectiveness or in improved management practices have to be analysed in the long term, but the interim assessment looks positive as shown by the responses from staff. The restructuring of the substantive sectors is the next main challenge, a task that started with the Education Sector in 2011. The Inspectors stress that the restructuring of substantive sectors has to be conducted keeping the prioritization strategy in mind.

Table 6: Views of UNESCO employees regarding the 2009-2010 restructuring (in percentages)

Q. Do you believe that the following restructuring initiatives will contribute to enhancing organizational effectiveness at UNESCO?				
	Yes	**Some what**	**No**	**Do not know**
Merging of the two secretariats serving the Executive Board and the General Conference to enhance synergies and build upon similar competence and skills	38.5	24.9	4.8	31.7
Merging the Bureau of Strategic Planning (BSP) with part of Bureau of the Budget to consolidate programming and budgeting activities, including extra budgetary resource mobilization	32.8	30.4	17.5	19.4
Merging the responsibilities for external relations and public information into one consolidated entity to increase visibility and coherence of communication towards member States and external audiences	43.8	33	9.9	13.4
Merging of the Bureau of the Budget and the Bureau of the Comptroller to create a Bureau of Financial Management to provide one single desk for all UNESCO financial management and financial control	38.2	30.5	8.8	22.5

Source: JIU survey 2011

53. General Conference 30 C/Resolution 83 established the UNESCO decentralization strategy and policy. The decentralization process started in the early nineties "to enhance operational effectiveness in meeting UNESCO strategic programme objectives and to cater

more effectively to the needs of member States." The decentralization strategy and action plan was further redefined in 2000/2001.

54. As documented in many interim reports on the decentralization process, there has been a progressive transfer of regular budget resources to field operations in the last decade. Due to a lack of data, it was difficult to assess the magnitude of this redeployment of all types of resources, regular and extra-budgetary, at the corporate level.

55. The investment in the field is likely to continue to position UNESCO closer to stakeholders, as recommended by the IEE and its follow-up documents. Again, the determination of the right balance of resources between headquarters and the field is highly dependent on the debate on the focus of UNESCO and its prioritization strategy. The decisions on these aspects must be consistent with a larger strategic vision. Only once that vision is proposed by the administration and authorized by member States can it be implemented by the secretariat in terms of human and financial resources allocated.

56. Overall, the comments received by the Inspectors on the decentralization question the level of resources allocated to field offices, the level of autonomy accorded to them to establish successful relationships with local partners, and more importantly the benefits for the Organization in terms of capacity to deliver.

Table 7: Views of UNESCO employees regarding the implementation of decentralization (in percentages)

Q. The progressive implementation of decentralization at UNESCO has been overall successful, improving the capacity of the Organization to deliver					
	Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**	**Do not know**
All employees	4.6	24.1	26.4	11.1	33.7
Directors and above	12.8	30.8	33.3	2.6	20.5
International professionals	4	24.4	29.8	15	26.8
Headquarters staff	2.8	21.5	25.4	12.6	37.6
Field staff	6.6	27	27.7	9.3	29.5

Source: JIU survey 2011

57. The JIU review confirms the findings highlighted by previous oversight reports, including the comprehensive internal evaluation exercises conducted in 2001 and 2004, which pointed out several management issues related to decentralization and problems in management practices within decentralized entities:[18]

- Lack of resources;
- Lack of coordination and information sharing among field offices of the same region and with headquarters;
- Lack of uniformity in sectors' decentralization framework and decentralized capacity;
- Absence of performance management, in particular of field office heads;
- Lack of oversight capacity of field offices;
- IT-related issues (connectivity, compatibility, etc.).

58. In the current architecture, the UNESCO field presence is heavily influenced by the sector structure. Regional offices are mainly dedicated to one predominant sector, for example the office in Havana is the Regional Bureau for Culture in Latin America and the Caribbean; its activities are focused on cultural issues and other sector activities within the same countries do not receive the same level of resources/attention. The office also serves as a

[18] 171 EX/6, Part III, 182 EX/6, Part II and IOS/EVS/PI/49, "Field Office Evaluations: A report consolidating the results of evaluations".

cluster office for Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Haiti and Aruba. The office in Santiago de Chile is the Regional Bureau for Education in Latin America and the Caribbean and National Office to Chile, with the same negative consequences for other substantive areas. Meetings held with local authorities responsible for cultural issues and educational matters both in Cuba and Chile showed that regional offices' activities are heavily influenced by the parent sector and that local activities falling within another sector's area of responsibility do not receive the same consideration. This is very significant as eight of the ten regional thematic bureaux also have a cluster function, while one has a national mandate. This implies a loss of corporate vision and creates many small UNESCOs across the world. The current architecture also leads to multiple reporting lines whether one focuses on administrative costs or programme costs.

59. The support provided by headquarters concerning substantive programmes has been queried: "Owing to their limited capacity and their lack of comprehensive awareness of regional and country characteristics and needs, programme sectors at Headquarters are not in a position to provide context-specific strategic guidance to field offices and to ensure adequate monitoring of their activities and projects".[19] These issues were confirmed by the Director-General's report on the reform of the field architecture. The reform is intended to address and remedy issues in the current field network architecture, which is seen to be "thinly spread, not fully equipped in terms of human capacity and often working in silos and not with a holistic and systematic approach to multifaceted demands and challenges".[20] **The Inspectors welcome the fact that UNESCO is continuing to improve the relevance and the effectiveness of its field presence.**

60. The reshaping of the decentralized presence of UNESCO is a highly sensitive reform element which has financial and human resources implications. The Inspectors note the uncertainty of the current situation.

61. The exercise has political dimensions as well. During the consultation process, member States underlined "the requirement for a flexible and progressive country presence that is adapted to the nature of the priority needs of various groups of member States". The Inspectors wish to reaffirm that the criteria used for regional and country implementation should primarily focus on how to configure the most appropriate network and achieve the objectives of UNESCO and its impact in the interests of, and as mandated by, member States themselves.

62. **In general, the Inspectors concur with the main options of the reform endorsed by the Executive Board in October 2010.** In particular, the establishment of multi-skilled regional entities (complemented by a network of desk officers deployed in countries as part of the United Nations presence) represents an opportunity to further develop cross-cutting work and bring more clarity to reporting and accountability lines. However, the exercise should not be limited to a mapping exercise: **the debate on the field network architecture needs to be closely linked with the debate on strategic focus and future priorities. The UNESCO secretariat should thus ensure that both processes are conducted in parallel and that member States are both informed and consulted in a timely manner.**

63. The Inspectors commend certain positive steps that have been taken in the process:

- The regular consultations held with member States of each region at various stages of the implementation, as a way to explain rationales and secure their support;
- The phased approach for the implementation of the new network in two budget bienniums and the planning of a pilot phase focusing on one region (Africa);
- The efforts to estimate the budgetary implications of various scenarios with their consequences in terms of redeployment and capacity to deliver;

[19] 182 EX/6, Part II.
[20] 186 EX/28.

- The adoption of a flexible "one size does not fit all" approach. The original option of a standard platform for regional offices has been abandoned in favour of a more flexible approach, to build offices tailored to regional or country needs.

64. It will be of utmost importance, however, to manage the risks associated with this process, namely:

- The absence of support due to political reasons;
- The possible isolation of desk officers in countries where UNESCO does not have a field presence;
- The inadequate level of resources allocated to meet all regional requirements and support desk officers;
- The establishment of a too diverse network may create confusion and ineffectiveness in coordination and cooperation among field entities and with headquarters.

65. The recent IOS evaluation report on UNESCO liaison offices[21] illustrates the type of management issues to be tackled as a priority with concrete actions when redefining the architecture of the entire field network. The report points out the lack of strategic guidance for liaison offices; the absence of clearly formulated expectations and profiles for liaison office staff (including directors and liaison officers); and the need for better reporting and communication lines with headquarters and decentralized entities. The Inspectors have been informed that the Director General subsequently issued a policy note in 2011 setting out the roles and responsibilities of the liaison offices.

66. When adopting the reform and the new field structure, UNESCO has an opportunity to resolve some of the difficulties identified in the past. A thorough risk management approach is a prerequisite for successful reform and should be aimed at (a) simplifying the network architecture and enhancing its internal coordination; (b) clarifying the reporting and accountability lines of field entities and of their heads; and (c) improving oversight of field activities.

The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to improve the effectiveness of the Organization's activities

Recommendation 3


The General Conference and the Executive Board should ensure that decisions regarding the field architecture and field deployment are fully in line with the conclusions of the debate on strategic focus and future priorities of the Organization.

UNESCO network

67. To fulfil its mandates, UNESCO relies on its secretariat, composed of the Paris headquarters and a worldwide field presence of offices and institutes, complemented by a vast network comprising various types of entities such as national commissions, clubs, chairs, etc. It also has a wide range of partnerships with United Nations system entities, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and in the academic world. Figure 2 shows the complexity of the UNESCO spider network and the diversity of entities associated with its secretariat. This network is a unique feature in the United Nations system that should enable UNESCO "to mobilize diverse actors in support of its values and principles, to access specialized knowledge, to implement programmes, to share experience and good practices, and to further international cooperation in its mandated areas of work".[22]

[21] IOS/EVS/PI/110 Rev., "Review of UNESCO Liaison Offices".
[22] 186 EX/17.

Figure 2: UNESCO network



68. This review does not intend to assess how this network is actually mobilized and contributes to UNESCO's goals. This issue was extensively studied in the partnership section of the IEE report that concluded that "at present, this network is under-valued and under-managed". It is a difficult exercise due to the diversity of types of relations between UNESCO and these entities. The added value is difficult to assess and is very much dependent on the specific situation, which might be quite different in each country. One of the proposed actions deriving from the IEE is "to take stock of and assess UNESCO experience of working with different categories of its partners". This task has been initiated by the UNESCO secretariat for some entities such as the UNESCO clubs and NGOs for example.

69. Nevertheless, the network presents some serious challenges and risks in terms of overall management for the UNESCO secretariat: heterogeneity of internal governance, disparate coordination mechanisms with the secretariat, different funding modalities sometimes heavily influencing activities, consistency and accessibility of reporting on results achieved and alignment with UNESCO priorities, etc.

70. While the UNESCO secretariat has adopted policy or strategy documents regarding the network components, and reports thereon to the governing bodies, these issues require more corporate oversight and attention on a case-by-case basis. Table 8 provides an overview of the assessments and evaluations concerning the relations of UNESCO with network components which are not assessed or evaluated on a regular basis from a global perspective. This is of primary importance as there is a reputational risk involved in that all the components of the network are considered by many as UNESCO itself.

Table 8: Policies and strategies relevant to UNESCO network entities and their assessment

Network component	Policy/Strategy document	Assessments
National Commissions	UNESCO Constitution Charter of National Commissions for UNESCO 171 EX/58 171 EX/Decision 64	Review of the Cooperation of the UNESCO Secretariat with the National Commissions of UNESCO (2011)
Institutes and Centres Cat. 1	171 EX/18 171 EX/Decision 23 33 C/19 and decision	Consolidated Findings of the evaluations of UNESCO Major Programme Category I Institutes and Centres (2006), IOS/EVS/PI/58 Evaluation on a case-by-case basis by IOS or the External auditor.
Institutes and Centres Cat. 2	171 EX/18 171 EX/Decision 23 33 C/19 and decision	Review of the Implementation of the Framework for UNESCO Category 2 Institutes/Centres (2011) Evaluation on a case-by-case basis by IOS
NGOs	UNESCO Constitution 165 EX/39 32 C/31	Evaluation of Non-Governmental Organizations as UNESCO Programme Delivery Mechanisms (2006), IOS/EVS/PI/66
Chairs	26 C/Resolution 1.1(c) 176 EX/10 176 EX/Decision 10	Several internal and external evaluations, by sector Evaluation of Social and Human Sciences Programming and the UNESCO Chairs/UNITWIN Networks (2006), OS/EVS/PI/67/REV
Prizes	171 EX/19 171 EX/Decision 24	Evaluation of UNESCO Prizes (from Evaluation Plan 2011)
Ambassadors		No audit/evaluation conducted
Clubs		No audit/evaluation conducted
Associated schools		Global Review of UNESCO's Associated Schools Project Network (2004), ED-2004/WS/2 REV

Source: Prepared by JIU

The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the controls and compliance of network components.

Recommendation 4

The Director-General should present to the Executive Board and the General Conference (at the 37th session) a comprehensive report on all network components and take appropriate measures for their evaluation at least every four years.

Information and communication technology (ICT)

71. The Division of Information Systems and Telecommunications (ADM/DIT) is part of the Sector for Administration. Since 2000, radical changes have occurred in the information technology area leading to significant improvement, in particular in operational terms. The implementation of the SAP Enterprise Resource Planning system (ERP) in successive phases is a positive development despite the delays observed. UNESCO should move towards more governance in the ICT area and increased integration of IT systems.

72. There is a risk of fragmentation in the ICT area due to compartmentalization in sectors and the decentralization of the secretariat. UNESCO sectors and field offices have their own administrative and operational needs, supported by their own IT capacity. UNESCO has a decentralized IT budget. In addition to the ADM/DIT budget, most UNESCO programmes

and services also have their own IT budget. As a result, IT projects and initiatives are decided by the relevant business managers with limited consultation with other UNESCO programmes and managers. Therefore, decisions regarding IT issues may be spread across various levels of the Organization and within individual sectors that maintain their own IT capacity.

73. UNESCO has made some effort to enhance the governance of its ICT function. The Committee on Information Systems and Services (CISS) was created as a permanent management committee to address ICT issues and investments. It did not fully serve as an ICT governance committee capable of ensuring coherent and coordinated use of ICT across sectors and field offices and institutes, as a result of problems in the frequency of meetings and the participation of business owners and management. The CISS was discontinued and the Corporate Services Committee, whose role is to coordinate the process of streamlining corporate service operations and procedures, should now be the forum for progress in this area, but has not embraced it to date.

74. UNESCO officials informed the Inspectors that the recruitment of the Chief Information Officer (CIO) in 2011 was specifically intended to meet the objective of developing and implementing an effective knowledge and information management systems corporate strategy. This would be a positive development. There is an urgent need to take the necessary measures to enhance ICT corporate governance in the Organization, a priority area that has not benefited from concrete developments in recent years. The fact remains that UNESCO still has multiple information management systems in place to deal with major corporate processes (Box 2).

Box 2: Main information management systems at UNESCO

The System of Information on Strategies, Tasks and the Evaluation of Results (SISTER), introduced in 1999, serves as the main information management system to support RBM (i.e. preparation of the Programme and Budget, development of related work plans and implementation follow-up).
The Finance And Budget System (FABS), introduced in 2002, records financial transactions, maintains the accounts and provides data for budgetary and financial reporting.
The System to Enhance Personnel Services (STEPS), introduced in 2006, was intended to cover human resources management, training information and payroll functions.

75. In the view of the Inspectors, UNESCO should endeavour to introduce an integrated system capable of handling its wide range of financial and administrative operations, to better support corporate business processes and backstop its programme activities. UNESCO should make further financial investments to implement fully integrated systems, taking into consideration standardization of hardware and software applications, connectivity and the capacity to deal with programme management requirements.

IV: HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

76. The 2000 JIU review called for the strengthening of the human resources section/division "to secure its capacity to ensure respect for staff rules and regulations and objectivity in recruitment, promotion and career development". There are still repeated signals indicating that human resources management requires attention.

- Since 2000, several internal and external oversight reports on various human resources management aspects flagged difficulties and problems in procedures as implemented by line managers and by the Bureau of Human Resources Management (HRM).[23] UNESCO executive management informed the Inspectors that the vast majority of recommendations emanating from these oversight reports have been implemented;
- Both the UNESCO Global Staff Survey and the JIU survey collected negative opinions in this area. Staff representatives have repeatedly expressed their concerns;
- About 30 per cent of requests to the ethics officers are related to human resources issues. In addition, the recommendations contained in the 2010 annual report of the UNESCO Mediators refer to a number of highly problematic cases related to HR practices.

77. As underlined in the 2010 secretariat's Task Force report, "the opposite trend has taken place with decentralization of personnel matters to the sectors, lack of independent oversight of senior management, recruitment and promotion, and de-professionalization of the staff. Recruitment, rotation, mobility, merit-based rewards, retention and performance evaluation are all substantial parts of what ails UNESCO".[24]

78. The HR manual and its appendices provide an appropriate framework: relevant policies, rules and procedures have been developed and adopted in the last decade, often in consultation with staff unions and other consultation bodies. The table of delegated authority is comprehensive. This is also recognized by respondents to the JIU survey as shown below. However, there is a general feeling among staff that these regulations and rules are unevenly applied and that procedures are not consistently followed.

Table 9: Views of UNESCO employees regarding regulations and rules of the Organization (in percentages)

Q. Do you find regulations, rules and other administrative instruments sufficient and clear enough for effective implementation?				
	Yes	**Somewhat**	**No**	**Do not know**
	21.9	40.9	33.2	4
Q. Do you find regulations, rules and other administrative instruments easily accessible?				
	35.3	37.2	25.3	2.2
Q. In your views, are administrative regulations and rules implemented in a consistent and fair manner?				
	12.6	30.3	48.5	8.6

Source: JIU survey 2011

79. The delegation of authority and accountability to sector managers regarding various human resources matters, combined with the decentralization process and the independence of the sectors, have created a risk for the Organization. HR processes (definition of posts, verification of candidates' profiles and eligibility, performance evaluation, etc.) and decisions

[23] For example, 186 EX/30 Part IV, External Auditor's audit of the recruitment and end of service procedures and IOS/EVS/PI/96 Rev.2, "Evaluation of UNESCO's Recruitment Policy and Practice".
[24] Quoted from the consolidated report of Task forces created in 2010 to "analyze, examine and mobilize UNESCO's staff at all levels, from Headquarters and from the Field, to propose new ideas and orientations and to assist me in introducing new working methods in order to optimize the work of the Organization."

(recruitment, promotion, etc.) are currently spread across UNESCO. While UNESCO has corporate policies in place on all HR issues, they are handled by entities that vary in size and resources, have different priorities and are led by different types of managers. There is therefore an increased risk of inconsistency in the implementation of policies and rules. UNESCO requires a Bureau of Human Resources capable of providing strong oversight and systematic communication and training on HR matters throughout the Organization both at headquarters and in the field. The placement of HR officers in specific sectors and at field locations when relevant must also be considered.

80. The above goes along with a perceived lack of accountability on the part of managers, together with a certain feeling of impunity as underlined by the UNESCO Global Staff Survey in which only 38 per cent of respondents consider that their managers promote compliance with regulations and rules. The JIU survey allowed respondents to refine that statement and showed that line managers are perceived more positively compared to senior managers in that regard. Nevertheless, the Inspectors stress here that HR managerial responsibilities should necessarily be linked with managerial accountability.[25]

The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the controls of and compliance with human resources processes for accountability purposes.

Recommendation 5

The Director-General should ensure full compliance with human resources rules and procedures and consistency in their enforcement across the Organization.

A. UNESCO workforce

81. Table 10 provides a snapshot of the UNESCO workforce in 2010 (all positions, funded by the regular budget and from other sources, showing heterogeneity in status and locations). The Inspectors wish to underline the following points:

- UNESCO's workforce capacity has dropped by 7 per cent (from 4,285 in 2007 to 3,980 in 2010), notably due to budget constraints;
- Professional expertise is still mostly headquarters-based, and UNESCO can be seen as a centralized organization with a significant percentage of its staff funded by the regular budget and stationed in Paris;
- Over 40 per cent of the workforce consists of temporary assistance. UNESCO executive management considers this a reasonable level to ensure flexibility of the workforce. **In the opinion of the Inspectors, this, however, constitutes a risk for organizational effectiveness, business continuity, retention of expertise, knowledge management, etc.** At UNESCO, there is an extreme diversity in the contractual arrangements for temporary assistance according to the nature of services, the duration, the hiring authority and the funding modalities.[26] In this context, the planned streamlining of the contractual arrangements for temporary assistance to be implemented in 2012 is very much welcomed by the Inspectors.

[25] JIU/REP/2011/5, "Accountability Frameworks in the United Nations System".
[26] For example: temporary staff members, appointment of limited duration, short-term language contracts, supernumeraries, service contracts, special services agreements or individual consultants.

Table 10: UNESCO workforce in 2010, distributed by categories and by locations, in numbers and percentages

	Headquarters	Field**	Total	Headquarters	Field**
International Professionals (and Directors)	672	333	1005	67%	33%
General Service staff	691	444	1135	61%	39%
National officers	-	87	87	-	100%
Appointment of limited duration (ALD)	94	90	184	51%	49%
Consultants*	252	374	626	40%	60%
Supernumeraries*	152		152	100%	
Special services agreements* (SSAs)	-	95	95	-	100%
Service contactors* (SCs)	-	696	696	-	100%
Total	1861	2119	3980	46.8%	53.2%

*Source: Based on data provided by UNESCO in 2010. * refers to full time equivalent positions, ** field includes staff at Institutes*

82. In the past, a number of persons were employed on temporary contracts for periods exceeding regulations and rules and best practices. The UNESCO secretariat indicated that the number of staff employed for 3-5 years under short-term contracts had been brought down from 84 in 2008 to 5 in 2011 as the result of action by HRM. The review involved a competitive process to recruit the most competent candidates on fixed-term appointments, appointments of limited duration or separations, as appropriate.

83. The vacancy rate at UNESCO is above 10 per cent (as of January 2011). The Inspectors welcome the fact that the corporate Human Resources Strategy (2011-2015) contains provisions to address this situation. **The UNESCO secretariat should continue to make all efforts to reduce recruitment delays, which are still significant, in particular at the field level.** On average internal recruitment processes last seven months and external processes 11 months. The target for recruitment set by the HR strategy is six months.

84. The Inspectors noted that, for the period 2008-2010, 101 staff members were extended beyond the mandatory age of retirement (of whom 25 at Director level). A number of retired staff were recruited thereafter as consultants, supernumeraries or temporary assistance (86 in 2008, 141 in 2009 and 107 in 2010). Without wishing to minimize their contributions to the Organization and whilst recognizing the necessary succession planning procedures, this is not considered to be good practice. It runs counter to the introduction of new blood and talent into the Organization and reduces and even jeopardizes career opportunities for experienced internal staff members. The Inspectors also call for further clarification of the reasons for the use of these staff, the duration and the number of possible extensions.

85. The External Auditor pointed out recurrent issues related to the use of consultants; in particular the reasons for recourse to external consultants and the procedures followed to recruit and hire them. In 2010, 1,248 individual consultancy contracts were issued at headquarters and 2,107 in the field (not including the 1,165 contracts delivered solely for the UNESCO Brasilia Office, which appears to be a special case). Even if these figures have slightly decreased compared to 2009, the recourse to consultancy at UNESCO remains high even though it is justified by the need for expertise to fulfil the Organization's mandate. The number of individual consultants then decreased by about 20 per cent. In 2010, almost 500 consultants were employed by UNESCO, most of them hired directly at the sector or field level under delegated authority.

86. Two recent audits produced by the External Auditor on two UNESCO divisions belonging to two different substantive sectors revealed problems.[27] The qualitative aspect of selection and performance appraisal of consultants could be enhanced. UNESCO is currently reviewing and strengthening its evaluation methodology.

Gender balance

87. Overall, women represented 56 per cent of the workforce of UNESCO in 2011, which compares favourably with other United Nations organizations.[28] The representation of women in the International Professional category is slightly lower but still above gender parity at 52 per cent. However, these figures hide a less positive reality regarding gender balance:

- Women mainly hold positions at P2 and P3 levels;
- The ADG level shows good gender balance, but despite some improvement in recent years, the director level remains largely male dominated;
- Women represent only 23 per cent of Directors of Bureau/Heads of Field offices (11 out of 41, as of April 2011);
- The internal promotions granted at Director and P5 levels during November 2009 and October 2010 were largely male dominated. Not surprisingly, 77 per cent of women promoted were from the General Services category. Internal promotions reflect a lower rate for professional women, a situation which should be reviewed by senior management. The gender balance is much better for the external recruitment exercises.

Table 11: Gender balance at UNESCO (as of January 2011)

Grade	Female	Male	Female	Male	Total
DDG	0	1	0%	100%	1
ADG	5	6	45%	55%	11
D-2	6	16	27%	73%	22
D-1	16	50	24%	76%	66
Total D and above	27	73	27%	73%	100
P-5	64	101	39%	61%	165
P-4	96	113	46%	54%	209
P-3	152	133	53%	47%	285
P-2	117	56	68%	32%	173
P-1	10	5	67%	33%	15
Total P	439	408	52%	48%	847
Total NO	40	51	44%	56%	91
Total GS	695	416	63%	37%	1111
Total	1201	948	56%	44%	2149

Source: Based on data provided by UNESCO in 2011

88. The UNESCO Action Plan for Gender Parity (2008-2015, aimed at achieving parity among senior management positions (D-1 and above) by 2015, is a positive development.[29] The plan is based on measures in the areas of recruitment, training and work/life balance. Intermediate results are already below initial expectations; there is thus a need to intensify efforts to achieve its ambitious target. UNESCO should continue its proactive measures to identify current female staff interested in assuming managerial responsibilities and better prepare them for managerial functions. For external recruitment, demonstrated managerial experience on the part of women candidates should be seen as an asset for joining the

[27] 185 EX/32 Part II and 186 EX/30 Part III.
[28] Based on CEB statistics for 2008 or 2009.
[29] 179 EX/5 Part I.

Organization. With due respect to the professional capacity and experience of other competitors without regard to gender, **the Director-General should continue to undertake special measures to ensure full compliance with gender balance targets as expressed in the Gender Action Plan, paying specific attention to senior management level.**

Geographical distribution

89. Article VI.4 of the UNESCO Constitution stresses the need to meet the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence and integrity as well as the importance of a wide geographical basis for the secretariat workforce. There are currently 890 posts subject to geographical distribution in the UNESCO secretariat, across 155 countries (out of 193 member States) using a method of calculation revised in 2003.[30] In 2000, JIU made two recommendations directed at improving geographical distribution, including among senior level officials, which are still relevant and have been included by UNESCO in the Action Plan for the Improvement of Geographical Distribution in the Secretariat (2010-2015).[31]

90. Table 12 compares figures on geographical distribution from 2000, 2005 and 2011. It shows a positive development: the number of countries normally represented has increased while the number of countries overrepresented and non-represented has decreased. This is, however, tempered by the slight growth in the underrepresented category.

Table 12: Geographical representation since 2000

Status of representation	2000		2005		2011		Variation in number
Normally represented	68	36%	79	41%	78	40%	+ 10
Overrepresented	31	16%	26	14%	26	13%	- 5
Underrepresented	45	24%	55	29%	51	26%	+ 6
Total-represented	144	77%	160	84%	155	80%	+ 11
Non-represented	44	23%	31	16%	38	20%	- 6
Total Member States	188	100%	191	100%	193	100%	+ 5

Source: Based on data provided by UNESCO

91. Progress was made mainly during the period 2000-2005. In some cases, figures actually deteriorated after 2005. The UNESCO secretariat thus presented a five-year Action Plan (2010-2015) aimed "at increasing the number of normally represented countries, (and) at reducing the number of non-represented and underrepresented countries and at improving the geographical balance at Director Level". Given the persistent difficulties in this area, the time frame and targets detailed in the Human Resources Strategy for achieving results seem reasonable.


92. UNESCO also produces statistics on the representation of regional groups even though the quotas refer to individual country representation. The Inspectors wish to stress that two groups, namely Group III (The Latin American and Caribbean Group of States, GRULAC) and Group IV (The Asia and Pacific Group of States, ASPAC), have remained underrepresented for years.

93. This is of primary importance to ensure diversity not only of workforce composition but of its expertise, bearing in mind the UNESCO Constitution and its Staff Regulations and Rules. The UNESCO mandate relates principally to developing countries but its human expertise originates mainly from the developed countries. For example: 40.5 per cent of

[30] See General Conference resolution 32 C/Resolution 71 (2003) for current methodology for the calculation of geographical quotas, based on a combination of three factors, e.g. membership, contributions and population.
[31] 184 EX/5.

Directors' positions are occupied by staff from Group I (Europe and North America) while only 6 per cent are occupied by staff from Group II (Eastern Europe and Russia).

Figure 3: Geographical diversity at Director level in 2011



Source: Based on data provided by UNESCO

94. One of the proactive measures to improve geographical distribution focuses on the junior level. Each biennium in the Young Professionals Programme, at least ten positions are identified and directly announced to non/underrepresented countries, which are encouraged to submit candidates. The Inspectors identified this as a good practice that could be transferred to other organizations. Bi-monthly monitoring charts on key HR indicators including information on geographical representation and gender balance are provided to ADGs and Directors of Bureaux. These reports are designed to provide information to facilitate the planning and selection process in each Sector/Bureau.

95. As stated by UNESCO, the retirement forecasts for the coming years provide an opportunity to make decisive progress towards the ambitious targets defined in areas of both geographical distribution and gender balance. For example, UNESCO estimates the number of expected retirements on geographical posts at 155, of which 46 are Directors, until the end of 2015. **The Director-General should continue to undertake measures to ensure that geographical distribution of staff is in line with current targets as set out in the Action Plan for the Improvement of Geographical Distribution, paying specific attention to equitable representation at the senior level.**

B. Career management

96. The Human Resources Strategy 2011-2015 must be viewed as a key corporate tool to assist in building the future UNESCO workforce, due to (a) the large number of upcoming retirements of staff members, which makes it necessary to take succession planning measures

at all levels of the Organization[32] and (b) the need to replace retiring staff with appropriate profiles to meet future challenges. **The content of the HR strategy is closely related to the debates on the focus and priorities of UNESCO and of each of its substantive sectors. The definition of skills and competencies that UNESCO staff should demonstrate in the future cannot be separated from the debate on strategic positioning, flagship programmes, etc**.

97. As in many international organizations, career development is a sensitive matter and a subject of concern among staff members. This appears to be more prominent at UNESCO and creates frustration among all categories of staff. Fewer than 50 per cent of respondents to the UNESCO Global Staff Survey considered that the Organization provides opportunity for development and professional growth. It is one of the main points raised by those considering leaving the Organization, in particular within the Professional and General Services categories. This was confirmed by the JIU survey. To nuance this assessment, UNESCO executive management informed the Inspectors that for the biennium 2008/2009, a total of 290 individuals (15 per cent of the staff) were promoted.

Table 13: Views of UNESCO employees on the recruitment and promotion process (in percentages)

Q. In my personal experience, the processes listed below are fair and related decisions are communicated in a transparent manner					
	Strongly agree	**Agree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly disagree**	**Do not know**
Recruitment	7.6	29.6	34.3	19.8	8.7
Promotion	3.4	14.1	40	24.2	18.2

Source: JIU survey 2011

98. The Inspectors were informed by management and staff that it was not unusual to observe pressure from member States' representatives in recruitment or promotion processes. The Inspectors are of the opinion that member States should act in compliance with the rules and procedures in force on the matter.

99. The discussions with staff, their representatives and UNESCO managers highlighted serious divergences of opinion regarding career management, in particular on the question of internal versus external recruitment. The profile and overall professional quality of the current workforce is questioned by some UNESCO managers. It should be noted that UNESCO staff rules provide that all posts for Directors and above be externally advertised, and that the Director-General has the discretionary authority to advertise all other posts externally. UNESCO executive management uses this option strategically, in particular when it is important to ensure a minimum number of appropriately qualified applicants to allow a competitive process. Staff Rule 104.2bis reads "The posts in the Director category and above at HQs shall be advertised externally for two months (…) without prejudice to the discretionary power of the DG to authorize in specific cases that other posts be also advertised externally", which provides a great deal of flexibility for external recruitment. Table 14 provides comparative figures on human resources processes and shows that the number of candidates recruited externally exceeded the number of current staff promoted during the period reviewed by the Inspectors (November 2009-October 2010).

[32]UNESCO foresees the retirement of almost 20 per cent of its staff by 2015 (21% at HQ, 18% in the Field and 15% in Institutes). Source: UNESCO Key staffing data 2011.

Table 14: Summary of HR processes at headquarters and in the field conducted between November 2009 and October 2010, broken down by grade (in figures)

	External recruitment	Internal promotion	Internal transfer
Directors	9	9	5
P5	2	9	10
P1-P4	32	23	32
GS	48	22	15
Total	91	63	62

Source: Data consolidated from UNESCO intranet

100. The Inspectors reaffirm the principle of a competitive process for recruitment and promotion with the objective of recruiting the best qualified and most experienced candidate for any given position. However, the career path of internal candidates is a legitimate concern and should be part of the global approach. Internal candidates should be offered sufficient and adequate training opportunities to have a chance to compete successfully. UNESCO executive management informed the Inspectors that a self-assessment competency tool is presently under development.

101. While General Service (GS) staff are allowed to compete for posts in the Professional category and are regarded as internal candidates in the competitive process, few were able to reach the Professional (P) category (12 cases in 2008-2009). There are currently no formal routes (such as an examination) for UNESCO GS staff members to reach the P category as is the case in other organizations. This is an opportunity to be explored; either through participating in existing examination processes or by organizing a dedicated UNESCO examination at regular intervals.

C. Mobility

102. Mobility is a sensitive matter as it is a challenge for any organization to create the conditions to meet both organizational needs and the staff's professional and personal expectations. After a latency period, UNESCO is making efforts to implement the Mobility Policy adopted by the Executive Board in 2009,[33] which is based on (a) the mandatory movements of internationally recruited Professionals and (b) the principle of rotation to hardship duty stations coupled with time limits for assignments. A geographical mobility coordinator was appointed in 2010 and a dedicated internet site launched by HRM.

103. Progress is noticeable in particular regarding the reassignments of staff deployed at hardship and non-family duty stations. Mobility requirements should be further included in the recruitment and promotion processes to increase this trend. However, all figures consulted by the Inspectors reveal that geographical mobility of international staff at UNESCO remains limited (the mobility rate stands at roughly 10 per cent of the staff concerned) and that mobility is primarily a field to field event.

104. There are currently inherent difficulties associated with increasing mobility at UNESCO: (a) the attractiveness of Paris headquarters in terms of living conditions should not be underestimated; (b) at this point in time, the UNESCO field network does not provide sufficient mobility opportunities for its P staff to ensure smooth rotation (not enough positions of an appropriate level, not enough vacant posts); (c) mobility has cost implications; and (d) the idea of functional mobility between sectors or functions clashes with the need to ensure maximum expertise within sectors. Interviews revealed that mobility may be perceived and implemented in different ways in the sectors, which are quite different in size and not decentralized in the same way.

[33] 181 EX/ 6.

105. **The Inspectors are nevertheless convinced that mobility is a prerequisite for international civil servants and an integral part of their career path.**[34] Increased rotation of staff members between UNESCO headquarters and field locations (geographical mobility) and between its sectors or between functions (functional mobility) could be of assistance to the Organization in the development of better corporate and institutional knowledge and the sharing of experiences resulting from exposure to different cultures and realities. Such mobility could also contribute to ease intersectoral and cross-cutting work throughout the Organization. It could also to some extent involve GS staff, as administrative expertise is transferrable from one sector to another. The proposal to establish a Mobility Review Committee, which emerged during the discussions of the secretariat's Task Force, should be further explored.

106. UNESCO employees are looking forward to seeing this happening: the UNESCO Global Staff Survey shows that both P and GS staff are receptive to intersectoral assignments, lateral movements, posting to another sector or even another agency, and transfer to another duty station.

Table 15: Views of UNESCO employees on mobility issues (in percentages)

Q. I would like UNESCO to give me more opportunity for…					
	Strongly Agree	**Agree**	**Disagree**	**Strongly Disagree**	**Not Stated**
Intersectoral assignments	25	38	13	6	18
Lateral movements	23	28	16	5	20
Moving to another duty station	22	28	22	7	21
Moving to another Sector/Bureau/Institute	23	31	19	6	20
Support for Inter-agency mobility	29	32	15	5	19

Source: UNESCO Global Staff Survey 2010

107. Mobility has to be linked with a global set of incentives going beyond the current incentives, which are mainly of a financial nature. It should be more closely related to career progression. In coordination with other system-wide initiatives, UNESCO could explore potential internal incentives and other motivation methods to increase the mobility of its staff, such as making field positions more attractive in terms of professional challenges and conditions of work, granting access to temporary promotion in the field, granting promotion at headquarters subject to minimum field experience, allowing increased occupational mobility when going to the field, greater financial compensation, extended work-life measures, etc.

The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of the Organization.

Recommendation 6

With due regard to financial implications and operational requirements, the Director-General should set up a Mobility Review Committee to accelerate the implementation of the mobility policy of International Professionals and explore modalities for the functional mobility of other categories of staff.

D. Performance management

108. In the Inspectors' opinion, delegation of authority is a basic principle of good management. Nevertheless, there is a recurrent risk in organizations in which senior officers with an expert profile are granted significant delegated authority as managers. Being a

[34] JIU/REP/2010/8, "Inter-agency Staff Mobility and Work-life Balance in the organizations of the United Nations system".

specialist in any substantive area does not necessarily mean having the capacity for, or interest in, managing people (for example, being a good deputy does not necessarily translate into being a good director or high-level official). As pointed out before, the fact that UNESCO has a compartmentalized and decentralized structure increases the need for adequate managerial capacities. Seniority in a specific position must go along with professional expertise and proven managerial performance.

109. Some figures from the UNESCO Global Staff Survey and some interviews conducted by the Inspectors indicate that there are some difficulties between UNESCO staff and their managers:

- Only 58 per cent of respondents say that their manager set a positive ethical tone (UNESCO Global Staff Survey). This figure only stresses the importance of the Ethics Office created in 2009;
- More than 50 per cent were eager to receive more support from their supervisor as a means to improve their own effectiveness in the workplace (UNESCO Global Staff Survey);
- Only 52 per cent of respondents would be confident that their supervisor would be able to effectively handle a concern raised by staff. (UNESCO Global Staff Survey);
- Line managers are generally better appreciated than senior management.

110. The area of performance assessment/management was flagged as problematic by the responses to the UNESCO Global Staff Survey and in the reports of mediators. It was confirmed by the interviews conducted by the Inspectors. Staff members do not feel that their performance is managed in a proactive and consistent way by their supervisors. Increased recognition and support was pointed out as a way to improve effectiveness, and this was reiterated by staff representatives. Absence of recognition may lead to de-motivation and frustration among staff and impair the organizational capacity to deliver.

111. Since 2004, performance assessment/management of UNESCO staff members at headquarters and in the field has been handled on a biennial basis through the Perfoweb system, with a mid-cycle review to ensure dialogue and realignment of tasks if necessary. The Inspectors recall the findings and the recommendations of the External Auditor in 2009.[35] In 2010, fewer than 50 per cent of respondents felt that the system was adequate (with no major difference between headquarters and field staff). Concerns expressed are both substantive (with regard to feedback received) and technical (with regard to connectivity or coverage). The compliance rate at headquarters was over 80 per cent, but is lower in the field, in particular with respect to the organization of review panels.

112. It was brought to the attention of the Inspectors that HRM has developed "Supporting Performance Management at UNESCO: A Guide for Staff and Managers", which addresses the principles of effective performance management and processes as well as a manual on navigating the online tools. **To further develop a stronger performance culture, the Inspectors strongly recommend implementing a 360-degree evaluation system**, a system that is supported by UNESCO staff members, including at the Director level, in the UNESCO Global Staff Survey.

113. There is a need to implement a clear and transparent mechanism to assess senior managers' performance. In recent years, it has been unclear how the performance of top-level officials was evaluated. During the review, the Inspectors were told that a new performance contract for senior managers had been introduced in 2011. It concerns all 19 SMT members and all Directors/Heads of Field Offices. As stated by UNESCO, the objectives are to emphasize the responsibility of managers with regard to performance management and to enhance the internal control mechanism and accountability required of senior managers. The

[35] 182 EX/48.

Inspectors are looking forward to seeing the implementation of such performance contracts as of 2011.

114. Several United Nations system organizations have such a system in place via the establishment of compacts agreed with high-level officials that are reviewed and scored annually by a management performance board against specific programmatic objectives and managerial targets.[36] The new system must be implemented in a fully transparent manner. This is a requirement in order to avoid the development of a tangible perception of impunity on the part of senior managers among staff.

The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance accountability within the Organization.

Recommendation 7

The Director-General should implement a new system of managing individual performance, including for senior officials, by, inter alia, including a 360-degree feedback mechanism as an annual exercise, no later than 2013.

E. Training

115. UNESCO allocates 1.2 per cent of the total staff expenditure per biennium to training purposes (4,760,000 USD based on 2010-2011 figures). The amount allocated to training has significantly decreased in the last two bienniums (6,000,000 USD in 2006-2007). There is also a training budget for each sector, which is managed internally, to develop substantive skills.

116. As previously mentioned, UNESCO staff want more opportunities for development and professional growth, which must be linked to adequate corporate training programmes. However, the percentage of the training budget dedicated to career development is less than 5 per cent of the total training budget.

117. In general, current training opportunities received a critical response from UNESCO Global Staff Survey respondents: over 60 per cent were dissatisfied with the quantity and the quality of training. More than 80 per cent of UNESCO staff members are looking forward to having more opportunities to update their skills within their own area of competence, but also within another area of competence, which is an encouraging statement for developing functional mobility. The Inspectors note in this regard that the level of dissatisfaction does not vary between staff members located at headquarters and those deployed in the field or in Institutes. A transparent, balanced and well regulated system for training among staff will avoid growing perceptions of favouritism towards some staff members who, as a consequence, enjoy better opportunities for promotion.

[36] JIU/REP/2011/5, “Accountability Frameworks in the United Nations system”.

Table 16: Training opportunities at UNESCO (2008-2009)

Objective 1: Enhance Organizational Effectiveness
Senior Management Symposium
UNAIDS – Implementation of UNAIDS learning strategy
Institutional training: Field Offices and institutional at HQs
Staff Orientation for HQ and Briefing for Headquarters and Fields
CCA-UNDAF & Related Programming Tools (e.g. SWAP) (2004-2005 : UNSSC $50000)
Senior Management Network (SMN)
UNSSC Financial Contribution
Spouse Employment Dual Career
Induction Course New Reps/Head of Office
UN Cost Sharing Learning Projects
UN Learning and Management Network & UN Career Network & Roundtable
Generic Training on UN Reform
UN Resident Coordinator Assessment Centre
Anti-Harassment Training "Positive and Productive Workplaces" (design and pilot)
Objective 2: Enhance Professional Competencies
Post-Conflict / Post Disaster Training
Enhance Professional and Management skills for Programme Delivery (Soft Skills)
Language Training
Human Rights Training
Gender Mainstreaming Training
Office Software Training
Delegated Funds (Field Offices + Institutes 1st cat. + HQ: including all training)
Objective 3: Enhance Management and Accountability
Results-Based Management
Leadership and Management Development
Management Tools (FABS, SISTER, WEB, STEPS)
AO Training (Field)
IPSAS Training
Table of Authority Learning Programme
Financial Accountability
Quality Assurance for Publication
Enhancement of Governing Body documentation quality
Objective 4: Career Development
Assessment Center for Development
Succession Planning
Competency Profile
Mentoring Programme
Management Development for Women
Career Development Training

Source: Based on information received from UNESCO

118. Several suggestions from the UNESCO Global Staff Survey received positive feedback from respondents: coaching, mentoring, external training and on-the-job training etc. More proactive partnerships with private and academic/research entities could open training opportunities for UNESCO staff that would ultimately enhance internal capacity. With regard to reform, UNESCO should add to its training portfolio specific training on change management to provide managers with the skills to effectively manage the change process and facilitate a change of culture across the Organization.

V. PLANNING AND BUDGETING

A. Strategic guidance, planning and results-based management


119. "UNESCO has to better define its focus, to agree on its priority areas in which it could demonstrate more impact instead of spreading activities in all areas relevant to its wide and permissive mandate". This is a common opinion expressed by member States, the Director-General, secretariat officials, the Senior Expert Group on Reforms and the IEE team.

120. As identified by member States and the UNESCO secretariat, the next medium-term strategy (2014-2019) will be an opportunity to make decisive progress in the definition of UNESCO's focus and priorities. As a result of IEE, the Director-General indicated her intention to concentrate on a limited number of strategic objectives and related outcomes. This requires a wide-ranging, comprehensive debate among all stakeholders. Preliminary discussions for guidance took place at the 36th session of the General Conference in the context of the preparation of the next C/4 and C/5 planning documents to enable in-depth discussions and to capture relevant feedback before strategic choices are made by member States. There is little time to start implementing the operational actions planned by the Director-General in her follow-up report to the IEE.[37] This is an important matter as member States that were interviewed by the Inspectors were not fully satisfied with the consultation and planning processes in the past.

121. The Inspectors are thus looking forward to seeing future C/4 documents successfully addressing these challenges. A number of improvements have already been launched to define a set of criteria assessing current and future programmes against the priorities as decided by the General Conference, so that member States may confirm the relevance of these: (a) the introduction of rating scales into the consultation process; (b) the strengthening of internal management through monitoring of programme implementation and development of exit strategies when necessary; and (c) the ongoing assessments by the Executive Board of key achievements and challenges across all programmes contributing to the discussions on the continuation or discontinuation of certain programmes, for example.

122. The current elements of the strategic planning at UNESCO and the reporting thereon are shown in Figure 4. Planning comprises a Medium-Term Strategy adopted by the General Conference covering three bienniums (C/4 document), and the biennial programme budget, for which a draft is prepared by the secretariat, reviewed by the Executive Board and adopted by the General Conference (C/5 document). Each sector subsequently draws up an action plan to cover regular programme and extra-budgetary activities.

Figure 4: UNESCO planning



[37] 186 EX/17, Part II.

123. There is a consensus of opinion among the representatives of member States and the UNESCO managers that current planning and reporting procedures are cumbersome and repetitive (comprising many intermediate versions and checks and balances), making this almost an ongoing process from one biennium to the next. It requires significant resources from the secretariat potentially at the cost of programme delivery. One of the key challenges for strategic planning at UNESCO is that it has to deal with five independent sectors (and their satellite institutes) tackling five substantive areas from a system-wide perspective.

124. The WGIEE indicated a number of measures that have the potential to improve the situation: the adoption of a four-year medium-term planning cycle (instead of the existing two years), the systematic application of agreed criteria for introducing new, maintaining existing, or ending programmes under regular and extra-budgetary funding, inter alia. The proposal to have a C/4 strategic document of a rolling nature over eight years together with a medium-term programming cycle of four years is positive. It should contribute to streamlining the process and aligning it with the quadrennial cycle of the United Nations. However, it does not by itself solve the challenge of having clear strategic directions and priorities set up to focus the work of UNESCO on areas where it can demonstrate impact.

125. Appropriately, UNESCO has strengthened the Bureau of Strategic Planning to take care of both programmatic and budget preparation where, in the past, other entities would have been involved. Under the PMC, there are also ongoing efforts to make the planning process more inclusive and improve information sharing to avoid the juxtaposition of individual sector's planning.

The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the focus and prioritization scheme of the Organization.

Recommendation 8

The General Conference, at its 37th session, should adopt a new Medium-Term Strategy which clearly defines the Organization's focus, its priorities and expected results.

126. Results-based management[38] (RBM) is stated as a priority for the Organization: "maximum attention to improve the quality of programme delivery, at the global, regional, and country level and to apply optimal results-based management".[39] Some issues remain to be tackled in this area. RBM was identified as being a risk for the Organization by the senior management retreat in 2008. This point was also raised by the 2011 study conducted by the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) on the strengths and weaknesses of United Nations organizations: "UNESCO's results framework is poor, the programme information system is complicated and inadequate attention is paid to results in programming decisions".[40] UNESCO strongly disagreed with this assessment and publicly provided its counter-arguments.[41] The compartmentalization of the Organization might be an issue and there might be some differences in how sectors handle RBM, as implicitly stated in the 2007 IOS evaluation.[42]

127. Since the move to RBM in early 2000, UNESCO has developed guidelines and training modules that have contributed to enhancing internal capacity. These efforts have paid off as

[38] RBB/RBM is defined in A/53/500 as "Results-based budgeting, in the form proposed by the Secretary-General for implementation at the United Nations, is a programme budget process in which: (a) programme formulation revolves around a set of predefined objectives and expected results; (b) expected results would justify resource requirements which are derived from and linked to the outputs required to achieve such results; and (c) actual performance in achieving results is measured by objective performance indicators"

[39] 36 C/5 draft resolutions, vol. I.

[40] Multilateral Aid Review, United Kingdom Department for International Development, March 2011.

[41] See http://www.dfid.gov.uk/Documents/MAR/UNESCO-reponse2.pdf?epslanguage=en

[42] IOS/EVS/PI/72, "Evaluation of UNESCO's results-based management training programme."

over 60 per cent of respondents to the JIU survey declared that they were quite familiar with the concept, which can be seen as positive (over 80 per cent of Professional staff). But despite these statements, the implementation of RBM may also still be seen by certain staff and managers as an administrative requirement rather than as a tool for assessing performance and demonstrating usefulness of programmes or taking corrective measures. The Inspectors recall the benchmarking exercise proposed by JIU in its report in 2006, which might serve as a guide to improve RBM at UNESCO.[43]

128. The Inspectors acknowledge that planning and reporting documents produced by UNESCO have improved in recent years, but the analysis of some these documents shows that further progress is needed. While the C/5 programme budget document is well structured according to Biennial Sectoral Priorities (BSP) and Main Line of Actions (MLAs) of each of the UNESCO sectors, the expected outputs are expressed in terms that are too general; the indicators mainly focus on activities (number of policy papers or reports issued, number of seminars held) or are too vague (research undertaken). In some cases, there is inconsistency and confusion between indicators and benchmarks.[44]

129. These difficulties are recognized in several UNESCO statements and were underlined by member States during the WGIEE. As in any global programme budget, it is a challenge to cover all UNESCO activities at the global, regional and country levels and to express expected outputs in such generic terms that they capture the diverse contexts of member States. The 36 C/5 document includes more consistent and clearer indicators and benchmarks, but a substantial margin for improvement still exists. In particular, there is a need to reduce the number of process indicators and to increase the recourse to indicators that are capable of demonstrating the contribution of UNESCO to the achievement of its programmes, even when conducted in partnership. The Director-General's proposals in the IEE follow-up report are going in the right direction. Building on more actionable measures, the Inspectors trust it will lead to improved practices and further implementation of RBM at all levels of the Organization.

130. A key aspect of RBM is the ability of the Organization to report on its results and achievements. The UNESCO secretariat reports on the execution of the programmes at every session of the Executive Board through its EX/4 documents. At the end of the biennium, a consolidated version of EX/4 (complemented by the IOS comments) is prepared for the consideration of the General Conference (C/3 document).

131. The quality of reporting on UNESCO activities and on achieved results was severely questioned by some interviewees during the review. UNESCO evaluation documents regularly point out the absence of reliable data, the variable quality of reporting and the lack of specific indicators of measurement. For example, "Objectives set by UNESCO are defined rather broadly; as a result there is a lack of specific measurable indicators and of an integrated monitoring system".[45] The Executive Board itself, acknowledging some progress, observed that reports "are not always presented with sufficient precision against the expected results listed in the C/5 documents, and do not sufficiently relay the challenges, lessons learned, cost-effectiveness and sustainability of UNESCO's activities".[46] During interviews, some member States expressed a lack of understanding of "what UNESCO is doing", and what its impact is on the ground.

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[43] JIU/REP/2006/6, "Results-based Management in the United Nations in the context of the Reform Process".

[44] Another example is given by the External Auditor report auditing one of the divisions in the Natural Science sector for which one recommendation calls for improving the quality of programming documents, particularly the formulation of performance indicators and benchmarks. See 185 EX/32 Part II.

[45] IOS/EVS/PI/108 Rev: Evaluation of Strategic Programme Objective 7: "Enhancing research-policy linkages on social transformations, October 2010.

[46] 35 C/9, Part II.


132. The reporting documents should be further improved to meet two major objectives: (a) to focus on results and to demonstrate the link between resources assigned/devoted to programmes and the quality of results obtained by these programmes in the medium and long terms, and (b) to be an effective instrument feeding into the decision-making process of member States in the governing bodies, based on clear and relevant information and data. In that spirit, the WGIEE requested the Director-General to propose a quality framework for Executive Board documents to ensure concise, analytical and action-oriented reports.

133. Several steps taken are worth mentioning in this context: the simplification of the reporting component of the SISTER information system, the standardization of the reporting format, and the consolidation mechanisms for reporting information at headquarters and/or in regional offices. The discussions on further simplifying and shortening biannual mandatory reporting are also positive developments.

B. Investment in reform

134. Figure 5 presents the financial resources of UNESCO since 2004-2005, with the respective trends of assessed and voluntary contributions. One can observe that the overall level of resources remain at the same level in nominal terms. That means a decrease in financial capacity (in real terms). A decrease in voluntary contributions during the last three biennia has contributed to a reduction in the proportion of extra-budgetary (XB) funding vis-à-vis regular programme resources. This trend is opposite to the trend generally observed in the United Nations system organizations, where XB funding is generally increasing faster than assessed budgeting. This has to be read in the light of recent developments affecting the budgetary situation of the Organization.

Figure 5: UNESCO regular budget and voluntary contributions resources, 2004-2005 to 2010-2011, in millions of USD



	2004-2005	2006-2007	2008-2009	2010-2011
Regular Budget	610,000	610,000	631,000	653,000
Voluntary Contributions	629,127	710,791	601,316	565,722

Source: Data compiled from C5 documents, BOA report on audited accounts and from UNESCO reports on voluntary contributions. Voluntary contributions for 2010-2011 were estimated ceteris paribus on the basis of 2010 figures

135. These figures provide member States with a medium-term perspective on UNESCO resources. After several years of cuts in various areas and in support services, the UNESCO secretariat warned that continuing in the same way would "seriously undermine its capacity to deliver and will have to be accompanied by major reductions in programmes".[47] In this context, and taking into account the need to invest to ensure the implementation of agreed

[47] 36 C/5, Draft resolutions 2012-2013, Volume I.

reforms, the UNESCO secretariat's initial budget proposal for 2012-2013 was based on a Zero Real Growth (ZRG) scenario which meant an increase in nominal terms only. This scenario was not embraced by member States, which requested an alternative Zero Nominal Growth (ZNG) budget scenario subsequently presented by the Director-General.

136. The ZNG budget scenario will impact on reform efforts at a crucial time for the Organization during which investment is necessary to conduct reform and implement change. Any investment entails some risk, but if member States support the need for reform, the UNESCO secretariat should be given the capacity to conduct the exercise. At the same time, the Director-General should continue, or even step up, efforts to make sure that budget resources are allocated and spent in an optimal manner. If regular budget resources cannot cover the reform implementation, attention should be given to a potential alternative for the UNESCO secretariat. Based on its cost estimation of the main reform initiatives, the Director-General should explore the possibility of further mobilizing extra-budgetary contributions for reform purposes.

137. The Inspectors are aware of the fact that reforms will be gradually implemented over the next few years. At the end of the 2012-2013 biennium, an interim external assessment of reform measures and their effectiveness should be conducted to see if they have produced the intended effects, and propose corrective measures thereafter, if appropriate.

138. The debates on the focus of UNESCO touches upon the necessary coherence of its programme activities funded via predictable resources such as pooled or individual voluntary contributions, private and business partners, or governments providing self-benefiting funds with those planned in the C/5 approved by member States. The C/5 document only includes partial XB figures based on firm commitments at the time of the production of the document, an amount which is often higher in reality at the end of the biennium.

139. These issues were previously raised by the External Auditor in 2004 and 2006 and triggered some measures that were intended to reinforce the link between regular and XB resources.[48] However, the 2010 IOS audit highlighted persistent difficulties regarding the XB framework in terms of corporate coherence and the need for strategic vision in this matter.[49] In that context, the WGIEE stressed that the same criteria used for regular budget-based programmes should also guide the decision on activities financed through XB funds, and that such activities should be subject to accountability measures.[50] Such integration is crucial and the Organization should have strong procedures in place to ensure effective implementation. The PMC has an important role to play in this context through ensuring consistency and transparency in the application of agreed criteria for allocating resources.

140. Since 2008-2009, the Complimentary Additional Programme (CAP) contributed to ensuring better alignment between the main lines of actions of the regular programme and extra-budgetary-funded activities. UNESCO is now launching its third CAP 2012-2013. The Inspectors welcome the recent audit of CAP by the External Auditor and concur with its recommendations.

141. Several factors might explain the trend for decline in voluntary contributions, such as the world economic financial crisis and the rationalization of one of the major self-benefiting contributors, but also the deterioration of some donors' confidence in the added value and impact of UNESCO. Tables 17 to 19 provide information on voluntary cash contributions to UNESCO.

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[48] 174 EX/27

[49] IOS/AUD/2010/02, "Audit of UNESCO's Extra-budgetary Framework", February 2011.

[50] 186 EX/17 Part I. Criteria are: alignment with the overarching/strategic programme objectives; (b) determination of the capacity to deliver and the probability of real impact through the assessment of budgetary and human resources available; (c) delineation and comparative advantage as well as complementarity with the activities of other United Nations partners; (d) formulation of exit strategies and sunset provisions; and (e) periodic assessment of programmes, their implementation rates and exit strategies based on decision-oriented evaluations

- There is no major change in recent years although the number of donors is decreasing;
- Contributions provided by a small group of donors represent over 70 per cent of the contributions, which indicates the need to diversify the funding sources[51];
- The amount of XB contributions made to dedicated trust funds (26.8%) and to self-benefiting trust funds (15.1%) imposes management constraints for UNESCO and may lead to problems in implementation;
- As they rely on a low proportion of regular budget resources, Institutes capture roughly a quarter of the contributions; the majority goes to the Education sector.

Table 17: UNESCO XB contributions (2008-2010), by amount and number of donors

Amount of contribution	2008	Donors	2009	Donors	2010	Donors
Up to USD 100.000	4,352,227	212	3,748,051	217	4,007,637	199
From USD 100.000 to 1 mln.	21,694,847	69	23,099,331	69	17,584,328	56
From 1 to 5 million	46,555,306	19	47,022,569	20	58,755,197	23
Over 5 million	235,175,692	13	219,668,473	14	202,513,876	10
Total	307,778,072	313	293,538,424	320	282,861,038	288

Source: data compiled from UNESCO internal memo on voluntary contributions (2008-2010)

Table 18: UNESCO XB contributions (2008-2010), by amount and type of donors

Donor type	2008	2009	2010
Government sources	243,190,617	19,4571,141	204,715,732
Other sources	25,036,300	43,469,890	32,238,385
United Nations sources	39,551,155	55,497,393	45,906,921
Total	307,778,072	293,538,424	282,861,038

Source: data compiled from UNESCO internal memo on voluntary contributions (2008-2010)

Table 19: UNESCO main donors (2008-2010) for XB contributions

2008	2009	2010
Brazil	Italy	Japan
Italy	Brazil	Italy
Japan	Netherlands	Brazil
Netherlands	Spain	Netherlands
Spain	Norway	Norway
Norway	Japan	Spain
Denmark	Sweden	France
France	France	Belgium
Sweden	Germany	Sweden
United States of America	Denmark	Iraq
and 125 other countries	and 131 other countries	and 125 other countries

Source: UNESCO internal memo on voluntary contributions 2010

142. **Particularly during this period of uncertainty, the Inspectors encourage the UNESCO secretariat to continue its efforts to diversify its resources, including from the academic circle and the private sector.** Considering the mandated areas of UNESCO, there are indeed promising funding opportunities for the Organization, but also some risks, in 2009

[51] BFM/FRA/2011/28, Voluntary Contributions received in cash to extrabudgetary activities and Institutes for the period 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2010.

JIU provided benchmarks on corporate sponsoring that could help structure the approach of UNESCO on this matter.[52]

143. In 2011, the SMT addressed the need for better guidance for fund-raising activities. It decided that a new corporate resource mobilization strategy should be presented to UNESCO governing bodies with the objective of broadening the donor base, and providing clear criteria for developing and maintaining relations with other partners, including those in the private sector. All statements, findings and lessons learned identified in various internal committees in the last couple of years, for example at the RMC, should be fully utilized in this process. It should include a solid verification mechanism to be used before engaging with any funding partners in order to ensure avoidance of conflict of interest.

[52] JIU/NOTE/2009/1, "Corporate Sponsoring in the United Nations System"

VI. OVERSIGHT

144. Since 2000, UNESCO has built a comprehensive oversight framework composed of a consolidated Internal Oversight Section (IOS) for audit, evaluation and investigation supplemented by external oversight mechanisms such as the External Auditor, the Oversight Advisory Committee (OAC) and the Joint Inspection Unit. This framework is compliant with the JIU recommendations made in 2000.

Table 20: UNESCO oversight framework

IOS	Conducting internal audits, evaluations, investigations and providing other management support
External Auditor	Auditing of UNESCO's annual accounts and financial statements and other specific matters
OAC	Advising the Director-General on internal oversight matters
JIU	Conducting evaluations, inspections and investigations across the United Nations system

Source: IOS annual report 2010

A. Internal Oversight Service

145. The administrative authority establishing the internal oversight functions in UNESCO is found in the Administrative Manual, chapter 1.6. Table 21 shows the evolution of IOS resources from regular and XB sources. The IOS share in the UNESCO budget is 0.57 per cent, which is in line with the JIU suggested ranges issued in 2006.[53] The Inspectors note that the resources devoted to internal oversight have been decreasing in recent bienniums. Considering the need for increased oversight at many levels of the Organization, as pointed out in this review, the Inspectors are concerned by this trend, in particular since IOS also takes on other corporate responsibilities.

Table 21: Internal Oversight Service resources in USD

2008-2009	Regular budget: 6,161,900 Voluntary contributions: 882,000	Total: 7,043,900
2010-2011	Regular budget: 6,073,100 Voluntary contributions: 814,400	Total: 6,887,500
2012-2013	Regular budget: 6,207,000 Voluntary contributions: 736,000	Total: 6,943,000

Source: 34 C/5, 35 C/5 and 36 C/5 (Draft resolutions 2012-2013, Volume I)

Internal audit

146. IOS uses a risk-based approach in defining its audit plan. Audited entities are prioritized and related resources allocated after an analytical exercise considering elements of risk such as the size of the budget, the operational significance, the nature of the expenditure and previous audit findings. For that purpose, entities and business processes are divided into three groups: (a) headquarters units and operations managed by headquarters, (b) field units

[53] See JIU/REP/2006/2, "Oversight Lacunae in the United Nations System".

and entities away from headquarters and (c) Information and Communication Technology (ICT) related categories.

147. Internal audit functions are aligned to professional norms and standards and have been subject to external peer reviews or self assessment exercises in recent years. IOS has also developed various quality assurance mechanisms[54] and introduced a number of best practices such as electronic working papers, professional certification requirements and client surveys. Internal audit recommendations and their status of implementation are recorded in an IOS database. The Inspectors welcome this follow-up mechanism as an important element in fulfilling the IOS mission. The number of outstanding audit recommendations has been drastically reduced in recent years through increased emphasis by senior management and close follow-up by IOS. However, the tracking of outstanding recommendations resulting from evaluations is consolidated only in an electronic text document which makes follow-up a more complex exercise than if a database were used.

Evaluation

148. The current evaluation strategy (2008-2013) contains the corporate policy statement on evaluation. It is structured under eight main objectives to ensure that strategic areas are evaluated within the medium-term strategy period, as well as main decentralized bodies and key centralized functions. The biennial evaluation plan lists all evaluations planned in a given biennium (strategic, thematic or field oriented). The fact that the evaluation plan is included as an annex to the C/5 programme and budget document is consistent with good practice.

149. The Inspectors note that a number of evaluations are outsourced under the overall management of IOS and that, as in many United Nations system organizations, decentralized evaluations and self-evaluations are of varying quality. The Inspectors thus welcome the Director-General's commitment to enhance the evaluation capacity within UNESCO in particular at field level, notably through increased use of self-evaluation as a component of programme management. The Inspectors concur with a recurrent IOS finding on the limited evaluation expertise available in field offices, and the weakness of systematic monitoring, managing and reporting capacity. Current evaluation capacity lacks resources, in particular since many evaluations are conducted by external parties. During debates about the reform of the field structure, there were also proposals to include evaluation and knowledge management functions as part of the regional presence. However, budget limitations might impair such capacity reinforcement in the future.

150. While IOS underwent a peer review exercise in 2008, consisting of a self-assessment based on the United Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG) norms and standards followed by a validation exercise by an external auditor, the Inspectors believe that the IOS Evaluation Section should submit itself to regular peer review exercises to assess how it complies with professional norms and standards and that these should follow the model proposed by UNEG, as appropriate.

Investigation

151. Established in 2008, the Investigation Unit may investigate any case of misconduct, after explicit approval from the Director-General. The investigator's role is to examine and determine the veracity of allegations about irregularities (fraud, waste, abuse and other misconduct) and provide supporting evidence for potential disciplinary measures or prosecution as specified in the UNESCO Administrative Manual. The investigation function in United Nations system organizations has been reviewed by JIU in a separate report.[55] The

[54] For example: (a) Evaluation Handbook, (b) Guidelines for Developing Terms of References, (c) Desk Study Checklist, (d) Guidelines for Selection of Evaluators, (e) Guidelines for Inception Reports, (f) Guidelines for Managing External Evaluations, (g) Guidelines for Follow-up to Evaluation Report Recommendations.

[55] JIU/REP/2010/5, "The Audit Function in the United Nations System". And JIU/REP/2011/7, "The Investigation Function in the United Nations system".

Inspectors wish to flag one of several impediments to the independence of the function within UNESCO, specifically, that an investigation can only be opened "after explicit approval from the Director-General." This problem should be addressed as indicated in the report.

B. Oversight Advisory Committee (OAC)

152. In 2000, JIU recommended the establishment of an advisory expert body on oversight to assist the legislative organs. Over the course of the following decade, the committee's functions, composition and organizational placement lacked the continuity that is necessary to fully achieve its potential added value to the Organization. The OAC finally became a standing committee following General Conference 35 C/Resolution 101 and its terms of reference were adopted in Executive Board decision 181 EX/33. The OAC is composed of four external experts tasked to advise the Director-General on oversight and related activities in UNESCO (risk management, financial control and ethics).[56] Its annual report is transmitted to the Executive Board. On the basis of its interim reports, the Inspectors expect that the OAC will now function smoothly. Its role in and added value to UNESCO should be re-evaluated regularly in the light of the recommendations of the JIU report on the Audit function.

C. Joint Inspection Unit

153. The JIU provides independent external oversight, with a focus on system-wide issues, to UNESCO, which is one of its participating organizations. UNESCO has a positive and proactive attitude towards JIU reports and recommendations. This is demonstrated by the high rate of acceptance (76 per cent) and of implementation (65 per cent implemented and 30 per cent in progress) of recommendations issued during the period 2004-2009. The summary report prepared for consideration and action by the Executive Board is consistent with good practice. It is complemented by an action plan that includes comments on JIU recommendations and is available on the IOS internet site. However, the Inspectors regret that full reports are not forwarded for consideration to the UNESCO governing bodies, in particular to the General Conference, which does not handle JIU reports. As a matter of fact, the recommendations addressed to the governing bodies of UNESCO in the JIU report of 2000 were not presented and discussed as such.

D. Dissemination of oversight recommendations

154. Oversight reports and their recommendations are distributed to the Director-General and the governing bodies in various manners. During the review, member States' representatives pointed out the lack of sufficient information provided to them regarding implementation measures for accepted oversight recommendations, in particular those under the responsibility of the Director-General. According to the Guidelines for follow-up to evaluation report recommendations, "IOS reports periodically to the Executive Board and the College of ADGs (now SMT) on the overall progress made in the implementation of Action Plans." The IOS reports on all three functions (audit, evaluation and investigations) and provides implementation rates and information at the general level, not on individual recommendations, partly because of the document page limitations imposed by the Executive Board. Nevertheless, t**he Director-General should make efforts to ensure accurate and complete information for member States on the follow-up given to oversight recommendations.**

[56] 35 C/47.

Annex I: JIU ONLINE SURVEY

UNESCO employees contributed to the Inspectors' review through an online survey made available to both headquarters and field-deployed employees in June 2011. The survey was prepared as a complement to the UNESCO 2010 Global Staff Survey. It therefore focused on issues related to executive management and change management. The participation rate, in particular at Paris headquarters, is illustrative and statistically representative of the views of some categories of staff. Interestingly, more than one third of the respondents have more than ten years of experience at UNESCO, providing a long-term perspective. The findings based on aggregated and filtered data by various categories of respondents and locations have been included in the narrative of the report.

Participation in the JIU online survey 2011, by location

	Recipients	Respondents	Participation rate
Paris headquarters	1861	685	36.8%
Other locations*	2119	587	27.7%
Total	3980	1272**	32.0%

**Includes all staff located outside of headquarters ** Includes incomplete surveys*

Participation in the JIU online survey 2011, by main category


	Recipients	Respondents	Participation rate
International Professionals	1005	521	51.8%
General Service	1135	366	32.2%
Other categories	1840	385	20.9%

In analysing the responses, the Inspectors note the following points of interest:

- Results indicate that when assessing the current reforms process, respondents are divided into three main groups: positive opinion, negative opinion and no opinion;
- By location, headquarters staff is generally more negative in their assessment. While one third of the field employees often indicate that they are not aware of a specific issue, informed respondents usually provide a more positive opinion. UNESCO employees active in the Institutes are, by far, the most disconnected of all categories and often have difficulty expressing an opinion;
- By grade, about half the directors of UNESCO contributed to the survey. It is worth noting that they provided a mixed assessment of many issues, and were sometimes quite critical.

The Inspectors also collected comments and suggestions that tackled a large number of management and administration issues. The main concerns expressed were: (a) many staff members see their organization as bureaucratic and administratively heavy with regard to day-to-day operations; (b) field staff deplored the lack of resources made available to them for conducting their activities; (C) frustration and discouragement were also often expressed.

Annex II: UNESCO organizational structure (2012-2013)



Annex III: Overview of action to be taken by participating organizations on the recommendations of the Joint Inspection Unit

JIU/REP/2011/8

		Intended impact	United nations, its funds and programmes													Specialized agencies and IAEA											
			United Nations*	UNCTAD	UNODC	UNEP	UN-Habitat	UNHCR	UNRWA	UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	WFP	UN Women	UNOPS	ILO	FAO	UNESCO	ICAO	WHO	UPU	ITU	WMO	IMO	WIPO	UNIDO	UNWTO	IAEA
Note	For action																	☒										
	For information		☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒		☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒
Recommendation 1		**e**																E										
Recommendation 2		**e**																E										
Recommendation 3		**e**																L										
Recommendation 4		**c**																E										
Recommendation 5		**d**																E										
Recommendation 6		**e**																E										
Recommendation 7		**a**																E										
Recommendation 8		**o**																L										

Legend: L: Recommendation for decision by legislative organ **E:** Recommendation for action by executive head

: Recommendation does not require action by this organization **Intended impact: a:** enhanced accountability **b:** dissemination of best practices **c:** enhanced coordination and cooperation **d:** enhanced controls and compliance **e:** enhanced effectiveness **f:** significant financial savings **g:** enhanced efficiency **o:** other. * Covers all entities listed in ST/SGB/2002/11 other than UNCTAD, UNODC, UNEP, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNRWA.

JIU/REP/2011/9

INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY (ICT) GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM ORGANIZATIONS

Prepared by

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Information and communication technology (ICT) governance in United Nations system organizations
JIU/REP/2011/9

Objective

In recent years, the world has witnessed the rapid growth and ever-increasing importance of information and communication technologies (ICT). ICT has become a dynamic, strategic and indispensable asset of an organization in the achievement of its mission and goals.

How to harness the power of ICT effectively? How to maximize investment in ICT? How to mitigate the risks associated with ICT? All these questions point to and rely on one parameter: ICT governance.

The objective of the review is to conduct a comparative analysis of the different ICT governance frameworks, practices and processes in the various United Nations system organizations with a view to identifying best practices and lessons learned, and thereby promote effective ICT governance.

Main findings and conclusions

The report contains 11 recommendations, one of which is addressed to the legislative bodies of the United Nations system organizations, nine to their executive heads and one to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in his capacity as Chairman of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB).

In the Inspectors' opinion, an effective ICT governance framework should include the following:

- A well-functioning ICT governance committee or equivalent, which should be composed of senior managers from all parts of the organizations and meet regularly, and whose functioning is reviewed periodically (recommendations 2 and 3);

- Strong leadership over the ICT governance infrastructure by the executive management, preferably at the level of the deputy head of the organizations (recommendation 1);

- An appropriate Chief Information Officer (CIO) or equivalent in a senior-level post with overall responsibilities and authority and access to the executive management (recommendation 4);

- A full-fledged corporate ICT strategy aligned to the organizations' business needs and priorities, and yielding true value of the ICT investment, which

should be reviewed and updated periodically (recommendations 5 and 7);

- A well-established mechanism to monitor the implementation of the ICT strategy (recommendation 8);

- Strengthened efforts to track ICT costs in the organizations and conduct post-implementation reviews of major ICT investments so as to facilitate strategic decision-making, cost-effectiveness, accountability and transparency (recommendations 9 and 10).

Recommendation for consideration by the legislative organs

Recommendation 6

The legislative bodies of the United Nations system organizations should request the executive heads to present the corporate ICT strategies to member States for their information and support.

Recommendation for consideration by the CEB

Recommendation 11

The Secretary-General, in his capacity as Chairman of the CEB, should streamline the Board's ICT Network by identifying and focusing on common ICT issues and providing clear guidance to the network in order to improve cooperation and coordination among the United Nations system organizations.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CEB	United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination
CBIT	Committee on Business and Information Technology
COBIT	Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology
EPM	Enterprise Portfolio Management
ERM	Enterprise Risk Management
ERP	Enterprise Resource Planning
EU	European Union
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
HLCM	High-Level Committee on Management
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
ICTN	ICT Network of the United Nations System under the CEB
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
ISACA	Information Systems Audit and Control Association
IPSAS	International Public Sector Accounting Standards
IT	Information Technology
ITGI	IT Governance Institute
ITIL	Information Technology Infrastructure Library
ITU	International Telecommunications Union
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
OHCHR	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UN-ICC	United Nations International Computing Centre
UNICEF	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNWTO	United Nations World Tourism Organization
UPU	Universal Postal Union
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Background, objectives, scope and methodology

1. As part of its programme of work for 2011, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU), in response to a suggestion from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) that was supported by a dozen other United Nations system organizations, conducted a review of "Information and communication technology (ICT) governance in the United Nations system organizations."

2. No system-wide review of ICT governance in the United Nations system organizations has yet been conducted. However, in 2008, the JIU issued two reports[1] which briefly touched on the topic of ICT governance. The reports stressed the importance of effective ICT governance as a critical factor for successful ICT operations in an organization. They also highlighted that ICT governance is an issue of critical significance for the United Nations system organizations, one which merited further study.

3. In his report "Investing in information and communications technology: status report" (A/62/502), the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated that achieving effective ICT governance was a major challenge for large, complex and geographically dispersed organizations.[2]

4. The objective of this review is to conduct a comparative analysis of the different ICT governance frameworks, practices and processes in the various United Nations system organizations, with a view to identifying best practices and lessons learned and thereby promote effective ICT governance. The key aspects considered included the ICT governance structures in place; implementation of the organization's ICT strategy; strategic alignment of ICT with the organization's business objectives and mandate; ICT resource management, decision-making process and investment; ICT performance and risk management, including ICT security and business continuity/disaster recovery. In addition to ICT governance within the organizations, the review also examined ICT governance at the United Nations system-wide level, notably coordination and cooperation among the United Nations system organizations in the area of ICT, for example, through the ICT Network (ICTN) of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) and its High-Level Committee on Management (HLCM).

5. In the preparation of the report, the Inspectors took into consideration, as appropriate, internationally accepted ICT governance standards and methodologies considered industries best practice, such as the Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT), developed by the Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA) and its affiliated IT Governance Institute (ITGI), the Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL), developed by the Government of the United Kingdom, Prince2 methodologies, ISO 20000 and 27000 standards for IT security, as well as ISO standard ISO/IEC 38500-2008 for corporate governance of information technology.

6. In accordance with JIU internal standards and guidelines and its internal working procedures, the methodology used to prepare this report included a preliminary review, questionnaires, interviews and an in-depth analysis. Interviews were conducted in Geneva, New York, Paris, Rome, Vienna and Washington DC with officials of most JIU participating

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[1] See JIU/REP/2008/5, Review of ICT hosting services in the UN system organizations, and JIU/REP/2008/6, Review of management of internet websites in the UN system organizations; also JIU/REP/2002/9, Information management in the United Nations systems organizations.

[2] A/62/502, para. 2.

organizations, as well as the CEB Secretariat. Consultation and dialogue were sought with all main stakeholders, including senior and executive managers, ICT officials, users as well as oversight officials.

7. The report team also participated, upon invitation, in the 16th and 17th session of the CEB ICT Network (ICTN), held in April and October 2011 respectively, and discussed major issues concerning ICT governance with participants.

8. Other international organizations and financial institutions, such as the European Union (EU), the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE), and the World Bank were also consulted. Given the wide range of issues covered, it was not possible to carry out an in-depth review of all of them in each and every United Nations system organization. Therefore, reference is made to organizations in particular contexts with the sole aim of providing examples.

9. Finally, the internal and external auditors of the United Nations system organizations and their evaluation offices have issued various reports touching on ICT governance. Those reports, as well as the ongoing discussions and debate at the CEB/HLCM level on pertinent issues were taken into account in the appropriate context.

10. As is customary, comments on the draft report were sought from the participating organizations and taken into account in the final report.

11. In accordance with article 11.2 of the JIU statute, this report was finalized after consultation among the Inspectors so as to test its conclusions and recommendations against the collective wisdom of the Unit.

12. To facilitate the handling of the report and the implementation of its recommendations and the monitoring thereof, the table in annex IV indicates whether the report is submitted to the organizations concerned for action or for information. The table identifies the recommendations relevant for each organization and specifies whether a decision by the legislative body of the organization or action by its executive head is required

13. The Inspectors express their appreciation to all who assisted them in the preparation of this report, particularly those who participated in the interviews and so willingly shared their knowledge and expertise.

II. GOVERNANCE

A. Definition of ICT governance

14. ICT governance is a subset discipline and an integral part of corporate governance. [3] "ICT governance is the responsibility of executives and the board of directors, and consists of the leadership, organisational structures and processes that ensure that the enterprise's ICT sustains and extends the organisation's strategies and objectives." [4]

15. In line with this definition, the Secretary-General, in a recent report, stated as follows: "The principles and processes associated with ICT decision-making and its underlying organizational structures come together under the broad concept of ICT governance. The ICT management framework clarifies how decisions are made, who provides inputs for the decisions, who is accountable and how ICT activities are coordinated within the Secretariat and ensures that key stakeholders take on the appropriate roles and responsibilities to clearly and effectively guide the management of the Organization's ICT activities and resources."[5]

16. According to COBIT, the governance of ICT is the pivot directing ICT endeavours and ensuring that ICT performance meets the following objectives: (i) alignment with and realization of the organization's mandate and objectives; (ii enablement of the organization by exploiting opportunities and maximizing benefits; (iii) responsible use of ICT resources; and (iv) appropriate management of ICT-related risks.[6]

B. Importance of ICT governance

17. In recent years, the world has witnessed the rapid growth and ever-increasing importance of ICT. It is hard to imagine an organization operating successfully in the 21st century without a strong ICT infrastructure.

18. The role of ICT has evolved over the past decades from a supporting, back-office function to a key function, enabler and driving force for organizations. It has become a dynamic and strategic asset of an organization for the successful achievement of its mission and goals. ICT is essential to managing transactions, information and knowledge necessary to achieve and sustain an organization's mandate and goals. Hence, organizations are becoming increasingly dependant on a well-functioning ICT infrastructure.

19. At the same time, the expenditure and costs for ICT have grown significantly over the past years. The approximate total ICT costs in the United Nations system organizations range from about 2 to about 13 per cent of the total annual budget of the organizations over 2009 and 2010, with most organizations spending about 4 to 7 per cent of the total annual budget

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[3] The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) defines corporate governance of IT in paragraph 1.6.3 of its standard ISO/IEC 38500-2008, Corporate governance of information technology, as the system by which the current and future use of IT is directed and controlled. Corporate governance of IT involves evaluating and directing the use of IT to support the organization and monitoring this use to achieve plans. It includes the strategy and policies for using IT within an organization.

[4] See ITGI, *Board Briefing on IT Governance*, 2nd Edition, 2003, pp. 6-11, available at http://www.isaca.org/Knowledge-Center/Research/Documents/BoardBriefing/26904_Board_Briefing_final.pdf

[5] A/65/491, para. 24.

[6] For further information on COBIT, see http://www.isaca.org/Knowledge-Center/cobit/Pages/Overview.aspx.

on ICT.[7] Not included in those costs is expenditure for specific ICT initiatives and projects, such as Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems, which, as some organizations observed, may be as high as the annual ICT budgets of the organizations. Total ICT costs at the World Food Programme (WFP) were about 3 per cent of the budget in 2009/2010, and at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), approximately 3 and 4 per cent in 2009 and 2010 respectively. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) spent around 2 per cent of their budget on ICT during this period, while the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) spent about 7 per cent (CAD 2.7 million) of its annual budget on ICT in 2009-2010, although major ICT projects were funded through additional funds, in the amount of CAD 640.000 in 2009, and CAD 2.5 million in 2010. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) spent about 3.4 percent (CHF 2.9 million) of its annual budget on ICT in 2010, while an additional CHF 3.2 million was spent on IPSAS implementation during the period 2008-2011.

20. ICT governance is an important factor in generating business value from ICT. A study on ICT governance was conducted by MIT Sloan School of Management's Centre for Information System Research (CISR). The study covered more than 300 enterprises in over 20 countries and concluded that IT business value directly results from effective IT governance. The research indicated that firms with superior IT governance have at least 20 per cent higher profits than firms with poor governance, given the same strategic objectives. [8]

21. Effective ICT governance is a critical factor for successful ICT operation in an organization; it ensures that the organization's ICT is aligned to and supports its strategies and mandate. To this end, the ICT governance mechanism should ensure that the decision-making process on ICT direction, strategy and investments are driven by business so as to enable close alignment of ICT with the organization's business needs. The ICT governance structure and processes should also guarantee the resolution of cross-cutting priorities and requirements at an organization-wide level, which is often a challenge in the United Nations system organizations which have federated and de-centralized ICT architectures and concomitant ICT resource allocations.

22. Effective ICT governance also contributes to better harmonization and coherence with respect to ICT security levels, ICT project management methodologies and generally ICT systems. Finally, an effective ICT governance structure facilitates appropriate awareness of the strategic importance of ICT among managers and staff, and promotes ICT as a strategic tool and enabler for enhancing organizational effectiveness and efficiency and facilitating change management.

C. Basic ICT governance structures and frameworks

23. There is no single ICT governance formula or framework to suit all the United Nations system organizations. Nevertheless, there are agreed common elements that form the basic structure of an ICT governance framework.

24. ICT governance mainly addresses three critical questions: What decisions must be made to ensure appropriate management and use of ICT? Who should make these decisions? How will these decisions be implemented and monitored?

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[7] Information based on responses to the questionnaire; the figures indicated are aggregates aimed at presenting an overview of the situation. They do not allow for specific conclusions to be drawn in respect of the organizations, bearing in mind the different mandates, structures, activities and operations of the organizations.

[8] See Peter Weill and Jeanne W. Ross, *IT Governance*, Harvard Business School Press, 2004, p. VIII; the research covered the period 1999-2003.

25. The central element is the ICT governance committee or equivalent, composed of business managers providing overall guidance and direction on ICT at the organization-wide level. The committee or board is often supported by a technical committee which provides technical advice and support. The United Nations organizations[9] and those with regional and field offices also have local ICT committees in the organizations' substantive departments and/or regional and country offices.

26. Most organizations also have one or several working group(s) or task force(s) for certain major ICT programmes, for example, the working groups for each of the three strategic ICT programmes at the United Nations.[10] Finally, in addition to standing ICT governance bodies, separate ad hoc governance structures are established for major, large-scale and cross-cutting ICT projects, such as enterprise resource planning (ERP) implementation, which may comprise steering committees, project teams, working groups and task forces at different levels, as appropriate.

27. The organization's corporate ICT strategy forms an integral part of the basic ICT governance. Further, the CIO, CTO or Head of the ICT department, the ultimate responsible official for ICT in the organization to whom the CIO or equivalent reports to and Member States in the legislative bodies, i.e. with respect in deciding on and allocating ICT resources through the organization's programme budget preparation process for ICT, play an important role in governing the organization's ICT.

28. Given the various structures and mandates of the United Nations system organizations, ICT governance frameworks, including the ICT governance committee or equivalent, vary across the organizations.

D. ICT governance committees

29. The great majority of organizations have an ICT governance committee or equivalent in place. In most organizations, including the United Nations, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and WMO, the ICT governance committee is a separate body composed of officers at the senior and executive levels representing all parts of the organization and chaired by an executive manager.[11] Some organizations, such as UNESCO and ICAO, do not have separate ICT governance committees, rather their established management committees deal with ICT matters in addition to other organizational and managerial issues. At UNIDO, the Committee for Change and Organizational Renewal (CCOR), which was established in February 2010, provides strategic direction and oversight with regard to all change undertakings in the organization, including all ICT-related issues and governance frameworks.

30. The most crucial role and function of the ICT governance committee is to ensure alignment of ICT with the organization's business needs. The committee provides a forum

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[9] The ICT structures at OHCHR, UNCTAD, UNEP, UN-Habitat, UNOV, UNODC and UNWRA are governed by the ICT governance framework and the ICT strategy of the United Nations, established by the Office of Information and Communications Technology (OICT) of the United Nations Secretariat.

[10] These are knowledge management, resource management and infrastructure management.

[11] UNDP, UNFPA, UNOPS, UN Women and UNU also have a unique ICT governance mechanism, whereby all Atlas agencies are members of the Inter-Agency Atlas Governance Group (IAAG). The Group meets regularly to review common Atlas-related issues, and it is an important aspect of ICT governance in those organizations where strategic issues impacting the Atlas agencies are escalated to the Executive Sponsor Group which comprises Assistant Secretary-Generals of the three core Atlas agencies (UNDP, UNFPA and UNOPS).

and mechanism where business managers from all parts of the organization can meet to discuss ICT requirements and needs at the organization level; it therefore serves as a mechanism for the resolution of competing priorities at that level. This function gains particular importance due to the fact that the great majority of organizations have strong de-centralized and federated ICT structures, with various ICT units located in their major departments and programmes as well as in the organizations' regional and country offices. Without a central governance body dealing with cross-cutting issues at the corporate level, organizations risk having fragmented, inefficient and ineffective ICT structures.

31. At the time of the review, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and UNESCO were in the process of reforming their ICT governance frameworks. In this context, the organizations also reviewed the composition and terms of reference (TOR) of their ICT governance committees or equivalent, and some departments had not yet established their ICT governance committees or they were not fully operational. Following a review of its ICT governance structure, UNDP is currently revising the TOR of its ICT governance body, the ICT Board.

32. Therefore, in the Inspectors' view, **the executive heads of FAO[12] and UNESCO should ensure that their ICT governance committees or equivalent are established and operational without undue delay, so as to make full use of ICT in sustaining the organizations' mandates and objectives.**

1. Composition of the ICT governance committee

33. ICT governance is the responsibility of senior management. The composition and chairmanship of ICT governance committees or equivalent varies across the United Nations system organizations. Membership usually includes business managers at different levels from various parts of the organization, including regional and country offices, as appropriate. The committee is chaired by an executive officer, sometimes the deputy executive head of the organization, in other cases the director of administration or equivalent.

34. The CIO or Head of ICT is also represented on the ICT governance committee, as an ex officio member or as secretary of the committee.[13] This ensures that the CIO can provide administrative and technical support to facilitate the work of the committee; it also ensures that the CIO is informed of the committee's discussions and decisions.

35. The Inspectors noted that the composition of the committees in some organizations does not ensure adequate representation of business managers from all parts of the organization, including from the various substantive departments and programmes at headquarters and in regional and country offices for organizations with a strong field presence. The Inspectors also learned that the committee members are not in all organizations business managers at the appropriate senior level.

36. In the Inspectors' view, **it is of utmost importance that all or at least the major business owners from all the major services of the organization, including the regional and country offices, as appropriate, are represented in the organization's ICT governance body, so as to ensure an effective ICT governance committee or equivalent,**

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[12] FAO's new Information Technology and Knowledge Management Governance Framework was approved by its Director-General on July 18th, 2011 and implemented in September 2011.

[13] Practices in the organizations differ: for example at the United Nations and UNHCR, the CIO is an ex officio member of the ICT-EC and the UNHCHR ICT Governance Board, respectively; at WFP, the CIO is a member of the MISSC; while at UNDP, the CTO performs the role of secretary to the UNDP ICT Board.

as a forum where business owners can discuss and provide direction and guidance on ICT at the organization level.

37. Furthermore, the members of the committee should be business managers at the appropriate senior level, preferably the most senior level. Only then can they adequately represent their departments and programmes, with the authority to present and defend their ICT needs and requirements within the committee, thereby allowing the committee to serve as a forum for discussion and decision-making on ICT matters, including the resolution of competing ICT priorities, requirements and needs at the organization level. That would also ensure that all business managers are regularly updated on ICT issues, as well as on ICT requirements, the status of major ICT initiatives and investments in the organization.

2. Leadership of the ICT governance committee

38. The Inspectors believe that an organization's ICT governance committee should be chaired by an executive manager, preferably a deputy executive head of the organization or an executive officer with similar status, function or authority. This would ensure that inputs and views of the executive management are brought into the discussions and work of the body, and at the same time, executive management will be apprised of and periodically updated on its work, discussions and decisions. This would also contribute to raising awareness at the executive management level of the strategic value and importance of ICT for the organization, and leverage ICT governance at the highest echelons of the organization.

39. The Inspectors consider the ICT governance committees, or equivalent, in the FAO, United Nations, UNHCR, WFP and WMO as good examples. The committees are chaired by the deputy executive heads of the respective organizations and their membership comprises senior managers from all services of the organizations, as well as adequate representation of offices away from headquarters and on the ground. Outside the United Nations system, the IMF also serves as a best practice, as its ICT governance body, the Committee on Business and Information Technology (CBIT) is chaired by one of the Fund's three deputy managing directors and composed of senior management from the different departments. Such chairmanship and composition of the ICT governance committees or equivalent in those organizations ensure the involvement of senior and executive management in ICT issues, help to enhance alignment of ICT with the organizations' respective business needs, including resolving competing ICT needs and priorities against the background of limited resources at the organization-wide level, and, overall, increase recognition of the strategic value of ICT within the organization.

40. The implementation of the following recommendations is expected to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of ICT governance at the corporate level, based on best practice.

Recommendation 1

The executive heads of the United Nations system organizations should ensure that the ICT governance committee, or equivalent, is composed of the most senior business managers representing all major services of the organization, and chaired by an executive manager, preferably at the level of deputy head of the organization or equivalent.

3. Terms of reference of the ICT governance committee

41. The roles and functions of ICT governance committees vary among the United Nations system organizations. In general, their functions include, inter alia: reviewing and endorsing the ICT strategy; reviewing and providing advice on the investment portfolio and ICT priorities, including IT investment priorities; providing oversight on ICT investments, including changes and post-implementation reviews of key ICT initiatives; providing advice on and endorsing ICT policies, standards and procedures; and providing general advice and guidance on ICT matters.

42. The Inspectors are of the opinion that the ICT governance committee of an organization plays a key role in providing overall guidance and serves as a forum for discussion and consideration of ICT issues at the organization level and on a cross-cutting scale. This is of particular significance, as most organizations have rather decentralized and hybrid ICT structures comprised of both a central IT department as well as IT units located in the various substantive departments and programmes, as well as in regional and field offices.

43. To avoid problems, such as fragmentation, inefficiencies, duplication of work, application of different levels of IT standards – such as security standards –, incompatibility of systems, inter alia, within an organization, a forum or mechanism is needed where business managers from all services of the organization and ICT can meet to discuss and consider ICT matters at the corporate level. This is best achieved through a well-functioning ICT governance committee, whose TOR and role also extend to cross-cutting ICT issues, such as fostering the application of harmonized and common ICT standards, systems compatibility, facilitation of knowledge and sharing of information on ICT. The committee should also serve as a forum where the competing ICT demands of the various departments and programmes could be discussed and considered at the corporate level, so as to allow for prioritization based on the organization's key ICT priorities and needs. The committee should provide overall guidance on ICT at the organization level, so as to ensure close alignment of ICT with business needs and priorities at the organization level instead of at the departmental level.

44. At the same time, participation of senior business managers in the committee and adequate chairmanship of the body at the executive level is essential. Reference is made to Recommendation 1 above in this respect.

4. Effectiveness of the ICT governance committee

45. In the Inspectors' opinion the following areas are essential and would enhance the functions of the ICT governance committee.

(a) Raising awareness of the strategic value of ICT

46. The strategic value and importance of ICT is not fully recognized, that is the common assertion the Inspectors learned during their meetings and interviews with both ICT and business managers. It was noted to the Inspectors that given the rapidly changing technologies, the complexity of the operating system, the growing dependence on ICT for the organizations work and the high requirement from various users, any decisions on administrative, operational or even programmatic issues have an ICT component and/or implications. Also brought up were the substantial costs for ICT in the organizations, ranging from 2 to up to 13 per cent of the organizations' annual budgets. It was noted that single major ICT initiatives, such as the implementation of ERP systems, have cost implications of several millions of US$ each.

47. The Inspectors noted the urgent need to ensure that ICT aspects and elements are fed into the debate and decisions on administrative, managerial or operational issues with ICT implications. This would guarantee close alignment of ICT with business as well as raise the value of ICT as an enabler, strategic asset and tool for improving cost-effectiveness. This could best be achieved through a well-functioning ICT governance committee, serving as a forum where all major business managers can meet to discuss their ICT needs.

48. The Inspectors share those concerns and concur with the said considerations. **The Inspectors are of the view that the ICT governance committee is an excellent vehicle to leverage the profile of ICT within an organization. It would also ensure that business drives ICT, and not the other way around, making ICT a tool for achieving the organization's mandate and goals and for increasing effectiveness and efficiency.**

(b) Increasing the efficiency of the ICT governance committee

49. While most ICT governance committees function properly in general, the Inspectors were informed that inefficiencies do exist in some cases. Improvement is notably needed in the following three areas: (a) frequency of meetings as stipulated in the TOR is not always respected; (b) members would not participate in adequate numbers or would be represented by an alternate, often junior official; (c) documentation for the meetings is sometimes not provided in time or is not adequate – in some cases, the documentation did not contain all the necessary information, in others, it was too comprehensive and bulky or too technical in nature, thereby hampering discussions and decisions within the committee.

50. The Inspectors consider that these issues need to be addressed. They are also of the opinion that, given the essential role that the ICT governance committee plays with regard to effective ICT governance, its functioning and performance should be reviewed and assessed periodically, at least every three years, in order to ensure its effective functioning and to explore ways to further enhance its work.

(c) Strengthening communication between ICT and business

51. Communication and dialogue between ICT and business are of vital importance for any organization wishing to fully tap the potentials of ICT. Such communication is lacking or is inadequate in some organizations. In one organization, the ICT officers expressed satisfaction with the ICT-business communication, asserting that they met the needs and service requirements for business, while several directors (D2 level) stated that they had difficulties communicating with ICT. Although they have fully conveyed their needs to ICT, they were told by ICT officers that their requests and needs could not be met and they would have to take what ICT could offer. As such, they felt that their business needs were not adequately taken into account and neglected.

52. The Inspectors also observed various good examples of successful dialogue between ICT and business. For instance, at the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), one sector proposed a major revamp to an application for selling WIPO publications and periodicals online. After a full examination of the project with ICT, it was recognized that the investment could not be offset within a reasonable period by the income generated through the online sales. As a consequence, other mechanisms were explored including using market bookstore chains to sell their books, periodicals and other publications.

53. Close communication and cooperation is particularly essential for major ICT projects requiring extensive input and work from both business and ICT, as in the case of implementing ERP systems. The success of such projects depends, among other factors, especially on a close and effective partnership, interaction and cooperation between the ICT

and the business departments. To achieve such close cooperation and communication, the roles, responsibilities of ICT and business must be clear.

54. In the Inspectors' view, **further measures should be taken to strengthening communication between ICT and business. This in turn will facilitate and enhance the work and functioning of the ICT governance committee.**

(d) Promoting information sharing

55. Information sharing, including the sharing of documentation, such as minutes, decisions, as well as communication in general among the ICT governance committee and other standing bodies of the ICT governance framework, such as technical ICT advisory committees, working groups or task forces, was insufficient in some instances. This has led to the situation whereby the advisory and technical bodies, in some cases, could not properly fulfil their mandate and vice versa.

56. Similarly, there is still a potential for better communication and information sharing among the standing ICT governance bodies, advisory and technical bodies, workings groups with the various ad hoc bodies and working groups established for specific major ICT projects, such as the implementation of ERP systems. Overall, there is also still room for improvement in sharing and communicating the decisions and discussions of the ICT governance committee and the other bodies, as appropriate, to management and users on a continuing and timely basis.

57. In the view of the Inspectors, **the executive heads of the United Nations system organizations should ensure that all ICT technical and advisory bodies, working groups and task forces are functioning properly, including holding regular meetings with adequate member participation, communicating and sharing the decisions and developments with management and users on a regular and timely basis.**

58. The implementation of the following recommendations would enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of ICT governance.

Recommendation 2

The executive heads of the United Nations system organizations should ensure that the ICT governance committee, or equivalent, is convened regularly with the fullest possible participation of its members, adequate documentation is provided in a timely manner and meeting records are kept, so as to make full use of the committee's work and function.

Recommendation 3

The executive heads of the United Nations system organizations should ensure that the function and performance of the ICT governance committee, or equivalent, is reviewed and evaluated regularly, but not less than every three years, so as to ensure its effectiveness and facilitate improvement.

E. Chief Information Officer (CIO)

59. The level, reporting line and functions of the most senior ICT officer varies across organizations. Different terminology is also used for the title, such as Chief Information Officer (CIO), Chief Information Technology Officer (CITO), Chief Technology Officer (CTO), Director or Chief or Head of IT.

60. In some organizations, the CIO, or equivalent, reports to the deputy executive head of the organization (for example FAO, United Nations, ITU, UNHCR, UNICEF and WFP), while in others, the CIO reports to the director of administration, or equivalent (for example ICAO, UNEP, UNFPA, UNIDO, UNODC and WMO).

61. Also the function of the CIO, or equivalent, varies among the different organizations also, depending on the organizational and ICT structure of the respective organization. Most organizations have a decentralized and hybrid ICT structure made up of a central IT department and IT units located in the various substantive departments and programmes, as well as in regional and some field offices.

62. In organizations with a more centralized ICT structure and a strong ICT department, the CIO usually has more authority over corporate ICT issues and services provided to the entire organization. In contrast, in some strongly federated organizations (for example IAEA and ITU) or organizations with a strong field presence (such as UNDP and WHO), the function and authority of the CIO are limited to providing basic ICT services and support in line with the mandate of the organization's ICT department. Specialized ICT services for substantive departments and programmes are provided by the IT units of those departments and programmes. Such units usually report and are accountable to the respective department or programme head (or the head of the relevant regional or field office). Those IT units are also funded through the budgets of the respective departments, programmes, regional or field offices, and not by ICT programme budget of the organization.

63. The particularities of each UN system organization and its specific organizational structures make it difficult to compare in detail the situation, function and TOR of the CIO or equivalent in the organizations. However, the Inspectors made two main observations: the great majority of organizations have – with different degrees – a rather federated and de-centralized ICT structure, which was seen problematic on one hand but also beneficial on the other by the managers and officials interviewed; there have been attempts by some organizations in recent years towards more centralizing their ICT infrastructures, including strengthening their ICT departments.

64. Most organizations have a hybrid structure comprising both a central IT department and IT units located in and serving the organization's substantive departments, programmes and regional and field offices. The officers interviewed indicated that this type of structure creates problems, including fragmentation, inefficiencies, duplication of work, the application of different IT systems and levels of IT standards, for example security standards, within the organization. At the same time, several business mangers indicated that they were not comfortable fully relying on a centralized IT department; they felt that the dedicated IT units know the particular department's specialized IT systems (for example the systems used in human resources or for procurement, supply change, etc.) and have built special knowledge and expertise. As they are closely connected to the departments, they know the particular business needs and can respond in a timely manner to requests. Furthermore, in some organizations (for example IAEA, ITU and WIPO), certain confidentiality requirements and the independence of some departments and programmes require separate IT units and systems.

65. Organizations such as FAO, the United Nations, UNFPA, UNHCR and WFP have made significant efforts and progress towards centralizing their ICT structure over the past years. Basic ICT services (such as IT infrastructure and help-desk services) are ensured throughout the organization by the ICT department; ICT project management procedures and methodology have been harmonized across the organization, including the establishment of an ICT project management function within the ICT department; steps have been taken to harmonize the IT architecture and infrastructure; the application of harmonized standards have been advanced. UNHCR is increasingly outsourcing central, basic IT services to external service providers (private and UN-ICC), which may lead to cost savings. Following the recommendations of its root and branch review, FAO has also moved towards a centralized IT and is assessing the options for more cost effective delivery of basic services, within the limitations of the United Nations protocol on privileges and immunities. The ICT centralization process in those organizations is often accompanied by the establishment of focal points or liaison officers for the major departments and programmes, so as to increase communication and interaction with business, and alignment with the needs of business owners, as has been done in FAO, the United Nations, UNHCR and WIPO.

66. The implementation of ERP systems (UMOJA in the United Nations and ATLAS in UNDP and UNFPA) has further increased the trend towards more centralized ICT, which, in turn, has led to new challenges and risks, relating for example to connectivity and security.

67. ICT centralization in those organizations is an ongoing process. The Inspectors were informed that, in some organizations, there are resource gaps with regard to the new cross-cutting functions of the ICT department, such as harmonizing ICT policy, architecture and systems and setting standards.

68. Other organizations (such as UNICEF) considered a federal model as preferable and the most suitable structure, if supported by a strong regulative environment, formalized matrix management and a strong centralized headquarters function for strategy, standardization, policy and practice. For field-oriented organizations in particular, the ultimate goal is local impact, agility and responsiveness for optimal fulfilment of the core mandate. In this respect, UNICEF is in the process of decentralizing and strengthening a number of its non-headquarters ICT services, while building a strong centralized headquarters function for strategy, standardization and policy.

69. The Inspectors do not wish to make any specific proposals as to whether organizations should adopt centralized or de-centralized, federated ICT structures. Both models have their pros and cons, as outlined above, and it is rather up to the organizations to decide, taking into account their specific structures, mandates and needs.

70. However, the Inspectors noted that in some organizations the federated systems have led to fragmentation in terms of IT systems, infrastructure and architecture. For instance, in some cases, the IT system was not compatible or able to communicate with each other. Furthermore, in many organizations, different polices and standards are applied throughout the organization, which, for example in the case of IT security standards, can have severe implications for the whole organization. Through the wide use of intranets, extranets, mobile devices, and so on, low IT security levels in one part of an organization may be a threat to other parts of the organization. Finally, the Inspectors noted that information and knowledge sharing on ICT is still weak in several organizations. For instance, there have been cases where a department commissioned the development of specific IT systems which had already been developed and in use in other departments, resulting in duplication of work and inefficient use of resources.

71. The Inspectors believe that **the function and role of the ICT department or the CIO should, under the overall direction and guidance of the ICT governance committee and the officer ultimately responsible for ICT in the organization, be extended to include cross-cutting functions, such as harmonization of ICT systems, architecture, standards and policies, as well as information and knowledge sharing on ICT within the organization, as appropriate**. This would strengthen ICT governance at the corporate level, resulting in more effective and efficient ICT.

72. At the same time, given the importance of ICT and the fact that it is closely linked with and indispensable for all major operations and work processes in the organizations, as well as the significant cost of ICT, the CIO, or equivalent, should be at an appropriate level in the organization so as to have direct access to senior and executive management. This would ensure that ICT aspects are considered and fed into the discussions and decisions on all relevant administrative processes, work flows and procedures, and ensure close alignment of ICT with business needs. It would also facilitate leveraging ICT as an enabler and a tool for cost savings and innovation. Good practices in this respect are those organizations, where the CIO, or equivalent, reports to the deputy head of the organization, such as in the United Nations, UNHCR, ITU and WFP.

73. The implementation of the following recommendation would enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of ICT governance.

Recommendation 4

The executive heads of the United Nations system organizations should ensure that the Chief Information Officer (CIO), or equivalent, should be placed at an appropriate senior level with overall responsibilities and authority, and have access to executive management.

III. STRATEGY

74. ICT strategy is a crucial component part of ICT governance. It serves as a blueprint and guideline on the future direction and performance of ICT for the relevant time period (usually 4 to 5 years), providing the foundation for achieving a comprehensive vision by enhancing existing ICT efforts and launching new ICT initiatives that will assist the achievement of the organizations' goals.[14]

75. Its purpose is to deliver value through the effective use of ICT. An ICT strategy is expected to enhance an organization's effectiveness by aligning ICT with business needs and improving efficiency through timely adoption and use of new technologies. The strategy usually includes ICT key priorities, investments and deliverables for the specified time period in support of and aligned to the organization's mandate, strategic plans and operations. It often also outlines the organization's ICT governance and management framework.

76. The great majority of organizations have ICT strategies. At the time of the review, several organizations (such as FAO,[15] UNESCO and UNIDO) were in the process of preparing and endorsing their ICT strategies in the context of their ongoing reform. UNICEF is in the process of reviewing and revising its current ICT strategy, and aims to finish this work in the first quarter of 2012.

A. Preparation, endorsement and regular update of the ICT strategy

77. Effective ICT governance cannot be achieved without a strategic document outlining the organization's key ICT priorities, investments and deliverables for a medium-term period. The ICT strategy also serves as the central and essential tool and mechanism for ensuring alignment of ICT with the organization's business needs and contains the basic ICT governance frameworks, including the role and function of the ICT governance bodies, technical and advisory bodies and working groups, and hence the modalities and procedures for the ICT-related decision-making process. Therefore, in the Inspectors' view, **those organizations which have not yet adopted an ICT strategy should do so without undue delay.**

78. Not all of the organizations regularly review and update their ICT strategies.

79. In order to be closely aligned with and reflect the organization's mandates, business needs and priorities, the ICT strategy should be periodically reviewed and updated with a view to addressing shifting priorities and changes in the focus of the organization's work or in terms of funding and resources available for ICT, as well as to keep up with technological changes and developments. Good examples of organizations periodically revising and updating their ICT strategies are ILO, UNDP, UNFPA and UNHCR.

80. The process of updating the ICT strategy **should follow the same steps as the process for preparing and endorsing the original strategy. In particular, the full and active involvement of many levels of the organization, including senior and executive managers, business owners and users should be ensured.** This would be best achieved through an extensive formal and informal consultation process of ICT and business.

81. The revised strategy should also be endorsed by the organization's ICT governance committee, or equivalent, and approved by the executive head of the organization or a

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[14] See A/62/793, para. 4.

[15] The FAO Director-General approved the Organization's new IT Strategy on July 18, 2011, which is in the process of being implemented.

responsible officer with the relevant delegated authority. Besides ensuring close alignment of ICT with business in strategy and operations, such procedures encourage co-responsibility between ICT and business, and also reinforce the important role that senior and executive management play with regard to defining the ICT strategy. They also further reflect the fact that the ICT strategy updating process is a cross-cutting activity that supports different organizational objectives and functions, and that it is driven by the business owners.

82. Good examples with regard to the strategy preparation process were observed at FAO, WIPO and the United Nations. During the preparation of WIPO's IT strategy, extensive consultations with all departments were conducted through meetings, workshops and information sessions, so as to better understand and obtain inputs on priorities, business needs as well as risks, and on how ICT could help to satisfy those needs and address the risks. At the United Nations, the strategic planning process began with a broad-based exercise aimed at identifying key ICT needs. To this end, a series of strategic planning activities, including executive interviews, an organization-wide ICT survey, consultations with permanent missions, technology research and a strategic planning retreat for senior ICT managers were undertaken.[16]

83. At ITU, UNCTAD, UNECE, WFP and WMO, the ICT strategy is endorsed by the executive head of the organization, while at UNHCR it is endorsed by the deputy executive head. In some organizations, such as the United Nations, the ICT strategy has been endorsed by the legislative body; while in other organizations, the ICT strategy is shared and submitted to the legislative body upon request (for example UNICEF and UNFPA) or for information purposes (as at WIPO).

84. The Inspectors consider that **the ICT strategy should be an integral part of the documentation made available to Member States in the legislative bodies, so as to allow them to prepare and take the necessary IT-related decisions.** The strategy should provide in particular for key ICT initiatives and investments with coherent, concrete, prioritized and coordinated projects, including indication of a realistic time frame for implementation, as well as resource implications. Member States should not only be provided with information and resources needs for certain major high-cost ICT projects and investments, but should also be kept abreast of ongoing and planned key ICT priorities, needs, initiatives and investments as outlined in the organization's ICT strategy. In that way, they would be in a position to make well-founded decisions on ICT prioritization and the corresponding resource allocations. This would allow for a more strategic perspective and approach to ICT at the corporate level, and hence reduce fragmentation and enhance alignment and effective and efficient use of resource allocation to ICT in the organizations. It would also ensure involvement by the ultimate business owners, the Member States.

85. The implementation of the following recommendations would enhance accountability and the effectiveness and efficiency of ICT governance.

Recommendation 5

The executive heads of the United Nations system organizations should ensure that corporate ICT strategies are prepared, endorsed and periodically reviewed and updated, in order to ensure that they are closely aligned to the organization's business needs and priorities and yield value for their ICT investment.

[16] See A/62/793, paras. 6 to 12.

Recommendation 6

The legislative bodies of the United Nations system organizations should request the executive heads to present the corporate ICT strategies to Member States for their information and support.

B. Alignment of the ICT strategy with the organization's strategic plans

86. Not all the ICT strategies are aligned closely enough to the respective organization's medium- and long-term strategic plans. Consequently, these organizations face potential risks that their ICT might not fully sustain and support the business needs and priorities of the organization as identified and outlined in their strategic plans.

87. The Inspectors are of the view that organizations should pay due attention when preparing and updating their ICT strategies that they are closely aligned to their medium- and long-term strategic plans. This would best be done if the ICT strategy makes specific reference to and details how the key ICT priorities, initiatives and activities of the ICT strategy respond to and support the corresponding strategic goals of the organization concerned, as contained in the overall medium- and long-term strategic plan(s).

88. Good examples include the ICT strategies of UNDP, UNFPA and ITU. For instance, UNFPA's ICT strategy for 2011-2013 specifically links and aligns its ICT strategic goals and objectives to UNFPA's strategic plan, as adopted by its Executive Board. The actions contained in ITU's current ICT strategy is also linked and aligned to its 2009-2012 operational plan for the General Secretariat. UNDP has implemented the practice of formalizing a multi-year ICT Strategy to support the Strategic Plan of the Organization. The ICT Strategy (or IM Strategy) has been endorsed by its Operations Group chaired by the Associate Administrator.

89. The implementation of the following recommendations would enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of ICT governance.

Recommendation 7

The executive heads of the United Nations system organizations should make sure that their ICT strategies are closely aligned to the organization's medium- and long-term strategic plans or equivalent, so as to ensure that ICT sustains and supports the organization's business needs and mandates.

C. Implementation and monitoring of the ICT strategy

90. The Inspectors also considered the performance of ICT and the implementation and monitoring of the ICT strategy.

91. In various organizations, the ICT strategy and its complementary documents, such as roadmaps and implementation plans, do not indicate priorities or specific, tangible and time-bound deliverables and performance indicators. Good practices were observed in some organizations (for example UNFPA and ITU) whose ICT strategies set out detailed

deliverables and corresponding timelines, which allow close monitoring. Other organizations (such as UNHCR and UNDP) have complemented their ICT strategies with roadmaps (UNDP) or strategic and operating plans (UNHCR) which outline the concrete actions, initiatives and activities to be put in place within given time frames in order to fulfil the ICT strategies.

92. Not all the organizations have translated the key priorities and initiatives identified in the ICT strategy into the organization's or the individual department or unit's ICT budgets and work plans. However, in some organizations good examples where observed. For instance, at WIPO the key priorities and initiatives contained in its ICT strategy have been translated and mapped into the organization's ICT programme budget and the ICT department's biennial work plans.

93. Some organizations do have those mechanisms in place to facilitate implementation and monitoring of their ICT strategies. The absence of such a mechanism impedes the implementation of the ICT strategy and accountability as to which department, office or officer is responsible for the implementation of a certain activity or initiative outlined in the ICT strategy is blurred. Finally, the implementation of the ICT strategy may be hampered by funding gaps, as no or insufficient resources were allocated for certain ICT activities and priorities identified in the strategy in the organization's ICT programme budgets or the budgets of the respective substantive departments and programmes.

94. The implementation of the following recommendation would enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of ICT governance, as well as controls and compliance.

Recommendation 8

The executive heads of the United Nations system organizations should establish monitoring mechanisms for the implementation of their ICT strategies, ensuring that the ICT strategy and its implementation roadmap, deliverables and performance indicators are continuously monitored and regularly reported on to the ICT governance committee, or equivalent.

IV. RESOURCES AND OTHER ICT ISSUES

A. Transparency of ICT costs

95. The Inspectors noted that the great majority of the United Nations system organizations had difficulties indicating their total annual resource requirements for ICT, given their hybrid structure comprised of a central IT department and IT units located in the various substantive departments and programmes as well as in regional and field offices. In particular, strongly decentralized and field-based organizations have difficulty quantifying the total cost of ownership for ICT, as budgets are managed separately by the respective substantive departments and regional and field offices. In the case of UNDP, that amounts to 166 offices around the world. In addition, ICT cost components are often already directly budgeted into the organization's substantive programmes and activities.

96. Further, total ICT costs also include the resource needs for particular medium- and large-scale ICT projects, such as the implementation of ERP systems or other new IT systems, which are often financed through the organization's capital budget over a period of a number of years.

97. Based on the responses to the questionnaire, the approximate total ICT costs in the organizations range from about two to about 13 per cent of the organization's total annual budget; most organizations spending about four to seven per cent of their total annual budget for ICT. This figure does not include expenditure for particular ICT initiatives and projects, such as ERP systems, which could be as high as the recurring annual ICT costs.

98. As indicated above, there is a trend towards a certain centralization of ICT in some organizations. This would lead to more transparency with regard to ICT costs, as such cost would, to a great extent, correspond to the programme budgets of the organizations' ICT departments, and only the costs for major ICT initiatives and projects would have to be added. Furthermore, some organizations have adopted or are in the process of preparing ICT cost catalogues for their basic ICT services. This will also enhance transparency and clarity regarding the cost of ICT. A similar exercise is currently underway at the HLCM and the ICTN on a system-wide level. Finally, the implementation of International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) will further assist the United Nations agencies with identifying their IT costs.

99. In the Inspectors' view, **effective ICT governance at the corporate level cannot be achieved without a clear picture of the total ICT costs incurred by the organization. M**ore detailed information on ICT costs, including, at a minimum, the total annual ICT costs incurred, the portions of recurring and ad hoc annual ICT costs, details and a breakdown of costs for certain ICT activities, specific systems and projects, the cost implications of proposed future IT investment and initiatives, is needed to ensure effective ICT governance based on a strategic, results-based and cost effective approach. Internal and external decision-makers must have information on cost implications so as to better take into consideration those cost factors in their decision-making and prioritization process. The current situation also impairs accountability and transparency of ICT governance.

100. In this respect, the Inspectors also refer to recommendation 1 of a previous JIU report on ICT hosting services in the United Nations system (JIU/REP/2008/5), which proposed that "The executive heads of the United Nations system organizations should work with HLCM towards defining a consistent method of recording ICT expenditures/costs to facilitate cost-benefit analysis of ICT services." The Inspectors acknowledge, in this respect, the work done in some organizations, as well as in the HLCM and the ICTN on the costing of ICT services.

However, they encourage said organizations as well as the HLCM and the ICTN to conclude and finalize their work without undue delay.

101. The implementation of the following recommendation would enhance accountability and the effectiveness and efficiency of ICT governance.

Recommendation 9

The executive heads of the United Nations system organizations should strengthen their efforts in keeping track of the ICT costs in their organizations, including the total annual recurring and ad hoc ICT costs, as well as details on the main cost elements.

B. ICT investments

102. The decision-making process on ICT investments varies across the organizations. In most organizations, the decision-making process depends on the financial volume of the projects: for small ICT projects, the decision-making authority would be the CIO and/or the heads of substantive departments or regional or field offices; medium-size projects would need endorsement from the head of the department and, in some cases, the organization's ICT governance committee, as well as the approval of senior managers and/or the highest authority on ICT or the head of the organization; for very large and cost-intensive projects, ad hoc project governance structures, comprising steering and management committees, working groups and so on have to be established, and funding for those projects would be sought from Member States or they may be funded from the organizations' capital budgets.

103. Most organizations have established project management methodologies, typically based on and following Prince2. However, those methodologies are often not consistently applied across the organization, given the decentralized and federated ICT structures of most of the organizations. In some cases, different methodologies are in place and used by different organizational departments and units within the same organization. This results in the application of different assessment and decision criteria for ICT investments/projects, as well as different approval and quality assurance requirements, requisites for technical specifications, such as ICT security standards/requirements, among others.

104. Therefore, in the Inspectors' view, **the executive heads of the United Nations system organizations should make an effort to further develop and endorse ICT project investment methodologies and guidelines applicable to all the departments and services of their respective organizations.** The guidelines should, in particular, include the requirements for submitting business cases for all IT project proposals, supported by the adequate documentation, and including a lifecycle cost-benefit analysis and outlining funding needs and sources. They should also include certain project investment assessment criteria to guide the selection process, so as to allow for a fair and transparent process, as well as the requirement to indicate how the proposed project would support the overall corporate ICT strategic goals. The guidelines should also include provisions on project implementation and a mandatory post-implementation review of major IT projects and investments.

105. In most of the organizations, the Inspectors noted the absence of a central project portfolio, listing all the ICT projects implemented within the organization. This impedes decision-making on ICT investments and priorities at the corporate level, favouring ad hoc rather than strategic decision-making, and could also lead to duplication or incompatibility of systems, providing grounds for inefficiencies.

106. **A project management office or function should be established in the ICT department, taking into account existing resources, to assist in the administration of the implementation of project methodologies and guidelines, as appropriate.** Furthermore, **a central project portfolio, comprising all ICT projects implemented within the organization should be established and regularly updated.**

107. Good examples of the above were observed at FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, United Nations, WIPO and WFP. For instance, the United Nations has established a central PMO within OICT's Strategic Management Service, aimed at ensuring alignment of ICT investments with organizational priorities. The three primary functions of the PMO that span the full lifecycle of a project, from business justification through benefits realization, include enterprise portfolio management (EPM), project management support and project benefits assessment. Similar functions have also been established at WFP and WIPO. Those organizations are in the process of establishing an ICT project portfolio to keep track of existing ICT infrastructure and systems.

C. ICT performance and oversight

108. Effective ICT governance also requires performance management processes and structures to ensure timely, objective and measurable performance monitoring of ICT operation and projects, and their alignment to business needs and priorities.

109. COBIT ME.4.6 control objective[17] requires confirming that (i) agreed-upon IT goals have been met or exceeded; (ii) progress toward such goals meet expectations; and (iii) when objectives have been missed or progress is not expected, management takes remedial action. It also provides for reporting on relevant portfolios, programmes and IT performance to enable senior management and governing bodies to review progress with regard to meeting identified goals. Measuring IT performance should be a key concern of business and IT executives, as it demonstrates the effectiveness and added business value of IT.

110. ICT performance measurement takes place at different levels in the organizations and through various mechanisms. The performance of the central ICT department and other ICT units is measured through common performance measurement tools in place in the organizations. Most organizations also conduct periodic ICT satisfaction surveys, and post-implementation reviews are conducted for certain major ICT investments and projects.

111. However, in some organizations there is a lack of ICT performance assessment at the organization level, in terms of delivering added value as expected and outlined in the organization's ICT strategy, and hence ensuring that ICT is closely aligned to and sustaining the organization's business needs and priorities at the corporate level.

112. In various organizations, the key deliverables and priorities, as identified and outlined in the ICT strategy, are not or are inadequately reflected in the TOR or job descriptions, and the corresponding performance evaluations of relevant staff, in both the central ICT department and the other ICT units and programmes of the organizations. The Inspectors are of the view that **the terms of reference and performance assessment for staff should include and be linked to the key corporate ICT priorities and needs as outlined in the organization's ICT strategy, so as to ensure close alignment of the ICT function and services and facilitate monitoring of ICT performance in this respect.** Reference is also made to recommendation 7 above.

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[17] For further information on COBIT, see http://www.isaca.org/Knowledge-Center/cobit/Pages/Overview.aspx.

113. The Inspectors were informed that, in particular, regular post-implementation or peer reviews of ICT investments and projects are not regularly conducted. This was considered a major drawback, as it did not allow the assessment of whether the objectives linked to the IT investments were achieved or whether the viability of the relevant related cost-benefit analyses and estimations were correct. It also impedes learning lessons for future ICT projects. This problem was also highlighted in many of the audit and evaluation reports reviewed by the Inspectors.

114. The implementation of the following recommendation would enhance controls and compliance as well as the effectiveness and efficiency of ICT governance.

Recommendation 10

The executive heads of the United Nations system organization should ensure that post-implementation reviews of major ICT investments and projects are conducted in line with the organization's ICT investment methodologies and policies.

115. ICT is subject to the organization's internal and external oversight function. The Inspectors noted that the organization's ICT operations were adequately covered and subject to regular audits and evaluations.

116. However, the Inspectors also noted that the oversight recommendations were not always fully implemented and in a timely manner. They therefore urge the executive heads of the organizations to speed up their implementation. Furthermore, the Inspectors consider that it would be useful for the ICT governance committee to periodically include in its agenda the main issues raised in the ICT audit and evaluation reports of its work, in particular those having an organization-wide dimension and impact.

D. ICT risk management

117. The United Nations system organizations are at different stages of ICT risk management, with most of them either in the process of preparing policy and framework documents or undertaking pilot or first-phase exercises. ICT risk management is either led by the ICT departments, or in several organizations, it is part of the organization-wide implementation of enterprise risk management (ERM).

118. Some organizations (such as ITU, UNDP, WFP, and WIPO) have already established risk registers which also cover ICT risks. However, most (e.g. FAO, UNICEF and WMO) are still in the process of developing ERM models and methodologies. Besides the information gathered in this review, the recent JIU report on the implementation of enterprise risk management (ERM) in the United Nations system organizations (JIU/REP/2010/4) also provides a good overview of the topic.

119. Although progress has been made in ICT risk management, there is still room for improvement, as identified during the meetings with officers and as noted in the various internal and external audit and evaluation reports.

120. In the Inspectors' view, effective ICT risk management should provide for periodic risk assessments at both the strategic global level and the system- specific levels, as well as for major future projects. Risk assessments of the ICT structures in regional and country offices should also be undertaken. The **United Nations system organizations should establish and regularly update ICT risk registers or catalogues covering all parts of the respective**

organization. Finally, risk assessments could serve as the basis for formulating IT security strategies and policies as well as business-continuity and disaster-recovery plans.

121. Information on ICT risk and ICT risk assessments and catalogues should be considered by the ICT governance committees, insofar as they concern risks with implications for ICT at the organization level, such as those linked to the implementation of a new ERP system, for example, or to other major ICT systems used throughout the organization.

E. IT security

122. ICT security plays an increasingly important role given technological development, the widespread use and the indispensable nature of ICT in the organizations. ICT security is of particular importance to the United Nations system organizations as most of them (in particular United Nations, IAEA and WIPO) handle very sensitive and confidential information.

123. The level and quality of ICT security management varies across organizations, although most follow ISO 27001 and ISO 9001. Their IT security activities include preparing and updating ICT risk registers; conducting information security architecture reviews; vulnerability assessments of major applications and systems; IT awareness training; mandatory information security compliance/risk assessment questionnaire and workshops for ICT managers. UNDP also extends these activities to their regional and country offices.

124. However, not all the organizations have adopted ICT security policies and manuals or they are not applied consistently within the organization, resulting in different ICT security levels and policies within the same organization. This is the case, in particular, in organizations with a strong decentralized ICT structure, and those with regional and country offices. Given the strong inter-connectivity of modern ICT systems, different ICT security levels and policies applied in different parts of a same organization result in security threats for the entire organization. Furthermore, the roles, responsibilities and accountability of staff (IT and non-IT) as well as non-staff (e.g. external service providers) are not always clear. Finally, in various organizations where ICT security policies have been adopted, they are not adequately communicated to all staff and appropriate training is not provided to IT and non-IT staff.

125. Hence, in the Inspectors' view, **the executive heads of the United Nations system organizations should ensure that an ICT security strategy, in the form of a stand-alone document or as part of the corporate ICT strategy, is prepared and regularly updated.** In this regard, new IT security risks, for example, through various technologies and systems such as mobile devices, Blackberries, Internet, ERP systems, and so on, should be taken into account. The ICT security strategy or polices and manual should also clarify the roles, responsibilities and accountability of staff with respect to IT security. The policies should be communicated to staff and relevant training should be provided, as appropriate.

126. Regular ICT security reports should be prepared by the relevant officers in the ICT department and submitted to senior management as well as to the ICT governance committee, or equivalent, for consideration and action.

F. ICT business continuity and disaster recovery

127. Most organizations have adopted policies and plans on business continuity and disaster recovery and some organizations are in the process of doing so. A few organizations (UNDP, UNICEF and the United Nations) have already conducted tests and simulations of their systems.

128. The Inspectors noted that technological changes, such as the use of ERP systems and cloud computing, poses new and additional business continuity risks (including to connectivity and safe backup hosting sites), which need to be addressed and taken into account when preparing, implementing and testing business continuity and disaster recovery plans. In this context, some officers interviewed proposed looking into the role of UN-ICC as the service provider for many United Nations system organizations, and also into possibilities and ways of increasing cooperation among United Nations organizations in this area, for instance by exploring the possibilities of organizations serving as mutual safe backup sites for each other, as already practiced among some of the New York- and Geneva-based organizations.

129. In the Inspectors' view, **the executive heads of the United Nations organizations should include business continuity and disaster recovery risks in their ICT risk assessments and registers, and speed up the adoption and implementation of their respective plans, which should be updated and tested periodically.** Regular reports should be made to the ICT governance committee on the adoption and implementation of the organizations' business continuity and disaster recovery plans, insofar as they pertain to ICT issues.

V. SYSTEM-WIDE ICT COOPERATION

130. The work of the CEB ICT Network (ICTN) was considered useful and helpful overall for enhancing ICT coordination, cooperation and coherence within the United Nations system organizations. Indeed, the organizations would, in particular, benefit from the work of some of the ICTN working groups, such as those on ICT security and ICT cost categories.

131. At the same time, some organizations argued that the Network's discussions do not always lead to concrete outcomes and decisions, and that not all the organizations are in a position to effectively implement its proposals, recommendations and decisions. It was also mentioned that the cost of attending the Network's semi-annual meetings were fairly high for some organizations in relation to the benefits obtained. Finally, some officers expressed concern at the number of formal and informal ICT networks, in addition to the ICTN, such as local ICT networks at the different duty stations, the UN-ICC working group, among others, proposing that their number be reduced in order to avoid duplication and reduce participation costs. Other organizations indicated that the field-level ICT coordination bodies were relevant, useful and supportive mechanisms, and that it was at the prerogative of the individual United Nations Country Management Teams concerned to decide and provide guidance on how best to utilize those structures effectively.

132. In order to leverage the ICTN, some officers interviewed proposed that the role and work of the ICTN could be enhanced, if the CEB provided clear guidance, including through asking for and requesting specific outputs in the ICT area identified as common problems for the majority of the United Nations system organizations. It was also noted that information sharing on common ICT issues at the ICTN level could be further improved.

133. The Inspectors share these considerations. The HLCM, representing business and management, should include on its agenda strategic and ICT issues, such as ICT costs, ICT procurement, implementation of ERP systems, inter-connectivity among IT systems, IT security, the use of new technologies, that are common to and that affect all the United Nations system organizations. The respective discussions and decisions in the HLCM could then serve as guidance and provide overall direction to the ICTN and its work. At the same, this would encourage discussion of strategic ICT issues from a business perspective at a system-wide level in the HLCM and facilitate communication and interaction among ICT and business at that level.

134. The implementation of the following recommendation would enhance ICT coordination and cooperation within the United Nations system.

Recommendation 11

The Secretary-General, in his capacity as Chairman of the CEB, should streamline the CEB ICT Network by identifying and focusing on common ICT issues, and providing clear guidance to the network in order to improve cooperation and coordination among the United Nations system organizations.

Annex I

ICT governance committees, or equivalent, in the
United Nations system organizations

Annex I is published on the JIU website (www.unjiu.org) together with the report.

Annex II

ICT strategies in the United Nations system organizations

Annex II is published on the JIU website (www.unjiu.org) together with the report.

Annex III

Chief Information Officers (CIO), or equivalent, in the United Nations system organizations

Organization	Title	Grade	Reporting Line	Functions
United Nations	**Chief Information Technology Officer (CITO)**	ASG	The CITO is accountable to the Secretary-General, and reports to the Deputy Secretary-General who has been delegated the responsibility for oversight of the Secretariat-wide ICT portfolio of activities	The CITO is provided with sufficient central authority and resources to oversee ICT activities in the United Nations Secretariat worldwide (*). The CITO is responsible for the overall direction and performance of ICT activities in the organization. Key functions and responsibilities include: (a) providing strategic vision and leadership in the management of information and technology for the global Secretariat, (b) acting as the principal representative of the Secretary-General with regard to technology and information management; (c) providing advice to the executive committee on information and communications technology, in the capacity as permanent member of the committee; (d) promulgating ICT policies and standards; (e) participating in the ICT steering committees which guide major ICT initiatives; (f) acting as the Head of OICT (responsible for carrying out strategic ICT activities and providing shared services affecting the entire organization); (g) monitoring and improving the effectiveness of the ICT management framework.
UNCTAD *	**Chief, Information Technology Support Section**	P5	The ITSS Chief reports to the Head of Administration and Chief Resource Management Service	
UNODC *	**Chief, Information Technology Service**	D1	The ITS Chief reports to the Director of the Division of Management at UNOV/UNODC. Technically, the ITS Chief also reports to the CITO of the United Nations	
UNEP *	**ICT Advisor**	P5	The ICT Advisor reports to the Director of the Office of Operations in the Executive Office	
UN-Habitat *				
UNHCR	**CIO & Director Division of Information Systems and Telecommunications (DIST)**	D2	The CIO reports directly to the Executive Head (High Commissioner)	The CIO chairs the ICT Business Owners Committee (ICTBOC) that is attended by Deputy Directors to ensure ICT investments in UNHCR are well governed and system-wide systems are developed as far as possible. HQ and field investment is being aligned so that projects are visible and investment can be tracked. CIO provides support in running the ICTGB which is chaired by the Deputy High Commissioner and attended by Divisional and Bureau Directors. Major investment programs are brought here for approval or status update.
UNRWA *	**Chief Information Systems Division**	P5	The Chief reports to the Director of Administrative Support (D1)	

UNDP	**The UNDP Chief Technology Officer (CTO) and Director of the Office of Information Systems and Technology (OIST)**	D2		The CTO oversees ICT-related United Nations reform initiatives and represents UNDP in various inter-agency fora, oversees ICT governance, and implements the IM strategy. The CTO provides technical leadership in the procurement, development, management and enhancement of ICT systems and services, provides technical support for mission-critical enterprise ICT systems, implements fraud prevention controls, and enables the appropriate assessment and management of ICT risk.
UNFPA	**Chief, Management Information Services**	D1	The Chief reports directly to the Deputy Executive Director, Management.	The Chief strategizes, manages and supervises ICT-related initiatives, activities and operations globally, including ERP in UNFPA. The Chief is responsible for creating an enabling environment with the integration of ICT into development and operational business processes leading to effective and efficient programme delivery. The Chief ensures that the enabled environment stretches globally within UNFPA and serves all staff, offices and activities with the adoption of UNFPA-specific ICT standards. The Chief ensures business continuity of UNFPA operations through maintenance of fully functioning ICT systems and disaster recovery plans.
UNICEF	**Director Information Technology Solutions and Services (ITSS)**	D2	The ITSS Director reports to the Deputy Executive Director, Management (ASG)	The Director has an authority span equivalent to an organizational CIO and CTO. He/She initiates the majority of substantive undertakings.
WFP	**Chief Information Officer (CIO)**	D2	The CIO reports to the Deputy Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer (COO) for Operations.	The functions of the ICT Director and CIO are as follows: • Formulate overall strategies and policies for ICT and ensure properly implementation and compliance; • Advise management on all ICT issues and initiatives; • Oversee the development of a global ICT strategy to provide cost-effective access to information; • Manage the planning, administration and execution of all system maintenance and enhancement activities; • Develop strategies to contain the cost of ownership of technologies and monitor global ICT services expenditure; • Establish and consolidate relationships with partner United Nations agencies and other international bodies; and • Initiate and participate in private-sector partnership arrangements.
UNOPS				
ILO	**Director, Information Technology and Communications Bureau (ITCOM)**		The ITCOM Director reports to the Executive Director of Management and Administration Sector (MAS)	The current vacancy announcement for Director of ITCOM includes new functions and duties, including strategic functions concerning IT.
FAO	**Chief Information Officer (CIO)**		The CIO reports to the Deputy Director-General (Operations)	The CIO is the principal adviser to the organization's senior management and the Director of the Division providing IT services with regard to information technology and systems, including strategy, architecture, governance, policy and operations.
UNESCO	**Chief Information Officer (CIO)**		The CIO reports to the Assistant Director-General for Administration (ADG/ADM)	The CIO will be responsible for all substantive and operational needs relating to the organization's knowledge and information management systems (KIMS). This will involve developing, maintaining and monitoring the implementation of an effective KIMS strategy. The CIO will serve as the principal advisor to senior management with regard to knowledge and

				information management and ICT systems and systems integration, and will lead innovation, increase operational impact and optimize investment in UNESCO's information and communication technology platforms.
ICAO	**Chief of ICT Section**	P 5	The Chief of ICT reports to the Director or the Deputy Director of ADB.	No CIO role and function has been established at ICAO. The Chief of ICT is the highest graded IT professional in ICAO and is the decision-making authority on technical and operational IT issues.
WHO	**Director, ITT**			
UPU				
ITU	**Chief, Information Services Department**	D1	The Chief is accountable and reports to the SG or the DSG	
WMO	**Chief, Information Technology Division**	P5	The Chief is accountable and reports to the Director, Resource Management Department (D2)	
IMO	**Deputy Director/ Head IT & IS**	D1	The holder of this post reports to the Director, Administrative Division or the ASG (D2)	
WIPO				
UNIDO	**Chief, Information, Communications Management**	P5	The Chief reports to the Managing Director, Programme Support and General Management Division (D2)	
UNWTO	**ICT Programme Coordinator**	P4	The Coordinator reports to the Director of Administration and Finance	
IAEA	**Chief Information Officer (CIO), Director, MTIT**	D	The CIO reports to the Deputy Director-General, Management	The CIO is responsible for ICT operational and policy issues. The CIO reports to the Secretariat executive leadership on issues related to the Agency's information strategy, security, planning, capital investments, policies and standards.

* UNCTAD, UNEP, UN-Habitat, UNOV/UNODC and UNWRA are governed by the ICT governance framework of the United Nations established by the Office of Information and Communications Technology (OICT) of the United Nations Secretariat and follow the ICT strategy of the United Nations.

Annex IV

Overview of action to be taken by participating organizations on JIU recommendations JIU/REP/2011/9

		Intended impact		United Nations, its funds and programmes												Specialized agencies and IAEA												
			CEB*	United Nations**	UNCTAD	UNODC	UNEP	UN-HABITAT	UNHCR	UNRWA	UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	WFP	UNOPS	ILO	FAO	UNESCO	ICAO	WHO	UPU	ITU	WMO	IMO	WIPO	UNIDO	UNWTO	IAEA
Report	For action		☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒
	For information		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Recommendation 1		**e**		**E**	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 2		**e**		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 3		**e**		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 4		**e**		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 5		**a**		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 6		**a**		L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L
Recommendation 7		**e**		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 8		**d**		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E

Legend: **L:** Recommendation for decision by legislative organ
E: Recommendation for action by executive head
: Recommendation does not require action by this organization

Intended impact: **a:** enhanced accountability **b:** dissemination of best practices **c:** enhanced coordination and cooperation **d:** enhanced controls and compliance **e:** enhanced effectiveness **f:** significant financial savings **g:** enhanced efficiency **o:** other

* Action to be taken by the Chairman of the CEB.
** Covers all entities listed in ST/SGB/2002/11, other than UNCTAD, UNODC, UNEP, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR, UNRWA.

		Intended impact		United Nations, its funds and programmes												Specialized agencies and IAEA												
			CEB*	United Nations**	UNCTAD	UNODC	UNEP	UN-HABITAT	UNHCR	UNRWA	UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	WFP	UNOPS	ILO	FAO	UNESCO	ICAO	WHO	UPU	ITU	WMO	IMO	WIPO	UNIDO	UNWTO	IAEA
Report	For action		☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒
	For information		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Recommendation 9		**a**		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 10		**d**		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E
Recommendation 11		**c**	E																									

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Intended impact: **a:** enhanced accountability **b:** dissemination of best practices **c:** enhanced coordination and cooperation **d:** enhanced controls and compliance **e:** enhanced effectiveness **f:** significant financial savings **g:** enhanced efficiency **o:** other

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JIU/REP/2011/9

INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY (ICT) GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM ORGANIZATIONS

Annexes I and II

Annex I

ICT governance committees/boards or equivalent in United Nations system organizations

Organization	ICT governance committee or equivalent	Composition / Chair	TOR/ functions	Periodicity of meetings	Other committees, bodies dealing with ICT
United Nations	ICT-Executive Committee (ICT-EC)	The Committee is comprised of the Deputy Secretary-General (chair), 13 senior managers at the level of Under-Secretary-General, from both substantive and support areas, and the Chief Information Technology Officer (ex officio member).	· Review and endorse the ICT Strategy · Review and endorse major changes in ICT governance structures · Review the overall programme performance of ICT · Determine investment portfolio and management priorities · Ensure institutional support for programmes and changes introduced by ICT	Five times in 2010	Standing bodies: a) The ICT Advisory Group (ICT-AG): ICT-AG is a working level group that provides a forum for interaction between users and providers of ICT. ICTAG is represented by each major organizational unit of the Secretariat (e.g., departments, offices in HQ and overseas, regional commissions, and tribunals), usually at the department head (D1-D2) level. The ICT-AG is an advisory, not a decision-making, body on ICT matters. Its primary functions are: • Contributes to the development of the ICT strategy for the Secretariat by providing Organization-wide and departmental viewpoints • Provides inputs for the development and revision of ICT policies and procedures • Provides advice to the CITO on important ICT issues • Identifies and raises ICT issues affecting the user community • Maintains awareness of major ICT projects and issues, ICT budgets, service offerings, service level agreements, and technology changes. b) ICT Management Coordination Group (ICT-MCG): The goal of the ICT Management Coordination Group (ICT-MCG) is to achieve a unified approach for the development and implementation of the ICT strategy for the United Nations Secretariat. The ICT Management Coordination Group, chaired by the CITO, is composed of the heads of the ICT units and managers with significant ICT-related responsibilities in Departments, Offices (OAHs, regional commissions, tribunals, etc.) and field missions. Its primary functions are: · Contribute to the development and updates to the ICT Strategy · Provide strategic leadership for ICT matters through the alignment of ICT strategic

					objectives and activities with business strategic objectives and processes · Review and endorse ICT policy, architecture and standards · Implement ICT strategy, programmes and management frameworks · Ensure ICT spending/investment is aligned with Organization-wide needs and priorities · Report on overall programme performance of ICT in the Secretariat · Review and promote the ICT Fast Forward initiatives and innovative solutions. c) ICT Program Working Groups: ICT Program Working Groups have been established for each of the three strategic programmes: knowledge management (KM), resource management (RM) and infrastructure management (IM). These working groups maintain the strategic direction for the Secretariat's ICT strategic programme, review proposed ICT initiatives and monitor their implementation status. The working group provides policy advice and programme suggestions to the CITO. d) Local ICT Committees: Local ICT Committees have been formed for each department. Each committee is comprised of substantive area representatives who meet periodically to raise busi-ness needs that may require an ICT solution. The committees are chaired by a substantive expert of the respective department and include the local ICT chief as an ex officio member. <u>Ad hoc bodies:</u> Ad hoc governance structures, committees/bodies are established for major ICT projects, such as e.g. UMOJA (see Annex IV above), which may have various committees, advisory groups, project teams, working groups etc. <u>Other:</u> The Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Informatics which is the ICT governance group of the Member States.
UNCTAD *	Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Committee	The UNCTAD ICT Committee (which a t the same time is also a Local ICT Committee according to the UN Secretariat ICT governance structure) is formed comprising of substantive area representatives who meet periodically to raise business needs that may require an ICT	The Committee, among other, performs these functions: approves a rolling strategic plan for IT services and applications covering the next two biennia; oversees all major decisions related to software applications, defines system and data ownership and monitor IT-related matters; monitors all systems development within UNCTAD, irrespective of the source of funding, and ensure this follows the methodologies, standards and procedures set out by the ICT Board, etc.	At least quarterly	<u>Standing bodies:</u> 1. Project Review Committee: Composition: The Committee consists of seven members and seven alternate members. The Director, Information Technology Services Division, is a member and the chairperson of the Committee. Function: The purpose of the Committee is to apply uniformly the standards decided upon by the Information and Communications Technology Board to information and communications technology initiatives within the Organization and to recommend whether such initiatives should proceed. <u>2.</u> Technological Innovation Committee (TIC) of Geneva (soon to undergo a major change) 3. Respective Working Groups under the TIC 4. ICT Procurement Committee at UNOG 5. ICT- AG (ICT Advisory Group) 6. ICT- EC (ICT Executive Committee)

		solution. The committee is chaired by the Deputy Secretary General of UNCTAD and includes the local (UNCTAD) ITSS Chief as an ex officio member.			
UNODC *	UNOV/UNODC Information Technology Service (ITS) is governed by the ICT Governance Framework established by the Office of Information and Communications Technology (OICT) UNHQs New York and follows ICT strategy of the United Nations				
UNEP *	The UNEP Senior Management Team (SMT)	The SMT comprises of the Executive Director, Deputy Executive Director, Chef du Cabinet and all Division Directors.	The SMT It is the highest-level decision making body on major ICT matters for UNEP. It decides on all major ICT matters for UNEP and the overall strategy and priorities for ICT policies and major organization-wide systems. The SMT discusses and reviews ICT matters as and when required – for example, when a specific policy on ICT (e.g.		<u>Standing bodies:</u> a) UNEP bodies: (1)The three working groups, comprised of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from each division, regional/ outposted office and the MEAs: -UNEP Working group on Knowledge management (KM) The KM working group guides the knowledge management activities in UNEP to ensure the retention of institutional knowledge. -UNEP Working group on Resource Management (RM) The RM working group guides the resource management activities in UNEP to ensure

	Greening ICT in UNEP) or a proposal for a UNEP-wide system (e.g. a project management information system to be used by all UNEP staff) has been prepared by the working groups and cleared by the ICT Synthesis Group for presentation to the SMT.	improvement in UNEP's capabilities in managing human, financial and other resources. -UNEP Working group on Infrastructure Management (IM) The IM working group guides the infrastructure management activities in UNEP to ensure improvement in UNEP's infrastructure. (2) UNEP ICT Synthesis Group (UNEP - ISG): Composition: The Chair of each working group (working group on knowledge management, working group on resource management, working group on infrastructure management), a representative from the Quality Assurance Section (QAS), a Business Change Representative and UNEP Project Sponsors or managers. Function: The UNEP – ISG reviews policy, process and standard operating procedures for ICT and reviews proposals for UNEP-wide systems that have been prepared by each working group for submission to the SMT; reviews the ICT components of UNEP projects that have been discussed by each working group to ensure that they follow Organization-wide (UNEP and UN) standards; ensures that proposed ICT projects and activities are aligned with the MTS. b) UNON bodies: (1) Three UNON working groups -Application Development Steering Committee (KM), meets quarterly -IMIS- ERP Steering Committee (RM) -Technical Review Group (TRG) (IM) These working groups guide the three strategic programmes in KM, RM and IM for UNON. The UNEP ICT Adviser participates in each working group. (2)UNON ICT Committee, meets every 6 months Comprises of three members, one from UNEP, one from HABITAT and one from UNON. This committee ensures that local ICT priorities are aligned with the Secretariat- wide ICT strategy. c) ICT governance bodies of United Nations Secretariat : (1) ICT Advisory Group (ICT - AG): Composition: The Chief, CSS and ICT Advisor participate in the ICT Advisory Group, which Ensures that the UNEP ICT priorities are aligned with the Secretariat-wide ICT strategy and sharing of knowledge, experiences and lessons learned with other organizations across the Secretariat. (2) ICT Executive Committee (ICT- EC) UNEP Executive Director participates in the ICT Executive Committee (ICT- EC) of the Secretariat, the highest level decision making body on major ICT matters and the overall ICT strategy and priorities.

UN-Habitat *

UNHCR	ICT Governance Board (ICTGB)I	The board is composed of the Assistant High Commissioners (Protection; Operations), Directors from the Divisions (Information Systems & Telecoms; Human Resources Management; International Protection; External Relations; Programme & Support Management; Financial & Administrative Management; Emergency Security & Supply) and Bureaux (Americas; Africa; Asia & Pacific; Europe; Middle East & North Africa). Chaired by the Deputy High Commissioner. The ICT Project Office provides secretariat services to the board.	The purpose of the Board is to provide organization-wide senior-management oversight and coordination of all investments related to information and communications technology. In this context the ICT Governance Board establishes priorities, approves projects and investments and provides monitoring and oversight of efforts that are in progress across the entire organization.	Three times per year. Special sessions may be convened by the Chairperson when required.	<u>Standing bodies:</u> a) ICT Business Owners Committee (ICTBOC): Composition: Deputy Directors from the Divisions and Bureaux. Chaired by the CIO & Director of Information Systems & Telecoms. Function: The ICTBOC provides a mechanism for structured and coordinated interactions between DIST, other Divisions and Bureaux on ICT related projects, and ensures that needs for new or enhanced ICT systems and services are identified and met, taking into account budgetary and capacity constraints. The ICTBOC prioritises ICT investments and presents them to the ICTGB for decision. b) Change Advisory Board (CAB): Composition: Representatives from Business and technical sections along with the user community that can approve or reject changes Function: To efficiently and effectively handle all changes. Has a pivotal role in managing changes to the ICT infrastructure including Business applications. The board that has regular meetings which are often virtual and participants can vary considerably depending on the change(s) being discussed <u>Ad-hoc bodies:</u> Project specific Project Steering Committees that are mandatory for large projects and optional for medium projects.

UNRWA *	Information Management Committee (established in April 2008) However, UNRWA ICT governance is at present provided by an ERP Steering Committee. Furthermore, UNRWA is currently engaging a consultant to conduct an ICT Assessment in order to review various aspects of ICT management including the governance structure. (*)				Ad hoc body: ERP Steering Committee: Composition: Deputy Commissioner-General, Chair Director ERP, Secretary Members Director Administration Support Director of Human Resources Director of Finance Deputy Director of UNRWA Operation/ JFO Deputy Director of UNRWA Operation/WB Deputy Director of UNRWA Operation/Lebanon Deputy Director of UNRWA Operation/Gaza Deputy Director of UNRWA Operation/ Syria Deputy Director External Relation Division Chief Information Services Division Chief Procurement & Logistics Division Coordinator of Programme Services Chief General Legal Division Function: Guiding and overseeing the implementation of the new ERP system at UNRWA
UNDP	ICT Board	The ICT Board consists of members from the Regional Bureau, Central Bureau and its units, Country Offices, and members from the funds administered by UNDP, such as UNV and UNCDF. The members are the policy and technical staff selected on the basis of their knowledge and	The ICT Board: oversees implementation of IM strategy; oversees new and ongoing ICT initiatives; endorses ICT standards and policies; and it is involved in corporate ICT priority-setting and risk management.	Three times in 2010.	<u>Standing bodies:</u> a)ICT Technical Committee: The ICT Technical Committee, a sub-group of the ICT Board, provides technical recommendations for ICT Board decisions. b)Change Control Board (CCB): <u>Ad hoc bodies:</u> Project Boards; and the Projects Teams/Technical Tracks, such as for ERP implementation <u>Other:</u> Inter-Agency Atlas Governance Group (IAAG) for the ATLAS system, in which UNDP, UNFPA, UNOPS, UN Women and UNU participate.

		interest as users, representative management, and functional owners of ICT initiatives.			
UNFPA	ICT Board	Director, Division for Management Services, Chairperson; Deputy Director, Division for Human Resources, Member; Deputy Director , Technical Division, Member; Deputy Director , Division for Oversight Services; Deputy Director , Division for Oversight Services, Member; Chief , Finance Branch, Member; Chief , Media and Communications Branch, Member; Chief , Programme Support and Regional Desks Branch, Member; Advisor , Enterprise Risk Management, Member; Two persons from regional and/or sub-regional offices ; Two country representatives ,	The ICT Board is responsible for ensuring efficient use of ICT resources for the maximum benefit of the organization. The ICT Board further ensures that: •ICT initiatives are aligned with UNFPA business practices, support the achievement of organizational objectives, and promote organizational efficiencies; •Organizational units take business ownership of ICT initiatives; •All foreseeable risks associated with ICT initiatives are clearly identified; •There is no duplication and overlap between various ICT initiatives in different offices of UNFPA; •Development of approved ICT projects/initiatives are prioritized; •Funding requirements for approved ICT initiatives are fully identified; and •Approved ICT policies and standards are applied to all ICT initiatives, as relevant.	Quarterly	<u>Standing bodies:</u> a)Change Control Board: Composition: Change Release Manager, Chairman; Relevant Management Information Services (MIS) staff; Clients and Users. Function: It evaluates the impact and risk of the requested changes to ICT services and ICT infrastructure from both business and technical viewpoints; makes recommendations for implementation, further analysis, deferment, or cancellation of the change request submitted for approval. Meetings are held as necessary. b) ICT Procurement Planning Committee: Composition: The ICT Procurement Planning Committee consists of senior MIS staff. It is chaired by the MIS Chief. Members include the Technology Manager, Applications Development Manager, and Business Support Manager. Function: The mandate of the ICT Procurement Committee is to provide checks and balances on procurement activities of various functions within the MIS. It is the goal of the ICT Procurement Committee to ensure that relevant Procurement and MIS policies are adhered to at all times. <u>Other:</u> Inter-Agency Atlas Governance Group (IAAG) for the ATLAS system, in which UNDP, UNFPA, UNOPS, UN Women and UNU participate.

		Members; and Chief , Management Information Services, Secretariat. The ICT Board is an organ of the Operations Committee (OC). The OC is co-chaired by the two Deputy Executive Directors and comprised of senior managers of all major UNFPA organizational units. The ICT Board reports to the OC.			
UNICEF	ICT Board	The ICT Board members are appointed by the Executive Director among senior staff. The Information Technology Solution and Services (ITSS) division provides secretariat services to the Board. The ITSS Director serves as ex-officio member. The members are appointed for a 3-year period. The ICT experts may be selected to serve as external advisors in ensuring enough technical expertise.	The mandate of the ICT Board is to ensure an appropriate and coordinated use of ICT means and resources across the organization. The goals of the ICT Boards are to promote standardization of ICT systems, avoid duplication of management efforts, and ensure that all projects and initiatives are aligned with the UNICEF ICT Strategy, which guides all new and ongoing ICT initiatives. The Board will: -Advise the Executive Director and the Global Management Team on matters of technology adaptation and prioritization; -Ensure coherent and coordinated usage of ICT throughout UNICEF and beyond in line with the objectives of the organization; -Oversee the implementation of the ICT Strategy and its alignment to UNICEF's current and future strategic objectives; -Ensure the delivery of value by ITSS to UNICEF's stakeholders; -Endorse recommendations for resources and other means necessary to meet ICT goals; -Establish ICT-related risk tolerance; -Review ICT performance indicators and provide the Information Technology Review	The ICT Board meets at least once every 3 months or on an ad hoc basis as demanded by emerging issues.	<u>Standing bodies:</u> Information Technology Review Committee (ITRC): Composition: The ITSS Director (Chair); all ICT Chief of HQ away from NY; Regional ICT Chiefs, Deputy Director for Integrated Applications and Knowledge Management Support; Chief, IT Programs & Quality Assurance; Chief, Administrative Services; Chief, Application Functional Service; Chief, Cross-Functional Services; Chief, Knowledge Management Support; Chief, Technical Architecture; Chief IT Operations and Services, Chief IT Security. Function: The ICTR reviews, vets and approves IT projects, technical standards and policies and operational activities. Its activities, among others, include: ensuring continuous improvement in ICT effectiveness, efficiency and transparency through management of the planning, monitoring, and performance evaluation of ICT initiatives; ensuring that all ICT initiatives follow a rigorous project management methodology and final roll-out assessment: ensuring consistency in the application of technology, standards and solutions through UNICEF; identifying and measuring the effectiveness of ICT policies, procedures, standards and guidelines and modifying them accordingly. The ITRC meets at least once a month. Additional meetings may be scheduled by the Chair to address time-sensitive issues and initiatives as needed. <u>Ad hoc bodies:</u> Project specific governance bodies, usually chaired by a Deputy Executive Director and a membership on D2 level. For instance, the organisation had decided to create a dedicated project governance structure for its migration to one single off-the-shelf ERP system on SAP basis – a project ("VISION") also coping with the simultaneous changeover to IPSAS as new accounting standard. The Project Director reports to a Project Steering Committee chaired by the Deputy Executive Director – Management, ASG level. Committee

			Committee (ITRC) guidance for improvement; -Advise on matters related to: ICT priority setting and risk management, progress toward meeting UNICEF's goals, escalation by UNICEF stakeholders associated with ICT initiatives. The ICT Board members serve on the Board in both a decision-making and advisory capacity to the Executive Director and the GMT depending on the nature of particular ICT matters and specific areas of scope. The ITSS division and select advisors provide technical expertise and advice to the Board on specific topics. The largest ICT initiatives/investments are brought up for discussion and clearance to the full UNICEF Global Management Team, the GMT, composed of all Directors and executive management at the D2 level and above.		membership comprises the directors of key stakeholder divisions.
WFP	Management Information Systems Steering Committee (MISSC)	Members include: Deputy Executive Director and Chief Operating Officer, Operations Department; Deputy Executive Director, External Relation Department; Deputy Executive Director and Chief Financial Officer, Resource management and Accountability Apartment; Deputy Executive Director, Office of Hunger Solutions; Chief Information Officer & Director, IT and Management Services Division; Director,	The MISSC shall be responsible for setting the strategic direction of WFP's information technology systems, ensuring that they meet the organization's needs in an efficient and cost-effective manner. It shall perform the following functions: -Review the IT strategic plan which constitutes the roadmap for IT in WFP, on an ongoing basis, to ensure its consistency and alignment with the business goals and strategy of WFP; -Define a 'value management framework' for business changes that allow for organization-wide tracking of tangible and intangible benefits arising from the IT-enablement of these projects. This framework will define quality acceptance levels for business cases for IT-enabled investments with particular emphasis on the definition of key financial indicators and the comprehensive appraisal of the downside risk; -Identify "IT investment criteria" and define	The MISSC meets once a year. Additional meetings, if needed, may be convened by the Chairperson.	<u>Standing bodies:</u> Executive Management Council (EMC): The MISSC reports to the Executive Management Council (EMC), the body which supports the Executive Director's managerial functions and is responsible for formalizing and focusing managerial decision-making processes at the executive level in WFP. <u>Ad hoc bodies:</u> Separate governance structures may be established for large-scale projects. For instance the one for the WFP ERP upgrade project (WINGS), which is comprised of a Project Board, Steering Committee and Project Owners, among others.

		Communications, Public Policy and Private Partnerships Division; and Director, Human Resources Division. The Chairperson of the MISSC is the Chief Operating Officer. The alternate chair - Chief Financial Officer.	thresholds for each, above MISSC approval shall be required; -Approve and prioritise business initiatives, the IT project pipeline and project portfolio, and authorize allocation of ownership, budget and responsibilities; -Provide ongoing oversight of key projects, including of approval of major corporate project scope changes; -Resolve issues impeding the timely delivery of high-priority projects; -Approve architectures and information and solutions standards including assignment of application and information ownership and project delivery models proposed by IT, which are related to business process standards proposed by the business; -Review post implementation reviews of major projects and independent IT effectiveness assessments; and -Review and obtain organizational acceptance of business risks of IT-enabled projects and provide continued oversight of these risks to ensure their containement.		
UNOPS					
ILO	The Information and Communications Technology Subcommittee (ICTS) of the Programme, Financial and Administrative Committee (PFAC) of the ILO	The ICTS is a standing committee of the PFAC) of the ILO Governing Body that, together with other committees, comprises the ILO Governing Body.	The ICT Subcommittee was established in 2005 to “assist the PFAC in the governance of the ICT policies of the Office and would review and discuss substantive ICT issues that have a direct impact on the budget, with a view to making recommendations for consideration by the PFAC of the ILO Governing Body.	annually	<u>Standing bodies:</u> <u>a)</u> Technology Advisory Committee (ITAC): Composition: It is chaired by the Executive Director of the Management and Administration Sector (MAS), and its membership consists of representatives from each department at the department director or bureau chief level. Function: ITAC advises on the strategic direction for the use of IT throughout the ILO, reviews the implementation of major IT investments and establishes IT standards on the recommendation of ITCOM and monitor compliance with them. b) Senior Management Team (SMT): Composition: It is composed of all directors, except the director of ITCOM. Function: Senior management committee which also deals with IT issues and policies. c) Information Technology Application Advisory Board (ITAAB): Composition: It is chaired by the Chief of Information Technology and Communications Bureau (ITCOM) and its membership consist of IT application specialists from FINANCE, HRD, ITCOM, and PROGRAM. Specialists from technical sectors and

	Governing Body				DGREPORTS will be invited on an as needed basis. Function: ITAAB advises the Executive Director of the MAS Sector (ED/MAS) on the coordination of the development of IT applications and the acquisition of application software, so as to avoid duplication and incompatibilities with established office-wide applications, such as IRIS and the EDMS. ITAAB's review process ensures a consistency in proposed IT projects as far as methodology, project management, and subsequent maintenance throughout the expected life cycle of the application. ITAAB is guided by ILO's IT Strategy and standards, as well as established industry standards such as COBIT and ITIL. <u>Ad hoc bodies:</u> Separate governance structures may be established for major IT initiatives, as it was for instance done for the implementation of an ERP system, the Integrated Resource Information System (IRIS), which is governed by the IRIS Governance Board (IGB) and the IRIS Management Task Team (IMTT).
FAO	FAO has a common structure for the governance of Knowledge Management (KM) and Information Technology (IT), in which "IT" includes both information systems and information management. Governing body is the IT/KM Governance Committee	Co-chairs: DDG (Operations) and DDG (Knowledge) Members: Directeur de Cabinet; HQ ADG's; DO ADG's; Director, CIO (Co-Secretary); Director, OEK (Co- Secretary); Director, OSP; Advisor - Legal Counsel, LEG; Advisor - Inspector General, AUD	The IT/KM Governance Committee ensures alignment between IT and KM strategies, plans and investments. Among others, it: - Ensures the IT and KM strategies and plans are aligned to the Organization's strategic objectives, functional objectives and priorities and are supported by an appropriate investment and resource plan aligned to the IT and KM medium-term strategies. - Advises the ELT on strategic and policy issues relating to information technology and knowledge management. - Reviews and advises the ELT on Capital Expenditure Fund (CAPEX) funding and other major IS/ICT and KM/IM investments. - Monitors and reviews implementation of the information systems and communication technology project portfolio, investments and performance reporting. - Monitors and reviews compliance with IT and KM standards and procedures. - Considers and decides on proposals from the IT/KM Bureau on matters within its remit and makes recommendations to the . - Delegates IT and KM technical matters to the IT/KM Architecture Board.		<u>Standing bodies:</u> a) IT/KM Architecture Board Composition: Co-chairs: CIO and Director OEK (based on agenda/topic, IT or KM); Secretary: Senior officer IT Governance and OEK (as per agenda); Members: 2 focal points per Departmental/Regional office (as per agenda); Ex-officio: CIO and OEK Senior officers (as per agenda) Function: The IT/KM Architecture Board develops, monitors, and communicates IT and KM enterprise architecture (norms and standards) and procedures, including technical publishing. It monitors the development of strategy and plans, reports on investments and benefits and major project initiatives. It is responsible for exploring emerging new approaches, methodologies and technologies and their possible use by FAO. b) IT/KM Bureau: Composition: Co-chairs: DDG (Operations) and DDG (Knowledge) Members: ADG Technical departments (two departments, rotating annually); ADG Decentralized offices (rotating annually); ADG, CS; Director, OSP; Director, CIO; Director, OEK; Director, OSD. Function: The IT/KM Bureau ensures that biennial information systems, information communications technology and knowledge management needs are identified and plans are produced and agreed to meet the Organizations strategic objectives and core functions, and align with medium-term IT and KM strategies. It considers Capital Expenditure Fund (CAPEX) investment proposals and makes recommendations to the IT/KM Governance Committee. It reports on IT/KM investments and benefits realized. It monitors major IT and KM initiatives and ensures the reduction of duplication and fragmentation of information, information systems and technology. It reports directly to the IT/KM Governance Committee for approval of plans, major projects and investments.

UNESCO	Corporate Services Committee	Senior/executive management	The Corporate Services Committee is a senior/executive committee which decides on managerial, policy and strategic issues, including in the area of IT and it provides guidance to and 'oversight' on the CIO and IT department.		
ICAO	The Senior Management Group (SMG)	Chaired by Secretary General, members include Director, Regional Director and Chief of offices, who is directly reporting to Secretary General. All Directors, Chief de Cabinet and Secretary General are D2 and above.	The highest decision making body and the authority in ICAO.		<u>Ad hoc bodies:</u> Enterprise Project Governance Body (Steering Group): Chaired by Director/ADB (Director and Deputy Director Administration Bureau), members include Chief/ICT and Business Representatives of Technical Offices. Director/ADB chairs the Steering Group and owns the accountability of ICAO secretariats' administrative services, who reports to Secretary General directly. The Steering Group is the actual IT governance body to all enterprise wide IT implementations. The Steering Group meeting is not on regular basis; the meetings are based on the progression of the Projects.
WHO	Global ICT Leadership Team (GLT)	ICT heads or focal points from the WHO Regional Offices, Partner Agencies, and HQ's out-posted offices.	The GLT group is an executive group that is mandated to provide clear ICT direction for the whole organization. The objectives of the GLT are: -To regularly review the current Global ICT strategy and its alignment with WHO's strategic objectives; -To provide an overall ICT strategy for the whole of the Organization, in light of appropriate technological trends and changing business needs; -To assess the relevance of current ICT services provided globally to WHO end users and external partners. Consequently, providing a modernized list of global ICT services; -To develop a global resource capacity to deliver ICT services and re-evaluate where services are effectively managed and efficiently delivered; -To assist in developing metrics to evaluate the performance of each global ICT service and hence make adjustments to service delivery; -To review current financing standing, evaluate costs, and identify new ways of financing global ICT services; -To report on local or individual ICT projects	Twice per year	<u>Ad hoc bodies:</u> A separate governance structure has been established for the implementation of ERP in WHO, the Global Management System.

			fro information sharing and transparency; -To establish a Global ICT Governance; -To regularly meet, in between the Gloabal ICT meetings, to discuss the progress of each action items and ensure continuous alignment of the initiatives with the decisions.		
UPU					
ITU	Information, Communication and Technology Committee (ICTC)	Deputy Secretary-General (Chair) Deputy Directors (D2), Chiefs (D1)	1. Provide a consultative forum for information exchange on the development of ICT and Information Management (IM) strategies and plans for ICT innovation, on the evolution and major changes to the ICT environment, and on the related projects; 2. Co-ordinate with the relevant services concerned, formulate, and recommend policy on ICT matters; 3. Monitor the implementation of policy on ICT matters; 4. Develop and revise, as needed, an ICT investment plan based on priorities that reflect ITU strategic objectives; 5. Recommend the allocation of resources for ICT innovations and projects, ensuring that the needs of the Regional and Area Offices are duly taken into account; 6. Identify possible sources to fund and replenish the ICT Capital Fund; 7. Review the progress of ICT projects and the attainment of financial and performance objectives, soliciting and taking into account user feedback; 8. Make recommendations concerning recruitment and training issues specific to ICT matters.	Quarterly	<u>Standing bodies:</u> ICTC: governs and makes recommendations with respect to investments from the ICT capital fund <u>Ad hoc bodies:</u> a) ERP: SG was the project sponsor, weekly reporting meetings with SG. Human and Financial Resources Management Departments and IS were co-project managers, Steering Committee comprising Deputy Directors of Sectors (D2), functional and technical teams, quality assurance, formal sign-off (including SG for certain decisions affecting the organizational processes). Regular reporting to ITU Council; b) IPSAS project: as above but with participation of an ITU Council Member

WMO	Information Systems Strategy Advisory Committee (ISSAC)	Chairperson: - Deputy Secretary General Members: - Director, Resource Management Department (D2) - Director, Observation and Information systems Department (D2) - Director, Cabinet and External Relations (D2) - Director, Development and Regional Activities Department (D2) Secretary - Chief, Information Technology Division (P5).	ISSAC's mandate is to oversee the planning, development and implementation of IT/IM projects with a view to modernize the related systems and to enhance efficiency and promote a more effective use of relevant tools (Report on IT Governance 2006-07). ISSAC advises the Secretary General on: IT and IM strategies, business plans and budgets for approval; IT and IM risks according to overall WMO strategy and business plans; requirements for coherent IT and IM policies and procedures and mechanisms for compliance control; proposal for significant investments in new IT/IM initiatives; integration of system, data and people enabling IT solutions to support streamlining and simplification of processes; and ownership of sustainability of all information related initiatives and projects and monitor implementation of major projects (e.g., Oracle and EDMS).	At least annually	Other committees, working groups, and task forces have been formed to look into IT and process related issues in WMO. (Some of these have evolved as a result of relevant issues identified at WMO management retreats.) The website redesign committee is tasked with the redesign of the WMO public website. Additionally, there is a task force on process simplification looking into streamlining of processes in areas like travel. Furthermore, a "Documents Management Board" has been created for implementation of the EDMS project upon recommendation of ISSAC.
IMO	The IT/IS Governance Board	Chaired by the Director of Administration Division and includes representatives from all Divisions plus IOS, IT&IS Section, the SAP Unit and the Policy and Planning Unit.	The IT/IS Governance Board will provide the vision and strategy for the IT/IS investment and use in the Organization and its work will include: 1.Review of existing and planned inventory of IT systems and IT services in the IMO 2.Overall leadership regarding the implementation of the IT and IS strategy [to be developed, and endorsed by the Board] 3.Define and implement criteria to prioritise requests for IT system changes and application development 4.Review and endorse prioritised IT system development requests 5.Advise and approve proposals for outsourcing developments and systems 6.Align IT and IS investment to the IMO business needs and strategic directions 7.Monitor and enforce Organizational IT&IS security policy [to be developed, and endorsed by the Board] 8.Monitor staff development programme to ensure IT&IS skills are appropriate	Quarterly, and depending on needs	"Standard bodies (a) ICT Management Team This team is chaired by the Deputy Director/Head IT and Information Systems. It comprises group leaders from each of the four strategic ICT programmes and is responsible for coordinating the development of the ICT strategy and its periodic alignment to the wider Organisational strategy. It also implements the ICT strategy and related plans and programmes, while developing ICT policies and procedures. The team also ensures that ICT investment is strictly aligned with business needs, towards the realisation of the Organisation's work programme. The team meets monthly and reports on the overall ICT performance to Senior Management. (b) ICT Programme Working Group Working groups are established for each of the four strategic programmes: - Knowledge management - Application development - Resource management - Infrastructure management The working group is responsible for reviewing proposed ICT initiatives and for managing their implementation. The working group advises the ICT management team on policy and programmatic issues. The group meets weekly. Ad hoc bodies:

					Separate governance structures are established for major IT projects, such as the implementation of the ERP system and the website project.
WIPO	ICT Board	It is composed of high-level officials, including the WIPO Deputy Director-General, Assistant Director General (Chair) and Chief of Cabinet.	The ICT board deals with and decides on major IT strategies and investments, including the biennial ICT budget.		
UNIDO	Under the Programme for Change and Organizational Renewal (PCOR): The Committee for Change and Organizational Renewal (CCOR) - including the Project Board	Consists of 20 senior managers from all functional areas, including all members of the Executive Board. The CCOR is chaired by the Director-General.	The CCOR is the main decision-making body for PCOR. As such, it provides the strategic direction and oversight. The CCOR reports to the Executive Board. Furthermore, the Project Board, consisting of three Executive Board members and two senior managers, is the decision-making body for operational decisions under PCOR, including for ICT-related matter.		
UNWTO	There is no specific ICT supervision body; the SMT (Senior Management Team) takes supervisory role on an ad-hoc basis	Secretary General, (Chairman) Executive Director, Programme and Coordination, Executive Director, Competitiveness, External Relations & Partnerships Executive Director, Member Relations and Services Director, Administration and Finance	The SMT takes a supervisory role in respect of ICT issues on an ad-hoc basis.	Twice a month	<u>Ad hoc bodies:</u> Evaluation panels and task forces nay be established to dealing with special issues when needed.

IAEA	IT Committee (ITC)	Chaired by the Director, MTIT, acting in his/her capacity as Chief Information Officer (CIO). One member and one alternate will be nominated by each DDG and will normally be at Director level. IT specialist will be invited to attend as required.	The ITC is a standing interdepartmental committee. It is established for promotion, partnership and cooperation in information management (IM) and information technology (IT) in the Secretariat. It will advise on IM/IT issues of strategic nature and those which affect more than one programme and will seek to establish consensus on such issues in order that information is shared effectively and IT solutions are implemented efficiently throughout the Secretariat. The functions of the ITC are: - to review, advise on, and ratifySecretariat IM/IT strategy and policies, including on the draft IM/IT Strategy; - to be an advisory body to the CIO on issues of IT technical standards, IT planning, IT risk management and operational issues. The CIO retains final decision making authority over these issues; - to review and make recommendations to the CIO for the implementation of the Agency's centralized IT services budget; - to review and recommend – within the Programme and Budget cycle – all IM/IT investments with a significant IT component (over €100 000), major changes in IT staff assignments or those investments of a lesser value which in the view of the ITC are likely to have a significant impact on more than one Department. These recommendations will be based on objectives and established criteria (e.g. business case, duplication in the house, availability of long-term financial resources to support continuing operations, risk — see SEC/NOT/1915 for more details). In the event that the IT Committee cannot reach consensus on an investment, the CIO and the DDG concerned will jointly present the issue to the PCC for final decision; - to advise on introduction of new and emerging technologies. -to review and provide by establishing consensus among its members.	Monthly	<u>Standing bodies:</u> a) The Nucleus Steering Group (NSG): The NSG is an interdepartmental advisory body set up by the ITC that is concerned with all policy issues related to Nucleus. Nucleus is a portal that allows Agency staff members and counterparts in Member States easy access to the detailed scientific, technical and regulatory information resources of the Agency. b) The Information Security Policy Steering Group (ISPSG): The ISPSG is a standing body in the Agency responsible for advising the ITC, through DIR-MTIT/CIO, about information security issues, procedures, policies, and practices.

* UNCTAD, UNEP, UN-Habitat, UNOV/UNODC and UNWRA are governed by the ICT governance framework of the United Nations established by the Office of Information and Communications Technology (OICT) of the United Nations Secretariat and follow the ICT strategy of the United Nations.

Annex II

ICT Strategies in United Nations system organizations

Organization	Current ICTS (main content; period covered; alignment to org. strategic plans)	Regular Updates	Process of adoption/update	Endorsed by Legislative Bodies
United Nations	The UN ICT Strategy covers the five-year period from January 2009 to Decmber 2013. The ICT strategy is comprised of a vision, a management framework and three strategic programmes. Based on the vision, the Management Framework is aimed at enhancing ICT management processes and structures and sets outs five main priorities: Develop ICT management structures; Deliver strategic programmes; Enhance service and performance management; Implement global architecture and standards; and Improve Financial control and reporting. The three Strategic Programmes include Knowledge Management, Resource Management, and Infrastructure Management	ICT strategy is a 'living document' and updated on a periodic basis (5 years). It is only mentioned that the strategy will be updated on a periodic basis.	In developing the ICT strategy, a comprehensive planning process was initiated in 2007-2008 , aimed at identifying the key ICT needs of the global Secretariat, including: Executive interviews with heads of departments and offices to determine common needs and unique needs; An organization-wide ICT survey on staff needs and activities associated with ICT; Discussions with Permanent Mission representatives to assess how the Secretariat's ICT can support Member State needs; Research on technology trends and products from industry-leading vendors, to review best practices and assess the industry's current evolution. The organizational needs, as well as technological trends and market developments, have served as the building blocks of the ICT vision for the Secretariat. The institutional needs along with four major technological trends of recent years have formed the basis for the ICT strategy of the Secretariat. Further, in 2010 an UN-wide ICT Structural Review had been conducted to provide detailed recommendations on strategic and organizational changes that will boost the efficiency, impact and cohesiveness of the ICT operation.	yes
UNCTAD *	UNCTAD Information Technology (IT) Strategic Plan 2011-2014 represents the importance of positioning Information Technology as a strategic entity of the organization towards achieving its mission objectives. The UNCTAD ICT strategy aims at: better aligning internal ICT support services with the strategic objectives of the organization, complying with the UN secretariat ICT strategy, and promoting and delivering flexible and state of the art technology required by the organization. The IT Strategic Plan outlines 9 activities for achieving the IT objectives: Rationalizing the existing Administrative Systems & Databases; Servicing the needs of the Substantive and other Areas; Managing Enterprise Content; Facilitating e- Mail & Other Communication Means; Servicing Meetings and Conferences; Facilitating Telecommuting; Establishing & Implementing digital Security; Establishing & Implementing IT Disaster Recovery; Facilitating High-Quality Client Services.	Yes; previous IT strategy was adopted in 2006.	A draft strategy is prepared by the Chief of ITSS head of IT after consultation with management and users. The draft ICT strategy is submitted for discussion and endorsement by the UNCTAD ICT Committee and finally endorsed by the UNCTAD Deputy Secretary-General.	

UNODC *	UNOV/UNODC Information Technology Service (ITS) is governed by the ICT Governance Framework established by the Office of Information and Communications Technology (OICT) UNHQs New York.		
UNEP *	UNEP's mission for ICT: Supporting the medium-term strategy 2010-2013: To realise the medium-term vision for UNEP, the mission of ICT is to create an innovative and dynamic ICT environment which provides staff with effective and efficient technology solutions that enable them to deliver tangible results in pursuit of UNEP's priorities. In support of this mission, the ICT goals have been drawn from the objectives of UNEP's thematic priorities that articulate the vision for UNEP with the goal of promoting ICT as a strategic tool in enhancing the productivity of staff and managers and achieving organization results. The objective of the ICT strategy for UNEP is having an agreed upon Organization-wide ICT strategy which provides the context for the use of ICT in supporting and enhancing the vision and goals of UNEP. The strategy encompasses 5 cross-cutting priority areas of (a) ICT management structure, (b) strategic programme delivery, (c) service delivery and performance management, (d) global architecture and standards, and (e) financial control and reporting. The ICT strategy covers 3 years, from 2010 to 2013.	The strategy is in constant review through continuous improvement of the process itself. The strategy and governance framework is intended to be a four-year view of UNEP's ICT Strategy – it is, however, reviewed and updated annually to reflect changing needs, directions and emerging development of technology	The strategy is prepared by the ICT Advisor through the director of Office of Operations and endorsed by the (Senior Management Team) SMT of UNEP. It is proposed that the strategy is adopted in three phases: first by the 7 Divisions of UNEP (done in the First Quarter of 2010), followed by the Regional/Out-posted offices in the second phase (First Quarter of 2011) and the MEAs in phase three (Second Quarter of 2011) – after careful consideration of the specific needs and requirements for phases two and three.
UN-Habitat *			

UNHCR	The UNHCR ICT strategy aims to ensure that: · All ICT initiatives are aligned with the organization's Global Strategic Objectives. · The potential benefits of modern ICT systems are fully utilized through the development of a service portfolio, organization and management procedures. · Agility, efficiency, and effectiveness of ICT systems and services are increased. · and the Division of Information Service Technology (DIST) is recognized as the authority, expert, and owner of all matters ICT in UNHCR. The ICT Strategy is a longer term (typically five years) statement of direction for ICT within the organization. It also elaborates on issues such as: the ICT Strategy Framework; the demand for, supply of and management and control of ICT Services and Systems at UNHCR; and ICT risks. It is complemented by an Strategic Plan outlining at a high level the overall action plan and initiatives that will need to be put in place to fulfill the strategy, and an Operating Plan that details specific activities that will be completed in a specific timeframe (typically one budget cycle) and which directly influence the day to day ICT operations and the development of new services and systems.	Annually	Strategy is prepared by The Division of Information Service Technology (DIST). The ICT strategy is endorsed by governance bodies and Deputy High Commissioner.
UNRWA *	UNRWA information systems strategy and master plan (adopted in October 2004)		
UNDP	The UNDP Information Management (IM) Strategy 2008-2011 offers a strategy and critical recommendations for ICT to support the organization in implementing its UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-2011. It covers standard ICT areas as well as UNDP-specific business areas, including: •ICT Governance •Sustaining Country Office ICT Needs •Support to Knowledge Management and Online Advocacy •Records Management •Business Reporting and Management •Atlas ERP Efficiencies •Business Process Management •ICT Security •Infrastructure and Telecommunications •Multi-sourcing Strategy •Green ICT •UN Reform The IM Strategy 2008-2011 was created in alignment with the UNDP Strategic Plan 2008-2011. ICT results support UNDP Strategic Plan Institutional Results Framework areas: As an aid in implementing the Information Management Strategy 2008-2011 (and its extension to 2013), ICT roadmaps, approved by the ICT	IM Strategy 2008-2011 extended to 2013	IM Strategy was epproved by the UNDP Operations Group

	Board, set out specific strategic business project results and will also guide the development and prioritization of UNDP business projects.		
UNFPA	The ICT strategy outlines how the ICT systems and infrastructure will support UNFPA in achieving its business objectives, through a set of ICT strategic outcomes and outputs complementing the UNFPA Strategic Plan, and to ensure that UNFPA has strong ICT systems support in terms of planning, implementation, monitoring and reporting. The ICT strategy outlines the following three outcomes with respective outputs for the 2011-2013 time-period (duration of the extended UNFPA Strategic Plan): Outcome 1: Improve accountability and transparency through better alignment of systems with business processes and effective ICT governance and control framework Output 1.1: Streamlined applications in support of business processes Output 1.2: Strengthened ICT governance and control framework Outcome 2: Strengthen the ability to share information across the Organization Output 2.1: Standardized and centralized ICT environment with productivity tools for User empowerment Output 2.2: Increased partnership with other organizations Outcome 3: Ensure secure and reliable ICT infrastructure for enhanced connectivity and business continuity Output 3.1: Strengthened communications infrastructure Output 3.2: Robust and cost-effective technical platform, disaster recovery and business continuity including support to Regional, Sub-regional and Country Offices	The ICT Strategy is reviewed every other year.	The ICT Strategy is developed by the Management Information Services in consultation with all organizational units of the Fund and subsequently presented to the ICT Board for endorsement. Following its endorsement, the Strategy is presented to and approved by the Operations Committee
UNICEF	A strategy document for the 2010-2013 period was produced in the first quarter of 2010. This ICT strategy had not been formally approved by UNICEF senior management or the ICT Board at the time of the review.		The strategy gets elaborated by UNICEF's global ICT management team (identical with ITRC), under the lead of the Director ITSS and substantial coordination by the ITSS PMO. A large group of key stakeholders on D2 and above level gets interviewed at the occasion of major revisions. The ICT Strategy will then be presented to the ICT Board for review and approval.

WFP	The IT Strategy is currently being revised. An earlier strategy called for strategic initiatives such as modernization of the communications and collaboration services, expansion of the telecommunications infrastructure, development of innovative solutions for IT services in emergencies and establishment of information governance and tools. These initiatives are currently in progress.		Development of the IT Strategy has been carried out by ensuring alignment with the WFP Strategy and is intended to be reviewed by senior management prior to approval.	
UNOPS				
ILO	The current ICT Strategy is for the time period 2010-15 and it is complemented by a respective work-plan for IT. The ICT strategy is linked back to the organization's overall higher-level strategy. It also contains criteria, objectives, targets and indicators for ICT.	The ICT strategies are regularly updated. Previous ICT strategies covered periods from 2007-09, 2001-06 and 1997-2000.	Extensive consultations took place for the preparation of the ICT Strategy. The ITCOM meets with all 30 sectors in the house to receive their input. Then, the director of ITCOM prepares a draft. At this stage, planning meetings with the executive director of MAS take place, as well as ongoing informal meetings with different departments, working groups, etc. ILO often uses external consultants for their expertise and advice when preparing the IT strategy. The draft IT strategy is submitted to the subcommittee of Programme, Financial and Administrative Committee (PFAC) for endorsement.	yes
FAO	FAO's senior management has recently approved the organziation's IT Strategy for the 2012-2019 period. The ICT Strategy is a major building block in support of achievement of the Organization's Strategic objectives and provides an alignment between IT and the Organization's business objectives. The strategy advocates commitment to a single corporate transformation programme called SYNTHESIS 2019, reflecting the necessity to 'Function as One' in the area of IT. The programme incorporates six transformation areas with the following objectives: 1. ONE Corporate Framework: to develop an integrated approach to planning, controlling, and evaluating IT initiatives throughout the Organization. 2. ONE Administrative Environment: to foster a more cohesive global administrative work system that meets the needs of all departments, divisions and decentralized offices. 3. ONE Technical Environment: to foster a common technical environment to support the technical work of the Organization. 4. ONE Global Environment: to cultivate a globally integrated technology environment that meets the common and shared needs of all decentralized offices. 5. ONE Collaborative Environment: to create a globally integrated		ICT strategy approved by Senior Management.	

	workspace that supports collaborative working and learning throughout the Organization and with external partners. 6. ONE Technology Community: to nurture a global IT community that has the capability and capacity to meet the Organization's needs for IT into the future.			
UNESCO	Currently no IT Strategy, but a draft had been prepared by the former IT Committee, which had been discontinued in the meantime. The new CIO [recruitment process was ongoing at the time of the review] will be tasked to develop/finalize the IT strategy.			
ICAO	Enhancing ICT service quality to all bureaux - One-ICAO ICT infrastructure - Enterprise service support structure - High Availability ICT infrastructure eICAO: - Implement enterprise information management framework - Establish Web management and strategic plan - Build Enterprise Content management - Solid Data management systems (database systems)	ICT presents the Strategic Plan or Master Plan every 3 years in order for meeting the timeline of the Assembly.	The Chief of ICT proposes the ICT Strategy to the D/ADB for review, and then presents it to AMG/Secretary General for approval.	
WHO				
UPU				
ITU	The purpose of the strategy is to deliver value, as requested by Council and the Plenipotentiary through the effective use of technology and information. Value will be delivered in three areas aligned to the 2009-2012 Operational Plan for the General Secretariat: • Services to Member States, Sector Members, and Associates • Enhanced ITU efficiency • Greater transparency and accountability			The ICT strategy is also presented to the annual Executive Council, and to the World Meteorologi cal Congress, the supreme body of the

			body of the Organization, once every four years
WMO	The IT/IM Strategy for the WMO was issued in November 2006. The purpose of the strategy is to deliver value. as requested through the effective use of technology and data. Value will be delivered in three areas aligned to the Long Term Plan of WMO: • Services to Member States • Enhanced WMO efficiency • Create transparency and accountability		The ICT strategy is prepared by the Chief, ITD in consultation with the Director, Resource Management Department, is presented to the Information Systems Strategy Advisory Committee (ISSAC) for endorsement
IMO	The current Information Management Strategy 2004-2010 was built on the principle of the Secretariat adopting, on an on-going basis, comprehensive solutions that efficiently integrate Information and Communication Technology into work processes, procedures and practices, to promote managerial effectiveness and provide a platform for efficient information sharing and knowledge management. The following summarizes the five pillar of the current ICT strategy; -Providing an enabling environment and user friendly interface for sharing information, and for capturing and managing organization's knowledge; -Leveraging management and policy initiatives to provide effective information systems for secure, seamless and collaborative interaction between staff members, delegates and their counterparts in Member states; -Improving on people, skills and organization for improved planning and developing of corporate information systems; -Developing data repository that frees corporate information from legacy application for easy retrieval and sharing in a secured environment and; -Providing the technology infrastructure for both staff and member states to access and share information easily and seamlessly from any location around the world.	biannually	The following process is applied for updating the current IT strategy: The consultation for strategic preparation process will start with an internal review of the information technology strategy and systems currently in place. Consultations will be held with stakeholders to gather inputs to prepare the new strategy. These Internal consultations will take place individually with member of the ICT Governance board and major stakeholders within Divisions and Section of the Organization. Consultation with Secretaries to Committees and Chairmen of Committees and their Sub-committees will take place. On-line consultations will also be conducted. In addition, staff will attend selected relevant events (presentations, forums, meetings etc) to solicit inputs. Main issues, discussion highlights and recommendations at each consultation will be summarized and used as inputs to formulate the draft Strategy. Once discussed and agreed by ICT Governance Board, the draft strategy will be posted on IMODOCs website and shared with Member States and other stakeholders for a period of online consultation. As needed, targeted consultations with stakeholders will be undertaken mainly through web-based tools. Feedback from the consultation process will be documented for internal circulation and consideration by the governance board. The final Strategy

			Results Framework will also be posted on-line in addition to the Strategy itself and will be used as a basis for staying in touch with stakeholders after the consultation is completed.
WIPO	WIPO had adopted a comprehensive IT strategy which is in line with the WIPO medium term plan for 2011-2015 and contains tangible initiatives, outputs and benchmarks.		
UNIDO	A new ICT strategy is being developed by UNIDO alongside the ERP implementation under PCOR		It will be endorsed by the Director-General and the senior management at the Executive Board level
UNWTO	An annual strategic work plan is prepared based on audit recommendations, users' requirements, annual budget and emerging technologies.	reviewed monthly and updated	The annual strategic work plan is prepared by the ICT Programme Coordinator, for approval by the Director of Administration and Finance.
IAEA	The Information Management/Technology Medium Term Strategy (IM/IT MTS) covers the period 2007-2011, to align with the Agency's overall "Medium Term Strategy 2006-2011". It is intended to establish an Agency framework for all programmes involving Information Management (IM) activities and related Information Technology (IT) services.		Prepared by the IT Committee with the participation of representatives from all departments.

JIU/REP/2011/10

Staff-management relations within the United Nations

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Staff-management relations within the United Nations
JIU/REP/2011/10

The report on staff-management relations (SMR) within the United Nations was prepared following suggestions made in this regard by the Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Management, the Human Resources (HR) Network of the United Nations Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) and a number of Staff Representatives (SRs). Good and effective interaction between the management of the organizations of the United Nations system and their staff, is critical for the delivery of high-performance services. The objective of the report is to identify and promote the conditions that would further SMR at all levels: the United Nations Secretariat, its duty stations, and the separately administered organs, programmes, Tribunals, peace operations and political missions, on the basis of the principles and texts agreed to by the Member States. The scope of the report is limited to the processes and mechanisms of SMR, rather than on substantive Human Resources (HR) issues except for illustrative purposes.

It is expected that the implementation of the report's recommendations by the Executive Heads complemented by the consideration by the elected leadership of the Staff Representative Bodies (SRBs) of some suggestions will help to improve the work of various established Joint Bodies (JBs) and make SMR more effective for the overall benefit of the entities concerned and meet the General Assembly's clear wish, when addressing Human Resources Management (HRM) issues (General Assembly resolution 63/250), to receive proposals for the review of the staff-management mechanisms.

Main findings and conclusions

The research revealed that while the principles of SMR in the United Nations are established from a legal and political point of view - by various texts including numerous General Assembly resolutions binding or committing all stakeholders - in practice, the implementation of these principles is far from being uniformly satisfactory in various entities and at all levels of staff-management interaction. The Inspector had to reorder the initial structure of the present report and delve first and foremost with the "crisis" in SMR when several SRBs representing thousands of staff members globally either refused to participate or threatened to boycott the June 2011 session of the most important Joint Staff-Management (SM) Body in the United Nations - the Staff-Management Coordination Committee (SMCC).

SMCC XXXII (June 2011) eventually took place following a clear commitment by the Secretary-General to promulgate - by September 2011 - the new Terms of Reference (ToR) for the Committee (drafted three years earlier). The new ToR was subsequently issued on 8 September 2011 (ST/SGB/2011/6) replacing the SMCC with the Staff Management Committee (SMC). Nonetheless, despite some important positive steps, SMCC XXXII did not resolve other major pending issues that served as a significant source of mistrust and frustration for SRs, including some policy decisions on which – allegedly - neither prior adequate consultations nor negotiations were undertaken with SRs. Such practices would have clearly contradicted Staff Regulation 8.1, which states that:

> *The Secretary-General shall establish and maintain continuous contact and communication with the staff in order to ensure the effective participation of the staff in identifying, examining and resolving issues relating to staff welfare,*

including conditions of work, general conditions of life and other human resources policies.

The contested decisions touched upon "*issues within the authority of the Secretary-General*" including contractual arrangements, mobility, safety and security, reduction of allotments, and even a new version of the Staff Rules. Effective SMR requires clarity in the delineation of authority on the management side. It also requires from both sides, the willingness to participate in the discussions in good faith and a proper understanding of the issues at stake, the latter point being closely tied to necessary training on SMR and HR issues.

In the present report, the Inspector proposes a major reform of the Staff Management Committee (SMC) building upon the new ToR of the SMC and going further to transform it from a five-day event into a five-month process as detailed in Chapter 8. The related changes may represent a difficult deviation from customary thinking and business as usual procedures, but may be necessary for safeguarding and improving SMR. The report highlights some major points in this regard:

(a) The scope of issues on which the Secretary-General and senior management should engage with SRs is clearly defined and limited by Staff Regulations 8.1(a) and 8.2. Subsequently, providing for such participation would not amount to the co-management of the organization;

(b) The Secretary-General, as the Chief administrative officer of the United Nations, has the final say to accept or reject any proposed agreement on issues on which he is designated as the ultimate authority. On other issues that fall within the realm of authority of the Member States (including system-wide issues and ones with budgetary implications), the Committee may strive to agree on a common position which the Secretary-General would then be obligated to defend before the General Assembly. If, as suggested, the Secretary-General follows negotiations in the SMC as they occur, then he will not be lacking for time to fully consider any proposed agreement in all its aspects before agreeing and signing on to it;

(c) Credible and thoughtful agreements that take into account all possible aspects of an issue cannot and should not be deliberated and determined overnight; they may require different time frames, from days to months. In order to ensure that there are no unnecessary shocks or surprises for either side, the three steps necessary to attaining agreements in good-faith - namely, mutual information, mutual consultation and, most importantly, negotiation – must be respected;

(d) The appropriate framework for negotiations will vary according to the nature and scope of the issue under consideration, from informal discussions between line managers and the staff of their units for issues specific to a department or unit (in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity), to Joint Advisory Committees (JACs) and Joint Negotiating Committees (JNCs) for duty-station specific issues and to the SMC for issues with Secretariat-wide significance. In this regard, Chapters III and VI make the case that if the United Nations is to be described as the employer and is represented by a mandated management when discussing and formalizing agreements, it can then be concluded that all features characterizing collective bargaining do presently exist in most formal SMR negotiating processes in the organization, in particular within the SMC and the JNCs;

(e) Decisions reached in the aforementioned fora, with due representation of both staff and management, should be accompanied by necessary joint monitoring and implementation, with a defined time-frame for action. Given the means available to it, management is particularly accountable for this task, beginning with the Chief administrative officer of the United Nations and the Executive Head (EH) of every United Nations entity.

Recommendations, Guidelines and proposals

The Inspector has made six recommendations in the present report: one to the General Assembly, one to the Secretary-General exclusively and four to the Secretary-General and the Executive Heads of the separately administered organs and programmes. The Inspector also proposed, on a purely advisory basis, five guidelines for the consideration of and possible implementation by the Staff Representative Bodies (SRBs) as appropriate. Unlike the "recommendations", these guidelines will not be the object of any JIU follow-up on their acceptance and implementation.

In addition, the staff and management representatives are invited as members of the SMC to consider, discuss and improve - at the first session of the SMC - the institutional changes proposed in chapter VIII to make this Committee, hence the SMR, more effective.

Recommendation for consideration by legislative organs

Recommendation 5
The General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to present to it for its approval, an appropriate staff regulation confirming the recognition of the right of the United Nations staff to collective bargaining as outlined in the annex to its resolution 128 (II). The Secretary-General and the Executive Heads of the separately administered organs and programmes should apply to the staff of their respective entities the standards and principles emerging from the relevant ILO instruments, particularly the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998).

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Abbreviations and acronyms

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
ACC	Administrative Committee on Coordination (now CEB)
AI	Administrative Instructions
AoJ	Administration of Justice at the United Nations
ASG	Assistant Secretary-General
ASU	Area Staff Union (UNRWA)
BoA	Board of Auditors
CCISUA	Coordinating Committee for International Staff Unions and Associations of the United Nations System
CEB	United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (formerly ACC)
CMT	Country Management Team
DA	Delegation of Authority
DFS	Department of Field Support
DM	Department of Management (UNHQ)
DMT	Divisional Management Teams
DPA	Department of Political Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSA	Daily Subsistence Allowance
DSG	Deputy Secretary-General
EC	European Commission
EH	Executive Head
ERP	Enterprise Resource Planning
EU	European Union
FICSA	Federation of International Civil Servants' Associations
FJNC	Field Joint Negotiation Committee
FSO	Field Service Officers
FSU	Field Staff Union
FUNSA	Federation of United Nations Staff Associations
GFTU	General Federation of Trade Unions
GS	General Service
GSA	Global Staff Association (UNICEF)
GLT	Global Leadership Teams
HLCM	High-Level Committee on Management (CEB)
HQ	Headquarters

HR	Human Resources
HRM	Human Resources Management
ICSC	International Civil Service Commission
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
ILO	International Labour Organization
ILOAT	International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal
JAC	Joint Advisory Committee
JCC	Joint Consultative Committee
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
JNC	Joint Negotiation Committee
OAH	Offices of the United Nations Secretariat away from Headquarters
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OHRM	Office of Human Resources Management (UNHQ)
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
OLA	Office of Legal Affairs (UNHQ)
OSLA	Office of Staff Legal Assistance
SA	Staff association
SC	Staff Council
SCC	Staff Coordinating Council
SG	Secretary-General
SM	Staff-Management
SMC	Staff-Management Committee
SMCC	Staff-Management Coordination Committee
SMR	Staff-Management Relations
SR	staff representative
SRB	Staff Representative Body
ST	Secretariat of the United Nations Organization
ST/AI	Secretary-General’s Administrative Instruction
ST/IC	Secretary-General’s Information Circular
ST/SGB	Secretary-General’s Bulletin
SU	Staff Union
ToR	Terms of Reference
UDHR	Universal Declaration of Human Rights
UNAT	United Nations Administrative Tribunal
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNCT	United Nations Country Teams

UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNDT	United Nations Dispute Tribunal
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNECLAC	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
UNESCWA	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNFSU	United Nations Field Staff Union
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UN-Habitat	United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHQ	United Nations Headquarters (New York)
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNISERV	United Nations International Civil Servants Federation
UN LB	United Nations Logistics Base
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOG	United Nations Office at Geneva
UNON	United Nations Office at Nairobi
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNOV	United Nations Office at Vienna
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSU	United Nations Staff Union (New York)
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
UNU	United Nations University
USG	Under-Secretary-General
WG	Working Group

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Objectives and scope

1. As part of its programme of work for 2009, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) undertook in November of that year a review of Staff Management Relations (SMR) in the United Nations. The review - as initially announced in A/63/34 (paras. 141-5) - aimed at assessing SMR in the whole United Nations System and was included in the programme of the JIU following suggestions made by the Under-Secretary-General (USG) for Management, the Human Resources (HR) Network of the United Nations Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), and a number of Staff Representatives (SRs). Due to the unexpected diversity and fragmentation of SMR within the United Nations, the review had to be divided into two reports with the present one focusing on the United Nations Group[1] and a forthcoming one (included in the JIU's Programme of Work for 2011) that will cover the United Nations' specialized agencies and on the ways in which Staff and Management Representatives are related and interacting at the level of the U.N. system.

2. The starting point is the premise that good and effective interaction between the management of the organizations of the United Nations system and their staff, who are considered to be their most precious asset, is critical for the delivery of high-performance services. From this perspective, nearly 100 hours of interviews (conducted in symmetry with SRs and MRs) convinced the Inspector that the quality of SMR is far from satisfactory (with the exception of some cases of excellent SMR, as in UNICEF) – a notion confirmed by other JIU Inspectors working on other topics in contact with SRs and MRs.

3. **The objective of both projects is to identify and promote the conditions that would further SMR at all levels** – local, United Nations Secretariat, Group and system - on the basis of the principles and texts agreed to by the Member States. It is expected that JIU recommendations to its traditional addressees (Governing bodies or Executive Heads) complemented by guidance to the elected leadership of the Staff Representative Bodies (SRBs) will improve the work of various established joint bodies and remove obstacles to making SMR more effective for the overall benefit of the entities concerned. In addressing such a topic, **this report focuses on the processes and mechanisms of SMR, rather than on substantive Human Resources (HR) issues, mentioned only** for illustrative purposes.

4. While Member States and the staff-at-large may not be involved as directly as either the staff representatives (SRs) or the HR Management on SMR issues, **as stakeholders, they have expressed a common desire to see greater transparency and better dissemination of information regarding the topic, given a common perception of multiple SMR frameworks and ill-defined accountability boundaries.** Rather than placing itself in the

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[1]The "U.N. Group" includes all entities whose management and staff are presently represented as members or associate members of the Staff Management (Coordination) Committee (SM(C)C). It includes the UN Secretariat Headquarters, three UN Offices Away from Headquarters (OAH) in Geneva (UNOG, OCHA Geneva, OHCHR, UNCTAD, UNECE, UNHCR), Nairobi (UNON including UNEP and UN-Habitat) and Vienna (UNODC, UNOV), four regional Economic Commissions (UNECA-Addis Ababa, UNESCAP-Bangkok, UNESCWA–Beirut, UNECLAC-Santiago), Department of Field Support (DFS), DPKO and DPA (who represent approximately forty plus Peace Keeping Operations and Special Political Missions), United Nations Funds and Programmes (UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, UNOPS, UNRWA), United Nations University (UNU) and two United Nations Criminal Tribunals (ICTR - Arusha and Kigali, ICTY -The Hague). UNRWA is not represented in the Committee.

delicate position of concurrently serving as a judge and concerned party, the United Nations Secretariat suggested this topic to be addressed by the JIU, which is best placed to address it as the "only independent external oversight body of the United Nations System." It is expected that the analysis and recommendations contained in the two successive volumes will meet the General Assembly's clear wish to receive proposals for the review of the staff-management mechanisms in addressing Human Resources Management (HRM) issues (General Assembly resolution 63/250).

B. Methodology

5. Given that the present report addresses situations where actors on the staff and management sides each defend distinct interests, it highlights both points of agreement and divergences and acknowledges the impact of personalities on SMR. It is based primarily on perspectives from each side in an attempt to capture the nature of their relations as neutrally and objectively as possible. Thus, a symmetrical approach was utilized and the views of both staff representatives (SRs) and management representatives (MRs) in all duty stations considered were captured via parallel questionnaires and interviews, in full impartiality and with guarantees of confidentiality.

6. In accordance with the internal standards and guidelines of the JIU and its internal working procedures, the methodology followed in preparing this report included a preliminary desk review, 66 interviews including 18 through videoconferences and their in-depth analysis. 33 detailed questionnaires were sent to MRs and SRBs of the United Nations Group, with a response rate of 100 per cent from management and 77 per cent from SRBs. The Inspector conducted interviews with SRs and MRs, with the former President and the Vice-President of the Staff Management Coordination Committee (SMCC) in Vienna, and exchanged views with the current President of SMCC. Interviews were also held with the representatives of 16 MS in New York, and some specialists on labour relations in their individual or institutional capacity.

7. As part of the review, in addition to contacts in Geneva, the Inspector visited New York (United Nations Secretariat,[2] UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF, ICSC, representatives of 16 MS), Beirut (ESCWA) and Naqoura (UNIFIL), Vienna (UNODC/UNOV), The Hague (ICTY) and Brussels (European Commission). Positive responses were received for all videoconference (VC) requests. In accordance with article 11.2 of the JIU statute, this report has been finalized after consultation among the Inspectors in order to test its conclusions and recommendations against the collective wisdom of the Unit.

8. The Inspector had to inquire and reflect, without excluding any stakeholder, on the main aspects which on each side may influence the quality of SMR, taking into account all perceptions found. It is well known that the JIU Inspectors have statutorily[3] a purely advisory role and neither a power of decision nor a right "to interfere in the operations of the services they inspect" but they "may propose reforms or make recommendations". The present report recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary General to present to it for its approval a Staff Regulation explicitly recognizing the right to collective bargaining in the United Nations. As regards the SRBs, in order to clearly respect their freedom of association, the Inspector is only offering "guidelines" or even broad suggestions presented in the text itself, that each SRB can discuss and make a determination on whether to use or not. No

[2] Including the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA), the Departments of Field Support (DFS) and the Department of Management (DM), particularly the Office of Human Resources Management (OHRM).
[3] Art.5.5 of the Statute of the JIU, (res. 31/192, annex) downloadable from www.unjiu.org

guideline will be tracked in the JIU follow-up system. It is obvious that, by virtue of the freedom of association, each organization's staff members were historically free to conceive and establish, and are still free to criticize, reform and democratically improve their representative bodies and that they are the only ones in a position to do so. Neither any Manager nor a third party, be it a Member State or the General Assembly can decide for them in this area. To facilitate the handling of the report, the implementation of its recommendations and monitoring thereof, annex IV contains a table indicating whether the report is submitted for action or for information to the EHs of the Organization and entities concerned.

9. The Inspector wishes to express his deep appreciation to all those who assisted him in the preparation of this report, and particularly to those representatives of the Member States, management and staff who participated in the interviews, sent comments and willingly shared their knowledge and expertise in a climate of trust.

II. STAFF-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN CHRONIC CRISIS

A. Past and Current State of staff-management relations

10. The earliest text on SMR (1920), Article 9(1) of Chapter IV in the ILO Staff regulations[4] was quite positive: the Staff Committee and the Joint Committee were vested with the powers to "*facilitate relations between the Director and the staff as a whole, and place these relations on a more regular basis*". The same spirit was illustrated by the purposes enumerated in the Draft Statute of the Staff Committee (SC) of the United Nations[5]. In its 1949 Report[6] the latter defined its role as *"a formula which will work: a Staff Committee which would reflect the views and opinions of its constituents, a Committee which would be neither beholden to the Administration nor opposed to it a priori, a Committee which neither seeks to provoke crisis nor tries by vague words to quiet legitimate discontent, a Committee which cooperates with those members of the Association whose role it is to give administrative direction to their colleagues"*. Such a formula continues to be relevant.

11. Following a positive and intense start, characterized by mutual trust in the 1940s,[7] SMR in the United Nations has experienced ups and down (as illustrated in annex II) for the last 30 years. Crisis in SMR is not a new phenomenon. In addition to a number of General Assembly resolutions showing that a range of serious concerns of the staff members were shared by Member States,[8] various JIU reports show "deterioration" and "crisis" of SMR in the past. This was due to a variety of reasons mostly related to new HR policies - less for their content than for the abrupt way they were introduced. This is an area where the MS also have certain responsibilities, in addition to those of the Secretary-General.

12. In the 1980s, there was a crisis of confidence of sorts, resulting in the ASG for HR touring most Secretariat duty stations in 1985, issuing a penetrating report[9] which was badly received by the staff in the next SMCC. The year 1991 saw the HQ staff demonstrating for hours before the New York Secretariat building. In 1997, JIU Inspectors analyzed the years 1995-1997, in an unpublished paper, as a time of crisis of relationships between management and staff, stating that both must contribute to its solution. From 2003 to May 2011, another crisis was observed at UNHQ between the Department of Management (DM) and the (headquarters) United Nations Staff Union (UNSU) which refused for eight years to participate in the SMCC, a move imitated by UNOG-Staff Coordinating Council (SCC) and the Field Staff Union (UNFSU) until 2006. In both duty stations, and in ESCWA (when visited by the Inspector in 2010), a high level of antagonistic relations between SRs and MRs was aggravated by personality clashes and cultural differences. Another telling indicator of a challenging work environment is the significant number of staff members in Geneva voluntarily participating in a stress management course (in French) offered by UNOG's Medical Services Section. Out of approximately 8,000 eligible staff members, around 1,500 signed up.

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[4] See Djokitch Alexandre, *The Staff Union of International Labour Office – Its origins and the commencement of its activity*, Geneva: ILO, 1973.
[5] See Permanent Staff Council (PSC) Circular no. 15, 13 January 1947, p.2.
[6] See Annual Report of the Staff Committee, 27 April 1949, SCC/54, p.7.
[7] See *Report of the Permanent Staff Committee to the Staff of the United Nations Secretariat*, PSC/13, 13 December 1946.
[8] See for instance res. 47/226, which reaffirmed the need for the Secretary General to use to the fullest extent the staff-management consultative mechanism set out by staff rule 108.2
[9] SMCC/X/6, 12 April 1985: Status of Staff Management Relations, Report of a mission to duty stations and offices away from Headquarters, Pascal Negre.

13. Some of the difficulties alluded to above related to general policies or situations including the financial crisis coupled with downsizing and redeployment. Others typically related to HR policies such as mobility, harmonization of allowances, management deficiencies in the application of the Organization's recruitment, placement and promotion policies and the establishment of ill conceived and time consuming management tools without neither sufficient prior testing (ex. the first Performance Appraisal System and the recruitment tools Galaxy and Inspira) nor internal controls. Most of these policies were justified as parts of the ongoing "reform of the Organization".

14. Grievances on the substance of measures decided were worsened by the chronic lack of communication, early consultation and sometimes good faith in negotiations between Staff and Management. While the principles and frameworks for mutual information, consultation and negotiation were available via joint bodies, the failure to effectively apply them creates a confrontational atmosphere.

15. With one exception[10] there were few major surveys of the staff-at-large to gauge the state of SMR. At the commendable joint initiative of the Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the Department for Field Support (DFS), a study was conducted between 2008-2010 covering the United Nations Headquarters and eight Peace Missions, involving 3,000 respondents to a survey on "promoting a positive work environment". A note signed by both USGs concerned revealed that the majority of staff were dissatisfied with (in descending order): *"1) fair promotion processes 2) availability of job related training that may lead to promotion/mobility 3) fair recruitment processes 4) availability of career planning/guidance 5) fair performance appraisal processes 6) managerial accountability to address abuse of authority"*.

16. The survey also revealed that *"Job satisfaction for staff both at HQ and in the missions is predicted by the treatment staff experience from managers and the quality of their relationships with colleagues"*. It further stressed that "*staff who tend to be happier in their posts are also staff who: feel recognized by senior management; perceive senior management to be accessible; feel that managers treat staff respectfully and demonstrate concern for their career aspiration; have supportive relationships with colleagues and experience respect for cultural diversity"*. The analysis made by the Inspector in the following chapters confirms that such a bleak picture, coming from the management of the United Nations, outlines both the symptoms of the crisis in SMR and major elements for its necessary treatment.

17. Views gathered on SMR in 2010 and 2011 by the Inspector were generally more optimistic on the management side compared to the staff side, with the latter giving more importance to the quality of SMR in particular as regards their level of inclusion in the determination of HR policies. SMR in some entities can be characterized as excellent (UNICEF[11]), cordial (UNECLAC, UNIFIL) or cooperative (UNICTY[12]) but these positive cases are more the exception than the norm. While in some duty-stations (DS) such as Vienna or Naqoura (Lebanon), local SMR may be qualified as good, they are challenged by frustrations caused, in particular, by a number of Secretariat-wide HR policies issued in 2011,

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[10] Cranfield University's School of Management's 1999 report issued a useful report entitled "Human Resources Management: Policies and practices in the United Nations Family of Organizations and Related agencies. A comparative analysis with European Government Institutions."

[11] In UNICEF, the SRB has a say in the management structure through an ex-officio seat in the Global Leadership Team (GLT) which meets three times a year with participation set at least at the D-2 level; SRs also participate in the Divisional Management Teams (DMT).

[12] SRs and MRs were instrumental in working together to face the ongoing challenges of downsizing.

perceived as unilaterally imposed. Elsewhere, as in Addis Ababa, Arusha, Kigali, Bangkok and Nairobi the quality of local SMR can best be described as neither positive nor negative but "fair"[13], while in UNHCR, it appeared "challenging".

18. Over the years, the chronic crisis observed in the biggest DS - UNHQ and UNOG, contributed to discouraging the active participation of the staff-at-large in the activities of the related SRBs. As expressed during meetings between the UN administration and some JIU Inspectors in the 1990s, only 15 per cent of the staff at UNHQ participated in Staff Council elections, with only 45 per cent of the staff-at-large paying staff union dues. It is instructive that as early as its fiftieth session, the General Assembly included *"improving the efficiency of SM consultations on administrative issuances"* as one of the objectives of the administration and management in the programme budget for 1996-1997. Presently, a divided staff representation has resulted in repetitions of the aforementioned situations, exemplified by the fact that neither UNSU nor UNOG-SCC could obtain a quorum in the formal meetings attended by the Inspector in 2010 and 2011. These appear to indicate that much work remains to be done for these SRBs to motivate their constituents to participate.[14]

B. Chronic weaknesses in the Staff-Management Coordination Committee (SMCC)

19. The SMCC, the sole staff-management mechanism at the Secretariat-wide level, had its own fair share of challenges, as it chronically suffered – as per its reports over the three last decades (see chapter III) - from two defects: the late submission of documentation by both sides and weakness in the implementation of its decisions, including their monitoring and follow-up. In 2011 those two factors became even more evident.

B.1 Late submission of documentation

20. Since the earliest SMCC sessions, representatives on both sides regularly faced (as delegates in intergovernmental bodies) delays in obtaining documentation from the other party,[15] a practice contradicting paragraph 8.1 of the SMCC TOR which clearly stated that "*the provisional agenda and all other working documents shall be circulated to all members, alternates and associate members* ***at least three weeks in advance of a session***". The time lead of three weeks itself reflects a reduction in half (from six weeks) decided in 1997. The risk that participants might question the impartiality of the Committee's secretariat given that it is currently under the control of one of the parties, is one of the reasons why it is recommended that it becomes operationally independent from the DM and placed under the sole authority of the President (*see Chapter VIII, Section B*).

21. During preparations for SMCC XXXII, the agenda and documents were not distributed to participants with enough lead time. SRs received them as late as 8 June 2011, just two weeks before they were to travel to Belgrade to attend the meeting. Therefore, no preliminary consultations could be held with staff-at-large on the issues tabled for discussion. While this

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[13] The limited budget for this report did not allow the Inspector to visit more than one field mission.

[14] Attendance figures: 43rd UNSU Council meeting on 11 Nov. 2010: 9 participants; UNOG-SCC's annual Ordinary General Assembly (second call) on 4 February 2011: 50 participants; UNOG-SCC's Extraordinary General Assembly after SMCC on 12 July: less than 50 participants; it should be noted that neither UNSU nor UNOG-SCC were anywhere close to attaining a quorum for the aforementioned meetings. A table of staff participation in elections is presented in section IV, B.4. In 2009 only 19 out of 37 electoral units in the 43rd UNSU Staff Council had elected representatives while the remaining 18 seats were vacant.

[15] For example, SMCC VI (1983) report (para. 7) notes that the late delivery of essential documentation prevented the SRs to discuss it with their colleagues at their own duty stations.

was perceived by some SRs as a unilateral decision-making process imposed from the management side, the Department of Management (DM) argued that "*the delay in circulating was not (…) on the management side but because staff representatives could not agree to attend. As soon as they agreed to attend and submit their part of the agenda, it was circulated."* This explanation would have sufficed if such situation were exceptional. But the documents for the crucial informal session on contractual arrangements (including its provisional agenda) held in Vienna from 26-29 January 2010 were sent as late as 22 January 2010, noting that the OHRM presentation was "*still being prepared*."

B.2 Uneven implementation of SMCC agreements

22. The SMCC's credibility and effectiveness was most seriously challenged by the fact that, since its first sessions, many agreements arrived at through this forum have not been evenly respected and implemented across duty stations – either in full or in part. This failure became so systematic that the issue of implementation became a regular agenda item in the SMCC sessions. Nevertheless, implementation continued to be weak and uneven to the extent that successive sessions adopted a series of damage control initiatives (see Chapter III, section C2) but again with limited success. It must be recalled that within the limits of his/her delegated authority, each manager is accountable for the implementation of SMCC agreements.

23. Setting the stage for recent difficulties in SMR, the move - over the past 15 years - from secure permanent contracts into a system of continuing and fixed-term appointments has been a source of ongoing debate in the United Nations. Discontent has been growing among the staff due to being increasingly deprived of their traditional career prospects, with a general feeling of precariousness with regards to job security and resentment over the loss of acquired rights.

24. As noted below, some important decisions affecting staff welfare were taken either directly by the Secretary-General or indirectly through an insufficiently informed dialogue with the General Assembly, without any prior consultation or updates provided to the SRs. It is particularly troubling that some of these decisions were taken just after SMCC XXXII, during which the DSG affirmed that the Secretary-General had made consultation with staff one of his priorities".[16]

25. In view of the Secretary General's report (A/65/305Add.1), the Inspector agrees with Management that the Secretary General presented the Beirut SMCC XXXI agreement in good faith to the MS. It remains to be known how strongly these agreements were defended before the MS. The absence of any mechanisms enabling SRs to witness these discussions highlights the lack of any real and direct channel of communication between the staff-at-large and the MS. As a third party, the Inspector can only observe ex-post **the enormous gaps between staff and management perceptions of the discussions between MRs and MS** once decisions are made and known. According to the SRs, when facing the MS, the management side "*withdrew from the agreed position*". According to the DM "*it had defended the position before the MS who did not accept it and went on with their own proposal*." Nobody contests that the final text included terms that had been clearly rejected by the SRs in Vienna, as they excluded local staff in non-family peacekeeping missions and all staff in the Tribunals from being eligible for continuing appointments.

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[16] SMCC XXXII, para21.

26. In recent years, significant aspects of major decisions taken by the General Assembly on contractual arrangements appeared to vary from what had been previously discussed at length and in particular agreed to between SRs and MRs at the SMCC meeting in Beirut in June 2010.[17] The implications of Assembly resolution 63/250 of 24 Dec. 2008, making provisions for three types of appointments (temporary, fixed-term and continuing) and resolution 65/247 certainly affected the frail trust between staff and management, notwithstanding the latter's explanations in this regard.

27. Management is thus perceived as having been unable to effectively and smoothly play its pivotal intermediary role between MS and SRs. In general, the staff-at-large perceived itself as having been inadequately involved in such an important process, both by Management and SRs. Even when, as in 2010, a common position is agreed to at the SMCC, the SRs have no means to observe, react to and influence what follows, particularly the deliberations and decision-making processes of the General Assembly on proposals by management in the Fifth Committee informal sessions or the even more restricted "informal informals". Likewise, management finds itself in the unenviable situation of facing up either to staff reactions regarding HR reforms ex-post facto, where it has neither the ultimate power nor the last word, or MS who are increasingly and more selectively sensitive to budgetary constraints.

B.3 Conflicting perceptions on major decisions allegedly taken without staff participation

28. SMR has been particularly affected by a series of initiatives by management (at various levels) promulgated both before and after the SMCC XXXII meeting (June 2011). SRs considered such moves as unilateral initiatives that were contrary to the spirit and letters of Staff Regulations 8.1 and 8.2 and Staff Rule 8.1 h (see texts in Annex I). The following table gives only recent examples of the major gap between the respective perceptions of SRs and MRs (the latter mostly based on comments received from the DM) on some of these cases, issues on which the Inspector lacks both the necessary information and legitimacy to assert a definitive position.

Table 1: Examples of decisions considered by SRs as taken without consultation

Topic	Staff representatives' perception	Position of the U.N. Department of Management [18]
Reform of contractual arrangements (2009-2011)	The Secretary-General, when facing the MS, withdrew from SMCC agreements negotiated over the course of several years on contractual arrangements. The new HR reform was launched without the endorsement of SRBs, and contained changes that had been completely rejected by SRs in January 2010 in Vienna.	"This is how the inter-governmental process works. Member States have the prerogative to decide and have indeed made it clear that they do not need the endorsement of SRBs for HR initiatives."
Mobility	Letter from the SMCC-VP to the SG dated 14 Sep. 2011: "As you know, staff and management had been working together for the past year on developing a mobility	

[17] The positive outcome of the Beirut meeting contrasts with the preceding efforts in Vienna (via an informal special SMCC meeting in January 2010) which failed to reach an agreement.
[18] When no other source is quoted, the source is the comments received on 20 September 2011 by the JIU from Department of Management at UNHQ on the draft of this report.

Topic	Staff representatives' perception	Position of the U.N. Department of Management [18]
	policy. Two models were explored: the first would increase incentives to move, the second would bring in a managed mobility system. At June's SMCC, staff and management agreed to explore both models through focus groups and further analysis with a view to preparing recommendations for approval next summer. However, two months on, that agreement has been breached and the working group has been told that only the managed mobility model will be accepted by you."	
Mobility 2	Email from SMCC VP to ASG for HR dated 29 Nov. 2011: "The working group has been mandated by SMCC and that mandate cannot be changed by either party. This mandate includes a request to further examine both options with a view to putting forward a final proposal. The paper presented by management *(in September)* prejudges the outcome of the working group and consequently undermines its ability to undertake the task it was mandated to perform. It *(the paper)* clearly forces management members of the group to follow the broad lines set out in the proposal and consequently, erodes the trust staff have in their ability to have their views taken into account. The paper further inhibits the group's ability to examine the issue in a balanced and fair manner. In order to redress the imbalance, the staff members of the group will work on their own proposal, which we hope will form the basis of the group's agenda."	Email from ASG for HR to SMCC VP dated 21 Nov. 2011: "The SG respects the process of the SMC and notes the agreement from Belgrade. At the same time (…) the voluntary mobility model is not producing effective mobility in our Organization. (…). Therefore only a more managed approach where staff change jobs periodically throughout their careers will truly "enable mobility". It is important that this is clear from the outset as the working group takes forward work on the policy."
New system of administration of justice	Unilateral decision to ask SRBs to subsidize the Office of Staff Legal Assistance (OSLA), within the Office of Administration of Justice pursuant to General Assembly resolution 63/253 of 24 December 2008.	"Discussions between MRs and SRs on the issue of a staff funded scheme have been based solely on numerous General Assembly resolutions in which the GA invited the SRs and then requested the Secretary-General to present proposals for such a scheme (Res.61/261, 62/228, 63/253 and 65/251). The SRs were consulted on each occasion and their views on the matter were put before the GA in each case."
Safety and security	Issuance of the Policy Manual for the Security Management System (8-4-2011). The manual was elaborated without any consultation with FSU, despite a prior agreement to ensure their participation in country Security Management Teams.	
Harmonization of conditions of service of	As outlined in the FJNC minutes (April 2011) the changes in conditions of service for Field Staff and particularly the Field	"The changes were discussed with FSU and staff-at-large in a number of occasions. Ultimately, it was a GA decision.

Topic	Staff representatives' perception	Position of the U.N. Department of Management [18]
staff serving in Non-Family Duty Stations (DC) (2010)	Service Officers (FSO) category were never discussed with the SRs but imposed unilaterally by management. These changes provoke not only financial losses, but also a considerable reduction in FSO mobility, a key element of their category status since its inception, which for example made hitherto possible their redeployment into any start-up mission in 48 hours.	The question if whether they were on permanent appointments is irrelevant to the conditions of service."
Harmonization of conditions of service in the field (2010)	Re-designation of a number of hardship posts (e.g. Tinduf [19]) as "family duty stations" without any consultations with SRs.	"Staff representatives have never been part to the process of designating family/non-family duty stations… and that is for ICSC as a function of DSS advice not a matter of negotiation with staff". [20]
Various memos requiring approval of draft ST/SGBs or ST/AIs during the summer of 2011 by e-mail only	In 2011, instead of discussing draft administrative issuances during the June SMCC session as would have been the most appropriate forum for effective consultations, the management sought comments on such documents only by email soon after the SMCC session concluded and provided only a short time to respond. This was the case for the draft administrative issuances on Grounds Passes and Permanent Residency.	

C. Open crisis in 2011

29. It is against the aforementioned background that a number of significant events took place in 2011 that can only be termed as constituting an open crisis in SMR at the United Nations, related to the organization of HR reforms as discussed by the General Assembly, within the context of and pressurized by serious budgetary constraints:

(a) On 7 March 2011, a memorandum from the Secretary-General's Chef de Cabinet was sent to all heads of departments and offices, requesting that a proposal be devised within a very limited time frame for 3 per cent cuts across the board in their budgets for the 2012-2013 biennium. In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 22 March, the Vice-President of the SMCC noted the "alarm and dismay" of the staff-at-large at such a move, noting that such bleak budgetary realities "demand mature discussion, not hasty action" and that the "staff, managers and indeed the Member States expect nothing less", and reminding the letter's addressee that the rules and core values of the United Nations require that measures with possible impact on the staff-at-large must be the subject to prior consultations with SRBs without exception;

(b) On 16 May 2011, the Field Staff Union (UNFSU) - representing 7,500 staff members at the professional and FS levels - announced its withdrawal from "participation in Staff-Management (SM) consultations held under the auspices of SMCC", with immediate effect. It

[19] Families would have to live within a military camp without a school or hospital, in a remote location in the Sahara.

[20] However, according to the Inspector's discussions with the ICSC, the process of classifying duty stations does involve staff federations.

accused the administration of using the SMCC 2002 TOR as "a management control tool" and highlighted its grievances on contractual arrangements and the administration of justice. It termed the SMCC as "one-sided, where one party has all the power and the other none". UNDP-UNFPA-UNOPSSA (affiliated with UNISERV) also withdrew from the SMCC shortly after;

(c) On 18 May 2011, the SMCC Vice-President sent a letter to the President of SMCC on behalf of 12 SRBs stating their "grave concerns about the lack of proper consultations" and that they had decided to attend SMCC XXXII only "to avoid a total breakdown in the dialogue process, but not under any conditions". The letter further noted that they would participate despite the difficult situation they currently faced with Management in order to "guarantee that authority and weight are returned to SMCC." The letter went on to enumerate four provisions that needed to be met including:

(i) Holding SMCC XXXII in New York;[21]
(ii) Dealing with the implementation of SMCC agreements made since 2007 through a 2+2 group;
(iii) Finalizing an ST/SGB (the Terms of Reference (ToR) for a Staff Management Committee (SMC) "which has been put on hold by the Secretary-General"[22]; and
(iv) Discussing the draft ST/SGB on continuing appointments.

30. Following internal consultations prior to the SMCC session, the SRs who remained practically threatened to reconsider their engagement with the Committee should they not receive a clear commitment with regards to the aforementioned provisions. The opening session of SMCC XXXII, as noted in the session report, focused on the challenges faced. While the ASG for OHRM reconfirmed her commitment to work constructively and engage with all participants to reach agreements on all agenda items, the re-elected SMCC Vice-President noted "troubling developments in staff-management relations, highlighting the different proposals that had been provided to the General Assembly on continuing contracts, the recent budget cuts and the note on mobility on which staff were not consulted." She felt there was a lack of respect for the consultative process that reaches up to the higher quarters of the Organization.[23]

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[21] This was in accordance with the alternate locations required by the ToR in force, (ST/SGB/2002/15, para. 7.2) but contrary to an agreed decision of the previous session that FSU would propose a venue in the months following SMCC XXXI (report para.80). UNFSU proposed Brindisi, offering the use of equipment and support staff free of charge. However, management opted for a hotel in Belgrade, with the Department of Management (DM) stating that *"the decision was taken because the estimated costs were lower in Belgrade"* following discussions with UNFSU.

[22] It had apparently been overlooked or forgotten by many representatives interviewed by the Inspector that the 2008 agreement (as contained in the report of the SMCC XXIX (Annex IV/Appendix 4) had been reached with the understanding that *"further consultation was necessary with member unions who were not present at the current session prior to submission to the Secretary-General in accordance with the established practice.*" This sentence was clearly alluding to the UNSU at UNHQ, before it had decided to come back to the SMCC after its own elections in May 2011.

[23] SMCC XXXII, para 10.

D. SMCC XXXII apparently solves the crisis

31. Before addressing a number of substantive issues, SMCC XXXII addressed three of the four aforementioned provisions.[24] On the second provision, following a proposal by the President that was welcomed, it was agreed that the follow-up of the status of the implementation of SMCC agreements would be done by the SMCC Secretariat in a more systematic manner and updated on a continual basis. Periodic updates would be shared with SMCC participants. The agreements would also be numbered and this would be referred to in the text of the report.[25]

32. On the third provision, following informal consultations among themselves, the SRs threatened not to engage in the formal SMCC if they did not receive guarantees of positive responses from the highest level of management. The Secretary-General designated the Deputy-Secretary-General (DSG) and the Chef de Cabinet to discuss the issue with the SMCC via videoconference, where the DSG clearly "*committed to promulgating the draft SGB on the SMC by 21 September 2011*"[26] (the commitment was duly honoured on 8 September 2011). This unprecedented bargaining event is reported in para 17 of the SMCC XXXII report, with the simple mention of "a considerable deliberation".

33. The last basic issue was the lack of consultations before HR policies were decided upon: SRs requested that they be included in the work of the change-management team and that staff be provided with relevant information and the opportunity to contribute and be appraised of the process. Management indicated that the change-management team would welcome the participation of the staff as part of the process and proposed that a focal point through which staff could share their ideas and concerns, be designated to be included in the change-management team's network.[27]

34. With regards to the consultation process, SRs pointed out the need to update the 1994 ST/SGB/274 ("Procedures and terms of reference of the Staff Management consultation machinery at the departmental or office level") to better define the meaning of consultation and to establish procedures for the consultative process. Management concurred with the need to review and update the bulletin and invited SRs to provide suggestions for a revised text. It was agreed that SRs would nominate a focal point to work informally with management to draft a revised SGB, which would then be circulated for comments in accordance with normal procedures.[28] During the videoconference, "the Chef de Cabinet indicated that there was openness to the proposed facilitation of staff making their views known to the Fifth Committee. He also felt that underlying many of the issues was the lack of trust, and that there could not be degrees of trust. Either there was trust or there was not, and **both sides should try to rebuild trust".**[29]

35. The aforementioned sentence gives the exact dimension of what is at stake with regards to SMR in 2011 and defines a major goal for the present report. It is clearly anticipated that (its) recommendations would need to be reviewed and consulted by both staff and management and that the ToR of the SMC as issued and ST/AI/293 (on facilities for SRBs) as revised "may subsequently need to be further updated depending on the recommendations of

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[24] The first provision, that of holding the SMCC session in New York, could obviously not be dealt with, as the meeting was already underway in Belgrade.
[25] Ibid., para 16.
[26] SMCC XXXII, para 17.
[27] Ibid, para. 18.
[28] Ibid, para. 19.
[29] Ibid, para. 21.

the JIU report".[30] As it is advisable that standard facilities granted to SRBs and staff federations be harmonized system-wide, the recommendations will take into account observations made within the two successive JIU reports on SMR.

36. Following SMCC XXXII (Belgrade), the most recent developments in S-M dialog at the United Nations indicate some improvements. Along with the DSG, the present Secretary-General received (for the first time in his term in office) the staff unions of the United Nations. The VP of SMCC termed the meeting as valuable and permitting "a constructive exchange of views on a wide range on matters affecting the staff, setting a precedent for the future". Topics discussed included (among others) the importance of consultation, staff security and systemic issues emerging from the internal justice system. Other messages exchanged from September to December 2011 between the SMCC VP and senior management at the United Nations (DSG and ASG for HR) on various subjects (mobility policy, temporary appointments, travel and the change management team) appear to indicate the need for better dialogue and an improved understanding of what consultation involves.

[30] Ibid, para. 22.

III. THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT STAFF-MANAGEMENT (COORDINATION) COMMITTEE (SMCC/SMC)[31]

37. Many elements of the present crisis in SMR as outlined in chapter II could possibly have been resolved amicably if dealt with regularly through the SMCC – the lone existing official forum for staff-management dialogue at the United Nations Secretariat level. An understanding of its working, successes and challenges over the past 30-plus years as outlined in this chapter is vital for furthering SMR in the United Nations while Chapter VIII outlines the ways in which the Committee can move forward.

A. Terms of reference and authority

38. Established in 1980[32] the SMCC had its ToR modified on five occasions, with a sixth revision issued on 8 September 2011, as promised by the DSG to SMCC XXXII following pressure from SR members. According to its new Terms of Reference:

> *1.1: The objective of the Staff Management Committee* (SMC) *is to have an equitable and effective principal mechanism for staff management negotiation.*
>
> *1.2: The SMC shall identify, examine and resolve issues through consensus relating to staff welfare; in particular such issues as conditions of work, general conditions of life and other personnel policies, as provided for in staff regulation 8.1(a).*
>
> *1.3: The SMC shall agree by consensus on those issues within the authority of the Secretary-General. For matters outside the authority of the S-G, the Committee shall agree on a position to be presented to the General Assembly. In the instances where consensus is not reached in the deliberations, modalities shall be developed by the SMC to facilitate reaching a consensus. Should these efforts fail, the S-G shall appoint a party acceptable to staff and management to mediate and, if necessary submit a tripartite presentation to the S-G for a decision.*

39. The new ToR is based on Staff Regulations and defines the same scope for the SMC as the former one for the SMCC. However, it strengthens the authority of the Committee by being clearly "results-based" and by insisting on the required consensus, while the former ToR only stated that "the SMCC shall endeavour to reach agreement on recommendations to the Secretary-General on policies and procedures".[33]

40. If strictly implemented, the new ToR provides extraordinary leverage to the staff to participate in decision-making processes impacting upon themselves. In a clearer manner than the previous ToR, this text not only enables the duly elected SRs to initiate proposals to the Secretary-General, but also prohibits that policies impacting upon staff welfare be unilaterally promulgated. Importantly, it gives an active role to the staff-at-large via the SRBs and JBs represented, which will have sufficient time (a minimum of six weeks according to art. 7.5) to consider and comment upon them. The history of the SMCC shows that a question on which

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[31] The draft of the present report was sent for external comments in July 2011, while the TOR replacing the SMCC with the SMC was issued on 8 September 2011 (ST/SGB/2011/6). The final version of this report is updated and will continue to call the Committee "SMCC", as regards the past, and use "SMC" with regards to its new TOR and its future. While the new SMC TOR can be considered as progress, the Inspector regrets the loss of the word "Coordination" in the title, as it reflected the Committee's role as both the coordinating mechanism and the apex of all JBs existing in the various duty stations.

[32] ST/SGB/176.

[33] Para 1.1 of ST/SGB/2002/15

no agreement could be reached at any given session becomes the object of new efforts at the following session. Within the new ToR, unilaterally promulgating or shortening time for consultation becomes a real infringement to a strong normative text, made even worse in the absence of any discussion before the Committee. However, in order to create a real rule of law in this respect, those responsible for such acts should be held accountable before a judicial power on administrative actions. Currently, the SMC is well placed to request and ensure that the regulations, rules and ToR are respected, implemented and enforced.

41. The SMCC has already attained a certain measure of success in enforcing its authority, with SMCC VII (1983) qualifying its own process of "negotiation" and agreeing that all Administrative Instructions (AIs) affecting staff members away from headquarters should be submitted for consultation with local JACs or SRBs. Such important agreed texts often result from difficult and lengthy discussions possibly entailing numerous sessions, and reflect clear evidences of **negotiated** outcomes. The credibility of agreements arrived at via Committee sessions is furthermore enhanced when taking into account the fact that **historically, SMCC reports (with annexes containing the agreements arrived at) have always met with the approval of the Secretary-General as the chief administrative officer.**

B. Composition and relations with local joint committees

42. The SMCC membership – comprising of an equal number of SRs and MRs – includes nine SRBs (each representing one of eight designated duty-stations[34] as well as the FSU for field staff) as well as nine members "at an appropriately high level representing the administration, with due regard to the need for representation from the various duty stations."[35] It also includes associate members (upon request)[36] and as all interventions made by SMC members carry equal importance[37] (a principle derived from the desire to attain agreements by consensus), weighted representation (according to the number of SM represented) becomes a non-issue in the SMC.

43. Similar to the previous ToR, the new text has provisions for alternates (one per member) and advisers (one for each side, who may request to speak). A President shall be selected by the S-G from a list proposed by the SRs (Staff Rule 8.2 b). The SRs will elect one of them as Vice President for a term of one year. The SMCC's President plays the role of a neutral moderator and is supported by a Secretariat which updates participants on SMR related developments in-between sessions and is allocated a Secretary and a Legal Adviser. The Committee establishes its own procedures and decides on its programme of work. SMCC sessions have been held annually since 1985 (before that, semi-annually) lasting just over 6 days on average, with three days reserved before and after each session for consultations among SRs. It brings together approximately 50 participants on average during its annual session. As a new element of the SMC ToR, the SRs "shall designate a lead person to present their position and conduct negotiations." (art. 3.7). The management representatives are led by the USG for Management and the ASG for HRM with the same functions, to whom the Secretary-General delegates authority to reach consensus with respect to agenda items falling

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[34] UNHQ, OAH (Geneva, Nairobi, Vienna), Regional Economic Commissions (ECA, ESCAP, ESCWA, ECLAC) and the UN Logistics Base (UN LB, Brindisi) where the U.N. FSU is now headquartered.
[35] STSGB/2002/15 and ST/SGB/2011/6 para 3.1 (b)
[36] Their list in the former TOR included: ICTR, ICTY, UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOPS and UNU; both Tribunals have a constitutionally limited life expectancy.
[37] ST/SGB/2011/6, Article 1.4

in the scope of his authority. (art.3.8). Future experience will show whether this helps the Committee work.

44. The SMCC worked closely with the joint staff-management bodies established in the DS concerned and the field, often taking on board their initiatives, consulting with them, reviewing their work and occasionally entrusting them with special missions. When a joint body was unable to resolve HR policy issues raised locally, it could refer it to the SMCC for its recommendation. The new SMC ToR reads in this regard: "The existence of the SMC does not preclude the consideration by local joint staff management bodies of issues of importance to staff globally, it being understood that such matters shall be referred to the SMC for final approval." Apart from issues dealing with the implementation of previous agreements, the SMCC usually addressed global issues rather than duty station specific issues.

C. Positive elements of the SMCC

C.1 The best practices of Working Groups (WGs)

45. Working Groups were subsidiary SMCC entities (utilized since its first session) comprising small groups of knowledgeable and experienced representatives who undertake in-depth deliberations on multifaceted issues that cannot readily be resolved by a full plenary within the limited duration of an SMCC session. While some WGs were intra-sessional (limited to the duration of an SMCC session), others are inter-sessional (with flexible duration) and their format (more time among fewer but more knowledgeable members) allows for serious deliberations and consultations with all interested/experienced parties with the intent to issue recommendations for the SMCC's consideration. With most WG reports (and their recommendations) meeting with the SMCC's approval, they became a regular feature, culminating with the formal adoption of a ToR for an inter-sessional mechanism during the 19th SMCC (1995).

C.2 Initiatives to further the monitoring of the implementation of agreements

46. As noted above, SMCC's effectiveness has been regularly hindered by both the non-implementation and the uneven implementation of agreements arrived at across duty stations. It should be made clear to managers at all levels, that they have an official duty to implement any Committee agreement once it has been agreed to by the Secretary-General. Indeed, within the limits of his/her delegated authority, each manager is accountable for their implementation. The SMCC has adopted a number of measures to address the issue of the weak and/or uneven implementation of agreements arrived at, including, among others, the establishment by SMCC XX (1996) of the principle of joint monitoring. Other initiatives adopted in this regard should have greatly improved monitoring had they been respected and implemented.[38] Indeed, the number and diversity of such initiatives reveal the resilience of

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[38] These initiatives include:
(a) WG for inter-sessional follow-up (SMCC V and XIX);
(b) Six-month progress reports on implementation following approval (SMCC XV);
(c) Report by the local JACs to SMCC Secretary on implementation at DS level to be submitted three months prior to each session (SMCC XX);
(d) Planned implementation dates (SMCC XX);
(e) Table for follow-up of agreements (SMCC XX);
(f) One-time review of the implementation of HR policies in duty stations away from HQ, particularly on conditions of service of local GS staff (SMCC XXII);
(g) Establishment of a (2+2) (Joint) Contact Group to assist the SMCC President to monitor the implementation of past and future SMCC agreements (SMCC XXVII);

the issue. The importance of such a follow-up function is also demonstrated by the fact that, from 2003-2005 - a particularly low period for SMR during which no SMCC session took place - two joint WGs, in September 2004 and August 2005, still managed to produce a table on the implementation status of previous agreements. (See chapter II, C. "Open crisis in 2011" for another example of similar importance).

47. The list outlined in footnote 38 highlights the urgent need, acknowledged both by OIOS (A/64/221) and General Assembly resolution 63/250 to strengthen the monitoring function of OHRM and to further communication among managers and among SRs. Despite acknowledgment by MRs on different occasions of the need for increased monitoring,[39] SRs in SMCC continued to urge management[40] to establish a concrete joint monitoring mechanism as agreements continue to go unimplemented. This may have cost implications and an appropriate budget should be proposed by the Executive Heads concerned to their governing bodies.

48. It is regrettable that regular delays of several weeks/months - between the adoption of an SMCC report and its eventual approval by the Secretary-General, followed by publication, have diminished the immediacy of the SMCC's outcomes and limited the scope for the early implementation of its agreements. For example, the report of SMCC XXXII was published in late September 2011.

C.3 Overall efforts towards agreed solutions

49. While discussions in the SMCC - unlike a general debate – were targeted towards the attainment of agreed solutions, the new ToR for an SMC (art. 1.3 as quoted above) clarifies better than the previous SMCC ToR (art. 1.2) the procedure to follow when disagreements cannot be easily overcome. While some disagreements can readily be resolved by respecting basic participation procedures (see Table 4 on rules for constructive negotiations), in situations where conflicting positions are clearly established, various options have in fact been utilized by the SMCC over the years. These include the following processes:

- Preparation of a paper by a concerned party (for the next session) outlining the current system and evaluating the pros and cons of the alternative solutions proposed;
- Each side is tasked with preparing revised texts of its respective papers for the next session;

(h) Recommendation that JAC meetings be convened in all duty stations shortly after each SMCC session to monitor the implementation process;
(i) Call upon the local JACs to immediately refer issues unable to be resolved at the local level to an OHRM "focal point for SMR" (SMCC XX and XXV);
(j) Recommendation that, in the future, the list of implemented actions should always make reference to the specific session during which the agreement was reached and the relevant paragraph number, as well as specify the designated action office and the anticipated timeframe (SMCC XXIX).

[39] During SMCC XVII, the administration noted its intent to increase monitoring of the proper implementation of administrative rules and practices; in SMCC XX, MRs agreed that increased monitoring of approved SMCC recommendations were in line with SMCC agreements.

[40] For instance, during SMCC XII (1988), SRs requested that the administration ensure the implementation of recommendations made at SMCC XI concerning the need to regularize the functioning of the JAC machinery in UNIFIL, UNDOF and UNTSO (SMCC/XI/12 Annex IV, para. 9).

- The President, in consultation with the legal adviser, prepares and circulates a consolidated text before the next session;
- One side's withdrawal of its proposed text;
- Where no agreement was possible at the time of the session,
  - The two sides presented their own (often contradictory) recommendations to the Secretary-General for his decision;
  - The SMCC President, in transmitting the session report to the Secretary-General, annexed an explanatory letter identifying each party's position; the Secretary-General then had the option to call upon SRs and/or MRs to provide any additional information required to make a decision;
  - The SMCC submitted WG reports to the Secretary-General for consideration, together with the Administration's reservations and additions proposed by staff, intended to serve as general advice.

In the Inspector's opinion, the latter option (when no agreement was possible) contradicts the essence of the SMCC which is to produce agreements. The established procedures for the SMC are more coherent.

50. The worst-case scenario is an unclear/uncertain agreement where some (or all) representatives on a particular side perceive that their views were neither considered nor reflected adequately in an agreement, or that they were betrayed - either by fellow representatives on their own side, or by their counterparts on the other side, or even by the co-rapporteurs.[41] When facing such a situation of a perceived breakdown in trust, aggrieved parties have, at times, withdrawn entirely from the entire SMCC process. Such negative experiences prompted the SMCC in 2008 to issue a proposed draft ST/SGB on a "new" SMC, now promulgated. The Inspector believes that this ToR does not preclude other practical changes reflecting lessons learned, particularly in recent years, as a way for the Committee to implement article 7.3 of its ToR, which reads: "The SMC will establish its own procedures".

51. Overall, the SMCC had significant achievements over the years, measurable by the resulting agreements attained, that can broadly be categorized under three types: agreements on substantive issues (ex. Performance Assessment System, administration of justice); agreements on SMR-related issues (ex. facilities and time release for SRs, JBs); and agreements on the Committee's own issues. A subjective assessment by the Inspector of all the SMCC reports (see annex II) reveals differing "moods" in SMR, with the "lows" clearly associated with decisions on staff welfare made without prior or adequate consultation with SRs (despite clear Staff Regulations and Rules) as well as frictions among SRs and MRs aggravated by conflicts among leading personalities (annex III lists only the SMR-related references).[42]

D. Challenges that need to be addressed for a better functioning Committee

D.1 Reviewing the membership structure

52. While the same Staff Regulations and Rules do apply to all entities represented within the SMCC, including its observers, there are significant differences in their HR policies because of their different profiles, mandates, types of work etc. and the practice of their executive heads to issue administrative texts which, in principle, are not meant to contradict

[41] This is an example of non-compliance with "common sense rule # 5" on cohesion and coherence (defined in Chapter VII).

[42] The references to all other agenda items were also worked on by the JIU team but were not added to the report but for the sake of brevity.

common staff rules. In its comments, DM stated that "the majority of the issues before SMCC affect the Secretariat only". The new ToR of the SMC appears to have resolved the issue of distinct participation rights for Members and Observers as often discussed in the SMCC, with Section 3.4 of the SMC TOR clearly stating that:

> *Duly designated representatives of organizations and organs of the United Nations system whose staff are directly affected by the Staff-Management Committee agreements shall be granted the status of associate members upon request. Associate members may fully participate in the discussion and provide their opinions on all matters. On matters that directly affect these organizations and organs, their representatives shall have the same rights of the regular members and fully participate in the negotiations.*

D.2 Resolving uncertainties in delegated authority

53. Uncertainties in the delegation of authority from the United Nations to the entities and their Executive Heads served as a key factor in undermining the effectiveness of the SMCC's work. The exact level of DA to each actor (line or HR-manager, EHs of separately administered entities, and even the Secretary-General by Member States in accordance with Article 97 of the Charter), should be clarified for all SMCC participants on both sides on the basis of clear legal and administrative texts (and the proper application of the principle of subsidiarity) as early as during the drafting stage of the provisional agenda. Identifying who in the United Nations Group has authority on what and in which area, should be one of the main tasks of the SMCC's legal adviser who could benefit greatly from the ongoing efforts of the Department of Management in compiling all pertinent official texts on the delegation of authority for financial and human resources,[43] as well as from the JIU report on various accountability frameworks in the United Nations system (mandated by the General Assembly in its resolution 64/259, para 4).[44]

54. Similarly, the SMC ToR clarifies in its article 1.3 that discussions have the objective of attaining agreements by consensus on those issues within the authority of the Secretary-General and, ideally, a common position to be presented to the General Assembly for matters outside the authority of the Secretary-General. The participants should be informed accordingly by labeling items as either "for agreement" or "for common advice to competent bodies." in the (provisional) agenda of each session. The latter category would include all system-wide issues deriving from the report of the ICSC, as well as some United Nations HRM issues - including those involving budgetary implications and changes in Staff Regulations.

55. For items "for agreement", the Secretary-General would simply need to implement the agreements arrived at and inform the MS about them at the earliest convenience through the report of the SMC. For the other items, the Committee can at best recommend a common agreed position that would be defended before the ICSC and ACABQ both by MRs[45] as the administration of the Organization and by SRs through their respective Federations. In the past the SMCC used to defer its own consideration on such issues when they were already actively under consideration by the competent bodies.[46] As such, the SMC should have an opportunity to discuss in depth and as much in advance as possible on system-wide issues,

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[43] Efforts to clarify delegated authority comply with Rules 1 and 2 outlined in Table 4.
[44] JIU/REP/2011/5: "Accountability Frameworks in the United Nations System."
[45] SMCC XIV, (1990): on the agenda item "security and independence of the civil service", "the administration took note of the staff proposal and concerns and promised to take up the issue in the context of CCAQ and possibly ICSC at the appropriate time."
[46] See SMCC I (1980), para. 7 regarding extension of the education grant to GS and related categories.

when they impact on any category of United Nations staff. If agreed, the resulting position should be presented to the Member States of the Fifth Committee as the common SMCC position of the Staff and the Secretary-General.

56. Agreements reached at the SMCC do carry their own weight and can influence bodies like the ACABQ,[47] the HLCM and the ICSC, sometimes too much in the opinion of representatives of other organizations.[48] Overall, the SMCC's track record of relationships with other bodies has been a mix of both close cooperation (ICSC) and challenging relations (former ACC) at different times.[49] The SMCC on its own did not initiate direct contact with such bodies, and its successor shall continue to be mindful of the fact that "any specific measure of support that has financial implications would have to be subject to authorization by the General Assembly under the normal budgetary procedures".[50]

D.3 Furthering the interest and understanding of Member States on developments in the Committee

57. The Inspector strongly regrets and sees no justification for the absence of official dissemination to the MS of the reports of the SM(C)C annual sessions, which aggravates the lack of direct interaction between the SMCC and intergovernmental bodies.[51] He also regrets the limited time allocated to SMR in discussions on HR items. Such situations can account for the high level of unawareness and lack of interest on SMR issues, relatively to other HR issues observed among the MS delegates (even based in New York) and might also partly explain the low level of implementation of SMCC decisions, including their possible funding implications. Subsequently, the MS delegates interviewed in New York repeatedly reiterated to the Inspector their interest in receiving clear and balanced information on SMR and hearing only one voice from the staff side.

58. It may be noted that some information is provided by management, which, every two years prepares the Secretary-General's reports on HR issues for the Fifth Committee and may orally develop its own vision of developments in SMR, including from the most recent sessions of the SMCC. The sharing of staff views with MS is considerably more limited. The various SRs sometimes have difficulties to speak with one voice, in particular, because no one in the staff side has received a clear United Nations Secretariat-wide mandate in this regard, not even the SMCC Vice-President who in recent times sent letters to management on behalf of the SRBs participating in the SMCC.

59. The new SMC ToR does not clarify the Vice-President's role, apart from his/her role as a replacement for the President; importantly, the VP cannot speak on behalf of his/her constituents. Even if the VP or any other SR democratically nominated by the staff was to receive such a mandate, the present framework does not enable him/her to orally present staff views in informal Fifth Committee discussions on HR issues, as currently only a common document on behalf of all staff can be presented. This is in accordance with paragraph 4 of

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[47] As on the protection of locally-recruited staff, SMCC V, 1982, para. 15.
[48] The next JIU report on SMR in the specialized agencies and common system will revert to this issue.
[49] See SMCC VII, para. 34, on allowances in cases of evacuation - to be addressed by the expanded ICSC working group on the designation of hardship DS; SMCC XVII, para. 52, on age of separation, by the Pension board or Unified personnel nomenclature by the ICSC; SMCC XVIII, paras. 64-65, on the review salary survey methodology - it was agreed that SRs would prepare a list of concrete proposals for the Administration's review, with a view to submit them to the ICSC.
[50] SMCC IV (1982), para 16.
[51] In 2008, the SRBs having participated to the SMCC session had its report disseminated by them as an official document A/C.5/63/3/Add.1.

resolution 34/220 (1980) in which the General Assembly expresses "its readiness to receive and consider fully the views of the staff as set out by a single recognized representative of the staff of the United Nations Secretariat in a document to be submitted through the Secretary-General and issued under the item entitled 'Personnel questions' " (now "Human resources management").

60. SMCC has not favoured any encroachment by the MS upon the authority of the Secretary-General. It even regretted that the "attempts by MS to amend the Staff Rules constituted a further erosion of the Secretary-General's prerogatives".[52] Indeed, as acknowledged by the former USG of DM during SMCC XXIX with regards to the General Assembly's approval of the new internal justice system, a unified staff-management position on any proposal carries "political and moral strength" in the eyes of Member States, increasing their scope for acceptance. Subsequently, there is no official and real contact to date between the staff-at-large via their representatives with their ultimate employers (Member States) - one of the main conditions for any collective bargaining framework, as conceived and recommended by ILO.

61. The Inspector is of the view that, as a minimum service, **from now on all Member States should officially receive the report of every SMC session, prepared under the authority of its President. Such a report which represents the respective or agreed views of both parties should be presented by the Committee's President during an informal annual meeting with the MS to discuss the outcome of the most recent sessions, including reporting on the status of the implementation of agreements adopted in previous sessions.** SRs and MRs could attend such a meeting to take stock of the comments and suggestions. While no substantive decisions would be made in such a meeting, it would allow all stakeholders to develop an understanding of, and an interest in the most pressing SMR issues as well as further transparency and mutual understanding. In order to strengthen communication and understanding between the staff and the MS, the Inspector suggests that the SMC could set-up a working group on this issue, the outcome of which could be presented to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly once agreed upon by the Committee. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of the SMC.

Recommendation 1

The Secretary-General should provide all Member States with the reports of all forthcoming SMC sessions, including their annexes and should further facilitate the arrangement of an informal meeting on an annual basis for the SMC President to present to the Member States the report of each session, including reporting on the status of the implementation of agreements reached in previous SMCC sessions.

D.4 Furthering professionalism in the SM(C)C

62. The range of issues discussed by the SMCC is so broad that few participants (on either side) are able to adequately master them, including the corresponding updated texts and policies in effect for all pertinent issues. While the extensive use of WGs is useful in alleviating this need, an active participation in the Committee requires familiarity by the representatives on agenda items to be discussed. Aware that a number of representatives

[52] SMCC IX, 1984, para. 16.

appeared to lack such knowledge,[53] both sides expressed a clear desire for organizing relevant training (as agreed in 2007 but never implemented because of alleged financial constraints).[54]

63. The Inspector acknowledges that this is particularly demanding for newly elected SRs, in particular when lacking sufficient time release from their regular duties as staff: they must not only communicate and coordinate within their peers, but also (as MRs) undertake discussions with (possibly) external HR specialists on issues under consideration. Provisions for alternates as a means to further preparedness, while useful in terms of division of labour and accountability,[55] have also resulted in an increase in the total number of SMCC participants. Currently, each delegation is limited to two attendees per SRB. Some SRBs have also requested for experts and other executive committee members to attend the SMCC (in both cases, at the SRB's own expense).

E. Consultation or negotiation?

64. This sub-section outlines the main observations of the Inspector, on the much debated concepts of consultation and negotiation, based on a thorough review of 31 years of SMCC reports, as well as an analysis of texts and interviews on SMR practices during 2010-11. Indeed, disputes arose at different times in the SMCC[56] on the type of interaction that should exist between the Secretary-General and SRs. In this regard, it is useful to reflect on Judgment No. 380 of the ILO Administrative Tribunal which attempts to clarify the distinction:

> *If the end-product of the discussions (to use a wide and neutral term) is a unilateral decision, 'consultation' is the appropriate word. If it is a bilateral decision, i.e. an agreement, 'negotiation' is appropriate. Decisions are reached after consultation; agreements after negotiation. Negotiation starts from an equality of bargaining power (i.e. legal equality; economic strength may be unequal); consultation supposes legal power to be in the hands of the decision-maker, diminished only by the duty to consult. Where there is only a simple obligation to consult, the decision-maker's duty is to listen or at most to exchange views.*"
> *"The ordinary employer, who has no contractual power of fixing wages, is always in this position and always has to negotiate in order to get any agreement at all. The organisations on the other hand, with their reserve power of unilateral decision, are only in that position if they put themselves there voluntarily and because they want an agreed solution in preference to one that is imposed.*

65. In the United Nations, Staff Regulation 8.1(a) – the foremost Staff Regulation on Staff Relations - states that: "The Secretary-General shall establish and maintain continuous contact and communication with the staff in order to ensure the effective participation of the staff in identifying, examining and resolving issues relating to staff welfare, including conditions of work, general conditions of life and other human resources policies". In opting to use "shall", the General Assembly clearly chose to voluntarily place the organization in a position to find agreed rather than imposed solutions to its labour conflicts. Within the scope defined by Reg. 8.1, (and only within that scope) **such an obligation commits the Secretary-General and**

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[53] Training in this respect was an idea already put forward by the staff at SMCC XVIII (1994) and by both parties (for the benefit of the other one!) at SMCC XX (1996) before they finally agreed on a common need.

[54] See chapter V, section F.

[55] Each member may be accompanied by an alternate (ST/SGB/2011/6, para 3.1a) and b)).

[56] SMCC special session 1982; SMCC VI (paras 13, 17); SMCC IX (para 16); SMCC XI (para 6); SMCC XII (para 84); SMCC XVI (1996).

management as a whole "to ensure the effective participation of the staff" at each step of the decision-making process on policies affecting staff. Participation should commence during the period of initial diagnosis when the issue is identified and continue until the issue is resolved. Certainly, participation should not be limited to the stage where a ready made product such as a draft ST/SGB or ST/AI is sent to SRBs for approval within a fortnight. To use the language of the ILOAT, **the said Regulation 8.1 made the end-product of the discussions "*a bilateral decision, i.e. an agreement,*" hence, following its reasoning 'negotiation' is appropriate."**

66. The interpretation of **mandatory negotiation** in the defined scope of staff relations via identified Joint Bodies is further justified by the following:

- Historically, most staff rules, ST/SGBs and ST/AIs impacting SMR were issued following **agreements** between SRs and MRs in the SMCC[57], often thanks to the efforts of intra/inter-sessional Working Groups;
- The term "agreement" has always been used within this framework and in the reports made by the SMCC President to the Secretary-General;
- The provision for "negotiations" has regularly featured in all SMCC ToRs since 1983;
- In 2000, the "management, acknowledged the SMCC as "the Secretariat-wide mechanism for negotiation between SRs and the administrations";[58]
- In 2008, management acknowledged that de facto negotiations had governed the procedures applied by the Committee since it resumed its functioning in 2006";[59]
- Some of the recently established joint bodies for discussions on HR policies (and their interpretation) are called Joint Negotiation Committees (JNCs). In some cases, these have replaced Joint Advisory Committees (JACs) in UNHQ (New York, 2007), UNOG (May 2008) and the Field (August 2008). All have defined themselves as "the joint staff-management mechanism for negotiation between representatives of staff and the administration" with their purposes and scope, at the DS concerned, in line with Staff Regulation 8.1. It remains to be seen whether other Offices away from HQ (OAH) and Regional Economic Commissions will follow suit towards formal negotiation committees, for the sake of harmonization;
- The new ToR for the SMC (ST/SGB/2011/6) closes the recurrent discussion by referring to negotiations on six occasions;
- SMCC XXXII worked to reach more formal and specific written "agreements" which would be "numbered" (ex. Agreement No. SMCCXXXII/1) with official symbols (para. 16 of session report); according to the ILOAT Judgment No. 380, agreements are reached after negotiation.

67. It should be clear that, within the United Nations, **negotiation processes do not exclude consultation processes** as negotiation implies preceding processes of mutual information, communication and subsequently consultation. Additionally, within the context of the "joint staff-management machinery at both local and Secretariat-wide" level,[60] some JBs work to

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[57] As illustrated in two of the 25 annexes of SMCC XIV (1990): Ann. XI: Staff position paper: comments on revised chapters I, V, VI and VII of the Staff Rules (SR); Ann. XII: draft amendments to chapter VIII of the SR and ST/SGB/176/Rev.1; other examples include Revision 5 of the 300 Series (1993), the draft ST/AI on membership in advisory bodies and draft ST/AI/293 on Facilities to be provided to SRs.

[58] SMCC XXIV, para. 12.

[59] SMCC XXIX, para. 18.

[60] Established as per Staff Regulation 8.2 and subject of Staff Rule 8.2.

fulfil the function embedded in regulation 8.2 i.e. to advise the Secretary-General (and local management at the duty-station level) regarding HR policies and general questions of staff welfare. A number of boards and committees were or are still called “advisory”, including for important functions concerning the procedures for recruitment, placement, promotion and administration of justice. Other existing advisory entities - even though they might not explicitly be termed as such – include those on the management of health and safety, the commissary, catering, parking, etc., where management is clearly expected to consult with SRs in the delivery of such services.

68. To determine whether an interaction process involves consultation or negotiation, the ToR of the JB concerned can be indicative. The implementation process can also be indicative - when implementation is binding upon both sides the process generally involves a negotiated outcome. Where disagreement exists as to the process followed in making a determination – particularly on issues that affect the conditions of service of staff – the issue can be referred to the relevant jurisdiction in charge of the administration of internal justice in an organization to make a determination.

IV. STAFF REPRESENTATIVE BODIES (SRBs) AND SMR AT THE LOCAL LEVEL

69. The staff-at-large across the United Nations Group have established their own representational structures to discuss issues that impact upon them: locally among themselves, organization-wide with other SRBs of the same Federation (see B.3 below) and subsequently with management through joint bodies, foremost among which is the SMCC/SMC. While the top-down functional lines of authority are well known (from legislative bodies to Executive Heads, then to management and finally to the staff-at-large), symmetrical bottom-up processes and spaces for discussion also exist where the staff-at-large elect their SRs for SRBs to advise or negotiate on behalf of the staff with management via forums like JBs including the SMCC.

A. What purposes do Staff Representative Bodies (SRBs) serve?

70. While the scope and effectiveness of the role that SRs at the local level perform can and do vary greatly from one SRB to another, an analysis of the statutes of 19 SRBs of the United Nations Group indicates that their objectives generally encompass: safeguarding the rights, privileges, interests and welfare of all staff members as well as providing other services of use to staff; ensuring their full participation in bodies for which provisions are made; representing all staff by developing common positions on issues that affect them; encouraging staff participation in SRB activities; and furthering cooperation with SRBs in other organizations/entities to promote collective interests.

B. How is the United Nations staff represented and organized?

71. By virtue of the recognized freedom-of-association principle, SRBs show a big diversity in the various United Nations duty stations where they generally go by the terms of either “staff union” (SU) or “staff association,”(SA) which imply no significant differences, except in Geneva where a “staff coordinating council” includes representatives from various groups (see para 78 below).

72. Throughout the UN Group, regardless of the terminology used, the functions and powers of all SRBs are quite similar and each one is affiliated with one of the following three federations: Federation of International Civil Servants Associations (FICSA); Coordinating Committee for International Staff Unions and Associations of the United Nations system (CCISUA) – the founding members of which (UNSU and UNOG SCC) split from FICSA in 1982; and United Nations Civil Servants Federation (UNISERV), the founders of which split respectively from CCISUA (UNSU) and FICSA (UNDP/UNOPS/UNFPA) in 2007, joined by UNFSU in 2008.The forthcoming JIU report on SMR in the specialized agencies and the Common System will review the major roles of the three staff federations.

B.1 Respective interests of different categories of staff

73. SMR is invariably affected by the differences in concerns and interests of staff, based on many factors including their grade (GS, P, D), duty station,[61] recruitment category (local - international), and contract type arising from differing compensation levels and provisions of entitlements and benefits. Differences also arise depending on whether staff members are based in HQ or away from it, and whether they are based in a modern and well equipped DS compared to a small and isolated DS, since the former enjoy comparative advantages that includes (among others): lesser concerns for safety and security and better access to adequate

[61] HQ, OAH, Regional Economic Commissions and Field, including family and non-family missions.

healthcare and educational facilities. Those working in HQ can add to this list: easier access to senior management and MS delegates, earlier access to information on vacancies and organizational policy changes, etc.

74. Apart from compensation and entitlement differences, interests vary among United Nations Field Staff, depending mostly on whether they are national or international staff, with a corresponding impact upon their career mobility: while the international field staff can move from one mission to another, the careers of national staff are by definition, limited by the duration of one particular mission. Currently, while the Field Staff Union (UNFSU) is adequately representing the international staff from 42 field missions, UNSU (New York) is formally tasked with representing national field staff of those missions but maintains little in the way of regular communication with them in practice. The national field staff share more in common with international field staff - including common concerns (hazardous working conditions, safety and security issues, etc.) and challenges (limited SMR experience due to half of DFS field staff having less than two years of work experience with the United Nations)[62] – than they share with the New York-based staff who are UNSU's primary constituency.

75. In the Inspector's opinion, **national and international field staff could be better served through uniting under the common umbrella of the UNFSU** which could establish sub-committees (by location) to allow for the discussion of issues specific to each category, before they are worked on and reconciled at the committee (local) and/or Council (global) levels. It should be made clear from the start that a united structure should not in any way bring with it attempts to confuse the conditions of service for national staff with international staff, which are clearly differentiated. **The FSU leadership could undertake internal consultations with its own membership, and external consultations with existing SRBs representing the national staff of peace operations and special political missions, about a possible institutional arrangement of uniting these structures, with the UNSU facilitating such a move.**

B.2 Diverse organizational formulas

76. Within the United Nations Group, of the five SRBs[63] with a global scope not all of them represent their constituent staff members equally, with UNU-SA and UNHCR-SA making no provisions for subsidiary bodies at the field/local level (though field-based focal points and staff representatives exist), and UNHCR-SA even restricting field staff from participating in its executive organ.[64] On the contrary, UNICEF-GSA fully provides for the comprehensive representation of all categories of staff irrespective of duty station. In laying the foundation for the establishment of SRBs via Staff Regulation 8.1, the General Assembly noted that they "shall be organized in such a way as to afford equitable representation of all staff members".[65] In the Inspector's view, it is both essential and beneficial for staff in all duty stations to have equal access to adequate and equitable representational mechanisms. On the other hand, the respective SRBs of UNHQ, each OAH, each regional commission (ECA, ECLAC, ESCAP, ESCWA) and each

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[62] Quote from the USG of DFS during interview with JIU, November 2010.

[63] UNICEF Global Staff Association (UNICEF-GSA), UN University Staff Council (UNU-SC), UNHCR Staff Association (UNHCR-SA), UNDP/UNFPA/UNOPS Staff Association (UNPD/UNFPA/UNOPS SA) and UN Field Staff Union (UN-FSU).

[64] Field unit SRs of UNHCR-SA can present a list of problems to the Staff Council but cannot sit in on it; UNHCR-SA's work-plan is determined exclusively by SRs based in Geneva despite the majority of staff being field-based; interests of staff in UNU's smaller duty stations (fewer than 10 staff) are represented by SRs based in Tokyo. On the other hand and as should be common practice, the Chair of the Unit Staff Committee (which serves as the Executive SRB in each field mission) serves as a member of the UNFSU Council.

[65] ST/SGB/2010/6: Staff Regulations of the UN and provisional Staff Rules (2 September 2010).

international criminal tribunal with assessed budget (ICTR, ICTY) represent mainly the staff working in the particular duty station/region concerned.[66] Some of them with regional presence also have provisions for subsidiary and parallel SRBs. Some SRBs are also more flexible with regards to their membership structure, making provisions for associate, affiliate, active and passive members, retired staff and even those with no minimum duration in their contract.

77. In a duty station where a large number of organizations of the United Nations system co-exist, each with its own SRB, these SRBs can come together to form a (local) **Federation of United Nations Staff Associations (FUNSA)** which looks at cross-cutting issues affecting staff (ex. local staff salaries, security, relations with host country, etc.) and deals with Country Management Teams (CMTs) as its management counterpart. In practice, such Federations are either non-existent in most duty stations or they are only at an embryonic stage or work as a mere coordination mechanism in the ones where they do exist. Given their cross-organizational staff representation structure and their ease of access to CMTs, FUNSAs can potentially play a major role among local SRBs to address issues – like common services - that can be resolved at the duty station level quickly and effectively, as per the subsidiarity principle. **Where a FUNSA exists, the EHs should encourage their representatives in the United Nations Country Teams (UNCTs) to undertake regular consultations with such a partner.**

78. UNOG has a unique staff representation[67] structure where various groups – either with or without an established statute - participate as "lists" in annual elections to constitute through proportional representation the UNOG Staff Coordinating Council (SCC) where they co-exist as per the Regulations on Representation of the Staff of the United Nations at Geneva (January 1983). Similar to other SRBs, the SCC is considered by UNOG Administration as the sole interlocutor for UNOG staff. Instead of voting to elect a staff member to a particular position, staff members at UNOG vote for an entire group list, with five groups competing in annual elections to the UNOG-SCC in 2011. Everywhere, in responding to the JIU's questionnaires, both SRs and MRs cautioned against the proliferation of SRBs as counter-productive as it may lead to a situation of "too many cooks spoiling the broth" and unnecessary, divisive competition within the staff.[68]

B.3 Internal structure and procedures of SRBs

79. Presently, most SRBs are organized at three levels, the generic terms for which are used in this report. The first level is composed of the staff-at-large i.e. "electors." The second level is a "Staff Council" which comprises of representatives elected by the staff-at-large to serve for a specific term (usually two years). The third level is a "Bureau" which usually comprises of a small group of representatives elected by the Council members from amongst themselves. This three-tiered structure is followed by most SRBs, albeit with some variations.

80. The Staff Council, as the directly elected organ implements the decisions of the plenary by orienting the tasks of the Bureau. It represents the staff-at-large on matters concerning HR policies and staff welfare and can establish subsidiary committees as well as "ad hoc"

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[66] UNOV-SU also represents UNICRI and UNODC field offices with SRs elected from the field.
[67] See "Regulations on representation of the staff of the United Nations at Geneva".
[68] It may be noted that UNOG-SCC funds its activities mainly through proceeds from the staff-run commissary, arguably diminishing any motivation for them to collect any dues from the staff-at-large.

working groups. It also appoints representatives to management Committees and Statutory bodies and nominates candidates to JBs. The size of a Council can vary significantly according to the total staff population of an entity and some have provisions for representation of all staff categories[69] - a good practice to prevent the SRB from being dominated by a single category of staff. Certain SRBs have provisions for by-elections if the number of elected Council members fails to reach or falls below a certain minimum number - a positive incentive for SRBs to seek candidates with a demonstrated commitment to staff representational work. A few SRBs also make provisions for the Council to be dissolved through recalls / no-confidence motions / simple majority votes - all good practices to further SRB accountability.

81. The Bureau is a small executive group elected by a Council from among its members to implement the directives of the Council. It conducts discussions and negotiations with the organization's management on issues in pursuance of the objectives and work programme of the Council (in accordance with established priorities) and can undertake discussions with other SRBs and the Federation of SRBs to which it belongs, as directed by the Council. It effectively serves as the Council's eyes and ears, following-up on what's happening at various levels of management and preparing corresponding reactions. It manages the SRB's budget and its day-to-day administration (guiding the work of the SRB Secretariat's support staff), informs and communicates with the staff-at-large. A typical Bureau has three to seven members, with provisions for dissolution if minimum membership numbers are not met.

82. While established quorums for different types of SRB meetings exist including for (annual) General Assemblies or meetings, loopholes in certain SRB statutes allow for meetings to be conducted and decisions adopted, even in the absence of a majority of the elected members. Such loopholes must be closed by the SRBs as SRs should respect their representational duties towards their constituents. Should SRs fail to attend Council or Bureau meetings on a regular basis, **SRBs could consider strengthening the democratic principle of the majority rule within their statutes to address such situations.**

B.4 Democratic participation in SRB elections to a Council

83. Staff councils in the United Nations Group, elected via secret ballot, have varying levels of **inclusiveness**: (a) global SRBs that allow for membership for all staff from all duty stations of an organization (e.g. UNICEF); (b) local/regional SRBs (as within the United Nations) that restrict membership to staff from a particular duty station, region or sub-region (e.g. OAH, Regional Economic Commissions); and (c) SRBs that limit membership strictly to staff members in a certain job category (e.g. UNFSU). In all cases, **the SRB has to represent (without discrimination) the interests of all staff members who are defined as being represented in the statute of the SRB concerned.** In this context, it should be kept in mind that as long as the whole United Nations staff will not directly elect a SRB at the level of the entire Secretariat (and/or Group), on the model of total inclusiveness, **a coordination mechanism remains to be conceived and established by the current nine SRBs to give one uncontested voice to the Staff of the United Nations Secretariat (and Group).**

84. Unrestricted participation in Staff Council elections by the staff-at-large is a standard feature across the United Nations. Implementing this principle is done in a couple of different ways in practice. One practice is to allow all staff members with the automatic entitlement to

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[69] ESCWA-SA Council: equal number of P & GS staff; ECLAC-SSA Council: number of P & GS staff proportional to their membership; UNU-SU Council: equal number of academic and administrative staff.

vote (as in UNOG-SCC and UNSU). The other practice sees the SRB limiting the right to vote to its own members or to members who have paid their dues (for a reasonable fee); in such cases, registration and the payment of dues should be fully open to all staff members without any other preconditions. The Inspector sees merit in this latter option which can strengthen staff solidarity, even though this view differs from an OLA legal opinion stating that SRBs "must extend membership and related rights to all staff members irrespective of whether they pay membership dues".[70] In most cases the payment of dues via is made through direct payroll deductions - following a voluntary opt-in by the staff member when appointed with the right to withdraw at any time - is broadly assessed in one of these three ways: (a) flat fee; (b) percentage of salary; and (c) progressive with income.

85. Regulation 8.1 establishes that SRBs *"shall be organized in such a way as to afford equitable representation to all staff members"*. Subsequently, to mitigate the risk of unequal treatment, some SRB statutes stipulate that certain key elected posts be reserved for candidates from specific categories. In SRBs where no provisions are made to ensure representation from different categories, staff members have expressed concerns about their interests not being adequately addressed by representatives who may pertain exclusively to another staff category. Four SRBs[71] utilize electoral units to constitute their councils, whereby the views of staff pertaining to an electoral unit (specific job category or department) are represented in the Council via a representative elected from among their own.[72] While this can serve as a good practice of democratic representation as in ICTY-SU, a high proportion of uncontested/vacant seats for unit representative posts (as was the case in the forty-third UNSU SC) had lead management to question the representativeness of such SRBs. The high vacancy rates may also be indicative of either disinterest among the staff-at-large or a general fear of reprisal by management for engaging in staff representational work, or a combination of both, an issue often raised by SRs during interviews with the JIU team.

86. Elections to a Council take place on an annual (Geneva) or biennial basis (most SRBs) in conformity with Staff Regulation 8.1 which calls for elections to be held "at least biennially". Several SRBs (including the UNOG-SC) have rightly questioned the merit of annual elections, noting that such frequent turnovers result in a loss of time (needed by newly elected SRs to familiarize themselves), resources (organizing elections, training new SRs) and energy (in competitions). A standard two-year term would grant a Council a more efficient and realistic time-frame to deliver on its work-plans, but any change in this respect should be made by the SRBs concerned in accordance with their own statutes. By stipulating that only half (e.g. 5-6 out of 11) of all positions be up for elections each year, UNDP-UNFPA-UNOPS-SA avoids the scenario where an entirely new Council gets elected with no one having any prior experience in staff representation – which is a good practice.

Guideline 1: The Staff Representative Bodies (SRBs) should consider two years as the standard term for elected members of staff councils.

87. While some SRBs place no limits on the number of times a person can run for elections, others outline provisions limiting an elected SR to a maximum number of consecutive terms, following which he/she must complete one full term break in staff representation to become

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[70] UN *Juridical Yearbook*, 2008, pp. 449-453.
[71] Electoral Units: UNICTR-SU, UNON-SU, UNOV-SU and UNSU.
[72] While electoral units at UNSU are based on UNHQ's departmental structures and on the need to maintain parity in population numbers per unit (150-200 staff member per unit), UNICTR-SU's three electoral units are categorized as Professional, Field Service and General Service staff.

re-eligible to compete in future elections.[73] While any decision to impose term limits lies exclusively with the SRB concerned, the notion has both its pros and cons. On the plus side, it can it help to avoid the creation of "career staff representatives", serve as an incentive for injecting fresh blood/ideas/experience into SMR. On the other hand, it can also limit the benefits which can be drawn from a seasoned SR, in particular when negotiating with professional HR specialists, who themselves have often bypassed any mobility requirements. **The Inspector believes that the issue of term limits is worthy of discussion within SRBs through free, frank and respectful dialogue.**

Table 2: Staff participation in SRB elections

SRB	Electoral cycle	Date of last elections	Electoral Population a/	Effective voting population b/	% Voting
UNSU	Biennial	June 2011	6,325	1,841	**29%**
UNOG-SCC	Annual	March 2011	3,465	810	**23%**
UNOV-SU	Biennial	May 2010	1200 (436 in 2 electoral units holding elections	303 in 2 electoral units holding elections	**69%**
UNON-SU	Biennial	Nov. 2009	2,495	1,026	**41%**
ESCAP-SA	Biennial	Sep. 2010	427	234	**55%**
UNICEF-GSA	Annual	April 2011	10,700	4,824	**45%**
UNRWA-ASU	Triennial	March 2010	24,679	21,062	**85%**
UNFSU c/	Biennial	June 2010	7,250	No voting (one unopposed list)	
UNU-SC	Biennial	2009	727	Reappointed unopposed d/	

Note:
a/ Number of staff members having the right to vote.
b/ Number of staff members having voted.
c/ While candidates were re-elected unopposed, democratic procedures are well and alive in FSU with a new constitution being adopted via a referendum in June 2010 by 1,399 out of 1,575 voters (88,8 per cent).
d/ Number of candidates were the same as the number of positions up for elections.

C. Perceptions on staff representational role in SMR

88. Those not directly involved in SMR may have views on staff representatives shaped by their own cultural and political background regarding trade unions in general. Views on SRs tend to be quite strong due to a number of factors: (a) elected to officially perform public functions, the role of a SR is often (inaccurately) associated with that of a politician; (b) their image suffers from cases where a staff member feeling professionally vulnerable attempt to become a SR, wrongly thinking that such status would protect him/her; (c) in various DS most among the staff-at-large have little or no contact with their SRs; and (d) the fact that most SRs are not highly-placed in the organizational hierarchy (a good proportion are GS staff) does not help their credibility, in a corporate culture where seniority and rank are often implicitly associated with competency. Indeed, in the UN Group, except in exceptional cases, few in the highest grades of the Professional category and above seem to perceive a role for themselves in SRBs, contrary to some other organizations of the UN system. Paradoxically, managers with prior experience in

[73] Term limits in UNSU are as follows: Council (six years), Bureau (four years).

industrial relations in the private sector tend to be more open to SRs than counterparts who had spent the entirety of their careers in the public service (national and/or international).

A serious challenge to effective representation: the case of the UNRWA Area Staff

Due to UNRWA's unique context and the nature of its mandate to provide quasi-governmental services (education, health and relief/social services) to Palestinian refugees. The Inspector agrees with the ICSC which stated that "the legal status of UNRWA area staff was complex and equivocal".[74] The workforce consists of two categories of staff who are subject to separate Staff Regulations and Rules and terms of employment. For the international staff numbering about 200, more than half the funding is provided by the United Nations. These relatively few international staff are subject to the UN system's terms of employment and have a separate staff association. For the nearly 30,000 local staff who are subject to UNRWA Area Staff Regulations and Rules and whose salaries are aligned to those of the host governments, the Agency relies entirely on voluntary donor funding.

The local staff are organized into seven unions at five duty stations, which contributes to the complexity of UNRWA's SMR. Tensions and disagreements with local staff unions are regular and are most often related to salaries and other benefits. In the absence of formal conflict resolution mechanisms, disagreements regularly result in industrial action. Significant disparities in the contractual status and associated conditions of service for national and international staff has created rifts between them, adding further complexity to the resolution of differences between local staff and management.

The Inspector is convinced that the level of tension - including direct action via strikes - and the complexity of the political and technical aspects at stake are such that bold initiatives are required to resolve them, taking into account a full analysis of the legal, institutional, political, historic, economic, financial, social, and psychological dimensions. These undertakings should be conducted with the participation of staff and MRs in each of the five main duty stations of UNRWA, and the resulting observations, conclusions and recommendations should be transparently shared with all actors including the host-entities and the MS participating in UNRWA's Advisory Commission.

In this context it should be noted that in 2009, UNRWA contracted an external consultant to review SMR in the Agency and has additionally sought expert advice from the ILO on multiple occasions. The Inspector appreciates the launching of UNRWA's Joint SMR workshop and encourages the Agency to pursue the implementation of positive recommendations and to continue to seek external and independent support. The adoption of General Assembly resolution 65/272 on strengthening UNRWA's management capacity should serve as a catalyst for the Agency, its donors, and the United Nations Secretariat to resolve some of its major funding challenges.

C.1 Relationship between staff-at-large and staff representatives

89. Furthering relations between the staff-at-large and SRBs necessitates ensuring and advancing transparency and effectiveness in their day-to-day operations. The factors determining such a relationship include, inter alia: outreach efforts by SRBs (ex. broadcast messages, social events), participation in SRB meetings/elections and JBs, the way in which

[74] ICSC report A/57/30, para. 122

the opinions of newcomers are taken into account by SRBs. In some of the larger duty stations, concerns were raised on both sides with regards to the competence of some SRs in performing their roles. It is important to note that two basic principles regarding staff representation are often overlooked in various quarters:

(a) **SR functions are official** and SRs are staff members of the United Nations (General Assembly resolution 51/226[75]). Despite this acknowledgement, SRs have noted that their performance assessments do not incorporate staff representational roles performed. This practice is particularly damaging for SRB Chairs on full-time release whose performance assessments remain virtually empty. As a matter of principle, performing staff representational roles should neither hinder nor accelerate the professional career of any SR.

(b) **SR functions are benevolent**. In addition to not being compensated, most SRs must balance their staff representational tasks with their post-related professional assignments, often requiring them to invest their own personal time to meet their respective obligations, a constraint that is often overlooked by their direct supervisors. Good-faith relations between SRBs and management, including (but not limited to) the frequency of formal and informal contacts can and does influence the success of SRBs. Where staff representation is perceived as ineffective, it can often be attributed to SRs not being adequately integrated into decision-making processes affecting the staff-at-large.

90. As regards the issue of representativeness, the only requirement based on United Nations legal texts is that the SRBs should be organized in a way that will ensure "effective and equitable representation of all staff members" (Reg. 8.1b). Some MRs raised the question of a threshold for representativeness, highlighting low turnouts in Staff Council elections, as diminishing the legitimacy of elected representatives, which also raised the question of "whom exactly was the Staff Council representing?" Having no staff representation at all due to such a threshold would certainly not be a solution for improving SMR. SRBs should (continue to) give due consideration to the following guideline which is expected to enhance the accountability of staff representation**.**

Guideline 2: Representativeness

Staff representative bodies should ensure that the views of staff-at-large are adequately represented by effectively informing and consulting with them, prior to and after engaging in negotiations with the administration on issues that impact staff welfare.

D. Perceptions on the role of management in SMR

91. While some managers acknowledged SMR both as a part of their professional responsibilities and the organizations' established policy, others were generally unconvinced of its importance. In spite of the General Assembly recognizing the tasks of SRs as official, some managers, particularly in some peacekeeping operations simply choose to ignore it, contradicting article 23 of the UDHR, General Assembly resolution 128(II) and the Standards of Conduct in International Civil Service. According to a number of SRs interviewed, some MRs were holding consultations with staff more as a formal requirement, without any expectation of attaining a positive outcome from the process.

92. It should be reminded that Staff Rule 8.1(f) entitles SRs to both effectively participate in identifying/examining/resolving issues related to staff welfare and make proposals to the Secretary-General on behalf of the staff. In addition, Staff Rule 8.1(h) states that

[75] General Assembly resolution 51/226, paras. 10 and 11

instruction/directives related to staff welfare should be transmitted to SRBs in advance for consideration/comments (exception for emergency situations) before being placed into effect. This excludes the use of emails to inform SRBs about such instructions/directives, except if accompanied by an invitation to discuss the proposed text within an accepted Joint negotiation Body or framework and with an agreed minimum lead-time.

93. **ST/SGB/274 clearly outlines issues subject to consultation at the departmental/office level** including: (a) staff welfare matters and ways/means to improve them (via regulations/ rules/policies); application of Staff Rules under Secretary-General's delegated authority to departmental/office heads and their implementation of policies/recommendations approved by Secretary-General that impact upon staff; and (b) the resolution of problems/crises at the local level.

E. Protection of staff representatives

94. In practice, in entities where knowledge and implementation of, and compliance with these texts by management are lacking, **SRs have expressed fears of retaliation in their career aspirations** due to their representative functions, a fear also reported in some SMCC sessions. Normally, **wherever whistleblower policies exist, they should also benefit to SRs, particularly when any evidence of threats and/or acts against the official and protected functions of elected SRs are found**. As per the formal texts of the United Nations, SRs "have the same rights, duties, obligations and privileges as all staff members" and ought to "enjoy protection against any discrimination, treatment or prejudicial action based on their status or activities as staff representatives."[76]

95. The careers of staff representatives should not be negatively affected by their active or passive role in a SRB[77] and "it is an indispensable element of the right of association that no action should be taken against a member of the staff on the ground that he is or has been an officer or representative of the Staff Association or otherwise has been active in the Association".[78] They should be entitled to due protection when negotiating with management, which in turn should be restricted from resorting to disciplinary measures or exerting pressure on SRs, except in circumstances where the SRB's actions may impair the dignity of the international civil service.[79] SRs also enjoy "special rights that include broad freedom of speech and the right to take to task the administration of the organization whose employees it represents".[80] However, such protection should not excuse any misconduct.

F. Communication within and among SRBs

96. Regular and uncensored communication within/among SRBs is essential for effective staff representation. Both effective communication within a large SRB and coordination among SRBs face challenges, with the latter limited primarily to federation congresses and annual SMCC sessions. The incidences of management requiring prior authorization for SRBs to use broadcast facilities was raised and condemned by SMCC XVIII (1994) as such actions violate the spirit and provisions of ST/AI/293. The ILOAT has stated in this regard that "freedom of association is destroyed if communication between members is permitted only under supervision. A restriction, which would be unjustified if imposed on speech or letters or

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[76] ST/AI/293 & UNAT Judgment No. 15 (1952).
[77] UNAT Judgment No. 924 (1999).
[78] UNAT, Judgment No. 15, *Robinson* (1952).
[79] ILOAT, Judgment No. 349 (1978) & ILOAT, Judgment No. 911, at consideration 8 (1988).
[80] ILOAT, Judgment No. 911, consideration 8 (1988).

any other means of communication which the Association found for itself, does not become justified when the means are provided by the Administration".[81]

97. In accordance with the principles of freedom of association, all organizations should, as most of them already do, permit SRBs the use of its intranet and broadcast system without censorship or prior authorization. Such a principle was recently applied to I-seek by the UNOG SCC[82] and "it was agreed that ST/AI/293 on facilities to be provided to SRs would be updated to include provisions related to mass communication tools and broadcast facilities, taking into account local conditions and capacities".[83] While some or all of these channels exist in practice in the United Nations Group entities,[84] the effectiveness and transparency of these means are yet to be fully assessed, with the staff side expressing concern on discriminatory access to communication tools. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to further cooperation and coordination between SRBs and the staff-at-large.

Recommendation 2

The Secretary-General and the Executive Heads of the separately administered organs and programmes, acknowledging the official status of Staff Representative Bodies and elected staff representatives, should facilitate their access to all available and necessary means of communication with the staff-at-large, as agreed in SMCC XXXII (2011).

98. While web-based tools constitute the most practical and cost-efficient means to communicate with staff-at-large, in practice, only a handful of SRBs have their own website. Information and dissemination are generally done through broadcast messages. In their statutes, few SRBs have explicit provisions in place to disseminate Bureau/Council meeting minutes to staff-at-large. In the Inspector's opinion, what is discussed and decided upon within the various layers of SRBs should be relayed promptly to the staff-at-large and what is committed to should be upheld. In this regard, the implementation of the following guideline is expected to enhance the transparency and accountability of SRBs.

Guideline 3: Communication and transparency to staff–at–large

Staff Representative Bodies (SRBs) who have not already done so are invited to consider including in their respective statutes provisions ensuring that the records of Bureau meetings be circulated to all SRB members and those of Council meetings circulated to the staff-at-large in the specific working language(s) of the duty station, no later than 10 working days following the completion of the meeting, and to monitor and report on compliance in this regard.

G. Communication by management

99. In addition to its contacts with SRs, management communicates with staff-at-large through a variety of communication channels including: divisional and departmental meetings, JB meetings, written communication (ex. ST/SGBs, ST/AIs, internal memos) and ICT tools (intranet, blogs, social media). In recent years, management has increasingly used

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[81] ILOAT, Judgment No. 496, at consideration 37 (1982).
[82] Harmonizing procedures for broadcasts, SMCC XXXII, Annex III, Appendix 17.
[83] Report SMCC XXXII, para 78. Agreement No. SMCC-XXXII/12, which states: "Staff and OHRM would discuss issues related to access to i-seek and IT support with OICT and DPI respectively."
[84] For example, the Departments of Management and of Public Information have jointly contributed to the presence of SRB news on the U.N. intranet (I-seek).

Town Hall meetings to directly inform staff-at-large, including on decisions taken by the MS. Town Hall meetings can be beneficial to SMR as long as the information to be shared reflects decisions that have been worked on jointly between SRs and MRs and that staff-at-large are allowed to pose genuine questions directly to the SG or other officials holding townhall meetings without having them filtered ex-ante by any manager.

100. The use of petitions, demonstrations and even strikes – the latter as a last resort when other means of reaching agreement have failed or as a pressure tactic to extract certain concessions – represent uncommon practices for SRBs[85] at the United Nations. Exceptions include a significant demonstration on 6 December 1991 around the UNHQ courtyard in New York. Apart from UNRWA where strikes are endemic (ex. a strike in Oct./Nov. 2010 involving 5,000 area staff lasted 35 days) there have generally not been work stoppages of any great length, with one notable exception of a strike at UNOG from 25 February – 2 March 1976; a subsequent JIU report (JIU/REP/1976/6) on the incident highlighted that over and above a crisis in communication, there existed a crisis of confidence, with the "evident absence of any real dialogue based on understanding and mutual trust between the heads of the Office and their staff", apparently the same challenges behind the current SMR crisis at UNRWA.

[85] Strikes are permissible as per the statutes of UNOG-SCC and ECLAC-SSA. The staff rules are silent on this subject.

V. LOCAL STAFF-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: PRACTICES AND MEANS

A. Quality of the local SMR

101. Ensuring sufficient channels for dialogue between MRs and SRs at the local level is instrumental for constructive SMR. While no "one-size-fits-all" pattern of relationship is applicable across the United Nations Group, both sides often highlighted the lack of a reliable/entrusting working environment, with SRs additionally noting that the consultative processes in which they participated remained formal. The prevalence of active/constructive joint SM bodies serves as a good indicator that SMR in a particular duty station is working well. Provisions for joint bodies came about through Staff Regulation 8.2 which calls for their establishment to provide the Secretary-General with advice on HR policies and staff welfare questions. It stipulates parity in composition (SRs=MRs) as essential for a credible joint body, whose chair must be selected by the Secretary-General from a list proposed by SRs.

102. From his many contacts, direct observations and interviews, the Inspector concluded that SMR were often disrupted by biased perceptions and personality conflicts, jeopardizing the fairness of the processes at stake and resulting in a loss of mutual trust. In addition to establishing mutual respect, **other requisites for constructive SMR include the development of informal contacts and the ease of access to senior management**, where the tone is set by the Executive Head. Positive SMR based on participatory and open dialogue conducted in good faith necessitates - as a first step – that SRs and MRs clarify internally amongst themselves their own respective positions, such that they arrive at the discussion table with a unified voice on each side.

B. Different types of Joint Bodies

103. Joint Advisory Committees (JACs) were traditionally the most prevalent, providing advice/ recommendations to the Secretary-General on staff welfare issues in a given duty station or in the field in general. In recent years, Joint Negotiating Committees (JNCs) replaced JACs in three DSs (UNHQ[86], UNOG[87], UNECA) and in the field (FJNC[88]) – representing a significant evolution from their predecessors. Their respective purposes are the same: "As the joint staff-management mechanism for negotiation in good faith between representatives of staff and the administration, the Committee shall identify, examine and resolve issues through mutual agreements relating to staff welfare, including conditions of employment and of work, general conditions of life and other personnel policies, as provided for in staff regulation 8.1(a)".

104. **The Inspector is of the view that the management and SRBs of all entities within the UN Group should strive to ensure that all staff members, irrespective of duty station and categories, have their concerns represented in Joint Negotiation Bodies. On an annual basis the reports of the joint bodies should be jointly communicated to Member States and the staff-at-large located in their respective areas of competence on the status of implementations of agreements previously reached in the joint bodies.**

105. A second type of joint body is targeted towards **advising the Secretary-General** (the management in effect) **on more individual issues**: recruitment and promotion, for the Central Review Bodies (committees and panels) established in various duty stations,[89] Classification

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[86] ST/SGB/2007/9, JNC at HQ.
[87] ST/IC/Geneva/2008/18.
[88] ST/SGB/2008/11, JNC for the Field.
[89] See ST/SGB/2002/6 and ST/AI/2006/3.

Appeals Committees (GS/FS/P categories) and Voluntary Separation Panels. **A third type of JBs focuses on the management of services and facilities that are specific to a particular duty station** and include among others: committees for catering, garage operations, commissary, crèche, local transport, Staff Benevolent Funds etc. **The role performed by staff in such bodies is largely advisory.**

106. The major reform of the internal justice system of the United Nations, mandated to resolve staff-management disputes,[90] was aiming at making it more independent, professional and decentralized[91]. To those ends, joint bodies like the Joint Appeals Board (JAB) and the Joint Disciplinary Committee (JDC) have been replaced by the United Nations Dispute Tribunal (UNDT) comprising of professional judges. SRs can still play a significant role by participating in the Internal Justice Council,[92] a joint body which provides the General Assembly with recommendations on candidates for judges to UNDT and UNAT (United Nations Appeals Tribunal), gives it views on the implementation of the new system of AoJ and prepares the Code of Conduct for judges. SRs can also file a friend-of-the-court brief before the UNDT and UNAT in support of a staff member's complaint (with the judge's permission). However, despite the aforementioned reforms, several challenges remain: SRs noted that OSLA had a physical presence in only five duty stations, even though management everywhere in the United Nations system had access to legal advisers. In duty stations without an OSLA presence, staff had to rely on the assistance of SRs who had little or no legal background/knowledge.

C. Relations between management and joint bodies

107. While both SRs and MRs agreed in principle that joint bodies were a plus as mechanisms for good faith and meaningful consultations for SMR, joint bodies alone cannot guarantee positive SMR. Various mitigating factors limit the effectiveness of local joint bodies, (including the SMCC) that for some SRs interviewed included: the lack of follow-up on agreements/recommendations, JB recommendations often ignored by management, MRs frequently absent from joint body meetings or not taking part in proposing/setting the agenda and occasionally, personality clashes. SRs often faced a "fait accompli" situation where their comments were sought with very short notice or after management had already finalized a text. JB meetings were thus often perceived as sounding boards rather than fora for constructive dialogue to resolve issues.

108. Several MRs interviewed continued to perceive **all** JBs as purely advisory: SR positions could be accommodated as long as they were within the overall interests of the organization. In their view, the effectiveness of JACs was limited by the unprofessional approach of some SRs who were inappropriately utilizing them to raise individual concerns rather than issues concerning the staff-at-large. Some MRs at the local level also felt unfairly targeted when SRs criticized them for decisions taken unilaterally by HQ-level management (similar to HQ management being criticized for decisions taken by MS). MRs also called for flexibility in discussion mechanisms to take into consideration unique socio-cultural aspects of each DS.

109. Despite the aforementioned limitations, positive examples of joint bodies furthering SMR do exist. In UNICEF's Joint Consultative Committee (JCC), all agreements arrived at

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[90] At the Secretariat-level, the SMCC participated actively in the AoJ reform process since 2001.
[91] See A/RES/61/261, Administration of Justice at the United Nations.
[92] See ST/SGB/2010/3, Organization and terms of reference of the Office of the Administration of Justice.

are mutually binding, recorded and shared with all staff. JBs can also serve to mitigate tensions as in UNICTR, where, with the mandate of the Tribunal coming to a close, a Joint Staff Retention Committee was established (2008) to meet with each division to determine who was going to be laid off and who was going to be retained longer. Similarly, when downsizing in UNODC and the off-shoring of certain functions at UNU took place, the criteria for such actions were discussed in advance with SRs in an attempt to minimize their negative impact on staff. In UNHCR, the JAC reached an important agreement whereby management could not adopt any procedures without first outlining a clear policy on the issue.

D. Facilities and time release for staff representation

110. Access to facilities and release, vital for SRs and SRBs to adequately and effectively perform the official roles assigned to them by the Staff Regulations and Rules is guaranteed by ST/AI/293 (1982) which stipulates that they shall be afforded such facilities as may be required to enable them to carry out their functions promptly and efficiently and outlines the following facilities that they can avail of: space for holding meetings; provision of secretarial assistance; facilities for reproduction and distribution of notices, bulletins and other documents; right to have notices or bulletins posted at spaces or on bulletin boards; and use of telephone and cable and communication facilities.

111. As per ST/AI/293, SRs should be granted reasonable official time release (including reasonable travel time) to attend the meetings where they have a formal role to perform. During the 19th SMCC (1995), the Committee agreed to set up a joint SM task force to define representational activities and the time required to carry them out, the recommendations of which were taken on board by the Secretary-General in issuing report A/C.5/50/64 defining "reasonable time for staff representational activities" (see table below). Time-release for SRs was implicitly acknowledged by the General Assembly through its decision to limit the continuous release of elected SRs (full or part-time) to a maximum of four years (A/RES/51/226). In the opinion of the Inspector, apart from total population numbers represented, determining release should also factor in the number of duty stations represented by the same SRB.[93]

Table 3: Official release formula agreed at SMCC for specific Duty Stations (A/C.5/50/64)

Category of Staff Representative	Less than 1000 staff represented**	Range of 1000 staff represented*	Geneva	New York
President / Chairman / Executive Secretary	60% release (96 hrs/m.)	Full-Time (FT) release	FT release	FT release
1st & 2nd VP / Deputy Executive Secretary	30% release (48 hrs/m.)	60% release (96 hrs/ m.)	FT release	FT release
Other ExCom members	16 hrs/m.	32 hrs/m.	32 hrs/m.	44 hrs/m.
Staff Council members	10 hrs/m.		10 hrs/m.	15 hrs/m.
Field mission SRs	5 hrs/m.			
* Vienna ** Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Amman, Jerusalem/Field Service, Nairobi, Santiago				

[93] The issue of time release for federations will be addressed in the forthcoming JIU report on SMR in the United Nations Specialized Agencies and the Common System. Both issues are inter-related.

112. The aforementioned instructions were issued at a time when only HQ and UNOG were adhering to release based on the "the range of 1,000 staff represented". In practice, according to SRs, they are either ignored or improperly adhered to by management in many entities (an issue that has been regularly raised in several SMCC sessions), as some SRB Heads receive no time-release (UNU-SC, UNICTR-SU). Due consideration should be given to the unique circumstances facing SRs in each organization, particularly those in smaller ones where they are at best usually entitled to only part-time release and thus need to balance their professional and staff representational duties, with the quality of both often suffering as a consequence. Where no time-release is permitted, SRs often have to utilize regular office time to perform staff representational work and subsequently complete their official work during personal time. Such a situation contradicts the General Assembly's assertion that the functions of SRs are official.

113. In the same vein, while some SRBs are provided with a full-time administrative assistant paid for by the organization (UNOG-SCC, UNON-SU, ECLAC-SSA), others receive no such support (UNICTR). Some SRBs do pay for support staff out of their own budget, but management should not use this as a precedent to deny secretarial assistance to SRBs, particularly given the fact that such a provision is stipulated in ST/AI/293, and keeping in mind that the budget of small SRBs is usually too limited to pay for support staff. The review revealed the absence of any concrete criteria to determine what constitutes reasonable needs for adequate office space, leaving the decision to the goodwill of local management.

114. As per their statutes, SRBs present their independently audited accounts, typically during their annual general assembly. SRBs funds are used go towards the provision of services to their constituents (legal counsel, kindergarten, sport and entertainment, charities, training, travel to some meetings, outreach,). Clear guidelines should be established for determining the funding of travel and DSA for members and alternates of SRBs to major meetings, including the SMC and the annual general assembly of their respective Federations. Taking into account the significant growth in staff numbers in United Nations entities since the issuance of ST/AI/293 (1982), as well as some of its acknowledged omissions, the implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of staff representation.

Recommendation 3

Once an agreement has been reached in the SMC on fair and harmonized criteria for determining facilities and release for performing staff representation functions, the Secretary-General and the Executive Heads of the separately administered organs should issue revised administrative issuances in this regard; until then, ST/AI/293 and A/C.5/50/64, should be fully implemented and considered as minimal provisions.

E. Staff and management training in SMR

115. **One of the clearest findings of the review is the near-unanimous agreement on the necessity to develop and implement dedicated and complementary training on SMR issues for both SRs and MRs, including newly appointed line managers.** While the provision of such trainings has obvious implications in terms of educational programmes, materials and trainers, the benefits should outweigh the costs: increased professionalism on both sides on SMR processes, combined with a better understanding of each other's substantive concerns would result in an improved scope for resolving differences constructively and **significantly reduce costs, time and energy potentially lost in litigation**. During interviews, both sides highlighted areas in which training would be useful, including negotiation skills and better understanding of key issues, such as staff rules and regulations, HR policies, and codes of conduct. It should be

noted that a significant number of interviewees on both sides were open to joint training sessions.

116. HRM and the SRs also commissioned in 2006 some training material used in the special session of SMCC in 2007. In developing a training kit, UNICEF's training modules on SMR issues and the FICSA Handbook on norms of representation could be drawn upon[94] as well as the General Federation of Trade Unions' (GFTU) resource book on negotiating and influencing skills, utilized by some SRBs at CCISUA like ICTY. Training could take the form of both on-site training and on-line modules with both separate and combined sessions for SRs and MRs.

117. The need for training on SMR issues has also featured regularly in various SMCC sessions, including a recommendation for mandatory "people management" training for all managers (2001) and an agreement[95] on establishing a dedicated training programme for SRs (2007) which incorporates a three-day basic programme for all SRs and a two-day programme for executive members of staff committees. At SMCC XXXII (June 2011) it was agreed that the working group on training of SRs would be reconstituted and would continue its work, the results of which would be presented at the next SMC (Agreement No. SMCC-XXXII/14). The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance coordination and cooperation among SRs and MRs.

Recommendation 4

The Secretary-General and the Executive Heads of the separately administered organs and programmes should allot appropriate resources to their respective human resources units to develop (preferably jointly with staff representatives) and implement training activities on SMR-related issues and strongly encourage the participation of newly appointed managers and newly elected staff representatives in such training.

[94] See also *Practical industrial relations in the UN system. Negotiating and influencing skills resource book* (ICTY with the General Federation of Trade Unions (GFTU), April 2011).
[95] SMCC-XXVIII report, annex III, Appendix 6 (proposal by ICTY-SU).

VI. BASIC PRINCIPLES AND TEXTS ON SMR

A. Independence of international civil servants

118. In establishing the United Nations in 1945, pre-existing models of the international civil service, including HR and SMR policies and practices, were adopted from the League of Nations, the ILO Secretariat and the Foreign Service of countries such as the United States of America and the United Kingdom. The concept of the modern international civil service as independent from any particular State is derived from the vision of Sir James Eric Drummond, the first Secretary of the League of Nations and embedded in the Balfour Report (1920), which noted that the staff members of the League Secretariat, once appointed, were no longer the servants of the country of which they were citizens, but servants of the League and ought to be provided with a lasting or at least a stable position. Accordingly, United Nations staff members are remunerated primarily on the basis of the Noblemaire[96] and Flemming principles,[97] ensuring respectively that Professional (P) staff receive salaries comparable to the most highly compensated national civil servants globally, while General Service (GS) staff receive salaries comparable to the best prevailing local rates. The first Staff Regulations,[98] staff union, joint bodies and Administrative Tribunal to exist in an international organization were all established by the ILO in the 1920s.

119. The foundational treaty of the United Nations, the Charter of the United Nations, outlines four vital principles applicable to all staff members of the organization: (a) conformity with the principles of justice and international law (Art. 1); (b) promotion of universal respect for, and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all (Art. 55); (c) The exclusively international character of United Nations staff (Art. 100) and (d) paramount consideration in the employment of staff of adherence to the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity as (Art. 101.3). Subsequently, the Organization's staff, in pledging to uphold the Charter, should also have their human rights and fundamental freedoms upheld and receive due protection enshrined under international law.

B. Rule of law

120. Respect for the rule of law conditions the observance of all other principles of governance and functioning. The Secretary-General recently observed that "the evolution of international law has led to more and more rights being vested directly in the individual. Yet, the Organization has not evolved at the same pace. The time has come to align the law applicable to the United Nations with developments in international human rights law" (A/65/318). The Inspector concurs with this view and appreciates that the General Assembly recently encouraged "the United Nations system to systematically address, as appropriate, aspects of the rule of law in relevant activities, recognizing the importance of the rule of law to virtually all areas of United Nations engagement".[99]

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[96] The Noblemaire Report (1921) noted that the recruitment and career of international officials should be based on merit and not on national or political protection and staff should be selected reflecting a wide geographical distribution. It proposed permanent employment contracts to increase job security and to strengthen the capacity of officials to resist pressures exerted by their home Governments.

[97] The Flemming Committee, in its report to the Secretary-General (31 Oct. 1949) recommended the use of GS, P and higher categories posts to replace the 19-grade scale carried over from the LoN.

[98] See Djokitch Alexandre, *The Staff Union of International Labour Office – Its origins and the commencement of its activity*, Geneva: ILO, 1973.

[99] See General Assembly resolution 65/32, "The rule of law at the national and international levels".

121. This principle is well defined in the report of the Secretary-General on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies (S/2004/616) which adds: "It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the application, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency".[100] Interviews conducted confirm that staff members serving in the secretariats of international organizations are particularly sensitive to those aspects.

C. Freedom of association and staff representation

122. The principal legislative body of the United Nations, the General Assembly, began integrating SMR principles as early as its first session (February 1946) when the Provisional Staff Regulations with resolution 13(I)[101] were adopted. At its second session, on 17 Nov. 1947, the Assembly adopted resolution 128 (II) on Trade Union Rights (Freedom of Association) which welcomed "Decisions concerning the freedom of association adopted unanimously by ILC V" (11 July 1947). Recognizing the principles proclaimed by the ILC,[102], the Assembly considered the inalienable right of trade union freedom of association (…) as "essential to the improvement of the standard of living of workers and to their economic well-being" and requested the ILO "to continue its efforts in order that one or several international conventions may be adopted". The General Assembly endorsed the principles proclaimed by the ILC in respect of trade union rights… as well as those mentioned in the constitution of the ILO and the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944).[103]

123. The issue of staff representation, including staff rights and their access to various organizational mechanisms, has been dealt with, either directly or indirectly, through nearly 40 resolutions adopted by the General Assembly over the course of its first 65 sessions. The fundamental texts defining the role of SRBs in the United Nations and establishing Joint staff-management Bodies, were adopted by the sixth General Assembly session through Staff Regulations 8.1 and 8.2. The Standards of Conduct for the international civil service[104] clearly state that "freedom of association is a fundamental human right and international civil servants have the right to form and join associations, unions or other groupings to promote and defend their interests" (para 26).

D. Human rights

124. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, affirmed by the General Assembly in its resolution 217 (III) (10 December 1948), fully protects international civil servants, both as individuals (arts. 1, 2 and 20) and workers (arts. 23-24) to whom the right to organize is recognized by article 23.4. The Inspector was struck by the fact that most MRs in responding

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[100] Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies (S/2004/616).

[101] Staff Regulation 15: "The SG shall provide a machinery through which members of the staff may participate in the discussion of questions relating to appointment and promotion".

[102] This includes the "effective recognition of the right of collective bargaining, the cooperation of management and labour in the continuous improvement of productive efficiency and the collaboration of workers and employers in the preparation and application of social and economic measures".

[103] See General Assembly resolution 128 (II), first paragraph of the annex.

[104] The Standards of Conduct for the international civil service were initially prepared in 1954 by the International Civil Service Advisory Board and subsequently revised by the ICSC in 2001 and welcomed by the General Assembly in its resolution 56/244.

to the JIU questionnaire, noted that the UDHR and various relevant ILO Conventions and Declarations were applied de facto to staff members – but not explicitly recognized.

E. ILO Conventions and Declarations: collective bargaining

125. In an expanding global organization that has become increasingly diversified and fragmented with more complex lines of authority and differentiated conditions of service, SMR has understandably become more challenging. In such a context, the timing is certainly appropriate to outline some basic rules with system-wide applicability that would government the relations between staff and management and are themselves derived from existing international instruments and principles that many MS have already adopted and ratified. Indeed, international organizations in general and the United Nations in particular, serve as the ideal platform for embodying the concrete application of the universal values of these international instruments and principles. It may also be noted that the end of the permanent contracts will progressively give to most of the United Nations staff a status similar to the status of ordinary workers and therefore entitles them to benefit from the same rights as workers.

126. From the basic recognition of staff members as human beings via Resolution 128(II)) (and thus subject to the UDHR) and repeated acknowledgement of them as the Organization's "most precious asset", the General Assembly should ensure that the 10 principles outlined and promoted in the United Nations "Global Compact"[105] toward the private sector are fully applied to United Nations staff, most notably Principle 3 which calls for upholding the freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining. As per the relevant ILO instruments, the right to collective bargaining is deemed to be the activity or process leading to the conclusion of a collective agreement which corresponds to:

> *All agreements in writing regarding working conditions and terms of employment concluded between an employer, a group of employers or one or more employers' organisations, on the one hand, and one or more representative workers' organisations, or, in the absence of such organisations, the representatives of the workers duly elected and authorised by them in accordance with national laws and regulations, on the other.*[106]

127. Several ILO instruments[107] embody the right to collective bargaining, starting with the Declaration of Philadelphia (1944) which is integrated in the ILO Constitution and is considered as one of the solemn obligations of ILO and its Member States. The ILO Conventions on Collective Bargaining (No. 154, 1981) define it as extending to:

> *All negotiations which take place between an employer, a group of employers or one or more employers' organisations, on the one hand, and one or more workers' organisations, on the other, for: (a) determining working conditions and terms of employment; and/or (b) regulating relations between employers and workers;*

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[105] See JIU/REP/2010/9: "United Nations corporate partnerships: the role and functioning of the Global Compact". The initiative was launched in 1999 and is referred to in res.55/215, 56/76, 58/129, 60/215, 64/223.

[106] ILO Collective Agreements Recommendation No. 91, para. 2.

[107] ILO adopted another conventions and recommendations relating to collective bargaining and in particular, the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise Convention (1948 - No. 87), the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining Convention (1949 – No. 98), the Labour Relations (Public Service) Convention (1978 – No. 151), the Collective Bargaining Convention (1981 – No. 154), and the Collective Bargaining Recommendation (1981 – No. 163).

and/or (c) regulating relations between employers or their organizations and a workers' organisation or workers' organizations" (Article 2).

128. Chapter III of the present report has conclusively shown that:

- The negotiation processes in the SMCC, the future SMC and the JNCs have the character of "bargaining" and are furthermore "collective" as the interests of all staff of an organization/ entity or a category of that staff are at stake;
- The SRBs involved ensure by definition the representation of collective interests, are legitimately considered as "workers organizations" and the issues discussed are part of the "working conditions and terms of employment";
- The resulting agreements are made in writing and are collective in nature (even if the term "collective agreements" is not used in most cases in the United Nations context) and when they fall under the scope of full authority of the Secretary-General, they are not only considered binding, but are also subject to follow-up and joint follow-up procedures.

129. **If the United Nations is qualified as the employer and is represented by a mandated management when discussing and formalizing agreements, it can be concluded that all features characterizing collective bargaining do presently exist in most formal SMR negotiating processes in the organization, in particular the SMC. But this neither means nor implies that all SM interaction and Joint Bodies processes are aimed at collective agreements and constitute collective bargaining** at least in some types of joint bodies (see section V.B). In particular, **this does not imply that there can be collective bargaining beyond the limits of the delegated authority given by the MS to the Executive Head and the management.**

130. Indeed, when the General Assembly undertakes deliberations on the basis of ICSC reports (and subsequent advice from the ACABQ), it unilaterally determines the most significant element of the terms of employment i.e. remunerations. For decisions in this sphere, there is no collective bargaining. The subsequent JIU report on SMR will analyse the means for the SRs and their organizations to serve as advisers of the adviser (ICSC) of the decision maker. The Inspector recommends the adoption of the following recommendation, directly derived from ILO instruments including the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998).[108] The implementation of this recommendation is expected to enhance accountability within the United Nations.

Recommendation 5

The General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to present to it for its approval, an appropriate staff regulation confirming the recognition of the right of the United Nations staff to collective bargaining as outlined in the annex of its resolution 128 (II). The Secretary-General and the Executive Heads of the separately administered organs and programmes should apply to the staff of their respective entities the standards and principles emerging from the relevant ILO instruments, particularly the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (1998).

[108] The provisions of the recommendation are additionally drawn from: articles 1, 2.1 and 4 of ILO Convention 98 on the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining (1949) and articles 3 and 5 of ILO Convention 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize (1948).

131. **The progress in the implementation of recommendation 5, if adopted, should be reported to the General Assembly by the Secretary-General at every forthcoming session on Human Resources.**

VII. ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ALL

A. Responsibility and accountability of all stakeholders

132. For the effective implementation of SMR in the United Nations, all stakeholders should be held accountable for their respective roles, and should interact regularly through established forums with clear and transparent terms of reference and procedural rules, thus paving the way for effective consultation, negotiation, definition and approval of agreements and subsequent enforcement and monitoring of their implementation. Without this pre-requisite being met, any effort to bring about meaningful reform to SMR in international organizations will remain an elusive goal.

133. In line with staff regulations 8.1 and 8.2, given that SMR should culminate in negotiations (following mutual information and consultation), the Inspector hereby proposes eight (common sense) rules for constructive negotiations, based not only on interviews with SRs and MRs, but also on existing literature in the fields of psychology, diplomacy and industrial relations, as well as existing practices and lessons learned in diverse realms ranging from the agreements among private companies to ILO scholars[109]:

Table 4: Rules for constructive negotiations

R1 Institutional Framework	**Application to SMR**
Existence of a defined Institutional framework (agreed to by both sides) with transparent procedural rules and their unequivocal interpretation.	The JACs, JNCs, SMCC and the future SMC (with their respective ToRs) are the mutually agreed established frameworks for HR issues at the local, Secretariat and United Nations Group levels.
R2 Representativeness and accountability	
Legitimacy of every representative on both sides, through initial joint accreditation verification; representativeness and accountability of all representatives to their respective constituencies.	Representativeness on the Management side through written delegated authority from the Secretary-General to his/her direct representatives and to the EHs of United Nations entities. On the staff side, legitimate representativeness of SRBs through a system of elections ensuring a democratic representation of the staff-at-large and possible consultation with them on agreements with major impact.
R3 Mutual respect and good faith in communication	
Mutual respect and good faith are essential elements for constructive dialogue.	Communication among (on the same side) and between (both sides) SRs and MRs should follow democratic participatory processes, including the acceptance of different viewpoints targeted in good faith towards consensus-building.
R4 Knowledge-based participation and transparent information sharing	
Participants should necessarily have a verifiable level of knowledge/ expertise in the area concerned; relevant information should be shared with time-lead among parties.	A minimum threshold of expertise should be established for both MRs and SRs (including via mandatory training) on the basics of the HR framework (Staff Rules and Regulations) and SMR, as well as a general knowledge on managing collective issues in the field of labour relations.
R5 A clearly mandated position	
Each party comes to the negotiation prepared on substance (mandate) and	After preliminary stages of mutual information and consultation, representatives on both sides should come to the

[109] Sriyan de Silva, ILO Collective Bargaining Negotiations Conditions for Successful Collective Bargaining (http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/actemp/downloads/publications/srscbarg.pdf).

tactics (fall back positions).	JB prepared to fully represent the position established with their constituents.
R6 Effective participation in SMR procedures	
Within the agreed framework and with respect to the established rules of the game, active participation by all representatives.	To disassociate from consultative and negotiating processes (SM(C)C, JNCs) is not constructive and makes the process of attaining negotiated outcomes more challenging. An "empty chair" policy does not lead to anywhere.
R7 Cohesion and coherence	
Once all representatives' positions have been expressed and taken into account within each party, they should adopt a united front when facing external counterparts.	Fragmentation in any "side" should be avoided by discretely resolving internal issues within each side (if possible, before the negotiations) through constructive discussions.
R8 Verification and enforcement of agreements – Monitoring and evaluation	
A joint monitoring framework is formally established, managed and operated to ensure the effective implementation of agreements, identifying each party's respective responsibilities and adopting tools for effective measurement (within established time-frames).	Many processes have been tried and may be combined to follow the implementation of SMCC agreements; (see section III B.2). Compact agreements for managers can serve this purpose by adding an objective on SMR for all senior managers. The SMC and SRBs should define a system to monitor steps taken in every duty station towards implementing agreements that have been reached and signed.

134. The aforementioned rules are built on the concept of responsible behaviour and accountability which is defined as the "responsibility to someone for one's action" in the first of 16 agreed principles enunciated by SMCC XXIV (2000). Earlier SMCC sessions further agreed that "accountability mechanisms should be based on the principle of good governance encompassing respect for law, rules and regulations; transparency; effective and clear communication; team work; enhancing staff morale; respect for multiculturalism; loyalty to the Organization; and empowering training and mentoring of staff." The JIU reports on accountability and oversight (JIU/REP/1993/5 and JIU/REP/2011/5) are also instructive in this regard.[110]

135. An official definition of accountability came about only recently through General Assembly Resolution 65/259, which terms it as "the obligation of the Secretariat and its staff members to be answerable for all decisions made and actions taken by them, and to be responsible for honouring their commitments, without qualification or exception". This definition applies to both the management (including the EH) and the staff since the managers are also part of the staff, and are subject to the same Regulations and Rules. Some monitoring, reporting and possibly jurisdictional mechanisms remain to be conceived, established and put into practice to ensure that each stakeholder is held accountable for its actions. Table 5 outlines the roles of the three key stakeholders in SMR.

B. Responsibility and accountability of staff representatives

136. The credibility of SRBs as SMR partners is measured both in terms of their accountability to the staff-at-large and to other SRs (internal framework) and their adherence to the rules and regulations of the organization (external framework). In line with the organization's Charter and Staff Regulation 8.1 (see annex I) on SRB organization and elections, recognition and acceptance of an SRB by the Administration infers that its

[110]The General Assembly took note of the former with appreciation in its resolution 48/218.

democratic functioning is ensured inter alia by the respect of staff rules 8.1(c) on eligibility and 8.1(d) on polling officers. In addition, most SRB statutes make provisions for staff-at-large to propose/adopt statutory amendments (via referendum) and initiate recall votes/motions of no confidence to dismiss the elected Council, provided that minimum participation requirements are met. For their part, SRBs can proactively conduct surveys of the staff-at-large to gauge their assessment on issues of concern.

Table 5: Responsibilities of SMR stakeholders

Responsibility per category		
Member States (MS) Representatives	**Executive Heads & Management Representatives (MRs)**	**Staff Representatives (SRs)**
- Active interest in the main features of SMR and its institutional framework within the United Nations Group. Seeking direct information on and ensuring that they are apprised of the positions and perspectives of staff and management representatives on HR issues at stake before engaging in discussions among themselves. - Regular dialogue established with SRs. - Respect for the authority of the Secretary-General as the first administrative officer and refraining from micro-management. - Consistency between the endorsements of SMR related policies and their budgetary implementation.	- Effective management of the organization, in full accordance with existing texts in effect (rule of law). - Effective communication with both SRs and MRs, including line-managers, aimed at enabling constructive SMR. - Ensuring timely and transparent dialogue with SRs on HR initiatives and effective implementation of agreed HR policies. - Coherent alignment between HR managers and line-managers, at all locations. - Open door policy for SRB leadership	- Personal work to acquire knowledge on HR issues. - Willingness to build agreements with management through strengthened and constructive dialogue. - Effective representative function based on consultation with staff-at-large and interaction with administration. - Democratic practices based on mutual respect within the SRBs and among them.
Shared responsibilities		
Building trust and establishing clear boundaries with regards to the delegation of authority from MS to the Secretary-General (and from the Secretary-General to the Executive Heads of self-administered United Nations entities).	Effective implementation of HR policies and defence of staff rights and obligations, fully respecting the United Nations Charter, internationally recognized human rights and labour principles as well as internal rules and regulations; respect for and implementation of the rules of the game by both sides will encourage staff-at-large to participate in democratic processes and debates on issues that affect them.	

137. In order to increase the accountability of elected SRs, some SRB statutes (UNSU, UNOG-SCC, ECA-SU) provide for an internal arbitration process, in line with the principle

that internal issue should be dealt with through internal mechanisms[111] like Arbitration Commissions whose rulings are binding upon all SRBs and SRs and can include provisions for sanctions.[112] In practice, the effectiveness (ability to resolve internal disputes) and independence of these bodies necessitate strengthening them in order to face up to pressures from a Council, Bureau or even the concerned management.

Guideline 4: Enhancing the effectiveness of arbitration committees

In Staff Representative Bodies (SRBs) where an arbitration committee exists, candidates to such a body should be able to demonstrate adequate skills on legal and SMR-related issues, be chosen through a transparent selection process, should have no direct/indirect role in SRB activities that could represent a conflict of interest and should be fully independent in performing their functions.

138. With regards to furthering accountability and democracy in the electoral processes of SRBs, most SRB statutes provide for polling officers who independently organize and conduct elections and publish their results (often through a report). Polling officers should be statutorily ineligible for election as SRs or for serving on any SRB entity (that could represent a conflict of interest) and be operationally independent from other SRB entities and organs.

Guideline 5: All SRBs should consider incorporating mechanisms for voter verification and recounts by independent polling officers when organizing elections.

139. To further the accountability and effectiveness of SRs, newly elected SRs should receive training on basic SMR issues as they should be knowledgeable about the HR framework (staff rules and regulations, relevant AIs, etc.) in order to abide by them and assist the staff-at-large in interpreting and understanding their rights and duties under the existing legal framework and possible changes.

140. Financial records of SRBs (maintained by an elected Treasurer) should be audited either by an independent auditor (good practice to avoid conflict of interest and ensure full transparency) or an internal Audit Committee (provided for in 13 SRB statutes out of 19) who/which certifies annually the SRB accounts presented by the Treasurer to the staff-at-large. For its part, United Nations administration should to every extent possible, refrain from involvement in the internal operations of and disputes within SRBs. **In order to enhance the accountability of staff representation, SRs, as staff members, must abide by the existing financial and staff regulations of the organization/entity. When acting of behalf of SRBs, SRs are additionally subject to its internal oversight.**

C. Responsibility and accountability of managers

141. **Managerial responsibility and the scope of authority of managers concerned with HR matters should be well-defined for each of them. Effective and continuing training of managers is essential to the development of a culture of accountability.** These

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[111] UN *Juridical Yearbook*, 2009, Chapter VI, Legal Opinions of the UN Secretariat, *Note to USG for Internal Oversight Services regarding oversight authority over UNSU*, p. 394.

[112] Sanctions include: verbal warning, written warning, suspension of voting rights in Executive Board and/or Council or a recommendation for recall. While the Arbitration Commission of Geneva can hear any "failure to observe these Regulations", its New York counterpart can only hear complaints relating to decisions of the SRB's organs or its SRs. However, their statutes provide no specific protection with regards to the rights of SRs and SRBs. Neither ILOAT nor UNAT consider themselves competent on internal disputes; See ILOAT judgments 1147 and 1897 and UNAT judgment No 1145 (2003).

two important principles were agreed upon at SMCC XXIV. Nonetheless, during interviews with the JIU, SRs noted that internal controls and oversight mechanisms, including means to report to all stakeholders for decisions undertaken, remain limited. SRs currently play no role in monitoring management performance, even though current management trends demonstrate interest in such practices through yet to be established as 360-degree reviews. Management oversight is conducted top-down by management itself (without sharing such information externally) and MRs generally consider yearly OIOS and BOA audits as sufficiently robust oversight. However, as per resolution 64/259, the organization considers itself to be accountable not only to the oversight bodies, but also to the MS and staff.

142. The compacts established in 2009 - agreements between senior managers and the Secretary-General encompassing, among others, an HR Action Plan - represent an important accountability tool. One of the plan's indicators is aimed at measuring the effective implementation of SM consultation via the number of meetings held between administration and SRs during the performance cycle. It is essential that any new monitoring system contain meaningful indicators (outlined below as proposals) to monitor the implementation of measures to improve SMR through an interactive process of consultation with SRs on matters relevant to the staff.

Table 6: Indicators for managerial performance in SMR at all levels

Proposed indicator for SMR performance	Purpose
1: Number of issues within the scope defined by Regulation 8.1 consulted on /negotiated with SRs.	This indicator measures whether all relevant issues for the staff have been consulted/negotiated on in compliance with the existing regulations and rules in this regard.
2: For new measures affecting staff, the number of substantive documents issued at least four weeks in advance of local JB sessions and six weeks before SMC sessions, with clear indication of the time period given for expected first comments from staff.	To allow SRs to organize consultations with staff-at-large in their respective locations to benefit from truly representative feedback from their members as a necessary element of good SMR (its assessment would be a key element in measuring improvements in this area).
3 Number of information meetings and particularly joint information meetings to inform staff-at-large on the impact of agreed measures before they are promulgated/in effect.	This indicator would provide a measurable figure on joint staff-management initiatives, and could be set at a minimum number per year.

143. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance coordination and cooperation between SRs and MRs.

Recommendation 6

The Secretary-General and the Executive Heads of the separately administered organs and programmes should ensure to the Staff Representative Bodies of their respective entities an easy and frequent access to all appropriate levels of management, including at the highest level, through both formal and informal channels.

D. SMR and the delegation of authority (DA)

144. A clearly defined accountability framework, associated with a related oversight framework is essential for effective SMR and will contribute to the alleviation of mistrust and frustrations. During interviews, both SRs and MRs underlined the necessity of having a well-defined and established accountability framework, with some SRs lamenting that MRs,

despite receiving managerial training, were ultimately not held accountable for implementing the decisions they themselves had agreed to in the realm of SMR.

145. Operationalizing the new entities established over time within the United Nations Group was achieved through varying appointment procedures with regards to senior management,[113] as well as varying rules and administrative issuances for the staff. These developments, occurring over several decades through numerous resolutions and in the context of varying interests of different parties, added complexity to diversity, resulting in **a fragmented and complex corpus of normative texts that are unclear on the issue of delegated authority**. Both the ACABQ (A/64/683) and the General Assembly in its resolution 64/259 have expressed concerns in this respect.

146. During SMCC XXIV, the management side expressed its frustration noting that "there was still a multiple-level system of authority and decision-making, which tended to blur individual responsibility". What had been lacking was an element, which, essentially for managers, clearly spelt out the authority and responsibility given to their Executive Heads to achieve the stated objectives in order to hold managers and staff accountable for the discharge of their responsibilities. In this respect, it is to be noted that in SMR, a good deal can also be "lost in translation" with regard to what is verbally agreed upon between SRs and MRs in joint bodies and what comes out in writing.

147. Solving all issues at the appropriate local level with sufficiently delegated authority is the essence of the "principle of subsidiarity". Its implementation avoids bottlenecks and resource wastages higher up in the organizational hierarchy to whom managers regularly refer to when uncertainties exist with regards to their level of DA. Such practices generate inefficiency and delays in solving issues that could have been addressed at the local level, had a clearer definition of DA been applied. MRs at the local level need DA through a margin for manoeuvre to directly address issues limited to the scope of their duty station in consultation with SRs through local JBs, while issues of Secretariat-wide relevance could be dealt with by the SMC.

E. Responsibility and accountability of Member States in SMR

E.1 Communication

148. While the staff has a clear right to be heard by the ACABQ (following its inception in 1946 via resolution 14(I), para. 2) when the latter deals with the budgetary aspects of personnel matters, MS mostly hear about staff through management. Formal direct and limited access for staff to Member States was provided for in 1979 by the General Assembly in its resolution 34/220, through which the Assembly "expressed its readiness to consider fully the views of staff" as presented through (a) a single recognized United Nations Secretariat SR via a document submitted under the agenda item "Personnel Questions" (now HR Management) and (b) at the United Nations system level, by a designated FICSA representative under the agenda item "Report of the ICSC".[114] Presenting the staff views on "personnel questions" was traditionally a role entrusted only to the Chairperson of the New York-based UNSU. Following UNSU's decision (2003-10) to suspend its participation in SMCC, both the UNSU Chairman and the SMCC Vice-President were allowed to present

[113]See JIU/REP/2009/8 "Selection and conditions of service of the executive heads in the UN system Organizations"; JIU/REP/2011/2 "Transparency in the Selection and Appointment of Senior Managers in the UN Secretariat".

[114] The latter will be considered in the JIU report on SMR in the specialized agencies and the common system.

their views to the Fifth Committee, albeit on an ad-hoc basis through written requests. **In the Inspector's opinion, the time is right to establish simple provisions with regards to these matters.**

E.2 Member States' perspectives on and interest in SMR

149. The Inspector observed striking differences both in the level of understanding of and interest in SMR within a sample of 16 Member States during his mission to New York, including (but not limited to) Chairs of regional groups (November 2010) as well as some countries who on their own initiative participated in a much appreciated GRULAC meeting with the Inspector on the topic of SMR. While some MS appeared to have little interest in SMR beyond concerns raised by their nationals serving in the United Nations (or had their interest limited precisely by the fact that very few compatriots were serving in the organization), others, like representatives from G-77 countries, noted that it was important for them to have a unified position on SMR (which they currently lacked), as they collectively had a significant number or staff members working for the Secretariat who needed to be defended. The MS generally viewed the "existing mistrust between staff and management" as harmful and a few of them further noted discrepancies in the Secretariat's position in the sixty-fifth General Assembly (HR) session. Subsequently, the challenge facing SMR was twofold: while the staff appeared to be disorganized, management did not seem to listen to staff concerns on certain issues or were unable to represent them in a convincing manner before the MS.

150. MS highlighted the need for greater transparency in decision-making processes from either side, noting that they were willing to consider divergent views, as long as they were transparently presented. In the absence of such transparency, doubts would exist, not only on whether the expression of staff concerns was being curtailed by management, but also on whether SRs were accurately reflecting the concerns of all their constituents. Prior to presenting any proposal to the MS, management needed to not only discuss it with SRBs, but also conduct a thorough analysis of the proposals' merits. The challenges facing SRBs, as per the perspectives of MS, included fragmentation and inadequacies in internal governance resulting in stalemates and the expression of unrealistic proposals. Management, for their part, needed to serve as a better intermediary between MS and staff. Also, the MS called upon the United Nations entities to provide awards / recommendations for better management practices as an incentive measure.

E.3 Member States' positions on measures to improve SMR

151. Representatives of most MS were of the view that the organizations of the United Nations system needed to respect the provisions of conventions pertaining to human and labour rights and norms, particularly with regards to their application to United Nations staff, with some noting that the staff themselves could negotiate to have such language incorporated into their contracts. They noted the importance of measures to protect the independence of international civil servants, and were generally open to reforms in the SMCC, transforming it from an event into a process. With regards to more direct dialogue with SRBs, Member States noted that the current provisions of Assembly resolution 34/220 limited their ability to engage in direct contacts with different SRBs. They cautioned that with far too many voices on the staff side, more direct and fragmented dialogue could lead to the expression of fringe sentiments rather than representative ones. **To improve their communication with MS, SRBs need to organize the relations among themselves much more rigorously in the future. In particular, they could regroup the SRBs by federating them into one United Nations staff structure. Such a structure would be able to legitimately speak and be heard on behalf of all staff.**

152. To the MS, SMR was an issue that the management side is supposed to deal with. The MS should not have to micro-manage the process and it is each organization's responsibility to empower line managers and make them accountable for consulting with staff, particularly when deliberating on issues that directly impacted upon them. **At the very least, they should ensure that such issues have really been discussed between staff and management and as appropriate inquire about the respective positions before accepting to deliberate on the matter.** Overall, Member States felt under-informed on SMR issues in general and the SMCC in particular (see Chapter III, section D.3).

VIII. TOWARDS A NEW STAFF-MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

A. A new SM(C)C?

153. **While the Inspector considers this chapter as containing major elements of his proposals, he refrained from using the customary form of crisp "recommendations" for it, as the decisions concerning the terms of reference of the Committee belong exclusively to its members on both sides and depends on a negotiated agreement on a complex set of provisions.** The Inspector appreciates the provision contained in para 22 of the report of SMCC XXXII, noting that the issuance of the draft SGB on SMC and the revision of ST/AI/293 may subsequently need to be further updated depending on the recommendations of the present JIU report.

154. The changes proposed to the institutional aspects of the Committee result from a critical appraisal of more than 30 years of its experience, as described in chapter III, and in particular from the Committee's assessment of its own functioning, in light of the best provisions drawn from its previous and present ToRs.[115] These proposed changes infer a greater level of accountability from the part of all concerned actors. They place the "negotiation" phase only where it should be, i.e. in the negotiation bodies and after the phase of mutual information on new policy concepts and mutual consultation on those initiatives. The joint provision of information on agreements reached or not reached to both MS and staff-at-large should follow.

B. Making the Committee secretariat more effective and independent

155. The SMC's ToR outlines its President's role as that of a neutral moderator and of the Vice-President as his/her assistant and replacement in case of absence. However, their roles in-between sessions are not defined and there is no mention of compensation or term limits. Additionally, in the absence of a representative structure for United Nations Staff, the Vice President - by definition a staff member – has to speak on their behalf, without any formal assistance or mandate to do so and correctly fulfils this obligation. The Inspector finds merit in the former SMCC President's wish of having two separate Vice-Presidents elected respectively from the staff and the management. Each of them could present the positions of his/her side and conduct negotiations on their behalf as outlined in the new ToR on the SMC.

156. A Bureau composed of a neutral President and two Vice-Presidents could also strengthen the presidency by furthering his/her independence. The Vice-President elected by the SRBs could facilitate coordination among them while the Vice-President from the management side would ensure the full expression and coordination of the managers from the various duty stations and the Departments in charge of the field. This would alleviate some of the coordination responsibilities currently entrusted to USG-DM and ASG-HR who could then focus on appraising the Secretary-General on agreements to be worked on or arrived at.

157. The Bureau itself could play a leading role in monitoring the implementation of agreements reached by the Committee. The concerned managers, and, as appropriate, the Chairs of SRBs should be held accountable for their implementation. Once again, following SMCC XXXII, the Committee's "Secretariat"[116] initiated the monitoring of the implementation of agreements, with the upcoming plenary session of the Committee due to report on its outcome.

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[115] ST/SGB/2002/15 and ST/SGB/2011/6.
[116] A newly appeared structure succeeding a Secretary under the authority of OHRM.

158. To remove any perceived doubts as to the neutrality of the President, he/she should be guaranteed full operational independence from OHRM. In this regard, the Secretariat of the Committee should be placed under the sole authority of the President. It should have its own budget line within the OHRM budget, including significant funds dedicated to train SRs and MRs on SMR-related skills and knowledge.[117] A full-time Committee Secretary (P staff) and a full-time assistant (GS staff) should be seconded from OHRM to the Committee Secretariat, working year-round undertaking the necessary research, providing logistical support on SMR related issues and activities and assisting in the dissemination of information in-between sessions.

C. Clarification on to whom each text will be applicable and who should discuss it

159. In line with Chapter VII.D., greater clarity of the status and scope of negotiated texts is necessary prior to the commencement of any negotiations and should be based on:

(a) The assurance that provisions to be discussed fall either under the sole responsibility of the Secretary-General and are subsequently discussed exclusively within the Committee; or fall within the realm of the General Assembly, entailing the need for a common position or recommendation made to this body through the parallel channels of the relevant official(s) delegated by the Secretary General the Staff Federations for the SRBs;

(b) Joint identification and delineation of the United Nations entities to whom the provisions and texts under discussion would be fully applicable without further negotiation following a Committee agreement; or should be subject to further discussions between each EH and each SRB within the separately administered organs and programmes;

(c) An analytical study by the SMC legal officer on the delegation of authority to associate entities by the Secretary-General. Responsibilities of associate members would thus depend on such examinations, and their representation (on both sides) should conform to the principle that **only (all) those who would be held accountable for an agreement should participate in the decision-making process**.

D. Giving time and space to analysis and consultations

160. As noted in chapter III, limitations, frustrations and suspicions surrounding most past SMCC sessions arising from the late reception of its agenda as well as the availability of limited documentation for advanced preparation and effective preliminary consultations within each side, are yet to be addressed. Such delays played a major role in the failure of the January 2010 special session on contractual arrangements. The situation deteriorated before SMCC XXXII (2011) as **its provisional agenda was not determined during the previous session as is typically the case.** SRs in Geneva received the agenda and related documentation less than two weeks prior to coming to the preparatory meetings - insufficient time for undertaking necessary consultations with the staff-at-large or for drafting a unified counter-proposal on the staff side. Unfortunately this absence of provisional agenda was repeated in June 2011 for the forthcoming session of SMC, for which only the venue in Arusha) was decided. **The current situation requires a major change whereby more time is given to all interested managers and staff members to prepare themselves and develop a common understanding on the issues at stake through a series of meetings and exchanges of comments.**

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[117] Such funding for training is currently provided for in the DFS programme budget section and could be partially transferred to OHRM section for this purpose.

161. The 2012 SMC session due to be held prior to the sixty-seventh General Assembly session dedicated to Human Resources Management, will provide the opportunity to discuss and decide upon further major improvements in its working processes, including, as per the suggestions made in the present report, giving more time to SMC participants. To this end, the session could also discuss the possible transformation of future sessions from a **five-day event entailing some working groups into an annual five-month process** to be completed by June[118] which will give to each stakeholder greater guarantees of transparency, democracy and efficiency as elaborated below**.** The implementation of the revised process implies that all SRs involved be granted the necessary time-release to allow for their meaningful participation:

(a) New topics and texts for inclusion into the SMC's agenda (prepared on the basis of the provisional agenda discussed by the preceding session) should be received by the SMC Secretariat by the **end of January** for immediate dissemination to all members;[119]

(b) A virtual "organizational" session (via video/teleconference) of the 18 SMC members chaired by the President should be held by **mid-February** to: elect and appoint a Vice-President (from each side); to adopt the session agenda; determine with the assistance of the legal adviser whether an issue falls within the realm of authority of the Secretary-General; assess the interest of the associate members; allocate a limited number of major issues to as many WGs; and nominate three representatives per side and per WG as chosen by each party;

(c) A process of internal consultation within each side until the **end of March** to give them enough time and flexibility to prepare their respective positions. For the SRBs, this would include discussions with staff-at-large on initiatives and texts as disseminated, collecting and recording their reactions and developing a common negotiating position shared among all SRs (and possibly MRs if appropriate); for HR managers, this would include working towards a common position based on the inputs of individual managers. This six week period would also allow all representatives (members and associate members) to: familiarize themselves with rules and provisions presently in effect for the issue under consideration, and to compare the possible consequences (both positive and negative) of the changes envisaged to them; to raise questions on the justifications behind proposed changes; to gather information on similar best practice initiatives in other contexts (if available); and to share the viewpoints of each side with the SMC President and Secretary through a position paper disseminated to all SRs and MRs;

(d) The first series of Working Group meetings (lasting 2-3 days each) to discuss and negotiate on the designated issue prior to **mid-April**; upon completion, jointly drafted issue reports would be immediately disseminated by the Secretariat to all Committee members and when appropriate, associate members, with a clear identification of points of agreement and disagreement.

(e) A five day general meeting of all SMC members and when appropriate, associate members, at the **beginning of May** to deliberate on all issues on the agenda, particularly the WG reports. Taking the previous steps into account, further preparatory consultations among members of the same side would appear unnecessary at this stage or should be reduced to a minimum; a detailed report on each agenda item, once closed, would be drafted by the co-rapporteurs with a clear delineation on points of agreement and

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[118] All proposed times are for illustrative purposes only and can be modified by the Committee.

[119] Pertinent topics/texts can include: new/proposed initiatives, follow-up on previous decisions, consequences of GA resolutions impacting upon staff welfare, implications of changes in staff rules and AIs on the basis of ongoing discussions in the ICSC, HLCM and HR network.

disagreement as well as outlining the schedule, venue and provisional agenda of the next annual session at the earliest. The agreed texts would be immediately conveyed by the USG for DM or the ASG for HR to the Secretary-General for signature.

(f) On issues where disagreements persist, the Bureau, Secretary and the WGs concerned would meet for one last time **at the end of May** to try to attain an agreed outcome. If successful, a complementary WG report would be prepared and conveyed immediately by the USG for Management or the ASG for Human Resources to the Secretary-General (who would have followed the negotiations in real time) for signature. The Secretary-General would then be fully committed and accountable for defending the agreements reached before the Member States, promulgating them through administrative issuances and monitoring their effective implementation.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

162. The research by the Joint Inspection Unit project team revealed that while the principles of staff-management relations in the United Nations are solidly established by various legally binding texts, including numerous General Assembly resolutions, the implementation of these principles is far from satisfactory at most levels, precipitating in a crisis in SMR in 2010-11. In order to attain effective agreements in SMR, the necessity for the Secretary-General and senior management representatives "to ensure the effective participation of the staff in identifying, examining and resolving issues relating to staff welfare, including conditions of work, general conditions of life and other human resources policies" may represent a difficult deviation from business as usual procedures for stakeholders whose mindsets are strictly tried to that of a hierarchic organizational culture. Safeguarding SMR would involve nothing less than a change in management culture. The report has highlighted some major points in this respect:

(a) The scope of issues of which the Secretary-General / senior management should engage with SRs is clearly defined and limited by Staff Regulations 8.1(a) and 8.2 (see annex I). Compared to the total number of issues on which the United Nations is currently engaged, interaction with the staff is only formally necessary in a small fraction of them. Subsequently, providing for such participation would clearly not amount to the "co-management" of the organization, as sometimes feared;

(b) While the Secretary-General is bound by the rules and regulations of the organization to engage the staff on issues that affect them, such engagement should not in any way be viewed as the partial usurpation of the Secretary-General's authority by the staff side. It should be remembered that **the Secretary-General, as the Chief administrative officer of the United Nations, has the final say to accept or reject any proposed agreement on issues where he/she is designated as the ultimate authority**. Subsequently, as per the Inspector's proposal for a reformed Committee, if the Secretary-General or his/her delegated representative follows negotiations as they occur, then he/she will have the necessary time (and he/she certainly has the authority) to fully consider any proposed agreement in all its aspects before agreeing and signing on to it;

(c) If the aforementioned principles and procedures are applied, the inclusion of the staff representatives in certain decision-making processes should be of great value added to the effective functioning of the organization and contribute to a more positive work environment;

(d) Credible and thoughtful agreements that take into account all possible angles of an issue cannot and should not be deliberated and determined overnight and may require different time frames, from days to months. In order to ensure that there are no unnecessary shocks or surprises for either side, **the three steps necessary to attaining agreements in good-faith - namely, timely mutual information, mutual consultation and negotiation – must be respected** (and complemented by the provision of relevant information jointly by SRs and MRs to all concerned parties). In this regard, it is important to recall the conclusion reached in chapter VI that all features characterizing collective bargaining do already exist in most formal SMR negotiating processes in the United Nations, in particular the SMC and the JNCs. The applicability of the concepts of negotiation and the right to collective bargaining should be officially acknowledged by the General Assembly through the approval of a staff regulation to be drafted by the Secretary-General as recommended in chapter VI above, as applied selectively to certain JBs. Additionally, the Organization and its separately administered organs and programmes should explicitly acknowledge their adherence to the standards and principles emerging from the ILO's relevant

Conventions and Recommendations, particularly the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work;

(e) The appropriate framework for negotiations will vary according to the nature and scope of the issue under consideration, from the SMC for issues with Secretariat-wide significance, to Joint Bodies for duty-station specific issues to informal discussions between line managers and the staff of their unit for issues specific to a department or unit (in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity).

(f) **Agreements reached** in the aforementioned fora, with due representation of both staff and management, **should be accompanied by a necessary joint monitoring and implementation framework, clearly determining who on each side is to be held accountable for these tasks, with a clearly defined time-frame for action**. Given the means available to it, management is best placed to be held accountable for this task, beginning with the Secretary-General as first administrative officer of the United Nations and the EH of every United Nations entity.

163. At a time when the General Assembly has requested the Secretary-General to focus on the management of the Organization on the basis of accountability[120], the aforementioned principles should apply fully to both SRBs (in particular their leaders toward their constituents from the staff-at-large) and Management (in particular at the senior level), in parallel with adherence to the highest standards of efficiency, competence, and integrity as mentioned in Article 101.3 of the United Nations Charter, applicable equally to both staff and management. The need for SMR training for representatives on either side is vital in this regard.

164. Staff participation in SRBs should be clearly encouraged and should not be viewed with either condescension, annoyance or suspicion by the management side at any level; this would help to dispel any lingering apprehension (either justified or otherwise) of possible management retaliation regarding staff representational functions, foster transparency and good-faith in their interaction and further the possibility for constructive dialog at any level (as evidenced from the past positive experiences in the SMCC). Active and accountable SRBs are one of best manifestations of democracy in practice at the grassroots level of the United Nations.

165. It is the Inspector's expectation that the findings of this report, including lessons learnt from the past and recommendations for the way forward, will also benefit the staff and management of the specialized agencies of the United Nations system who will be the subject of a forthcoming report on SMR in the common system, as adopted in the JIU's programme of work for 2011.[121]

[120] See General Assembly resolution 64/259, including for the agreed definition.
[121] See A/65/34 para 118.

Annex I
Regulations and Rules on Staff Relations
ST/SGB/2011/1

Staff Regulations:
Article VIII: Staff relations

Regulation 8.1

(a) The Secretary-General shall establish and maintain continuous contact and communication with the staff in order to ensure the effective participation of the staff in identifying, examining and resolving issues relating to staff welfare, including conditions of work, general conditions of life and other human resources policies;

(b) Staff representative bodies shall be established and shall be entitled to initiate proposals to the Secretary-General for the purpose set forth in paragraph (a) above. They shall be organized in such a way as to afford equitable representation to all staff members, by means of elections that shall take place at least biennially under electoral regulations drawn up by the respective staff representative body and agreed to by the Secretary-General.

Regulation 8.2

The Secretary-General shall establish joint staff-management machinery at both local and Secretariat-wide levels to advise him or her regarding human resources policies and general questions of staff welfare as provided in regulation 8.1.

Staff Rules:
Chapter VIII: Staff relations

Rule 8.1: Staff representative bodies and staff representatives

Definitions

(a) The term “staff representative bodies”, as used in the present chapter of the Staff Rules, shall be deemed to include staff associations, unions or other corresponding staff representative bodies established in accordance with staff regulation 8.1 (b).

(b) Staff representative bodies may be established for a duty station or for a group of duty stations. Staff members serving in duty stations where no staff representative body exists may seek representation through a staff representative body at another duty station.

(c) Each member of the staff may participate in elections to a staff representative body, and all staff serving at a duty station where a staff representative body exists shall be eligible for election to it, subject to any exceptions as may be provided in the statutes or electoral regulations drawn up by the staff representative body concerned and meeting the requirements of staff regulation 8.1 (b).

(d) Polling officers selected by the staff shall conduct the election of the members of each staff representative body, on the basis of the electoral regulations of the staff representative body concerned, in such a way as to ensure the complete secrecy and fairness of the vote. The polling officers shall also conduct other elections of staff members as required by the Staff Regulations and Staff Rules.

(e) No staff member shall threaten, retaliate against or attempt to retaliate against a staff representative exercising his or her functions under the present chapter.

(f) **The staff representative bodies shall be entitled to effective participation, through their duly elected executive committees, in identifying, examining and resolving issues relating to staff welfare, including conditions of work, general conditions of life and other human resources policies, and shall be entitled to make proposals to the Secretary-General on behalf of the staff.**

(g) In accordance with the principle of freedom of association, staff members may form and join associations, unions or other groupings. However, formal contact and communication on the matters referred to in paragraph (f) above shall be conducted at each duty station through the executive committee of the staff representative body, which shall be the sole and exclusive representative body for such purpose.

(h) **General administrative instructions or directives on questions within the scope of paragraph (f) above shall be transmitted in advance**, unless emergency situations make it impracticable, to the executive committees of the staff representative bodies concerned for consideration and comment before being placed in effect.

Rule 8.2: Joint staff-management machinery

(a) The joint staff-management machinery provided for in staff regulation 8.2 shall consist of:

(i) Joint advisory committees or corresponding staff-management bodies, at designated duty stations, normally composed of not fewer than three and not more than seven staff representatives and an equal number of representatives of the Secretary-General;

(ii) A Secretariat-wide joint staff-management body composed of equal number of representatives of the staff and representatives of the Secretary-General.

(b) The President of the joint staff-management bodies referred to in paragraph (a) above shall be selected by the Secretary-General from a list proposed by the staff representatives.

(c) Instructions or directives embodying recommendations made by the bodies referred to in paragraph (a) above shall be regarded as having satisfied the requirements of staff rule 8.1 (f) and (h).

(d) The joint staff-management bodies referred to in paragraph (a) above shall establish their own rules and procedures.

(e) The Secretary-General shall designate secretaries of the joint staff management bodies referred to in paragraph (a) above and shall arrange for such services as may be necessary for their proper functioning.

Annex II

Table of the perceived quality of SMR through the SMCC reports

The following table of the quality of SMR during the SMCC sessions, only drawn from their respective reports and annexes, as perceived by the Inspector is based on the importance and the number of agreements (and disagreements) reached by each session, with more weight given to the substantive over the procedural agreements, and a view to the speeches and position papers of both parties' leaders.

PERCEIVED QUALITY OF STAFF – MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AT SMCC					
SMCC session number	**Date of Session**	**Location**	**Apparently Productive**	**Fair**	**Poor/ Challenging**
I	Sept. 1980	Vienna	X		
II	June 1981	NYHQ		X	
III	Sept. 1981	NYHQ			X
IV	April 1982	NYHQ		X	
V	Sept. 1982	NYHQ	X		
VI	March 1983	Vienna	X		
VII	Sept.1983	NYHQ	X		
VIII	April 1984	Geneva			X
IX	Sept. 1984	NYHQ		X	
X	June 1985	NYHQ			X
	1986			NO SMCC	
XI	June 1987	Geneva	X		
XII	March 1988	NYHQ			X
XIII	March 1989	NYHQ			X
XIV	March 1990	Geneva	X		
XV	June 1991	NYHQ	X		
XVI	June 1992	NYHQ		X	
XVII	Sept. 1993	NYHQ	X		
XVIII	June 1994	NYHQ	X		
XIX	June 1995	Amman	X		
XX	Sept-Oct. 1996	NYHQ	X		
XXI	June 1997	NYHQ	X		
XXII	May 1998	Bangkok	X		
XXIII	July 1999	NYHQ	X		
XXIV	April-May 2000	Vienna		X	
XXV	Oct. 2001	NYHQ	X		
XXVI	Sept-Oct. 2002	NYHQ			X
	2003-5			NO SMCC	
XXVII	June 2006	NYHQ	X		
XXVIII	June-July 2007	Nicosia			X
XXIX	June 2008	NYHQ	X		
XXX	June 2009	Nairobi		X	
XXXI	June 2010	Beirut		X (during meeting)	
XXXII	June 2011	Belgrade			X

Annex III

Staff-Management issues in SMCC sessions

Issues	Session date and relevant paragraphs[122]
Staff-Management Relations	June 2011 (17-22); June 2008 (17-22); July 2007 (14-19); Oct. 2002 (48-58, 63-66); May 2000 (57-61); June 1997 (86-87); Oct. 1996 (38-57, 98-99); June 1995 (53-70); June 1994 (72-77); Sept. 1993 (16, 35-47); June 1992 (46-51); June 1991 (14-21); March 1990 (19-27); March 1989 (81-95; 108-109); March 1988 (84-90); June 1987 (14-23); June 1985 (9-19); Sept. 1984 (12-16); April 1984 (11-15; 59-60); Sept. 1983 (8-9); Oct. 1982 (50); April 1982 (20-23); Sept. 1981 (30-31); June 1981(28-30); Sept. 1980 (8).
Facilities provided to SRs	May 1998 (105); June 1997 (23-26); Oct. 1996 (12-13); June 1994 (26-28).
Rights and obligations of SRs and facilities to be provided	April 1982 (39-44); Sept. 1981 (29); June 1981(31-32); Sept. 1980 (9).
Participation of Staff in JBs	Oct 2001 (152-155); March 1988 (21); June 1987 (97-100); Sept. 1980 (10).
Implementation of SMCC agreements	June 2011 (14-16); June 2010 (13-14, 57-58); June 2009 (15-17); June 2008 (15-16); July 2007 (5-7); June 2006 (6-25); Oct. 1996 (12-13, 38-57, 98-99); July 1999 (47-62); March 1983 (13-23).

[122] See the correspondence between dates and roman numerals for SMCC sessions in Annex II.

Annex IV

Overview of action to be taken by participating organizations on the recommendations of the Joint Inspection Unit

		Intended impact	United Nations, its funds and programmes													Specialized agencies and IAEA													
			United Nations*	UNCTAD	UNODC	UNEP	UN-Habitat	UNHCR	UNRWA	UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	WFP	UNOPS	UN-Women	ILO	FAO	UNESCO	ICAO	WHO	UPU	ITU	WMO	IMO	WIPO	UNIDO	UNWTO	IAEA
Report	For action		☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	For information		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒
Recommendation 1		**e**	**E**																										
Recommendation 2		**c**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**																	
Recommendation 3		**e**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**																	
Recommendation 4		**c**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**																	
Recommendation 5		**a**	**L**																										
Recommendation 6		**c**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**	**E**																	

Legend: **L:** Recommendation for decision by legislative organ
E: Recommendation for action by executive head
Recommendation does not require action by this organization

Intended impact: **a:** enhanced accountability **b:** dissemination of best practices **c:** enhanced coordination and cooperation **d:** enhanced controls and compliance **e:** enhanced effectiveness **f:** significant financial savings **g:** enhanced efficiency **o:** other

* Covers all entities listed in ST/SGB/2002/11 other than UNCTAD, UNODC, UNEP, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNRWA.

Supplementary paper to JIU/REP/2011/10: Staff-management relations within the United Nations

Historical and recent background of staff-management relations within the United Nations

Prepared by Inspector Biraud, under his sole responsibility, May 2012

Not an official document, to read the report JIU/REP/2011/10, click here

Introduction

Staff-Management Relations are the tip of the iceberg: their quality measures of a result: what is immediately seen and perceived on both "sides", not the underlying reasons explaining changes. The existence and development of international organizations have for long been justified by the perceived impossibility to find purely national solutions to more and more issues recognized as critical and the necessity to entrust them to a dedicated growing International Civil Service.(section I below). Its subsequent growth followed the development of the mandates and scope of the international organizations due to the historical, technological, demographical, economic, ideological and political transformations of the World since one century, As such, those upward adaptations, in a still restricted skills world market were not, a source of major SMR difficulties (section II). But progressively a general realization by the member States, as contributors that other changes are necessary to decrease the financial burden of the secretariats became a major if not, for some of them the major reasons for budgetary conservatism, as well as HR "reform" as the latter had progressively become a must in the private sector entities looking to maximized short term profit including through minimizing all costs. Hence a number of new human resources policies appeared (section III), imported by the organizations from member States where similar experiences had been made (section IV) **Change management became a major part of HR management: this is giving today a particular actuality to an informed SMR** as the logics behind each proposal should be explained to, consulted and negotiated with the staff at large through its legitimate representatives with mutual full transparency, cleverness, good faith and respect.

The experience shows that when advantages for the general interest of the organizations concerned are demonstrated, when their main values are respected and where there is a "continuous contact" between staff representatives and Management up to the highest level, the Staff representative bodies accept surprisingly well those changes. By contrast, SMR crisis appear in case of collision of

the recommended changes with the logics of the organization fundamental texts, as internalized by its staff. This is aggravated or even created where prevail clumsiness, authoritarianism, lack of transparency, communication and consultation with the staff representative bodies. They were precisely created to avoid those situations of bad surprise, fait accompli and no-recognition.
The present note offers four approaches to the SMR background which can be read separately and address respectively:

I) The roots of the international civil service;
II) The broad evolution and dissemination in United Nations staff jobs and functions;
III) Some major trends and questions in Human Resources policies in the national public sectors
IV) Which type of future Human Resources management?

I. 1920-1950: Birth of the International Civil Service and Staff-Management Relations[1]

In the 19th century, when multilateral events were restricted to international conferences, the need to have small ad-hoc units to provide an organizational background was generally agreed upon. The members of the secretariats of various "international unions" on technical issues related with transports and communications were either recruited from the host country or seconded by member governments.[2] For the first time the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907 had a secretariat composed of diplomats from participating countries.

The concept of the modern international civil service was first realized in the international Secretariat of the League of Nations (LON) and in the International Labour Office (ILO) in Geneva, 1920[3]. It can be traced to the vision and proposals of the first Secretary-General of the LON who summarized the civil service tasks needed to prepare the new conferences as follows: "summing up the points of convergence among national representatives and preparing the discussion of others". "Further, we maintained that the execution of decisions should be entrusted to people who, being the servants of all the State Members of the League, could be relied upon to carry them out with complete freedom from national bias. (…) Under this scheme the Secretary-General would not only be the coordinating centre of the activities of the Secretariat, but its members would be responsible to him alone, and not to the Governments of the countries of which they were nationals, and would be remunerated from the general funds of the League "[4].
These principles were supported and further specified in the reports of three League Committees published between 1920 and 1930. **The Balfour Report**[5] of 1920 stated that "members of the Secretariat once appointed are no longer the servants of the country of which they are citizens, but become for the time being the servants only of the League of Nations." In accordance with this **principle of loyalty, they should consider only the best interest of their Intergovernmental Organization** (IGO), a requirement stipulated by the Staff regulations in 1930 (and subsequently by art. 100 of the UNITED NATIONS Charter): "They may not seek or receive instructions from any government or other authority external to the secretariat of the League of Nations".

1 See Dobromir Mihajlov: Origin and Early Development of International Civil Service in Miskolc Journal of International Law, to which the first part of this note owes much.
2 Bennett, A. Le Roy : International Organizations, Principles and Issues, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 4th edition 1988, p. 386
3 The bolded parts of this note result from the Inspector's wish.
4 Article in The World Today, March 1924, as quoted by Robert S. Jordan (ed.) – International Administration: Its Evolution and Contemporary Applications, Oxford University Press, 1971, p. 48.
5 Official Journal (of the League of Nations), June 1920, pp.136-139.

The only definition of the principle of loyalty quoted by different studies was formulated by Suzanne Basdevant,[6] "***An international civil servant is*** *a person to whom the representatives of several States, or an organ acting on their behalf, have entrusted, in virtue of an inter-State agreement and under their supervision, the continuous and exclusive exercise of functions in the common interests of the States in question subject to special legal rules"*. Based on judgments 26 and 37 to 46 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal (UNAT), the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion of 13 July 1954[7] dealt with contracts arranging employment relationships of staff and pointed out **the organization's responsibility as employer towards the staff**, contesting the "right" of the General Assembly as budgetary power to oppose the supplementary appropriation requested by the Secretary-General in order to pay the compensations awarded to employees as per the decision of the Tribunal.[8]

The Balfour Report also stresses the **necessity that officials should obtain a lasting or at least a stable position**. Some of the main findings of **the Noblemaire Report**[9] of 1921 also motivated international officials and enhanced the attractiveness of their career. It stated that **their recruitment and career should be based on merit and not on national or political protection.** It urged that staff should be selected **reflecting a wide geographical distribution**. **Permanent employment contracts** are proposed to increase job security and to strengthen the capability of officials to resist pressures exerted by their home governments. And last but not least is the recommendation that for the sake of attracting highly qualified officials, **it is indispensable to establish their salary level as exceeding or at least equal to the best paid national civil services in the world** (at that time the UK, followed by the USA after WWII). This reflected the lesson from the experience of the Institute for Agriculture in Rome, predecessor to the FAO, where the low salaries offered at its creation could not attract and retain in Rome many other nationals other than Italians.[10]

As soon as an international civil service appeared, staff and management were facing challenges in the implementation of their complementary roles to be performed for the organizations. The LON Secretariat had to be built up with no precedents to serve as guide[11], while ILO Secretariat grappled with the question of "rights guaranteed to members of the staff."[12] The first Staff Regulations in the ILO Secretariat, resulted from **negotiations between members of administration and representatives of staff**; the outcome document, entitled: "Rights Guaranteed to Members of Staff" was issued around 1 May 1920, with a Chapter IV named "**Staff Committee and the Joint Committee**", where Article 9(1) stated in a very positive manner that those Committees were **vested with the powers to "facilitate relations between the Director and the staff as a whole**, and place these *relations* on a more regular basis." The Staff Committee envisaged in the aforementioned rules emerged as a new entity, the "**Staff Union**", presumably reflecting the mode of thinking of trade unions.
Meanwhile, the first case of litigation by a staff member against the organization took place in 1925 and was a unique step in its historical development. For the purpose, an ad-hoc board of jurists was consulted, and in 1927 the Assembly established **the first (temporary) Administrative Tribunal**

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6 Les fonctionnaires Internationaux, Librairie du Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1931, the first chapter of which is devoted to the definition of the International Civil Servants.
7 Effects of awards of compensation made by the United Nations Administrative Tribunal
8 Secretary-General report A/2534
9 Actes de la Deuxième Assemblée, Séances Plénières, 1921, pp. 595-626
10 The international treaty establishing the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome signed in 1905 by 38 countries defined for the first time as "international" the administrative staff of the Institute. It recommended that all staff should be recruited by the parties to the treaty, though their appointment had to be previously approved by the Italian government. Another novelty was that officials of the Institute were conferred some privileges and immunities and some regulations tried to decrease their dependence from the home country
11 Supra n.1, p. 176
12 Supra n. 2, p. 15.

which was **the predecessor of the permanent bodies which in ILO and the U.N. administered justice with regards to claims in the domain of employment relationships in international administrations**.
In their first conferences in Washington and in New York in 1943, **the Allies under the name of United Nations** reaffirmed that the empiric evidence collected for 20 years was enough to back up the necessity of the new institution for practicable management of international affairs. The first beneficiaries of the concept were the members of the Preparatory Commission of the United Nations whose recommendation to take over and apply the principles formulated by the first LON Secretary-General was finally reflected in the Charter of the Organization of the United Nations (Articles 100-101).
When the UN was created in 1945 with elements taken from existing prior models of the international civil service, HR and SMR were those of the politically (but not technically) discredited LON,[13] the ILO Secretariat[14] and the Foreign Services of countries like the USA and UK.

In the first years of the United Nations, the role of professional and support staff was aimed essentially at promoting, respectively, the political basis and logistics of **normative and parliamentary functions**, i.e. documentation, research, substantive studies and missions of experts focused on peace, international law, human rights and disarmament on one hand, and logistics of conference services on the other.

"In its report to the Secretary General on 31 October 1949, the **Flemming Committee recommended what is by and large the structure of posts we still have**, with different categories: the General Service, Professional and higher categories. With this recommendation, the Committee abolished the 19-grade scale that had been carried over from the LON With regard to General Service (GS) staff, the Flemming Committee recommended that: *"**salaries and wages for locally engaged staff** should be fixed and paid in local currency and **should be sufficiently high to recruit and retain staff of high quality and standing.** This means that, generally speaking, a local salary and wage scale should be equivalent to the "best" prevailing local rates, corresponding to the situation at headquarters. Particular account should be taken of rates paid by governmental or public authorities in the area where such authorities themselves use the formula of best prevailing rates".* [15]

The newly recruited staff members were highly qualified, young and motivated and considered themselves (at least) as the international equivalent of national public servants, in particular those of the foreign affairs ministries. They strove towards a lifelong career in the stable environments of New York and Geneva, punctuated for some by missions in the field.

The specialized agencies based in Rome (FAO), Geneva (ILO, WHO, UNHCR) and Paris (UNESCO) were not so different, working fundamentally as discussion fora in their respective technical areas, and benefiting from a nucleus of high level experts with the requisite technical knowledge necessary for their normative functions.

The staff were and in principle continue to be recruited on the basis of the Noblemaire Principle, carried on from the time of the LON and Flemming principle, to ensure respectively to the U.N. professional selected on the world labour market and the GS staff on the local market optimal

13 See Howard-Ellis C. *The Origin Structure and Working of the League of Nations*, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1928.
14 See Djokitch Alexandre, The Staff Union of International Labour Office – Its origins and the commencement of its activity, Geneva: ILO, 1973.
15 Gerhard Schramek's article "General Service salaries: the Flemming principle" written for the ICSC Working Group for the comprehensive review of the General Service salary survey methodology (1997).

working conditions and full independence at a time when many nations were in a rebuilding phase and eager to keep their qualified national staff to themselves.

II. 1950-2010 Growth, Diversification and dissemination of the United Nations labour force

Various factors contributed rapidly towards eroding the reality and legitimacy of a quasi-monopoly by career civil servants, particularly in New York, on SMR in the organization: the growth and diversification of the labour force, its decentralization with the creation of both Offices Away from Headquarters (OAH) (Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi) and a global network of duty stations focused on humanitarian, development, peace keeping, peace building and post-conflict rehabilitation tasks.

A) Development focus and decentralization

Beyond the continuation of its original studies and debates on the conditions for peace, disarmament, law of the sea etc. polarized by the cold war climate, the decline of colonialism increased the responsibilities of the United Nations and its various specialized agencies by enhancing the need for the promotion of development in the newly independent countries, shifting thinking and research towards developmental goals and related operational activities. The United Nations and its specialized agencies in agriculture, education, health, employment, industry etc. subsequently witnessed a corresponding shift in priorities, spearheaded by the new majority of developing countries.

The efforts of the main contributors to strictly limit the recourse to assessed budget for the funding of technical cooperation and humanitarian activities resulted in the development of new instruments relying exclusively on voluntary contributions, such as UNICEF, WFP, UNHCR, UNRWA and UNFPA. UNDP served as the main instrument for allocating funds towards furthering technical assistance capacities within the UN system and other entities. Under the leadership of UNDP resident representatives, then the UN resident coordinators, the capitals of developing countries witnessed an influx of representatives and international experts from bilateral and multilateral agencies, particularly of the UN system. Many agencies furthered decentralization efforts with shift in staff from headquarters to national and regional structures in developing countries.

B) Geneva-New York-Geneva

Prior to the United Nations, Geneva hosted several international organizations including the ICRC (since 1863), ITU (since 1865)[16] and ILO (since 1919). Subsequent agencies to headquarter themselves in Geneva include: WHO (since 1946/8); WMO (since 1951) succeeding International Meteorological Organization (since 1873); WIPO (since 1967) and UNAIDS (since 2001). Non-UN IGOs headquartered in Geneva include IOM (since 1951) and WTO (since 1995). Within the UN Secretariat,[17] Geneva hosts UNECE (since 1947), UNHCR (since 1950), UNCTAD (since 1964), Conference on Disarmament (since 1979), OHCHR (since 1993), and OCHA (since 1998) - all established by the General Assembly. a global then regional structure dedicated to environment has also been operational in Geneva. The United Nations Office in Geneva (UNOG) established in 1966 as the first of three OAHs and succeeding the European Office of the UN, also manages some cultural and administrative functions to more rationally serve a number of these entities. The organization's expansion has increased UNOG-Staff Coordinating Council's (UNOG SCC) responsibilities, with the HR structure in Geneva being stretched between HR personnel in some entities (like UNCTAD and OHCHR, International Trade Center) and HRM in UNOG, but also HE related actions and certainly policies being determined in New York.

16 Named until 1934 Union Télégraphique Internationale (UTI)

17 See ST/SGB/1997/5 Organization of the Secretariat of the United Nations

C) Operational peace keeping and peace building activities

Shortly after its creation, the United Nations began participating in peace keeping missions through dispatching military observers,[18] police and military contingents and operations units – resulting in the creation of a new category of civilian employees - the field officers. **The growth in peace-keeping operations in the last two decades** has been a well-known factor in the transformation of the United Nations labour force. Spurred on by the Security Council, many new functions were created (policing, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, establishment of the rule of law, exercise of judicial power, operational protection of human rights, and the de-facto assumption of the entire governance function as in the cases of Kosovo and East Timor). **The corresponding structures required distinct categories of U.N. staff, in particular between international and national or local staff, novel recruitment strategies, lines of authority and differentiated conditions of service.** Such functions were characterized by dissimilar appointment categories, delicate civilian-military relations, less safety and often more difficult work-life relations, particularly in "non-family missions".

After initially being represented by UNSU, the civilian component of the first generation of Peace Keeping Operations separated into two SRBs, when the mobile Field Service officers created the UN Field Service Staff Union (FSSU), justified by their conditions of service differing greatly from HQ staff in New York. The professional field staff managed to structure themselves into one staff union with a global dimension and many local committees. The New York based UNSU continues to officially represent the local (national) staff in field missions (whose conditions of service are even more contrasted compared to HQ staff).

D) A growing membership to serve

From its 51 founding Member States in 1945, UN membership expanded rapidly to 99 Members States by 1960, 127 by 1970, 154 by 1980 and 193 today, augmented largely in the 1950s-70s by the newly independent post-colonial States and in the 1990s by the breakup of a number of states in Eastern Europe. New efforts were also required for the countries "in transition". In addition to the above-mentioned growing complexity, the UN's parliamentary machinery also grew in relation to its membership, resulting in a steadily increasing number of administrative and financial posts. Such growth was further compounded by the successive adoption of four new official UN languages, justifying the creation of numerous conference services and linguistic posts in Geneva and New York followed by Vienna.

E) Resulting decentralized, diversified and fragmented Staff-Management Relations

As a result of these transformations, institutional arrangements - particularly Staff Regulations 8.1 and 8.2 on "Staff relations", initially conceived for one U.N. Staff Council and one Joint Advisory Committee, have been extended and decentralized over the years. They now include OAHs, field staff in 40+ duty stations represented by UNFSU and the regional economic commissions (Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Beirut and Santiago). Inevitably, such expansion, depriving the New York-centric UNSU from its initial monopole, created an understandable frustration among its members and leaders.

In the eighties, an effort was made to give some coordination tool to the various UN SRBs, with the creation of a Staff-Management Coordination Committee (SMCC) inaugurated in 1980. It met nearly every year until its 32nd session in June 2011, gathering an equal number of Staff and Management Representatives from all UN Secretariat and associated UN entities (except UNRWA & WFP), for mutual consultation and negotiation. But the UN SRBs never established the representative legal structure which would have democratically federated them into one UN meta-association or union representing the whole UN Staff through one established democratic process and one authorized spokesperson, with the necessary communications procedures. FICSA, CCISUA

18 1948: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) still existing; 1949: United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) still existing, to be followed by dozens of others.

and UNISERV are not recognized as performing such a role at the SMCC level, even though they are active in the ICSC and to a lesser extent within the HLCM.

III. 1980-2008 Evolution of employment relations in the Public Sector of the "model" countries[19]

Shaped in the 20th century by western national civil services, could the international civil service develop in pure isolation while the various national public sectors and civil services which initially served as models were transforming in depth, including their industrial relations? For the United Nations and its sister organizations, living and managed in a changing world, some important questions have to be raised from the analysis of the transformation observed in the EU and OECD countries.

A) Job security versus denial of the right to negotiate wages

The international civil service was born from a conception where the State or the public service was the representative of the general interest of the nation, including the interest of its employees. Thus, the independence of its staff members had to be especially protected and preserved from both private and national pressures and temptations. At the national level, this translated into a special employment status, consisting of various substantive and procedural prerogatives: apart from employment security, other special conditions focused on aspects of the internal labour market, such as recruitment, the job classification system, vertical and horizontal mobility and careers as well as compensation schemes. Initially, privileged conditions of service were conceived to compensate for the denial of the right to collective bargaining to establish salary scales (and at times also of the right of association and the right to strike) in favor of unilateral regulation of the terms and conditions of employment through laws or administrative measures.

B) A new, private sector inspired HR management

Since the early 1960s, the clear-cut differentiation between the system of public and private sector employment relations became increasingly blurred as the number of employees engaged in typical welfare state activities (education, health and social services) rapidly increased and such services were often provided by the private sector which used employment contracts subject to ordinary or commercial law. In the 1980s and 1990s, cost-efficiency pressures due to increasing macro-economic constraints associated with the internationalization and the overall submission of the economy to financial criteria, as well as the development of sophisticated anti-tax technologies and tax-free paradises made fiscal discipline an economic imperative for all governments.

It became necessary to sustain investments and employment, control inflation, limit the burden on taxpayers, and improve the overall competitiveness of their respective economies. Within this context, the efficiency of public services and the containment of public sector expenditures, including take-home pay, became one of the urgent priorities of government economic policy in many countries. The number of non-permanent, fixed term, temporary or contingent and part time workers, as well as the use of real and disguised consultants or external collaborators increased steadily, although less so in the civil service and central government functions than elsewhere. Non-permanent fixed term contracts are often used at the two extremes of the job ladder: either at the most junior grade-level for manual and blue collar occupations, or at the most senior level for top managerial positions.

In the eighties, many political leaders and scholars were influenced by the beneficiaries of the deregulation principle, theoretically justified by the neoclassical macroeconomics of the Chicago

19 Much of this section id derived from the article "Trade unions and employment relations in the context of public sector change", International Journal of Public Sector Management, Volume 20, Issue 1 (2007), Emerald Insight Publishers.

school with Milton Friedman as its foremost champion. Unrealistic double digit profit rates and as limited as possible public intervention became universal standards, maintained in spite of their clear attached risks for the employees[20] and disadvantages for the final consumers and clients. Some of the reforms conceived for the national public services in previous years emphasized that the public sector had to borrow as much as possible from the private sector practices and its model of governance and employment relations. This selectively included, among its main features the strengthening and hardening of the powers and prerogatives of managers. .

C) Resulting changes in the status of public civil servants

"There is a range of imperatives for change that vary from the market-led to the politically directed and the technologically facilitated. [21] Ian Kirkpatrick identifies three main aspects of organizational change in the public sector which dovetail with the development of organizational forms in the private sector: a departure from vertical integration, the move to fragment and decentralize the management of public services, and the final one is the trend to more flexible service delivery and employment."[22]

Changes that have seriously challenged the special status of public service and central government employees in terms of reform strategies include:

1) **Cutting back the number and proportion of employees with special employment status**: This strategy has been pursued through privatization, outsourcing, non-replacement of retiring employees, increased turnover and the transfer of services and tasks from the central government to decentralized or independent authorities, with a possible shift of activities from career public servants to contractual employees.

2) **Eroding or weakening the special prerogatives attached to special employment status**: This strategy was pursued through gradual rule changes in national labour law as regards dismissal conditions, pay and promotion practices, retirement and pension arrangements; such gradual changes are more easily implemented than an outright abolition of the special status attached to career public servants.

Steps towards harmonization of special employment status with private sector practices were:

- Flexibility in recruitment practices;
- Reduction in importance of seniority in career and promotion processes in favor of merit and performance;
- Facilitation of mobility;
- Extension of fixed-term contracts to (senior) civil servants;
- Introduction of variable components in remuneration and performance-related pay;
- Curtailment of retirement and pension privileges;
- Weakening of job protection;
- Dismissal procedures and collective redundancies made easier and less costly.

The majority, if not all of the former EU 15 countries were affected by the processes of privatization and outsourcing of public services and state-owned activities, which in the 1990s also had a major impact on all the former communist countries of central and eastern Europe.

"In Western Europe where there are some of the most regulated systems of industrial relations, their transformation has become an acute debate both for trade unionists and employees. Forms of

20 Stress, harassment and even suicides when the human dimension of personnel management is removed from consideration.

21 "Post-Fordism and organization change within the state administration" in Alonso L.E. and Martinez Lucio M., (Eds) in Employment relations in a changing society, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2006

22 Miguel Marinez Lucio: The public sector , "old welfare states" and the politics of managerialism: introduction, Trade Unions and employment relations in the context of public sector change.

privatization, the adoption of quality management systems[23], the decentralization of service delivery, the adoption of new accounting standards, and increasingly individualized forms of management impact upon the way people in the public sector are managed."[24] The latter translates with a "greater emphasis on performance management and measurement within the public sector and its employment relations. There is an attempt at a greater alignment of pay and labour activities to determined outputs" and even "a cult of surveillance." The word 'client' appeared also in this context, including in the United Nations management language to parallel the firm-customer relations.

"Despite significant changes in 1990s and 2000s, a large proportion of central government employees in many EU countries continue to enjoy special status". Two key features stand out within the public sector: a distinction between employees with special employment status (career civil servants) usually subject to public or administrative law and personnel on ordinary employment contracts, subject to private or commercial law." In almost every country, there is "a system where career civil servants – unlike public workers under ordinary employment contract and private sector employees – are usually appointed unilaterally or 'nominated' by administrative measure, and enjoy special prerogatives in terms of recruitment, career, mobility, job protection and often remuneration and pension arrangements."

Another typical feature of the public sector in Western Europe is the **fragmentation of its organizational structure:** apart from ideological divisions (with former Confederations recognizing themselves in the Christian-Democrats, communists etc.), a clear demarcation also exists along occupational and professional lines. The United Nations and the other organizations of the UN system are not immune from such trend, nor the landscape of the staff representation.
But is reforming the civil service simply a question of making it more like the private sector? Can we treat the business of government just like any other business, or are there **fundamental cultural values embedded in a national or an international civil service** which are important to society and which need to be safeguarded in the reform process?

IV. Which type of public service, including within the United Nations?[25]

There are two basic models for employment in the core public service in OECD countries, **"career-based" or "position-based"**. The choice of one system or the other has a profound effect on a country's public service culture and in particular on the desirability and possibility of collective bargaining.

In career-based systems, public servants are expected to stay in the public service (more or less) throughout their working life. Initial entry is based on academic credentials and/or a civil service entry (possibly competitive) examination. Once recruited, people are placed in positions at the will of the organization. This may include a duty of mobility from one ministry to another and from one area of specialization to another. Promotion is based on a system of grades attached more to the individual rather than to a specific position. This sort of system is characterized by limited possibilities for entering the civil service mid-career and a strong emphasis on career development. In position-based systems, the focus is on selecting the best-suited candidate for each position, whether by external recruitment or internal promotion. Position-based systems allow for more open access, and lateral entry is relatively common.

23 I Kirkpatrick and M M Lucio: the politics of quality in the public sector, particularly the chapter 11: Quality and 'new industrial relations': the case of Royal Mail, Routledge, London and New York, 1995
24 Miguel Marinez Lucio: The public sector , old welfare states" and the politics of managerialism,
25 This section owes much to the OECD policy brief: Public Sector Modernization: modernizing public employment, published by the OECD Observer, July 2004

"The challenge for career-based systems is how to have a civil service which is responsive to the needs and specialized skill demands of contemporary society. The challenge for position-based systems is how to ensure that the collective interest is served. Is it then just a matter of "mixing and matching" between the two approaches? Unfortunately it is not so easy. Career-based systems have an implied contract with employees that, having passed the demanding entry conditions, their career will progress to higher and more varied responsibilities. Making some positions "open" challenges that implied contract and may undermine morale and motivation. On the other hand making some career-type appointments in a position based system, unless it is confined to clearly specified positions, challenges the integrity of the competitive principle."[26]

If there is an overall trend in well-developed countries, it would seem to be towards a position-based approach. But one disadvantage of such systems is that any negative effects fall on areas important to government, such as a sense of collective values, direction and responsibility. A number of countries which have sharpened the position focus of their civil service employment systems are taking action to protect against any loss of critical cultural attributes – mainly by refocusing their efforts on building a collective culture among, the senior government management group. But there is some concern that these remedies may be insufficient once the impact of current policies finally works its way through to influencing the public service culture.

No current OECD country civil service is a pure example of either the career-based or position-based type. There seems to be a tendency for each to adopt some processes from the other to mitigate the weaknesses to which each system is prone. Four main forces influence the behavior of organizations: 1) Markets 2) Internal and external regulation 3) Contracts with internal or external parties and 4) Social pressures which mould individual and group behaviour.

Any organization is influenced by all four factors, but the mix varies. In general it appears that social pressures influence behavior more in career-based civil service systems than in position-based ones. In a career-based system, a public servant's progress depends to a large extent on how he/she is viewed by the organizational hierarchy, a powerful lever for moulding behaviour to conform with group norms. By contrast, in a position-based system, technical considerations are likely to be more important and the individual will be somewhat less responsive to social pressures.

Authority and the conceptual role for Human Resource Management (HRM) policy is still highly centralized in most OECD countries, but in half of them the implementation of these policies has been decentralized. Although the scope and pace of devolution vary from one country to another, most OECD countries have moved towards delegating responsibility for HRM to give managers more flexibility and freedom. In general, there appear to be three strategies with regards to delegation:
1) Transferring responsibility for HRM from central bodies to line departments;
2) Simplifying rules and procedures;
3) Developing more flexible policies.

A good indicator of the freedom to manage is the degree to which departments, rather than central agencies, control the personnel budget. Devolving budgetary authority is essential before central control over key HRM aspects such as staff numbers, classification, grading and pay can be relaxed. In general, position-based systems seem to go hand in hand with higher freedom to manage. In many countries this freedom has been accompanied by a focus on holding managers accountable for results through systems of corporate and personal performance management and RBM frameworks.

A job for life?
Permanent employment has traditionally been the norm in OECD public sectors, with much greater job security than the private sector. Indeed, job security and retirement benefits led to a popular

26 Ibid, p3.

belief in many countries that it was a good thing for a young person to obtain a public service job. This situation has changed significantly since the late 1980s. The differences between public sector and private sector employment are lessening; legislation is becoming more flexible and fixed-term contracts are becoming more prevalent. The employment status of civil servants is now very similar to that of employees generally in 16 OECD countries. The move towards more temporary employment – and away from lifelong careers – appears to be driven mainly by the realities of the contemporary labour market. There have also been changes in recruitment practices, with many OECD countries moving towards recruiting employees from the market rather than nurturing their careers from an early stage. Whatever recruitment strategy they adopt, there is similarity in the principles they espouse: recruitment by open competition and selection based on merit and competence.

Resulting challenges for HRM and SRM within the United Nations

As illustrated by the decision making process toward the end of the permanent contracts in some of the UN system Organizations, particularly the United Nations, the aforementioned transformations in the national public services had a substantial impact on a number of factors affecting HRM and SMR in inter-governmental organizations: the nature, quantity, and conditions of recruitment; increased competition on the global and local skills market; plurality of contractual arrangements, of qualifications, remunerations, compensations, location, security and safety among others. Because such transformative changes appeared only progressively, they rarely pushed the Executive Heads (either individually or collectively through the CEB), ICSC and the General Assembly, to envisage and discuss new HR policies with a medium term outlook. Nor did some of these entities equip themselves with an approach and framework for sufficient dialogue among all stakeholders.

On the other hand, in spite of the major reforms undertaken on various fronts by the administrations spurred on by some influential member States, the Staff Representative Bodies (SRBs) failed to develop a unified staff representational structure within the United Nations, to identify, examine and concretize proposals that would assist the United Nations and its associate entities to solve key HR issues affecting the staff-at-large. Beyond that Organization, SRBs organized themselves within one, then two and now three "staff Federations" at the U.N. system level. As will be seen from the second JIU report on the SMR, in addition to a coordinating role among SRBs, their officials are performing representational tasks in various common system bodies.

What is cementing the United Nations system is a common belief in the core values embedded in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration on Human rights. "If we look to the private sector for models in modernizing public employment we must not forget that the fundamental purpose of the public service is government, not management. This means paying attention to fundamental values like fairness, equity, justice, and social cohesion to maintain confidence in the governmental and political system as a whole. Managerial aspects, while important, must be considered secondary."[27]

We also borrow from the excellent 2004 OECD policy brief on "Modernizing Public employment" its conclusion which, in our view retains full validity for the universe of international organizations of the United Nations system:

"New problems and a changing labour market, as much as new management ideas, have driven the main trends in public employment modernization in the past two decades. The OECD's most important finding is that the two archetypical civil service systems – the traditional career-based system, and the position-based system which in many countries is replacing it – are both under pressure. However, the actions taken to date have tended to be adaptations of particular employment instruments to meet specific problems, with less attention to their impact on the public management system as a whole. It is important to give more attention to these systemic issues and in particular to three fundamental dilemmas:

27 Ibid, p 2

- The increasing knowledge and skill demands of modern government, and the increasing difficulty of government in attracting and keeping high quality staff.
- The interconnectedness of key public problems, and the fragmentation of public action and the individualization of public service responsibilities and incentives.
- The need to attract and motivate senior executives who meet the high performance demands of a modern ministry, while keeping them in a wider cross-government culture bound by the public interest. (…).

In the medium term, it appears that countries with career-based systems will be working on ways to bring more market pressures to bear, while those with position-based systems are looking for ways to strengthen cultural cohesion. It is unclear how effective the current modifications to both kinds of system will be in changing the deeper tendencies." ./..

JIU/REP/2011/11

EVALUATION OF THE SCOPE, ORGANIZATION, EFFECTIVENESS AND APPROACH OF THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN MINE ACTION

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Evaluation of the scope, organization, effectiveness and approach of the work of the United Nations in mine action

JIU/REP/2011/11

Background

As part of its programme of work for 2010, the Joint Inspection Unit conducted a review of the scope, organization, effectiveness and approach of the work of the United Nations in mine action; as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 64/84 of 10 December 2009. The objective of the review is to provide member States with an independent perspective on the work of the United Nations in this area. It is expected that the review will also serve to inform the development of the new United Nations Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy for the period 2011-2015.

Mine action encompasses several dimensions, all of which must be taken into account in order to address the full range of problems posed by landmine contamination. Five major "pillars" support mine action, namely: (a) advocacy; (b) mine risk education (MRE); (c) humanitarian demining, often referred to as "clearance"; (d) victim assistance; and (e) stockpile destruction. It is important to note that the wide range of diverse activities grouped under the concept of mine action makes it almost impossible for a single organization to perform successfully in all areas.

Mine action has evolved, and the centre of attention has changed: the focus, previously on casualty reduction, is now on the socio-economic impact on affected communities. Even though it took years of debate to incorporate mine action into development schemes, it is now widely accepted that mine action should be an integral part of country development plans, and the linkages between mine action and socio-economic development are clearly acknowledged. Mine action, therefore, is also a means towards the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals.

Main findings and conclusions

United Nations mine action coordination

The Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action (IACG-MA) is the main mechanism supporting inter-agency coordination of mine action activities within the United Nations system. Its composition includes 14 United Nations departments, agencies, programmes and funds that play a role in mine action programmes in over 30 countries and three territories.

- There is a need for stronger coordination. The results of the review indicate that the general division of roles and responsibilities within the IACG-MA is largely adequate. However, in spite of a joint United Nations policy, the broad definition of the roles and responsibilities of each IACG-MA member involved allows for different interpretations as to when exactly one agency's mandate ends and another begins. Historically, there appears to be some continuation of inter-agency competition, and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) struggles to assert its leadership role within the United Nations family. UNMAS is formally

accepted as the focal point for mine action, but in terms of operational relevance, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) (as implementing partner) now have considerable leverage. Cooperation is partly achieved through the various coordination and liaison groups that have been established. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of cooperation and coordination both at headquarters and in the field varies from case to case and is very much country dependent and personality driven. **The diversity of mine action-related activities and actors demands, overall, coordination and full adhesion to the principles of partnership.**

Policy and the Strategy

The principal framework for United Nations interventions in mine action is provided in the document entitled "Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Inter-Agency Policy" (the Policy), and the United Nations Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy: 2006 – 2010 (the Strategy). The United Nations mine action programmes take place either in a peacekeeping operation, in a humanitarian context, or as part of a development programme. Most mine action programmes are developed under the auspices of either UNMAS, in humanitarian emergencies and peacekeeping operations, or UNDP, for long-term capacity-building programmes, and are frequently executed with the support of UNOPS.

- **The Policy** refers to core competencies and defines the role, responsibilities and the activities to be performed by United Nations entities involved in mine action. However, in some cases, the actual activities undertaken by entities do not correspond exactly to the competencies and activities as reflected in the Policy. This issue is of special relevance in the case of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.

- The United Nations system has tried to optimize the use of its resources and make the best use of the strengths and comparative advantages of each of the entities in the system. For example, while UNICEF is the leading entity for MRE, the role of UNDP is focused on economic development and capacity-building. However, **there is a gap between mine action and national health systems that is not addressed properly by the United Nations system. There is a need for a victim-assistance leading entity within the United Nations system.**

- **Mine action coordination** is performed in parallel with project management and/or implementation, and decisions regarding implementation, when undertaken or managed by a United Nations entity, should be determined by actual competencies on the ground. **The Inspectors believe that UNMAS is the focal point and main mine action coordinating entity, while recognizing its operational role in specific contexts such as emergency responses, peacekeeping and support to special political missions.**

- **The Strategy** for 2006-2010 focuses on the following four major strategic objectives:

  (1) Reduce death and injury by at least 50 per cent;

(2) Mitigate the risk to community livelihoods and expand freedom of movement for at least 80 per cent of the most seriously affected communities;

(3) Integrate mine action needs into national development, reconstruction plans and budgets in at least 15 countries;

(4) Assist the development of national institutions to manage the threat of landmines/explosive remnants of war, and at the same time prepare for residual response capacity in at least 15 countries.

- Mine-action stakeholders recognize that progress has been made towards each of the strategic objectives. However, the challenge is to systematically measure this progress, as the strategic objectives are difficult to measure and do not meet the SMART criteria (specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time-bound). Furthermore, there is no reliable baseline data to quantify progress. Progress is uneven and context specific; while some countries have considerably advanced, others have seen negative trends in the evolution of some of the objectives.

- **A new United Nations strategy for the period 2011 – 2015** is being developed. It is hoped that it will assist the United Nations in further clarifying roles, responsibilities and division of labour among United Nations entities, including providing individual objectives for each entity involved. The present review includes some elements to be taken into consideration in the development and implementation of the new strategy.

Mine action funding

Funding for mine action between 1996 and 2009 was substantial and marked by constant growth in annual contributions. However, a recent trend over the last two to three years indicates a declining allocation of funding specific for mine action. Several mechanisms that channel funds for mine action are in place within the United Nations system; each of the main actors, namely UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF, has established or manages specific funds. The Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) is a major instrument for channelling mine action funding, having received US$680 million since its establishment. It has been managed by UNMAS since 1998. The terms of reference of the VTF, as adopted in 1994, no longer reflect the reality on the ground and have not yet taken into account institutional changes or United Nations reform efforts in this area. There is dissatisfaction with the management of the Fund; key recipients and major stakeholders criticize its responsiveness, its transparency and associated overheads.

- Delays in the disbursement of VTF funds have been repeatedly cited as a cause of concern among implementing partners, NGOs and donors, and mine-affected countries. UNMAS is taking these concerns seriously and is currently addressing as matter of urgency the ways and means to ensure prompt and effective transfer of funds to the relevant parties.

- There is a widespread perception that a conflict of interest exists regarding the double and incompatible role of UNMAS as, on one hand, the VTF administrator, and on the other, as a direct beneficiary of the Fund. The administration of the VTF should be conferred to an independent entity, not involved in project management and/or implementation activities funded directly from the VTF, and a

governance mechanism, inclusive of relevant stakeholders, should be established.

- Fees charged for the administration of the VTF should be revised with a view to increasing both transparency and efficiency.

Recommendations

- **Recommendation 1**

  The Secretary-General, as Chairman of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), in consultation with the executive heads of relevant United Nations system organizations involved in mine action, should appoint a focal point for victim assistance within the United Nations system. This entity should place particular emphasis on integrating victim assistance into national health systems when feasible, while considering the broader work, capacity-building and the international normative framework related to the rights of persons with disabilities and the role of the Inter-Agency Support Group on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

- **Recommendation 2**

  In the context of the preparation of the new strategy, the Secretary-General should establish a global baseline of reliable data while building on ongoing efforts, which should facilitate the systematic monitoring of progress and the final evaluation of actual results achieved towards the strategic objectives.

- **Recommendation 3**

  The Secretary-General, as Chairman of the CEB and in consultation with the executive heads of relevant United Nations system organizations involved in mine action, should initiate a transparent and inclusive process aimed at clarifying the terms of reference of UNMAS as well as the tasks and mandates of other actors, with a view to positioning UNMAS as the main mine action policy and coordinating entity in addition to its role as a focal point for United Nations mine action, while recognizing its operational role in specific contexts, such as emergency responses, peacekeeping and support to special political missions.

- **Recommendation 4**

  UNMAS, in its role as the focal point for mine action, should develop relevant training materials to strengthen the staff capacity, in particular for the common induction of new staff joining any of the United Nations funds, programmes and/or specialized agencies involved in activities related to mine action, paying particular attention to the important role played by non-United Nations entities.

- **Recommendation 5**

  UNMAS, in consultation with the IACG-MA, should develop an evaluation strategy establishing the framework for all types of evaluations, internal or external, including criteria for the systematic evaluation of the Strategy as well as

of field activities when relevant.

- **Recommendation 6**

  The Secretary-General should revise the terms of reference of the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action, taking into account recent United Nations trust-fund reform efforts, relevant institutional changes and lessons learned from the experience with multi-donor trust funds, with a view to ensuring a more inclusive, transparent and independent governance of the Fund as well as to making its management more efficient and effective:

- **Recommendation 7**

  The General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the recommendations contained in the present report at its sixty-eighth session.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AA	administrative agent
AoR	areas of responsibility
APMBC	Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
CEB	United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
DHA	Department of Humanitarian Affairs
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ERW	explosive remnants of war
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GICHD	Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
IACG-MA	Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICBL	International Campaign to Ban Landmines
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IED	improvised explosive device
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMAS	International Mine Action Standards
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
IMAP	Integrated Mine Action Programme
MACCA	Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan
MASG	Mine Action Support Group
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDTF	multi-donor trust fund
MRE	mine risk education
NGO	non-governmental organizations
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
OROLSI	Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions
OSAGI	Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women
PBF	Peacebuilding Fund
PSC	programme support cost
SCMA	Steering Committee on Mine Action
SMART	specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time-bound
UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMAO	United Nations Mine Action Office
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNODA	United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UXO	unexploded ordnance
VTF	Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization

I. INTRODUCTION

Scope, objectives and methodology

1. As part of its programme of work for 2010, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) conducted a review of the scope, organization, effectiveness and approach of the work of the United Nations in mine action. The General Assembly, in its resolution 64/84 of 10 December 2009, stressed the importance of cooperation and coordination in mine action, including the primary responsibility of national authorities and the supporting role of the United Nations and other relevant organizations. It also underlined "the need for a comprehensive and independent evaluation of the scope, organization, effectiveness and approach of the work of the United Nations in mine action".

2. In order to meet the General Assembly request for an independent evaluation, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), as focal point for United Nations mine action, in consultation with the Inter-Agency Coordination Group on Mine Action (IACG-MA), requested JIU to carry out the evaluation, given that its mandate covers all United Nations entities involved in mine action as members of the IACG-MA.[1] It should be noted that this is not a review of UNMAS but of the work of the United Nations system in mine action.

3. The objectives of the present evaluation are: to provide member States with an independent perspective on the performance of the United Nations in this area, and to inform the development of a new United Nations Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy for the period 2011-2015. In carrying out the evaluation, the Inspectors looked into the approach, efficiency, effectiveness and coherence of the work of the United Nations in mine action, as set out in the United Nations Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy for the period 2006-2010 (the Strategy), identified best practices and lessons learned and formulated recommendations with a view to strengthening the work and coordination among United Nations mine action actors.

4. **It should be noted that since the beginning of the United Nation's involvement in mine action, no comprehensive evaluation of its contribution to mine action has been undertaken.** The General Assembly request demands that a wide range of issues be covered by the review. In order to assess "the scope, organization, effectiveness and approach of the work of the United Nations in mine action", the following approach has been followed: (a) the scope of United Nations mine action is determined by the Strategy and the document entitled "Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Inter-Agency Policy" (the Policy), which set the framework for United Nations interventions and are addressed in chapter II; (b) the organization of United Nations mine action is addressed in chapter II, where main actors are described, and in chapter III on the coordination of diverse actors; (c) the effectiveness of United Nations mine action is assessed from a global perspective by looking into, inter alia, the progress achieved towards the strategic objectives included in the

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[1] Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women (OSAGI), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the World Food Programme (WFP), the World Health Organization (WHO), and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), as well as the World Bank, which is an observer. In 2011, OSAGI was integrated into the new United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women.

Strategy; and (d) the assessment of the approach is reflected in the various chapters of the report. The approach is a difficult concept to assess, given that it depends heavily on specific local contexts. However, reference is made to specific country examples when these have been considered relevant from a global perspective.

5. In accordance with the internal standards and guidelines of JIU, the methodology followed in preparing the present report included in-depth analysis of relevant documentation, a desk review, a portfolio review, interviews and field missions, and an online survey that was distributed to more than 200 concerned individuals. In selecting the specific field missions to be undertaken, consultations were held with an extensive number of United Nations and non-United Nations actors to determine the most relevant locations and entities to be included in the review. In this regard, it was considered important to have a balanced geographical sample of mine-affected countries, and missions were undertaken to locations in Europe, the Americas, Asia and Africa (see annex V).

6. The Inspectors conducted missions between January and June 2011 to United Nations headquarters and selected donor countries, and field missions to mine-affected countries where the United Nations is playing either a managing or supporting role in mine action, namely, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambodia, Colombia, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Nicaragua and South Sudan. It was the intention of the authors to visit also Afghanistan and Nepal; however budgetary limitations, security and a general strike in Nepal, once the mission was scheduled, prevented the team from undertaking these field missions. The field missions undertaken included interviews and meetings with major local stakeholder groups, such as Governments of countries affected by anti-personnel landmines and other types of explosive remnants of war (ERW), United Nations entities involved in mine action, donor countries and civil society. Given the highly specialized nature of mine action, an expert consultant was tasked with specific assignments to support the review; the case study on South Sudan, attached as annex I and available on the JIU website, is his report of the mission undertaken with the JIU team. Following the internal procedures of JIU, comments from participating organizations on the draft report were sought and taken into account in finalizing the present report. Since the initial coordinator of the review left the JIU before the finalization of the report, another Inspector assumed that responsibility.

7. In accordance with article 11, paragraph 2, of the JIU Statute, the present report has been finalized after consultation among the Inspectors so as to test its conclusions and recommendations against the collective wisdom of the Unit.

8. To facilitate the handling of the report and the implementation of its recommendations and the monitoring thereof, annex VI contains a table indicating whether the report is submitted to the organizations concerned for action or for information. The table identifies those recommendations relevant for each organization, specifying whether they require a decision by the organization's legislative or governing body or can be acted upon by the organization's executive head.

9. The Inspectors wish to express their appreciation to all who assisted them in the preparation of this report, and particularly to those who participated in the interviews and so willingly shared their knowledge and expertise.

II. MINE ACTION: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE PROBLEM AND ITS IMPACT

A. Background

10. The first steps by the international community to regulate the use and transfer of landmines were taken within the framework of the Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices (Protocol II) of the 1980 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects. As amended in 1996, the Protocol prohibits the use of remotely delivered anti-personnel mines without effective self-destructing or self-deactivating mechanisms. At the end of an armed conflict, States parties to Amended Protocol II are obliged to remove all mines laid by them. The Protocol entered into force in December 1998.

11. Nonetheless, Amended Protocol II does not provide for, nor has the Conference on Disarmament managed to agree on, a comprehensive and total ban on anti-personnel mines. International civil society and a small group of like-minded countries, concerned by the humanitarian consequences of the use of anti-personnel mines, decided to push further the efforts towards a total ban of this indiscriminate weapon. As a consequence, the negotiations preceding the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, also known as the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), were primarily driven by humanitarian concerns, rather than military and disarmament considerations. The Convention was then negotiated in a free-standing process outside the traditional multilateral disarmament forums.

12. In October 1996, a first conference was held in Ottawa, receiving the support of 50 Governments, the United Nations, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), among others. On the same occasion, it was decided that a treaty prohibiting the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines and their destruction should be opened for signature. At the 1997 Oslo Conference, formal treaty negotiations were concluded and the APMBC was formally adopted on 18 September 1997. The Convention entered into force on 1 March 1999. The Secretary-General acts as its depositary. As of September 2011, there were 156 ratifications or accessions to the Convention.

13. Civil society organizations played a very important role along this process, and ICBL was doubtlessly a major driving actor. It was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1997 for its advocacy campaign to put the landmine issue on the agenda of the international community. The interaction among governments, international organizations and civil society was characterized by open cooperation to the extent that the negotiations leading to the APMBC, also called the “Ottawa process”, are still often cited as a “new model of diplomacy”.[2]

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[2] Rosy Cave, “Disarmament as humanitarian action? Comparing negotiations on anti-personnel mines and explosive remnants of war”, in *Disarmament as Humanitarian Action. From Perspective to Practice*, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, John Borrie and Vanessa Martin Randin, eds. (United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.06.0.9), pp. 55 and 63.

B. Landmines and mine action

14. Since late in the 1980s, the words "mine" or "landmine" have been used to refer primarily to anti-personnel landmines—the weapon system banned from use by the APMBC—yet such systems are but one type of the increasingly varied range of weapons on which mine action focuses. There is a growing lexicon of terms, such as unexploded ordnance (UXO), ERW, abandoned explosive ordnance, explosive ordnance, cluster munition (and submunition), and improvised explosive device (IED). However, the distinction between landmines and other types of explosive devices usually does not apply to the daily work on the ground.[3] Although they represent different types of threat, the problems posed and the impact on socio-economic activities of affected communities are analogous to those of landmines.

15. "Mine action refers to all those activities aimed at addressing problems faced by civil societies as a result of landmine contamination. The essence of mine action, however, is not about weapons, but about people. Its objective, though technical in practice, is humanitarian and developmental in consequence."[4] The IMAS define mine action as "activities which aim to reduce the social, economic and environmental impact of landmines and ERW, including cluster munitions."[5]

16. Mine action encompasses several dimensions, all of which must be taken into account in order to address the full range of problems posed by ERW contamination. As defined in the IMAS, five major "pillars" support mine action; these are: (a) advocacy, (b) mine risk education (MRE); (c) humanitarian demining, often referred to as "clearance", which includes all technical activities required during the clearance process (i.e. survey, mapping, marking, clearance); (d) victim assistance, which includes physical and psychological rehabilitation and reintegration; and (e) stockpile destruction.

17. It is important to note that the wide range of diverse activities grouped under the concept of mine action makes it almost impossible for a single organization to perform successfully in all areas. This fact, together with the maturity of the sector, has led different organizations to specialize in one or several of these components. The United Nations system has tried to optimize the use of its resources and make the best use of the strengths and comparative advantages of the different entities that form the United Nations system. **The civil society, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and national Governments are also key actors; this implies that partnership, cooperation and coordination are key concepts in mine action.**

18. Past mine action has provided some good examples of cooperation among relevant stakeholders at the international level, such as the development of standards for humanitarian mine clearance issued by the United Nations first in 1997, which guide the planning, implementation and management of mine action programmes. Updated in 2000 and broadened beyond clearance operations, they include other components of mine action, such as MRE, survey and training, and stockpile destruction. In order to reflect these changes they were renamed as IMAS. They are reviewed periodically by the mine action community.

19. As of September 2010, 66 States were believed to be affected by landmines, as well as seven areas not internationally recognized; approximately 3,000 km^2 of land worldwide was believed to be contaminated with mines. Casualties are at a level far below earlier estimates, with recorded casualties in 2009 amounting to fewer than 4,000 worldwide. The total number

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[3] For relevant terms and definitions in the context of mine action please refer to the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS), available from www.mineactionstandards.org/.
[4] Report of the Secretary-General on assistance in mine clearance (A/53/496), para. 7.
[5] A Guide to International Mine Action Standards, appendix 2, p. 177.

of casualties has steadily decreased from about 8,000 in the year 2000 to less than half that in 2010. It is important to note that this is an aggregate trend, and that in some countries the number of victims has increased. In almost all cases, the increases have been due to specific circumstances. Overall, this is a very positive achievement, and evident proof that the efforts of the international community are generating results.

20. Interested civil society organizations and coalitions, such as ICBL, followed by international organizations and governments, raised awareness of the landmine problem, positioning it among the top priorities on the public agenda in the late 1990s. At that time, there was a focus on victims as the most visible impact of landmines and other ERW. Not only are their situations tragic and a source of existential difficulties for relatives and families, but they also affect the entire socio-economic development of a country. Landmine survivors need intensive long-term assistance (in most cases for the rest of their lives), care, and support before reintegration, which is often not accessible or cannot be afforded by most of them. Victims are often marginalized, in particular when they already belong to vulnerable groups, living in post-conflict countries with limited resources and facing competing priorities.

21. The Inspectors would like to stress that each single casualty counts and is a very dramatic occurrence; however, from a global perspective, the number of casualties resulting from mines and ERW is not significant when compared to other global threats, such as malaria, HIV/AIDS or others. This fact, inter alia, is one of the factors that have contributed to the loss of visibility of the landmines issue in the international global media.

22. The nature of mine action has evolved since 1993, and so have the expectations of donors. The centre of attention has changed: the emphasis, previously on humanitarian aspects, is now on the socio-economic impact on affected communities. The purpose of mine action is to recreate for affected communities a safe environment conducive to normal life and development.

23. Landmines have an impact on agricultural land, water canals and roads; thus, they can disrupt markets and production, prevent the delivery of government services, impede the return of refugees or serve as a physical inhibitor to economic reconstruction and development, to name only a few of the many negative indirect consequences of the presence or even the suspicion of the existence of landmines.[6]

24. A case study from Mozambique, for example, concludes that mine contamination in that country heavily affects not only the level but also the depth of poverty. In addition, the more intense the mine contamination, the stronger the decrease in the daily per capita consumption. The study therefore identifies a statistically significant causal effect of war on poverty and consumption even several years after the ceasefire.[7] Similarly with cluster munitions, a study published in 2008 focusing on the economic impact in Lebanon states that during 2006-2008, economic losses between US$33 million and $122 million directly resulted from the spread of cluster munitions (including the cost of agricultural production, death and injury). The greatest costs fall heavily on individuals and families.[8]

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[6] Gregory L. Bier, "The economic impact of landmines on developing countries", *International Journal of Social Economics*, vol. 30, No. 5 (2003), pp. 655-656.
[7] Ouarda Merrouche, "Landmines and poverty: IV evidence from Mozambique", *Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public Policy*, vol. 14, No. 1 (2008), pp. 7 and 10.
[8] Greg Crowther, *Counting the Cost: The Economic Impact of Cluster Munition Contamination in Lebanon* (London, Landmine Action, 2008), pp. 3-6 and 17-25.

25. Even though it took years of debate to incorporate mine action into development schemes, now it is widely accepted that mine action should be an integral part of country development plans, and the linkages between mine action and development are clearly acknowledged. Mine action is therefore also a means toward the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); as reflected in the IACG-MA Policy: "the United Nations encourages all actors to integrate mine action into their development programmes, strategies and budgets … [and] promotes the mainstreaming of mine action into national development plans and processes to advance the Millennium Development Goals …."[9] In the same direction, the Strategy for 2006-2010 also promotes achievement of the MDGs through mine action. Some affected countries, such as Afghanistan and Cambodia, have made mine action a pillar of their national MDGs.[10] In Lao People's Democratic Republic, where the presence of UXO not only destroys lives but hinders socio-economic development (the correlation is apparent in 41 out of the 46 poorest districts contaminated by UXO), a localized MDG 9 was introduced to reduce the socio-economic impact of UXO.

26. This shift away from the initial view on mine action is not without resistance, as some NGOs deplore the dilution of the principles of mine action and complain about the increasing subordination to socio-economic impact, being of the view that such a shift reduces the focus on international legal obligations, such as the need to fully clear contaminated areas, as contained in the APMBC.

C. Victim assistance

27. The APMBC set a precedent with the introduction of a legal obligation to assist victims. In its preamble, States parties expressed their will "to do their utmost in providing assistance for the care and rehabilitation, including the social and economic integration of mine victims". Article 6 further refines this statement, in particular in its paragraph 3, indicating that "each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance for the care and rehabilitation, and social and economic integration, of mine victims".

28. The scope of victim assistance includes data collection, medical care, physical and psychological rehabilitation, including assistive devices, and access to education, employment and full participation in socio-economic life, and should be supported by relevant laws and policies.

29. In 1998, the World Health Assembly declared that the impact of anti-personnel mines is a public health problem, and requested Governments of mine-affected countries to include in national health plans prevention mechanisms to avoid anti-personnel mine accidents, and assistance to victims. At the first Meeting of States parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, held in Maputo in 1999, State parties recognized that "anti-personnel mines represent a major public health threat" and that victim assistance must be integrated into broader public health strategies to ensure not only emergency and short-term care but

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[9] Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Inter-Agency Policy, 6 June 2005, para. 25.

[10] Cambodia also has a specific MDG 9 focusing on demining, UXO and victim assistance. Goal 9 of Afghanistan, on enhancing security, deals with demining and stockpile destruction; for more information, see UNDP, *Vision 2020–Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals: Annual Progress Report 2008*, p. 28.

also longer-term related issues.[11] At this same meeting, the Strategic Framework for Victim Assistance, also known as the Maputo Strategy, was endorsed.

30. The Framework was based on seven principles, namely: non-discrimination of victims; an integrated and comprehensive approach; participation of all relevant actors; national ownership; transparency and efficiency; a sustainable development approach; and the empowerment of victims. These principles set the framework for the work of the Standing Committee on Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration, established in 1999. The said Committee has played an important role since then in advancing the achievement of objectives in the area of anti-personnel mines, helping States parties to identify and better understand victim-assistance issues working in relationship with United Nations entities and NGOs.

31. At the Nairobi Summit on a Mine-Free World, held in 2004, States parties formally adopted principles on victim assistance, and it was acknowledged that victim assistance should be part of the overall public health systems and human rights frameworks of mine-affected countries. The Nairobi Action Plan 2005-2009 was adopted; it committed States parties to do their utmost to establish and enhance health-care services needed to respond to the needs of anti-personnel mine victims. In this context, the Inspectors would like to recall action No. 36 of the Nairobi Action Plan, which requests State parties to "act upon their obligation under Article 6(3) to promptly assist those State Parties with clearly demonstrated needs for external support".

32. The 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions includes comprehensive victim assistance provisions drawn from lessons learned from the implementation of the APMBC. It includes a definition of a "victim", which is not only the affected individual but also his or her family and community. The Convention makes the provision of assistance to victims a formal requirement for all States parties with respect to victims under their jurisdiction and calls for international assistance, which should be rights based in accordance with other relevant national strategies, including for disability and development.

33. At the Cartagena Summit on a Mine-Free World, held in 2009, it was recognized that there had been improvements and gains in the area of victim assistance, although these were mainly process related. However, the challenge to demonstrate improvements in the quality of life of mine victims still remains.

34. Victim assistance is also part of the Strategy of the United Nations; however, it is only included as part of one of the four strategic objectives, which are discussed in more detail in chapter III, section C. Specifically, under strategic objective 3 on the "integration of mine action needs into national development and reconstruction plans and budgets in at least 15 countries", the major relevant activities include supporting efforts to ensure the rights of landmine/ERW survivors within the context of national programmes and facilities for persons with disabilities, and advocating for increased resources and support to persons with disabilities, including landmine/ERW survivors.


35. In addition to the above international law instruments, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities is of particular relevance in recognizing the human rights of people with disabilities, which also apply to victims of anti-personnel mines. The Convention is a paradigm shift in the treatment of persons with disabilities, since it moves from a medical or charity perspective to a rights-based approach, ensuring that persons with disabilities, including victims of landmines, can participate in decisions that affect their lives and can seek

[11] Maputo Declaration (APLC/MSP.1/1999/1, part II), para. 15.

redress for violations of their rights. The Convention provides a framework for addressing the needs of survivors and ensuring the full realization of their human rights and respect for their inherent dignity.

36. **The Inspectors conclude that the international legal framework is quite clear and comprehensive, and its development can be considered an unprecedented success story of cooperation among States parties, civil society, including victims themselves, NGOs and the United Nations family.**

Figure 1: Thematic contributions by the 25 largest donors, 2009
(percentage)



Source: ICBL, *Landmine Monitor* , 2010; www.the-monitor.org.

37. However, victim assistance receives less than 10 per cent of overall mine action funding (see figure 1). Out of 33 donors, only 15 reported having supported victim assistance in 2009.[12] Serious concerns about the lack of improvement in the quality of landmine survivors' daily lives since the Nairobi Summit, as expressed, for example, by Handicap International, underlines the need for increased national and international efforts in this area. The true overall level of resources allocated to victim assistance has not been determined, and many donors have indicated that their priority has moved from victim assistance-dedicated funding to other parts of their aid programmes, particularly those for long-term assistance to all survivors irrespective of the cause of the disability.

38. Though some progress has been achieved in certain countries, it is uneven, and in most cases victim assistance is relegated in the scale of national priorities. However, there are best practices worth mentioning, such as the Presidential Program for Mine Action (Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal) launched by the Government of Colombia. It is structured around the major components of mine action and, under the specific pillar of victim assistance, a new national forum for the discussion of victims' needs was launched during the field mission undertaken by the Inspectors to Colombia. The Inspectors noted the involvement of all national and international stakeholders and partners, including victims and representatives of the civil society. As already discussed, victim assistance

[12] International Campaign to Ban Landmines, *Landmine Monitor 2010*, pp. 48-49.

encompasses a wide range of interrelated activities, which take place in most cases under the responsibility of various entities or ministries at the national level. Only through the open and determined participation and coordination of all relevant actors at the national level, including international partners present locally, can victim assistance be successfully provided.

39. The promise made to victims contained in the various international legal instruments must be translated into facts and tangible realities. During their field missions the Inspectors discussed with national authorities the issue of victim assistance, and visited different victim rehabilitation centres in mine-affected countries. They observed that although "mine action is about people", often people, in particular victims, are placed low on the scale of priorities and resource allocation. **The Inspectors conclude that there is still much to do to enhance victim assistance and that, despite the evolution of the international legal framework and the obligations imposed, these are still far from being met.** As an example, during the Inspectors' field mission to Cambodia, they visited a demining site (Kok Romeat commune, Thmar Puok district) and a rehabilitation centre (Svay Dong Kum commune, Siem Reap district, Siem Reap Province). There, they were informed that the rehabilitation centre, currently supported by Handicap International, might be forced to close down, as the unpredictable financing made it difficult to continue paying staff salaries, the annual estimated cost of which was less than US$ 10,000. The Inspectors would like to call for a higher involvement of the United Nations system in the field of victim assistance, and recognize that this cannot simply be left to mine action alone.

D. Global funding for mine action

40. Funding for mine action between 1996 and 2009 was substantial and marked by constant growth in annual contributions (see figure 2). However, a recent trend over the last two to three years (2008-2010) indicates that the amount of funding allocated to mine action has been increasing at a slower rate, or even declining. This assessment is supported by various studies, such as a donor study commissioned by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD).[13] This was also confirmed by the Inspectors during interviews with donor countries. It should be noted that according to Landmine Monitor 2011, in 2010, 31 donors contributed US$ 480 million in international support for mine action in 57 affected States and areas, an increase of 8 per cent from 2009.

41. In addition to donors' own individual political strategies, donor funding is influenced by the international public agenda, as well as, in the current economic context, by the need to make the most efficient use out of the limited resources available. Delivering specific results is a pressing need for all donors interviewed, and the return on investments made has become a key factor in international cooperation, mine action is not an exception in this regard. This factor has also contributed to the evolution of mine action and its integration into broader contexts, such as socio-economic development, as described in previous paragraphs.

42. Based on interviews conducted by the Inspectors and the conclusions of several studies, there is no indication that mine action funding will increase in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, the downward trend continued in 2010 but at a slower pace. There is no confirmation that donors having reduced their funding will recover their past level. There are many reasons for this slow but predictable trend towards gradually reduced funding levels:


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[13] Jean Devlin, "Mine action funding: trends, modalities and future prospects – results of a survey of donor countries carried out in May–June 2010" (Geneva, GICHD, 2010).

lack of clarity and progress on clearance, the lack of value for funds invested and competition for limited funding.[14]

43. Donor responses to the JIU survey conducted in May/June 2011 revealed that most donors expect funding for mine action to decrease for the years 2011-2015. This view is shared by most United Nations officials and NGO representatives interviewed. The available data on the amount of international contributions to mine action reveals in quantitative terms that overall, a certain plateau has been reached and it is likely that global funding for mine action has reached its peak, and will diminish in the foreseeable future.

Figure 2. National and international funding for mine action, 1996-2009
(millions of United States dollars)



Data gathered from ICBL, *Landmine Monitor* , 2000; 2005-2008; 2010.

44. The most significant change in donor patterns in the past 10 years has been a shift from focusing on the object, namely, the anti-personnel mine as an indiscriminate weapon and its control, to minimizing the impact on affected populations and survivors. Furthermore, donor policy is now marked by pragmatism. Without actually promoting the notion of a mine-safe world as opposed to the ultimate aim of a mine free world, some donors' policies do not place emphasis on the original call of the APMBC.[15]

45. The results of the JIU survey for donor behaviour are very similar to those included in the GICHD donor study, revealing the following regarding funding trends and prospects:

- Impact achieved and follow-up are the most important factors for donors when deciding on resource allocation; these factors are followed by overhead costs associated with projects, reporting requirements and donor visibility with respect to contributions made.

- Donors do not anticipate any major changes in the way they do business, in particular regarding funding channels, with a preference for bilateral funding.

[14] Ibid., p. 23.
[15] Ibid., p. 12.

- Integrating and mainstreaming mine action projects into broader contexts, such as national development programmes, is seen as one of the preferred mechanisms to demonstrate the impact achieved.

- Donors remain confident and generally satisfied with the partners they work with, although they tend to apply greater conditionality to their grants.

- Uncertainty about what is left to be done is a cause of concern. Cost estimates should be revised to more realistic levels. Donors would like to see a better identification of magnitudes of needs.

- The commitment of affected countries to build national capacities, and in the longer term assume the residual responsibility, is key when deciding on funding for mine action.

III. UNITED NATIONS MINE ACTION

A. United Nations mine action actors

46. United Nations mine action is conducted on the basis of resolutions of the General Assembly and Security Council. It is guided by the relevant international instruments prohibiting or restricting the use of landmines and addressing ERW, the general principles of international humanitarian law on the conduct of war and the protection of civilians, and international human rights instruments such as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; additional information on the legal framework is provided on the JIU website.

47. The issue of mine action has been on the agenda of the General Assembly since 1993, and has been considered annually since then. Despite General Assembly resolution 48/7 of 19 October 1993, which called for coordination of the United Nations response to the global landmine crisis, various parts of the United Nations system continued to independently provide and/or manage mine action services for the next four years. The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA), UNDP and UNICEF all had dedicated mine action resources.

48. Prior to the transfer of responsibilities to DPKO, DHA was engaged in several important mine action initiatives; additionally, UNICEF had developed comprehensive mine-awareness guidelines and was at the forefront of mine risk education and advocacy. Because the extensive use and destructive power of landmines had become critical items on the international agenda, the Secretary-General decided the issue should be addressed in the dual context of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations (A/53/496, para. 5). The Secretary-General declared that DPKO was the lead agency for mine action because of its existing operational capacity in post-conflict countries and, since October 1997, DPKO has been serving as the focal point within the United Nations system for all mine-related issues and activities.

49. UNDP has for years played a major role in worldwide mine action through the management of multi-donor funded operations that are also designed to build national capacities for demining. UNDP currently supports and facilitates the management of mine action programmes in 38 countries, typically becoming involved once the emergency phase is over and when building national capacity becomes of paramount importance. In specific circumstances UNDP, at the request of authorities in mine-affected countries, manages some or all of the elements of mine action programmes. UNDP addresses the landmine problem from a development perspective and promotes the mainstreaming of mine action into national and sector development plans and programmes.

50. Based on the reform programme presented by the Secretary-General in 1997, coordination in mine action and its management structure were strengthened. For this purpose, UNMAS was created within DPKO to take over the lead from the then DHA and to serve as the focal point for mine action within the United Nation system. The initial mandate of UNMAS comprised ensuring greater interaction between the United Nations and its partners and the work of the international community. More importantly, UNMAS was tasked to ensure “an effective, proactive and coordinated response by the United Nations in any country contaminated by landmines”. The General Assembly, in its resolution 53/26, welcomed the creation of and the mandate given to UNMAS in 1998.

51. UNMAS, located in the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions within DPKO, has the following core areas of responsibility:

- Ensuring an effective, proactive and coordinated United Nations response to landmines and ERW through collaboration with other United Nations departments, agencies, funds and programmes.
- Coordinating the development and monitoring of the United Nations mine action policy and strategy.
- In peacekeeping and emergency settings, UNMAS establishes and manages mine action coordination centres in mine-affected countries, plans and manages operations, mobilizes resources, manages the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action (VTF) and sets mine action priorities in the countries and territories it serves.
- UNMAS coordinates United Nations advocacy in support of international legal instruments related to landmines and ERW and the human rights of persons affected by them.

52. In addition to the major mine action actors within the United Nations system, namely UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF, UNOPS is a principal service provider and implementing partner, offering project management and logistics services for programmes and projects managed or funded by the United Nations, international financial institutions, regional and subregional development banks or host governments. It identifies and recruits international technical experts and contracts them for mine action services. It can also, as appropriate, implement mine action programmes in collaboration with concerned partners. However, according to UNMAS, UNOPS has for several years had a policy indicating that it will not undertake mine action activities independently.

53. United Nations mine action is also supported by the following United Nations organizations and other entities: FAO, OCHA, OHCHR, UNHCR, WFP, WHO, UNODA, and the World Bank. In addition, a variety of intergovernmental, international and regional organizations, as well as international financial institutions, support mine action by funding operations or providing services to individuals and communities affected by landmines and ERW.

54. UNODA is tasked with supporting the Secretary-General, in his capacity as the Chief Administrative Officer of the United Nations system, in the fulfilment of specific United Nations responsibilities related to the implementation of the APMBC (for example, the collection of article 7 reports). According to the Policy, UNODA was to assume a number of responsibilities in the areas of coordination, capacity development, standards and quality management, resource mobilization, advocacy and information, promoting mine action as a disarmament activity. Yet the Office has not been involved in mine clearance, nor in related humanitarian, social or economic assistance activities; the analysis of the mandate shows that UNODA does not completely fulfil the said assigned tasks. In fact, the Implementation Support Unit, an entity that does not belong to the United Nations system and was established by States parties to the APMBC in 2001,[16] largely took over the substantive work in the implementation of the Convention. In this context, the Inspectors stress the importance of promoting and advocating for the goals of existing international legal instruments, in particular those relevant to mine action; in their view, this endeavour, though part of the UNODA mandate, is not sufficiently fulfilled; UNODA is not actively participating in substantive discussions and it is a minor actor in mine action. While recognizing the work of UNODA in relation to the Coordinating Committee and the Bureau of the annual meetings of

[16] "Implementation Support for the Convention on the Prohibition of Anti-Personnel Mines", paper circulated at the third Meeting of States Parties, Managua, 18-21 September 2001. Available from www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/pdf/mbc/MSP/3MSP/3MSP_Fina_%20Report_ISU_en.pdf.

the APMBC, **the Inspectors noted that the role of UNODA is limited to conference management**.

55. WHO, within the United Nations inter-agency framework, is responsible for the development of appropriate standards and methodologies, as well as the promotion of health service capacity-building for sustainable victim assistance. The WHO plan of action is part of the portfolio for the mine action projects of UNMAS, and WHO was represented in assessment missions led by UNMAS. At the tenth Meeting of the States Parties to the Ottawa Convention, held in 2010, WHO, along with the International Labour Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), launched the Community-Based Rehabilitation Guidelines, which aim at empowering persons with disabilities, including landmine survivors.[17] Through its integrated approach to public health, WHO also provides technical support at the national level, for example in the fields of trauma care or data collection, which also benefit survivors of landmines. However, the Inspectors could not find evidence of WHO mine action activities during the field missions they undertook. It would have exceeded the scope of the present review to evaluate the work of WHO at the national level in cooperation with ministries of health of affected countries and their country plans.

56. The United Nations has tried to use the strengths of the different funds, programmes and agencies to deal with the diverse aspects of mine action. While UNICEF is the leading entity for MRE, UNDP has focused on economic development and capacity-building; however, there is no United Nations entity leading victim assistance. As already discussed, it is commonly agreed that victim assistance should be part of national health systems. However, some consider this as a very peripheral issue within mine action. Many countries emerging from conflict situations do not have adequate—if any—national health systems to deal with victims. **The Inspectors conclude that there is a gap between mine action and national health systems which is not addressed properly by the United Nations system; in their view there is a need for a leading entity on victim assistance to bridge that gap.**

57. In this regard, the Inspectors welcome the recent establishment by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, OHCHR, UNDP, WHO, ILO and UNICEF of a multi-donor trust fund (MTDF) for disability, launched during the Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities in December 2011. However, they regret that none of the entities participating in the Inter-Agency Support Group for the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities has offered to become the United Nations lead agency for disability, which should include, inter-alia, leading mine victim assistance.

58. The United Nations system is just one actor in mine action that plays an important role; however, in certain contexts, such as advocacy, its role is unique. The United Nations is also in a privileged position to act as a knowledge-management and -sharing catalyst, for example as a forum facilitating open discussions inclusive of all relevant mine action actors, recognizing that much of the actual work, such as demining and mine-risk education, is carried out by NGOs, commercial contractors and, in some situations, by militaries that provide mine action services. The **diversity of mine action-related activities and actors demands, overall, coordination and full adhesion to the principles of partnership.**

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[17] See AP Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit, "Landmine survivors to benefit from new rehabilitation guidelines developed by WHO and partners", press release, 2 December 2010. Available from www.apminebanconvention.org/fileadmin/pdf/mbc/MSP/10MSP/news/10MSP-PR-WHO-launch-2Dec2010.pdf.

59. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the accountability in United Nations mine action, in particular in the area of victim assistance.

Recommendation 1

The Secretary-General, as Chairman of the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB), in consultation with the executive heads of relevant United Nations system organizations involved in mine action, should appoint a focal point for victim assistance within the United Nations system. This entity should place particular emphasis on integrating victim assistance into national health systems when feasible, while considering the broader work, capacity-building and the international normative framework related to the rights of persons with disabilities and the role of the Inter-Agency Support Group on the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

B. The United Nations Policy

60. The principal framework for United Nations interventions in mine action is provided in the document entitled "Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Inter-Agency Policy" (the Policy); it was approved by the IACG-MA at the Principals' level on 6 June 2005. The Policy defines the vision and core commitments of the United Nations in mine action, outlines the legal framework within which the United Nations mine action takes place, elaborates the common positions deriving from the vision and describes the individual roles and responsibilities of the IACG-MA members It is also intended to clarify how decisions are made and how coordination is achieved among the IACG-MA members and with other stakeholders.

61. According to the Policy, the United Nations envisions a **"world free of the threat of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), where individuals and communities live in a safe environment conducive to development and where the needs of mine and ERW victims are met and they are fully integrated into their societies"**.[18] In line with the Policy, the IACG-MA members established a five-year strategy, which not only comprises the broad goals outlined in the Policy, but also includes the specific strategic objectives that the United Nations intends to achieve during the period. The scope of United Nations mine action is mainly determined by the Policy and the Strategy.

62. The United Nations is involved in mine action in different contexts, as reflected in the Policy. United Nations mine action programmes take place either in a peacekeeping operation, in a humanitarian context, or as part of a development programme. In some situations, for example in South Sudan, programmes may relate to more than one of these contexts. Most United Nations mine action programmes are developed under the auspices of either UNMAS (in humanitarian emergencies and peacekeeping operations) or UNDP (for long-term capacity-building programmes), and are frequently executed with the support of UNOPS. The United Nations supports mine action in over 30 of the more than 60 mine-affected countries and in three territories; eight of these programmes are implemented in the context of peacekeeping operations.

[18] Mine Action and Effective Coordination: The United Nations Inter-Agency Policy, para. 1.

63. The Policy describes three different operational scenarios for programmes managed by the United Nations, including: (a) those established by a Security Council resolution, and which constitute a humanitarian intervention, usually led by UNMAS and centralized management in New York; (b) national programmes which are undertaken at the request of a government and usually decentralized through country-level management with a small headquarters team, often led by UNDP or UNICEF; and (c) emergency situations, which constitute a short-term intervention, usually led by UNMAS.

64. The Inspectors concur with the view of several officials interviewed who indicated that the current policy remains vague and unclear in certain areas and that it would be better known to all United Nations agencies on mine action roles and responsibilities, in particular at the field level. An example of overlapping mandates can be found in paragraphs 84 and 105 of the Policy; while paragraph 84 refers to the responsibility of UNMAS to coordinate the planning for the transfer of programme management responsibilities to national authorities, paragraph 105 indicates that "UNDP facilitates the United Nations effort to assist national authorities to develop national capacity… UNDP assists national authorities to prepare for an effective transition to national management". It is understood that UNMAS and UNDP operate in different contexts; however this is not always the case, such as in the example of Colombia, discussed below. The decentralized approach assumes a high-level of communication and effective information and coordination between the field and headquarters, in particular during the transition from a United Nations-managed to a United Nations-supported programme. During their interviews, the Inspectors ascertained that a wide range of stakeholders, including United Nations officers, believe that the United Nations should speak with a common voice—delivering as one—but fail to see this happened in practice; some specific examples can be found in subsequent paragraphs.

65. Additionally, **the Inspectors conclude that the core competencies and activities of United Nations entities involved in mine action, as reflected in the Policy, do not correspond exactly with the actual activities undertaken by them**. This issue is of particular relevance in the cases of WHO and UNODA, as described in previous paragraphs.

66. It is hoped that the new strategy will assist the United Nations in further clarifying roles and responsibilities of United Nations agencies. However, **the Inspectors are convinced that the roles and responsibilities, as well as the issue of strategic joint planning, should be dealt with in the context of an eventual revision of the Policy itself which, in their view, should include individual objectives for each entity involved**.

C. The United Nations Strategy

67. In 2006, the IACG-MA members adopted the five-year Strategy with the following overall goal: "**The UN will work with national authorities and in partnership with NGOs, the private sector, international and regional organisations and others, to reduce the humanitarian and socio-economic threats posed by landmines and explosive remnants of war, at which point the UN mine action assistance will no longer be necessary**".[19] The Strategy for 2006-2010 focuses on the following major strategic objectives:

(1) Reduce death and injury by at least 50 per cent;

(2) Mitigate the risk to community livelihoods and expand freedom of movement for at least 80 per cent of the most seriously affected communities;

[19] United Nations Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy: 2006-2010, para. 14.

(3) Integrate mine action needs into national development and reconstruction plans and budgets in at least 15 countries;


(4) Assist the development of national institutions to manage the landmine/ERW threat, and at the same time prepare for residual response capacity in at least 15 countries.

68. One approach to evaluating the effectiveness of United Nations mine action is to assess the progress in achieving the above strategic objectives. In the course of 2009 and 2010, the IACG-MA members developed an internal survey, sent to 49 mine action programmes that receive or have received support from the United Nations system, with a view to (a) measure the progress made towards these strategic objectives, and (b) elaborate the development of the new 2011-2015 strategy.

69. With respect to strategic objective 1 (reduce death and injury by at least 50 per cent), a significant decline in casualties can be noted since 2002, characterized by a constant annual reduction. Casualties decreased globally to the lowest number ever recorded since Landmine Monitor began reporting in 1999 (see figure 3). There has been a steady decrease in the number of reported casualties worldwide since 2006, when the number of reported casualties, according to Landmine Monitor, was 6,022. The latest figures for 2009 indicate a total number of reported casualties of 3,956, representing about a 35 per cent reduction in four years. Thus, to achieve the 50 per cent reduction as planned in the Strategy for the period 2006-2010 seems challenging. However, this simple calculation does not provide a full picture of progress towards the achievement of strategic objective 1.

70. There are considerable differences between countries in terms of the number of casualties. In 2010, 64 countries and territories reported accidents due to mine action contamination; however, about half of the victims were reported by only four countries, namely: Afghanistan, Colombia, Pakistan and Myanmar (see figure 4).


Figure 3: Total casualties per year[a] (2000-2009)



	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
abs no.	8378	8417	8333	8270	6607	6873	6022	5473	5197	3956

[a] Casualties caused by mines, ERW and IEDs.
Source: ICBL, *Landmine Monitor* , 2004-2006; 2008-2010.

Figure 4: Casualties in most-affected countries[a] (2003-2009)



[a] Casualties caused by mines, ERW and IEDs.
Source: ICBL, *Landmine Monitor* , 2004-2010.

71. The analysis of the survey indicates that progress has been made towards reducing death and injury; however, findings do not represent a single global trend on landmine and ERW casualties. The raw figures of death and injury are not fully comparable across years or from one country to another. Overall, the numbers of casualties (including death and injury) were reported to be decreasing in 22 of 30 mine-affected countries that provided complete data. However, eight affected countries and territories reported an increase in casualties.

72. Strategic objective 2 (mitigate the risk to community livelihoods and expand freedom of movement for at least 80 per cent of the most seriously affected communities) is simply impossible to measure. The Inspectors could ascertain during their interviews that there is no clear understanding from mine action stakeholders of what the "80 per cent risk to community livelihoods and expansion of freedom of movement" is. However, the survey revealed that 91 per cent of respondents agree that mine action has facilitated the expansion of freedom of movement and has also enabled socio-economic development

73. As regards strategic objective 3 (integrate mine action needs into national development and reconstruction plans and budgets in at least 15 countries), the survey indicates that mine action has been integrated into national development and reconstruction plans in at least 25 countries. A total of 28 countries report having established a national mine action authority, all of which have a national mine action strategy. Of these, 20 have also established a national policy on mine action. However, the most important issues regarding strategic objective 3 are: first, its ownership, since, despite being part of the Strategy, the ownership of strategic objective 3 clearly rests with national authorities and in this regard might not be representative enough of the work undertaken by the United Nations; and second, the lack of a qualitative analysis that could help to determine if the national plans and capacities established are appropriate and effective in addressing mine action local needs.

74. Regarding strategic objective 4 (assist the development of national institutions to manage the landmine/ERW threat, and at the same time prepare for residual response capacity in at least 15 countries), the Inspectors determined that there is no common understanding of what residual response capacity is. The survey indicates that, of the 25 countries that provided information, 14 indicated that they have all 10 types of residual response capacities included in the survey[20] to a certain degree; the remainder indicated that they have at least 5 of these types. It should be noted that residual response capacity should be tailored to local needs and that not all countries require residual response capacity in all 10 areas. Again, as indicated for strategic objective 3, this objective does not address the effectiveness and qualitative aspects of the reported response capacity in relation to the specific problem faced by each mine-affected country.

75. The survey identified the need for further analysis to assess the degree to which each objective has been achieved. **The conclusion of the survey is largely in accordance with the Inspectors' findings. Progress has been made towards reducing death and injury, facilitating humanitarian assistance and development activities, building national ownership, and integrating mine action into national development and reconstruction plans. Overall, progress has been achieved; the remaining challenge is to measure it. These findings also indicate that mine action efforts remain relevant and require continued and sustained focus, assistance and funding.**

76. Objectives should be specific, measurable, attainable, relevant and time-bound (SMART). However, the strategic objectives included in the Strategy are not SMART enough. In addition, reliable baseline data is not available, and the survey analysis undertaken by a consultant indicates that "progress towards each strategic objective … is measured differently from country to country". Furthermore, the consultant states in the analysis that "many country offices do not have the appropriate data collection and data management capabilities in place". The Inspectors concur with these statements; several stakeholders, including some mine action national authorities, confirmed that the data that is available is not reliable, or that data is simply very difficult, thus expensive, to obtain and therefore only partially available.

77. The Inspectors would like to highlight the responsibility of UNMAS in this regard. Strategic objectives 1 and 2 include major activities linked to the development of adequate monitoring systems to measure progress (objective 1, activity (d) and objective 2, activity (c)) or to the provision of mine action data to national planning agencies (objective 3, activity (a)). At the end of the strategic cycle 2006-2010, this area was still a work in progress.

78. In this regard, the Inspectors welcome the publicly available database on landmine contamination, casualties and clearance (LC^3D) that was launched in June 2011 by the World Bank's Development Economics Research Group. The online version contains 192 countries and data is provided from two sources: the Landmine Monitor and the United Nations. The data will prove important for comparison among countries and the assessment of development impact, as well as for the identification of trends in contamination, in casualties or in clearance activities. The database is intended to fill a gap in the statistical analysis and supplement the narrative on mine action for better informed policymaking.[21] Furthermore, it constitutes a major step in collecting, compiling and analysing mine action-related information.

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[20] Residual response capacity as defined in the survey includes the following 10 areas: accreditation, coordination, explosive ordnance disposal, mine clearance, mine risk education, procurement, public information media, quality assurance, resource mobilization and survivor assistance.

[21] World Bank, "Note 1: introduction to the LC^3D", presented at the 12th International Meeting of National Mine Action Directors and United Nations Advisors, 26 March 2009.

79. In the context of the increasing mainstreaming of mine action into development, it is more important than ever to have reliable data on the economic impact of mine action and ERW contamination on development efforts. The need to use information emphasizing the linkages between mine action and achieving the MDGs was specifically recognized by the United Nations in the Strategy review. Although the available data is not yet entirely consistent and there are deficits in terms of its user-friendliness, the World Bank database is a unique initiative that needs support to secure its maintenance in the long term, beyond the two years during which the World Bank is hosting it. **The Inspectors therefore conclude that the IACG-MA should take a decision on how to best support this encouraging initiative with a view to further improving the database and securing its maintenance.**

80. The survey and the inter-agency process that led to its development point to some important gaps and challenges and to some important lessons learned. The main challenges are: (a) there is no global baseline data for mine action, yet such data is urgently needed to measure impact and monitor the implementation of the Strategy, (b) there is an absence of appropriate data collection, monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that would align the Strategy's objectives with the mine action programmes' achievements, and finally, (c) there is a lack of understanding and consensus from mine action stakeholders on how to measure impact and monitor the implementation of the Strategy over time. Again, the Inspectors stress the importance of considering these factors when developing the new strategy for 2011-2015.

81. There have been efforts by IACG-MA members to define output-oriented objectives, but the above review illustrated how difficult it is to measure some of the current strategic objectives. The results of the questionnaire conducted by JIU in May/June 2011 reflects the need expressed by various stakeholders to establish SMART objectives and indicators as part of the new strategy.

82. It can be argued that the results of the internal review commissioned by IACG-MA show a misleading picture concerning the overall contribution of the United Nations, because the impact and results achieved cannot be attributed to the United Nations alone. This again is an area for further improvement: ownership of objectives/activities, which needs to be further clarified in the new strategy.

D. Development of a new strategy

83. The draft outline of the 2011-2015 strategy, presented at the 14th International Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and United Nations Advisors, held on 15 March 2011, highlights some changes compared to the previous Strategy. According to the draft outline, the strategy should be first and foremost a United Nations document for United Nations mine action, contrary to the 2006-2010 Strategy, which is considered a global document for the entire sector. However, the questionnaire undertaken by JIU for the present review reveals that the vast majority (81 per cent) of all respondents, regardless of their affiliation, are of the view that the next strategy should be a reference document for all stakeholders in mine action. The draft strategy is designed to be a pinnacle document in a hierarchy of plans, such as agency-specific mine action guidance or country-level plans. It contains the following major strategic goals:

- Affected member States have appropriate institutions and mechanisms for mine action
- Normative frameworks and advocacy efforts that support mine action are strengthened
- Coordinated and coherent mine action support is provided to the field

84. The consultations and elaboration of the new strategy brought to the forefront some systemic problems. First, there is little consensus within the IACG-MA on how mine action should move ahead, which has created considerable tension among its members. Moreover, even though a clear majority of the respondents to the JIU survey agree that the drafting process should include all concerned stakeholders, some actors, in particular NGOs, do not feel sufficiently consulted. This could eventually undermine the acceptance of the new strategy.

85. The development of the new strategy is not an easy undertaking. It should, inter alia, reflect the leading, coordination, and facilitation roles of the United Nations in mine action and its position in the global context. In summing up, the Inspectors stress that the development of the new strategy should give sufficient attention to the following major points:

- Promoting Delivering as one
- Positioning the United Nations as the global leading actor in mine action
- Emphasizing the importance of establishing a sound monitoring and evaluation process required to evaluate progress in mine action, inter alia through the establishment of global baseline data, and the development of SMART objectives and concrete indicators with measurable outcomes to assess major activities
- Taking into account the role of donors
- Making reference to the broader, in particular socio-economic, context of mine action in line with existing international norms and standards, including the MDGs
- Engaging national institutions and supporting capacity-building
- Including all stakeholders concerned in the further discussion and drafting process to achieve a broad acceptance of the new strategy
- Informing the development of a new Policy in which roles, responsibilities and the ownership of agencies for different scenarios are further clarified
- Reinforcing compliance with international law

86. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of the United Nations mine action activities.

Recommendation 2

In the context of the preparation of the new strategy, the Secretary-General should establish a global baseline of reliable data while building on ongoing efforts, which should facilitate the systematic monitoring of progress and the final evaluation of actual results achieved towards the strategic objectives.

IV. COORDINATION

A. Coordination within the United Nations and the cluster framework

87. The IACG-MA is the main mechanism supporting inter-agency coordination of mine action initiatives and activities within the United Nations system. Chaired by the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations; its composition includes 14 United Nations departments, agencies, programmes and funds that play a role in mine action programmes in over 30 countries and three territories. The IACG-MA is the forum for coordinating United Nations mine action policies and strategies, monitoring the landmine and ERW threat around the world, and reviewing the United Nations mine action response in a given country. It also provides options and recommendations for consideration by senior United Nations officials in given countries. The group meets monthly at the working level and biannually for major policy decisions which are taken by consensus.

88. The results of the review support the view that the general division of roles and responsibilities within the IACG-MA is largely adequate. However, despite a joint United Nations policy, the broad definition of the roles and responsibilities of each IACG-MA member involved allows for different interpretations as to when exactly one agency's mandate ends and another begins. Historically, there appears to be some continuation of inter-agency competition and, in some cases, UNMAS struggles to assert its leadership role within the United Nations family. UNMAS is formally accepted as the focal point for mine action, but in terms of operational relevance, UNDP, UNICEF and UNOPS now have considerable leverage. Cooperation is partly achieved through the various coordination and liaison groups that have been established. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of cooperation and coordination both at headquarters and in the field varies from case to case and is very much country dependant and personality driven.

89. An internal evaluation of UNMAS conducted in 2006 by the DKPO Best Practices Section concluded that the function of UNMAS as focal point for mine action is not sufficiently recognized. The considerable leverage of actors such as UNDP and UNICEF in mine action has an impact on the mandate of UNMAS as the focal-point. The focal-point role of UNMAS has, without a doubt, contributed to the creation of stronger and more coherent inter-agency strategic planning and policy. The 2006 internal UNMAS evaluation indicated that "UNMAS has, however, demonstrated particular weaknesses in its focal point role. These include the pooling and distribution of resources, the avoidance of double coordination costs between itself and contracted intermediaries, and in its inability to ensure national balance among contracted staff and providers of goods".[22] The Inspectors ascertained that some of these issues remain to be solved.

90. As noted by many key stakeholders in mine action, UNMAS has been given somewhat of a challenging mandate. Coordination requires a degree of authority: UNMAS in its role as the lead entity and focal point for United Nations mine action should have some influence, or "coordination authority" over other United Nations entities involved in mine action. However, this is a difficult issue to solve, given that some of these entities have their own governance structures and policies, as well as a stronger field presence. The broader institutional context is a particular challenge for coordination. Thus it seems that it is, at the very least, difficult for this relatively small entity within DPKO to "impose itself". UNMAS is not only tasked to coordinate the 14 United Nations agencies, programmes and funds involved in mine action,

[22] Peacekeeping Best Practices Section/UNMAS, "Post-conflict coordination – the case of the United Nations Mine Action Service: lessons learned" (June 2006), p. 23.

but also to work as the implementer on the ground, mainly in peacekeeping and emergency contexts. Furthermore, UNMAS has been also entrusted with the responsibility of managing the VTF—the major mine action-funding mechanism (discussed in more detail in chapter V). The VTF channels funding from donors to mine action-related programmes. This multiplicity of roles is at the origin of a widespread perception among mine action stakeholders of the existence of an apparent conflict of interest, as stated by key actors during interviews.

91. The presence of UNMAS in non-peacekeeping contexts at times was found to trigger tensions among agencies. A case in point is the recent example of UNMAS entering into Colombia, at the request of the national authorities, to provide technical support to the national mine action programme, directly and not integrated into the country plan context developed by the United Nations Country Team and the Resident Coordinator system. In fact, UNMAS is not part of the United Nations Country Team, and it established a parallel dialogue with national authorities, alienating some United Nations agencies, donors and NGOs, which had a negative impact on the humanitarian and development work done locally by UNDP and UNICEF, leading some agencies to question the role of UNMAS. These problems arose even though a study undertaken by the DPKO Best Practices Section clearly stated in 2006 that the United Nations Mine Action Policy ought to focus on actual competencies on the ground, rather than predetermined mandates.

92. In this context, the Inspectors reiterate the fundamental principles of humanitarian assistance, namely, humanity, neutrality and impartiality (General Assembly resolution 46/182) and that, according to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) guidelines, "as a matter of principle, the military and civil defence assets of belligerent forces or of units that find themselves actively engaged in combat *shall not* be used to support humanitarian activities".[23] Consequently, the provision of assistance to belligerents is not excluded per se; however, it is imperative that such cooperative and collaborative arrangements with national institutions do not hinder the United Nation's neutrality and impartiality, even though, in the case of Colombia, the work of UNMAS was focused on the development of civilian structures within the Presidential Program for Mine Action.

93. Field missions undertaken confirmed that each country is a very specific case. The history, the nature of the conflict, together with major actors, including the United Nations local presence, are unique in each case. This leads the Inspectors to fully concur with the idea that mine action should focus on actual competencies on the ground. However, headquarters coordination is crucial and has an important impact on specific country activities, as the Inspectors observed during the field visit to Colombia, where the lack of coordination at headquarters level negatively affects the coordination of United Nations entities at the national level.

94. Whereas key stakeholders support the establishment of a "firewall" between the UNMAS role of coordinator and that of implementer, UNMAS itself stresses that the focal point function for mine action is well placed within DPKO, mainly due to the importance of peacekeeping contexts, the centralized organizational structure of DPKO and its direct access to the assessed budget. A comparable conflict of interest existed in some mine-affected countries where mine action coordination, policy development, normative activities, and sometimes even funding coordination and allocation, were the responsibility of a single national body (for example, in Cambodia), which also had programme implementation under its responsibilities. The conflict of interest was resolved by splitting the entity into two different organizations, one responsible for, inter-alia, coordination, priority setting, the development of norms and local standards and the maintenance of relevant information systems and national databases, and the other

[23] IASC, "Civil-military relationship in complex emergencies", IASC reference paper, June 2004, para. 38.

responsible for the implementation of projects. The Inspectors are convinced that the same approach should be used within the United Nations system. In their view, overall mine action coordination should be separated from project management and/or implementation, and decisions regarding implementation, when undertaken or managed by a United Nations entity, should be determined by actual competencies on the ground.

95. **The inspectors agree with some donor member States interviewed that, within certain contexts (e.g. peacekeeping or emergency responses), UNMAS may have the comparative advantage to exercise an effective key operational function when there are no alternative actors. However, limiting UNMAS to a mere coordination role may be counterproductive and may have a negative impact on the effectiveness of United Nations mine action on the ground. Hence, an operational role in such cases must be carefully thought through and linked to a hand-over strategy beyond the emergency and/or peacekeeping/political mandates.**

96. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance coordination and cooperation within the United Nations system.

Recommendation 3

The Secretary-General, as Chairman of the CEB and in consultation with the executive heads of relevant United Nations system organizations involved in mine action, should initiate a transparent and inclusive process aimed at clarifying the terms of reference of UNMAS as well as the tasks and mandates of other actors, with a view to positioning UNMAS as the main mine action policy and coordinating entity in addition to its role as a focal point for United Nations mine action, while recognizing its operational role in specific contexts, such as emergency responses, peacekeeping and support to special political missions.

97. The atmosphere of conflict within the United Nations entities in which the new draft strategy has been prepared is another sign of tension, one that is reflected at the field level and is a well-known issue among mine action practitioners. The Inspectors firmly believe that this atmosphere is jeopardizing open cooperation and coordination and goes against the vision of Delivering as one. Furthermore, the 2006-2010 Strategy had already identified the risk of "a lack of willingness on the part of the partners to work together"[24] as a potential major hurdle in its implementation.

98. The High-level Panel on United Nations System-wide Coherence in the areas of development, humanitarian assistance and the environment states in its report published in 2006 that "inefficient and ineffective governance and unpredictable funding have contributed to policy incoherence, duplication and operational ineffectiveness across the system. Cooperation between organizations has been hindered by competition for funding, mission creep and by outdated business practices".[25] In order to address this fragmentation, the High-level Panel recommended the "Delivering as one" approach and a stronger commitment to working together on the implementation of one strategy, in the pursuit of one set of goals.[26]

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[24] United Nations Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy: 2006-2010, para. 13.
[25] A/61/583, p. 10.
[26] Ibid.

99. In Albania, one of the pilot countries for the Delivering as one initiative, and where one of the field missions was undertaken by the Inspectors, the coherent implementation of this concept, together with a small and efficient country team, has greatly helped to improve coordination and communication among United Nations agencies, thus benefiting also mine action-related activities and contributing to the overall success of mine action in that country.

100. The 2009 report of the Secretary-General on peacebuilding in the immediate aftermath of conflict identified mine action as a priority area,[27] and UNMAS is referred to as a good example of a single entity that acts as a go-to source of knowledge, expertise and capacity and that may host limited rapidly deployable capacities.[28] Nonetheless, the Secretary General's progress report from July 2010 revealed that in mine action, the internal policy had not always provided sufficient coordination authority to ensure rapid, predictable and effective delivery in complex post-conflict environments.[29]

101. In 2004, a review of the international humanitarian system identified major gaps in several areas of humanitarian response, as well as problems of coordination. The absence of clearly mandated lead agencies often resulted in international responses to humanitarian crises that were ad hoc, leading to capacity and response gaps. In 2005, the IASC agreed on the use of the cluster approach when dealing with complex humanitarian emergencies, and that it should be applied at the global and also at the country level with some flexibility. Each cluster is a major sector, such as nutrition, protection or education. In the case of the Global Protection Cluster, this is further broken down into areas of responsibility (AoRs) that operate under the overall leadership of UNHCR as the global lead agency for protection. UNMAS is the lead entity for the mine action AoR. While there has been a mine action AoR since 2005, it had never been operational. Instead, the IACG-MA and the Policy remained the main mechanisms for United Nations mine action coordination. A "cluster lead" is an agency/organization that formally commits to take on a leadership role within the international humanitarian community in a particular sector (area of activity), to ensure adequate response and high standards of predictability, accountability and partnership. A cluster lead takes on the commitment to act as the "provider of last resort" in that particular sector (area of activity). AoR lead agencies hold similar roles within their area of responsibility, while the lead agency maintains overall leadership and accountability, including accountability for the cluster.

102. The Policy Committee issued decision 2010/18/i, tasking the IACG-MA to review the current inter-agency Policy and the associated Framework for Mine Action Planning and Rapid Response, as previously mentioned. At a brainstorming session in October 2010, the IACG-MA decided that, in principle, the Global Protection Cluster was the most appropriate forum of coordination for mine action. In this sense, the decision implicitly amended the Policy, in particular with respect to those humanitarian interventions that fall within the third scenario contemplated in the Policy (emergency response) and where the cluster approach is applicable.

103. Other scenarios, where the cluster approach is not applicable, will remain under the consideration of the IACG-MA. On 2 March 2011, UNMAS convened an information briefing on the mine action AoR and a review of the draft AoR terms of reference with the participation of relevant mine action actors, including NGOs. The terms of reference were endorsed and approved by those attending the 1 July 2011 meeting on the AoR. The mine action AoR is aimed at supporting cohesive, inter-agency and inter-organization responses at the field level

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[27] A/63/881–S/2009/304, para. 17
[28] Ibid., para. 53.
[29] A/64/866–S/2010/386, para. 37.

through global level advocacy, standards and policy setting, building response capacity and other support as required.

104. Libya provides the first example of applying the AoR concept at the field level, initiated by UNMAS at headquarters and leading to the establishment of the Joint Mine Action Coordination Team, with relevant field operators providing coordination, prioritization of tasks, mobilization of resources, liaison with authorities and linking to the cluster system at the country level.

B. Coordination with donors

105. Given the difficult economic context and the likely decline of the international financial support specific for mine action, donor coordination is an element critical to making the most efficient use of resources available. The GIHCD study entitled "Mine action funding: trends, modalities and future prospects" includes the results of a survey among donor countries carried out in 2010 and concludes, regarding donor coordination, that:

- Donors are generally in favour of improved coordination, both among themselves and with mine-affected countries.
- They tend to respond to invitations to coordinate, as opposed to being proactive and initiating activities in support of coordination.
- Donor administrations and, in particular, the number of officers responsible for mine action, have been reduced over the years. As a result, donor capacities have been weakened, resulting in a loss of focus, increased dependency on mine action operators, NGOs and the United Nations, and loss of corporate memory and in-house expertise.
- Their participation in coordinating activities in the field depends very much on the type of programming and the approach they take in their relationships vis-à-vis the host country.[30]

106. The United Nations has an important role to play regarding donor coordination, in particular at the global level. As reflected in the Policy, the United Nations provides support to the Mine Action Support Group (MASG), a donor forum including State parties and non-State parties to the APMBC, which generally meets in New York. The MASG, chaired by donor countries on a rotating basis, is a body providing an opportunity for donors and the United Nations to share information on emerging trends, operational priorities, funding gaps and the effective and efficient coordination and implementation of mine action.[31]

107. The Inspectors noted that donor coordination has been a serious challenge for effective mine action in the past. Despite some reform initiatives, more efforts will be needed in the coming years to provide for an open dialogue and to improve the collective donor contribution. The functioning of the MASG has been improved, for example, by reducing the number of meetings, originally held on a monthly basis, to two to three meetings per year and thereby allowing the participation of decision-makers from capitals. Nevertheless, the meetings are often attended by officers with no decision-making capacity. Another initiative,

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
[30] See footnote 13, pp. 12-13.
[31] Report of the Secretary-General on assistance in mine action (A/64/287), para. 32.

which is currently being implemented with funds provided by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, is to fund a strengthened MASG secretariat until the end of March 2013.

108. Serious challenges remain. For example, most of the funding is still provided on a short-term annual basis. Even though the Inspectors are aware that some donors may face challenges in their national legislative frameworks, better results may be achieved if more States parties follow the examples of the donors who are already providing multi-year funding, which is key to facilitate subsequent planning.

109. Several tools have been developed to facilitate donor coordination and to support in-country coordination: the *Portfolio of Mine Action Projects* has been published annually since 1998 and is intended as a comprehensive resource tool and reference document for donors, policymakers, advocates, and national and international mine action implementers. The *Portfolio* is intended ideally to reflect on projects conceived by mine- and ERW-affected countries based on national priorities and strategies. Each project proposal contains a description of objectives, targeted beneficiaries, planned activities, expected outcomes, the name of the appealing agency, a list of implementing partners, the total budget and the expected shortfall for the coming years; the country overviews and project proposals are posted and regularly updated online at www.mineaction.org. The *Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2011* lists 238 projects for 29 countries, territories or missions affected by landmines and ERW, amounting to over US$ 498 million in combined budgets and for which there was a funding shortfall of US$ 367 million as of March 2011 (see figure 5). The geographical distribution in terms of projects shows that most planned activities are deployed in Africa (92 projects out of 238). In terms of shortfall as well, Africa, in particular Sudan, has seen the largest—more than US$ 172 million.

Figure 5. Share of total projects and shortfall by region, 2011



Source: UNMAS/UNDP/UNICEF, *Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2011*, p. 379.

110. The *Portfolio* in its current form and format has moved primarily towards one of its initial objectives: it is considered more of a fundraising tool than a mechanism to facilitate in-country coordination and joint planning. However, the Inspectors are convinced that both elements should complement each other and that the full potential of the *Portfolio* still needs to be explored. Furthermore, the Inspectors stress that project proposals must be based on needs assessments, which greatly enhance their relevance, and highlight the importance of engaging representatives from national and local authorities as well as other relevant actors with in-country knowledge in the drafting process. Particular attention should also be paid to

countries or territories that may currently not be reflected in the *Portfolio,* but that still need assistance.

111. In this context, representatives from mine-affected countries have repeatedly expressed concerns about information gaps and transparency regarding incoming funding, and have highlighted the need to be better informed in order to facilitate planning at the national level. It is vital, therefore, that funding flows are transparent and that donors make sure that support for mine action funding, in particular through bilateral channels, is in line with national priorities. Some affected countries still do not know where and how to access donor funding, more than 10 years after the APMBC entered into force.

112. In order to address these deficits and to promote information sharing, UNMAS should consider revitalizing the global Database of Mine Action Investments,[32] which was initially developed for that purpose, but has not been maintained. Furthermore, the Inspectors stress that an exploration should be undertaken as to what extent this database—basically a "portfolio of donors"—could either complement the *Portfolio of Mine Action Projects* or even be integrated in this tool. Given the recent decision to publish the *Portfolio* only electronically (for the first time in 2010) on the E-MINE website, it may also be useful to consider creating a regularly updated financial tracking system similar to the model used by OCHA for humanitarian aid flows. A practical and user-friendly information-sharing platform would not only increase transparency regarding both funding availability and existing funding needs, but it would facilitate coordination and allow for the tracking of contributions.

113. Overall, **the Inspectors conclude that donor coordination needs improvement.** Donors also expressed the need to strengthen existing coordination mechanisms, especially the MASG. **Ideally, donors should get together with mine-affected countries and jointly develop strategies.** However, this is the exception rather than the rule. A first encouraging step in this direction was recently taken at the tenth Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, where it was decided to establish the Standing Committee on Resources, Coordination and Assistance.

C. Coordination with other actors

114. The Steering Committee on Mine Action (SCMA) supports the coordination of United Nations mine action initiatives with non-United Nations partners. In addition to members of the IACG-MA, it includes, inter alia, representatives of ICRC and ICBL, GICHD and international mine action NGOs.

115. For more than a decade, the IACG-MA, in partnership with GICHD, has organized the annual International Meeting of National Mine Action Programme Directors and United Nations Advisors, which is traditionally attended by senior officials from national mine action programmes, United Nations mine action advisors and officials, NGOs, experts from donor governments and other implementing partners. The meeting constitutes an opportunity for participants to meet and assess progress achieved and discuss future challenges for the sector. The Inspectors attended the 2011 meeting and had the opportunity to exchange views with diverse mine action actors from different mine-affected countries, who provided valuable information for the preparation of the present review. The International Meeting of National

[32] The Database of Mine Action Investments was initially developed with the support of the Government of Canada to provide information on the resources made available worldwide for international mine action assistance. See www.mineaction.org/overview.asp?o=27.

Mine Action Programme Directors and United Nations Advisors is a positive initiative that promotes relevant knowledge-sharing and open discussions and, in the view of the Inspectors, should be maintained.

116. As previously mentioned, civil society was a major driving force in the establishment of the Ottawa Convention and, as illustrated in previous paragraphs, it is a major actor in current mine action. NGOs are the interested observers of the APMBC and, in most cases, the implementers on the ground. Therefore, communication and coordination between civil society and the United Nations entities concerned is essential. In order to gather their views, the Inspectors held interviews with civil society representatives in every field mission undertaken, and a group meeting was convened with NGO representatives in Geneva. NGO officials interviewed expressed regret that the dialogue between them and the United Nations agencies has deteriorated since the Nairobi Summit in 2004; however, interviews conducted and the results of the JIU survey indicate that the dialogue is being revitalized.

117. In general, NGOs support the view of a "mine-free" world, while some donor countries and other stakeholders promote the concept of "impact-free", which implies concentrating efforts in clearing land based on socio-economic criteria and the impact on affected communities, thus relegating the legal obligation to remove all mines as contained in the APMBC. The Convention requires that each State Party make every effort to identify all mine areas containing anti-personnel mines and to clear and destroy all anti-personnel mines found in areas under its jurisdiction or control. For its part, the United Nations, partly driven by donors, modified its humanitarian approach to mine action by considering it in a broader development context. While both concepts and preferences should be seen as part of a continuum rather than separate and disparate end states, NGOs strongly feel that this disconnect should be resolved and the dialogue renewed in an open and constructive manner.

118. The tools to facilitate the dialogue are in place. The SCMA supports the coordination of United Nations mine action initiatives with non-United Nations partners, providing a forum for open discussion and the sharing of information. The SCMA meets at least once a year, normally in Geneva, and may set up ad hoc groups to tackle particular country-specific or thematic issues. The AoR for mine action within the Global Protection Cluster, if activated, is another forum through which NGOs could provide feedback to the United Nations system.

119. NGO responses to the JIU survey revealed a certain uneasiness when it comes to assessing working relations with the United Nations. At the same time, NGOs acknowledged that a more constructive dialogue has started with the United Nations in recent months, especially on issues such as cooperation, the efficient and effective use of resources, and humanitarian emergencies, including their involvement in the mine action AoR.

120. Coordination at the field level is also affected by work processes, such as procurement and other contractual arrangements. Different partners have different internal working procedures that in most cases are well understood within their respective organizations; however, they might not be understood when cooperating in partnership with other organizations. This is especially important when very different organizations enter partnership agreements. Bureaucracy hinders cooperation. In this context, key implementing NGOs highlighted the burdensome reporting requirements of some United Nations entities; furthermore, different United Nations entities and programmes place different reporting requirements and obligations on implementing partners. **The Inspectors conclude, therefore, that the United Nations system should make an effort to harmonize reporting criteria (for example, through common templates) when working with external partners in humanitarian and developmental projects, including mine action.**

D. The development of national capacity and transition to national ownership

121. As defined in the Policy, United Nations mine action activities are intended to promote national ownership, institution-building and capacity development. Furthermore, the strategic goal of the United Nations Inter-Agency Mine Action Strategy 2006-2010 is to "… work with national authorities … to reduce the humanitarian and socio-economic threats posed by landmines … at which point United Nations mine action assistance will no longer be necessary" (para. 14). This implies that in the longer term, nationally defined mine action goals and objectives can be reached with little or no international support. Strategic objective 4 outlines major activities to assist national authorities and includes general indicators to measure progress. The primary responsibility for mine action always lies with the Government of the mine-affected country. This responsibility should be vested in a national mine action authority that is charged with the regulation, management and coordination of a national mine action programme.

122. The context and circumstances for national capacity development and institution-building to manage the landmine/ERW threat vary significantly and depend greatly on the commitment of the Governments of mine-affected countries. Consequently, mine action authorities within affected countries have unique mandates, often—but not necessarily—laid out in the national legislation, structured to establish and articulate the coordination and management of activities. In a typical mine action programme, the United Nations supports the development of national mine action structures at three levels:

(1) A mine action regulatory and policy institution at the inter-ministerial level;
(2) A coordination body that also supervises the various mine action operations in consultation with key stakeholders;
(3) Operating organizations of non-governmental, commercial, civil defence, police or military nature.

123. Under certain circumstances, in particular peacekeeping and humanitarian emergencies, the United Nations assumes some or all of the responsibilities normally undertaken by a national mine action authority. In such cases, it is UNMAS, in cooperation with other relevant IACG-MA members, that is typically mandated to coordinate the planning for an emergency response, establish a mine action programme, support the deployment of any peacekeeping operation, and eventually transfer programme-management responsibilities to national authorities. In other circumstances, usually other than immediately post-conflict and facilitated by their established country presences, other IACG-MA members, such as UNDP or UNICEF, may manage and/or support some parts or even the entire national mine action programme at the request of national authorities.

124. The development of national mine action structures and institutions and the coordination among agencies undertaking related activities are among the biggest challenges for United Nations mine action programming. Capacity-building has not received the strategic attention it deserves, and the related support activities appear to be ad hoc, consisting mainly of middle and senior management training, including missions to other mine action programmes, and the provision of offices and purchasing of vehicles. In many cases it does not appear that there is a joint United Nations strategy with a comprehensive and detailed capacity-building plan in place on how the United Nations will work with national authorities over a certain period of time in order to progressively transfer responsibility for mine action. The often quoted case of Chad illustrates this deficit in the transfer of knowledge to local staff and national authorities, as acknowledged by key mine action stakeholders, including senior United Nations officials. National authorities in Chad argued that consultants sent by UNDP to work with the Government were often ill-equipped to improve the Government's management skills. At the

same time, it is clear that national capacity can improve only if the national actors assume their role, take responsibility and speak up about the priorities.[33]

125. As pointed out in the review of the progress achieved towards strategic goals, only 56 per cent of mine-affected countries, or 14 out of 25 countries that provided data, have a residual response capacity for all areas of mine action in place. Given that each country represents a very specific context, mine action national capacities and response, including residual response, do not need to cover all areas of mine action but only those relevant to the national context, thus the figures provided are only a reference and do not provide a precise idea of how adequate these capacities are to deal locally with the problem of ERW. Furthermore, there is little information available about the effectiveness and quality of the countries' capacities, which limits the value of the results presented in the progress report.

126. As already indicated, comparing results in national capacity-building and extracting lessons learned from context-specific programmes is difficult. Nevertheless, some countries provide good examples that should be taken into consideration. For instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the transition to national ownership and the sustainability of capacities is, at least overall, a success story. Other countries, such as Albania, are very close to assuming full national ownership. According to the chairman and director of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre, the transfer of responsibilities from the United Nations to the Centre was smooth and successful. UNDP has actively supported the mine action efforts of Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1996. Initially, it managed the mine action centre responsible for coordinating the national programme and for compiling and maintaining the database of minefield records. These responsibilities were transferred to national authorities in 1998, at which point UNDP initiated its multi-donor-financed Integrated Mine Action Programme (IMAP). IMAP has been successful in supporting the emergence of national capacities for planning and coordinating the mine action programme. Overall, IMAP is an effective instrument to support the development of national capacities, and to facilitate the progressive transition of the country programme from post-conflict reconstruction and resettlement toward sustainable development.[34] Despite some challenges related to management and transparency, Bosnia and Herzegovina reached a relatively high level of national capacities and experience, to the extent that there is considerable potential for other countries to learn from and exchange lessons learned with Bosnia and Herzegovina; Georgia, Sudan and Jordan have already done so.[35]

127. In this context, the Inspectors underline that the full potential of South-South and triangular cooperation still remains to be explored.[36] Initiatives have been undertaken in the framework of the UNDP Mine Action Exchange Programme, which facilitates cooperation and peer review among affected countries and the dissemination of good practices. For example, exchanges of information and experience among the mine action programmes of

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[33] For additional information on the case of Chad, see: The Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN-OCHA), "Analysis: the problem of demining in Chad", 18 June 2010, available from www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportID=89536; and Chad, "Convention sur l'interdiction de l'emploi, du stockage de la production et du transfert des mines antipersonnel et sur leur destruction: demande de prolongation du délai accordé au titre de l'article 5 de la Convention, République du Tchad", 17 August 2010.

[34] GICHD, "Mid-term review of the UNDP Integrated Mine Action Programme (IMAP): final report", July 2006, p. iii.

[35] Emina Abrahamsdotter, "Ex-post final evaluation report: Integrated Mine Action Program", 30 April 2010, eleventh page.

[36] See "South-South and triangular cooperation in the United Nations system" (JIU/REP/2011/3).

Angola, Cambodia and Mozambique[37] are encouraging developments in this regard that need to be supported and further enhanced.

128. In Cambodia, the Inspectors also recognize significant efforts undertaken by the national mine action authorities, in cooperation with the country's development partners, to strengthen leadership and ownership of the mine action sector. It is worth noting the recent introduction of Partnership Principles by the Cambodian Mine Action Authority for the implementation of the National Mine Action Strategy. The introduction to the principles commits development partners to follow the Government's leadership in the formulation and implementation of mine action policies and strategies and to align their support with the national plans. The Principles are also intended to enhance aid effectiveness. As a result of increased confidence in the national leadership, the implementation modality of the multi-donor-funded project Clearing for Results was converted from the direct implementation modality of phase I, carried out by UNDP, to the national implementation modality under the ownership and responsibility of the Cambodian Mine Action Authority—Clearing for Results: Phase II.

129. Several countries where national mine action authorities have full ownership over mine action activities are still very dependent on external funding. In fact, some of these national authorities are supported financially by United Nations entities without clear plans for a complete handover of ownership to national Governments, including the financing of their respective mine action national authorities. **The Inspectors conclude therefore that transition strategies should be more precise in this regard, establishing phases and specific deadlines for a complete handover of responsibilities.**

130. Alternatively, in some scenarios the United Nations is requested to manage mine action programmes on behalf of national authorities, such as in the case of Afghanistan. According to UNMAS, in 2002 the United Nations-managed Mine Action Coordination Centre of Afghanistan (MACCA), was entrusted by the Government of Afghanistan to support the mine action coordination of all stakeholders in the country and to assume the obligations under the terms of the APMBC. From 2002 to 2011, the mine action programme received US$ 392.8 million through the VTF, an amount that represents 59 per cent of the overall contributions to the VTF for the same period. These funds were primarily used for mine risk education and mine clearance activities. Between 2001 and 2011 the number of people killed or injured by mines and ERW in Afghanistan decreased considerably.[38] In addition, MACCA has worked with the Afghan Department of Mine Clearance to ensure that there is a clear understanding of all stakeholders, their respective mandates, their area of technical expertise, as well as the guidelines they follow when deciding on how and to what extent they should be involved to ensure an effective response and to avoid duplication of efforts.[39]

131. The technical support provided by the United Nations is a key element for the success of national capacity-building activities. In this regard, several stakeholders interviewed repeatedly expressed concerns about the added value of work done by some technical advisers deployed by the United Nations, referring to their level of competence. However, this varies greatly from country to country; therefore, the Inspectors conclude that a general assessment disregarding the context is impossible. Despite good context-specific case studies, **the Inspectors believe that there should not only be clearer job descriptions and**

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[37] Report of the Secretary-General on assistance in mine action (A/66/292), para. 34.

[38] Data as of February 2012: in 2001, 2,027 people were killed or injured by mines and ERW. By 2011, this figure had dropped to 391.

[39] As of January 2012, mine action activities (clearance, survey, mine risk education, and victim assistance) are conducted by 44 different stakeholders, employing over 12,700 people, who work in 91 districts in 25 provinces (source: UNMAS).

performance indicators for United Nations staff involved in mine action in general, but also a common induction/training for project managers and chief technical advisors in particular.

132. A challenge closely linked to providing adequate technical support for a sustainable national capacity concerns the potential dilution of mine action expertise through its integration into wider programming, for example, in the case of UNICEF into child protection or in the case of UNDP into the broader area of small arms and light weapons. Even though the Inspectors recognize the importance of an integrated approach to mine action. They stress that specific mine action expertise at headquarters level is in danger of steadily being diluted while being integrated into broader clusters such as small arms and light weapons or child protection.

133. **In conclusion, the Inspectors highlight that strengthening the competence of United Nations programme managers and technical advisors through a common training module for mine action induction should focus on how the United Nations, system-wide, conducts mine action activities**, with special emphasis on the concept of Delivering as one, including the roles and responsibilities of United Nations and non-United Nations actors and the different contexts they operate. Other elements could be added to the training programme to guarantee that each United Nations staff member working on mine action has a common basic understanding of United Nations mine action, regardless of the United Nations entity to which he or she belongs.

134. **The Inspectors conclude that this induction should be completed by all new staff expected to work in mine action-related activities, including those at UNMAS, UNICEF, UNDP, UNOPS, and any of the other entities working on mine action-related activities**. The training module could be mandatory for those working in mine action-related activities and should be developed taking into consideration current technologies, such that it is available through the Internet and can be completed from anywhere at any time; resources for its development could come from unearmarked VTF funds. In addition, clear job descriptions and performance indicators need to be established for United Nations staff in the field. As the focal point, UNMAS has the main responsibility in this context.

135. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of United Nations mine action activities.

Recommendation 4

UNMAS, in its role as the focal point for mine action, should develop relevant training materials to strengthen the staff capacity, in particular for the common induction of new staff joining any of the United Nations funds, programmes and/or specialized agencies involved in activities related to mine action, paying particular attention to the important role played by non-United Nations entities.

E. Monitoring and evaluation of mine action

136. Monitoring and evaluation is an integral part of the United Nation Inter-Agency Policy framework for mine action. The Policy outlines that the United Nations, overall, should regularly commission external evaluations of its mine action programmes and participate in, or encourage, evaluations of mine action programmes involving all stakeholders at the

national or regional levels. Lessons learned from evaluations should inform future planning and programming.[40] The Policy also specifically tasks UNMAS to commission external evaluations of its field programmes, requests UNDP to regularly conduct both internal and external evaluations of its mine action activities, with results and lessons learned made available to all partners and other interested parties, and asks UNICEF to undertake periodic evaluations with a view to develop, disseminate and promote practices, standards, policies and guidelines in the field of MRE. Similarly, implementation activities undertaken by UNOPS are to be continuously monitored, evaluated and assessed to ensure that the right products are delivered in a timely fashion.[41]

137. UNMAS seeks to translate these guiding principles into practice through a variety of means, depending on the context and specificities of different programmes. It works with the field missions on the formulation of programme evaluations for the mine action component of those programmes receiving assessed contributions for peacekeeping operations; these programmes may also be subject to internal audits and evaluations by the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) as well as internal evaluations by the DPKO Division for Policy, Evaluation and Training. For programmes receiving funding from the VTF or other sources, the evaluation requirements are determined internally, at the request of the donors to the programme or by donors directly. UNMAS strives to undertake two external programme evaluations a year, but in practice this has rarely been the case. At the time of writing the present report, UNMAS was not able to provide information on the number and type of evaluations conducted in the past years, so it is difficult to assess its role in this regard. However, **the Inspectors noted that there is no formal evaluation strategy in place that translates the guiding evaluation principles included in the Policy into practice, nor is there a systematic dissemination of lessons learned.**

138. In 2008, UNMAS developed the Recommendations Tracking Tool with the goal to track all recommendations, ranging from those issued in the context of OIOS audits and technical assessments to those formulated in external evaluations. While the Inspectors are generally supportive of the Recommendations Tracking Tool and stress the potential value added by this initiative in capturing recommendations and monitoring them through implementation, they note that implementation and follow-up need improvement, a situation UNMAS attributes to the frequent turnover of staff tasked with its administration. The Inspectors hope that the recent decision to move responsibility for the tool from the Programme Section, as originally envisioned, to the Policy Section, will help to ensure a better follow-up.

139. **To sum up, the Inspectors regret that despite an increasing emphasis on monitoring and evaluation, a culture of monitoring and evaluation has not yet been sufficiently promoted.** The Inspectors underline the importance of monitoring and evaluation, conducted both internally and externally. If monitoring and evaluation of the impact and effectiveness of mine action programmes are seldom undertaken, this seriously weakens long-term impact and project effectiveness in all pillars. The Inspectors conclude therefore that UNMAS and all IACG-MA members need to value increasingly the importance of evaluation and ongoing monitoring in their supported programmes, and should strive to promote a culture of monitoring and evaluation. Particular emphasis should be given to the development of an evaluation strategy and of appropriate monitoring mechanisms.

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[40] Mine Action and Effective Coordination (footnote 9 above), para. 27.
[41] Ibid., para. 86 (UNMAS); para. 106 (UNDP); para. 119 (UNICEF); and paras. 135 and 136 (UNOPS).

140. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of United Nations mine action activities.

Recommendation 5:

UNMAS, in consultation with the IACG-MA, should develop an evaluation strategy establishing the framework for all types of evaluations, internal or external, including criteria for the systematic evaluation of the Strategy as well as of field activities when relevant.

V. UNITED NATIONS FUNDING FOR MINE ACTION

A. United Nations funding mechanisms for mine action

141. There are several funding mechanisms in place within the United Nations to channel funds for mine action; each of the main actors, namely, UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF, has established or manages specific funds.

142. UNMAS-managed programmes in the field and UNMAS headquarters coordination activities are funded by: appropriations by the General Assembly for the mine action component of seven peacekeeping missions;[42] funds allocated to UNMAS headquarters coordination activities within the United Nations peacekeeping support account; contributions of donor governments, organizations and private individuals to the VTF; and the allocation of funds from other United Nations trust funds and multi-donor trust funds (MDTFs), such as the Common Humanitarian Fund for Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo Pooled Fund, and the Nepal Peace Trust Fund. Between 2009 and 2010, voluntary contributions represented 53 per cent of all funding sources of United Nations mine action programmes and peacekeeping appropriations represented 46 per cent. In 2010, General Assembly appropriations for the mine action component represented 55 per cent of the total, the peacekeeping support account represented only 1 per cent and the remaining 44 per cent were voluntary contributions channelled through the VTF.[43] It is important to note that as a consequence of the increase of peacekeeping appropriations and the decrease in voluntary contributions, the ratio of sources of funding for UNMAS-managed programmes has changed, and now peacekeeping appropriations are higher than the VTF-funded portion of mine action programmes.

143. Other mechanisms that support mine action activities include the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, established by UNDP in 2000 and managed by the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, which has funded UNDP mine action efforts in the amount of US$ 110 million since 2004. In addition, funds are committed directly by UNDP country offices to specific mine action activities. UNICEF funds for mine action programming are mainly managed directly by the relevant UNICEF country offices as well as the Child Protection Section in New York and the Public Sector Alliances and Resource Mobilization Office.

B. The management of the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action

144. The VTF was established in 1994 and has been administered by UNMAS since 1998; it is a central fund for United Nations and non-United Nations system-wide assistance to mine action activities. The VTF is a major instrument for channelling mine action funding, having received US$ 680 million since its establishment. According to the established United Nations policies, which govern the management of trust funds, UNMAS, under the authority of the Controller, retains authority over funds received in the VTF in its capacity as the VTF manager, and should perform programme oversight and monitoring functions in line with accountability expectations of the VTF donors.

145. Among the voluntary contributions, the VTF is by far the largest source of funding for mine action. In 2009, its contributions amounted to more than US$ 90 million, whereas for 2010 contributions decreased to a total of US$ 63.5 million. In 2010, of the total amount of funds

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[42] United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad, United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, African Union Mission in Somalia and United Nations Mission in Sudan.
[43] UNMAS, “Who pays for it?”, www.mineaction.org/section.asp?s=who_pays_for_it (9 June 2011).

available to the VTF, only US$ 1.9 million, or 3 per cent of funds, were unearmarked contributions. Figure 6 shows the total amount of voluntary contributions received over the period 1998/1999 to 2010/2011. Contributions to the VTF consistently grew, reaching a peak during the 2008/09 biennium, with donations of more than US$ 180 million.[44]

146. However, in 2010 and 2011, the VTF was not replenished at an adequate level and, as a result of funding constraints, UNMAS had to re-prioritize its programmes and introduce significant budgetary reductions. Contributions made to the VTF during the last biennia reached a peak in the 2008-2009 biennium and then declined (see figure 6); it is probable that previously achieved levels will not be reached and that the decline in VTF funding anticipates a global trend towards gradually reduced funding specific for mine action, as discussed in previous paragraphs.


Figure 6. Contributions to the Voluntary Trust Fund, 1998/99-2010/11 in US Dollars



147. UNMAS, through the VTF, receives extrabudgetary support from 10 major donors, who contributed 96.4 per cent of the total amount received in 2010, with heavy dependence on four top donors: the European Commission, Canada, Japan and the Netherlands, which combined contributed 82.8 per cent of the total amount received in 2010. Figure 7 provides a breakdown of major donors to the VTF for 2009 and 2010.

[44] Ibid.

Figure 7: Major Voluntary Trust Fund donors, 2009-2010 (percentage)



148. Taking into account the dependence of UNMAS on a very limited number of donors, and the current global economic context, the Inspectors consider that UNMAS is at risk and would like to stress the need for cautious estimates when planning for the next strategic period. In order to address the potential widening gap between required funding and effective contributions, UNMAS developed the Resource Mobilization Strategy 2010-2013, which has recently been adopted.

149. Figures 8 and 9 provide an overview of the main recipients of contributions to the VTF in 2010 and 2011. More than half of all contributions were earmarked for Afghanistan, in both years. Unearmarked funds represent only about 3 per cent for each year.

Figure 8. Recipients of the VTF contributions 2010 (percentage)





Figure 9. Recipients of the VTF contributions 2011 (percentage)



150. It is worth noting that some of the largest donor countries in mine action are not contributors to the VTF. The Inspectors held interviews with major donor countries, including some that are not contributors to the VTF. The reasons given by the latter for not using the VTF as one of their major funding channels are diverse, ranging from a donor's specific national cooperation policies to concerns about the efficiency and effectiveness of the VTF as a funding mechanism; in their view, the VTF is expensive, slow and not flexible enough, issues that are discussed in subsequent paragraphs. Furthermore, these views are shared by some mine action practitioners: "The VTF has proved an inefficient mechanism for channelling money to programmes and is disliked by donors because of the high overheads retained by the UN Administration and its slow disbursement of funds to field operations. Increased use of bilateral and other funding mechanisms have sought to bypass such bureaucratic bottlenecks but have also posed problems for the UN's mine action coordination role."[45] Critical voices consider that the survival of the VTF is not a result of the Fund's good performance and efficiency, but more a consequence of the lack of capacity of some donors to follow up on their contributions.

C. Timely disbursement of Voluntary Trust Fund funds

151. The present review is not an evaluation of the financial management of the VTF; specific examples are provided only to illustrate some of the major issues identified by the Inspectors. The delays in the disbursement of VTF funds have repeatedly been a cause of concern among implementing partners, NGOs and donors, as well as mine-affected countries, as the Inspectors confirmed during interviews held with relevant officials.

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[45] Alan Bryden, "Optimising mine action policies and practice", in *Security Governance in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding*, Alan Bryden, Heiner Haenggi, eds. (Geneva, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2005), p. 165.

152. OIOS undertook audits of the VTF in 1998, 2004 and 2008,[46] addressing the effectiveness and efficiency of the financial management of the Fund. Following relevant recommendations, UNMAS undertook several important measures to improve the financial management of the VTF. These measures have resulted in improvements in the Fund's financial performance and the UNMAS management of fund assets. Notwithstanding these improvements, OIOS, inter-alia, noted a number of control weaknesses in the financial management of the Fund, including a lack of compliance with financial reporting requirements by implementing partners, delayed disbursement of funds resulting in delayed project implementation, missing deadlines for the efficient return of unspent balances and accrued interest, and lack of reporting of financial results to donors. One major finding addresses the disbursement timeline from the time of receipt to actual disbursement to projects. OIOS found that the average time taken to disburse the contributions was seven months, taking into consideration all approved projects between 2004 and 2006.

153. OIOS also reiterated a recommendation contained in a previous report, in which it requested UNMAS to obtain from the Controller trust fund management and certifying authority for the management of the VTF. In its report AP2009/600/4, dated 29 October 2009, OIOS reiterated, for a second time, its recommendation and stressed that the Department of Management had still not granted the delegation of authority for financial management to streamline processing of instalment payments. The absence of such an authority often resulted in delays in project execution. Finally, in July 2010, officers in the UNMAS Budget, Financial Management and Reporting Unit were delegated certifying authority by the United Nations Controller. This enables UNMAS to authorize payments within the terms of the Financial Agreement, as approved and signed by the Controller. This resulted in a reduction of steps in the allocation and disbursement processes, which the Inspectors see as an encouraging sign.

154. The Inspectors ascertained during the interviews conducted that the timely disbursement of funds remains an issue. There is evidence of delays in various countries, such as in Pakistan (a UNICEF mine-risk education project) and in Chad—the most prominent case in recent years.[47] In both cases the transfers to United Nations partners were significantly delayed due to mostly administrative reasons. At the eighth Meeting of States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction Chad requested an extension of 14 months with regard to its article 5 obligations in order to get a clear picture of contamination and to provide the base for further clearance.[48] In March 2009, Japan had signed an earmarked contribution to the VTF of almost US$ 5.6 million to the VTF for a technical survey in Chad to be channelled to UNDP; after lengthy discussions on administrative issues and programme support costs to be charged, funds were finally transferred to UNDP in February 2010, when it was acknowledged that the extended deadline could not be met, inter alia, due to the administrative difficulties already mentioned. This delayed the availability of resources necessary to conduct the technical survey, an essential element for understanding the dimension of ERW contamination.[49]

155. The need for improvements become even more apparent when considering the terms of reference of the VTF, which emphasize the role of the Trust Fund as a tool to ensure that "assistance in mine clearance must be delivered in a timely and coordinated manner", indicating also that "the Trust Fund is consequently designed to have a balance of funds…

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[46] OIOS Audit Nos. AP97/124/6; AP2003/600/01; and AN2007/600/1.
[47] IRIN-OCHA, "Analysis: the problems of demining in Chad" (footnote 30 above).
[48] Chad, "Demande de prolongation du délai prescrit a l'article 5", 25 July 2008, pp. 6-7.
[49] Chad, "Demande de prolongation" (footnote 33 above), p. 5.

that can be quickly utilized for mine action activities."[50] **The presentation given by UNMAS on the management of the VTF at the meeting of the Standing Committee on Resources, Cooperation and Assistance in June 2011 is a first encouraging sign towards enhanced transparency in this regard.**

156. UNMAS, on behalf of the IACG-MA, stated at the tenth Meeting of States Parties in December 2010 that it acknowledged concerns raised regarding delays in the provision of funding through the United Nations system, and assured that the United Nations is taking these concerns seriously and currently addressing, as matter of urgency, ways and means to ensure a prompt and effective transfer of funds to the relevant parties.

157. To ensure efficient and cost-effective funding for mine action, and following Policy Committee Decision 2010/18/iii of July 2010, the United Nations Office of the Controller was tasked to facilitate and assist the process in coordination with relevant officers from other United Nations entities, adopting procedures and templates to rapidly disburse funds from the VTF through standardized agreements. The measure requested by the Policy Committee should have been implemented. However, there are still issues which continue to impede a final agreement.

158. **The Inspectors highlight the importance of the timely disbursement of mine action funds** through the VTF. Despite the fact that it is a well-known issue, they reiterate **the need to streamline processes and minimize bureaucracy. A plan of action should be established for the implementation of decision 2010/18/iii to review the disbursement mechanism, establishing a revised deadline for its conclusion and including target indicators for its expected performance; progress achieved towards the efficient and timely disbursement of funds should be monitored in a systematic manner.**

D. The use of unearmarked funds

159. VTF funds can be divided into earmarked and unearmarked contributions. While the former apply to those funds that are granted by donors for specific countries, programmes or United Nations agencies, the latter comprise contributions not tied to specific conditions, as well as interest income generated by the United Nations as a result of investment activities that donors do not require to be paid back. Of the US$ 63.5 million received by the VTF in 2010, no less than US$ 61.6 million, or 97 per cent, was earmarked, whereas only the remaining 3 per cent, or US$ 1.9 million, was contributed without any particular purpose. The VTF terms of reference, dating from 1994, define that "the Trust Fund will achieve its primary goals only with an adequate balance of unearmarked contributions".[51] However, the low level of unearmarked contributions negatively affects the capacity of UNMAS to plan strategically in the medium and long term. In addition, discontinuous support by key contributors is another aspect that has considerable impact on strategic planning. In a previous JIU report, the importance of predictability of voluntary funding was acknowledged, and it was noted with concern that earmarking can lead to the distortion of programme priorities.[52] At the same time, donors themselves recognized in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability that

[50] Terms of reference of the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, 1994, pp. 1-2; see also A/49/375, p. 23.
[51] Terms of reference of the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Clearance, p. 4, para. 18.
[52] See "Voluntary contributions in United Nations system organizations: impact on programme delivery and resource mobilization strategies" (JIU/REP/2007/1).

concrete measures should be taken to address the "failure to provide more predictable and multi-year commitments on aid flows" (para. 4).

160. Whereas the lack of long-term funding commitment and the small percentage of unearmarked funds received are external factors, the use of unearmarked VTF contributions is an issue inherent to IACG-MA coordination. The use of such funds is not clearly addressed in the terms of reference of the VTF. It should be noted that some unearmarked funds, which should benefit the entire IACG-MA, are used to fund UNMAS headquarters coordination activities. However, several stakeholders interviewed complained about the lack of transparency and, in their views, the self-benefitting use made by UNMAS of unearmarked funds.

161. In fact, there are two categories of unearmarked funds: unearmarked contributions as per donor agreement and pooled unearmarked. For reference purposes, it should be noted that for the period 2006-2010 it is estimated that only 3 per cent of unearmarked contributions as per donor agreement went to NGOs, while 39 per cent went to UNOPS for the implementation of UNMAS programmes and 58 per cent went to UNMAS headquarters activities. Pooled earmarked funds were allocated as follows for the period 2007-2010: 25 per cent went to NGOs or mine action national authorities and 5 per cent to UNDP, while 42 per cent went to UNOPS for the implementation of UNMAS programmes and 28 per cent to UNMAS headquarters activities.

162. The lack of a VTF governing mechanism inclusive of all relevant stakeholders is at the origin of the issue. Officials from key IACG-MA members with whom the Inspectors met during the present review highlighted these deficits as a priority issue that should be addressed urgently. It should be mentioned that the Policy Committee of the Secretary-General recommended in July 2010 that an enhanced governance mechanism for the VTF be developed and implemented to guide the most appropriate distribution of unearmarked funds (decision 2010/18/iii). Consequently, the IACG-MA established a working group to take charge of formulating recommendations for the proper allocation of those funds. In response to the Policy Committee's recommendation, the IACG-MA jointly recognized that the use of unearmarked VTF funds requires more transparency, with a view to ensure that agencies are able to access those funds for immediate response. In October 2010, UNMAS submitted a discussion paper to the IACG-MA and provided examples of governance mechanisms for funds, both within and outside the United Nations system. However, since then, no further action has been taken and compliance with the Policy Committee decision was still pending as of July 2011.

163. **The Inspectors conclude that there is a perception that there is an apparent conflict of interest regarding the double role of UNMAS as, on one hand, the VTF fund administrator, and on the other, as a direct beneficiary. They stress the importance of implementing Policy Committee decision 2010/18/iii, and urge the IACG-MA to take immediate action, to implement it in close coordination with the Controller's Office by adopting procedures to more rapidly disburse funds from the VTF, and to develop an enhanced governance mechanism for the VTF. In the Inspectors' view, an improved VTF may well present an attractive platform for donors in the future, and this is an opportunity for the United Nations system to address the criticism raised by some key stakeholders, while building on the value-added the Fund has to offer.**

E. Programme support costs

164. The total amount of overhead or programme support costs (PSCs) for channelling funds through the VTF is a major concern for stakeholders, especially donors. The rate of recovery only for the administration of the VTF has been set at 3 per cent since the 2006-2007 biennium. It should be noted that only indirect costs are recovered through this fee. Direct costs, which can be clearly attributed to operations (for example staff and other personnel costs, travel, contractual services, operational expenses, procurement) are not covered by the 3 per cent fee, but recovered as identifiable components of operations, programmes and projects financed from the VTF.

165. Depending on the type of project and its implementation modality, additional overheads can build up as they are charged by each entity participating in the management and implementation chain. For example, UNDP or UNICEF consistently recover 7 per cent as indirect costs, while UNOPS, as implementing partner, recovers 4 or 5 per cent (also called an administrative or management fee). According to UNMAS, charges by NGOs for grants provided by UNMAS are in the range of 5 to 10 per cent, not to exceed the combined programme support costs of 13 per cent established by the General Assembly. Direct costs can result in additional implementation costs (e.g. 2.85 per cent in the case of UNOPS), but these are usually directly charged to the project budget as indicated above.

166. A detailed analysis of PSCs is outside of the scope of this review, however there is a perception that the overall PSC costs are unnecessarily high. Data was requested to further assess the build-up of PSCs in the implementation chain at the time of writing the present report; however, the necessary data has only partially been received. **The Inspectors conclude that in the light of enhanced transparency and within the context of the actions recommended in subsequent paragraphs, the PSC chain and actual overheads should be subject to further analysis and clarification by UNMAS and the IACG-MA.**

167. It should be noted that in the MTDF framework, "there is an ongoing discussion among the participating organizations as to whether the 1 per cent management fee for the AA's [administrative agent's] services is adequate or excessive".[53] Thus there is scope for reconsidering and clarifying the PSC rates for the VTF; however, it should be noted that the UNMAS role is not equivalent to that of the AA.

F. Towards an enhanced financial mechanism for assistance in mine action: the revision of the terms of reference of the Voluntary Trust Fund

168. The recommendations and measures contained in previous paragraphs, such as strengthening its responsiveness in disbursing funds, are aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of the VTF in the short term. However, the issues addressed are related to several key elements of the VTF, such as: a responsive mechanism for the effective disbursement of funds; the need to enhance transparency by establishing a governing mechanism inclusive of all relevant stakeholders; and the need to make the VTF more efficient by reviewing PSC rates. These important issues point to a major revision of the terms of reference of the VTF. As adopted in 1994, they no longer reflect the reality on the ground and have not yet taken into account institutional changes or United Nations reform efforts in this area.

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[53] "Policies and procedures for the administration of trust funds in the United Nations system organizations" (JIU/REP/2010/7), para. 111.

169. As highlighted in the 2010 JIU report on the administration of trust funds, the administration and management of trust funds, which are project-based, generally take place within the organization's usual implementation procedures. On the contrary, thematic trust funds and those with bigger volumes "usually have a specifically established governance structure, including a steering or advisory committee or board of trustees".[54] Not only is the VTF a thematic trust fund, but it is one of the largest and most active general trust funds financing humanitarian programmes. However, whereas the VTF is not governed by a specific decision-making body, MDTFs do necessarily comprise a steering committee or similar entity. Even though MDTFs are established in another framework and thus a comparison may seem difficult, some elements could be taken into consideration to enhance the accountability, responsiveness and transparency of the VTF. For instance, an MDTF steering committee may have the key responsibility to review and allocate unearmarked funds, to review and approve proposals from agencies for funding and ensure their conformity with the requirement of the Fund's agreements, or to ensure appropriate consultative planning in order to avoid duplication or overlap between the MDTF and other funding mechanisms. A governance mechanism similar to the steering committees for the MDTFs is lacking in the VTF structure.

170. The Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), despite its focus on short-term emergencies, can be used as an example of the involvement of different stakeholders in its management. It was established by the United Nations to enable more timely and reliable humanitarian assistance to those affected by natural disasters and armed conflicts. Established by the General Assembly through resolution 60/124 of 15 December 2005, the CERF Advisory Group provides the Secretary-General with periodic policy guidance and expert advice on the use and impact of the Fund through the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and the Emergency Relief Coordinator. Members of the Advisory Group serve in their individual capacity, and not as representatives of their countries or Governments. They include government officials from contributing and recipient countries, representatives of humanitarian NGOs, and academic experts. They have been carefully selected to reflect a geographical and gender balance. **The Inspectors believe that this same approach could be applied to the management of the VTF.**

171. In this context, important lessons can be learned from the MDTF setting. For 31 of the 32 MDTFs, the MDTF Office of UNDP functions as the AA within the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) framework. Although part of UNDP, the MDTF Office is self-financed and is strictly separated from the UNDP business operations, in line with the Protocol on the Administrative Agent for Multi Donor Trust Funds and Joint Programmes, and One UN Funds, which stipulates that "where the AA is also a Participating UN Organization, a clear delineation, including distinct reporting lines and an accountability framework, will be established and maintained within the organization designated as the AA between its functions as an AA and its functions as a Participating UN Organization" (para. 6). The experience with MDTFs shows that this institutional arrangement works and is relatively well accepted.

172. **The Inspectors acknowledge the recent progress made and encourage further efforts in increasing the efficiency and transparency of the VTF. They also conclude that the terms of reference of the VTF of 1994 should be revised. To support the process and with a view to make clear recommendations for revision of the VTF, a working group should be established with the participation of representatives of large trust funds managed by the United Nations Secretariat, members of the IACG-MA, and UNMAS.**

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[54] Ibid., para. 50.

The working group should take into account the views of member States, in particular of mine-affected countries and donor countries, and should be guided by recent lessons learned from the experience with MDTFs such as the Peacebuilding Fund. In particular, the working group should take into account the following key elements:

- The need for an improved governance mechanism inclusive of relevant stakeholders should be established.
- A determination on whether the administration of the VTF should be conferred to an independent entity not involved in project management and/or implementation, so as to be in line with the UNDG principles on the independence of administrative agents, or alternatively a mechanism to minimize the perceived conflict of interest.
- A clarification of the fees charged for the administration of the VTF with a view to increasing both transparency and efficiency.

173. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the VTF management.

Recommendation 6

The Secretary-General should revise the terms of reference of the Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action, taking into account recent United Nations trust-fund reform efforts, relevant institutional changes and lessons learned from the experience with multi-donor trust funds, with a view to ensuring a more inclusive, transparent and independent governance of the Fund as well as to making its management more efficient and effective.

174. The Inspectors would like to highlight the importance of implementing the above recommendations and, in this regard, they would like to stress the request made by the General Assembly, in its resolution 66/69, for the Secretary-General to report, inter alia, on this evaluation at the sixty-eighth session.

175. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance accountability of United Nations mine action.

Recommendation 7

The General Assembly should request the Secretary-General to report on the implementation of the recommendations contained in the present report at its sixty-eighth session.

Annexes

Annex I*

SUDAN
A CASE STUDY ON UNITED NATIONS MINE ACTION COOPERATION IN THE FIELD

INTRODUCTION

Sudan, as defined by its pre-11 July 2011 borders, provides an interesting case study in the work of the United Nations (UN) as a whole but this short paper focuses only on its work in mine action.

What is often referred to as the 'Second Civil War'[55] started in 1983 and ended with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on 9 January 2005. This also set out the timetable for referendum on independence in South Sudan. The referendum took place between 9 and 15 January 2011 with 98.83% of the population in the south voting for independence and independence itself was celebrated on 11 July 2011. In the words of a senior UN official: "*This is a once in a lifetime chance to build a country from almost nothing"; and "It is a unique opportunity for national and international communities to work together. Without comprehensive co-operation, the risk of failure is greater and success will take longer.*"

This very brief synopsis masks a multitude of events, situations, experiences and lessons-learned for both the international community and the UN and it is the same for mine action. Indeed, mine action has been a constant activity in Sudan for many years but this paper starts with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and the events leading up to it. Even as far back as 2002, there was a common view between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) that the need to allow mine action to take place was outside politics.

THE ROLE OF MINE ACTION

A legal dimension

The General Assembly adopted a Resolution on emergency assistance to the Sudan[56] in which (Section 14) the GoS is reminded of its obligations under the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) "*... and urges the international community and the United Nations agencies to provide appropriate assistance related to mine action in the Sudan.*" During the Fourth Meeting of States Parties to MBT[57] (16-20 September 2002), a meeting took place between representatives of the GoS, SPLM, and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS). The meeting focussed on appropriate ways for the UN to provide support to the development

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* Reproduced as received.

55 The 'First Civil War' was between 1955 and 1972.

56 Resolution adopted by the General Assembly 56/112. Emergency Assistance to the Sudan; 12 February 2002.

57 Also known as the Ottawa Convention.

of national mine action. A tripartite Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed by all parties on 19 September 2002[58].

Under the terms of the MoU, the UN agreed to help both parties to jointly develop a national mine action strategy to meet the immediate needs of the humanitarian situation and the longer-term post-conflict situation in the Sudan. A '*Sudan National Mine Action Strategic Framework*' was developed by all sides to the MoU and presented to an international audience in Nairobi on 24 August 2004. Both Sudanese parties requested immediate assistance to implement emergency mine action to reduce civilian casualties. Support was to be developed in three areas:

- Creation of a national mine action management capability.
- Direct, emergency intervention to address immediate needs and support immediate humanitarian requirements.
- Facilitate the development of an appropriate national NGO mine clearance capability.

A co-ordination dimension

A National Mine Action Office (NMAO) was created in Khartoum, the short-term aim of which was to plan activities in all areas in a way that ensures common standards. It was hoped that the NMAO might become a truly national co-ordination office at some time in the future serving all parts of Sudan.

A large United Nations Mine Action Office (UNMAO) – co-located with the NMAO – was created covering both north and south Sudan and it had the distinction of being largest mine action office in the world. However, the arrival of UNMAO was not universally welcomed by some mine action NGOs who felt they were being side-lined despite having been in the country long before UNMAO arrived. This view was not unique to the Sudan as the UN mine action response almost always lagged behind that of NGOs who, usually, felt they managed perfectly well without the UN. However, seeing all actors as partners, the NMAO opened its doors to all mine action agencies and offered them working space in the same building. Many mine action actors – now referred to as implementing partners – working in the north accepted the offer creating a level of national/UN/NGO co-ordination rarely seen in mine action.

Operations

The operations emerging from these co-ordination activities were numerous but three are particularly noteworthy:

Humanitarian aid accelerated although the mines situation in the south of the country was not well understood. A Landmine Impact Survey, first considered in June 2003, was commissioned by UNMAO but did not really start until 2006 and only completed in July 2009. It found that the landmine problem was largely confined to five of the 25 states, mostly

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[58] Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Sudan, the Sudan People's Liberation Army Regarding United Nations Mine Action Service Support to Sudan. Signed by all parties on 19 September 2002.

to the south and east, with a total of 605 Suspected Hazard Areas throughout the country. Now the humanitarian agencies have a better understanding of the situation.

A key factor in distributing humanitarian aid was road access along roads that were either impassable or suspected of being mined. This led to a two-pronged approach which became fairly common. Firstly, an 8 metre wide path was cleared of landmines by a South African company working for UNMAO mainly, but not only, to allow UN military teams better access. Secondly, many – if not all – roads were rebuilt to the status, and width, of main trunk roads. This work was commissioned by the World Food Programme (WFP) using a combination of mine clearance and road-reconstruction assets (a combination used also in Afghanistan).

Although a risk management approach to mine action was not new, after much discussion, it was employed in Sudan to a much greater extent than elsewhere. It was an evidence based system which used route survey to determine whether roads actually needed to be cleared as described above. If there was no evidence of mines, the road was opened allowing thousands of kilometres of roads to be released very quickly for use by UN agencies and NGOs.

Some important – and successful – cross-border co-operation took place in the Nuba Mountains where a mine action NGO undertook cross-line demining training with an initial 12 students each from GoS areas and SPLM areas. The students wore a common style of clothing and they worked together and lived in the same camp at a location accepted as neutral by both sides. Once training was finished for the day, the international instructors departed leaving the students together. The training was successfully completed although not too much was not expected from this co-operation as the situation between GoS and SPLM was still very fragile even in the Nuba Mountains. Nevertheless it was a ground-breaking initiative and was a demonstration of the unique part that could be played by mine action in the Sudan. Attempts to create 'Joint Implementation Units' – mixed teams permitted to work together on either side of the north-south border – were not successful

Each of these actions was designed to demonstrate a peace-dividend and each, in its way, did so. Whilst the politics of the situation remained complex these were examples where progress that mattered to people could be made. For many years the NMAO and UNMAO cross-border roles were made much more difficult because direct flight between Khartoum and Rumbek (the then capital in the south) were not permitted. Although UNMAO could remain effective, it made any real prospect of an effective NMAO very unlikely, and there is now no point anyway after the independence of South Sudan.

The impact of military missions

The UN military missions had a key role to play in how mine action developed. The best known mission is the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) whose role is outside the scope of this paper. Its impact on mine action was three-fold:

- It required UNMAO operational support to enable troops to travel down roads considered mined. In most cases, as explained above, this was achieved by a commercial contractor clearing an 8 metre width along roads down which access was required.

- Some contributing nations provided military mine clearance teams which had to be accredited by UNMAO. These teams had a dual role of helping the mission undertake its mandate by doing some of the mine clearances required and, otherwise, undertaking work for humanitarian purposes.

- Perhaps the mission's most significant impact on mine action was budgetary. For many years, and still, more than 50% of all mine action funding in Sudan comes from the Assessed Budget.

There is another mission that deserves mention here. In the Nuba Mountains Ceasefire Agreement of 19 January 2002, the GoS and the SPLA agreed to an internationally monitored ceasefire between their forces in the Nuba Mountains for a renewable period of six months, with the broader objective of promoting a just, peaceful and comprehensive settlement of the conflict. The CFA, together with a Status of Mission Agreement, provided for the Joint Military Commission (JMC), which became operational in April 2002. The UN Security Council subsequently welcomed the establishment of the JMC and other monitoring mechanisms in Sudan[59]. What was commonly called 'the JMC' consisted in fact of two entities: the international Joint Monitoring Mission (JMM), which monitored compliance with the CFA and assisted in the disengagement and redeployment of combatants, and the JMC proper, also called the Chairman's Group, which decided whether an action constituted a cease-fire violation or not. The JMC Head of Mission had command and control over the joint monitoring teams, and simultaneously acted as the Chairman of the Chairman's Group. In addition, the JMC was supported by the Friends of Nuba Mountains, a group of 12 European and North American countries that funded the JMC and provided its unarmed international monitors. The support provided by the JMC/JMM was very important for the development of mine action in the Nuba Mountains. The extent of the goodwill it generated between both sides was remarkable and the physical support it provided mine action was considerable and vital.

THE PRESENT

So where does this leave mine action in the context of Sudan and what lessons are there to be learned? This short report was written after the independence of South Sudan and following a visit by a Joint Inspection Unit team (including the author) between 27 June and 1 July 2011 (just before actual independence). Two things stood out very clearly during the visit. Firstly, the respect given to UNMAO by everyone was remarkable and the extent of it is probably unique. Secondly, the challenge presented by the independence of South Sudan is daunting.

The respect given to UNMAO is well-earned but it has not been a smooth path. UN mine action in Sudan has had its share of problems at the political, technical and personal level. The politics have been complex and have at times seriously inhibited the effectiveness of co-ordination and operations. The uncertainty of what the actual landmines problem was over a vast country did not make long-term planning easy and sometimes led to an oversized co-ordination structure. The occasional mixture of strong personalities, egos and variable quality of mine action staff has not always been helpful. Yet out of this list of not uncommon problems has emerged a structure of uncommon effectiveness. There is no doubt – so far as mine action in Sudan is concerned – that UNMAO is in charge and that it shows effective leadership. Why this should be so is hard to determine but could be due to the combination of

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[59] Presidential Statement S/PRST/2003/16 of 10 October 2003.

five factors: a very high international focus leading to – sometimes – timely decisions (the example of the Nuba Mountains is an important example); the presence of UNMIS whose mandate created an imperative for timely action; a plentiful supply of funding from the Assessed Budget and from international donors; a very clear-minded and strong senior management team in UNMAO employing competent and experienced technical advisors; the programme was fully managed by UNMAO in-country rather than – as was often the case elsewhere – from New York.

Sudan, to the north, will probably manage its own mine action into the future with limited support from the UN but there is no doubt that South Sudan is a continuing case requiring considerable UN and international support well into the future. It remains to be seen whether the country with its new found confidence after independence provides the conditions which will allow the UN to continue its support as effectively as has been the case so far. The same senior UN official mentioned at the beginning of this paper also said "*South Sudan could end up as a failure but it need not be so*." No doubt mine action will continue to play its part in seeking a successful outcome for the country but it can only do so if there is sufficient political will from the Government of South Sudan and from the international community.

Annex II

Current resource capacities and programmes in mine action of UNMAS, UNDP and UNICEF

Entity	Financial resources (USD)		Staffing		No. of field programmes	Remarks
	HQ	Field	HQ	Field		
UNMAS	~4.5m	~160m	22	~110 Int. ~225 Nat.	22	○ Field programmes comprise 10 United Nations-managed and 2 United Nations-supported national programmes and 10 additional PKO/SPM programmes. ○ HQ staff only includes Professional staff. ○ UNOPS manages an additional 112 international and 520 national field staff on behalf of UNMAS.
UNDP		68.5m	17	40 Int. + UNDP contracted nationals	38	○ HQ staff is composed of 2 FTEs and 15 desk-support staff. ○ Field staff excludes national programme staff. ○ Budget for HQ is equivalent to the 2 FTEs. ○ Financial resources for field programmes are based on the UNDP appeal in the 2010 Portfolio. Funding for mine action is dynamic, and this figure represents an approximate annual budget for a typical year.
UNICEF	~24m		21	~24 Int. ~43 Nat.	31	○ UNICEF mine action work is integrated into its work on child protection. ○ Staff comprises only those working in programming, and not those providing operational support, resource mobilization or communications in support of mine action. ○ HQ staff includes only Professional staff. ○ Financial resources cover both HQ and field and are based on 2010 requirements. ○ HQ staff includes New York and regional centres.


Source: Policy Committee Decision Update 6 May 2011, annex B, and relevant updates from individual IACG-MA members (status: 2 August 2011)

Annex III

Survey

Between 26 May and 17 June 2011, the Joint Inspection Unit conducted an electronic survey, in which a total of 201 representatives of the United Nations, national mine action authorities, donors, and international organizations/NGOs/private contractors were invited to participate. The rationale behind choosing a non-randomized sampling technique was to include stakeholders the Inspectors had already met in the course of the review as well as stakeholders not yet considered. The survey represents an important source of information in addition to the desk review and missions, and therefore provides for the triangulation of sources "to increase the accuracy of the data" and "to strengthen findings".[60]

Breakdown of recipients and respondents to the JIU electronic survey (by group of stakeholders):



[60] Linda G. Morra-Imas; Ray C. Rist, *The Road to Results: Designing and Conducting Effective Development Evaluations* (Washington D.C., World Bank, 2009), p. 300.

Annex IV

List of interviewees

The Inspectors carried out extended interviews with officials from the following entities:

United Nations Common System:
- DPKO/ OROLSI
- OCHA Country Office Colombia
- OCHA Country Office Sudan (Juba)
- OHCHR Country Office Colombia
- UNODA
- UNDP HQ
- UNDP Country Office Albania
- UNDP Country Office Bosnia and Herzegovina
- UNDP Country Office Cambodia
- UNDP Country Office Colombia
- UNDP Country Office Lao People's Democratic Republic
- UNDP Country Office Nicaragua
- UNDP Country Office Sudan (Juba)
- UNHCR HQ
- UNHCR Country Office Colombia
- UNICEF HQ
- UNICEF Country Office Albania
- UNICEF Country Office Bosnia and Herzegovina
- UNICEF Country Office Cambodia
- UNICEF Country Office Colombia
- UNICEF Country Office Lao People's Democratic Republic
- UNICEF Country Office Nicaragua
- UNICEF Country Office Sudan (Juba)
- UNMAO Sudan (Juba)
- UNMAS HQ
- UNMAS Country Office Colombia
- UNODC Country Office Lao People's Democratic Republic
- United Nations Mission in Sudan Juba
- UNOPS
- WFP Country Office Colombia
- WFP Country Office Lao People's Democratic Republic
- World Bank

International organizations:
- Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
- Implementation Support Unit
- International Committee of the Red Cross HQ
- International Committee of the Red Cross Colombia Office
- International Committee of the Red Cross New York Delegation
- International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance Bosnia and Herzegovina Office
- Organization of American States Washington
- Organization of American States Nicaragua Office

NGOs/private contractors:
- ALB-AID
- Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas
- Centro Integral de Rehabilitación de Colombia
- Danish Church Aid HQ
- G4S Juba Office
- Handicap International
- Handicap International Lao People's Democratic Republic Office
- HALO Trust Office Cambodia
- International Campaign to Ban Landmines
- International Campaign to Ban Landmines Nicaragua
- Jesuit Services/ Cambodian Campaign to Ban Landmines
- MECHEM Juba Office
- Mines Action Canada
- Mines Advisory Group HQ
- Mines Advisory Group Cambodia Office
- Mines Advisory Group Lao People's Democratic Republic Office
- Mines Advisory Group Juba Office
- Mine Tech International Juba Office
- Norwegian People's Aid HQ
- Norwegian People's Aid Bosnia and Herzegovina Office
- Norwegian People's Aid Juba Office
- Sudan Integrated Mine Action Service
- Operation Landmine Action and Victim Support

Donors:


- AusAID Cambodia Office
- AusAID Lao People's Democratic Republic Office
- Austrian Foreign Ministry
- Canadian International Development Agency
- Canadian International Development Agency Cambodia Office
- Canadian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade
- Delegation of the European Union to Lao People's Democratic Republic
- European Commission Directorate General for Enlargement
- European Commission Directorate General for Development and Cooperation – EuropeAid
- European Union European External Action Service
- European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department Juba Office
- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation Lao People's Democratic Republic Office
- United States Department of State
- United States Embassy Lao People's Democratic Republic

National mine action authorities:

- Albanian Mine Action Executive
- Albanian Ministry of Defence
- Albanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- Prefecture of Kukes Region, Albania
- Bosnia and Herzegovina Demining Commission
- Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Center
- Bosnian and Herzegovina Ministry of Defence
- Cambodian Mine Action and Victim Assistant Authority
- Cambodian Mine Action Centre
- Instituto Nacional de Desminagem Mozambique
- Instituto Nacional Tecnológico Nicaragua
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lao People's Democratic Republic
- National Regulatory Authority Lao People's Democratic Republic
- National Mine Action Center Sudan
- Nicaraguan Ministry of Defence
- Nicaraguan National Demining Commission
- Programa Presidencial para la Acción Integral contra Minas Antipersonal Colombia
- UXO Lao
- South Sudan Demining Authority

Annex V*

World map of missions undertaken for the review



* Reproduced as received.

Annex VI

Overview of action to be taken by participating organizations on JIU recommendations
JIU/REP/2011/11

		Intended impact	United Nations, its funds and programmes													Specialized agencies and IAEA													
			United Nations*	OHCHR	UNCTAD	UNODC	UNEP	UN-Habitat	UNHCR	UNRWA	UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	WFP	UNOPS	ILO	FAO	UNESCO	ICAO	WHO	UPU	ITU	WMO	IMO	WIPO	UNIDO	UNWTO	IAEA
	For action		☒	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☒	☐	☒	☒	☒	☐	☒	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
	For information		☐	☐	☒	☒	☒	☒	☐	☒	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☒	☒	☐	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒
Recommendation 1**		**a**	**E**	**E**					**E**		**E**		**E**	**E**	**E**		**E**			**E**								
Recommendation 2		**e**	**E**																									
Recommendation 3		**c**	**E**																									
Recommendation 4		**e**	**E**																									
Recommendation 5		**e**	**E**																									
Recommendation 6		**g**	**E**																									
Recommendation 7		**a**	**L**																									

Legend: **L:** Recommendation for decision by legislative organ
E: Recommendation for action by executive head
Recommendation does not require action by this organization

Intended impact: **a:** enhanced accountability **b:** dissemination of best practices **c:** enhanced coordination and cooperation **d:** enhanced controls and compliance **e:** enhanced effectiveness **f:** significant financial savings **g:** enhanced efficiency **o:** other

* Covers all entities listed in ST/SGB/2002/11 other than UNCTAD, UNODC, UNEP, UN-Habitat, UNHCR and UNRWA.

JIU/NOTE/2011/1

Procurement reforms in the United Nations system

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Geneva 2011

United Nations

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Procurement reforms in the United Nations system

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United Nations, Geneva 2011

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Procurement reforms in the United Nations system
JIU/NOTE/2011/1

The objective of the present study was to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and coherence of procurement policies, practices and reform initiatives adopted by United Nations system organizations, and identify potential good practices and areas for improvement.

The present note on procurement reform covers the following areas: procurement strategy development; the supply chain management approach; sustainable procurement; procurement from developing countries; ethics management; vendor sanctioning and procurement challenge mechanisms; a common coding system; risk management; monitoring, reporting and performance management; and inter-agency coordination and collaboration.

Main findings and conclusions

For many years procurement was considered a transaction-oriented back-office function, and was often fragmented and managed in a haphazard manner. Between 2004 and 2009, the total procurement volume of United Nations organizations jumped from $6.5 billion to $13.8 billion, and the variety and complexity of procurement activities have increased tremendously. Prompted by the dramatic increase in procurement volumes, most United Nations organizations, especially large ones, have become more aware of the strategic importance of procurement in achieving the broader goals of the organizations. This situation has led organizations to initiate many reforms in the past five years.

On the basis of the review, the present note establishes 18 recommendations for implementation by the organizations. The recommendations should be considered as benchmarks towards achieving best practices rather than strict criticism. Many recommendations have already been implemented or are in progress in many organizations. If a recommendation is addressed to an organization for implementation, it does not necessarily mean that the organization has not put in place any reform efforts; rather, it should be seen as encouragement for further improvements towards the achievement of best practices.

Organizational structure, human resources capacity and training

Procurement needs to be considered as a profession and recognized as an important function on a par with other important functions, such as finance and human resources management. Thus procurement function needs to be structured, and resources provided on a par with its importance. The number and professional qualifications of procurement staff is of the utmost importance in ensuring effective and efficient procurement processes.

The dynamic nature of procurement, including the expansion of activities and increasing technical complexity, calls for regular professional training of procurement staff. Staff without proper training should not be placed in positions of responsibility over procurement matters. Staff employed in key procurement posts should have completed or should be working towards advanced certification on procurement. Executive heads should consider increasing procurement staffing and training opportunities as an

investment capable of providing a relatively quick payback in terms of financial savings and best value for money. To that effect, organizations should assess their procurement capability on a regular basis and develop strategies to ensure that their procurement capacity can achieve best value for money.

Information systems

Greater use of information technology in all procurement operations has a range of benefits. It can reduce transaction costs, facilitate better internal control and monitoring, and provide managerial information for decision-making. A procurement information system has to include basic integrated back-office transactions and contract management, as well as monitoring and data collection capabilities. Some other important advantages offered by information technology, such as paperless electronic requisitioning, ordering and invoice reconciliation, e-procurement and on-line catalogues, should be considered.

United Nations system organizations do not yet have adequate capabilities for procurement function. However, most of the organizations are about to implement new information systems. Organizations should take this opportunity to integrate necessary processes and data collection and monitoring capabilities into their new information systems.

Procurement strategy

United Nations organizations have some elements of procurement strategies but they generally do not have a documented consolidated procurement strategy and planning process. This situation may lead to uncoordinated buying, limited possibilities to aggregate volume, duplicated efforts and inefficient use of resources. The organizations need to develop and implement a dynamic strategy to guide their procurement activities. To this effect they should build adequate human resources and information management capacity for data collection, procurement analysis and strategy development.

Sustainable procurement

Although sustainable procurement includes economic, social and environmental aspects, in the United Nations system sustainable procurement is mostly associated with environmentally friendly or green procurement. Even so, the organizations lack clear policies for environmentally friendly procurement. Although there is no one-size-fits-all policy for all the organizations and all goods and services, there is a need for a general policy to direct efforts towards more environmentally friendly procurements.

The review also found that the social aspect of sustainable procurement is fragmented and not consistent among organizations. Organizations need to improve the social aspects through a consolidated, coherent and focused approach. Procurement from developing countries has increased over the years but there is room for further progress, which could be supported through the adoption of a more proactive approach to using procurement as a strategic tool to further organizational objectives.

Ethics management

The organizations have made great progress in the area of ethics in procurement, but some polices and methods of implementation differ among organizations. Some policies and methods of implementation can be considered best practices. Organizations should review their policy and practices in the light of identified best practices, with a view to making necessary alignments in their practices. There can be clearer policies and guidelines on a range of ethics issues, such as financial disclosure, post-employment restrictions, blacklisting and vendor complaints.

Monitoring, reporting and evaluation

Procurement involves a substantial amount of resources and also affects the achievement of organizational objectives. Therefore monitoring and performance evaluation is key to improving efficiency and effectiveness and maintaining accountability in procurement activities. The review found that the monitoring of procurement activities needs to be improved. Organizations should integrate necessary modules and capabilities into their information systems for effective monitoring. In order to facilitate proper oversight, there should be regular reporting to senior management and governing bodies on procurement activities.

Knowledge sharing

Knowledge sharing is an important element in improving the quality of procurement activities and promoting consistency and correctness of implementation across the organizational units. The identification and effective sharing of lessons learned and best practices and the facilitation of easy communication would help expand the knowledge of the procurement staff. Therefore organizations should invest in this area by introducing necessary means, such as best-practice databases, intranet networks, on-line libraries and discussion platforms.

Inter-agency coordination, harmonization and collaboration

Inter-agency collaborative procurement practices offer great opportunities to achieve financial savings and improve procurement practices. Greater use of collaborative methods will allow the organizations to reduce transaction costs, and benefit from negotiated lower prices and better delivery and warranty conditions for the procurement of many goods and services. Collaborative approaches should not be limited to procurement itself but should also include collaboration throughout the supply chain.

The review found that organizations headquartered in Geneva, Rome and Vienna collaborate significantly in the purchase of commonly used goods and services such as travel, office supplies, cleaning, energy and catering. There is also good collaboration among several organizations in the procurement of pharmaceuticals and vaccines. There are good examples of collaboration in the system; however there is room for further progress. Organizations need to take a more strategic approach to the issue by analysing major procurement items in the system and introducing common consolidated procurement strategies and joint common long-term agreements.

Recommendations

The present note includes 18 recommendations. As explained above, these recommendations should be seen as benchmarks towards the achievement of best practices. Of the recommendations, 16 are addressed to the executive heads of the organizations and 2 are addressed to the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB). It is expected that as chairman of CEB, the Secretary-General should pursue the implementation of these recommendations. The Inspectors suggest that organizations take stock of the issues, establish a plan and allocate the necessary resources to speed up the full implementation of the recommendations. Annex IV to this note contains a table identifying the recommendations relevant for each organization reviewed.

The organizations have broad mandates but limited resources. In recent years the financial crisis has aggravated the resource problem across the system, obliging the organizations to look at further options to achieve savings. **The Inspectors believe that procurement**

activities could allow for significant savings and, to this end, urge the organizations to invest in their procurement functions to speed up procurement reforms.

The procurement volume of four large United Nations organizations (the United Nations, the United Nations Development Programme, the World Food Programme and the United Nations Children's Fund) makes up the bulk of the total procurement volume in the United Nations system. These organizations should therefore lead reform efforts across the system, particularly in the area of effective inter-agency collaboration and harmonization of practices, by undertaking further responsibilities, providing resources and introducing a more systematic and coordinated approach to speed up reform efforts.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ARB	Award Review Board
CEB	United Nations System Chief Executive Board for Coordination
CIPS	Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply
CPT	Common Procurement Team
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
ERP	enterprise resource planning
ESCWA	Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
GCC	general conditions of contract
HLCM	High-level Committee on Management
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
IAPSO	Inter-Agency Procurement Services Office
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMO	International Maritime Organization
ITC	International Trade Centre
ITU	International Telecommunication Union
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
LCC	local committee on contracts
LTA	long-term agreement
MWDBEs	minority-, women- and disabled-owned business enterprises
OIOS	Office of Internal Oversight Services
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
UNCCS	United Nations Common Coding System
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNGM	United Nations Global Marketplace
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNRWA	United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
UNSPSC	United Nations Standard Products and Services Code
UNWTO	United Nations World Tourism Organization
UPU	Universal Postal Union
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WIPO	World Intellectual Property Organization

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Objective, methodology and scope

1. As part of its programme of work for 2010, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) conducted a system-wide review of procurement policies and practices in United Nations system organizations from July 2010 to May 2011. During the preparation of the JIU work programme the subject topped the list of topics that organizations wished to see in the JIU programme of work (11 organizations rated procurement as a matter of priority). The review had been suggested by the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

Objective

2. The objective of the study was to assess the efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and coherence of procurement policies, practices and reform initiatives adopted by United Nations system organizations and identify potential good practices and areas for improvement.

3. United Nations system organizations purchase a large variety of goods and services, and are considered to comprise one of the world's largest international trade platforms. Between 2004 and 2009 procurement jumped from $6.5 billion to $13.8 billion, primarily due to a nearly $4.7-billion growth in the procurement of services.[1] Procurement is not only a major expenditure item, but also an important element in the achievement of the organizational goals. In addition, considering the large volume of financial resources involved and the increasing complexity of procurement operations, governance of the procurement process constitutes a critical risk area.

4. Spurred into action by a sharp increase in procurement volumes and the ever more complex nature of procurement operations, United Nations system organizations have embarked on reforms aimed at improving the efficiency and operational effectiveness of their procurement activities. It is timely to assess the status of these reform initiatives and to identify best practices and lessons learned, with a view to making recommendations on how to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the process, further harmonize procurement policies and practices and deepen inter-agency cooperation.

Methodology

5. At the beginning of the present study a desk review was carried out, which included a review of publicly available procurement-related information, procurement policies, plans and strategies, manuals and the organizations' financial regulations and rules. Questionnaires were sent to all JIU participating organizations and, on the basis of the responses received, the Inspectors conducted interviews with officials of the participating organizations in person, or via video and telephone conferences.

6. The Inspectors also conducted interviews with key officials of several other international organizations, including the World Bank, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the European Commission and Council.

7. Comments from participating organizations on the draft note have been taken into account in finalizing the note. In accordance with article 11, paragraph 2, of the Statute of the Joint Inspection Unit, this note has been finalized after consultation among the Inspectors so as to test its conclusions and recommendations against the collective wisdom of the Unit. The Inspectors wish to express their

[1] United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), *2005 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement* (2006), p. 5, and *2009 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement* (2010), p. 3.

appreciation to all who assisted them in the preparation of this note and to those who participated in the interviews and so willingly shared their knowledge and expertise.

8. Annex IV of this note contains a table indicating whether the note is being submitted to the organizations concerned for action or for information. The table also indicates the recommendations relevant for each organization.

Scope

9. The scope of this review is system-wide and covers all JIU participating organizations. In terms of topic, the review included a wide range of reform issues. These issues/topics have been identified through a review of General Assembly resolutions and relevant documents in United Nations system and other international organizations.

10. The procurement reform process is a regular item on the agenda of the General Assembly, and numerous resolutions have been adopted to facilitate this process (General Assembly resolutions 65/261, 62/269, 61/246, 59/288, 57/279, 61/276, 60/266, 54/14 and 52/226). In the resolutions introduced, the General Assembly called on executive heads of the funds and programmes to improve the efficiency of procurement by reducing duplication and harmonizing procurement processes across the United Nations system. In his report "Investing in the United Nations: for a stronger Organization worldwide" (A/60/692), the Secretary-General also identified a series of actions for procurement reform. Over the years the High-level Committee on Management (HLCM) Procurement Network has emerged as a major platform for the discussion and development of many procurement reform issues at the inter-agency level.

11. In the JIU note "Corporate consultancies in United Nations system organizations" (2008),[2] a number of procurement and contract management reform issues were reviewed in detail. The note included detailed assessments regarding best value for money, waiver of competition, contract management, vendor performance evaluation, conflict of interest, and inter-agency knowledge sharing. The note identified significant room for improvement and made 22 recommendations.

12. The scope of the present note is reform areas not covered by the above-mentioned JIU note on corporate consultancies. The issues covered in this note are: procurement strategy development; supply chain management approach; sustainable procurement; ethics management; vendor sanctioning and procurement challenge mechanisms; a common coding system; risk management; monitoring, reporting and performance management; and inter-agency coordination and collaboration.

Limitations

13. The field of procurement is vast and multilayered. Collaboration and harmonization of procurement in the field is of major importance in the context of the One United Nations pilot programmes. However, due to budgetary and time constraints, the present review did not cover procurement at the field level in the context of Delivering as One. This is a recognized limitation of the review.

14. Due to the wide scope of issues covered, unfortunately it was not possible to include in this note details of all reform efforts implemented by various organizations. Recommendations addressed to the organizations do not necessarily mean that organizations have not made progress in that area. For many organizations it means that, although progress has been made, further actions can be taken to enhance their work towards best practice in a particular area, and that organizations should not be complacent with what has been implemented.

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[2] JIU/NOTE/2008/4.

Recommendations

15. The note includes 18 recommendations. As explained above, these recommendations should be seen as benchmarks towards the achievement of best practices. Of the recommendations, 16 are addressed to the executive heads of the organizations and 2 are addressed to the Secretary-General as the chairman of the United Nations Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB) to be implemented through the HLCM Procurement Network. The Inspectors suggest that organizations take stock of the issues, establish a plan and allocate the necessary resources to speed up the full implementation of the recommendations.

16. The organizations have broad mandates but limited resources. In recent years the financial crisis has aggravated the resources problem across the system, obliging organizations to look at further options to achieve savings. The Inspectors believe that procurement activities could allow for significant savings and, to this end, urge the organizations to invest in their procurement functions to speed up procurement reforms.


17. The procurement volume of four large United Nations organizations (the United Nations Secretariat, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)) makes up the bulk of the total procurement volume in the United Nations system. These organizations should therefore lead reform efforts across the system, particularly in the area of effective inter-agency collaboration and harmonization of practices, by undertaking further responsibilities, providing resources and introducing a more systematic and coordinated approach to speed up reform efforts.

B. Procurement trends

Procurement volume and type

18. Between 2004 and 2009 total procurement in the United Nations system jumped from $6.5 billion to $13.8 billion, mostly due to an increase in the procurement of services (from $2.74 billion in 2004 to $7.4 billion in 2009).[3] As seen in figure 1, the procurement of services exceeded the procurement of goods in 2008. It should be noted that services are typically more complex to purchase than goods and that procurement operations increasingly require specialized knowledge and expertise.

Figure 1



Distribution of procurement activities

19. The 10 United Nations entities with the largest procurement volume and the 5 with the smallest procurement volume in 2005 and 2009 are listed in table 1.[4] In 2009, the United Nations had the largest procurement volume, amounting to US$ 3.5 billion (including procurement for peacekeeping operations), of which 69 per cent was for the procurement of services. As can be seen, the top 10 agencies have remained more or less the same, with the exception of the World Health Organization (WHO) and the Inter-Agency Procurement Services Office, whose procurement volume was exceeded by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in 2009.

[3] UNOPS, 2005 Annual Statistical Report and 2009 Annual Statistical Report (see footnote 1).
[4] This includes both regular budget and extra budgetary funds.

Table 1

Top 10 organizations/entities with high procurement volume (millions of United States dollars)[5]			
2005		**2009**	
1. WFP	2,180.41	1. UN/PD[6]	3,488.42
2. UN	1,555.71	2. UNDP[7]	2,610.93
3. UNDP	1,143.20	3. WFP	2,568.62
4. UNICEF	1,135.05	4. UNICEF	1,829.12
5. UNOPS	719.43	5. UNOPS	871.48
6. UNFPA	253.48	6. UNHCR	406.53
7. PAHO	205.84	7. PAHO	384.90
8. IAPSO	193.30	8. UNFPA	357.93
9. WHO	149.83	9. UNRWA	265.27
10. UNRWA	115.02	10. UNESCO	185.67
Five organizations/entities with lowest procurement volume			
ECLAC	5.54	WMO	8.01
ITC	4.25	ITC	5.29
ESCWA	3.16	WTO	4.92
UNCTAD	1.81	ESCWA	2.95
WTO	0.18	UPU	0.37 [8] (5.26 including non-TC figures)

[5] UNOPS, *Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement*, 2005 and 2009.
[6] United Nations Procurement Division, listed as United Nations under 2005 column.
[7] Includes UNDP Headquarters procurement, national execution and direct execution.
[8] UPU clarified that the figure given in the *Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement* included only procurement under technical cooperation funds. If non-technical cooperation (non-TC) funds are added to the budget, UPU estimates their total volume to be SwF 5,260,000.

II. GOVERNANCE, POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES

A. Governance structure

20. The dynamism of procurement and the financial resources involved make it a vulnerable area where sound policy and rigorous internal controls are essential. A strong governance structure is essential in minimizing risk and ensuring an efficient procurement function that also furthers the strategic aims of the organization.

Critical success factors

21. Critical success factors for the governance of the procurement function in an organization are:

- An overall organizational structure in which the procurement function is recognized as a high priority operation. It requires a dedicated procurement function and staff.
- An adequately staffed procurement function in terms of resources and skills and where enhancement of those resources and skills is perceived as an investment providing better efficiency and effectiveness.
- The availability of a sound policy and practices that fully address the complexity and criticality of procurement activities and transactions.
- The existence of effective information systems supporting the procurement operation and assisting its performance, including the ability of internal users to access an information system at their workplace to request goods and services, the collection of analytical procurement data for decision-making[9] and key performance indicators to measure performance.

22. The following subsections of the present chapter present findings on the success factors relating to organizational structure, human resources and information systems. Policies and practices will be reviewed in subsequent chapters.

Organizational structure

23. Good procurement governance requires an organizational structure and staffing levels commensurate with the procurement volume and its relative importance for each organization. Procurement plays a strategic role in helping organizations achieve their goals; thus, organizations should ensure that they have a dedicated and adequately staffed procurement unit. The Director of Procurement should report to a senior official at the highest level of the organization, or, in the case of large organizations, to the executive head (as is the case in the United Nations).

24. A good organizational structure is important, but not sufficient, for good governance. Heads of organizations should understand the importance of the procurement function and treat it accordingly. The procurement function and its chief should be considered as equally important as other major functions such as finance and human resources. **Procurement should be an integral part of the corporate decision-making and planning of each organization.**

25. The review found that most of the organizations have a dedicated procurement function and a procurement chief at the P-5 level or above reporting to a higher-level official. Although there are no major problems with respect to the structural location of the procurement function, there are concerns regarding the recognition of its importance and access to top-level officials and meetings. In most of the

[9] John F. McClelland, *Review of Public Procurement in Scotland: Report and Recommendations* (Edinburgh, 2006), p. 6.

organizations, the procurement units are housed under Management and Administration or are considered a Central Supply Services function. The procurement functions are generally divided into purchasing and contracts, by funding sources (regular budget and technical cooperation), or by type of goods (WHO has eight procurement clusters, such as: drugs, biological and laboratory equipment).

26. One of the problems identified in the procurement function is the disconnection between procurement and contract management. Lack of a clear definition of duties exacerbates the situation. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) informed the Inspectors that it has tried to address the disconnection by requiring that contract performance measures are considered in the planning for significant/critical procurements, and by introducing an amendment to the Administrative Manual that requires contract management to be conducted in coordination with the Office of Procurement Services.

Procurement committees/committees on contracts

27. One of the key elements of procurement governance is the existence of procurement committees/committees on contracts. United Nations organizations with significant procurement volume have established procurement committees in their headquarters. These committees play advisory roles in reviewing procurement cases above certain thresholds. In UNESCO and UNHCR, the headquarters committees on contracts also play a decision-making role. This situation is not in line with best practices, as it undermines accountability for procurement activities. Consequently the role of committees should be considered purely advisory, and final decision-making and accountability should be assigned to the chief of procurement in the operational line.

Decentralization and delegation of authority

28. Depending on the nature of the organizations' work and their internal structures, the procurement functions are either centralized in headquarters or decentralized to field offices. As part of their decentralization efforts, UNDP, WFP, UNHCR, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the United Nations have increasingly decentralized their procurement functions, establishing dedicated procurement officer positions in the field.

29. Decentralization and delegation of authority pose a significant operational and financial risk that needs to be addressed through proper strategies, such as capacity development and training in the field and better monitoring by headquarters. The organizations must complement their decentralization reforms with adequate staffing levels and provide proper training for staff to take on new tasks. The organizations should consider establishing regional procurement offices where they can provide significant added value, or utilizing the capacity of other organizations where possible. UNICEF operates a number of regional procurement centres (Nairobi, Pretoria, Beijing and New Delhi), and their role is to support other offices in the acquisition of supplies that are difficult to source through the local markets, but also to establish regional long-term agreements (LTAs) for supplies with substantial procurement spend.

30. Delegation of authority with respect to procurement in the field varies substantially. This situation affects the ability of the organizations to "Deliver as One" in the field. In efforts to counteract this, the Joint UN Procurement Guideline was established in 2009/2010 under the HLCM-Procurement Network and the United Nations Development Group/Development Operations Coordination Office; it provides country offices with guidance on how to conduct joint procurement. As part of all these efforts, including the harmonization of rules and regulations, the organizations should, as a matter of priority, also align the delegation of authority and processes to "procure as one" at the field level.

Human resources capacity and training

Staffing level

31. Over the years, a dramatic increase in procurement volume raised the profile of procurement as an important organizational function that should be treated on a par with other organizational functions, such as finance and human resources management. Therefore the importance of adequate human resources capacity in procurement cannot be stressed enough. The number and professional qualifications of procurement staff are of utmost importance in ensuring effective and efficient procurement processes. Competent staff are key to improving the procurement function. The complex nature of procurement operations requires staff to have a broad range of generic procurement skills and special expertise in many technical areas.

32. In the organizations there are problems with staffing level and skills to handle complex procurement operations and workload peaks and to support reform initiatives. There are capacity problems in data collection, analysis, planning, strategy development and monitoring. During the interviews there were complaints that the staffing level does not match the dramatic increase in procurement volumes and complexity. Without adequate staffing and skills, it will be difficult to achieve best value for money.

33. The number of procurement staff varies among the organizations. For instance, at the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), the United Nations, and the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) there are 10, 150 and 2 procurement staff, respectively. The question of how many staff are needed in the procurement function is not easy to answer. Work load, processes, and the diversity, complexity and volume of the procurement activities, as well as the availability of sound enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems, are all factors determining the required staffing levels. Organizations need to assess their staffing needs based on these indicators. The assessment of procurement staffing needs should not be restricted to procurement units; it should also include the needs of substantive departments, for they must be closely involved with the preparation, evaluation and implementation processes. The HLCM Procurement Network could consider undertaking a specific study to establish benchmarks in this area, taking into consideration the specific concerns/volume/business models of the organizations.

Training

34. Increasing procurement knowledge and expertise across the organizations could be one of the most effective ways to improve the procurement function. Staff need regular training to update their knowledge and capabilities in order to be able to cope with fast-developing procurement challenges in a dynamic environment. Given that procurement involves substantial amounts of resources and complex situations that require competencies in a wide variety of areas (i.e. market and cost-benefit analysis, evaluation, negotiation, quantitative and qualitative methods, ethics, etc.) it is necessary to have highly qualified staff so as to avoid any unnecessary waste of resources.

35. Rapid changes in the type and complexity of procurements call for regular professional training of procurement staff. To that effect organizations should have a dynamic training plan based on a training needs assessment, and it should be regularly updated. **Executive heads should consider increasing procurement staffing and training opportunities as an investment capable of providing a relatively quick payback in terms of financial savings and best value for money.**

36. The review found that in all large organizations, and some small ones, necessary funds have been provided for training, and a wide range of training activities has been organized. In many other organizations, procurement-related training was insufficient and conducted on an ad hoc basis. In addition, available training courses mostly targeted procurement officials only; training for staff in other departments and offices was inadequate. The amount of resources allocated for procurement training

differed widely from organization to organization. In some organizations no fixed budget was available and the procurement-specific training budget was earmarked on an ad hoc basis, depending on the availability of regular funds (e.g. at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and UNESCO) or extra-budgetary inflows (UNRWA). The International Labour Organization (ILO) informed the Inspectors that the procurement bureau sets aside 2 per cent of its regular budget per biennium for staff training. FAO managed to receive training funds by including procurement training in its organizational reform efforts.

37. The organizations also need to design more training programmes covering ethics, corruption and anti-fraud issues. Only the United Nations, UNICEF and UNDP offer specific training on ethical issues in procurement. E-learning, such as the initiative of the United Nations Procurement Division's online training campus, should be widely encouraged and emulated. Training programmes should focus not only on the headquarters level, but also on the country/regional levels, where specific environments may expose staff members to a greater risk of fraud. It is important that both requisitioners and procurement officials participate in these training programmes.

38. UNDP has started a certification scheme with the Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply (CIPS), which is widely considered to be the leading certification body dealing with purchasing issues. UNDP/CIPS courses are open to all staff in the United Nations system and are a good resource that United Nations system organizations can use to help professionalize staff involved in procurement. The United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) is a leading agency in the area of procurement training. All procurement staff at UNOPS must complete CIPS level 4, and a higher level[10] will soon become mandatory for all procurement officials at the P-3 level and above. Each level takes from 12 to 18 months to complete and consists of an on-line self-study course with tutor support. In addition, UNOPS has its own internal training at the country and regional levels. UNHCR, the ILO and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) informed the Inspectors that they have individualized training plans for procurement staff, to create "specialists" in certain areas of importance to their organizations.

39. IAEA has set out to conduct mandatory UNDP/CIPS training sessions for all staff involved in procurement, including requisitioners. Furthermore, it is planning to implement procurement training with a focus on ethics. UNICEF has introduced a five-day mandatory introductory training course on procurement. FAO and IAEA procurement officials informed the Inspectors that they had also conducted training courses for their requisitioner units and that, as a result, collaboration between staff of the procurement and requisitioner units had improved significantly. The UNICEF Supply Division established an annual training plan, including courses such as Introduction to Procurement, Procurement Strategies via Category Management, Quality Management System, Construction Contracting, and Procurement of Services.

40. The United Nations in its 2010-11 result-based budgetary framework affirmed its commitment to complete the development of an online procurement training module and procurement certification programme and implement best procurement practices throughout United Nations Headquarters and peacekeeping missions.

[10] M-CIPS, which is equivalent to a master's degree.

United Nations practice

In the context of procurement reform, the United Nations Procurement Division was granted a budget of $833,000 from the support account in 2006-2007, to develop and deliver basic procurement training for over 1,200 staff members at Headquarters and external offices. The staff trainees include procurement staff, requisitioners, certifying officers, auditors, directors/chiefs of mission support, and a cross section of General Service staff. In each successive year substantial funding has been received from the General Assembly for procurement training and an average of more than 1,000 staff have been trained on an annual basis. This training has included workshops, on-line training, and training through internationally recognized procurement entities such as the National Institute for Governmental Purchasing.

In addition, the United Nations Procurement Division engaged a consultant to conduct a training needs analysis in 2008 and, based on the report, a road map charting three phases of training was prepared. In Phase I of the online learning management system, the procurement training campus was launched in 2010. It includes four courses focusing on the fundamentals of procurement: Fundamentals of Procurement, Ethics and Integrity, Best Value for Money, and the Overview of the Procurement Manual.

In Phase II, 10 advanced procurement courses are being developed and will be rolled out by the end of 2011. This will target procurement staff as well as non-procurement staff such as requisitioners, contract managers and auditors, and will include the following modules: Procurement Strategy; Acquisition Planning; Risk Management and Fraud Prevention; Requisitioner Responsibilities; Development of Requirements; Development of Technical Evaluation Criteria; Development of Commercial Evaluation Criteria; Contractual Issues in Purchasing; Negotiation Skills; and Contract Management.

41. Whereas adequate recruitment practices should be a standard in ensuring that qualified staff are employed in the procurement function, training is imperative in order to maintain and develop skills, based on needs assessment. **Staff without proper training should not be placed in positions of responsibility over procurement matters. Staff employed in key procurement posts should have completed or should be working towards advanced certification on procurement.**

42. Training opportunities should be available to all staff who have procurement responsibilities. Given its strategic role, procurement training should also be included as a core skill in training programmes for managerial staff. **The organizations should assess their procurement capability on a regular basis and develop strategies to ensure that their procurement capacity can achieve best value for money.**

UNICEF practice

UNICEF has over 900 supply and logistics staff and opted to invest its limited budget to provide training to as many staff as possible. Certification programmes are often expensive and thus the cost of making them available to all staff members can be prohibitive. Therefore UNICEF established a professional development plan for its supply community. It is a combination of classroom-type workshops, online learning and certification schemes (in Humanitarian Logistics and in Supply Chain Management). The learning events are designed for both procurement staff and requisitioners.

43. As can be seen from the examples given above, training programmes are developed and implemented mostly by the larger organizations. These organizations should open up their programmes to the smaller organizations that may not have the resources to develop their own training packages. This would facilitate both the efficient use of resources and also communication and cooperation among procurement staff of the organizations.

Information systems

44. Greater use of information technology in all procurement operations has a range of benefits. It can reduce transaction costs, facilitate better internal control and monitoring, and provide managerial information for decision-making. A procurement information system should include basic integrated back-office transactions and contract management, as well as monitoring and data collection capabilities.

45. Most United Nations system organizations have information systems that are fragmented and do not have adequate capabilities. The information contained in their financial management systems are geared towards financial and budgetary control. Some other important advantages offered by information technology, such as paperless electronic requisitioning, ordering and invoice reconciliation, e-procurement/e-tendering and online catalogues, are yet to be used widely and effectively.

46. The information systems of UNDP, the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), UNESCO, UNOPS and FAO are relatively more effective for electronic contract management. UNDP officials reported that the contract management component in its ERP system will be launched in the fourth quarter of 2011. The UNFPA contract management system tracks the various stages of a procurement contract and serves as a data repository. UNESCO uses the material management module of its ERP system, which permits it to follow up on contracts with clear delivery. FAO purchased an e-Tendering system that includes an electronic contract management component that allows the capturing and monitoring of data, such as signature and expiry dates, receipt of the performance bond/bank guarantee and relevant expiry dates, amendments and all relevant documents required under the contract (completion of the works certificate, maintenance certificate, insurance policy, etc.).

47. The United Nations Secretariat informed the Inspectors that it is implementing a fully fledged comprehensive e-procurement solution to support its procure-to-pay process, including a contract management solution. This ERP-based solution will be integrated with other corporate processes, such as human resources and finance, but also with the United Nations Global Marketplace (UNGM) as the main United Nations portal for vendor registration. The UNICEF ERP offers paperless electronic requisitioning, order and invoice reconciliation, online catalogues, and electronic archiving of invoices and other documents. Some organizations note that additional developments in ERP systems require large sums of money and that, in the light of resource constraints, it may seem that the investment is not worth the cost, especially when the investment represents a disproportionate amount of overall procurement spend. The Inspectors are of the opinion that the integration of necessary modules at the initial design stage of ERP would reduce cost.

48. It is generally accepted that the associated transactions in traditional procurement (low-value purchasing) may be more costly than the actual price of the items. Information technology can effectively be used to reduce transaction costs through various methods. For example, e-solutions that fully integrate back-office systems into a supplier's platform and catalogues, or a virtual "shopping mall" that brings together a number of suppliers electronically, can help reduce transaction costs. IAEA has already introduced purchasing cards for commonly used low-value items.

IAEA practice

The average cost to IAEA for processing each of the low-value orders was estimated at €191 in 2010. A training programme commenced in October 2010, and by 31 March 2011 purchasing cards had been issued to 72 staff that had been trained and provided with delegated low-value purchasing authority.

Since 15 December 2010, all of the low-value goods or services for delivery at all IAEA locations (excluding items purchased for field projects) that are under €3,000 and are not available through a catalogue have been purchased using the direct charge method or a credit card. Based on 2010 figures, it would be expected that about 2,500 processed orders would be avoided under the low-value purchasing regime in 2011. This results in a theoretical savings of €477,500 in costs (2,500 x €191).

49. E-procurement/tendering offers the potential for faster buying and more reliable, up-to-date information to obtain better prices. Moreover, it offers scope to aggregate purchasing across organizations and facilitates better compliance with rules and good practices. However, caution is required in using e-tendering, as it may exclude vendors from developing countries from participating in procurement bids.

50. In the United Nations system there is an Internet-based procurement application called UN WebBuy, which allows clients to order commonly used items that can be delivered worldwide. Its user-friendly Web interface provides easy access to a range of commodities available under long-term agreements between UNOPS and various suppliers. Items on UN WebBuy include four-by-four vehicles, motorcycles, trucks, ambulances, armoured vehicles and radios.[11] Although UN WebBuy is a good tool, its product range is limited and its volume does not reflect the true potential of the system.

Common coding system

51. The availability of a modern product coding system, its integration into information systems and coherent use of codes are important management, monitoring and reporting issues. Such a coding system would allow organizations to register and report on the type and value of goods and services they acquired. In UNGM, vendors register in an online database and can choose specific goods and service codes. The organizations need to use specific codes in the database in order to find vendors for their specific goods and services. Without a modern coding system that includes codes for all available goods and services in the market, it would be difficult to locate the best vendors and establish a good management information system.

52. The United Nations Common Coding System (UNCCS) has been used by United Nations organizations for more than 20 years. It is available in English only and is not fully integrated into the organizations' information systems. Interviewees noted that UNCCS was outdated and new technological items were not listed. About 10 years ago, UNDP adopted another coding system: the United Nations Standard Products and Services Code (UNSPSC). UNSPSC is being used outside the United Nations by commercial industries worldwide and the code exists in 10 languages, including four official United Nations languages.

53. The United Nations Procurement Division commissioned a study to look at the use of UNCCS and UNSPSC and make recommendations for a common coding system. The study recommended the use of UNSPSC as it was found to be modern and better adapted to the context of the United Nations system. At its spring session (29 March–1 April) the HLCM Procurement Network members endorsed the switch to UNSPSC in UNGM and noted that this would be implemented in August 2011. The implementation of the code in internal processes and ERPs is subject to a decision by each member organization following a

[11] See www.unops.org.

cost study to be conducted by each organization. **The Inspectors invite organizations to consider the internal adoption of this modern coding system, including its integration into their information systems.**

ERP systems

54. Many of the organizations have already started introducing new ERP systems. It should be noted, however, that a new ERP system by itself will not be sufficient to capture all necessary information and that there are often significant problems in its implementation. Some reasons for the problems are inadequate changes in business processes when adopting new system, lack of integration of necessary functionalities into the ERP system in the design phase, and lack of training on how to use the new system. Procurement units should identify the prerequisites for an effective and efficient procurement function and ensure that they are incorporated into their information systems.

55. The integration of internal procurement processes, contract management and data collection capability into information systems should be a prerequisite. The use of e-tendering, online catalogues, purchasing cards and a "virtual shopping mall" can be developed and implemented progressively in the context of a procurement strategy.

56. It is expected that the implementation of the following recommendations 1 and 2 will enhance efficiency, and 3 will improve effectiveness in procurement activities.

Recommendation 1
Executive heads should assess and identify the importance of the procurement function for organizational activities at their respective organizations, position this function appropriately in the managerial hierarchy and provide the required human resources for procurement activities based on an analysis of volume, complexity and workload involved.

Recommendation 2
Executive heads should develop a procurement training policy based on the assessment of the competencies needed in procurement, with a view to ensuring that staff dealing with procurement are well trained and provide highly professional services.

Recommendation 3
Executive heads should ensure that the procurement process, contract management and data collection capabilities are integrated into the information systems of their organizations.

B. Procurement principles

57. The procurement principles are important since they establish a foundation for detailed policies and practices. The review of procurement principles in the United Nations system found many similarities, but also some important differences. Most of the organizations refer to the following principles (see annex I for a summary):

- Fairness, integrity and transparency
- Effective competition
- Best value for money
- Best interest of the organization

Competition principle

58. Significant differences between the organizations are most evident in the case of effective competition. While some use "effective international competition", others use "competition" as a principle. Many interviewees questioned the necessity of the international nature of competition, explaining that not all procurement notices were advertised internationally. For instance, while small procurements are based on local competition, larger ones are based on international competition. Also, some procurement can be location bound. The United Nations, UNDP, UNHCR and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) cite specifically international competition whereas most organizations simply require effective competition without mentioning whether competition should be local or international. A good definition of the principle of effective competition is found in the procurement manual of UNOPS, which states that **effective competition is "competition on as wide a geographic basis as is practicable and suited to market circumstances."**[12]

59. The Inspectors believe that in order for real competition to exist the organizations must endeavour to attract the best vendors through both advertisement and thorough, proactive market research. Without active market research and analysis capability, competition may exist on paper but may not include the best competitors in the market, thus compromising the achievement of best value for money.

Procurement in emergency situations

60. Cases where waivers for competition may be justified are those granted in emergency situations (e.g. a humanitarian crisis). UNDP, WFP, FAO and UNHCR have relatively clear procedures for emergency procurement. WFP officials stated that even in emergency situations they followed the principle of competition, except that the tender advertising period is shortened so that urgent purchases are made for the immediate term, while competition is launched for the long term. Since December 2010, the chief of procurement in the United Nations can, in specific emergency situations,[13] enter into contracts on behalf of the Organization without prior review by the Headquarters Committee on Contracts.[14]

Donor restrictions

61. The Inspectors are concerned that in some cases waivers and geographic limitations for bids were imposed by donor countries that provided funds for technical cooperation projects. In terms of costs and benefits, the Inspectors understand that the organizations are reluctant to forego such funding, but believe that they should do their utmost to discourage donors from restricting competition as a condition for using their funds.

Best value for money

62. Most of the organizations have moved away from the notion of "lowest cost, technically acceptable" to "best value for money" in their procurement principles. Of the 18 procurement manuals surveyed, only the UNFPA manual did not refer to best value for money as a principle, but to "maximizing economy and efficiency".[15] The ICAO Procurement Code refers to best value for money only for services.

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[12] UNOPS, *Procurement Manual* (Rev.4, 2010), p. 9.

[13] Defined as follows, "…where the United Nations faces a disaster and/or where lives of United Nations personnel and/or United Nations properties are in danger. Such situations would have an urgent need to immediately perform rapid deployment of life supporting goods and services, therefore, the need to ensure timely acquisition and delivery of requirements". Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary-General, Office of Central Support Services to the Chief of Procurement Operations Service, 2 December 2010, Delegation of Procurement Authority for Emergency Situations, United Nations, Reference PD/PCMS.

[14] Depending on the amount of the award (between $500,000 and $10 million, the award process will be submitted to the Headquarters Committee on Contracts for review on an ex post facto basis.

[15] UNFPA Procurement Procedures, section A.4, p. 3.

63. Although most of the organizations cite best value for money as one of their main principles, it is not easy to implement in practice without good guidelines and training. The United Nations, UNICEF and IAEA have relatively better guidance on best value for money. The United Nations included training on best value for money in its online training campus and issued additional guidelines for its implementation. The UNICEF Supply Manual provides guidance on the determination of best value for money. IAEA includes guidance in its administrative manual and also includes proactive supply market research and analysis as part of its procurement planning process, in order to support the development of a procurement strategy per good/service aimed at achieving best value for money.

64. The Inspectors agree with interviewees who notified them that there are dangers in not having clear guidance and training on this principle. Even minor variations to assigned weightings in evaluation criteria can radically alter the calculation results. Procurement staff, requisitioners and evaluators should be selected for their knowledge of best-value-for-money calculations, and sound written explanations of the evaluation results should accompany final decisions on procurement bids.

Best interest of the organization

65. Finding a precise definition of "best interest of the organization" in the procurement manuals proved a difficult exercise. This principle seems to be one of the most self-evident, but without a clear explanation it can lead to misunderstandings and a biased evaluation of bids. There is a need for a clear definition and instructions on how this principle should be applied in evaluating bids. Most importantly, in the case that best interest affects an award decision which otherwise would have been different; it should be documented clearly to justify its use.

Procurement manuals

66. The review found that UNWTO, the Universal Postal Union (UPU), ILO and WMO did not have stand-alone procurement manuals, but instead embedded procurement-related issues into their other administrative manuals or circulars. The Inspectors were informed that UNWTO was in the process of adopting principles and preparing a procurement manual. At the time of writing, the ILO was also developing a stand-alone procurement manual. The executive heads of UNWTO, UPU and WMO must ensure that their organizations have rules, regulations and manuals on procurement.

III. PROCUREMENT STRATEGY, SUPPLY CHAIN AND RISK MANAGEMENT

A. Procurement strategy development

67. For too long, procurement has been seen as a basic processing function. Procurement staff are tasked with helping operational units undertake procurements, often at the last minute. Consequently, this function is often fragmented throughout each organization, without any systematic and planned approach being adopted. Over the years the volume and diversity of procured items have increased substantially in the United Nations system, a situation which requires organizations to carry out procurements in a proactive and planned way as part of a well-thought procurement strategy.

Smarter buying principles

68. With substantial financial resources at stake, procurement activities pose significant financial, reputational and operational risks for the organizations. The fragmented approach inevitably leads to a waste of resources and lost opportunities in achieving best value for money. It is therefore important that the organizations adopt a consolidated analytical approach to carry out procurements effectively. Smarter Buying Principles[16] (figure 2) can provide a good framework for the analysis and design of procurement strategies:

Figure 2: Smarter buying principles



Procurement strategy development process

69. A procurement strategy would provide a common framework for all procurements and help the organizations meet their strategic objectives and priorities, achieve best value for money and ensure transparency. It requires a comprehensive analysis and planning of procurement activities which should define, inter alia, goods and services to be procured at the corporate and local levels; goods and services to be procured through common use agreements such as central/long-term/framework contracts or

[16] Government of Western Australia, "Procurement beyond the reforms (2008-2012)", p. 9, September 2008. www.dtf.wa.gov.au.

regional contracts; how procurement policy elements such as sustainable procurement should be integrated into the overall plan; and what procurement methods should be used for different groups of goods and services.

70. Procurement strategy/planning would provide opportunities to substantially improve efficiency. For instance, it would allow aggregated procurement of commonly used items, leading to economies of scale, reduced transaction costs through volume leverage and a single procurement operation instead of many. The HLCM Sub-Committee on Improved Efficiency and Cost Control Measures recently identified seven areas in procurement which would lead to greater cost savings in United Nations organizations.[17] The Inspectors consider this initiative to be a good step. However, there is a need for a more systematic and proactive approach to exploit the savings potential in the system. **The Inspectors believe that in order for this to be achieved, organizations need to develop capacity for procurement analysis, forecasting, planning and strategy development.**

71. Procurement plans and strategies can be prepared based on the analysis of historical procurement spend and future procurement needs assessments across each organization. Best practices require that procurement strategies be dynamic and updated on an ongoing basis. Based on the analysis of procurement data, organizations should devise strategies to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their acquisition plans. The strategies should identify how procurement-related resources should be spent efficiently and effectively, and how risks and opportunities should be managed to achieve best value for money while serving the best interest of the organization.

72. A procurement strategy development process should include:

- Historical procurement data and needs assessment for planning
- Analysis of the procurement portfolio
- Procurement profiling, and risk and value analysis of planned procurements
- Detailed analysis of key goods and services and their cost structure
- Demand and supply market analysis
- Segmentation of procurement goods and services
- Understanding the organization's market impact in specific items
- Development of procurement objectives and their link with strategic corporate objectives
- Detailed procurement strategies based on analysis of procurement segments and individual goods and services
- Measurement of performance and outcomes

73. Main strategy documents can include the summary of analysis, general strategy and specific methods in the implementation. As part of procurement portfolio management, goods and services to be procured can be classified according to their relative risk and value.

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[17] CEB/2011/HLCM/14, p. 3 (2011). The seven areas are: (1) maximization of use of long-term agreements, for significantly lower procurement-related costs through economies of scale and reduced transaction costs associated with contract extensions/renewal; (2) increased procurement from the same suppliers for basic common products and services (telephone carriers, supplies, computers, vehicles, etc.) in order to leverage volume to obtain better prices; (3) centralized (either with a United Nations organization or a non-United Nations partner) provision of basic common services (cars/drivers, travel, supplies, cleaning, building maintenance) for different United Nations agencies, locally and at Headquarters; (4) accelerated implementation of the harmonization of business solutions proposed by HLCM and UNDG; (5) Common Procurement Teams (pilot currently operational between FAO, the International Fund for Agricultural Development and WFP) to operate the procurement function under harmonized rules and procedures for joint tendering of commonly procured Headquarters goods, works and services; (6) joint/shared processing of travel claims and administration of various types of insurances (professional liability, travel, health, etc.) and long-service agreements; and (7) aggregation of translation and printing volumes.

Segment analysis

74. Figure 3 contains an analytical framework for the segmentation of procurements for further analysis and development of specific procurement strategies.[18]

Figure 3: Procurement segmentation framework

Low value and high risk	**High value and high risk**
Low value and low risk	**High value and low risk**

75. As can be seen in figure 3, each category of goods and services forecasted and planned to be procured in the coming years is assessed and categorized according to its relative risk and value. The resulting procurement portfolio includes four segments, each with a range of goods and services. This type of analysis would allow the organizations to establish different procurement strategies for each segment and identify and use the best methods in different procurement areas, such as:

- Aggregation of demand for consolidated procurements
- Use of framework/long-term agreements
- Piggybacking on another agency's contract
- Introducing purchasing cards

76. The benefit of procurement strategy/planning is not restricted to the development of procurement methods. It is also useful in many aspects, such as ensuring market research to find the best competitive vendors for tendering, better research to identify quality and evaluation criteria, better compliance with rules and regulations, and fewer waivers for competitive biddings.

Practice in United Nations organizations

77. The review found that many organizations attempted to develop acquisition plans at the country and project levels without explicit reference to the headquarters level or to consolidated acquisition planning and strategy development. UNICEF, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the United Nations, UNDP, ILO, UNRWA, UPU and UNOPS are developing acquisition plans, and the first four organizations also advertise acquisition plans on their public websites.

78. UNOPS officials explained that they went one step further by not only asking for procurement plans to be developed at the country and regional levels but also consolidating those plans into one plan at the headquarters level in order to identify procurement patterns for goods and services throughout the organization. This helps to establish either general terms of reference/technical specifications or global LTAs.

79. Although many of the organizations undertake acquisition planning, it is mainly at the field level, and consists mainly of financial planning, budgeting and time scheduling. There is no consolidated analysis or strategy document at the headquarters level to identify opportunities and risks in procurements across the organization. None of the organizations had a documented, consolidated procurement strategy except IAEA. UNICEF has documented strategies for most of its major product categories, both as part of the effort to maintain a quality management system, and as a step in implementing category management.

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[18] Office of the Auditor-General, New Zealand, *Procurement Guidance for Public Entities*, (2008, Wellington), p. 29. Available from www.oag.govt.nz/2008/procurement-guide.

80. Officials of the United Nations informed the Inspectors that although they do not have a consolidated paper on strategy, they have different facets in place: (a) nature and value: based on the nature of the requirement, and its value and complexity, they have identified several commodities as —special requirements" to be centrally procured at Headquarters level, and other commodities have been identified as —core requirements", which by nature lend themselves to local procurement; (b) analysis of spend throughout the field missions to decide on items suitable for consolidated procurement (system contracts); (c) low-value procurement conducted at the requisitioner level; and (d) analysis of spend throughout the field missions to identify recurring low-value purchases with a view to establishing long-term contracts for such purchases.

81. The Inspectors were informed that UNDP has established a procurement road map that identifies many areas and actions for improvement. UNDP is also executing a project in the area of strategic sourcing, which includes a needs assessment of common procurement items to establish various LTAs so that the organization can attain an optimal balance of centralized procurement at the country-office level. Furthermore, in order to enhance procurement efficiency at the country level, UNDP is reassessing the threshold level of micro-purchasing.

82. The Inspectors recognize that elements of procurement strategies are evident in the practices of the organizations, but a consolidated analysis and strategy development is lacking. The Inspectors would like to emphasize that a consolidated procurement strategy developed on the basis of the comprehensive analysis of the spend will improve the achievement of best value for money in the totality of procurement activities. Therefore organizations should develop a consolidated procurement strategy to guide their procurement activities and present it to Member States for their oversight on this strategic issue. **There is a need for a more systematic and structured approach to gathering and analysing procurement information and translating it into procurement strategies.**

IAEA practice

> IAEA made a comprehensive analysis of its procurement needs and methods. The procurement department adopting a portfolio management approach to procurement segmented procurements according to their value and risk level. Based on this analysis, it was found that 75 per cent of procurement activities consisted of procurements under $3,000. This represented only 4 per cent of the overall spend but was taking most of the procurement staff's time. In order to address this issue, IAEA decentralized all procurements up to the $3,000 threshold to designated staff in the technical units and introduced framework agreements and corporate cards. The Office of Procurement Services has developed and provided training courses for staff responsible for procurement in the technical units. Thus, the central procurement function is able to dedicate time to the remaining 25 per cent of high-risk, high-value and highly complex procurement actions.
>
> In the preparation of procurement plans for significant procurements, the Office of Procurement Services works together with the requisitioner divisions to analyse procurement requirements, the associated supply markets and stakeholders' needs and issues. Such analysis supports the development of a specific procurement strategy that is formally agreed between the Director of the Office of Procurement Services and the director of the requisitioner division.

83. IAEA developed an organization-wide procurement strategy for 2010. It was based on a portfolio management approach to procurement where the categories of goods and services to be procured by the agency were segmented according to their relative risk and value. The strategy addresses both general practice improvements and the specific alignment of objectives, systems, policies, procedures and

capabilities with the risk and opportunities inherent in each segment of the organization's procurement portfolio.[19] The objective of the strategy was to achieve best value for money in each segment (figure 4).

Figure 4

Segment	General strategy applied to obtain best value for money
Low risk/low value	Transaction-cost reduction through efficiency in the purchase-to-pay cycle
Low risk/high value	Cost and transaction-cost reduction through efficient and effective arrangements with suppliers to aggregate and leverage demand
High risk/low value	Risk reduction through effective risk assessment and management
High risk/high value	Optimization of costs over the life of an acquisition or the making of appropriate trade-offs between quality and cost through careful supplier selection and relationship management.[20]

84. Based on an analysis of goods and services by segment, the procurement department prepared specific strategies to reduce cost and achieve best value for money. For instance, in order to reduce transaction costs of procurements in the low risk/low value segment, IAEA considered introducing the following strategies:

- Use of purchasing cards
- Use of standing-offer arrangements and other forms of basic supply agreements
- Use of consolidator basic supply agreements, UNDP and local purchase in the recipient's country under Technical Cooperation projects

85. IAEA aims to make low-value/low-risk purchasing as close as possible to the point of requisition without the intervention of the procurement department. To facilitate this policy and make it effective, the procurement department decided that responsibility for low-value/low-risk purchasing cannot be delegated to any staff member before he or she completes basic procurement training workshops. IAEA has also developed a demand aggregation strategy which includes aggregation principles, analysis of the IAEA purchasing and aggregation structure, categories, items and areas of aggregation, and possible contractual arrangements. **The Inspectors identify the comprehensive and analytical approach of IAEA to strategy development as a best practice.**

A case from the private sector

86. Procurement strategy development is not limited to public sector organizations; it is also used in the private sector. A case in the private sector that indicates a comprehensive approach for strategy development to improve financial efficiency can be seen in box 2.

[19] IAEA Agency-wide procurement strategy 2010.
[20] IAEA, Secretariat directive, Procurement Governance, p. 9, January 2011.

A private sector case: BP[21]

BP practice (2008)
BP formed a market intelligence team comprising qualified staff with a master's degree in business administration. It was tasked with improving strategy development and gathering information that would help the company make fact-based decisions, minimize supply chain risks, identify new opportunities and improve cost-management.

BP reduced its operating cost significantly by renegotiating its supplier contracts, implementing more efficient procurement procedures and restructuring. A key factor in cost saving was a programme designed to use the total buying power of BP across entire regions. The objective was to leverage spend to optimize deals. BP moved away from negotiations based on current costs to how much services and goods should cost. The concept of working more closely with suppliers became a core part of the future strategy of BP as it sought to achieve savings from the entire supply chain.

BP continued to invest in its procurement function during the economic downturn. It increased the number of staff and provided training ranging from foundational training to purchasing and supply chain management programmes.

Long-term agreements/system contracts/framework contracts

87. Although most organizations do not have a documented procurement strategy, many have devised strategies for the procurement of certain goods and services. The use of LTAs and common service procurements are increasing across the system. LTAs are increasingly used by the organizations for the purchase of numerous goods and services, particularly office items such as computers, furniture, stationery and licences.

88. LTAs are established at different levels, such as at the organization-wide, regional or country levels. Based on estimated future demand, the organization goes for a single consolidated procurement, and requisitioner units place their orders based on this single contract without having to start another procurement process. LTAs are generally established as multi-year umbrella agreements and the organizations do not guarantee the volume to be purchased, but provide vendors with an estimation of how much is to be spent.

89. Unfortunately, there is a lack of statistics and analysis regarding the use and performance of LTAs. According to information available on the UNGM web page, only seven organizations had LTAs in 2011, and the total number of LTAs with an expiry date beyond 1 June 2011 was 91. UNICEF informed the Inspectors that in 2010, only 11.4 per cent of UNICEF international procurement was performed outside LTAs and it had 679 active LTAs. The United Nations reported over 180 LTAs as being in place for a total of $8.9 billion estimated value (over multiple years). These statistics seem to imply that many LTAs are not posted on the UNGM web page, which raises a question about the effectiveness of sharing LTAs in the system.

90. Optimizing benefits from LTAs depends on good forecasting, better standardization, the continuous collection and analysis of market data, smart articulation of provisions in contracts, and persuading the best vendors to participate in a bid. The Inspectors would like to point out that the use of LTAs alone does

[21] Source: Nick Martindale, "Fuel's gold", CPO Agenda (Winter 2009-2010). Available from www.cpoagenda.com/previous-articles/winter-2009-2010/features/fuels-gold/.

not necessarily ensure efficiency and provide savings. There is a risk that while LTAs are utilized mainly to avoid frequent procurements, they may end up being more costly in the absence of proper standardization, market monitoring and utilization of renegotiation opportunities. There must be regular assessments of the use of LTAs.

91. The Inspectors would like to point out the following risks in the use of LTAs:

- Due to the lack of standardization and demand aggregation, LTAs are not used at an optimal level. Thus total buying power in the organization is not leveraged effectively.
- LTAs are placed according to funding rather than market cycles. They do not have a mechanism to reduce the cost when market conditions change favourably. There are problems in the articulation of the basis on which price increases will be negotiated when the market price changes. The lack of relevant provisions can result in acrimonious discussions and potentially contract failure.
- There is often an assumption that an LTA continues to provide good value for many years. This may lead to a lack of effort to monitor the market and test LTAs regularly against market conditions with a view to either re-tender or renegotiate should opportunities arise to reduce costs.
- One of the key benefits of LTAs, besides lower costs, is the ability to secure supplier commitments to provisions of maintenance, replacement, warranty, training and technical support. These add considerable value to the downstream utilization of assets bought using LTAs. These provisions are neglected or badly articulated in contracts.

92. In order to benefit from the advantages offered by LTAs the organizations should not only know their procurement portfolios, but should also standardize products and services to the greatest extent possible. The lack of standardization jeopardizes the opportunity for volume leverage. Standardization is a major problem in the organizations and requires a concerted effort that will yield significant savings. Particularly when standardization of needs is not managed properly, actual use of LTAs can be lower than the estimation. Thus the ability of the organizations to negotiate major discounts for future orders is compromised.

93. Organizations should consider aggregating similar products or variations of the same product under one umbrella LTA to utilize volume leverage. LTAs in similar groups of products can be combined for a single bidding. Prices of products can fluctuate over months and years and organizations need to carefully study market trends in order to renegotiate prices, or undertake a new procurement when opportunities arise. In order to utilize opportunities it is important that the contracts include the necessary flexibility clauses.

Obstacles to planning

94. Obstacles to an effective procurement planning are manifold in United Nations system organizations. These include lack of modern information systems, lack of predictability in funding, insufficient human resources, underestimation of procurement, and lack of ownership of the task. Indeed, many organizations face unstable funding, which makes forecasting difficult. However, they can forecast their regular budget better. Organizations should strive to plan procurement on the basis of funding patterns and estimations so that when funding becomes available they will be ready to implement time-sensitive externally funded programmes and projects.

95. Another problem is that organizations do not consider the procurement analysis and strategy development tasks as an explicitly procurement function. In addition, the procurement function does not have sufficient human resources capacity to focus on these tasks. The result is that the procurement departments work reactively rather than proactively, without having the necessary lead time to plan and strategize. The lack of modern information systems with the required procurement data collection capability is a major challenge, particularly for large organizations.

Conclusion

96. Although United Nations organizations implement procurement strategies, most of them do not have a defined, documented procurement strategy based on the comprehensive analysis of procurement activities. This situation may lead to a lack of coordinated buying, limited capture of aggregation possibilities, and duplication of effort and inefficient use of resources. Unguided procurement efforts would inevitably result in fragmentation, confusing communication and lack of accountability.

97. Regardless of the size of their procurement function, organizations should include in their policies instructions and guidance on:

- How the procurement plan and strategy should be developed
- Who should have overall responsibility for planning and strategy development
- Who should be involved in the process and when
- How the procurement strategy should be linked to the organization's broader goals and strategic planning[22]

98. **Organizations should adopt a team-based approach in the development and implementation of their procurement strategy by requiring staff from various departments to work together. The procurement department cannot be expected to be the only department responsible for developing a procurement strategy and making it a success. This task should be accomplished with the aid of top management, which regrettably often shows a hands-off attitude in procurement matters, and with the collaboration of other departments.**

99. **Organizations need to develop adequate human resources and information system capacities for systematic and continuous data collection, analysis and strategy development.** The process should be an ongoing one and provide analytical information on the various aspects of procurement, including actual spend breakdown and future demand forecasting; possible standardization and demand aggregation for LTAs; high-quality suppliers for key items; existing suppliers and their performance; cost to administer the spend; cost breakdown of each step in the procurement process and lead time; the performance of procurement function; contract types and their performance; efficiency gains from LTAs; market trends in key goods and services; renegotiation opportunities to lower prices; and market information on key items.

100. Most procurement transactions in United Nations organizations might be for low-value and low-risk items, with a high proportion of resources used to support them. The organizations should therefore strive to standardize these items and aggregate procurement through system/framework/LTA contracts, purchasing cards and streamlined procedures. These measures will increase leverage and allow the organizations to drive prices down and lower transaction costs. They will also enable procurement staff to concentrate on areas where they can add most value – i.e. procurement of complex goods and services that require project development and management skills rather than traditional purchasing skills.

101. LTAs are an important method to improve efficiency in the organizations. However, without an analytical approach there is a risk that LTAs could end up being simple contracts without any additional efficiency value. Organizations should have clear objectives and criteria regarding the establishment and use of LTAs and should systematically assess their performance in order to maximize benefits. Besides increasing the number of items subject to LTAs, organizations should consider making the use of LTAs compulsory where feasible.

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[22] Office of the Auditor-General, New Zealand, *Procurement Guidance* (footnote 18 above), p. 28.

102. The implementation of the following recommendations is expected to increase efficiency in procurement activities.

Recommendation 4
Executive heads should develop and maintain a dynamic procurement strategy based on the comprehensive analysis of procurement spend with a view to ensuring the achievement of optimum effectiveness and efficiency for all procurement activities in their organizations.

Recommendation 5
Executive heads should regularly review the performance of LTAs and try to maximize their use by collecting and analysing relevant statistics and seeking more standardization and demand aggregation in the procurement of goods and services.

Recommendation 6
Executive heads, as part of their strategy development, should use techniques such as low/high-risk and low/high-value matrices to identify areas where procurement resources can have the most impact, with a view to ensuring that these areas get adequate attention.

B. Supply chain management approach

103. The supply chain approach considers end-to-end processes for the purchase and use of goods, and cuts across departmental lines to ensure the achievement of best value from the whole chain. It includes planning/forecasting, procurement, production, financing, transportation, inventory storage, internal distribution, maintenance and disposal. In other words, supply chain management is the management of procurement, goods and logistics in an integrated manner with a view to achieving optimum value from the whole chain. It requires organizations to identify risks and opportunities in these processes and encourages the individual segments of the supply chain to work together to ensure the success of the whole process.

104. UNICEF, UNHCR and UNRWA have brought their procurement and logistic functions under one umbrella in order to ensure more effective supply chain management. UNICEF has developed specific strategies for product categories, logistics, partnership and performance benchmarking, viewing the whole supply chain as one integrated process. It has also trained staff in the end-to-end supply chain approach.

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
105. In its procurement-related report (A/64/501) of 2009, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions called on the Secretary-General to develop an integrated supply chain approach to the procurement function, stating that:

> The Committee is of the view that there is a need to improve the functioning of the end-to-end supply chain at the Secretariat. The Committee encourages the Secretary-General to develop an integrated supply chain approach to the procurement function in the United Nations. This approach

> would cut across departmental lines, overcoming structural obstacles, so as to ensure that the products reach the client in a timely manner while meeting all other requirements.[23]

106. The United Nations Secretariat has recognized the importance of integrating supply chain management into its peacekeeping procurements, with the Secretary-General noting in 2007 that:

> Integrating procurement into the supply chain management system and simplifying the line of authority and accountability for procurement would also help address the underlying weaknesses in controls … by simplifying and strengthening the chain of responsibility, authority and accountability.[24]

107. Recently, efforts have been made in the United Nations to improve the supply chain management functions by harmonizing regulations and rules, streamlining processes and fostering a clearer division of labour.[25] The Inspectors are of the opinion that supply chain management is beneficial, particularly for the large amount of goods that the organizations must purchase, store and distribute. **Executive heads should consider adopting an integrated supply chain approach for procurement activities, particularly for large-volume items.** Organizations that have separate departments should develop a team approach to ensure that the supply chain management approach is adopted for the purchase of key goods. Supply chain management should be integrated into procurement planning and strategy development, particularly in organizations with major procurement portfolios.

108. United Nations organizations that procure the same/similar items can consider integrating their supply chains for these items in order to achieve higher value from the whole chain. This would be easily possible for organizations that have similar programmatic activities. Given the total value of procurements in the system, supply chain management could provide immense opportunities for higher efficiency, for example by establishing interagency warehouses and delivery systems.

C. Risk management

109. Procurement activities carry high inherent risk and therefore require proper risk management (risk identification, assessment and mitigation) procedures. Risk management should be an integral part of day-to-day operations and a key element in monitoring procurement activities. The use of risk management in procurement function takes several forms. First, the organizations should undertake periodic risk assessments of their procurement departments/units. Second, risk management should be used as an important tool in the analysis of procurement activities. Third, risk management should be an integral part of the tendering, contract preparation and management processes, particularly in the case of medium- to high-value procurements.

110. The review found that most organizations do not have proper risk management practices. They do not exercise risk-based analysis of their procurement activities; and risk assessment is not integrated into the preparation and implementation of individual procurements and contract management. Many organizations undertaking large projects use risk management, but only because of the requirements of project management rather than that of procurement rules and procedures. Since ERM has not been fully

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[23] Para. 22.

[24] "Comprehensive report on strengthening the capacity of the United Nations to manage and sustain operations" (A/61/858), para. 109.

[25] Report of the Secretary-General on simplification and harmonization of the United Nations development system (E/2011/88), para. 11.

operational in many organizations, risk assessment and management have not yet become an integral part of the activities.

111. IAEA and the ILO require risk assessment for individual procurements over a certain threshold. In IAEA this applies to each procurement action exceeding €25,000. Where a tender is to be conducted, the ILO requires that a risk register be completed by the requisitioner. The Inspectors would like to emphasize that risk assessment should be built into the procurement process and analysis of procurement activities.

112. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance accountability.

Recommendation 7
Executive heads should integrate risk management into the procurement process. This should include the operation of procurement units, analysis of procurement activities and the implementation of individual procurements.

IV. SUSTAINABLE PROCUREMENT

113. The HLCM Procurement Network defines sustainable procurement as practices that "integrate requirements, specifications and criteria that are compatible and in favour of the protection of the environment, of social progress and in support of economic development, namely by seeking resource efficiency, improving the quality of products and services and ultimately optimizing costs".[26]

114. The definition of sustainable procurement includes three aspects: economic, social and environmental. While economic factors include the costs of products and services over their entire life cycle, social factors include social justice and equity, safety and security, human rights and employment conditions. Environmental factors include emissions to air, land and water, climate change, biodiversity and natural resources.[27] In the United Nations system, however, sustainable procurement is mostly associated with environmentally friendly or green procurement, with discussions and efforts focusing mainly on this area.

115. The economic factor is a fundamental pillar of procurement and has been integrated into the procurement policies of the organizations through the adoption of the best value for money principle. The review found that the organizations had not reached a consensus regarding the adoption and integration of policies with respect to the two other pillars. Therefore this section of the present note will focus on the social and environmental aspects of procurement policies.

116. The Inspectors are of the opinion that in order to draw adequate attention to both issues and prevent social issues from being pushed off the agenda; it would be advisable to tackle environmental and social aspects of procurement separately during the policy-development stage. There is no denying that there is a close connection between these two issues, but this should not be a reason for "mixing" them, causing attention to be diverted away from the social aspects. It is noteworthy that the websites of the World Bank and Asian Development Bank have separate sections with information on their policies on environmentally and socially responsible procurement.

A. Environmentally responsible/friendly/green procurement

117. The JIU report entitled "Environmental profile of the United Nations system organizations" (JIU/REP/2010/1) found that most of the organizations had developed an awareness of sustainable procurement. Some ad hoc initiatives related to sustainable procurement had been launched, but policies and practices were yet to be adopted. Although inter-organizational collaboration under the lead of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) had produced several initiatives, the United Nations system had no system-wide sustainable procurement policies and guidelines. The report found that one reason for this situation is the concern of some Member States about the potentially limited access for their suppliers to the United Nations market, as a result of the inclusion of sustainability criteria in the procurement processes. It has been argued that sustainable procurement would amount to a de facto non-tariff barrier to trade that would impede access to markets for developing countries (JIU/REP/2010/1, para. 118). In the report, the Inspectors recommended that the executive heads of the United Nations

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[26] UNOPS, *2008 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement: Sustainable Procurement Supplement* (2009), p. 4; United Nations Environment Programme, *Moving Towards a Climate Neutral UN* (2011), p. 23.

[27] Comprehensive report of the Secretary-General on United Nations procurement activities (A/64/284/Add.2), para. 7.

system organizations involved in field activities establish in-house sustainable procurement policies and guidelines, taking account of the local conditions of the host country and the needs of field offices.[28]

118. Decisions have been taken over the years on the international forums to encourage environmentally friendly policies in many aspects, including procurement. The Governing Council of UNEP recently adopted decision 26/11, in which it encouraged the Environment Management Group:

> To continue supporting the implementation of the United Nations climate-neutral strategy and advancing the sustainability of policies, management practices and operations in the United Nations system, including sustainable procurement, and the establishment of an agreement to put in place a process for environmental impact assessment and the use of environmental and social safeguards in respect of projects taken up directly by the organizations of the United Nations system.[29]

119. Although most organizations have adopted some practices relating to environmental procurement, these practices are not underpinned by a clear policy. In its resolution 62/269, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare a comprehensive report on the sustainable procurement issue to be discussed at its sixty-fourth session. The Secretary-General presented his report on sustainable procurement (A/64/284/Add.2) in 2009. The General Assembly in its procurement review considered a number of procurement-related reports, including the sustainable procurement report of the Secretary General, and adopted resolution 65/261 at its sixty-fifth session. In the resolution, the General Assembly decided to consider further those reports, including the sustainable procurement report, at the first part of its resumed sixty-seventh session (2013), and requested the Secretary-General to submit an updated comprehensive report on United Nations procurement activities for its consideration at the same session. A possible policy decision of the General Assembly on sustainable procurement would be an important signal across the system.

Concerns

120. Some concerns identified regarding green/environmentally responsible procurement are as follows:

- Absence of an environmentally responsible procurement framework/policy which is broadly accepted by the United Nations system organizations
- It may exclude suppliers from developing countries and countries with economies in transition from participating in bids; as such, it can be perceived as a disguised barrier for the suppliers of these countries
- It is difficult to balance the trade-offs between environmental, social and economic considerations
- It may lead to an increase in the cost of procurement.

121. These concerns are legitimate, but should not prevent the adoption of environmental policies. Rather, policies should be developed and implemented gradually, taking into account these concerns. Assumptions regarding the inability of vendors from developing countries to produce environmentally friendly products and services may not be necessarily correct in many cases. All countries, including developing countries, have in recent years been moving towards establishing standards and regulations to protect the environment and climate. Vendors from developing countries are also integrating environmental standards into their exported products when required by the regulations of importing countries, such as member countries of the European Union.

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[28] Ibid., p. 30, recommendation 10.

[29] *Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 25* (A/66/25), annex.

122. The cost of environmentally friendly products can be higher or lower depending on their origin. In some cases, if the whole life-cycle cost is taken into account, the cost of a green product can be lower than that of a conventional one. For example, according to a UNEP study, the results of taking a life-cycle approach in purchasing electrical appliances indicate that green products may cost less than traditional ones.

123. It is important to keep in mind that the pillars of sustainable procurement can complement each other in many cases. For instance, local procurements in developing countries can support economic and social development, and help reduce energy consumption and the total cost of products because of lower transportation costs. Many officials stated that, by applying the total life-cycle cost criteria of best value for money, staff were already implementing green procurement without identifying it as such.

124. Some organizations in the United Nations system have already made progress in adopting environmentally friendly procurement policies. UNDP has developed a practice guide and policy. UNOPS has incorporated a chapter on sustainable procurement in its procurement manual and has developed guidelines. It considers that sustainable procurement should play a pivotal role in every organization's procurement and supply chain management strategy. UNEP has developed eight sets of guidelines for the sustainable procurement of specific products and services, including information technology, cleaning, stationery, furniture, vehicles, catering and generators.[30] These guidelines have been endorsed by the HLCM Procurement Network and are available through the UNGM knowledge centre.

125. Many organizations are implementing green procurement in the areas of building construction and maintenance, office equipment and cleaning/catering services. They are also integrating green requirements in their product specifications and evaluation criteria. Depending on the case, UNEP provides an additional weighting of 10 per cent to favour green requirements in its evaluations. UNEP is the only organization found to add a set weight to green elements.

126. FAO, WIPO, the United Nations and UNFPA follow UNEP guidelines in procurement for headquarters and include environmental factors in the procurement of construction materials, energy, information and technology equipment, paper and stationery. The LTAs of UNICEF contain elements of sustainable/green procurement in the area of cleaning services, where bids are issued with the requirement of using exclusively environmentally friendly cleaning products. UNICEF also issues bids on generators where 20 per cent of the evaluation criteria is dedicated to environmental issues, e.g. air and noise pollution, fuel consumption, ISO certification, packing cartons and material. The Common Procurement Activities Groups in Rome and Geneva consider incorporating on a case-by-case basis green procurement elements in their tender documents for goods and services such as cleaning products, catering and office supplies.

127. There is no one-size-fits-all green procurement policy that can apply to all the organizations and all goods and services. Green procurement of some goods can be easily implemented when it does not entail extra costs or limit the participation of vendors, but it tends to become controversial when it means higher costs and the exclusion of suppliers from developing countries. That said, it is possible and necessary for the organizations to develop a general policy framework that establishes good practices and encourages progress in green procurement.

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[30] UNEP, report of the Executive Director on enhanced coordination across the United Nations system, including the Environment Management Group, document UNEP/GC.26/15, para. 54.

128. UNEP has already started developing green policy guidelines for specific areas. These provide basic and advanced green criteria and establish a good basis on which to develop specific implementation policies. For example, organizations can choose to apply advanced criteria in developed countries and basic criteria in developing countries. The establishment of such guidelines and criteria must be based on market research and close dialogue with vendors, who should be informed well in advance of any policy changes so as to allow them to make the necessary adjustments.

129. Cognizant of the complexity and importance of the issue, several organizations have already started providing training in green procurement. UNEP has trained 120 staff. UNFPA has set up a green team and has been offering training on how to calculate carbon dioxide emissions and other related aspects of green procurement. UNOPS is conducting sustainable procurement training for procurement staff at headquarters and at its operations centres in the field. The Sustainable United Nations initiative has delivered practical training in some countries on how to implement green procurement.

130. The World Bank has taken steps to integrate green procurement into its corporate procurement and to monitor the supply chain to ensure adherence to environmental requirements. For instance, before the World Bank concluded a contract for the procurement of office paper, officials visited suppliers' mills and looked at their manufacturing processes, including lumber and transportation methods, and received environmental information for each step of the supply chain.

131. Although the United Nations system has integrated some elements of environmentally friendly procurement practices, most organizations do not have clear policies and guidelines in this area. Implementation is mostly ad hoc and fragmented. Given the importance of environmental issues and worldwide efforts to protect the environment and the climate, United Nations organizations cannot avoid integrating environmental concerns into their procurement policies. The Inspectors recognize that this issue is complex and that changes cannot be made overnight and therefore recommend that environmentally friendly procurement policies be introduced gradually, taking into account local conditions and requirements. **The policies should make sure that effective competition is secured and that vendors from developing countries are not excluded. Executive heads should inform their governing bodies of their policies and related impact evaluations and seek their guidance. In order to facilitate process and have a consistent approach, the HLCM Procurement Network should develop a general policy framework for the adoption and implementation of the organizations.**

132. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of environmentally responsible procurement practices.

Recommendation 8
Executive heads should, with the guidance of governing bodies, develop and gradually implement environmentally responsible procurement policies and guidelines in compliance with the principle of competition and with all due respect for the access of developing countries and countries in transition to procurement.

B. Socially responsible procurement

133. The Inspectors found that United Nations system organizations do not have a consolidated approach to socially responsible procurement. Their approach is selective, fragmented and varied, and depends on the specific interest of each organization. In general, elements of socially responsible procurement can be found in the organizations' general conditions of contracts (GCCs), such as prohibition of the use of child labour and sexual exploitation and the exclusion of vendors who manufacture anti-personnel mines (UNDP, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, the United Nations, UNOPS and UNRWA). The 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, which includes freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining, the elimination of forced or compulsory child labour; the abolition of child labour, and the elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation, is included in the GCCs of FAO, the ILO and UNOPS.

134. The GCC of ILO includes references to the ILO conventions on wages, working hours, safety at work and other working conditions. UNHCR includes a prohibition of the exploitation of refugees and other persons of concern to the organization. These are good illustrations of organizations using procurement to further their strategic objectives. It should be stressed, however, that incorporating these principles into GCCs, although important, is not sufficient. Specific policies should be developed on how to verify and monitor the compliance of the vendors with the terms and guidelines, to help staff members weigh such concerns consistently in each phase of the procurement process.

135. One tool for promoting socially responsible procurement could be the Global Compact Initiative, which directly incorporates the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. The Global Compact sets out 10 universally accepted principles, encompassing four areas (human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption), that businesses must adhere to and embed in their labour practices and supply chains worldwide.

136. A recent JIU report on the role and functioning of the Global Compact[31] found that although the procurement function of the United Nations supported the principles, these were not applied or enforced in procurement. On the advice of the Legal Division, the United Nations Procurement Division had taken the position that "the Global Compact should be viewed as a learning tool and something to aspire to, and not a concept to be enforced, as the Secretariat has neither the proper mechanism nor resources to monitor compliance by vendors".[32] Although vendors are asked whether they are party to the Global Compact when registering through UNGM, it is currently not being used by the organizations to enforce the implementation of its standards.

137. Considering the lowest procurement cost as the sole objective can promote bad social practices. Suppliers who use child and forced labour, who do not provide social benefits (retirement and health insurance) or who pay less than the legal minimum wage are, of course, likely to offer the lowest price in procurement tenders. In some cases the contracting supplier may offer good employment conditions but its subcontractor may not apply those good practices. Organizations therefore need to identify all the elements required for socially responsible procurement and integrate them into a single legally binding document, preferably in GCC. This document should become an integral part of all procurement tender documents from the beginning of the process, including requests for proposals and invitations to bid. Secondly, the organizations need to develop further guidelines to sensitize staff and provide methods of implementation.

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[31] United Nations corporate partnerships: the role and functioning of the Global Compact (JIU/REP/2010/9).
[32] Ibid., para. 36.

138. Although there is no active approach in implementing socially responsible procurement practices, some organizations have taken steps in this regard. UNICEF officials explained that they conducted inspections of factories of vendors that supply the organization with key goods, in order to ensure compliance with principles related to child labour, anti-personnel mines and waste management.

139. The Inspectors were informed that **at the latest HLCM Procurement Network meeting it was announced that the new United Nations sustainable procurement guide was at the final draft stage and that the social component has been covered in considerable detail, with input from the ILO. Organizations should review their policies in the light of the present Note and the work of the HLCM Procurement Network, with a view to ensuring that their policy and practices are in line with best practices.**

The World Bank practice

140. The socially responsible procurement policy of the World Bank states that ―as a socially responsible organization, the Bank Group, through its corporate procurement practices, endeavours to integrate socially responsible suppliers into its supply chain".[33] The World Bank's policy on sustainable procurement covers areas such as wages and benefits, health and safety at the workplace and accessibility issues. Bank officials state that this policy is fully reflected in the requests for proposals, requests for quotations, and invitations for bids, included as evaluation criteria in technical evaluations and considered in the cost analysis of all quotations, bids, and proposals received in identifying the best bidder.[34]

141. The World Bank also has a policy on supplier diversity. It states that the World Bank provides opportunities for the access and growth of minority-, women-, and disabled-owned business enterprises (MWDBEs) with an emphasis on measurable results and continuous improvement. The primary objective is to increase the participation of MWDBEs in contracts it awards. The World Bank has a set of targets, of which a certain percentage must be from MWDBE vendors. Bank officials reported an increase in MWDBE participation, which they credited to the proactive attitude and market research of contract officers, who contact MWDBE vendors and encourage them to bid. If their offer is rejected they are given feedback on the quality of their bid. Officers expect that market research, sensitization and vendor education will lead to a diversified vendor base.

142. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of socially responsible procurement practices.

Recommendation 9
Executive heads should review the social aspect of their procurement policy and practices with a view to ensuring that their policy includes all important social elements, and that guidelines are provided for effective implementation.

[33] World Bank, ―Socially Responsible Procurement", para. 1.1, available from http://go.worldbank.org/AORDIQYRF0.
[34] Ibid., para. 1.4.

C. Procurement from developing countries and countries with economies in transition

Share of developing countries in the total procurement of the United Nations system

143. Procurement from developing countries and countries with economies in transition (henceforth cited as developing countries) is an important aspect of socially responsible procurement repeatedly endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolutions on procurement reform.[35]

Table 2

Procurement share of developing countries and countries with economies in transition[36]

Year	Procurement from developing countries (millions of United States dollars)	Total procurement (millions of United States dollars)	Share of developing countries (percentage)
2004	2,291	6,526	35.1
2005	3,594	8,331	43.1
2006	5,166	9,404	54.9
2007	5,425	10,113	53.6
2008	6,972	13,594	51.3
2009	7,576	13,797	54.9

144. As can be seen in table 2, organizations have increased the procurement volume from developing countries substantially. The volume of procurement from developing countries more than tripled between 2004 and 2009, jumping from US$ 2.3 billion to $7.6 billion. The share of total procurement of countries in this category increased around 20 percentage points in the same period (from 35 to 55 per cent). However, considering the large number of these countries, the fact that their share of total procurement is just over half indicates there is still room for improvement. Given that promotion of development is a major objective of the organizations and that procurement is considered one of the tools to this end, organizations should strive to further increase procurement from developing countries.

145. The total procurement volume of four United Nations organizations (the United Nations, UNDP, WFP and UNICEF) makes up the bulk of overall procurement in the system. In 2009 their procurement accounted for 76 per cent of the total procurement volume across the system. Any change in their procurements from developing countries significantly affects the total share of procurements from those countries. The share of developing countries in the total procurement of these organizations between 2006 and 2009 is indicated in table 3.

[35] See General Assembly resolutions 59/288, 61/246 and 62/269.
[36] UNOPS, *Annual Statistical Reports*, 2004-2009.

Table 3

Procurement share of developing countries and countries with economies in transition in the top four United Nations organizations (percentage)[37]

	2006	2007	2008	2009
UN	44.5	40.6	33.8	28.7
UNDP	88.0	80.6	81.0	79.9
WFP	38.9	43.6	46.0	78.3
UNICEF	45.4	47.2	42.3	40.5

146. As can be seen, UNDP is the leading organization, procuring most of its goods and services (80 per cent) from developing countries. However, the share of developing countries declined from 88 per cent in 2006 to 79.9 per cent in 2009. In WFP, the share of developing countries jumped from 38.9 to 78.3 per cent, preventing a fall in the total share of developing countries across the system in 2009. WFP explains that the large increase in its procurement from developing countries is partly attributable to its Purchase for Progress initiative, which aims to help local economies through local purchases following the principle of best value for money.

Diversification of vendor base: top 10 countries in procurements

147. A review of the top 10 countries supplying goods and services to United Nations organizations in 2004 and 2009 showed that the same countries remain on the list and that the developed countries continue to be in the majority. Of the top 10 countries, 8 that figured on the list of 2004 were also on the list in 2009.[38] The total share of the top 10 in total procurement volume was around 46 per cent both in 2004 and 2009. This situation shows a longstanding concentration of procurements in a limited number of countries, reflecting a lack of improvement in the diversification of the procurement base.

148. Despite calls for the diversification of vendor sources and vendor geographic diversification, it seems that the same countries continue to dominate the supply market for the United Nations system. Out of four developing countries joining the list in 2009, Afghanistan and Sudan made it onto the list mainly due to transportation and construction work being carried out in these two countries, which may not reflect a genuine diversification of the vendor base. Moreover, no African countries are represented in the top 10 apart from Sudan.

Reliability of data: problems of definition

149. The statistics in table 3 were taken from the UNOPS annual statistical reports on procurement. During the finalization of the present note, the United Nations officials informed the Inspectors that the figures in the table do not match their calculation. According to the United Nations Procurement Division the correct percentages for the United Nations in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009 were 54.2, 52.2, 46.4 and 40.5 per cent, respectively. The Procurement Division explains that the reason for the discrepancy between the figures on its website and those in the UNOPS reports is the list of countries considered as developing and transition economies. The officials further explained that the Procurement Division uses

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[37] UNOPS, *Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement* (2006 to 2009).

[38] The top 10 countries in 2004: United States of America, Belgium, France, Italy, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, India, Afghanistan, Switzerland, Russian Federation and Denmark. Top 10 countries in 2009: United States, Switzerland, India, Sudan, Russian Federation, Afghanistan, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Belgium. UNOPS, *Annual Statistical Reports of United Nations Procurement* (2004 and 2009).

the list obtained from the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, while UNOPS uses UNDP as the basis for its criteria, which excludes the Russian Federation and Israel as developing and transition economies.

150. Differences in the countries included in the lists, and hence the inconsistency in statistics, represent a serious problem for real analysis and conclusions. **The Inspectors suggest that organizations agree on a common definition of statistics and introduce them consistently. The Inspectors further suggest that UNOPS publish statistical tables showing the procurement shares of developing countries and countries with economies in transition separately to allow better analysis and monitoring.**

151. The data seems to confirm significant levels of procurement from developing countries and countries with economies in transition. It is unclear, however, whether this data reflects country-of-origin certificates or simply the registered location of the vendor. The lack of clear guidelines regarding the identification and reporting of data on procurements from these countries raises questions about its reliability. **The Inspectors suggest that organizations discuss and agree on what constitutes procurement from this group of countries.**

152. The data needs to be more transparent, consistent and relevant. For instance, can a vehicle purchased from a local dealer of a multinational company be considered procurement from the country of the local dealer? **The Inspectors suggest that HLCM Procurement Network come up with a definition of "procurements from developing countries and countries with economies in transition" to serve as a guideline for the organizations to correctly and consistently identify and report procurements from developing countries.**

Problems with UNGM

153. Key factors identified throughout the interviews that hinder more procurement from developing countries were the complexity of registering with UNGM, and that UNGM currently functions only in English. It is difficult for smaller vendors from developing countries to comply with the requirement to submit numerous documents when registering online. In the field, the use of the local language will obviously increase the understanding and participation of local vendors. The Inspectors would like to remind the organizations that due respect must be given to all six official languages of the United Nations. Officials stated that they were aware of the problems, and were trying to solve them by introducing more languages and simplifying the registration requirements for small vendors. They further explained that UNGM is adopting a new coding system and it will be available in 10 languages, including four United Nations official languages.

154. The Inspectors were informed that the United Nations Procurement Division has recently financed the translation of UNGM into French and Spanish. It is expected that UNGM will be available in three official United Nations languages in 2012. It is also expected that at the next HLCM Procurement Network meeting, members will be requested to set up a working group to review the registration procedures of each organization in order to simplify the UNGM registration procedure. It is envisaged that if the results are endorsed by the membership, a concept paper will be prepared for assessment and funding. **The Inspectors understand that further improvements require financial resources and urge the executive heads of the organizations to allocate the necessary resources for improvement.**

UNHCR and UNICEF practices

155. Most of the organizations do not have specific incentives to increase procurement from developing countries. UNHCR states in its ―Report on Sustainable Procurement" that the objectives of sustainable procurement should be improving the livelihood of local communities and incomes within

national markets, while combating child labour. UNHCR allows for a 15 per cent price differential for local suppliers in selected cases where there are direct benefits to the community or considerable value added elements.[39] ILO has issued a specific circular stating that "if after evaluation and comparison, two offers are equal under all criteria, preference should be given to equipment manufactured in a developing country and/or to works and services to be carried out/performed by a firm of a developing country".[40] The United Nations Procurement Division is making efforts to diversify its vendor base by conducting business and vendor registration seminars in developing countries.

156. UNICEF has unique policies for the procurement of its strategic products, such as vaccines, syringes and therapeutic food. Its procurement objectives include increasing the number of local suppliers for key products and their global availability. For instance, its procurement strategy for therapeutic food is to increase the number of companies in the country of use. UNICEF calls its strategy "market shaping". Officials explained that in order to promote local production of certain products, they encourage local suppliers to enter the market by allowing them a price differential of up to 25 per cent. They hope that these policies will help expand their vendor base and help local industries in developing countries to flourish, which will ultimately result in a more competitive market and lower prices. They also expect that these policies will promote sustainability and reduce the risk of product shortages in times of surging demand.

157. UNICEF officials explained that for one specific product, there was initially only one supplier, which was from a developed country. Thanks to the implementation of the market shaping strategy, the number of suppliers of that product has increased over the years to 13. Although the targeted strategy of UNICEF is commendable, it has not adopted a policy document to guide these efforts, and no public information about suppliers and prices applied is available. This creates a lack of transparency and poses a risk for the organization. Still, the strategy provides a good example of positive discrimination in cases where the manufacturing of certain goods in developing countries can promote sustainable development and ultimately increase competition and lower prices.

158. The Inspectors were informed that the HLCM Procurement Network was also looking into the issue of promoting procurement from developing countries and supporting capacity development for procurement in countries where United Nations organizations operate. A working group on the subject was looking at increasing the number of training courses and business seminars to potential vendors in different regions in an effort to increase the supplier base from developing countries.

159. United Nations organizations have made progress over the years to increase their vendor base and procurement from developing countries. However, there is further room for progress in these areas. **The organizations need to be proactive in finding ways to use procurement, which makes up a large part of their spend, as a strategic tool to further their development objectives, rather than focus on short-term efficiency gains. Aligning procurement objectives with their broader goals requires increasing the participation of suppliers from developing countries.** The executive heads of the organizations should pursue such an approach based on an analysis of their procurement portfolio and the broader objectives of their organizations. This approach can include establishing targets to increase procurement from developing countries, sensitizing staff with training, allowing price differentials in some cases, and holding more workshops or seminars for vendors from developing countries.

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[39] UNHCR, "Report on sustainable procurement: initiatives taken and suggested next steps", p. 22.
[40] ILO Circular No. 8/58, Procurement and Contracting General, para. 5.9.4.

160. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of efforts to increase procurement from developing countries.

Recommendation 10
Executive heads should pursue proactive and pragmatic policies to increase procurement from developing countries and countries with economies in transition. This should include, inter alia, a clear definition of relevant data, the introduction of selective incentives, the use of multiple languages and the sensitization of staff.

V. ETHICS MANAGEMENT AND VENDOR ISSUES

A. Ethics management

161. The JIU report entitled "Ethics in the United Nations system" noted that "unethical behaviour and corrupt practices on the part of a few continue to mar the work and reputation of United Nations system organizations".[41] This statement applies in particular to procurement, with several cases in the past leading to extensive negative media coverage. Thus, ethics and transparency are crucial aspects which need to underpin all procurement actions.

162. With the increasing importance of ethics, United Nations organizations have issued a myriad of policies relating to the different aspects of ethical procurement (see annex II for a summary). In the context of the present study, the following aspects of existing policies and practices have been reviewed:

- Conflict of interest
- Financial disclosure
- Gifts, favours and hospitality
- Post-employment restrictions
- Vendor/Supplier Code of Conduct
- Whistleblower protection.

163. The main reference in the United Nations system for a code of conduct is the Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service. Most organizations refer to these standards in their procurement manual or on their procurement websites. Some organizations have taken it a step further and have developed specific guidance in sections or chapters of their procurement manuals. UNIDO, UNDP, FAO, ILO, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United Nations, UNDP, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNOPS, UNRWA, WFP, WIPO and WMO have all embedded ethical issues into their procurement regulations and manuals.

164. UNRWA has developed specific standards for a procurement code of conduct and UNOPS has detailed guidance for all staff involved in procurement actions. WIPO added a section entitled "Code of Conduct of Procurement staff" to its general code of conduct. The ILO and UNIDO deserve special mention, in that these two organizations require staff involved in procurement processes to sign a declaration to uphold ethical standards in all stages of the procurement process. This declaration focuses on ethical issues and the code of conduct during procurement.

ILO and UNIDO experience

> ILO procurement staff sign a declaration of principles and a requirement for ethical conduct. In addition, members of evaluation panels sign a declaration of confidentiality. In UNIDO, each participant in the procurement process is expected to be familiar with procurement ethics and professional responsibility and is required to fill out a declaration form of compliance with UNIDO procurement ethics and professional standards.

[41] JIU/REP/2010/3, para. 2.

Conflict of interest

165. Perceived conflict of interest situations are just as important as real ones, and staff involved in the procurement process (both requisitioners and procurement unit staff) must err on the side of caution in declaring even the slightest perceived conflict of interest. In many organizations, once a staff member declares a conflict of interest in a given activity, the Ethics Office has to decide whether that official should excuse himself or herself from that activity. Practice regarding the declaration of conflict of interest varies within the system.

166. UNOPS, UNRWA, UNFPA, UPU, WIPO, WMO, the United Nations, IMO, ILO and FAO have a policy stating that staff should report any conflict of interest as soon as it arises. The Inspectors note that these policies rely on staff making a voluntary declaration, rather than being a requirement for each and every significant procurement action in which staff are involved. ICAO, ILO, IAEA, WHO, the United Nations and UNIDO practices can be considered more effective, as they all go a step further and oblige staff to declare no conflict of interest either annually or per significant procurement action.

Good practices in conflict of interest

ICAO: Conflict of interest declaration is signed by all procurement staff along with the financial disclosure form. The documents are submitted to the Legal Office in a sealed envelope on an annual basis.
ILO: Procurement staff complete a declaration attesting that they have no conflict of interest in participating in a procedure and will maintain the confidentiality of information during the procurement process.
IAEA: Requires the submission of a Declaration of Impartiality and Confidentiality by all participants for significant procurements.
UNIDO: Procurement staff fill out, per procurement action, a Declaration of Compliance with UNIDO Procurement Ethics and Professional Standards. The Declaration includes the following clause: "I shall not have a financial interest in any suppliers responding to a UNIDO solicitation, and am prohibited from any involvement in the procurement action if I have such an interest…My actions in the procurement process shall be transparent so that it can be verified that these standards have been upheld."
United Nations: United Nations Terms and Conditions include clauses dealing with confidentiality, collusive bidding and other anti-competitive conduct, improper assistance, use of former United Nations employees in the preparation of proposals and process, corrupt practices and conflict of interest. Further, bidders are requested to abide by these clauses in their submissions. In cases where a violation of the terms and conditions is identified, the United Nations will have the right: to reject a proposal; to declare a company ineligible, either indefinitely or for a stated period of time, to become a United Nations registered vendor; and/or to terminate any contract entered into with such a vendor.
WHO: Designated staff fill in a declaration of interest form (covering also financial disclosure) which provides guidance on what kind of conflict of interest situations may arise.

167. Among the organizations, UNFPA, UNDP, ILO, IMO, ICAO and FAO require vendors to sign a conflict of interest declaration. For instance, the ILO requires suppliers to sign a declaration that covers conflict of interest and confidentiality issues and to declare whether they are included in the United Nations Security Council sanction list or whether they are subject to sanctions imposed by another agency in the United Nations system, including the World Bank.

168. **An ideal practice could be to require all staff involved in procurement to fill out a declaration of no conflict of interest per procurement action over a certain threshold and require suppliers/vendors to do the same**, as is the practice at the European Commission. The Inspectors are of

the view that these practices create better awareness and increase accountability. UNFPA and WIPO have included in the declaration form possible consequences for staff and vendors in case of failure to disclose a conflict of interest. Although signing a conflict of interest declaration may imply accountability, the integration of an explicit provision for consequences can increase its impact and legal power.

Good practices in conflict of interest

> **UNFPA:** If found in breach of the conflict of interest rules, the vendor will be criminally liable and UNFPA has the right to cancel the contract and to demand that the vendor pay for any loss or damage resulting from the cancellation.
>
> **WIPO:** Officials involved in a procurement action shall disclose in advance any possible conflict of interest that may arise in the course of carrying out their duties. Failure to do so may result in appropriate disciplinary action or other appropriate civil and/or criminal action.

Financial disclosure

169. The Inspectors found that all the organizations have adopted a financial disclosure policy except IMO, ITU and UNWTO. In all cases this policy covers officials at the D-1 level and above, procurement staff, staff who exercise financial authority or investment of organizational funds and, in some instances, ethics officers. From the procurement perspective, the Inspectors are of the opinion that inclusion of only procurement staff lacks the necessary coverage.

170. A distinction should be made between "staff in procurement" and "staff engaged in procurement", the latter covering also requisitioners, who may be tasked with drawing up specifications and conducting evaluations, sensitive phases which inherently carry critical risks in terms of possible irregularities. Therefore **organizations should review the scope of the financial disclosure policies to ensure that they apply to all staff involved in procurement (requisitioner units, consultants, procurement committees, etc).** UNICEF and UNHCR have a comprehensive definition of "officials engaged in procurement"[42] which other organizations may consider adopting.

171. The present review found that financial disclosures were made on an annual basis and were usually filed with the organization's ethics office (United Nations, UNDP, UNFPA, UNICEF and WFP). In 2010, the United Nations had over 4,100 financial disclosure statements to process. The Inspectors are of the opinion that the organizations should continue to require staff to fill in financial disclosure forms in sealed envelopes and, as recommended by the JIU report on ethics,[43] randomly verify a sample of declarations.

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[42] The UNICEF definition of "officials engaged in procurement" covers "personal, significant and substantive involvement in any of the following activities: (a) drafting, reviewing or approving specifications or statements of work; (b) preparing or developing solicitations; (c) identifying potential contractors or vendors; (d) managing the contractor or vendor database or the registration of new contractors or vendors; (e) evaluating bids or proposals or selecting a source; (f) negotiating price of terms and conditions of the contract; (g) reviewing and approving the award of the contract; (h) signing the contract; (i) certifying, approving and making payments under the contract; (j) managing the contract; (k) reviewing contractor or vendor performance; (l) handling contractor's or vendor's protests or disputes; (m) auditing the procurement process."

[43] JIU/REP/2010/3, p. 18, recommendation 13.

Gifts, favours and hospitality

172. Staff involved in procurement necessarily interact with potential suppliers and vendors, which exposes them to situations where they may be offered gifts, favours and hospitality. The acceptance of even nominal value gifts, favours and hospitality may lead to a perception of conflict of interest or bias in favour of a particular vendor. Current practice in United Nations system organizations ranges from no stated policy (UNWTO and WMO), to allowing the acceptance of gifts of a nominal value (UNRWA, WFP, WHO, UNESCO, ITU, IAEA, ILO, UNFPA and UPU), or zero tolerance for any gift or hospitality (FAO, IMO, United Nations, UNICEF, UNDP, UNIDO, UNOPS, UNHCR and WIPO).

173. One problem with a policy of accepting gifts of only nominal value is that it does not take into account the cumulative amount overtime. Furthermore, the definition of ―nominal" varies. For instance, UNHCR sets the bar at US$ 20; IAEA at €50; and UPU at SwF 300, the highest in the United Nations system. Despite differences in amounts, the definitions of nominal gifts are similar across the organizations. These are usually specified as company calendars, key chains, pens and business diaries. In terms of value, nominal gifts may be insignificant, but when seen in offices by other persons they may lead to a perception of bias or favouritism. Staff engaged in procurements should therefore exercise caution in accepting and displaying such gifts.

174. A zero tolerance policy prohibiting the acceptance of any gifts, favours and hospitality, including drinks and meals may, in certain cases, prove impractical. The World Bank has come up with a good solution to this.

World Bank practice

> The World Bank does not allow the acceptance of gifts and hospitality. In cases where a staff member is unable to refuse offers of hospitality, he or she should attempt to reciprocate the hospitality. Any staff member who has received a gift is required to fill out a declaration form. The procurement unit is responsible for managing the gifts received. Upon external evaluation of the gift, the staff member is given the option of either buying the gift at the evaluated price or donating it to a charitable foundation.

Post-employment restrictions

175. Only a few organizations have put in place clear policy instructions on post-employment restrictions of staff involved in the procurement process. The United Nations, UNDP and UNOPS have issued administrative instructions for staff involved in procurement, requiring them not to accept employment from any vendor who conducts or seeks to conduct business with the organization. IAEA officials stated that they have a policy of generally not doing business with suppliers that are represented in a marketing or sales capacity by former IAEA staff members. The World Bank practices a ―cooling-off period" of three years during which former staff are prohibited from seeking employment with certain entities or exercising certain activities without prior authorization.

176. **In addition to internal staff, employment restrictions should also apply to suppliers.** Article 22 of the United Nations Supplier Code of Conduct includes post-employment restrictions for both staff and suppliers:

> Post-employment restrictions apply to UN former staff members and to staff in service who participated in the procurement process, as well as to UN suppliers. For a period of one year following separation from service, former staff members are prohibited from seeking or accepting employment, from a UN supplier. Staff members in service must also refrain from accepting any future employment from a UN supplier, with whom they have been involved. In case of violations of these provisions, UN suppliers may be subject to having their registration as a qualified supplier with the United Nations barred, suspended or terminated.

177. Post-employment restrictions are important not only because they prevent possible abuses but also because they prevent misperception by the public. **Organizations that have not yet adopted a policy on post-employment restrictions for procurement staff and suppliers should do so without delay.**

Vendor/supplier code of conduct

178. It is essential that the organizations communicate their expectations to potential suppliers. The United Nations, WIPO, UNOPS, UNRWA, WHO, UNHCR, FAO, and UNDP have included the United Nations Supplier Code of Conduct in their procurement toolbox, and it is available in the six official languages on their public procurement websites. It includes many topics, such as forced labour, child labour, discrimination, working hours, anti-personnel mines, human rights, harassment, health and safety, the Global Compact and environmental protection. It sets general standards to create awareness and encourages suppliers to adhere to them.

179. The Code is not a legally binding document, but it gives a signal to suppliers that specific policies to enforce such standards are going to be introduced. The ILO informed the Inspectors that they have drafted a supplier code of conduct (pending internal clearance) that goes into further detail on the labour clauses. **The Inspectors recommend that United Nations organizations, through the HLCM Procurement Network, should agree on a common supplier code of conduct and apply it consistently.** Conveying expectations through a publicly available supplier code of conduct is a good practice. However, **the organizations should also incorporate corresponding policies in their GCCs so as to enforce compliance.**

Whistleblower policy

180. The aim of this policy is to protect staff from retaliation for reporting misconduct. The United Nations, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNOPS, UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, ILO and UNIDO have such a policy, whereas FAO, ICAO, UNESCO, UNWTO, WHO, WIPO and WMO do not.[44] Besides encouraging staff members to report misconduct, an effective policy should also make such reporting compulsory.

Conclusion

181. The review found that United Nations organizations in general have made great progress in developing and implementing ethics policies in procurement activities. However, there are some differences in the coverage, definition and method of implementation. Some practices can be considered relatively better than others. Certain organizations have adopted ethics policies directly related to procurement, the scope of which covers the responsibilities of staff engaged in procurement actions, suppliers and vendors. Their wide scope should be seen as acknowledgement that misconduct can occur at any stage in the procurement process, including outside the procurement units.

182. **The Inspectors recommend that organizations review their practices in the light of the experience of other United Nations system organizations and try to adopt best practices, particularly in the area of financial disclosure, conflict of interest and post-employment restrictions. The Inspectors also suggest that organizations, through the HLCM Procurement Network, should strive to harmonize their practices towards a single set of ethics policies applied across the system.**

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[44] JIU/REP/2010/3, para. 68.

183. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance transparency and accountability in procurement activities.

Recommendation 11
Executive heads should review their ethics policies and practices on procurement with a view to aligning them with best practices.

B. Vendor issues

Vendor registration/management

184. UNGM is envisaged as the main procurement portal of United Nations system organizations. It is used for vendor registration, tender notices and knowledge sharing. Currently, 19 system organizations are members of UNGM. Some organizations are not yet members due to cost implications. Member organizations utilize UNGM to varying degrees.

185. The major obstacles faced by UNGM, including registration and language barriers, were reviewed under chapter IV (section C) above. UNGM officials explained that regarding language, the problem was not only the translation of the website itself, but the translation of the coding system, which includes more than twenty thousand codes. Another problem is that the local roster functionality of UNGM has not yet been fully implemented; therefore many organizations still maintain their own local rosters.

186. Another important issue is the lack of integration between the information systems of UNGM and those of member organizations. UNGM officials stated that in order to facilitate better communication they aim to develop interfaces between the information systems of UNGM and member organizations. Another envisaged function is for UNGM to be used as a knowledge centre for the United Nations system. Its website includes information on sustainable procurement, tender notices, contract awards and LTAs. It is a good idea to develop UNGM as a system-wide knowledge centre.

187. The organizations should put in place a mechanism to identify and share best practices across the system. Contracts and tender documents should be deposited and shared through a common Intranet platform managed by UNGM. The Inspectors were informed that the HLCM Procurement Network has asked its members for feedback on the functionality and utility of UNGM, and results are to be presented to the Procurement Network before a decision is taken on improvements to be made. The Inspectors found that efforts for improvement have been slow, and suggest that organizations exert a more concerted effort by providing the resources necessary to speed up the process.

Vendor eligibility/sanctions/blacklisting/debarment

188. Vendor eligibility is based on the idea that organizations can accept only vendors who respect a set standard or code of conduct. Those who violate policies, standards or codes are to be disqualified either for life or until they demonstrate that they have changed their practices. Also known as blacklisting, vendor eligibility is an anti-corruption tool already being used in some countries and recommended by international/regional institutions such as the European Union and the World Bank.

World Bank practice

> The World Bank publishes a list of debarred firms on its website. The listed firms/individuals are ineligible for a World Bank-financed contract for the period indicated on the grounds that they have violated the fraud and corruption provisions of the Procurement Guidelines or Consultants Guidelines. The sanction is imposed following an administrative process that allows the accused firms/individuals to respond to the allegations made against them. In the case of a debarred firm, ineligibility extends to any firm that, or individual who, directly or indirectly controls the debarred firm or any firm that the debarred firm directly or indirectly controls. In the case of a debarred individual, ineligibility extends to any firm which the debarred individual directly or indirectly controls.

United Nations practice

189. The United Nations is the only organization within the United Nations system to have compiled a list of debarred vendors, which it makes available on its extranet. In order to facilitate this process, the Secretariat has established the Senior Vendor Review Committee. The Committee renders independent advice to the Under-Secretary-General for the Department of Management regarding vendors under investigation, accused, convicted or involved in litigation concerning fraudulent, corrupt or unethical practices. The Committee may recommend that certain vendors be debarred, either permanently or for a specific period of time, or that no action be taken at all. Vendors are informed of the decision and given an opportunity to appeal. Officials stated that handling these issues is a complex matter that requires adequate capacity.

190. Other organizations do not have any debarment list and most do not use the list of the United Nations because of the lack of a clear policy on the issue. Officials also explained that the United Nations list did not specify the reasons for debarring given vendors, which made it difficult for them to apply the sanction. One official related that when the United Nations Procurement Division was asked to explain the reasons for blacklisting a certain vendor, it replied that the information could not be divulged on the grounds of confidentiality. However, it informed the Inspectors that additional information such as the reasons for debarment can be provided to other organizations upon formal request. **The Inspectors believe that blacklisting, and the accompanying information on sanctioning, should be shared among the organizations.**

191. The Security Council currently maintains a consolidated list of individuals and entities subject to sanctions.[45] During interviews, only five organizations (the United Nations, UNDP, ILO, UNHCR and UNOPS) stated that they consulted and complied with the Security Council list in their procurement activities. This is a matter of serious concern. **Organizations should ensure that there is a procedure to comply with the Security Council sanction list as a matter of urgency.**

192. The Inspectors were concerned to find that many organizations refrained from compiling blacklists or vendor debarment lists, or applying the lists of other organizations. Instead they prefer to exclude problematic vendors informally. Many officials interviewed explained that this was due to advice from their legal office. In the absence of a binding vendor-sanctioning policy, the legal offices consider legal risks and advise against establishing vendor debarment lists.

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[45] The List established and maintained by the Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) with respect to individuals, groups, undertakings and other entities associated with Al-Qaida (referred to as the 1267 List).

193. The Inspectors were informed that an HLCM Procurement Network working group has already developed a model policy framework for vendor eligibility, which was recently reviewed and agreed upon by the HLCM Legal Network and endorsed by the Procurement Network in March 2011. The policy needs to be adopted and consistently implemented by organizations across the system. The plan is for the debarment list to be uploaded onto the UNGM website so that it can be shared by all the organizations and complied with. The Inspectors recommend that executive heads should adopt, as a matter of priority, a vendor eligibility/debarment policy for their organizations. UNDP informed the Inspectors that its vendor sanction policy is scheduled to be released in the fourth quarter of 2011.

194. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance transparency and accountability in procurement activities.

Recommendation 12
Executive heads should adopt a vendor sanction policy as a matter of priority so as to enhance transparency and accountability in procurement activities.

Procurement challenge/bid protest mechanism

195. In the United Nations system, the United Nations, UNDP, UNOPS, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO and UNRWA have put in place formal procurement challenge mechanisms, and the first four publish on their websites related information for vendors. The complaint mechanisms are similar in that, upon notification of a contract award, the unsuccessful vendors have the opportunity to lodge a complaint. Other United Nations organizations lack a formal mechanism that allows a vendor to challenge their procurement decisions. In the absence of such a mechanism, vendors may resort to a range of informal routes, including complaining to the chief of procurement or the head of the organization, or mobilizing the representatives of their Member State. The Inspectors disapprove of this practice and recommend that the organizations put in place a formal bid protest mechanism that is just, fair and transparent. In the absence of such a formal mechanism, the organizations are exposed to the risk of being perceived as partial, and of handling complaints depending on who the complainant was.

UNDP practice

196. UNDP established the Vendor Protest Review Committee, and the online vendor protest tracking system has been in use since 2010. The vendor protest procedure has been incorporated into the UNDP procurement manuals as well as all the tender documents. Under the system, vendors are allowed up to 10 working days following the date of the purchase order or contract award to submit a complaint/protest. The first contact is the project manager or procurement focal point. If the matter cannot be resolved at that level, the intervention of the resident representative or resident coordinator can be solicited. If the dispute still remains unresolved, the vendor may appeal to the Director of the Procurement Support Office in New York for a final decision.

United Nations practice—convening an independent board

197. The United Nations has recently established, on a pilot basis, the independent Award Review Board (ARB) in order to offer unsuccessful bidders the opportunity to challenge a contract award. The ARB consists of a single individual or a panel of three procurement experts, supported by a secretariat. The ARB renders independent advice to the Under-Secretary-General for the Department of Management, who takes the final administrative decision on the matter. The mechanism is unique in that it has a special board with external membership. This ensures objectivity and independence, though at a

financial cost. Large organizations with substantial amounts of procurement can benefit from this system, but for small ones it may not be cost-effective. The pilot, which began in 2009, was extended in November 2010 for another year. The Inspectors were informed that it is expected that the Secretariat will present an assessment and findings to the General Assembly at its sixty-seventh session.

United Nations pilot procurement challenge mechanism

Steps in the pilot procurement challenge mechanism of the United Nations

Letters of regret to unsuccessful vendors are issued within 10 business days of the issuance of an award.

Unsuccessful vendors must request a debriefing in writing within 10 business days from the date of their letter of regret.

An invitation letter for debriefing is sent to vendors within 10 business days from the date of receipt of the request for a debriefing.

Vendors who have been formally debriefed and remain unsatisfied can file a procurement challenge with the ARB within 10 business days of the debrief meeting.

The ARB reviews the complaint and reports its advice to the Under-Secretary-General for a final decision.

European Commission practice

198. In the European Commission, vendors may complain to the relevant department within the Commission. If they are dissatisfied with the debriefing, they can submit their complaint to the Ombudsman and ultimately to the Court of Justice of the European Commission.

Conclusion

199. In conclusion, the Inspectors believe that United Nations system organizations should have clear policies and guidelines on modalities for filing and processing complaints against procurement decisions. This should not be an ad hoc issue, with one vendor choosing to complain to the procurement staff and another to take it up with the representative of its Member State, which in turn complains to the executive head. To ensure that all vendors receive the same treatment, the organizations should develop a formal mechanism to review complaints and make them public on their websites. The Inspectors recognize that for smaller organizations with lower procurement volumes the mechanism need not be a sophisticated system with independent bodies, but at a minimum a formal process should be established. The complexity of the mechanism should depend on the volume and importance of procurement in each organization.

200. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance transparency and accountability in procurement activities.

Recommendation 13
Executive heads should develop a formal mechanism to review vendor complaints in order to enhance objectivity, fairness, transparency and consistency in the procurement process.

VI. MONITORING, REPORTING, EVALUATION AND KNOWLEDGE SHARING

A. Monitoring, reporting and evaluation

Monitoring and reporting

201. Procurement activities require proper monitoring, performance evaluation and reporting. Lack of monitoring and evaluation weakens the effectiveness of internal control and encourages irregularities. Effective monitoring is key to reducing waste and improving effectiveness. Monitoring, through collection and analysis of information, allows for proactive management of the procurement process.

202. Many organizations lack effective monitoring, evaluation and reporting mechanisms for procurement activities. Existing reporting concerns mainly general procurement data such as procurement volume and main procurement items. The lack of relevant, reliable and timely information compromises analysis and monitoring, thus weakening internal controls and increasing the likelihood of efficiency loss, fraud and mismanagement. Organizations that have decentralized procurement to the field are more exposed to these risks.

203. IMO, ITU, WHO, ILO and WIPO do not have a system of reporting on procurement activities to senior management or their governing bodies. UPU, UNOPS, the United Nations, FAO, UNWTO, UNIDO, UNRWA and UNICEF report to senior management or internal auditors. United Nations officials informed the Inspectors that they generate 23 automated reports covering a wide range of issues. These reports are sent to various recipients on a daily, weekly, monthly and exception basis. Summary versions of these reports are also sent to the Section Chiefs, as well as to the Director of the Procurement Division and requisitioner units. The UNESCO procurement division produces reports on its activities only upon request from senior management. Only the United Nations, WFP and UNDP report regularly to their governing bodies on procurement activities.

JIU questions

204. The JIU questionnaire sent in the context of the present review included two proxy questions to test the monitoring and information gathering capabilities of the organizations. The questions were:

- Please provide statistics on competitive and non-competitive procurement carried out by your organization in the last five years.
- What is the average length of the procurement process, from the publication of the Request for Proposals (RFP), Request for Quotes (RFQ) and Invitation to Bid (ITB), to the contract award?

205. In response to the first question, WFP, UNESCO, UNRWA, ICAO, UNWTO, UNIDO, WHO, ITU and UNHCR responded that they were unable to provide this information either due to a lack of a centrally managed information system, or because the data was captured only by local/regional offices and was not aggregated at the headquarters level. ILO was able to provide statistics on procurements at headquarters only. UNDP and UNOPS were able to provide statistics on procurement at headquarters and procurements reviewed by their Headquarters Committee on Contracts.

Non-competitive procurements

206. Non-competitive procurement carries a high risk in terms of fraud and mismanagement. Monitoring should also include the capture of cumulative awards to vendors, which would help management to identify cases where large procurements had been broken down into smaller units/pieces in order to avoid having to be reviewed by the committee on contracts. A recent Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) audit found that there had been splits in contracts in order to reduce the monetary value of the contracts and avoid review by the Headquarters Committee on Contracts. The

report noted that, in general, local committees on contracts were not sufficiently monitored by the central procurement units at headquarters.[46]

European Commission practice

207. The Inspectors would like to highlight a good practice regarding waiver of competition followed by the European Commission. The Commission publishes in its annual reports a list of procurements for which the competitive bidding requirements were waived with the names of the suppliers who were awarded contracts and the justifications for the waivers. Officials explained that the practice promoted transparency and discouraged the requisitioner units from resorting to unjustified waiver requests.

208. **The Inspectors recommend that United Nations organizations emulate this practice. The organizations should provide detailed information in their internal reports, including the list of waivers and justifications. Reports to governing bodies should contain summarized information on waivers, such as waiver trends, a list of waivers for amounts above a given threshold, types of goods and services usually granted waivers, and the geographic locations where waivers are generally granted, with the accompanying justifications.**

Average length of procurement process

209. The organizations responded to the second question either by stating that the information was not collected systematically, or by providing ranges based on personal estimates rather than actual data. The Inspectors recognize that the average length of the procurement process is not a perfect performance indicator. However, the ability to identify and monitor the time taken for the various steps in the process, to identify potential bottlenecks and steps taking longer than expected, is essential in devising effective strategies to improve the whole process. Based on the monitoring and analysis of the processes, organizations can establish a target time frame for each step for different groups of procurements.

Obstacles

210. Organizations face three types of obstacles in conducting a thorough monitoring and evaluation of procurement activities. The first is an implicit assumption that oversight, monitoring and evaluation are the purview of the audit body. It should be clear that while oversight bodies should exercise the oversight function, the responsibility for internal control and monitoring mechanisms rests with management. Monitoring should take place as an ongoing process and as a part of normal managerial and supervisory activities. The second and third obstacles are a shortage of human resources capacity and an insufficient data collection capability. Officials interviewed explained that the absence of integrated information systems adversely affected the organizations' ability to oversee procurement operations, especially in the field. The absence of a consistent and reliable data flow hampers analysis and effective decision-making.

211. The issue of the shortage of human resources and information systems is reviewed in detail in the governance section of the present note. There is a need for organizations to assess their human resources and information system needs, and mobilize resources to that end. The purchase of off-the-shelf modern information systems does not automatically solve the monitoring problem. The Inspectors found that monitoring and reporting practices are not adequate even in organizations that introduced ERP systems relatively early. The procurement units must identify the monitoring and reporting requirements for procurement activities and mobilize senior management to ensure that these requirements are taken into account in the design and implementation of ERP systems.

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[46] OIOS Audit of procurement management in the Secretariat, AH2008/513/01.

Performance evaluation

212. Performance measurement and evaluation are crucial to any core activity of the organizations. When performance of a function/activity is not measured, it cannot be managed effectively. The procurement units should be able to measure their performance in areas such as the efficiency of operations, customer satisfaction, benchmarking against other organizations, cost-effectiveness, and the contribution procurement makes to achieving the objectives of the organization. Furthermore, without key performance indicators it is difficult to create an environment where performance can be objectively evaluated and improved.

213. The review found that most of the organizations have not established performance indicators for procurement. A culture of achieving measurable results in terms of reduced costs, efficiency, or transaction costs is yet to be developed. The OIOS audit of procurement management in the United Nations Secretariat found that the Secretariat had failed to adopt key performance indicators.[47] The OIOS audit of the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo found that vendor payments had been delayed by up to 700 days.[48] The lack of effective coordination among key players in the payment process, and the failure of senior management to monitor delays were among the reasons cited. The audit noted that such delays might tarnish the image of the United Nations, and that the high cost of doing business with the United Nations risked being factored in by vendors and result in increased costs for the Organization.

214. The United Nations Procurement Division, however, informed the Inspectors that a recent study it had commissioned had come up with 23 key performance indicators and that it was considering ways to implement these indicators. UNICEF notified the Inspectors that it has performance indicators, and that it considers the most relevant to be the indicator on the timeliness of delivery, which is published every month on its Intranet.

215. Officials interviewed stated that it was difficult to establish performance indicators that truly reflect the efficiency and effectiveness of procurement processes. The Inspectors note that there are many ways to measure procurement performance, including benchmarking, establishing indicators relating to the processes, periodic satisfaction surveys, the monitoring of overhead costs and quality management tools. Organizations need to identify what works best in measuring the current performance of their procurement functions, and establish a baseline from which to measure progress.

UNDP practice

216. UNDP informed the Inspectors that it has developed a procurement dashboard listing the various procurement performance indicators and risks associated with procurement, so that both management and procurement practitioners can analyse procurement performance. The data produced from the dashboard has also been used for the approval process of the delegated procurement authority of each country office. UNDP is working to enhance the dashboard to provide not only key oversight, and transactional and procurement capacity information, but also information on supplier performance metrics, sourcing cycle times, and procurement of goods and services by country office, region, etc.

Conclusion

217. The Inspectors found that effective oversight over procurement is the missing element in managing procurement activities in the United Nations system. The organizations, in general, do not have adequate monitoring, performance evaluation and reporting mechanisms and tools to properly manage

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[47] Report of the OIOS on the audit of procurement management in the Secretariat (A/64/369), para. 17.

[48] OIOS, audit report on procurement management in MONUC, Assignment No. AP2009/620/13 (2010), para. 24.

their procurement activities. This reduces efficiency and increases the likelihood of procurement mismanagement, fraud and abuse going undetected. The Inspectors cannot stress enough the importance of day-to-day monitoring and capturing of relevant data to ensure proper management and monitoring of the procurement function.

218. Internal reporting to senior management should be done frequently and capture all essential information, to facilitate analysis and decision-making. It would serve to alert management to procurement activities that call for additional analysis and monitoring. Procurement should be a regular item on the meeting agenda of senior management committees. Furthermore, the executive heads of the organizations should report to their governing bodies on their procurement activities so as to facilitate these bodies' proper oversight. While internal reports should be detailed, frequent and analytical in nature, external ones can be submitted annually and should contain information such as procurement by category and location, contractual arrangements, non-competitive bids and accompanying justifications, main risk areas and related mitigation measures, procurement capacity, efficiency gains, inter-agency collaboration, reform agenda and achievements.

219. The implementation of the following recommendations is expected to lead to enhanced controls and compliance in procurement activities.

Recommendation 14
Executive heads should ensure that their organizations have in place proper procurement monitoring and performance-evaluation mechanisms.

Recommendation 15
Executive heads should ensure that there is regular internal (to senior management) and external (to governing bodies) reporting with respect to procurement activities.

B. Knowledge sharing

220. Knowledge sharing is important to consistently achieve best value for money throughout the procurement process. It is often argued that one of the best ways to improve the procurement function is to increase procurement knowledge, expertise and professionalism, and effective knowledge sharing practices can contribute substantially to this.

221. Many of the organizations have made efforts to decentralize and increase the delegation of authority for procurement activities. The result is that their procurement activities are spread across the globe. This situation makes knowledge sharing even more important, to ensure correct and consistent implementation across the organization. Many officials stated during the interviews that they uploaded the procurement policy and instructions, including templates, onto their information system. This is a good practice, provided that all staff in all locations can access the information systems and that information is updated continuously. It should be pointed out, however, that most staff do not have equal or sufficient experience in many aspects of the procurement process. Organizations should therefore encourage and support staff to share experience by establishing mechanisms to identify and disseminate lessons learned and best practices.

222. The United Nations Procurement Division has developed and implemented the Procurement Network Community of Practice. This website is available anywhere in the world via the United Nations Intranet or the global Internet. It is aimed at sharing documents, including policy, procedures, guidelines,

templates and best practices, and acts as a means and repository for communications. UNICEF has established a comprehensive knowledge management strategy, which includes the extensive use of an interactive Intranet (supply community) where news and updates are posted, including online discussions on a range of supply and logistics issues. UNDP has an internal knowledge-sharing network, and informed the Inspectors that its officials have been working to produce more effective communication tools to attain the effective dissemination of lessons learned, best procurement practices and policy guidance.

223. **The adoption of such knowledge-sharing practices would improve the quality of procurement documents, enhance consistent and accurate implementation across the organizational units and, most importantly, facilitate the achievement of best value for money for all procurement activities.** When monitoring implementation, the procurement units can also facilitate the identification of lessons learned and best practices by creating, for example, a database containing good examples of requests for proposals and terms of reference, and information on evaluation methods used to achieve best value for money for complex goods and services. Furthermore, an online communication and discussion platform dedicated to procurement issues would be an invaluable instrument in improving common knowledge and sharing lessons learned and best practices across the organization.

224. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to lead to better dissemination of lessons learned and best practices.

Recommendation 16
Executive heads should ensure the development and implementation of knowledge mechanisms to identify, share and disseminate lessons learned and best practices in procurement activities across their organizations.

VII. INTER-AGENCY HARMONIZATION, COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION

Harmonization

225. In 2009, the Guidelines for Harmonized UN Procurement at the Country Level were prepared by the United Nations Development Group, supported by the United Nations Development Operations Coordination Office Task Team on Common Services and Procurement, and in cooperation with the HLCM Procurement Network. In 2010, the Development Operations Coordination Office prepared a booklet[49] in which it discusses, inter alia, two examples of common procurement experiences in the field. The first refers to a common procurement plan that has been introduced in Tanzania for joint programmes, and which is expected to lower procurement costs. In the second experience, from Mozambique, harmonized procurement procedures and LTAs are expected to cut procurement costs by up to 89 per cent.[50]

226. The HLCM Finance and Budget Network has been working on the harmonization of financial regulations and rules across the United Nations system. The Inspectors were also informed that the HLCM Legal Advisers Network had been working on the harmonization of GCCs, and that an HLCM Procurement Network working group on harmonization had been established to work exclusively on United Nations procurement reform as it related to simplifying and harmonizing procurement procedures across the system. The working group is expected to develop toolkits for harmonized procurement at the country level and create a common framework for harmonizing processes. The group is expected to deliver its results in 2012. The full implementation of International Public Sector Accounting Standards is also expected to facilitate further harmonization of practices.

227. The Inspectors recognize that efforts are being made to harmonize rules and procedures. However, progress is slow. The organizations need to unify their efforts and focus on the issues at stake and establish clear deadlines. Some officials interviewed stated that it was not the lack of fully harmonized regulations and rules that impeded greater collaboration, but rather the mindset of organizations that preferred to work individually on procurement. The Inspectors also believe that lack of harmonization should not block further collaborative procurement efforts. However, the Inspectors also recognize that the harmonization of procurement procedures would greatly facilitate collaboration and cooperation in the system, and therefore recommend that the HLCM Procurement Network should speed up the system-wide harmonization of procurement procedures.

Collaboration

228. The top 20 major goods and services procured by the organizations in 2009 are listed in annex III of the present note.[51] The top 4 items made up 45 per cent of the total procurement volume in the system, the top 10 items made up 65 per cent and the top 20 items made up 78 per cent. This shows that the bulk of the procurement volume consists of a limited number of items, and gives a sense that collaboration among organizations is possible and would certainly lead to significant savings.

229. A quick review of the major procurement items shows that it should be possible to have closer collaboration in the procurement of pharmaceuticals, motor vehicles, textiles, petroleum and fuel products, computer and information technology equipment, furniture, and telecommunication equipment. Interviews reflected that collaboration is not sufficient in many of these areas. However, there is good collaboration in pharmaceuticals with joint procurements. In many other items, although large

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[49] "How delivering as one adds value – stories and testimonies from eight programme pilot countries".
[50] Ibid., pp. 26-27.
[51] Extracted from UNOPS, *2009 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement*, pp. 111-122.

organizations have LTAs and allow other organizations to piggyback on them, they are not based on inter-agency collaborative efforts and common strategies. Organizations, instead of choosing to establish individual LTAs, should develop LTAs based on inter-agency collaboration and common commodity strategies.

230. Given the fact that the organizations are working towards broader common goals worldwide, cooperation and collaboration, where possible, is a must. Cooperation and collaboration in procurement takes several forms in the system: (a) joint procurement of commonly used items in headquarters (common services); (b) piggybacking on LTAs/system contracts of other organizations; and (c) joint procurement of some major goods by several organizations.[52]

Common procurement services at headquarters

231. The review found that organizations headquartered in Geneva, Rome and Vienna collaborated closely in the procurement of commonly used goods and services such as travel, office supplies, cleaning, energy and catering. Other items/services commonly include warehouse and shipping insurance, transportation contracts and vehicles.[53] In his report to the Economic and Social Council, the Secretary-General noted that the Geneva offices reported approximately SwF 37 million in cost avoidance attributable to the collaborative procurement of services in 2010.[54]

Practice of the Rome-based organizations

232. A common procurement approach recently adopted by three Rome-based agencies—WFP, FAO and the International Fund for Agricultural Development—stands out as a best practice in terms of planning, clear objectives, saving targets and key performance indicators.

233. These organizations started a common pilot procurement practice early in 2010. They established the Common Procurement Team (CPT), comprising dedicated procurement staff from the organizations and tasked with working on the following objectives: (a) improvement of procurement planning, (b) harmonization opportunities, (c) alignment of contract expiry dates for future tenders, and (d) joint bidding activities. The CPT occupies one common office in FAO. Procurement for headquarters items has been planned and carried out together following the FAO procurement rules. The CPT has identified key performance indicators to measure progress in terms of efficiency, effectiveness, quality and sustainability. Team members set the goal of becoming a centre of excellence in procurement practices for the three agencies in Rome, taking the best from the experience of each.

234. The CPT has defined an annual plan of joint tenders, which is constantly updated as new opportunities and requirements emerge. A plan is prepared for each joint tender and the divisions concerned are requested to agree on milestones, the procurement method, evaluation strategy, contract alignment and tender documentation. The joint bidding activities of the CPT include 19 common tenders[55] valued at some US$ 28 million in 2010, with a 3 per cent estimated saving on average. For instance, according to the CPT, compared to previous contracts, savings on desktop computers, laptops and stationery were 5, 10 and 8 per cent, respectively.

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[52] As indicated in the introduction section of the present note, procurement practices in the context of Delivering as One in the field is not included in this review.

[53] E/2011/88, para. 12.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Common tenders include a range of goods and services, such as re-mailing services, information and communications technology consultancy services, petrol cards, mobile services, multi services (cleaning, waste disposal, etc.), office stationery and furniture, computers, software, training, gas, electricity, vehicles, actuarial valuation, etc.

Issues

235. Although the Rome-based organizations identify common needs and publish a single tender for specific goods or services, each organization is required by its own financial regulations and rules to revert back to its Committee on Contracts for final approval of the contract award. In the case of FAO, its procurement manual exempts from Procurement Committee review procurement actions awarded on the basis of the rules and procedures of another United Nations entity.

236. Another issue is that common contracts are umbrella contracts that require each organization to sign separate contracts with vendors based on its specific volume and conditions. This can reduce negotiation power and the total efficiency of the process due to ambiguity in full volume leverage and increasing individual transactions. There are many reasons for this, such as a lack of standardization of products, separate general conditions of contracts and difficulty in estimating volumes due to lack of planning.

237. Unfortunately, analytical data for common service procurements was unavailable. However, interviews revealed that there was room for achieving further efficiency in common service procurements through broader coverage, improved standardization of products and harmonized conditions of contracts. In order to measure progress, common services teams should collect and publish data regarding the use and performance of common contracts.

Piggybacking on LTAs

238. Organizations with large procurement volumes frequently utilize LTAs/system contracts for some commonly used items, such as computers and vehicles, and make these LTAs available for other organizations to piggyback on instead of going through a separate tendering process. Smaller organizations in particular can benefit from the expertise and negotiating power of large organizations to make savings by using their LTAs. According to the list posted on UNGM, only seven organizations currently have LTAs, and the total number of LTAs with an expiry date beyond 1 June 2011 is 91. The use of LTAs both within an organization and by other organizations is voluntary. Unfortunately, no statistics are available on the actual use of LTAs in the system, i.e., total volume and lists of organizations that use each LTA.

239. In most cases, LTAs are prepared based only on the estimated need of the organization taking the lead in establishing the LTA. Therefore, although other organizations piggybacking on LTAs benefit from reduced transaction costs, total volume leverage is not utilized properly. There is room for organizations to improve collaboration in the preparation of LTAs, as regards, inter alia, standardization of products, aggregation of demands, and analysis of risks. The organizations with larger procurement volumes should use their position to this effect, in order to foster greater collaboration and cooperation in the system.

240. The organizations should therefore establish joint LTAs or communicate and aggregate their needs during the preparation of the LTAs of the leading agency, in order to increase volume leverage to reduce prices further. Due to the lack of a systematic collaborative approach in the preparation of LTAs, there may be lost opportunities for further savings and better technical support. In other words, the total buying power of the organizations is not leveraged effectively to realize the maximum benefit.

241. Currently, common commodity strategies are lacking in the system. This situation prevents the use of full potential in the system to establish effective common or joint LTAs system wide or on a multi-agency basis. **Organizations should move towards establishing common commodity strategies for major procurement items in the system. This would not only facilitate the leveraging of total buying power, but would also enable organizations to benefit from better logistics, quality, warranty, technical support and other maintenance opportunities.**

Joint procurements

242. **Joint procurement of common goods and services is perhaps the most promising method of collaboration in the system to improve efficiency and effectiveness because it facilitates the development of a consolidated commodity strategy and full use of volume leverage. It also provides an opportunity to align procurement objectives with the broader objectives of the organizations.**

243. UNICEF, UNFPA, WHO and UNHCR make joint procurements of health products such as pharmaceuticals and vaccines. UNICEF officials stated that most of the health products of UNICEF were purchased jointly with other United Nations agencies (out of US$ 1.7 billion spent on goods, US$ 1.4 billion was spent on items purchased jointly with other organizations in 2009). Some examples of cooperation include warehousing and emergency training with WFP; joint procurement with UNHCR of hygiene kits, camp water supply and shelter equipment; health-product procurement with WHO; and the procurement of safe delivery kits with UNFPA.

244. UNDP used the services of UNFPA and UNICEF in the procurement of certain products, and UNICEF has also led a joint tender of international freight in Copenhagen. It was agreed that the organization procuring the largest volume of a specific product would lead the joint procurement of that product.

245. There is a growing realization that collaboration fosters more efficient procurement. Collaboration between organizations that have similar programmatic activities is now developing. However, there is a need for a more systematic and analytical approach in the identification of more procurement items and in the preparation of contracts. The 14 billion dollars spent annually on procurement across the system makes the United Nations system an important international client, and therefore calls for greater collaboration in procurements.

Vehicle procurements

246. The procurement of motor vehicles is one of the areas where organizations can easily achieve savings through consolidated strategy and planning. This will create an economy of scale, establishing the organizations as a single major customer with better buying power. The review found that the organizations did not have a common system-wide commodity strategy for the purchase of vehicles. The Inspectors were informed that the HLCM Procurement Network has recently established a group, which includes UNDP, the United Nations, UNOPS, UNIDO, UNHCR, UNRWA, FAO and UNICEF, to look into the issue of collaborative procurement of vehicles.

247. In 2009, US$ 478 million[56] was spent on vehicles and vehicle parts across the United Nations system. In this procurement, the United Nation's share was 35 per cent, while the UNOPS share was 21 per cent. The rest was procured by other organizations. Unfortunately, many organizations prefer to carry out the procurement of motor vehicles and related commodities on an individual basis, either by engaging in individual ad hoc tendering, establishing LTAs, or by piggybacking on existing LTAs. Thus, they miss the opportunity to act as one large customer by consolidating volume leverage to negotiate better prices, delivery and warranty terms.

248. Needs assessment and planning in the area of vehicle purchase is inadequate in the system. Purchases made at the last minute naturally drive prices higher. There are numerous LTAs and individual tenders for vehicle purchases, but no consolidated strategy to encourage competition and reduce prices. Due to this fragmented approach, the organizations end up paying different prices for the same vehicles.

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[56] UNOPS, *2009 Annual Statistical Report on United Nations Procurement*, p. 111.

Lack of standardization is a major issue, making it difficult to aggregate volume in order to negotiate better prices.

249. The review of vehicle purchases shows that organizations are not achieving optimum efficiency in the purchase of vehicles. Therefore **organizations should speed up their collaboration efforts to develop a consolidated common vehicle procurement strategy as a matter of urgency. Such a strategy should include the standardization of vehicle requirements and better planning and aggregation of demand.** The strategy should also devise ways of achieving effective competition through the diversification of the vendor base.

Conclusion

250. Although there are good examples of coordination and collaboration between organizations, the Inspectors are of the opinion that further efforts should be made to adopt a more systematic and comprehensive approach. In order to speed up cooperation and the implementation of collaborative procurement approaches in the system, organizations should improve their needs assessments, planning, analysis and strategy development. Having command of their procurement activities, the organizations should systematically look for more joint procurements and other collaborative procurement arrangements across the system, including the development of common procurement strategies.

251. The Inspectors are of the view that organizations **should try to develop common commodity strategies based on the joint assessment of needs, standardization of specifications and aggregation of demands in major goods and services.** Thus, instead of introducing many LTAs on the same procurement item across the system, it should be possible to establish common (multi-organization or system-wide) LTAs that can leverage the total buying power of the system. It is very important that the **use of LTAs that have been utilized by more than one organization in the system be regularly assessed by the HLCM Procurement Network, and relevant statistics published in annual statistical reports.**

252. **Greater use of collaborative methods will allow the organizations to reduce transaction costs, and profit from negotiated lower prices and better delivery and warranty conditions in the procurement of many goods and services. Such a collaborative approach should not be limited to procurement itself, but also include the whole supply chain** (e.g. warehousing, distribution and transportation). Any collaborative effort to increase efficiency can bring a significant level of savings to the system. For example, a 3 per cent saving out of US$ 14 billion of procurement would result in US$ 420 million in savings for the system.

253. The Inspectors believe that the HLCM Procurement Network can facilitate more collaboration through its meetings and studies. The Inspectors were informed recently that the Procurement Network launched a new initiative on common/collaborative procurement. It is envisaged that the Procurement Network secretariat will identify goods or services that members might wish to procure jointly, and that whenever the organizations agree to undertake common procurement, a lead agency will be chosen to conduct a tender on behalf of the other organizations. The Procurement Network secretariat will maintain the list of past, open and potential future products and services under collaborative procurement. The secretariat will present this as a summary at each meeting and, with the Management Board, facilitate Procurement Network decisions on future collaborative procurement initiatives.

254. To date, the following collaborative projects have been initiated within the Procurement Network: cargo insurance, vehicle and freight forwarding.[57] The Inspectors consider this initiative to be a good step in the right direction, and suggest that the Procurement Network also commission a study to identify further areas for system-wide or multi-organization collaborative procurements.

255. It is expected that the implementation of recommendation 17 will enhance the efficiency of procurement activities; and that recommendation 18 will enhance transparency.

Recommendation 17
CEB, through the HLCM Procurement Network, should proactively identify, initiate and maximize the development of collaborative procurements among the organizations with a view to leveraging the total buying power of the United Nations system. To this end, the Procurement Network should have a regular agenda item on discussing and identifying further opportunities.

Recommendation 18
CEB, through the HLCM Procurement Network, should regularly assess the use of collaborative procurement methods with a view to measuring progress, sharing good practices and improving contractual terms. To this end, the Procurement Network should collect and publish relevant statistics.

[57] CEB/2011/HLCM_PN/9, April 2011, para. 131.

Annex I

GENERAL PROCUREMENT PRINCIPLES IN THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM

Organization	**Source**	**General procurement principles**						
United Nations (UNHQ, UNOG, UNON)	United Nations Procurement Manual (Rev. 6), chapter 1	**Fairness, integrity and transparency**	**Effective competition**	**Interest of the organization**	**Best value for money**	Other principles	Other principles	Other principles
UNDP	Procurement Manual and response to JIU Questionnaire 2010	Fairness, integrity, transparency	Effective international competition	Interest of UNDP	Best value for money			
	UNDP Financial Regulations and Rules, rule 114.18		International soliciting of proposals and competitive bidding to allow prospective bidders fair and equal opportunities	Interests of the UNDP programme	Economy and efficiency	Preferential treatment to be accorded to sources of those supplies indigenous either to the country being assisted or to other developing countries	Equitable geographical distribution consistent with maximum effectiveness	Utilization of currencies available to UNDP and which require special management
UNICEF	UNICEF Supply Manual, chapter 7, section 8, article. 3.2.	Transparent, honest and fair	Competition (to ensure competitive tendering)	UNICEF objectives	Best value for money (website)	Equal treatment (ensure the same conditions for all suppliers)	Customer service to ensure customer satisfaction	
UNESCO	UNESCO Administrative Manual, chapter 10.2, para. 3	Fairness, integrity and transparency	Competition	Interests of UNESCO	Best value for money	Economy and effectiveness		
UNFPA	UNFPA Policies and Procedures Manual, Procurement Procedures, article A.3.1., and Questionnaire 2011	Promoting integrity and fairness; maintaining transparency in the procurement process	Encouraging competition	Interests of UNFPA (Administrative manual)	Maximizing economy and efficiency	Encouraging and including sources of supply that are either indigenous to the country being assisted or from other developing countries	Encouraging and including sources of supply from underutilized major donor countries	Supporting sustainable and environmental procurement

Organization	**Source**	**General procurement principles**						
UNHCR	IP Procurement Guidelines: For Implementing Partners of UNHCR funded Programmes, article 1	Fairness, integrity and transparency of the process	International procurement to capitalize on global competition. This applies in particular to goods and services covered by UNHCR frame agreements (Quick reference booklet, chapter 8, and Doing Business with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, revised 2007)	Mandate of UNHCR and the United Nations	Best value for money (~~D~~Doing business with UNHCR", revised 2007)	Non-discrimination and equal treatment of vendors	Confidentiality	Sustainable procurement
UNOPS	UNOPS Procurement Manual, revised 2010; From response to JIU questionnaire	Fairness, integrity and transparency	Competition on as wide a geographic basis as is practicable and suited to market circumstances -Effective competition per From response to JIU questionnaire	The interest of UNOPS and its clients	Best value for money			
FAO	MS 502 from response to JIU questionnaire 2010	Fairness, integrity, transparency	Competition		Best value for money	Economy and effectiveness		
IAEA	Response to JIU Questionnaire 2010	Fairness, integrity and transparency, through competition	Competition	To achieve the programmatic goals and objectives of IAEA	Best value for money			

Organization	Source	General procurement principles						
ICAO	Procurement Code, article 1	Accountability	National, regional or international competition	Best interest of ICAO and/or assisted States	Economy, efficiency			
	From response to JIU questionnaire 2010		Competitive tendering		Lowest cost, technically acceptable for goods and best value for money for services			
ILO	Financial Rules, (2010 edition), chapter X	Transparency and accountability in the procurement process	Fair and open competition giving all qualified suppliers an opportunity to participate	Interests of ILO	Best value for money			
IMO	Procurement Manual (May 2007)	The process is completely open and transparent		The Organization's interests are protected and safeguarded from litigation	The Organization secures value for money.			
ITU	Procurement manual, 2010 **(**draft**)**	Fairness, integrity and transparency	Effective competition	The interest of ITU and its clients	Best value for money			
	Service Order No. 13 as referred in response to JIU questionnaire 2010		Effective international competition					
UNRWA	Procurement Manual 2009 and response to JIU questionnaire 2010	Fairness, integrity and transparency	Effective competition	Interest of the Agency and the Palestine refugees	Best value for money			

Organization	Source	General procurement principles						
UNIDO	Procurement Manual, 2008 and response to JIU questionnaire 2010	Fairness, integrity and transparency	Effective competition	The best interest of UNIDO	Best value for money			
UPU	UPU Financial regulations, article 13	Integrity, transparency	Favourable competition	Obvious interest of the Union	Best value for money	Non-discrimination and equal treatment of suppliers Independence and impartiality of the organization Quality Sustainable development		
WFP	Response to JIU Questionnaire and Procurement Manual 2.2		Competition					
WIPO	OI 21/2006Rev para. 3 from response to JIU questionnaire 2010	Fairness, integrity, transparency	Effective and broad competition	The best interests of WIPO	Best value for money			
WHO	Response to JIU Questionnaire 2010	Fairness, integrity and transparency	Effective international competition	Interest of WHO	Best value for money	Environmental Concerns		
UNWTO	―We do not have adopted procurement principles" (response to JIU questionnaire 2010)							
WMO	WMO procurement webpage	Fairness, integrity and transparency	Open and international competition		Best value for money			

Organization	**Source**	**General procurement principles**						
European Community	*Financial Regulation and Implementing Rules Applicable to the General Budget of the European Communities*, Financial Regulation, article 89	Transparency The banning of technical specifications liable to discriminate against potential foreign bidders Application of objective criteria in tendering and award procedures	Community-wide advertising of contracts so that firms in all Member States have an opportunity to bid for them		Best value for money (art. 138, para. 1 (b) of the Implementing Rules, and art. 97, para. 2 of the Financial Regulation)	Transparency, proportionality, equal treatment and non-discrimination		
World Bank	World Bank Group Corporate Procurement Policy and Procedures Manual, article 1.1	Fairness, transparency	Open Competition	Interest of the Bank	Economy and efficiency		All eligible bidders from developed and developing countries are given the same information and equal opportunity to compete in providing goods, works, and non-consulting services financed by the Bank	
	Consulting Services Manual, chapter 3.1	Transparency	Competition among qualified consultants from all eligible countries		Economy and efficiency	High quality of services	Participation of national consultants	

Annex II

SUMMARY OF ETHICS POLICIES RELATED TO PROCUREMENT

	Financial disclosure	Conflict of interest	Security Council resolution 1267 (1999)	Whistleblower policy	Post-employment restrictions	Gifts and hospitality	Supplier code of conduct on website	Vendor complaint
FAO	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Zero tolerance	Yes	No
IAEA	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Nominal gifts allowed	No	No
ICAO	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Nominal gifts allowed	No	No
ILO	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Nominal gifts allowed	Yes	No
IMO	No	Yes	No	No	No	Zero tolerance	No	No
ITU	No	Yes	No	No	No	Nominal gifts allowed	No	No
UN	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Zero tolerance	Yes	Yes
UNDP	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Zero tolerance	Yes	Yes
UNESCO	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Nominal gifts allowed	No	No
UNFPA	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Nominal gifts allowed	No	No
UNICEF	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Zero tolerance	Yes	Yes
UNIDO	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Zero tolerance	No	Yes
UNOPS	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Zero tolerance	Yes	Yes
UNRWA	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Nominal gifts allowed	Yes	Yes
UNWTO	No	Yes	No	No	No	No policy	No	
UPU	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	No	Nominal gifts allowed	No	No
WFP	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Nominal gifts allowed	No	No
WHO	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	Nominal gifts allowed	Yes	No
WIPO	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Zero tolerance	Yes	No
WMO	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No policy	No	No
UNHCR	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Zero tolerance	Yes	Yes
UN related/ associated								
IFAD				Yes			Yes	
World Bank	Yes	Yes		Yes	Yes	Nominal gifts allowed	Yes	Yes
EC		Yes				Nominal gifts allowed	No	Yes
OECD		Yes				Zero tolerance	No	No

Annex III

MAJOR GOODS AND SERVICES PROCURED BY UNITED NATIONS AGENCIES (2009)

Major goods and services procured by United Nations agencies (2009)

(Value in thousands of United States dollars)

	Categories	
1	Transport services	2,384,521
2	Construction, engineering and architectural services	1,375,953
3	Food and nutrition	1,307,826
4	Pharmaceuticals and vaccines	1,184,084
5	Human resources, consultants and project staff	519,962
6	Motor vehicles and parts, including other transport equipment	477,673
7	Textiles, including clothing, tents, blankets, mosquito nets, etc.	380,670
8	Medical laboratory and hospital equipment	367,640
9	Computer and IT equipment, including software	339,410
10	Building and machinery maintenance and repair	313,737
10	Petroleum and fuel products	299,643
11	Travel and tourism	285,768
12	Leasing and rental services	255,748
13	Books, paper, office stationary and supplies	195,322
14	Computer and IT services	184,328
15	Furniture	183,554
16	Financial services, insurance, accountancy/audit	163,016
17	Management services and consultancy	157,294
18	Politics, peacekeeping and mine action services	130,839
19	Telecommunication equipment, including radio and satellite	123,062
20	Pumps, engines, lifting and cold chain equipment	104,740
	Total	**10,734,790**

Annex IV
OVERVIEW OF ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS ON THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE JOINT INSPECTION UNIT (JIU/NOTE/2011/1)

		Intended impact	United Nations, its funds and programmes												Specialized agencies and IAEA														
			United Nations	UNCTAD	UNODC/UNOV	UNEP	UN-HABITAT	UNHCR	UNRWA	UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	WFP	UNOPS	ILO	FAO	UNESCO	ICAO	WHO	UPU	ITU	WMO	IMO	WIPO	UNIDO	UNWTO	IAEA	CEB
Report	**For action**		☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☐	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒
	For information		☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Recommendation 1		**g**	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
Recommendation 2		**g**		E	E	E	E	E	E		E		E	E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		
Recommendation 3		**e**	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
Recommendation 4		**g**	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		E		E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		
Recommendation 5		**g**	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		
Recommendation 6		**g**	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		
Recommendation 7		**a**	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		
Recommendation 8		**e**	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
Recommendation 9		**e**	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
Recommendation 10		**e**	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
Recommendation 11		**a**		E	E	E	E	E	E		E		E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
Recommendation 12		**a**		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	

Recommendation 13	**a**		E	E	E	E				E		E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E		E			
Recommendation 14	**d**	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
Recommendation 15	**d**		E	E	E	E	E	E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
Recommendation 16	**b**		E	E	E	E	E	E		E		E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	E	
Recommendation 17	**g**																											E
Recommendation 18	**o**																											E

Legend: **L:** Recommendation for decision by legislative organ
E: Recommendation for action by executive head
: Recommendation does not require action by this organization

Intended impact: **a:** enhanced accountability **b:** dissemination of best practices **c:** enhanced coordination and cooperation **d:** enhanced controls and compliance **e:** enhanced effectiveness **f:** significant financial savings **g:** enhanced efficiency **o:** other

JIU/REP/2009/1

REVIEW OF MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD TOURISM ORGANIZATION (UNWTO)

Prepared by

Even Fontaine Ortiz

Joint Inspection Unit

Geneva 2009

United Nations

JIU/REP/2009/1
Original: ENGLISH

REVIEW OF MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED NATIONS WORLD TOURISM ORGANIZATION (UNWTO)

Prepared by

Even Fontaine Ortiz

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United Nations, Geneva 2009

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Review of management and administration in the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO) JIU/REP/2009/1

This "Review of management and administration in the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO)" is one of a series of reviews of management and administration of participating organizations undertaken by the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU). The objective of the review is to identify areas for the improvement in the management and administration practices in UNWTO. Its focus is on structure and governance, strategic planning and budgeting, human resources management, central support services, oversight and cooperation with other United Nations entities and private sector entities. Recommendations 2, 6, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15-18, 20, 21 and 24 are addressed to the Secretary-General for his action. Recommendations for consideration by the UNWTO General Assembly and Executive Council are listed below.

As UNWTO joined the United Nations system in 2003, the Organization is still in the process of harmonizing its rules and procedures to comply with those of the United Nations. While undertaking this review, the Inspector is of the view that future requests for admittance in the United Nations system should be subject to, inter-alia, an external and independent qualification process. Hence, recommendation 25 is directed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Recommendations for consideration by legislative bodies

Recommendation 1

The practice of appointing the Executive Director of Affiliate Members by a single Member State should be discontinued. The position may be financed from extra-budgetary sources, but the selection process has to be done according to an open, competitive and transparent recruitment process.

Recommendation 3

The Executive Council may wish to revisit its practice of holding its meetings outside Headquarters, in the light of the potential associated benefits and drawbacks.

Recommendation 4

The UNWTO General Assembly may wish to revisit its practice of holding its meetings outside Headquarters in the light of the potential associated benefits and drawbacks, and establish, as part of the Statutes of the Organization, an article regulating the conditions for exceptions.

Recommendation 5

The UNWTO General Assembly may wish to revisit its current decision-making process at all legislative levels to ensure that sufficient dialogue and negotiations among the parties take place, in order to reach clear decisions as a prerequisite to properly guide, direct and oversee the operations of the Organization, thus releasing the secretariat from the responsibility to provide the basis for its decisions.

Recommendation 7

The UNWTO General Assembly should call for a greater Member State participation and leadership in the planning, programming and budgeting process.

Recommendation 8

The UNWTO General Assembly should endorse the results-based management (RBM) framework developed by the JIU and request the secretariat to use it in the implementation of RBM.

Recommendation 11

The UNWTO General Assembly should call for the members to pay their arrears within the period stated in the Statutes and Financing Rules.

Recommendation 14

The UNWTO General Assembly should adopt the status, basic rights and duties of United Nations staff members (ST/SGB/2002/13) and the corresponding financial disclosures policy, while promoting ethics and integrity at work, and allocate resources for relevant training of staff on these issues.

Recommendation 19

The UNWTO General Assembly should provide the required resources to permit the use of the Chinese language as an official language of the Organization in accordance with UNWTO General Assembly resolution 521 (XVII).

Recommendation 22

The UNWTO General Assembly should in-source the internal audit, inspection, evaluation, investigation and monitoring functions to any other organization in the United Nations system that has the capacity to respond.

Alternatively, The UNWTO General Assembly should provide the necessary resources, three positions, for the above-mentioned functions for the 2010-2011 biennium.

Recommendation 23

The UNWTO General Assembly should modify the Statutes of the Organization in order to provide for the selection of a single external auditor with a specified term limitation and country rotation.

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ABBREVIATIONS

CEB	United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination
DPC	Direction for Programme Coordination
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
ERP	Enterprise resource planning
HLCM	High-Level Committee on Management
HLCP	High-Level Committee on Programmes
ICSC	International Civil Service Commission
ICT	Information and communications technology
ILO	International Labour Organization
ITC	International Trade Centre
IPSAS	International Public Sector Accounting Standards
JIU	Joint Inspection Unit
PAHO	Pan American Health Organization
RBM	Results-based management
ST-EP	Sustainable Tourism Eliminating Poverty
UIOTO	International Union of Official Travel Organizations
UNCCD	United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNTEN	United Nations Tourism Exchange Network
UNWTO	United Nations World Tourism Organization
WTO	World Tourism Organization

I. INTRODUCTION

1. As part of its programme of work for 2007, the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) has conducted a review of management and administration in the United Nations World Tourism Organization (UNWTO). This review is part of a series of reviews of management and administration at participating organizations. The objective of the review is to assess the management and administration of the Organization, with a view to providing guidance during its process of integration into the United Nations system, focussing on areas of governance, strategic planning, budgeting, human resources management, oversight and cooperation with other United Nations entities.

2. The Organization is the outcome of the transformation of the International Union of Official Travel Organizations (UIOTO) to the World Tourism Organization (WTO) in 1970 when it adopted its present Statutes. In 2003 it became a specialized agency of the United Nations with the approval and adoption of its General Assembly resolution 453 (XV) and the subsequent ratification by the General Assembly of the United Nations in resolution 58/232. In order to avoid confusion with the World Trade Organization, also known as WTO, it changed its name to UNWTO.

3. UNWTO is headquartered in Madrid, with a membership of 161 countries and territories and more than 350 Affiliate Members representing the private sector, educational institutions, tourism associations and local tourism authorities.

4. The fundamental aim of the Organization is the promotion and development of tourism with a view to contributing to economic development, international understanding, peace, prosperity, and universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. In pursuing this aim, the Organization shall pay particular attention to the interests of the developing countries in the field of tourism.[1]

5. UNWTO serves as a global forum for tourism policy issues and by encouraging the implementation of the Global Code of Ethics for Tourism recognized by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 56/212, helps to ensure that Member States, tourist destinations and the business community maximize the positive economic, social and cultural effects of tourism and fully reap its benefits, while minimizing its negative social and environmental impacts.

6. In accordance with the internal standards and guidelines of JIU and its internal working procedures, the methodology followed in preparing this report included a preliminary desk review, interviews and in-depth analysis. The JIU team also attended the seventeenth session of the UNWTO General Assembly in November 2007 in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, and was able to meet with representatives of Member States, Affiliate Members and other participants.

7. In accordance with article 11.2 of the JIU statute, this report has been finalized after consultation among the Inspectors so as to test its conclusion and recommendations against the collective wisdom of the Unit.

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[1] Article 3 of the UNWTO Statutes – www.unwto.org

8. To facilitate the handling of the report and the implementation of its recommendations and the monitoring thereof, annex II contains a table indicating whether the report is submitted to the organization concerned for action or for information. The table identifies those recommendations relevant for the organization, specifying whether they require a decision by the legislative organ of the organization or can be acted upon by its executive head.

9. The Inspector wishes to express his appreciation to all who assisted him in the preparation of this report, and particularly to those who participated in the interviews and so willingly shared their knowledge and expertise.

10. Nevertheless, the Inspector regrets that certain officials of the UNWTO secretariat were not forthright and cooperative in providing answers to questions raised by him as well as following through with promises to provide certain information requested. There are many instances of non-compliance with such requests and, therefore, the report includes paragraphs indicating that no information is available. In the view of the Inspector, there are several issues that appear awkward and require further clarification. In addition, the report identifies areas (i.e. staff promotion and recruitment, etc.) where the Organization practices are far from acceptable calling for an in-depth investigation to be carried out during 2009-2010.

II. STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE

11. UNWTO consists of five main organs: the General Assembly, the Regional Commissions, the Executive Council, Committees and the Secretariat. The World Committee on Tourism Ethics is a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly.

A. General Assembly

12. The General Assembly is the principal organ of UNWTO. It meets every two years to approve the budget and programme of work and to debate topics of vital importance to the tourism sector. Every four years it elects a Secretary-General. The General Assembly is composed of full members and associate members. Affiliate Members and representatives of other international organizations participate as observers.

13. Associate membership is open to all territories not responsible for their external relations and whose candidature has prior approval of the Member State that assumes responsibility for their external relations. There are currently seven Associate Members.

14. The original founders of UNWTO had a unique vision for the Organization – a leadership body for the tourism sector which, apart from its full members who are State representatives, includes Affiliate Members who may be from the private sector, academia and civil society. The Affiliate Members are expected to promote public-private partnerships that help support the UNWTO overall aims, including promoting responsible, sustainable and universally accessible tourism and contributing to economic and social development and international understanding, with particular attention paid to the interests of the developing countries.

15. Affiliate membership is open to the private sector, educational institutions, tourism associations and local tourism authorities whose activities are related to the aims of UNWTO. There are currently more than 350 Affiliate Members representing all aspects of the tourism industry, ranging from industry associations to airlines, travel agencies to consultants and trade unions to universities.

16. The involvement of these members is an indication of the UNWTO support for the involvement of civil society in the network of global institutions, as encouraged by the United Nations. Membership is made up of three groups of interest: UNWTO Business Council; UNWTO Education Council, and UNWTO Destination Council.

17. The Inspector notes that the participation of the private sector in UNWTO activities is a positive initiative, considering that tourism is not always the responsibility of national administrations and that the impact and influence of private sector firms in tourism activities is substantial. Furthermore, the tourism sector is characterized by the existence of an important number of small and medium-size enterprises, many of which are integrated in professional associations.

B. Regional Commissions

18. Established in 1975 as subsidiary organs of the General Assembly, the six Regional Commissions[2] normally meet once a year. They enable Member States to maintain contact

[2] The Commissions represent Africa, the Americas, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe, the Middle East and South Asia. Affiliate Members from the region participate as observers.

with one another and with the secretariat between sessions of the General Assembly, to which they submit their proposals and convey their concerns. Each Commission elects one Chairman and its Vice-Chairmen from among its members for a term of two years commencing from one session to the next session of the Assembly.

C. Executive Council

19. The Executive Council is the governing board of UNWTO, responsible for ensuring that the Organization carries out its programme of work and adheres to its budget. It meets at least twice a year and is composed of members elected by the General Assembly in a ratio of one for every five full members. Spain is a permanent member of the Council. Representatives of Associate and Affiliate Members participate in Council meetings as observers. It takes all necessary measures, in consultation with the Secretary-General, for the implementation of its own decisions and recommendations of the Assembly, and reports thereon to the Assembly. The term of office of Council Members is four years and elections for one-half of the Council membership are held every two years. The Council elects one Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen from among its members.

D. Committees

20. Specialized committees of UNWTO members advise on management and programme content. These include the Programme Committee, the Committee on Budget and Finance, the Committee on Statistics and the Tourism Satellite Account, the Committee on Market and Competitiveness, the Sustainable Development of Tourism Committee, the World Committee on Tourism Ethics, the Committee on Poverty Reduction and the Committee for the Review of Applications for Affiliate Membership.

E. Secretariat

21. The secretariat is headed by the Secretary-General, assisted by the Deputy Secretary-General and recently reinforced with the appointment of an Assistant Secretary-General. The secretariat is located in Madrid. It also includes a regional support office for Asia-Pacific in Osaka, Japan, established in 1995. The Organization has no field representation.

22. The secretariat comprises 106 full-time staff at the UNWTO Madrid Headquarters. These officials are responsible for implementing the UNWTO programme of work and serving the needs of members.

23. The Inspector was informed that a full-time position (Affiliate Members Executive Director at headquarters), is financed by the Spanish Government to support Affiliate Members; furthermore the incumbent is selected by the Spanish Government, contrary to best practices in the United Nations system. Though the agreement between UNWTO and the Government of Spain is to provide UNWTO with a pool of candidates to select from, it does not occur in actual practice. The Inspector believes that this arrangement needs to be reconsidered and that the selection of the incumbent should be subject to a competitive and transparent recruitment process under the full responsibility of the Secretary-General.

24. Similarly, the Japanese Government finances the UNWTO regional support office for the Asia-Pacific in Osaka. When the Secretary-General was asked about the financial arrangements of the secretariat office in Osaka, he indicated that he was not aware or informed of the management of the office, including financial matters. When requested to provide documents related to the establishment of the office, the initial reply of the Organization was that the documentation was not available in English, and then that it was simply not available.

The above facts show a lack of transparency that is unacceptable in the view of the Inspector and that should be properly addressed.

25. The existence and details of the UNWTO office in Japan can be found at the UNWTO website[3] as well as that of the regional office.[4] According to the latter site, the WTO in 1992 decided to open its first regional support office in Asia and the Pacific region. At the 10th Joint Meeting of the WTO Commissions for South Asia and for East Asia and the Pacific held in Bali, Indonesia in October 1993, Japan was selected as the headquarters of the new office. The subsequent WTO General Assembly approved the establishment of the office in Japan.

26. Being that as it may, the investigation mentioned in paragraph 10 above shall examine the establishment, role and function of the regional office in Osaka, including its financing and staffing, together with the other issues raised in the present report.

27. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the accountability of the Organization.

Recommendation 1

The practice of appointing the Executive Director of Affiliate Members by a single Member State should be discontinued. The position may be financed from extra-budgetary sources, but the selection process has to be done according to an open, competitive and transparent recruitment process.

F. Other bodies

28. UNWTO activities are also promoted through the work of foundations and offices that focus on specific UNWTO objectives. These foundations are financed by the host country Member States. The UNWTO THEMIS Foundation, headquartered in Andorra, is "an operational instrument to facilitate administration and management in implementing [UNWTO] programme of work in the area of education and training in tourism, and thus facilitating relations with UNWTO members".[5] The Sustainable Tourism Eliminating Poverty (ST-EP) Foundation is the cornerstone of the ST-EP Programme established in 2003 by UNWTO. Though many countries have contributed to the Programme, the contribution of the Government of the Republic of Korea was allocated to setting up the Foundation and the office in Seoul, Korea. While the Foundation is an international, non-profit umbrella body overseeing the ST-EP Programme, it is the UNWTO Department of Development Assistance that is responsible for the implementation of ST-EP projects.

29. The THEMIS Foundation was subject to an independent audit and the report was submitted to the Committee on Budget and Finance.[6] Its findings included, inter-alia, reimbursement of expenses without valid justification; questionable recruitment practices of

[3] www.unwto.org/aboutwto/how/en
[4] www.wto-osaka.org/english/index_e.htm
[5] UNWTO Education, Training and Knowledge Department coordinates the activities of the foundation (http://ekm.unwto.org/english/themis.php).
[6] CBF/48/2 – Administrative, Financial and Statutory Matters – Themis Foundation Audit Report – November 2007.

Foundation personnel; and the ambiguous status of the UNWTO "office" in Andorra. These issues, inter-alia, together with other concerns relative to the relationship of the Organization with the THEMIS Foundation, will be the subjects of an investigation to be undertaken by JIU.

30. A proposed World Centre of Excellence for Destinations is being established in Montreal, Canada, with the support of the Canadian Federal Government. This non-profit organization aims at expanding upon the activities of UNWTO by bringing added value and expertise on innovative destination policies and practices.[7]

31. The Inspector is of the view that the establishment of different foundations and offices, including the secretariat office in Osaka, does not follow a preconceived strategy, and while they perhaps increase UNWTO outputs, their financing and linkages with the secretariat need to be transparent. Moreover, the Inspector found that the purpose, structure and financing of these foundations are unclear, inasmuch as they are part and parcel of the Organization. Therefore, the establishment of the above foundations (THEMIS and ST-EP), the World Centre of Excellence for Destinations and the secretariat office in Osaka, including their relationship with UNWTO, shall be part of the investigation mentioned above, which will recommend concrete measures to ensure control, accountability, transparency and compliance with the pertinent financial regulations and rules and avoid duplication/overlap with secretariat activities.

32. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the accountability of the Organization.

Recommendation 2

The Secretary-General should develop modalities of cooperation with the respective foundations and offices and submit them to the 2011 UNWTO General Assembly for consideration and approval, together with the outcome of the mentioned JIU investigation on the subject.

G. Hosting of meetings

33. According to article 8, paragraph 2, of the UNWTO Statutes, "Meetings of the Assembly and the Council shall be held at the Headquarters of the Organization unless the respective organs decide otherwise." Nevertheless, most, if not all, meetings of both organs take place outside the host country, making the exception a rule. While it is reasonable and convenient, considering related costs (i.e. travel, daily subsistence allowances, etc.) that regional commissions meet in their respective geographical areas, it is not a regular practice for most of the United Nations organizations to systematically hold main governance meetings away from headquarters. UNWTO organizes, as a regular practice, its General Assembly sessions and Executive Council meetings in different locations. The UNWTO Statutes does not specify any criteria in this regard and relevant decisions are made by the General Assembly according to its rules of procedure (normally and for most matters by simple majority; financial and budgetary matters, inter-alia, require a two-thirds majority).

[7] See the "status report on the quality policy of destinations and establishment of the World Center of Excellence for Destinations of Montreal" (UNWTO General Assembly document A/17/21) for additional information on the proposed Centre.

34. Despite resolution 351 (XI) entitled " place and dates of the twelfth session" in which the UNWTO General Assembly adopted the procedure proposed by the Secretary-General for choosing the venue of the General Assembly session and the principle of geographical rotation in the choice of countries to host future sessions, the Inspector believes that the current practice of the organization of General Assembly meetings and in particular the organization of Executive Council meetings in different locations needs to be reconsidered.

35. The seventeenth session of UNWTO General Assembly was held in 2007 in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, and the next one is scheduled to take place in Astana, Kazakhstan in 2009. Since the first session, held in Madrid in 1975, only the seventh session in 1987 took place at headquarters. The Executive Council held sessions in: Senegal, 2005; Ecuador and Algeria, 2006; and Tunisia and Colombia, 2007.

36. UNWTO is the smallest specialized agency of the United Nations; its resources are very limited and it has practically no offices away from headquarters that could support the organization of meetings. Despite the considerable efforts and financial support of the countries interested in organizing a General Assembly, the Organization itself needs to make a significant logistical effort when organizing sessions abroad; sending support staff, documentation and relevant equipment and materials, which obviously imply indirect costs.[8]

37. While holding meetings outside headquarters may help to promote tourism in given countries, it makes more difficult the follow-up for delegations of Member States and does not contribute to the preservation of institutional memory on their side.

38. Different stakeholders interviewed by the JIU team, including host country authorities, expressed criticism on the issue of governance meetings being held in scattered locations, indicating that records of the Executive Council meetings are not regularly kept. Furthermore, they defined the governance process as "extraordinarily uncommon". The host country agreement includes provisions for the organization of meetings of the General Assembly and the Executive Council at headquarters. The Government of Spain is committed to offer facilities, at no additional cost for UNWTO, for the organization of such meetings.[9]

39. The Inspector observes that the holding of these meetings outside Headquarters may result in organizational resources being devoted to logistical activities as opposed to substantive matters. Furthermore, with a limited number of secretariat staff present at these meetings, there is very little substantive support available. Finally, the holding of such meetings outside headquarters limits accessibility/visibility for media and hence coverage is limited for the outcome.

40. The implementation of the following recommendations is expected to disseminate best practice and enhance accountability.

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[8] Although rule 1 of the Rules of Procedure state that the Assembly may meet at another place if it so decides, provided the host country reimburses the extra expenses involved in holding the session, the fact that key Secretariat staff are away from headquarters may hinder work flows.

[9] Article 25 of the Agreement between the Government of Spain and UNWTO; articles 11 and 12 of the supplementary agreement signed 19 May 1977 and article VII of the special agreement on premises of 10 March 1980. Furthermore, the interest of candidates to organize future General Assembly sessions might lead to potential conflicts of interest and to conniving decisions.

Recommendation 3

The Executive Council may wish to revisit its practice of holding its meetings outside Headquarters, in the light of the potential associated benefits and drawbacks.

Recommendation 4

The UNWTO General Assembly may wish to revisit its practice of holding its meetings outside Headquarters, in the light of the potential associated benefits and drawbacks, and establish, as part of the Statutes of the Organization, an article regulating the conditions for exceptions.

H. Legislative decision-making process

41. The Inspector was present at the seventeenth session of the UNWTO General Assembly, held in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia, and observed excessive interventions by the secretariat during the decision-making process, in particular during the negotiations of the resolutions and decisions and the adoption of the agenda, which is not the role of a secretariat. Meetings held at different locations help to perpetuate this situation as many delegations consist of participants who frequently have not attended previous UNWTO meetings. The Inspector was, in particular, concerned to observe that, contrary to the standard practice, member State representatives were negotiating with the secretariat staff, as opposed to among themselves, on the text of resolutions being adopted.

42. The Inspector was also informed that no written record of the discussions held during the Executive Council or General Assembly meetings are produced. Only decisions/resolutions are recorded. Further, for those agenda documents for which decisions/resolutions are required, the Inspector noted that in such cases, no draft decision/resolution is included. As a result, meetings are lengthened and without recorded minutes, no background information on a related decision/resolution is available for future reference.

43. The implementation of the following recommendations is expected to disseminate best practice and enhance accountability.

Recommendation 5

The UNWTO General Assembly may wish to revisit its current decision-making process at all legislative levels to ensure that sufficient dialogue and negotiations among the parties take place, in order to reach clear decisions as a prerequisite to properly guide, direct and oversee the operations of the Organization, thus releasing the secretariat from the responsibility to provide the basis for its decisions.

Recommendation 6

The Secretary-General should ensure that written summary records/minutes of the governing body meetings are duly produced.

III. STRATEGIC PLANNING AND BUDGETING

A. Strategic planning

44. In accordance with UNWTO statutory provisions, the Secretary-General submits to the General Assembly the draft general programme of work and budget for the biennium, approved by the Executive Council at its previous meeting. Accordingly, in resolution 524 (XVII), the General Assembly, at its seventeenth session, approved the Draft Programme of Work and Budget for the Organization for the period 2008-2009. This document constitutes a road map for the Organization and lists four strategic objectives that attempt to respond to the short and long term development needs of members; the promotion of partnerships and proper governance within the tourism sector and the provision of information technology advice and image-building support to members.

45. The draft programme of work was prepared by the Direction for Programme Coordination (DPC)[10] in five stages. An analysis of the priority areas indicated by the Member States in response to a 2006 survey undertaken by the secretariat served as the basis for the document. All programme departments, sections, units and regional representations within the secretariat were asked to prepare and submit proposals to DPC. These proposals were then reviewed by DPC to ensure coherence and avoid overlaps or duplications, and to group them around the four strategic objectives. Within each objective, a number of specific objectives and corresponding activities to achieve them were identified. Finally, the budgets for each activity were established and hence in the process, the budget presented was no longer structured around the secretariat departments, sections or regional representations, but around each activity.

46. The Inspector notes that only 31 Member States had replied to the 2006 survey and many of them had not indicated any priority areas for 2008-2009.[11] The Organization needs to be driven by the Member States, and not by its secretariat, in order for it to serve the needs of its constituents and develop its capabilities and usefulness.

47. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of the Organization:

Recommendation 7

The UNWTO General Assembly should call for a greater Member State participation and leadership in the planning, programming and budgeting process.

B. Results-based management

48. UNWTO started to consider results-based management (RBM) principles in 2004. The Secretary-General submitted Agenda 2010 to the Executive Council in 2004 in order to take a long-term outlook and plan of activities. This was done within the context of a presumed RBM approach, as it was important to establish a limited number of strategic objectives for such a plan and in the process pursue three main aims: (a) UNWTO reinforces its own structure in order to fully act as a United Nations specialized agency (b) increase its financial resources

[10] Established by the Secretary-General in February 2007.
[11] "Draft Programme of Work and Budget of the Organization for the Period 2008-2009" (General Assembly document A/17/7 Rev.), p.3.

coming from alternative sources other than government contributions and (c) be empowered during a four-year period to provide maximum assistance to its members. Four strategic objectives and the corresponding expected results and performance indicators were set out.[12]

49. At the seventeenth session of the UNWTO General Assembly, a mid-term evaluation of the four strategic objectives was tabled for review as well as the membership being informed that the Executive Council had requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report evaluating the 2006-2007 activities in order to assess the results obtained.[13] The Secretary-General also informed the membership that the Organization will have to adapt its performance evaluation procedures to the RBM system that is being devised by the United Nations System Chief Executives Board for Coordination (CEB).[14] However, the Inspector is not aware of any "RBM system being devised by the CEB"; additionally, he observed that there are no systematic and meaningful evaluation mechanisms in place within UNWTO.

50. The Inspector notes that while the RBM approach initiated by UNWTO is in accordance with trends in other organizations, it is very basic and limited in nature and needs further development, inter-alia, the careful selection and refinement of quantitative and qualitative indicators. The budget and programme of work includes strategic objectives and associated outputs and indicators. However, most of the indicators lack associated targets and baseline data to determine their relevance and to facilitate the evaluation of achievements. This is an area that should be improved upon.

51. Any comprehensive RBM approach should include, in addition to the programmatic and substantive component already initiated by UNWTO, a human resources management component as well. These components need to be supported by appropriate tools, i.e., information technology that can facilitate planning, programming, budgeting, monitoring, evaluation and reporting activities.

52. In 2004, the JIU prepared a series of reports on results-based management including a benchmarking framework for the implementation of RBM (JIU/REP/2004/5, JIU/REP/2004/6, JIU/REP/2004/7 and JIU/REP/2004/8). The JIU has already applied it in the administration and management reviews of several organizations, namely, the United Nations Secretariat, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD) and the International Labour Organization (ILO).

53. The CEB invited all organizations of the United Nations system to endorse the JIU benchmarking framework for RBM and to use it as the chapeau for their respective implementation of RBM.[15] The JIU RBM benchmarking framework was subsequently endorsed by the General Assembly of the United Nations.[16]

54. The main prerequisite for a results-based implementation, which is the development of a results oriented organizational culture, is still a challenge for an organization that needs to shift its culture from a compliance one, oriented towards form and procedures, to one geared to

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[12] See Agenda 2010 — Note by Secretary-General (UNWTO General Assembly document A/16/13(b)).
[13] "Report on the Implementation of the General Programme of Work for 2006-2007" – Note by Secretary-General (UNWTO General Assembly document A/17/4).
[14] Ibid, p. 2.
[15] CEB/2005/HLCM/R.6.
[16] Through the approval of paragraph 248 of the report of the fifty-fifth session of the CPC in resolution 60/257.

accountability and results achievement at all levels. The above-mentioned strategic framework for the implementation of RBM should guide this process.

55. The implementation of the following recommendations is expected to enhance the functionality of the Organization.

Recommendation 8

The UNWTO General Assembly should endorse the results-based management (RBM) framework developed by the JIU and request the secretariat to use it in the implementation of RBM.

C. Budget issues

56. The Organization is financed by assessed contributions of Full, Associate and Affiliate Members according to a scale of assessment accepted by the General Assembly and from other possible sources of receipts for the Organization in accordance with the Financing Rules. Contributions are determined in accordance with the "Lusaka formula", which takes into consideration different factors, including economic development and tourism activities of Full Members. It is noted that members are grouped in seven different categories. This report does not intend to analyse the appropriateness of the formula used, however the Inspector would like to highlight that contributions, from a United Nations system perspective, are very low.

57. The Inspector was informed that Member States have inquired from the secretariat as to the exact basis/criteria used in calculating their individual assessments. Such assessments should be established in a clear and transparent manner. For example, with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland withdrawing from the Organization, effective 1 August 2009, the resulting shortfall in the budget was covered by increasing proportionately the assessed contributions of other Member States. The revised assessments were made by the secretariat without informing the Member States accordingly.

58. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the accountability of the Organization.

Recommendation 9

The Secretary-General should inform and obtain approval from the UNWTO General Assembly prior to any revision of assessed contributions of Member States to the budget.

59. The programme budget of the Organization covers a biannual period. The current budget period (2008-2009) represents an amount of 25.1 million euros and is divided into three parts.

Part I: Programme of Work;

Part II: Executive Organs and Meetings

Part III: Programme support services and other budgetary provisions

Staff costs for the period amount to 70 per cent, in line with other United Nations entities; other expenditures related to Part I represent 15 per cent; Part II, 4 per cent and Part III, 11 per cent.

60. The Inspector welcomes the use of the euro as the budget currency for in doing so, the Organization protects itself against currency fluctuations, as the same currency is being used for planning purposes and most of the incurred organizational expenditure is in euros.

61. Article 17, paragraph 5, of the Agreement between the United Nations and the World Tourism Organization refers to the requirement to achieve uniformity in the presentation of the budget of system organizations.[17] In this regard, the Inspector would like to point out that UNWTO does not include in its budget presentation staffing tables for each department, or organizational unit; it only includes staff costs and other costs without a detailed breakdown of different categories of costs. Human resources allocated to sections are described in terms of "work/months". In order to achieve uniformity, transparency and accountability, it would be necessary to attach staffing tables for each section, indicating number of staff, categories and grades, in accordance with system practice. Furthermore, the budget for each section, departments or organizational units should show clearly resources allocated to each area and it should be broken down into different objects of expenditure to ensure that the programmes correlate with the level of resources allocated to them.

62. The Inspector regrets that important documents, such as the proposed programme budget, are not available in electronic format and only hardcopies were received when documentation was requested in the context of the preparation of this report. Furthermore, hardcopies of certain documents, including the answer to certain formal questions, were received in a sealed envelope without any introductory letter and/or covering note. The Inspector wishes to point out that formal questions and requests for information should be properly and officially answered by the Organization.

63. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance efficiency of the Organization.

Recommendation 10

The Secretary-General should include in the budget proposals a breakdown by organizational unit showing financial resources and staffing tables for each budget component (organizational unit).

64. In the 2008-2009 Draft Programme of Work and Budget, it is stated that the secretariat has a scarce financial capacity to deal with activities not included in its Programme of Work and thus sources of external financing have to be identified. Being that as it may, the Inspector notes that arrears of Member States as at 31 December 2007 amount to 16.44 million euros.[18] Though Member States are encouraged to repay their contribution arrears either in full or in instalments, the fact that some members owe contributions starting from 1976, is not a sign of financial discipline. There are provisions in the Statutes and Financing Rules relating to payment of arrears that are not strictly enforced.[19]

[17] United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/232, annex.
[18] Information provided by UNWTO Secretariat – 31 October 2008.
[19] See article 34 of the Statutes of the Organization and paragraph 13 of the Financing Rules.

65. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the functionality of the Organization.

Recommendation 11

The UNWTO General Assembly should call for the members to pay their arrears within the period stated in the Statutes and Financing Rules.

D. Accounting

66. The Organization currently bases its accounting procedures on local standards.[20] Current supporting information management systems are outdated and accounting activities require a lot of manual work. However, in July 2006 the General Assembly of the United Nations approved the introduction of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) across the system. In this regard, UNWTO is committed to implement IPSAS initially by 2010, in line with other entities of the United Nations system. Compliance with the IPSAS standards guarantees that the financial reporting of public bodies conveys what is termed a "true and fair view" of the financial situation. IPSAS takes account of the characteristic features of the public sector. The adoption of IPSAS, together with disclosure of compliance, will lead to a significant improvement in the quality of general purpose financial reporting by public sector entities. This, in turn, is likely to lead to better-informed assessments of the resource allocation decisions made, thereby increasing transparency and accountability. The Inspector welcomes the initiative of UNWTO to join other United Nations entities in the implementation of IPSAS; he also welcomes the decision of the UNWTO General Assembly (resolution 519 (XVII), para. 4) to make a provision of 100,000 euros in order to cover expenses related to the implementation of IPSAS. However, he warns about the potential resource implications of such implementation and the need to further develop a specific work plan, including, inter-alia, the costing of such implementation. The same warning and recommendation have been expressed by the auditors in their report for the closing of the period 2006 (CE/80/5I). The Executive Council, following the external auditors' recommendation, also requested the secretariat to prepare a plan for IPSAS implementation.

67. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the efficiency of the Organization.

Recommendation 12

The Secretary-General should elaborate a detailed phased work plan, including necessary resources, for the implementation of IPSAS and submit it to the General Assembly for approval.

[20] General Accounting Plan (Plan General Contable) is a standard accounting system used in Spain.

IV. HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

A. Organigramme

68. The UNWTO organizational chart[21] is complex and in some cases does not reflect clearly defined reporting lines. Given the small size of the Organization, the Secretary-General is involved in most of the management activities, including many that should be delegated to lower levels, from human resources management activities to direct supervision of substantive programmes. For example, the Secretary-General directly authorizes all mission travel,[22] and the chiefs of Conference Services and Human Resources Management both report directly to him. Interviews with staff members also indicated that there is a need for more delegation of authority. The Inspector agrees with those views.

69. The Organization is in a transition phase and while the centralization of authority could be somehow understood in the past, given its small size, there is a need for a clearer and wider distribution of responsibilities, instead of the current vertical chain of command, with a top-heavy structure which has become a bottleneck for the dynamic functioning of the Organization. The Organization is facing new challenges, such as its integration in the United Nations system, which demand a more horizontal and efficient management structure.

70. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance accountability within the Organization.

Recommendation 13

The Secretary-General should develop an organizational chart reflecting actual responsibilities and clear reporting lines consistent with the authority delegated.

Senior management

71. The Secretary-General, the Deputy Secretary-General, an Assistant Secretary-General, a Director of Programme Coordination and the Director of Administration form senior management. For an Organization of a little over 100 full time staff, it is top-heavy and there is potential overlap of responsibilities and functions.

72. The responsibilities and delegation of authority within senior management need to be clearly defined; for example Human Resources Management reports directly to the Secretary-General and is not under the responsibility of the Director of Administration, as is the normal practice in other United Nations entities.

73. The role and delegation of authority of the Deputy Secretary-General and that of other senior managers need to be expanded in order to reduce the number of direct reporting lines to the Secretary-General. A clear division of labour between the Secretary-General, Deputy Secretary-General and the Assistant Secretary-General needs to be reconsidered. The Inspector is of the view that the functions assigned to each of these positions are not clearly stated. When asked to submit the job descriptions for the Director of Programme Coordination and of the Assistant Secretary-General, the reply was that they are currently under review. A further request to provide the existing job descriptions was not adhered to.

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[21] See Annex I of the present report for the Secretariat structure.

[22] See Annex 1 to the "Detailed Financial Provisions of the Financial Regulations of the World Tourism Organization".

74. The Secretary-General is currently in his third mandate. The General Assembly approved an amendment to the UNWTO Statutes to establish a limit of two terms for the Secretary-General; [23] but regrettably this amendment has yet to be ratified. The Inspector notes with concern that all adopted amendments to the Statutes have not been ratified to date.

75. The Inspector notes with high concern that some senior managers and several managers at lower levels are either over the age of retirement or very close to retirement. The Inspector is not satisfied with the answers received regarding the number, names and activities undertaken by staff members over the age of retirement; the Organization provided repeatedly vague answers, again not contributing to the expected transparency. There are no systematic and objective criteria for the transparent and impartial granting of contract extensions beyond the age of retirement and cases are handled on a "case-by-case" basis, originating criticism within the Organization due to the unequal treatment of cases and alleged arbitrary decisions. This issue will also be part of the future investigation.

76. The Inspector also believes that the Organization needs to develop a culture of accountability, where results and performance at all levels are encouraged and recognized. In this respect, the role of senior management is crucial: senior management should lead the change through, inter-alia, exemplary behaviour. The series of reports on RBM refer to this point indicating, "In some secretariats, in fact, expectations of performance for posts at the highest level, for which even job descriptions are not always available, are not spelled out in any document. This may lead to a situation where accountability of senior managers is less clearly established than that of other staff at lower levels. The Inspector wishes to emphasize that for a genuine performance culture to strike root, everyone, including the executive heads and their senior staff, must be held accountable and it is therefore imperative that accountabilities for all officials be established in an unambiguous way." [24]

77. The same series states "Beyond the mere verification of the adequacy of existing control mechanisms to prevent potential abuses of authority, efforts must also be undertaken to strengthen the ethical behaviour of staff at all levels, but particularly of senior managers. Therefore, the formulation, dissemination and enforcement of codes of conduct and ethical standards must become one of the organizations' strategic priorities in the development of a culture of accountability." [25]

78. To this end, the seemingly improper behaviour within the office of some senior managers has been brought to the attention of the Inspector by staff members interviewed, including the case of a senior official who is concurrently holding positions (in some cases, remunerated) in tourism-related institutions. These too, will be looked into during the investigation that the JIU will be launching shortly. Even though the Secretary-General may have permitted such activities,[26] they are not in accordance with the United Nations system accepted standards on the subject and thus any such activity undertaken after the Organization joined the United Nations family is not acceptable.

79. The Inspector was also informed that a UNWTO senior official had used the services of a helicopter to attend a meeting, even though ground transportation had been approved and pre-arranged, and the costs were billed to the Organization. This incident will also be reviewed during the investigation process, which will look, inter-alia, into the use of travel resources.

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[23] Resolution 512(XVI) adopted at the sixteenth session, held in Dakar, November-December 2005.
[24] JIU/REP/2004/7, para. 47
[25] Ibid, para. 57.
[26] Rule 10(4) of the UNWTO Staff Rules

80. The Organization has not yet developed an internal code of conduct for staff. In this regard, the Inspector underlines that the adoption of codes of conduct of international civil servants is a must within the current efforts to bring accountability and oversight to the United Nations system organizations.

81. UNWTO has not established a clear management succession plan that in the view of the Inspector is urgent and necessary, to protect institutional memory and to guarantee a smooth transition and management of the Organization while adapting to United Nations practices and standards.

82. The implementation of the following recommendations is expected to disseminate best practice.

Recommendation 14

The UNWTO General Assembly should adopt the status, basic rights and duties of United Nations staff members (ST/SGB/2002/13) and the corresponding financial disclosures policy, while promoting ethics and integrity at work, and allocate resources for relevant training of staff on these issues.

Recommendation 15

The Secretary-General should:

(a) Develop a senior management succession plan in order to preserve institutional memory and guarantee the smooth future management of the Organization;

(b) Develop a rule defining the exceptional circumstances under which the extension of contracts over the age of retirement could be granted;

(c) Review the current top-heavy structure of the secretariat with a view to streamlining it.

B. Human resources issues

Job description and classification

83. The following table shows the number and category of established posts under the regular budget. While the table indicates that 106 posts have been approved for the period 2008-2009, only 96 have been filled. The Inspector learned that these vacant posts have been filled by retirees, the exact extent and number of which is not known as the Organization has refused to provide the actual numbers, while acknowledging the practice. A further nine positions will become vacant through retirement by the end of 2009.

	Number of posts		
	2004-2005	**2006-2007**	**2008-2009**
Secretary-General	**1**	**1**	**1**
Deputy Secretary-General	**1**	**1**	**1**
Assistant Secretary-General	**-**	**-**	**1**
Professional and higher categories	**42**	**44**	**45**
General Services category	**51**	**57**	**58**
TOTAL	**95**	**103**	**106**

84. The Organization, after joining the United Nations system in 2003, undertook a job classification exercise in 2004 with a view to harmonizing job descriptions/classifications in accordance with system standards. However, when interviewing staff, it was clear that this was an area that needed a lot of improvement. A considerable number of staff members showed their dissatisfaction indicating that they did not have, or did not know if they had, a job description; some others indicated that the functions undertaken by them did not correspond to the specific grade they had and several complained about arbitrary decisions regarding the awarding of grades and lack of transparency in certain promotions. It is ascertainable that there are cases of staff members undertaking very similar functions but having different grades.

85. The development of clear job descriptions and related fair grading is fundamental for a subsequent assessment of individual performance, which has a very important impact on staff morale. Interviews with staff representatives and with a group of staff representing the General Service category clearly indicated their frustration regarding this issue.

86. The integration of UNWTO into the United Nations system requires UNWTO to adapt its former practices to new standards. It is obvious that the transition from the old structure to the United Nations grading system has had and will have financial implications, however, article 16 of the Agreement between UNWTO and the United Nations indicates that both organizations "…agree to develop, in the interests of uniform standards of international employment and to the extent feasible, common personnel standards, methods and arrangements designed to avoid unjustified differences in terms and conditions of employment…"[27]

87. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of the Organization.

Recommendation 16

The Secretary-General should conduct an overall review of job descriptions and subsequently a job classification exercise in accordance with United Nations generic job descriptions and standards for consideration by the UNWTO General Assembly.

Recruitment and promotion

88. The Deputy Secretary-General chairs the Appointments and Promotions Board of the Organization, however and according to information received during the interviews held, the Secretary-General deals directly with vacancies for the Professional category. The recruitment of staff should be guided by the principles included in article 24, paragraph 3 of the Statutes of the Organization "the paramount consideration in the recruitment of staff and in the determination of the conditions of service shall be the necessity of securing the highest standards of efficiency, technical competence and integrity. Subject to this consideration, due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible." Along this line, the JIU RBM strategic framework indicates, inter-alia, that "Recruitment, placement, reassignment and promotion decisions should be based strictly on professional competence, and political considerations, other than those expressly agreed and legislated on by the legislative organs, are not allowed to influence those decisions."[28]

[27] United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/232, annex, article 16, para. 1.
[28] Overview of the series of reports on managing for results in the United Nations (JIU/REP/2004/5), Accountability; Benchmark 3.

"Transparent, effective and fair recruitment/placement systems are in place to support results-oriented contractual policies."[29] This should be done through, inter-alia:

(a) The development of tools and mechanisms such as tests, competency-based interviews and "assessment centres" to assist managers in the discharge of their responsibilities; the use of pre-defined, clear and verifiable criteria for the selection of candidates, the respective weights of these criteria to be clearly determined;

(b) The establishment of central bodies, which UNWTO has already established, that review selection decisions to verify that these pre-defined evaluation criteria and relevant procedures have been applied, and that the comparative evaluation has been duly recorded.

In addition to the above elements, the JIU RBM strategic framework also refers to the required empowerment of programme managers for the recruitment and placement of staff to posts under their responsibility; which is also an area for further improvement within the Organization.

89. Several cases of alleged recruitment favouritism were brought to the attention of the Inspector. The issue of alleged biased recruitment and associated lack of transparency, including those specific cases previously mentioned will also be part of the investigation to be conducted.

Geographical distribution and gender balance

90. According to article 24, paragraph 3, of the Statutes of the Organization, the staff should be recruited "on as wide a geographical basis as possible" (see paragraph 88 above). UNWTO does not have a formal policy for geographical distribution: in order to achieve as wide a geographical distribution as possible among staff, vacancy announcements for posts to be filled within UNWTO are circulated among its Member States, Associate Members, Affiliate Members, and other international organizations and advertised on the UNWTO website.

91. Being that as it may, the Inspector commends the Organization for having staff from 43 nationalities on board.[30] This includes staff from the General Service category and consultants, though Rule 14 (5) of the Staff Rules states that such posts are not subject to geographical distribution requirements.

92. Despite the absence of a specific rule/regulation on gender balance, the current gender balance for professional and general service staff is shown below.[31]

Professional Staff			**General Service Staff**			**TOTAL**
Female	**Male**	**Total**	**Female**	**Male**	**Total**	
17	24	41	38	17	55	96

93. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of the Organization.

[29] Ibid, Contractual arrangements; Benchmark 3.
[30] Information provided by the UNWTO Secretariat.
[31] Ibid.

Recommendation 17

The Secretary-General should develop tools and control mechanisms to guarantee that recruitment and promotion is based on transparent, comparative evaluations of the professional competencies of the candidates, with due consideration given to a balanced geographical and gender representation.

Performance appraisal systems

94. While the Organization has launched a new individual performance appraisal system, the fact remains that in many cases, there are no meaningful targets and objectives that could be used to assess performance in an objective manner. Furthermore, without clear job descriptions and a comprehensive performance assessment instrument, there is no individual accountability.

95. UNWTO has introduced a rudimentary results-based approach in its programme budget for 2008-2009. While some achievement indicators have been introduced, the programmatic objectives are not linked in a meaningful way to individual ones. In this respect, the Organization must make a concerted effort to adopt a comprehensive results-based approach to include human resources management, given that results are only achieved through the management of people.

96. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the effectiveness of the Organization.

Recommendation 18

The Secretary-General should develop, after consultations with the staff, an individual performance assessment instrument, which should include, inter-alia, Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Results-oriented and Time-bound (SMART) objectives and targets for each staff member in order to allow a fair, objective and transparent assessment of staff performance.

Training

97. Training is provided for staff members in the area of Information and Communications Technology (ICT), language and management skills. The Organization has also assisted staff wishing to undertake post-graduate studies related to their job-responsibilities.

98. The Inspector regrets that further elaboration in this subject area was not possible due to the inability to obtain further information from the secretariat, despite numerous reminders.

V. CENTRAL SUPPORT SERVICES

A. Conference and language services

99. The provision of conference and language services for UNWTO meeting bodies falls within the responsibility of the Conference Department. The official languages of the Organization are English, Spanish, French, Russian and Arabic. While the General Assembly, at its seventeenth session, approved the use of the Chinese language as an official language, the Secretary-General pointed out that the Organization had not provided for this in the 2008-2009 biennium budget and hence requested extra-budgetary funds for this activity.[32]

100. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the functionality of the Organization.

Recommendation 19

The UNWTO General Assembly should provide the required resources to permit the use of the Chinese language as an official language of the Organization in accordance with UNWTO General Assembly resolution 521 (XVII).

B. Information and communications technology systems

101. The Information and Communications Technology (ICT) systems in the secretariat are outdated and a project is envisaged at upgrading the network infrastructure. Financial systems are obsolete (see paragraph 66 above), as several accounting-related tasks need to be done manually.

102. The Inspector believes that given the diverse challenges faced by the Organization, it should develop a comprehensive ICT strategy. This strategy should take into consideration the current and future needs of the different departments/organizational units and future direction of management activities (i.e., implementation of RBM, IPSAS, etc.) and even consider implementing an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP)[33] and ERM solutions, like many United Nations entities.

103. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the efficiency of the Organization.

Recommendation 20

The Secretary-General should develop a long-term holistic ICT strategy taking into consideration the current and future needs of different stakeholders. The strategy should include a phased cost plan to be submitted to the General Assembly for consideration and approval.

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[32] See Report of UNWTO Secretary-General on linguistic diversity (document, A/17/5(c)).

[33] ERP is an information management system supporting all the information needs of an organization in a comprehensive and integrated manner. ERPs usually contain different modules (finance and accounting, human resources management, payroll, programme management, etc).

C. Publications and outreach

104. UNWTO has established an advanced system to sell its publications through the Internet. This system seems to be functional and bringing in revenue to the Organization.

105. In terms of dissemination of information about the activities of the Organization through its proprietary website (www.unwto.org), the Inspector is of the view that there is a necessity to revise the web content and functionality. For example, some of the links do not work, outdated information postings and the need to include additional information such as General Assembly resolutions by session, etc.

106. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to increase awareness of UNWTO activities.

Recommendation 21

The Secretary-General should revise, continuously update the content and maintain the functionality of the UNWTO website.

VI. OVERSIGHT

107. The JIU, in its report "Oversight lacunae in the United Nations system"[34] found that the internal oversight budget of UNWTO was nil (biennium 2004-2005, annex VII of the report) and that the Organization was below the minimum number of staff required by the JIU suggested standard for an in-house oversight function. The JIU report further stated that the Organization did not have in place an adequate structure for internal oversight, including investigative functions or professional staff on board for internal audit, investigation or evaluation.

108. Presently, the Secretary-General submits to the UNWTO General Assembly a report on the implementation of the general programme of work for the biennium and its evaluation. For the purpose of evaluating results, the regional representatives and heads of departments at UNWTO have been instructed to collect information from Member States regarding their assessments of the activities undertaken by the secretariat in each respective region or programme area. In addition, a comprehensive survey was carried out with all Member States in the second half of 2007 in order to collect and/or update information on the level of achievement in each country regarding: (a) the activities undertaken by the UNWTO secretariat during 2006/2007; and (b) the objectives established in the Agenda 2010 approved by the General Assembly, at its sixteenth session, held in Dakar in December 2005.

109. On the basis of the replies received, and other evaluation instruments being applied within the secretariat according to the recommendations of the Programme Committee, an evaluation of the implementation of the Programme of Work 2006-2007 was undertaken.

110. The above approach shows several limitations in undertaking an evaluation in a comprehensive and coherent manner. There is no indication about the availability of central evaluation guidance. Furthermore no secretariat documentation made available indicates any internal evaluation criteria and activities related to the performance of the different departments within the secretariat.

111. It should be noted that the Organization does not posses any internal audit, inspection, evaluation, investigation or monitoring capabilities. The Inspector believes that it is necessary for these functions to be either in-sourced to any other United Nations system organization that has the capacity to respond, or alternatively, an internal oversight unit should be established to perform the above-mentioned functions. This would be in accordance with the practice of other United Nations entities that establish such units. This would also help spearhead the introduction of RBM within UNWTO.

112. The Statutes of the Organization provides that the accounts of UNWTO shall be examined by two auditors elected by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Executive Council for a period of two years. The auditors shall be eligible for re-election. The auditors, in addition to examining the accounts, may make such observations as they deem necessary with respect to the efficiency of the financial procedures and management, the accounting system, the internal financial controls and, in general, the financial consequences of administrative practices.

113. The audit for the 2007 financial year also included an examination of the accounts of the Funds in Trust for activities related to Education and Sustainable Tourism Development

[34] JIU/REP/2006/2.

(UNWTO-Italy Agreement); the Permanent Secretariat of the Affiliate Members (UNWTO-Spain Agreement) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP-UNWTO). For completeness, the Inspector is of the view that the accounts of other UNWTO affiliated programmes/offices should be audited as well, failing which, their audited accounts should be presented to the General Assembly for consideration/review.

114. The General Assembly exceptionally decided at its last session to designate three auditors (France, Spain and India). The Indian auditors will be responsible for the inspection of the accounts relating to the activities carried out by UNWTO in its capacity, as an executing agency of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).

115. The Inspector is not convinced of the practice of having multiple external auditors and is of the view that the Organization should follow United Nations system-wide practice, namely the use of a single external auditor. In doing so, there is consistency in reporting and no potential overlap of subject areas covered.

116. The implementation of the following recommendations is expected to disseminate best practice.

Recommendation 22

The UNWTO General Assembly should in-source the internal audit, inspection, evaluation, investigation and monitoring functions to any other organization in the United Nations system that has the capacity to respond.

Alternatively, The UNWTO General Assembly should provide the necessary resources, three positions, for the above-mentioned functions for the 2010-2011 biennium.

Recommendation 23

The UNWTO General Assembly should modify the Statutes of the Organization in order to provide for the selection of a single external auditor with a specified term limitation as well as country rotation.

VII. COOPERATION

A. Cooperation with other United Nations organizations/entities

117. UNWTO has taken positive steps to integrate into the United Nations system. It has participated on a regular basis in the various coordination mechanisms, i.e., the CEB, the High-Level Committee on Programmes (HLCP), the High-Level Committee on Management (HLCM) and the United Nations Development Group (UNDG).

118. The CEB, at the UNWTO request, established the United Nations Tourism Exchange Network (UNTEN) in 2006. The UNTEN vision and mission is for the better coordination of UNWTO and other United Nations organizations in tourism through the development of a comprehensive database of tourism activities by all actors. The Inspector is fully supportive of the initiative but is of the view that the UNTEN web portal should be operational sooner than later. When asked for the status update of UNTEN, the Organization replied in October 2008 that "work on the UNTEN has been restructured and is now supervised directly by the Director of Programme and Coordination. The project is making good progress which will be reported to the 85th council session." However, in a document submitted to the 83rd session of the Executive Council, the Secretary-General stated that during the April 2008 meeting of the CEB, he informed them that UNTEN was operational.[35]

119. The Inspector notes that other international organizations are involved in tourism activities, including the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), the International Trade Centre (ITC), the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the World Bank. He is of the view that if the Organization wishes to be the specialized international agency on tourism and grow as an organization, it should partner the above-mentioned institutions in the planning and implementation of such activities, in particular when taking into consideration that the stated objective of UNTEN is to minimize duplication and overlap in tourism sector activity in the United Nations system, as well as generating synergies, in the spirit of the *One United Nations*.[36]

120. Furthermore, tourism has a major impact on many global issues, including environment and climate change; employment and poverty alleviation, gender issues and empowerment. UNWTO, as a member of the United Nations family, would have a paramount role to play in the above-mentioned areas if it is able to demonstrate that the Organization is ready to lead the coordination of tourism activities across the United Nations system, through, inter-alia, the effective and efficient use of resources. Therefore, the Inspector is of the view that the UNWTO General Assembly should fast-track the implementation of UNTEN, thereby asserting the specialized competence and role in tourism of UNWTO within the United Nations system.

B. Cooperation with the private sector

121. The Inspector refers to the recent JIU Note on "Corporate Sponsoring in the United Nations System"[37] and believes that its contents are relevant to the activities of the Organization, as the private sector has a key role in tourism-related activities.

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[35] CEB/83/6 Add 3 (May 2008) – Participation in the United Nations System's Coordination Mechanisms – Addendum 2.

[36] Presentation by Luigi Cabrini, Chief Sustainable Development of Tourism, UNWTO.

[37] JIU/NOTE/2009/1. Corporate Sponsoring is a form of a partnership between the private sector and United Nations entities in which the private sector entity, aiming to enhance its corporate image (or

122. The Inspector refers to the guidelines on cooperation between the United Nations and the business community[38] and believes that they should be extended to UNWTO and in particular that due care should be exercised in the use of the UNWTO logo for partnership activities. To prevent potential conflict of interest, rules and procedures should be adopted for the use of the logo.

123. The Inspector was informed that UNWTO is under constant pressure from the private sector to participate in a myriad of commercial activities, including the creation of a bank and endorsement of hotels. The Inspector cautions against any involvement of the Organization in commercial and/or profit activities besides those well-established revenue producing activities of any United Nations system organizations. As such, there is an urgent need to establish transparent rules and procedures for such requests.

124. The implementation of the following recommendation is expected to enhance the accountability and transparency within the Organization in dealing with the private sector.

Recommendation 24

The Secretary-General should develop rules and procedures for establishing private sector partnerships in the context of potential conflict of interest for the consideration and approval of the General Assembly.

obtain publicity for its product/service) supports an event or activity, through the provision of financial or in kind support, for promotional purposes, in exchange for publicity, and/or obtain access to a wider audience.

[38] Report of the Secretary-General on "Cooperation between the United Nations and all relevant partners, in particular the private sector (A/56/323), annex III.

VIII. INTEGRATION INTO THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM


125. Taking into consideration lessons learned during the preparation of the current review, the Inspector wishes to propose that future requests for admittance in the United Nations system should be carefully examined and that potential candidates to bear the name of the United Nations are subject to an external and independent qualification process, which might imply transitional and/or probationary periods.

Recommendation 25

The Secretary-General of the United Nations should develop a set of criteria and a mechanism for the prior qualification of organizations wishing to become members of the United Nations system, with a view to protecting the values and principles of the system and to guaranteeing the soundness of future members of the United Nations family, and submit them to the General Assembly of the United Nations for consideration and approval.

Annex I

ORGANIGRAMME



Annex II

OVERVIEW OF ACTION TO BE TAKEN BY PARTICIPATING ORGANIZATIONS ON JIU RECOMMENDATIONS
JIU/REP/2009/1

		Intended impact	United Nations, its funds and programmes												Specialized agencies and IAEA													
			United Nations*	UNCTAD	UNODC	UNEP	UN-HABITAT	UNHCR	UNRWA	UNDP	UNFPA	UNICEF	WFP	OTHERS	ILO	FAO	UNESCO	ICAO	WHO	UPU	ITU	WMO	IMO	WIPO	UNIDO	UNWTO	IAEA
Report	**For action**		☒	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☒	☐
	For information		☐	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☒	☐	☒
Recommendation 1	**a**																									L	
Recommendation 2	**a**																									E	
Recommendation 3	**b**																									L	
Recommendation 4	**b**																									L	
Recommendation 5	**b**																									L	
Recommendation 6	**b**																									E	
Recommendation 7	**e**																									L	
Recommendation 8	**o**																									L	
Recommendation 9	**a**																									E	
Recommendation 10	**g**																									E	
Recommendation 11	**o**																									L	
Recommendation 12	**g**																									E	
Recommendation 13	**a**																									E	
Recommendation 14	**b**																									L	
Recommendation 15	**b**																									E	
Recommendation 16	**e**																									E	

Recommendation 17	**e**																								E	
Recommendation 18	**e**																								E	
Recommendation 19	**o**																								L	
Recommendation 20	**g**																								E	
Recommendation 21	**o**																								E	
Recommendation 22	**b**																								l	
Recommendation 23	**b**																								L	
Recommendation 24	**a**																								E	
Recommendation 25	**o**	E																								

Legend: **L:** Recommendation for decision by legislative organ;
E: Recommendation for action by executive head
: Recommendation does not require action by this organization

Intended impact: **a:** enhanced accountability **b:** dissemination of best practices **c:** enhanced coordination and cooperation **d:** enhanced controls and compliance **e:** enhanced effectiveness **f:** significant financial savings **g:** enhanced efficiency **o:** other

*** Covers all entities listed in ST/SGB/2002/11 other than UNCTAD, UNODC, UNEP, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR, and UNRWA.**